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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/38232-h.zip b/38232-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e713388 --- /dev/null +++ b/38232-h.zip diff --git a/38232-h/38232-h.htm b/38232-h/38232-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5dbb60a --- /dev/null +++ b/38232-h/38232-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8979 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> +<title>Calvinistic Controversy</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + + body { + font-family:'Bookman Old Style', 'Book Antiqua', 'Garamond'; + text-align:justify; + margin-left:2em; + margin-right:2em + } + + p { + text-indent:1.5em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.pnn { + text-indent:0; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.ps { + text-indent:1.5em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.p0 { + margin-left:2em; + text-indent:-1em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.p1 { + margin-left:5em; + text-indent:-2em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.p2 { + margin-left:4em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:92%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.p2s { + margin-left:4em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:92%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.p3 { + margin-left:6em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:92%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.p3s { + margin-left:6em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:92%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.pr { + text-align:right; + margin-top:1em; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.pt1 { + text-align:center; + margin-top:1.5em; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:92%; + font-weight:normal + } + + .sc { + font-variant:small-caps + } + + h1 { + text-align:center; + margin-top:1.5em; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:125%; + font-weight:normal + } + +</style> + +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Calvinistic Controversy, by Wilbur Fisk + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Calvinistic Controversy + Embracing a Sermon on Predestination and Election and + Several Numbers, Formally Published in the Christian + Advocate and Journal. + +Author: Wilbur Fisk + +Release Date: December 6, 2011 [EBook #38232] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:150%; margin-top:2.0em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> +CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY: +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2.5em"> +EMBRACING A SERMON +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:104%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2.5em"> +ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:88%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2.5em"> +AND SEVERAL NUMBERS, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:3.5em"> +FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND<br> JOURNAL. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:0em; margin-bottom:3.0em"> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:3.5em"> +BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D. +</p> +<hr style="width:4em; margin-top:0em; margin-bottom:3.5em"> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.8em"> +NEW-YORK, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.3em"> +PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.8em"> +For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office,<br> 200 +Mulberry-street. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:0em; margin-bottom:0.4em"> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.3em"> +<i>J. Collord, Printer</i>. +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:8em"> +1835. +</p> + + + + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:88%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:9.5em"> +“Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh +and T. Mason, in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the +Southern District of New-York.” +</p> + + + + +<h1> +CONTENTS. +</h1> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:2em"> + +<p class="p0"><a href="#Advertisement"> +Advertisement +</a></p> + +<p class="p0"><a href="#Sermon"> +Sermon on Predestination and Election +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#I"> +I. Reply to the Christian Spectator +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#II"> +II. A proposition to Calvinists +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#III"> +III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#IV"> +IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism +in this country +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#V"> +V. Same subject continued +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#VI"> +VI. Predestination +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#VII"> +VII. Predestination, continued +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#VIII"> +VIII. Moral agency and accountability +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#IX"> +IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#X"> +X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent +provisions of grace +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#XI"> +XI. Same subject continued +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#XII"> +XII. Objections to gracious ability answered +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#XIII"> +XIII. Regeneration +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#XIV"> +XIV. Regeneration, continued +</a></p> + +<p class="p1"><a href="#XV"> +XV. Regeneration, continued +</a></p> + + + + +<h1 style="margin-top:9em; margin-bottom:0"><a name="Advertisement" id="Advertisement"> +ADVERTISEMENT. +</a></h1><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + +<p> +<span class="sc">The</span> numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, +were written at different times, and in some instances at quite +distant intervals from each other. This will be received, it is +hoped, as an apology for any want of connection or uniformity of +style, which the reader may notice. And if any farther apology be +necessary, it may be found in the fact, that the entire contents of +the volume as it is now presented, were written in the midst of +other pressing duties.—And the same reason has prevented my giving +the work such a thorough revision, as it should have had, before it +was presented to the public, in the more set and imposing form of a +book. Such a form was not originally thought of—and now that this +is called for, the author is well aware that the public might expect +a careful revision and correction of the whole. From this however, +he must, of <i>necessity</i>, be excused. He has been able to do little +more than correct the typographical errors. If the public have it, +therefore, it must go “with all its imperfections on its head.” +Only let it be understood, that <i>I do not send it out</i>. The +publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The +doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture, +although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be +found defective. +</p> + +<p> +It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on +election; but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough +had been said in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if +Calvinian predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency +and regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole +superstructure must fall of course. On these points therefore, we +may safely rest the entire question between us and the Calvinists. +</p> + +<p class="pr"> +W. Fisk. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Wesleyan University, April</i> 28, 1835. +</p> + + + + +<h1 style="margin-top:9em"><a name="Sermon" id="Sermon"> +A DISCOURSE +</a></h1> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:88%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.5em"> +ON +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:104%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.5em"> +PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + +<div style="font-size:92%"><p> +According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the +world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love. +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus +Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, +Ephesians i, 4, 5. +</p></div> + +<p> +<span class="sc">In</span> this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and +election are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some +errors respecting them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the +Scriptural and rational view of these doctrines, is the proposed +object of the present discourse. In doing this, much that is new +cannot be expected. The whole ground of this controversy has been +examined and re-examined; and the various arguments, on both sides, +have been urged and opposed, by the most able polemics in philosophy +and theology. The most, therefore, that can now be expected, is to +give a concise view of the subject, in a form and manner suited to +the present state of the controversy, and to the circumstances of +the present congregation. +</p> + +<p> +It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the +spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly +and Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. +Yet, in a desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, +nor neglect to point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and +its unprofitable influences on the minds of those who propagate or +receive it. The truth should be spoken, but it should be spoken in +love. Neither the subject, nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit +of temporizing. With these views, we come to our subject, by +examining, +</p> + +<p> +I. Predestination in general; +</p> + +<p> +II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of +election. +</p> + +<p> +I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to +bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has +knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control +future events; predestination, in a <i>proper</i> and <i>strict</i> sense, can +only be used in reference to him. And with respect to God, +predestination is that efficient determination which he has +maintained from eternity, respecting the control, direction, and +destiny of the laws, events, and creatures of the universe.—That +God hath a predetermination of this kind, there can be no doubt; and +therefore, on this fact, there can be no dispute. But the ground of +controversy is, the unlimited extent to which some have carried this +idea of predestination. Calvin, on this subject, says, “Every action +and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of +God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was ordained by him.” The +Assembly’s Catechism is similar:—“God did, from all eternity, +unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass.” And Mr. Buck defines +predestination to mean, “The decree of God, whereby he hath, for his +own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass.” With these +definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all +the Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.—To this view of +predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, +have objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent +beings, so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, +are not definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the +unalterable purpose and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we +are at issue. We believe, with the rigid predestinarians, that God +hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world, and that he +hath a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and +contingencies of his government; but that it is no part of this +plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human will. So far, +therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us, they affirm +what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon them. We +shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of their +system, and then bring up our arguments against it.<sup><a href="#n1" id="f1" title="see footnote" name="f1">[1]</a></sup> +</p> + +<p> +The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by +a threefold argument—the foreknowledge of God—the necessity of a +plan—and Scripture testimony. +</p> + +<p> +1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes +contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This, +however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is +self-evident, that <i>to know</i>, and <i>to decree</i>, are distinct +operations; and to every one acquainted with the common definition +of the terms, they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if +these are distinct operations in the <i>human</i> mind, they must be also +in the <i>Divine</i> mind, unless it can be shown that these terms, when +applied to God, have an entirely different meaning from that by +which they are understood among men. And as this cannot be +pretended, the more common and plausible argument is, that the +foreknowledge of God necessarily <i>implies</i> predestination. “For +how,” they ask, “can an action that is really to come to pass, be +foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every thing from the +beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had not so +determined it.” “God,” says Piscator, “foresees nothing but what he +has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge.” And Calvin +says, “God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, +because he has decreed they shall come to pass.” But to this idea +there are insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential +attribute of the Divine nature. But a determination to do this or +that, is not essential to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, +God might determine to make a particular planet or not to make it, +and in either case the perfection of his nature is not affected. But +<i>to know</i>, is so essential to him, that the moment he ceases to know +all that is, or will be, or might be, under any possible +contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd, then, to say the +least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend upon the +<i>exercise</i> of his attributes?—the Divine prescience depend upon his +decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument, that, +if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought, and +in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute +preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be +exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous +conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected +with it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must +predetermine events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in +no case dependent on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed +and his plan contrived, independently of his knowledge, which only +had an existence as the effect of these decrees. What must be the +character of that plan, and of those decrees, which were formed and +matured without knowledge, we will not stop to examine, for the idea +borders too closely upon the ludicrous to be dwelt upon in a serious +discourse. And yet I cannot see how this conclusion can be avoided, +reasoning from such premises. It seems to us, therefore, altogether +more consistent to consider that, in the order of cause and effect, +the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent upon their +existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of his +infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth +from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, +accords with the Scriptures:—“For whom he did foreknow, he also did +predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.” “Elect +according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.” In these passages +predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded +on foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God +foreknows in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in +order to foreknow.<sup><a href="#n2" id="f2" title="see footnote" name="f2">[2]</a></sup> +</p> + +<p> +But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. +“The foreknowledge of God,” it is said, “is tantamount to a decree; +because, inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he +foreknows must take place—his knowledge makes it certain.” This is +indeed shifting the argument; for if God’s knowledge makes an event +certain, of course it is not his predetermination. But, according to +this notion, every thing contained in the idea of predestination is +implied in foreknowledge, which is only throwing the subject back on +the ground first glanced at, that knowledge and decree are both one, +which is obviously absurd. Beside, such an idea would make the +scriptures that represent God’s foreknowledge as distinct from his +decree and antecedent to it, worse than unmeaning: “Whom he did +foreknow, them he did predestinate,” would mean, “whom he did +predestinate, them he did predestinate”—and, “Elect according to +the foreknowledge of God,” would only mean, “that the decree of +election was <i>according</i> to the decree of election!” the absurdity +of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, +farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge +cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence +in making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive +how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one +thinks that knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it—to +me such a connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or +foresees, will undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, +Does the event take place because it is foreknown, or is it +foreknown because it will take place? Or, in other words, Does God +know an event to be certain because it is certain, or does his +knowing it to be certain make it certain? The question thus stated, +at once suggests the true answer; for he would be considered a fool +or a madman who should seriously assert that a knowledge of a +certainty produced that certainty. According to that, a certainty +must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be foreknown in +order to exist! From all which it appears that foreknowledge can +have no influence in making a future event certain. Since, +therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not, +according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a +consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event +certain, no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour +of the doctrine that <i>God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to +pass</i>. +</p> + +<p> +2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. +“It cannot be conceived,” it is said, “that God would leave things +at random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take +place upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way.” +But this argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For +it assumes what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my +knowledge, ever been proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian +predestination, is to deny that God has a perfect plan. We +acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one part of which is, +to govern his responsible subjects, without controlling their will, +by a fixed decree—to punish the incorrigible, and save those who +repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the necessity of a +change, “on condition that his creatures act in this or that way?” +If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in order to +foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen to be +false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity +and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all +possibilities and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can +perfectly arrange his plan, and preclude the possibility of a +disappointment, although he does not, by a decree of predestination, +fix all the volitions and acts of his subjects. Even in human +governments, where the rulers can have no knowledge of the +individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and extent of the +transgressions, the principles and plan of government undergo no +change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of the +subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of +the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he +predestinate the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his +saints! The truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom +of God; for the perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is +predicated on the imperfection of his attributes. But our view of +the Divine plan accords well with our idea of his infinite nature. +Over the universe, and through eternity, he throws his all-pervading +knowledge—as he is in every point of wide immensity, so he is in +every moment of long eternity—and can such a God be disappointed? +</p> + +<p> +3. “But,” say the advocates of this system, “supposing there are +difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages +which at once prove the doctrine.” If this is true, then indeed we +must submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After +such a strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one +unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single +passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever +comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in +Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because +God hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed +all things. All those passages then which have been so frequently +quoted as proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God +hath predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are +the passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many +which say of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not +<i>command</i> them, nor <i>will</i> them; so that the abundant Scripture +proof seems altogether on the other side of the question. It is +argued, however, that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts +for which they are held responsible, are, according to the +Scriptures, the results of God’s predetermination, and therefore it +is reasonable to infer that all are. This general conclusion, +however, is not contained in the premises; nevertheless, if the +premises are true, if it can be proved from Scripture that God holds +his creatures responsible for the results of his own decrees, such +Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward off the +objections that are brought against this system. For if it is +consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible +for one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same +principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though +all were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, “As for +you,” says Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to +him, “ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good.” Now +without stopping here to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to +utter this sentiment, we are ready to acknowledge, that there are a +number of similar scriptures which teach that, in the results of the +wicked acts of wicked men, God had a design and a controlling +influence, and thereby made them subservient to his own purposes. He +hath wisdom and power “to make the wrath of man praise him, and to +restrain the remainder of wrath.” But does he therefore decree the +wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary to the accomplishment of +his purposes? As well might it be said, that because a government, +in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer from the +confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government decreed +the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of the +nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and +control the <i>results</i> of an act is altogether different from making +the act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power. +</p> + +<p> +Again it is said, “The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, +even the wicked for the day of evil.” That the Lord hath made all +things for his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and +doubted, I trust, by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the +former member of this passage. The latter clause, if it helps the +cause for which it is quoted at all, must mean, that the Lord has +predestinated men to be wicked, that he might make them miserable. +But it is not necessary to make the text speak this shocking +sentiment. We should do the text no violence to explain it thus—The +Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil, and this shall be +for his glory. +</p> + +<p> +But there is another class of passages like the following:—“He +doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the +inhabitants of the earth.” “He worketh all things after the counsel +of his will.” “I will do all my pleasure.” But these passages +establish nothing, in opposition to our views, unless it should +first be proved, by other passages, or in some other way, that it is +God’s will and pleasure to work <i>all things</i>, even wickedness, in +the wicked. These scriptures prove that all <i>God’s works</i> are in +accordance with his own will and pleasure; and that he will +accomplish them in spite of the opposition of sinners. If it pleases +him to form his moral government, so as to leave the responsible +acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this he will do, +for “he will do all his pleasure.” +</p> + +<p> +But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to +favour the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. +those passages which seem to represent God as bringing about and +procuring the wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:—“And I +will harden Pharaoh’s heart, that he should not let the people go.” +“Now therefore the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all +these thy prophets.” “He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their +hearts.” “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands ye have +crucified and slain.” On these and similar passages it may be +remarked, that God blinds men and hardens their hearts judicially, +as a just punishment for their abuse of their agency. And for this +act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does not make them +responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree of +wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to +this hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are +wicked men and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in +deceiving and tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them +power and liberty to go abroad, “deceiving and being deceived.” But +how does this prove that God hath decreed sin? The idea that God +hath made sin and wicked spirits the instruments of hardening and +tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and finally of shutting the +door of hope against him, has no kind of affinity to the idea, that +he decreed the sin which occasioned this hardness, or ordained the +wickedness of this lying spirit. +</p> + +<p> +As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus +Christ was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate +counsel and foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically +denied, that this or any other scripture proves, that the taking and +slaying of Jesus Christ by wicked hands, was the result of the +determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. If any think +otherwise, let them prove it. +</p> + +<p> +Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments +in favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge +against this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and +insufficient, but also that the system itself is liable to the most +serious and formidable objections. +</p> + +<p> +1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some +acknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the “<i>efficient</i> +cause” of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word. +Take for instance the words of Calvin. “I will not scruple to own,” +he says, “that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and +that every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass.” In accordance +with this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, +that “God procures adultery, cursings, and lyings”—“God is the +author of that act, which is evil”—“God, by his working on the +hearts of the wicked, binds them and stirs them to do evil.” They +deny, however, that God is the author of sin, because they say, “God +necessitates them to the <i>act</i>, and not to the <i>depravity</i> of sin:” +or, that “God does not sin when he makes men sin, because <i>he</i> is +under no law, and therefore cannot sin.” But these are miserable +shifts. Has not the <i>deformity</i> of sin come to pass? Then God has +decreed this deformity. To deny this, is to give up the doctrine. +But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as much the author of +the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God doubtless decreed +that sin should be <i>sin</i>, and not <i>holiness;</i> and it came to pass as +sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the direct procuring +cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are nothing but +evasions. The <i>fiat</i> of God brought forth sin as certainly as it +made the world. +</p> + +<p> +We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that +these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and +that they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the +fact is, we make them accountable only for the logical consequences +of their own doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, “God +foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.” For he that, by his will and +decree, produces and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of +his plan, and is the author of the very elements and materials of +his own plan, must be the proper and sole cause of sin, or we have +yet to learn the definition of common words, and the meaning of +plain propositions. The distinction therefore, of <i>ancient</i> and +<i>modern</i>, of <i>rigid</i> and <i>moderate</i> Calvinists, is more in word, +than in reality. And it would add much to the consistency of this +system, if all its advocates would acknowledge, what is evidently +deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient cause of sin. +</p> + +<p> +2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of +course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was +seen and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And +the opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them +on this subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that +the Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, “a cursed +doctrine”—“the most God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine +of the day”—“one of the prominent features of the beast”—“the +enemy of God”—“the offspring of the wicked one”—“the insolent brat +of hell.” Others, and the greater part of the Calvinists of the +present day, endeavour to reconcile the ideas of <i>necessity</i> and +<i>free agency</i>. Man, they say, sins voluntarily, because he chooses +or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence they exhort +sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they will. By +which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is in +their will—their <i>cannot</i> is their <i>will not</i>. This has led many to +think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the +Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if +there is not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of +words. God, according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as +the means, by his decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin +says, “every action and motion of every creature is governed by the +hidden counsel of God.” The will, therefore, in all its operations, +is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret impulse, some +fixed and all-controlling arrangement. It is altogether futile, +then, to talk about free agency under such a constitution; the very +spring of motion to the whole intellectual machinery is under the +influence of a secret, invincible power. And it <i>must</i> move as that +power directs, or it is the hand of Omnipotence that urges it on. He +<i>can</i> act as he <i>wills</i>, it is true, but the whole responsibility +consists in the volition, and this is the result of God’s propelling +power. He wills as he is <i>made</i> to will—he chooses as he <i>must</i> +choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon him. And can a +man, upon the known and universally acknowledged principles of +responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is argued, I +know, that man is responsible, because he <i>feels</i> that he acts +freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that +this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are +free—but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath +deceived us. He has made us <i>feel</i> that we might do otherwise, but +<i>he knows</i> we <i>cannot</i>—he has <i>determined</i> we <i>shall not</i>. So that, +in fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it +does not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the +Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that +man is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral +agent, to be free, must be possessed of a self-determining +principle. Make the will any thing short of this, and you put all +the volitions, and of course the whole moral man, under foreign and +irresistible influences. +</p> + +<p> +3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays +God’s secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not +to sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets +before them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for +the express purpose, as he informs us, “that they sin not;” but by +his predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them +in an opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine +informs us, to secure their transgression. <i>His</i> rule of action is +in direct opposition to <i>our</i> rule of duty. And yet he is the author +of both! Is God at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling +with his creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the +premises are false? When or where has God ever taught us, that he +has two opposing wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least +of it, ought not, without the most unequivocal evidence, to be +attributed to the adorable Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that +he is “of <i>one</i> mind”—that his “ways are equal;” and who can doubt +it? We are told, it is true, to relieve the difficulty, that this +seeming contradiction is one of the mysteries of God’s incomprehensible +nature. But it is not a <i>seeming</i> contradiction, it is a <i>real</i> one; +not an insolvable mystery, but a palpable absurdity. <i>God prohibits +the sinful act—God ordains and procures the sinful act—God wills +the salvation of the reprobate, whom he has from all eternity +irreversibly ordained to eternal death!</i> When I can embrace such +opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can believe that +two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less than the +whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at the +same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God’s +incomprehensible nature. +</p> + +<p> +4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be +added, that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral +attributes of God. If he holds men responsible for what is +unavoidable—if he makes laws and then impels men to break them, and +finally punishes them for their transgressions—if he mourns over +the evils of the world, and expostulates with sinners, saying, “How +can I give thee up—my heart is melted within me, my repentings are +kindled together,”—“O Jerusalem! Jerusalem! how oft would I have +gathered you, and ye would not,”—and still he himself “impels the +will of men,” to all this wickedness—if I say God does all this, +where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where is his justice? +What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant? What, of the +most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does this +doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out +into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is +enough to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the +supporters of this system <i>must</i> adhere to it, I rejoice that they +can close their eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it +would make them wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other +dangerous theoretical and practical errors. Indeed, in many +instances it has done this—which leads to another objection to this +doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in +their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason +thus: Whatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore +right. And God will not punish his creatures for doing right. +Whatever God decrees is unavoidable, and God will not punish his +creatures for what is unavoidable. But “every action and motion of +every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God.” Therefore +God will not punish any of his creatures for any of their acts. Now, +who can point out any fallacy in this reasoning? If therefore +predestination be true, Universalism is true, according to the +universally acknowledged principles of justice. And it is a +notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is prevailing so +generally through the country, rests for its chief support on the +doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought, +that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, +and that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, +inasmuch as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their +sins, have leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and +philosophical necessity. I have personally known numbers who have +been driven, by the doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And +it is well known, that the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied +to Calvinian predestination, is the element in which infidelity +“lives and moves and has its being.” And can this be the doctrine of +the Bible? How much is it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim +fathers should have sowed this Geneva seed in our happy country! The +evils done to the Church are incalculable. +</p> + +<p> +These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this +doctrine—objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that +you may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? +It is, doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the +doctrine of unconditional election, and what have been called by +Calvinists “the doctrines of grace.” But for unconditional election, +predestination would not be desired, even by those who now hold to +it; and but for predestination, unconditional election could not be +maintained. Hence these have very properly been called “twin +doctrines,” and must stand or fall together. Let us pass then to the +next proposition. +</p> + +<p> +II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to +election. +</p> + +<p> +Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is +an election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by +God:—thus Christ was God’s elect, for the redemption of the world; +and Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an +election of whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of +certain peculiar privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating +of course to this life:—thus Jacob and his descendants were God’s +chosen people, to the enjoyment of religious and national +privileges, from which Esau and his descendants, together with the +whole Gentile world, were excluded; and thus, too, subsequently, the +middle wall of partition, made by the former decree of election +between Jew and Gentile, being broken down, the Gentiles became +equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the new covenant, +called the “election of grace.” This election is unconditional, and +is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and many other +passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more +particularly in another place. +</p> + +<p> +There is a third election—an election unto eternal life, and this +is the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the +Church.—Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us, +maintain that, “By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his +glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, +and others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that +are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the +world, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, <i>without any +foresight of faith or good works</i>.” Others, and this also is our +doctrine, hold that “God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or +choose in Christ, all that should believe unto salvation, and this +decree proceeds from his own goodness, and is not built on any +goodness of the creature; and that God did from the beginning decree +to reprobate all who should finally and obstinately continue in +unbelief.” Thus it is seen, from the statement of the two doctrines, +that ours is an election of character, and so far as it relates to +individuals, it relates to them only as they are foreseen to possess +that character; whereas the other relates directly to individuals, +without any reference to character. It is an absolute act of +sovereignty—God elects them for no other reason or condition than +because he chooses. He makes no account of man’s agency or +responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is +entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. +Our views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally +dependent on the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the +sinner is made to receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the +other, he is elected, because he receives Christ. From this +difference, too, proceed other differences. The Calvinistic +election, to be consistent with itself, requires that, as the end is +arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be also—hence the doctrines of +irresistible grace, effectual calling, and infallible perseverance. +Calvinian election, therefore, stands intimately allied to Calvinian +predestination; and the whole forms a chain of doctrines differing +materially from ours. And here we acknowledge we have a position to +prove as well as our opponents. We assert that election to eternal +life is conditional; they, that it is unconditional. We will first +attempt to prove our position—then state and answer the arguments +in favour of unconditional election—and finally, urge some +objections against unconditional election and reprobation. +</p> + +<p> +1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal +life, is drawn from the position already established, that the +decrees of God are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, +that the decree of election to salvation, according to the +Scriptures, is founded on the Divine prescience. “Elect according to +the foreknowledge of God, through sanctification of the Spirit unto +obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ.” “Whom he +did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be conformed to the image +of his Son.” These scriptures seem to us decisive, that the decree +of election rests on foreknowledge, and that this election is made, +not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on the ground of +sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore, that men are +predestinated to eternal life, “without any foresight of faith or +good works,” must be false. +</p> + +<p> +2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, +can only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a +free moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, +man must believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to +believe and obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if +they do this, and criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according +to the doctrine of free agency already explained, man’s obedience or +disobedience, if it has any just relation to rewards and +punishments, must rest, in its responsible character, upon the self +-determining principle of the will. And if this view of the will be +correct, there is an <i>utter impossibility</i> of an unconditional +election. For the very act of God, imparting this self-determining +principle to man, renders it impossible, in the nature of things, +for the Almighty himself to elect a moral agent, unconditionally. +The argument stands thus—The Scriptures make man a responsible +moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be controlled by +foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so +controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining +principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This +being established, we argue again—The doctrine of unconditional +election necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely +impelling and controlling the will. But this would be to counteract +God’s own work, and to destroy man’s accountability; therefore there +is no such irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional +election. And since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of +in the Scriptures, it follows conclusively, if the foregoing +reasoning be sound, that this election is conditional.—Hence we may +bring forward, in one overwhelming argument, all the numerous and +various Bible conditions of salvation, as so many Scripture proofs +of a conditional election. +</p> + +<p> +3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, +and the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture +proofs of a conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted +“to take heed lest they fall?” “lest there be in them an evil heart +of unbelief, in departing from the living God?” “lest a promise +being left of entering into rest, any should come short?” lest +<i>they</i> should “also be cut off?” Why should St. Paul fear lest, +after having preached to others, he should be a castaway? Either +there is, or is not, danger of the elect’s being lost. If not, then +all these passages are not only without meaning, but savour very +strongly of deception. They are false colours held out to the elect, +for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear is. Will it be +said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of the elect, +and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be cautioned +and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and no +promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to <i>stand +fast</i>, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates +against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it +intimates a very ungracious work for the “Spirit of grace” to be +engaged in, clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the +decree of reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these +scriptures mean? Will it be said, as some have argued, that these +warnings and cautions are all consistent, because they are the very +means by which the decree of election is made sure? But let it be +understood, that the end is fixed, before the means; because +Calvinism tells us, that this election is “independent of any faith +or good works foreseen,” and that “God’s decree lays a necessity on +all things, so that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pass,” +and is therefore sure, “because he has decreed it.” The moment, +therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes sure, and to talk of +danger of a failure in that event, implies either a falsehood, or +that God’s decree can be <i>broken</i>. But Calvinists, I presume, will +not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or frustrating +the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the elect’s +coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and +warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours +and deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak +parents, who undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by +superstitious tales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is +giving out these intimations of danger, that there is no such +danger; his own eternal, unchangeable decree had secured their +salvation before the means were planned—all this if election is +unconditional. But far be this from a God of truth. If he exhorts +his creatures to “make their election sure,” <i>he</i> has not made it +sure.—If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail of the grace of +God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion therefore is +irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of election to +eternal life, on conditions; “He that believeth: shall be saved.” +</p> + +<p> +4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that +produces much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? +Why does he feel that there is but a step between him and +destruction? Is it fancy, or is it fact? If it is imagination +merely, then all his alarm is founded in deception, and he has +either deceived himself, or the Spirit of God hath deceived him. In +either case, this alarm seems necessary, in order to lead him to +Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion of one of the +elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said, that it +is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the +decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, +therefore, it is conditional. +</p> + +<p> +5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We +have time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, “For many +are called, but few are chosen.” This passage, with the parable of +the wedding that precedes it, teaches that the <i>choice</i> was made +subsequently to the call, and was grounded on the fact, that those +chosen had actually and fully complied with the invitation, and had +come to the wedding duly prepared. John xv, 19, “If ye were of the +world, the world would love you, but because ye are not of the +world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world +hateth you.” This passage teaches that Christ’s disciples were once +of the world, and that he had chosen them out of the world, and this +<i>choice</i> evidently refers to that time when they became of a +different character from the world; for then it was, and in +consequence of that election, that the world hated them.—2 Thess. +ii, 13, “Because God hath from the beginning, <i>chosen</i> you to +salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the +truth.” Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an +election <i>unto</i> sanctification, but an election <i>through</i> or <i>by</i> +sanctification and faith unto salvation. +</p> + +<p> +From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine +attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to +an unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election. +</p> + +<p> +In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of +unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, +which, as they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in +favour of their system. And as these scriptures are their strong and +only defence, it is proposed that they should be noticed. The limits +of this discourse, however, will admit of but a short notice, and +that not of individual texts, but of classes of texts. +</p> + +<p> +1. The first class of passages that we will now examine, which are +supposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that +speak of a predestination <i>unto</i> holiness. Our text is one of the +strongest instances of this kind, “He hath chosen us from the +foundation of the world, that we should be holy—having +predestinated us unto the adoption of sons,” &c. See also Rom. viii, +29, “For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be +conformed to the image of his Son,” and “whom he did predestinate +—he called—justified—and sanctified.” The argument upon these and +similar passages is, that the decree of predestination could not be +founded on their faith or holiness; because they were predestinated +to <i>become</i> holy—the decree of predestination had their holiness +for its object and end. But if these passages had an allusion to a +personal election to eternal life, they would not prove +unconditional election, “because,” to use the language of another, +“it would admit of being questioned, whether the choosing in Christ, +before the foundation of the world here mentioned, was a choice of +certain persons <i>as men merely</i>, or as <i>believing</i> men, which is +certainly the most rational.” This exposition must necessarily be +given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were the +subjects of predestination, were first <i>foreknown</i>: foreknown, not +merely as existing, for in this sense <i>all</i> were foreknown, but +foreknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why +<i>they</i> should be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as +believers in Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree +of God, they were to be made conformable to the image of Christ’s +holiness here, and glory hereafter. And according to the same Divine +plan, the order of this work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. +Glorification. And this interpretation, which so obviously upon the +face of it is the meaning of the passage from Romans, would also be +a good meaning to the passage in Ephesians, if that passage should +be understood in reference to personal election. But I do not so +understand it; and I think any unprejudiced reader, by looking at +the context, and especially from the 9th to the 11th verses +inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter, will +perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of +God, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the +Gentiles as well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of +grace, on equal terms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of +partition was to be broken down between Jew and Gentile; and this +was the mystery which was concealed for ages, not being understood +even by the Jews themselves, but then by the Gospel was brought to +light. According to this plan, the Ephesians and all other Gentiles +were chosen or elected to these Christian privileges, the very +design and purpose of which were to make them holy; and in the +improvement of which, according to the prescribed conditions of +faith in Christ, and repentance toward God, they should become his +adopted children. +</p> + +<p> +This fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the +gracious covenant, is the election most spoken of in the New +Testament.—And the reason why it was so often introduced, +especially in the writings of Paul, who was the chief apostle to the +Gentiles, was, because the Jews so uniformly and earnestly opposed +this feature of Christianity. They could not be reconciled to the +idea, that the peculiar and distinctive character of their theocracy +and ecclesiastical policy should be so changed, or that the dealings +of God with the world should be explained in such a manner as to +give <i>them</i> no superior claims, in the privileges of the Divine +covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to be God’s +elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates. The +apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose +these notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a +barrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus +the designs of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also +because these Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the +grace of God. They implied, that the original design of God in +favouring the Jews, was founded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, +but upon some goodness in them or their fathers. Hence they not only +limited the blessings of the Gospel, but they also corrupted its +gracious character, and thereby fed their own Pharisaic pride, and +dishonoured God. This will open the way for explaining many other +scriptures which the Calvinists press into their service. +</p> + +<p> +2. Especially will it assist in explaining those passages which +speak of election as depending solely on the sovereign will of God. +The strongest of these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to +the Romans. This portion of revelation is the strong hold, as is +supposed, of Calvinism. Whereas, we humbly conceive that <i>there is +not one word</i> in the whole chapter, of unconditional and personal +election to eternal life. It is only necessary to read that epistle +carefully, to see that the apostle is combatting that exclusive and +Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already alluded to, and is proving +in a forcible strain of argumentation, from reason and Scripture, +that the foundation of the plan of salvation for sinners, was the +goodness and unmerited love of God—that all, both Jews and +Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to +God—all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, +be saved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, +that God’s favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness +in them, but of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his +covenant of favour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which +embraced the Gentiles, was “not of works, lest any man should +boast,” “not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of +God that showeth mercy.” The apostle shows them, too, that the +covenant made with Abraham was not for circumcision, nor for the +works of the law, so far as it affected him or his posterity, +because it was made while Abraham was in uncircumcision, and on the +condition of faith. He argues farther, that this election of the +Jews to the enjoyment of these national and ecclesiastical +privileges, was not because they were children of Abraham, for +Ishmael was a child of Abraham, and yet he and his posterity were +rejected; nor yet because they were the children of Abraham through +Isaac, because Esau and his posterity were reprobated from these +national privileges, while Jacob and his posterity were the chosen +seed—not chosen to eternal life, because many of them perished in +sin and unbelief, but to the peculiar privileges of God’s covenant +people. And all this because it was the good pleasure of his will. +And as a sovereign, he had the same right to elect the Gentiles to +the enjoyment of the covenant of mercy, and upon the same conditions +of faith. The apostle concludes this reasoning by an argument which +cuts off entirely the idea of unconditional personal election and +reprobation. He informs us, that the reason why the unbelieving Jews +did not attain to personal righteousness, was “because they sought +it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law;” and the +Gentiles attained to personal righteousness, because they sought it +by faith. Hence, those that were not his people, became his people, +and those that were not beloved, became beloved—and these, “not of +the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles.” Whereas, if the doctrine +we oppose be true, the elect were <i>always</i> his people, and <i>always</i> +beloved, and that because he pleased to have it so. That portion of +Scripture, therefore, on which Calvinism leans for its greatest +support, not only affords it no aid, but actually teaches a +different doctrine. There is indeed something of mystery hanging +over the providence of God, in bestowing peculiar advantages on +some, and withholding them from others. But on this subject much +light is cast from various considerations which we have not time to +enlarge upon; but especially from that wholesome and consistent +Scripture doctrine, that “it is required of a man according to what +he hath, and not according to what he hath not.” This removes at +once all complaint of Jew and Gentile, and authorizes the reply, so +often misapplied, “Who art thou that repliest against God?” As a +sovereign, God has a right to make his creatures differ in these +things, so long as he requires only as he gives. But this differs as +widely from the Calvinistic idea of sovereignty, as <i>justice</i> from +<i>injustice</i>, as <i>equity</i> from <i>iniquity</i>. In fact, God no where in +the Scripture, places the election of individuals to eternal life, +solely on the ground of his sovereignty, but uniformly on the ground +of their complying with the conditions of the covenant of grace. +Hence his people are a <i>peculiar people</i>—his sheep <i>hear his voice +and follow him</i>—they are <i>chosen out of the world</i>—they are <i>in +Christ</i>, not by an eternal decree of election, but <i>by faith</i>—for +“if any man be <i>in Christ</i>, he is a <i>new creature</i>”—and of course, +he is not <i>in him</i>, until he is a “new creature”—then, and not +before, they become his, and he seals them as such, “In whom, <i>after +that ye believed</i>, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise.” +But if they were elected from eternity, they would be his when they +did not <i>hear his voice</i>, and were not <i>new creatures</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. From what has been said, we can easily answer a third class of +scriptures which the Calvinists dwell upon to support their system +—viz, those which declare salvation to be of <i>grace</i> and not of +<i>works</i>. Of these there is evidently a large catalogue of very +express and unequivocal passages. Take two or three for an example +of the whole, “Even so then, at the present time, there is a +remnant, according to the election of grace, and if it be by grace +then it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace; but +if it be of works, then it is no more grace, otherwise work is no +more work.” “By grace ye are saved.” “Having predestinated us unto +the adoption of his children, &c, to the praise of the glory of his +grace.” “Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but +according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration +and renewing of the Holy Ghost.” Now we profess to believe these +scriptures as unqualifiedly and as cordially as the Calvinists; and +we think them perfectly in accordance with our views of election. +For we believe, as has been already stated, that God’s plan for +saving sinners originated entirely in his love to his undeserving +creatures. There was nothing in all the character and circumstances +of the fallen family, except their sin and deserved misery, that +could claim the interposition of God’s saving power. The way of +executing his gracious plan, and rendering it available in any case, +he of course, as a sovereign, reserved to himself. And if he saw +that a conditional election was best suited to the principles of his +government, and the responsibility of man, shall it be said, this +cannot be, for it destroys the idea of grace? <i>Cannot</i> a conditional +election be of grace? Let the intelligent and candid answer. Even +many of the Calvinists acknowledge that <i>salvation</i> is conditional, +and yet it is of grace; for “by grace ye are saved.” Now if +salvation is conditional and yet of grace, why not election? Let +Calvinists answer this question. +</p> + +<p> +But that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident, +I think, from the following considerations. 1. It was pure unmerited +love that moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The +Gospel plan, therefore, with all its <i>provisions</i> and <i>conditions</i>, +is of grace. Not a step in that whole system, but rests in grace, is +presented by grace, and is executed through grace. 3. Even the power +of the will to choose life, and the conditions of life, is a +<i>gracious power</i>. A fallen man, without grace, could no more choose +to submit to God than a fallen angel. Herein we differ widely from +the Calvinists. They tell us man has a <i>natural</i> power to choose +life. If so, he has power to get to heaven without grace! We say, on +the contrary, that man is utterly unable to choose the way to +heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace of God. It is +grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and strengthens him +to seek after and obtain salvation, for “without Christ we <i>can do +nothing</i>.” Let the candid judge between us, then, and decide which +system most robs our gracious Redeemer of his glory, that which +gives man a <i>native</i> and <i>inherent</i> power to get to heaven of +himself, or that which attributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the +sinner repents and believes, there is no merit in these acts to +procure forgiveness and regeneration, and therefore, though he is +<i>now</i>, and <i>on these conditions</i>, elected, and made an heir of +salvation, yet it is for Christ’s sake, and “not for works of +righteousness which he has done.” Thus we “bring forth the top stone +with shouting, crying <i>grace</i>, <i>grace</i>, unto it.” Having gone over +and examined the arguments in favour of unconditional election, we +come to the last part of our subject; which was to urge some +objections against this doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, necessarily +implies the unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who +hold to the former, seem to deny the latter; for they represent God +as reprobating sinners, in view of their sins. When all were +sinners, they say God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, +they say the decree of damnation against the reprobates is just, +because it is against <i>sinners</i>. But this explanation is virtually +giving up the system, inasmuch as it gives up all the principal +arguments by which it is supported. In the first place, it makes +predestination dependent on foreknowledge; for God first foresees +that they will be sinners, and then predestinates them to +punishment. Here is one case then, in which the argument for +Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own supporters. But +again if God must fix by his decree all parts of his plan, in order +to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny of the +reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do +this, then the Calvinistic argument in favour of predestination, +drawn from the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more: this +explanation of the decree of reprobation destroys all the strongest +Scripture arguments which the Calvinists urge in favour of +unconditional election. The passages, for instance, in the ninth of +Romans, which are so often quoted in favour of Calvinian election, +are connected with others, equally strong, in favour of +unconditional reprobation. When it is said, “He will have mercy on +whom he will have mercy,” it is said also, “Whom he will he +hardeneth.” He that “makes one vessel unto honour, maketh another +unto dishonour.” He that says, “Jacob have I loved,” says also in +the same manner, “Esau have I hated.” Now if these relate to +personal election to eternal life, they relate also to personal +reprobation to eternal death. But if there is any explanation, by +which these are showed not to prove unconditional reprobation to +eternal death, the same principle of explanation will, and <i>must</i> +show, that they do not prove Calvinistic election. From henceforth, +therefore, let all those Calvinists who profess not to believe in +unconditional reprobation, cease to urge, in favour of their system, +any arguments drawn from the foreknowledge of God, or the necessity +of a Divine plan, or from those scriptures that are most commonly +quoted in favour of their doctrine. But when they do this, their +system must necessarily fall; for all its main pillars will be +removed. But I have not done with this objection yet. Whoever +maintains that “God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass,” +must also hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to pass, +that some are lost? Then this was ordained. Was sin necessary, as a +pretence to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these and other +views of the subject, Calvin was led to say, that “election could +not stand without reprobation,” and that it was “quite silly and +childish” to attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to +the unconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, +<i>must</i>, to be consistent with themselves, take into their creed, the +“horrible decree” of reprobation.—They must believe that in the +ages of eternity God determined to create men and angels for the +express purpose to damn them eternally! That he determined to +introduce sin, and influence men to commit sin, and harden them in +it, that they might be fit subjects of his wrath! That for doing as +they were impelled to do, by the irresistible decree of Jehovah, +they must lie down for ever, under the scalding phials of his +vengeance in the pit of hell! To state this doctrine in its true +character, is enough to chill one’s blood—and we are drawn by all +that is rational within us, to turn away from such a God with +horror, as from the presence of an Almighty Tyrant. +</p> + +<p> +2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free +grace and the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the reprobates, +there is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very +existence, connected as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is +an infinite curse. The temporal blessings which they enjoy, the +insincere offers that are held out to them, and the Gospel +privileges with which they are mocked, if they can be termed grace +at all, must be called <i>damning grace</i>. For all this is only +fattening them for the slaughter, and fitting them to suffer, to a +more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments that +await them. Hence Calvin’s sentiment, that “God calls to the +reprobates, that they may be more deaf—kindles a light, that they +may be more blind—brings his doctrine to them, that they may be +more ignorant—and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be +healed,” is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this +system. Surely, then, no one will pretend, that, according to this +doctrine, there is any grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a +moment’s attention will show, that there is little or none for the +elect. It is said, that God, out of his mere sovereignty, without +any thing in the creature to move him thereto, elects sinners to +everlasting life. But if there is nothing in the creature to move +him thereto, how can it be called <i>mercy</i> or <i>compassion?</i> He did +not determine to elect them because they were miserable, but because +he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the exciting cause, +then as all were equally miserable, he would have elected them all. +Is such a decree of election founded in love to the suffering +object? No: <i>it is the result of the most absolute and omnipotent +selfishness conceivable</i>. It is the exhibition of a character that +sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Almighty power, +<i>to create, to damn, and to save</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Some indeed pretend that, at any rate, <i>salvation</i> is of grace, if +election is not, because God saves <i>miserable</i>, <i>perishing</i> sinners. +But who made them miserable perishing sinners? Was not this the +effect of God’s decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing +men under a constitution which necessarily and unavoidably involves +them in sin and suffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign +honour of saving them? Surely the <i>tenderest</i> mercies of this system +are cruel—its brightest parts are dark—its boasted mercy hardly +comes up to sheer justice, even to the elect; since they only +receive back what God had deprived them of, and for the want of +which they had suffered perhaps for years; and to obtain which, they +could do nothing even as a condition, until God by his sovereign +power bestowed it upon them. And as for the reprobates, the Gospel +is unavoidably to them, a savour of death unto death. To them Christ +came, that they might have death, and that they might have it more +abundantly. Thus, turn this system as you will, it sweeps away the +mercy and goodness of God, destroys the grace of the Gospel, and in +most cases, transforms even the invitations and promises into +scalding messages of aggravated wrath. +</p> + +<p> +3. The doctrine we oppose makes God partial and a respecter of +persons; contrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. +For it represents God as determining to save some and damn others, +without reference to their character, all being precisely in the +same state. To deny this, is to acknowledge that the decree of +election and reprobation had respect to character, which is to give +up the doctrine. Some indeed pretend, that the decree of election +was unconditional, but not the decree of reprobation. But this is +impossible; for there could be no decree of election, only in view +of the whole number from which the choice was to be made; and the +very determination to select such a number, and those only, implied +the exclusion of all the rest. If it be said, as the Sublapsarians +contend, that the decree of election did not come in until all were +fallen, or viewed in the mind of God as fallen; and therefore since +all might have been justly damned, there was no injustice to those +who were left, though some of the guilty were taken and saved; we +reply, That even this would not wholly remove the objection of +partiality. But we need not dwell here, because we have a shorter +and more decisive way to dispose of this argument. The truth is, it +does not cover the whole ground of our objection. Had God nothing to +do with man until his prescient eye beheld the whole race in a +ruined state? How came man in this state? He was plunged there by +the sin of his federal head. But how came <i>he</i> to sin? “Adam +sinned,” says Calvin, “because God so ordained.” And so every one +must say, that believes God foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. +Taking all the links together, they stand thus:—God decreed to +create intelligent beings—he decreed that they should all become +sinners and children of wrath—and it was so. He then decreed that +part of those whom he had constituted heirs of wrath, should be +taken, and washed, and saved, and the others left to perish; and +then we are told there is no unjust partiality in God, since they +all deserve to be damned! What a singular evasion is this! God +wishes to damn a certain portion of his creatures, and save the +rest; but he cannot do this without subjecting himself to the charge +of partiality. To avoid this, he plunges them all into sin and ruin, +and forthwith he declares them all children of wrath, and heirs of +hell. But in the plenitude of his grace, he snatches some from the +pit of ruin, and leaves the rest in remediless wo! Is such a +supposition worthy of our righteous God?—Does it accord either with +his justice or wisdom? Reason, with half an eye, can see through the +flimsy veil, and discover the weakness of the device. I know an +attempt has been often made to charge these consequences upon our +system, as well as upon the Calvinistic doctrine. For if it is +acknowledged that man is born depraved, and this depravity is +damning in its nature, does it not follow, it is asked, that all +deserve to perish? And therefore God may elect some and justly pass +by the rest. I answer—Although all moral depravity, derived or +contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by virtue of the +atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity are +counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until by a voluntary +rejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his +nature the object of his own choice.—Hence, although abstractly +considered, this depravity is destructive to the possessors, yet +through the grace of the Gospel, <i>all</i> are born free from +condemnation. So the Apostle Paul, “As by the offence of one, +judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness +of one, the free gift came upon all men, unto justification of +life.” In accordance with these views also, the ground of +condemnation, according to the Scriptures, is not our native +depravity; but the sinner is condemned for <i>rejecting Christ</i>,—for +<i>refusing</i> to occupy upon the <i>talents given</i>,—for <i>rejecting +light</i>,—for <i>quenching the Spirit</i>,—for <i>unbelief</i>. Here then is +the difference on this point between the Calvinists and us. They +hold that God, by his decree, plunged Adam and all his race into the +pit of sin, from which none of them had the means of escape; but by +an omnipotent act of partial grace, he delivers a part, and the +remainder are left unavoidably to perish. We, on the contrary, +believe that by Adam’s unnecessitated sin he, and in him all his +posterity, became obnoxious to the curse of the Divine law. As the +first man sinned personally and actively, he was personally +condemned; but as his posterity had no agency or personal existence, +they could only have perished seminally in him. By the promise of a +Saviour however, our federal head was restored to the possibility of +obtaining salvation, through faith in the Redeemer. And in this +restoration, <i>all</i> the seminal generations of men were included. +Their possible and prospective existence was restored; and their +personal and active existence secured. And with this also, the +possibility of salvation was secured to all. To such as never come +to a personally responsible age, this salvation was secured +unconditionally by Christ; to <i>all</i> those who arrived to the age of +accountability, salvation was made possible, on equal and impartial +conditions. Thus, while on our principle, there is not the slightest +ground for a charge of partiality; on the Calvinistic principle, +the charge seems to lie with all its weight. It makes God, in the +worst sense of the terms, <i>partial, and a respecter of persons</i>. +</p> + +<p> +4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express and +repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. +It will surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that +Christ “tasted death for every man”—that he “gave himself a ransom +for all”—that he “died for all”—that he became “a propitiation for +the sins of the whole world”—because, these are so many express +Scripture propositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. +And while these stand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional +election must fall, for the two doctrines are incompatible. That +particular election and partial redemption must stand or fall +together, has been acknowledged, and is still maintained by most +Calvinists; and therefore they have endeavoured to explain away +those passages, which so clearly declare that “Christ died for all.” +But in this work they have found so many difficulties, that others, +and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy in New-England, have +acknowledged a general redemption, and have undertaken to reconcile +with it the doctrine of particular election and reprobation. But +this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To say nothing now +of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the reprobates, +unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation more +aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let +these very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its +object was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for +sinners to be saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the +reprobates to be saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and +therefore the idea of unconditional election and reprobation is +false. But if the atonement has only made it possible for the elect +to be saved, then it was made only for the elect. Let the supporters +of this system choose which horn of this dilemma they please; either +will destroy their doctrine. For as it is absurd to talk about +redeeming grace and Gospel provisions, <i>sufficient</i> to save those +who are eternally and effectually excluded from these blessings, so +it is idle to talk about a redemption for <i>all</i>, which includes +provisions sufficient only to save the <i>elect</i>. Not even the fiction +of a <i>natural ability</i> in all men to serve God and get to heaven, +will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument, that the +reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without grace, +and in spite of God’s decree, still, as this is called a <i>natural</i> +ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It is +equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be +universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if +they would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive +depravity which renders it impossible for them to receive the +atonement. For this is the same as to say, that a physician has an +efficient remedy to heal his patient, only he is so sick he cannot +take it. This excessive weakness is that for which the physician +should prescribe, and to which the medicine should be applied. And +if it does not come to this it is no medicine for this case. So the +atonement, if it is not a remedy for man’s extreme depravity, it is +no provision for him. If it does not give a gracious power to all +sinners to embrace salvation, it has accomplished nothing for the +depraved reprobate. Since, therefore, according to Calvinism, the +atonement provides for the reprobate neither natural nor moral +ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to be saved, it +follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But as this +is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this +conclusion must be false. +</p> + +<p> +5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several +objections to this doctrine:—Such as that it takes away all motives +to repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, “If I am to +be saved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I +must be, do what I can;”—it leads to the idea of infant damnation +—it weakens the zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and +benevolence—it destroys the end of punishment, the original design +of which was to prevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, +was designed merely for the glory of God; and sin was ordained for +the purpose of giving God an opportunity of glorifying himself in +punishing it. These and others might be dwelt upon with effect; but +passing them all, I hasten to the conclusion of my arguments, by +urging only one more objection to the system I am opposing. +</p> + +<p> +6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates +themselves seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of +its features, and are constantly changing their manner of stating +and defending their system. A little attention to the history of the +controversy between predestinarians and their opposers, will show +the truth and force of this objection. The charge that Calvinism +covers up and keeps out of sight some of its most offensive +features, does not lie so much against its advocates of the old +school, as those of the modern. With the exception of some logical +consequences, which we think chargeable upon the system, and which +they were unwilling to allow, these early defenders of unconditional +election came out boldly and fearlessly with their doctrine. If +modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need no other +refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of +Calvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various +forms of explanation and modes of proof, and also to various +modifications of the system itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, +“Agreement of Brethren,” &c, says:—“The question, as to the object +of the decrees, has gone out among our Calvinistic brethren into +endless digladiations and irreconcilable divisions,” and then goes +on to mention nine of these “irreconcilable divisions” that +prevailed at his day. At the present day these school subtleties are +not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a more popular cast, and +such as are suited to cover up the offensive features of the system, +are now introduced. The modern defence of this doctrine consists +chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous technicalities +which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common language +another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now a +common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their +pastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to +some, at least, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves +to spread the sentiment. +</p> + +<p> +This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more +reluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. +To represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our +brethren of insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to +truth would induce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an +excessive but honest zeal for their system, or whether it is +supposed the cause is so important, and at the same time so +difficult to be sustained, that the end will justify what, in other +cases, would be judged questionable policy, and hardly reconcilable +with the spirit of a guileless Christianity, is certainly not for me +to decide. With respect to their motives, they will stand or fall by +the judgment of Him that trieth the reins. But the course, at any +rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one instance:—All sinners, we +are told, may come to Christ <i>if they will;</i> and therefore they are +criminal if they do not.—Now this mode of speech corresponds very +well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not been specially +instructed in the dialect of this theology, would understand that +this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics, implied an +inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And yet this +is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a will +to come to Christ, we <i>may</i>, yet by a <i>Divine constitution</i> it is as +much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of +Jehovah,—Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; +they have a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, +and another thing in popular language. It never occurs to the +generality of mankind, when they are told they may do thus and thus, +<i>if they will</i>, that there is a secret omnipotent influence +impelling and controlling the will. They suppose these expressions, +therefore, mean that, independent of all irresistible foreign +influences, they have, within themselves, the power to choose or not +to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker differs as much +from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative. +</p> + +<p> +In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation +that is given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. +Reprobation is kept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed +by modern Calvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught +too; but it is taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned +Calvinism, in its primitive plain dress, we are told <i>these are old +authors;</i> we do not believe with them: “if we had lived in the days +of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in <i>their +errors</i>,” and yet “they are witnesses unto themselves, that they +<i>are the children</i> of them” who taught these errors. They recommend +their writings, they garnish their sepulchres, they teach their +catechisms to the rising generation; they say, even in their Church +articles of faith, “We believe in the doctrines of grace, as held +and taught by the <i>fathers</i> and <i>reformers</i> in the Church,”—and +especially do they hold to that root and foundation of the whole +system, “God hath, from all eternity, foreordained whatsoever comes +to pass.” +</p> + +<p> +Since I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of +this objection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of +this same ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of +Scripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different +constructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the +subscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of +faith have been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous +candidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for +professorships, in their theological institutions, are required to +subscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected, +doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, +though in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How +would honest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with +the same sentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches +that bear his name! He would not only call them “silly and +childish,” but he would, doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, +charge them with disingenuousness and cowardice, if not with +downright duplicity, for thus shunning and smoothing over and +covering up the more repulsive features of their system. How would +he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing their system, +while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same foundation of +predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of them what +they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates, may +come to Christ and be saved?—why they pretended to hold to +election, and not to reprobation?—how they could reconcile general +redemption with particular election?—and especially would he frown +indignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in +what has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New +-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any +taint or sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists, +exclusively and entirely, in <i>moral exercise!</i> But probably he would +get little satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear +his name. They would tell him that the old forms of this system were +so repulsive, the people would not receive them; and that, being +hard pressed by their antagonists, they had thrown up these new +redoubts, and assumed these new positions, not only to conceal their +doctrine, but if possible to defend it. And as he could get little +satisfaction of <i>them</i>, he would get less from us.—Could we meet +the venerable reformer, we would thank him for his successful zeal +and labour in the Protestant cause; but we would expostulate with +him for giving sanction and currency to his “horrible decree.” We +would tell him he had committed to his followers a system so +abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by Scripture, +that they had been <i>driven</i> into all these changes in hope of +finding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we +considered this as a striking and convincing argument against the +doctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; +that these changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms +that the doctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away. +</p> + +<p> +But I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration, +Christian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. +Whatever you may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I +think, of escaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments +here defended, will of course approve; and those who believe in +predestination will of course be reconciled to the preaching because +God hath decreed it. It hath come to pass that I have preached as I +have, and therefore it is a part of the Divine plan. It hath come +pass that Arminianism exists, and therefore this is a part of the +Divine plan. We beg our brethren who differ from us, not to fight +against God’s plan if they say it is right for us to fight against +it, because this also is decreed—I answer, This only confirms our +objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity against +himself. From all such inconsistencies, <i>may the God of truth +deliver us</i>. Amen. +</p> + + + + +<h1><a name="I" id="I"> +NUMBER I. +</a></h1> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.5em"> +REPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.<sup><a href="#n3" id="f3" title="see footnote" name="f3">[3]</a></sup> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">This</span> sermon had been before the public almost two years before it +received any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of +the advocates of predestination. After the third edition was +announced, there were several passing acrimonious censures in some +of the Calvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of +the question at issue between us and the predestinarians. At length +the Rev. Mr. Tyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a +sermon which was evidently written in reference to the sermon on +predestination. This sermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but +its general positions were so indefinite, and its modes of +illustration so vague, it seemed hardly calculated to narrow the +field of controversy or hasten a decision of the question at issue. +For example: Mr. T. defines election to be “the eternal purpose of +God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he wisely can, and +no others.” With such a proposition there certainly can be no +controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point in +dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There +are two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all +controversy, and especially religious controversy, ought to be +carefully guarded against. The one is an attempt to make the +subjects of difference more numerous and consequential than they are +in truth; and the other is an attempt to cover up real differences +under indefinite propositions and ambiguous terms. Both these errors +may be the result of honest motives: the former may arise from a +jealous regard to the truth, and the latter from a love of peace. +Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the one promote the +cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent peace. Indeed, +bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an additional +impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union +produces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the +Church, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and +injurious; yet, as an individual, I never can sign a <i>union creed</i> +of doubtful terms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my +while to contend about such terms and articles. I should fear the +searching interrogatory of Him who questioned Job: “Who is this that +darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?” In the present +controversy there is danger of this ambiguity also from a less +commendable principle than a love of peace, viz. an adherence to old +symbols of faith to avoid the imputation of a change; while, at the +same time, to escape the force of unanswerable argument, vague +propositions, ambiguous definitions, and equivocal terms are made +the bulwark of defence. This principle was alluded to in the sermon +on predestination; and although it has given great offence to some +of the Calvinists, and is represented by the author of the review +which we are about to notice as being “utterly unworthy of the +attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after truth;” yet it +seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks himself +incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem <i>utterly unworthy</i> of +an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon +systems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the +arguments urged against them, show the strength of the one and the +weakness of the other. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer +Mr. Tyler’s sermon, my strictures would consist chiefly in pointing +out its indefiniteness and incongruity. But this, without +convincing, might give offence. And although I see no way of +continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists now manage it, without +alluding to this course of the advocates of predestination, yet I am +happy to say there is less of it in the “review” before us than is +common in modern treatises on that subject. Though it is a laboured +article of about forty-three pages, yet it is generally in a manly +style, and sustained by a train of close and skilful argumentation. +It would afford me great pleasure to be able to equal the reviewer’s +ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply the serenity of his +spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the present case, to +dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I understand the +reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the “rugged,” at +least the decided “aspect of controversy” with my sermon, he is +nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more especially +to his views of predestination. On election there is evidently a +greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a man +discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that +the peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At +any rate, as the settling of the former question will have a very +strong bearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this +article to predestination. I am not certain that I understand the +reviewer; but his candour authorizes me to believe that he will +explain himself frankly, and correct me if I misunderstand him. If +we are agreed on this point we ought to know it, and give over the +controversy. If we are not, let us know the precise ground of +difference. And in either case we shall be the better prepared to +pursue the question of election. +</p> + +<p> +The question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there +between the decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of +man? The Arminian views on this question, as I understand them, are +these: God, as a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right +to determine on such a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely +wise and good, he would of course choose, in the contemplation of +all possible systems, to create such a one as, all things +considered, would bring the most glory to himself, and the greatest +good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he decided that such a +system would be a <i>moral government</i>, consisting of himself, as the +supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent subjects, having +full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the mandates of their +Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable incidents of such +a government would be the possible existence of moral evil; and, in +glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that moral evil +would <i>certainly</i> exist, involving innumerable multitudes in its +ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not +decree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a +decree of his: for although he foresaw that <i>if</i> he made such free +agents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would +certainly sin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this <i>certainty</i>, +to make these agents and govern them as proposed. He determined, +however, that they should be under no necessity of sinning, either +by his decree, or by the circumstances in which they should be +placed; but if they sinned, it should be their own free choice. As +he foresaw they would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would +pursue in reference to them as sinners, and arranged, in the +counsels of his own infinite mind, the extended concatenation of +causes and effects, so as to make the “wrath of man praise him,” and +deduce the greatest possible good from the best possible system. +Such, it is believed, is Arminianism—such is Methodism—such is the +doctrine of the sermon—and such are the dictates of the Bible and +of sound philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +The next question is, What is the doctrine of the reviewer? He shall +speak for himself. On page 612, of the review, he asks the question, +“But in what sense are we to understand the position that he (God) +purposes the existence of sin?” He proceeds to answer: “Not +necessarily, in the sense of his preferring its existence in his +kingdom to its non-existence, &c. In affirming the doctrine of +predestination we affirm no more necessarily than that God, with the +knowledge that these beings would sin in despite of the best +measures of providence and government he could take, purposed to +create them and pursue those measures, not for the sake of their +sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it was possible to +secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose with respect to +the existence of sin, a purpose to permit its existence, rather than +to have no moral system.”—Again, page 613: “Nothing more (touching +free agency) is implied in the purpose spoken of than a <span class="sc">certainty</span> +<i>foreseen</i> of God, that if he creates and upholds that being, and +pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at +a given time, fully choose in a given way.” In page 612 he says, +“God confers on them (mankind) in their creation the powers of free +agency, and he uses <i>no influence</i> in his providence or government +to procure their sin.” Page 614, “He (God) most obviously has no +will opposed to his law, though with a foresight of their conduct he +should purpose to permit their sin, rather than dispense with the +existence of a moral kingdom.” But it is useless to multiply +quotations. Suffice it to say that the reviewer’s whole ground of +defence against the arguments of the sermon, on the question of +predestination, is solely this Arminian explanation of the doctrine +of predestination. He acknowledges, nay boldly asserts, in a strain +“of rugged controversy” with his brethren who may differ from this +view of the subject, that there is no other explanation by which the +arguments of the sermon can be avoided—that is, as I understand it, +the only way to avoid the arguments against the doctrine of +Calvinian predestination is to give it up, and assume the Arminian +sentiment on this subject. If the reviewer does not mean this, he +will of course explain himself fully, and point out the precise +difference between his views and those of the Arminians. If, on this +subject, the reviewer is an Arminian, he has too much candor, I +trust, not to acknowledge it frankly, and too much moral courage to +be afraid of the name. If he is not, the cause of truth and his own +consistency of character imperiously demand an explanation. Until +this point, therefore, is decided, farther arguments on the merits +of the question in which we are supposed to be at issue, are +useless. +</p> + +<p> +I am not, however, quite ready to dismiss the review. I stated at +the commencement it was difficult to pursue this controversy without +alluding to the manner in which it had been conducted on the part of +our Calvinistic brethren; but that there was less ground for +objection in this article in the Spectator than in most others. +There are some things in this article, however, that I cannot +justify. I will state them frankly, though I trust in Christian +friendship. I cannot approve of the reviewer’s use of terms: though, +to my understanding, he has evidently given the doctrine of +predestination not merely a new <i>dress</i>, but a new <i>character</i>, yet +he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with only a new +method of explanation; and seriously and repeatedly complains of the +author of the sermon for “confounding the <i>fact</i> of God’s +foreordaining the voluntary actions of men with this or any other +<i>solution</i> of that fact or theory as to the <i>mode</i> in which it comes +to pass.” And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in +the <i>fact</i> of predestination, in the old Calvinistic sense, that in +stating his sentiments on this subject he uses the same forms of +expression which Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as +distant from his as the two poles from each other. He tells us, for +instance, that “God determined that the events which take place +should take place in the very manner in which they do, and for the +very ends.” Now if the writer mean what the words naturally imply, +then he believes that, in the case of a finally impenitent sinner, +God predetermined that all his sins <i>should</i> take place in the +manner they did, and for the very end that he might be damned! Again +he tells us, “God, in his eternal purpose, has predetermined all +events.” And, quoting from the Assembly’s Catechism, “God, from all +eternity, did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to +pass,” he tells us that this expresses essentially the views +entertained by the orthodox Congregationalists of New-England, among +whom, I suppose of course, he would include himself. Now, after what +I have said of the reviewer’s Arminianism, I doubt not but some of +my readers will be startled at these quotations, and be ready to +accuse me of great credulity in the judgment I have formed of the +writer’s sentiments. I shall exculpate myself, however, by saying, +in the first place, that if there is any contradiction in the +writer’s sentiments or language, it is not my fault, but his; and if +I should attempt to reconcile them, perhaps the reviewer would not +thank me for my officiousness. Beside, after what has been said, I +feel safer in understanding the reviewer in an <i>Arminian sense</i>, +because he and some others take it very ill of me that I have +represented them as Calvinists. But, in fairness to the reviewer, it +is presumed that he will not consider himself justly chargeable with +contradiction. He has used these old terms, it is true, and thus has +<i>subscribed</i> to the Calvinistic creed as positively as the +staunchest Calvinist; but then, let it be understood, he has +<i>explained</i> that creed, and defined the terms, and protests against +being held responsible for any other construction than his own. +Hence by God’s predetermining that sin <i>should</i> take place, in the +very manner, and for the very ends it does—by God’s foreordaining +whatsoever comes to pass—he only means that God foresaw that sin +would certainly take place, and predetermined that he would not +hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral agents, or by +throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their free agency. +In short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably incident +to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely could to +prevent it! This is <i>foreordaining sin!!</i> This is <i>predetermining</i> +that it <i>should be!!!</i> I cannot but express my <i>deepest regret</i> that +a gentleman of the reviewer’s standing and learning should lend his +aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language—to such +a confusion of tongues. We do not complain of the doctrine contained +in the <i>explanation;</i> but we protest, in the name of all that is +pure in language, in the name of all that is important in the +sentiments conveyed by language, against such an abuse of terms. +Alas for us! When will the watchmen see eye to eye! when will the +Church be at peace! while our spiritual guides, our doctors in +divinity, pursue this course? By what authority will the reviewer +support this definition? Do the words <i>predestinate</i>, or +<i>foreordain</i>, or <i>decree</i> mean, in common language, or even in their +radical and critical definition, nothing more than <i>to permit—not +absolutely to hinder—to submit to as an unavoidable but offensive +evil?</i> The reviewer certainly will not pretend this. Much less do +they mean this when used in a magisterial or authoritative sense, to +express the mind and will of a superior or governor toward an +inferior or a subject.—What is the <i>decree</i> of a king? What is the +<i>ordinance</i> of a senate? What is the official determination of a +legislative body? Let common sense and common usage answer the +question. Not a man probably can be found, from the philosopher to +the peasant, who would say these words would bear the explanation of +the reviewer. Yet it is in this official and authoritative sense +that theologians, and our reviewer among them, use these terms. The +Assembly’s Catechism, as quoted by himself, says, “God, from all +eternity, <i>did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, +freely and unchangeably ordain</i>,” &c. Now it would be a gross insult +to common sense to say of such language as this, in the mouth of an +earthly potentate, that the sovereign meant by this nothing more +than that he permitted the existence of certain unavoidable, and in +themselves, highly offensive evils in his kingdom, because he could +not remove them without embarrassing the essential operations of his +government. There is not, probably, a clearer case in the whole +range of philology. +</p> + +<p> +But the use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the +reviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are +used by most Calvinistic authors in a different sense.—Why, then, +should the reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in +the symbols of his faith? Different persons might give different +answers to such a question. For one, I would prefer he should answer +it himself. +</p> + +<p> +I cannot approve of the reviewer’s censures upon my manner of +treating the doctrine of predestination. He accuses me of +confounding the <i>doctrine</i> itself, with <i>modes</i> of explanation. He +says they are perfectly distinct; and though some may have been +unfortunate in their modes of explanation, and though he +acknowledges my arguments bear against such, yet the <i>fact</i> of the +doctrine itself is not thereby affected. His mode of explanation, +for example, he thinks untouched by the arguments of the sermon. But +his mode of explanation, as we have seen, turns the doctrine into +<i>Arminianism</i>. And it would, perhaps, be no difficult matter to +show, that any explanation of the doctrine, short of doing it away, +would be exposed to all the weight of the arguments urged in the +sermon. But the sermon was never written to oppose those who hold to +the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the reviewer +complain of the sermon? Why does he so “deeply regret” that the +author of the sermon “should come before the public with an attack +on the faith of a <i>large part</i> of the Christian community, conducted +in a way so obviously erroneous and unjust?” The sermon was against +Calvinism, not Arminianism. It is true, the reviewer may say, the +sermon alludes, in some parts, to the Calvinism of New-England, and +therefore he felt himself implicated. But he certainly was not +unless he is a New-England <i>Calvinist</i>—unless he believes that “God +foreordains whatsoever comes to pass,” in the proper sense of those +terms. Indeed, it seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is +as obnoxious to the reviewer, as to the author of the sermon; and +the former seems to have taken this opportunity to show the +<i>nakedness</i> of the system, and bring into notice a better doctrine. +If so, is it safe that the reviewer should still accord to them +their old symbols of faith? And is it just, that the author of the +sermon should be held the defendant on the record, when the +execution is issued against Calvinism itself? In answer to the +former question, I would say, it is utterly <i>unsafe</i>, and never will +be approved of, I believe, by Arminians. With respect to the latter +question, if it is <i>safer</i> to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, +I will not object, though it may seem at present to my disadvantage. +But I cannot see that it would be safer—an open bold front always +ends best. What if it should subject the reviewer, and the +theological doctors in New-Haven generally, to the charge of heresy? +Still they ought not to shrink from their responsibilities—they +occupy a commanding influence among the Churches and over the +candidates of their theological school, and that influence should be +openly and decidedly directed to discountenance error. They should +remove it, root and branch. Especially should they discard those old +symbols of faith, which are not only in themselves, in <i>their true +and proper meaning</i>, a reflection upon the clerical character, and a +<i>black spot</i> upon an otherwise orthodox creed, but are also +especially obnoxious, because they are the very articles which the +great body of the Calvinists have maintained, in a sense widely +different from that of the reviewer. At the head of these stands +Calvin, the author of the system, in the Protestant Church. Calvin, +who says, “I will not scruple to own that the will of God lays a +necessity on all things, and that every thing he wills necessarily +comes to pass.” “Adam fell, not only by the <i>permission</i>, but also +by the <i>appointment</i> of God. He not only <i>foresaw</i> that Adam would +fall, but also <i>ordained</i> that he should.” “The devil and wicked men +are so held in on every side, with the hand of God, that they cannot +conceive or contrive or execute any mischief, any farther than God +himself doth not <i>permit</i> only, but <i>command</i>—nor are they held in +fetters, but compelled also, as with a bridle, to perform obedience +to those commands.” Calvin, it seems, was far from thinking that +<i>appointment</i> only meant <i>permission</i>, or that to <i>ordain</i> only +meant certainty <i>foreseen</i>. In this he was correct: in this he has +been followed by a host of writers down to the present day, and +copied in numerous ecclesiastical symbols, in different parts of +Christendom; and does not the reviewer know that these terms are +understood by Hopkins and Emmons, and all the Calvinists of that +school, in a sense widely different from his explanation, and in a +sense, too, much more in accordance with the <i>proper meaning</i> of the +terms? Does he not know that a great majority of the Calvinists of +the United States, and perhaps in New-England, even understand these +terms, as indeed they ought to be understood, when used in reference +to sin, as expressing a preference of sin, in that part of the +Divine plan where sin occurs, to holiness in its stead? Indeed, as I +understand the reviewer, from the days of John Calvin down to the +present hour, there is, on this point, between the great body of +Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness, except in the use of +words. Theirs is one doctrine—his another. Why, then, does he +oppose the opposers of Calvinism, and thus keep error in +countenance? Especially, why does he hail from that party, and hoist +their signals, and then, alter <i>seeming</i> to get the victory, by +espousing the very cause of the assailed, encourage the <i>Calvinists</i> +to triumph, as if <i>their</i> cause had been successful? Is this justice +to the author of the sermon? Is it the best way to promote truth? +But I forbear. The reviewer’s subsequent explanations may remove +these difficulties. At any rate, the cause of truth will doubtless +advance. The appearance of this review has given additional strength +to the sentiment, Calvinism “is waxing old, and is ready to vanish +away.” The dogma that “God has predetermined all events, and elected +(in a Calvinistic sense) out of our guilty world all who shall be +heirs of salvation,” withers at the touch of advancing truth, and is +fast losing credit in the Christian Church. +</p> + +<p> +Since writing the above, I have seen an inquiry of a correspondent +in one of the Calvinistic papers, in these words, “Why do our +Calvinistic writers retain the words which seem so sadly to perplex +our Arminian brethren, when it is certain that we do not attach the +signification to them which they always pretend?” and then instances +in the word “foreordain.” The editor, in reply, gives as a reason +for using these words, that they are Scriptural; and seems to deem +it necessary that they should <i>persist</i> in this use until we submit. +This reply of the editor reminded me of a remark of Mr. Tyler, in +his sermon already alluded to: “The Calvinist contends that God +resolved, from eternity, to permit all the sins and miseries which +were to take place; and this he calls, in the language of the Bible, +<i>foreordination</i>.” Now, not to stop here, to show that no true +Calvinist would ever call <i>foreordination</i> and <i>permission</i> the same +thing, for Calvin has, as we have seen, clearly distinguished the +two words from each other, I beg the privilege of adding a thought +or two on this idea of Scripture authority for the use or these +terms. For if it is only because the Scriptures use these words in +this sense, that they <i>persist</i> in using them, I think we may easily +settle this question. Let it be shown that the Scriptures use +“foreordination,” or “predestination,” in the sense of mere +<i>permission—not absolutely hindering</i>. Again: let <i>one passage</i> be +shown in which it is said, God “predestinates” all things, or +“foreordains” whatsoever comes to pass. If this cannot be done, how +futile, how more than absurd is it, to talk about using these words, +because the Scriptures use them! To use Scripture words out of the +Scripture sense, and then appeal to Scripture to sanction this use, +is as sad a perversion of the Scriptures as it is of logic. Indeed, +to give such a meaning to the word predestinate, is at once to take +away the principal scriptures quoted by the reviewer, and others, to +prove Calvinistic election. See Eph. i, 5; ii, 10; Rom. viii, 29. +Does predestination in these passages mean merely <i>to permit</i>, or +not <i>to hinder?</i> and do these passages teach a personal election to +eternal life? Is this all the Calvinists mean by the <i>election</i> of +<i>sovereign grace</i>, not of man, nor of the will of mans but of God? +Alas! for the elect! If man does not elect himself, and God <i>only +predestinates</i>, that is, <i>permits—does not hinder</i> his election; +who, we ask, will elect him? How does error destroy itself! These +gentlemen may take which ground they please; they may either +acknowledge that Bible predestination means an <i>efficient purpose of +God</i> to accomplish an object, and then meet the sermon on the issue +there proposed; or they may interpret these words as the reviewer +has, and then give up those passages which they consider their +strong hold, in favour of Calvinian election. In either case their +system must suffer serious loss. Nothing could be more unfortunate, +I think, than this appeal to the Bible to sanction such an abuse of +terms. As to the word foreordain, I do not recollect that it occurs +in our translation. Jude 4, has “before of old ordained,” &c, but it +is in the original very different from the word rendered +predestinate. The allusion is to characters that were proscribed for +their sins, and designated for deserved punishment. The original for +predestinate, proorizo, is used in only one place, so far as I can +find, with any direct reference to a sinful act, Acts iv, 28. This +passage is quoted by the reviewer. But the determination here spoken +of, he himself informs us, relates to “the purpose of God to make an +atonement for the sin of the world, by means of the death of Jesus +Christ.” Hence the predetermination of God, in this instance, +probably refers to the <i>work</i> of atonement, without including +therein any special decree in respect to the means of the suffering. +Christ <i>could</i> have suffered, even unto death, in the garden without +any human means. But inasmuch as these men had the murderous +purpose, God “chose to leave Christ to their power,” &c, therefore +<i>decreed</i> the atonement, but <i>permitted</i> the means. This seems to be +the most rational construction. But whatever Calvinists may think of +this passage, the Scriptural use of the word is clearly on the side +of its <i>proper</i> meaning—an <i>authoritative ordinance</i> that the thing +predestinated <i>shall be</i>. +</p> + +<p> +I will avail myself of this opportunity to correct one or two errors +of the reviewer, respecting the sentiment of the sermon, which had +escaped my notice. He says, my “view of predestination is a +determination of God to produce a given result by his <i>own +immediate</i> and <i>efficient</i> energy.” This is a mistake. I said nothing +about <i>immediate energy;</i> this is an essential misrepresentation of +the sermon. Again: “On Dr. Fisk’s principle, it is impossible for God +to use the voluntary agency of any creature, to accomplish any valuable +end in his kingdom, and yet leave that creature accountable for his +conduct.” This is so manifestly incorrect and unjust, that I am sure +I need only call the attention of the reviewer to it a second time, +to secure a correction from himself. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="II" id="II"> +NUMBER II. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +A PROPOSITION TO CALVINISTS. +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +<span class="sc">The</span> communication below contains a proposition from Dr. W. Fisk, +which, however much we dislike theological controversies, we believe +is appropriate and interesting at this time. Such a discussion, +under such arrangements, will give the merits of the controversy to +both sides; and will, at least, convince all of one truth—that the +Methodist Episcopal Church seeks not concealment from the world or +her members, as charged by her adversaries. But it will develop a +still more important truth, and that is, what are the settled and +definite opinions of the old or the new school in the Calvinistic +Churches. It is known to all the world, that there is great +difficulty in ascertaining what are the theological opinions of +those ancient Churches of the land. They seem to be as far apart +from each other as they are from Arminianism; and their replies and +rejoinders to each other are as severe as if directed against us. +The discussion must be interesting and profitable, carried on by two +such persons as Dr. Fisk and his opponent, and under the steady +supervision, as to temper and manner, of third parties as proposed. +—<span class="sc">Eds</span>. +</p> + +<p> +I have just received a pamphlet of about forty-eight pages, +containing a series of letters, in answer to my sermon on +predestination and election. These letters are written by the Rev. +David Metcalf, of Lebanon, Connecticut, and purport to be an answer, +not only to the doctrinal part of the sermon, but to the “charges,” +as the writer is pleased to call them, contained in the sermon, and +published afterward in a specific form, first in the Connecticut +Observer, and then in the Christian Advocate and Journal. +</p> + +<p> +It will be recollected by your readers, that I pledged myself to +vindicate my statements against any responsible person, who, with +his own proper signature, would come forward and deny them: or if I +failed to support them, I would retract what I had written. This +pledge Mr. Metcalf calls upon me to redeem; not indeed by bringing +forward my proofs, or by making a reply; but, having thrown in his +plea, he supposes that the cause is decided, and has himself made up +the judgment, and issued the execution, and forthwith comes forward, +and claims his damage. His words are—“Of the author of the sermon +we claim a public acknowledgment of his errors, and make justice and +equity the ground of our claim.” Again, “If Dr. F. makes no public +retraction from the ground taken in his sermon—if after he shall +receive these letters, [!!] remembering also what is said in the +Christian Spectator’s review of his sermon, he shall allow another +copy of it to be printed, I think he will find it difficult to +convince any intelligent candid man, that he is not guilty of +breaking the ninth commandment,” &c. The intelligent reader, who has +studied human nature, will know how to make suitable allowances for +the dogmatical and premature decisions, and high claims contained in +the foregoing extracts. It is not an uncommon thing, that a zealous +advocate succeeds in <i>convincing himself</i> of the truth of his cause; +but utterly fails with respect to all others. I do not say, that +this writer will not gain his argument; but it requires more +“foreknowledge” than I am disposed to accord to him, to affirm this +as a “certainty.” I demur against this hasty manner of making up the +judgment. I wish to be heard in defence of my statements, and have +objections also to bring against his statements, and supposed proofs +and arguments. +</p> + +<p> +In the first place, I object to him, that he has not come out and +joined issue specifically and directly on any one of my “charges,” +but talks for most part in general terms, about the unfairness, +injustice, and misrepresentations of the sermon. This circumstance +would, of itself, free me from any obligation to notice these +letters, on the ground of my pledge in the Observer. But yet, as I +feel the most perfect readiness to discuss this subject, and as I +hope the cause of righteousness may be served thereby, I will +willingly proceed in this controversy, both as to doctrine and +policy, provided we can secure some suitable public medium, through +which to prosecute the discussion. And on this point Mr. M. +complains bitterly of the former editors of the Advocate and +Journal—for he had applied, it seems, for the privilege of having +his letters inserted in that paper, and was refused, on the ground +that “the sermon was not published in the Advocate, and therefore +justice did not require that its answer should be.” Now, since these +letters are professedly an answer to the <i>whole sermon</i>, the +editors, I think, were perfectly consistent with their former +statements, in refusing to publish them. If Mr. M. had confined +himself to the charges in the Observer, the editors would +undoubtedly have given the subject a place in the columns of the +Advocate: as it was, however, I think the charge of injustice and +unfairness made against the editors by Mr. M. is entirely gratuitous +and <i>unjustifiable</i>. If it was expected to produce an <i>effect</i> on +the public, by such a complaint, I think such an expectation will be +disappointed in all places where the subject is understood. And that +this was the expectation appears evident from another charge against +Methodist preachers, in the following words:—“It is supposed to be +the common sentiment, if not ‘the common talk in our land,’ that +the Methodist preachers have a strong aversion against their hearers +reading our writings. The reason of this, in part, is supposed to +be, that they choose to have their people receive all their +knowledge of our creed from their statements of it, instead of ours; +lest they should be convinced, by our arguments, of the truth of our +belief.” Now this charge we wholly and positively deny, and +challenge the writer for the proofs of what we know to be, not only +an ungenerous, but an unjust allegation. Nothing can be farther from +the whole genius of Methodism than this. Does not the reverend +gentleman know, that a great portion of our members in New England +are those who were once members of Calvinistic congregations? Does +he not know that they were trained up in these doctrines from their +infancy, and have heard them explained and defended from their +earliest recollections? Does he not know that Methodism has made its +way against the impressions of the nursery, the catechetical +instruction of the priest and the school master—the influence of +the pulpit and the press, and in maturer age against the still +stronger influence of academies and colleges? Does he not know, +also, that all this has been done in this generation? And shall we +now be told that Methodists examine but one side of the question? +How astonishing such a charge, from a man who can make any +pretension to a knowledge of ecclesiastical matters in our country! +Does not this writer know, also, that the editors of the Advocate, +and others, have called loudly, and almost continually, for +information upon this subject, that we might know what the +Calvinistic standards are, and ascertain what Calvinism is? and +shall we now be told, that Methodists are ignorant of the +Calvinistic faith, and, what is worse, the preachers strive to keep +them in ignorance, and that with the base purpose of keeping them +from a conviction of the truth! We say, if Calvinism is essentially +what it was from five to thirty years ago, we know its character as +well as we ever can know it. If we do not understand it now, it is +either because we have not <i>natural ability</i> to understand it, (and +therefore. Calvinism itself being judge, we are not criminal,) or it +is because the teachers of Calvinism have not had <i>natural ability</i> +to make it plain. But if Calvinism is not essentially what it was, +we ask what it now is? If it is changed in the hands of its +supporters, how much has it changed? Is it Calvinism still, or has +it lost its identity? In what does the identity of Calvinism +consist? Shall we take the Rev. Mr. Metcalf’s answer to these +questions? Shall we take the Christian Spectator’s answers? Mr. M. +appears fully to agree with the Spectator, for he makes frequent +reference to it, with great apparent approbation. And yet two +numbers of this periodical have been issued since my reply to the +review of my sermon in that work, in which reply I stated my +understanding of the reviewer’s doctrine of predestination, and +requested to be informed if I was incorrect; and neither my reply +nor my request has been noticed. And yet, let it be understood, that +in the last number there is a very laboured article, to show that +Dr. Taylor does not differ essentially from the orthodox Calvinistic +faith heretofore received. +</p> + +<p> +It is also known, that though Drs. Woods, Griffin, Tyler, Green, and +various others, come out and charge a portion of their brethren with +a serious and dangerous dereliction from the Calvinistic faith, yet +the accused, in their turn, strenuously maintain that they preserve +the old landmarks unremoved, and the essential principles of +Calvinism unimpaired; and that it is a calumnious charge to say they +have departed from the faith of the party. +</p> + +<p> +How shall we judge in this matter? If we think, from our +understanding of their writings, that some of them have changed +their views, and we ask them if they have, they are silent. If their +brethren charge them with changing, they deny it; and, standing up +before the world and before the Churches, and before their God, +pronounce <i>deliberately</i> and <i>emphatically</i>, the old symbols of +faith, as a test oath to prove their orthodoxy. Should we doubt +their repeated asseverations? Mr. M., or somebody else, might write +another pamphlet to screw us into repentance and confession, for +bearing false witness against our neighbour. But if we hold them to +the old doctrine, which we have had a good opportunity of learning, +from our youth up, we are accused of misrepresentation, and of +bearing false witness. None but the advocates of the New-Haven +divinity have, to my knowledge, taken a public stand against my +sermon; and <i>they</i> oppose it because <i>they</i> say it is a +misrepresentation of their doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +This, therefore, seems to us to be the state of the case with +respect to these gentlemen—We make a representation of Calvinism as +we have found it, and have heretofore understood it—they object, +because this is not their belief, and therefore we break the ninth +commandment! Their own brethren charge <i>them</i> with a departure from +the old doctrines, and they deny it! and charge them in turn with +bearing false witness! In the midst of our perplexity on this +subject, while we are looking every way for light, up comes Mr. M. +and tells us, we are unwilling our people should know what +Calvinists believe!! Is this generous, or just? We repel the charge, +and demand proof. And in the mean time, as a farther proof that the +charge is unfounded, I will, Messrs. Editors, with your consent and +approbation, make a proposition to Mr. Metcalf. It is certainly +desirable, that both Calvinists and Methodists should hear <i>both +sides</i>. Mr. M. seems very desirous to enlighten the Methodists. This +is very well. But we also wish to enlighten the Calvinists. To +accomplish this, the discussion on both sides should be put into the +hands of the people on both sides. If, then, some reputable and +extensively circulated Calvinistic periodical will publish my +sermon, and the discussion which <i>has</i> arisen, or <i>may</i> arise out of +it, on both sides, the Christian Advocate and Journal will publish +Mr. M.‘s letters and the discussions which shall follow; provided +always, that it shall be submitted to the respective editors, +whether the pieces are written in respectful and becoming style and +language; and provided also, that the Calvinistic editor shall, by +consenting to this arrangement, he considered as thereby +acknowledging, that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man to manage the +controversy in behalf of the Calvinists, and that you, Messrs. +Editors, by consenting to the arrangement, will thereby consent that +you are willing to trust the controversy in my hands, to be managed +in behalf of the Methodists. To give an opportunity for the +Calvinistic periodical to be prepared, I shall wait a reasonable +time, when, if the offer is not complied with, I shall want the +privilege, perhaps, of occupying the columns of the Advocate, by the +insertion of a few numbers touching the present Calvinistic +controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and also as +relates to the general question between them and us. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="III" id="III"> +NUMBER III. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +INDEFINITENESS OF CALVINISM. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">The</span> readers of the Christian Advocate and Journal will recollect the +proposition, made to the Rev. David Metcalf, in the 8th No. of the +present volume, on the subject of his review of my sermon. This +proposition has not been complied with on the part of Mr. M., and +according to the following extract from the New-York Evangelist, no +compliance can be expected:— +</p> + +<p> +“We have seen,” says the editor of the Evangelist, “in the Advocate, +since Mr. Metcalf’s work was published, a letter from Dr. F., in +which he shows his desire that the discussion shall still go +forward. There is one condition he exacts, however, which we think +impracticable. It is, that some person should be designated, by a +sort of common suffrage, as the champion of Calvinism. Now the truth +is, Calvinists, as a class, are rather remarkable for thinking for +themselves; and of course, while there are great principles on +which, as a class, they all agree, there are many things which will +be held or stated differently, by different minds. Consequently, we +can, each of us, defend ourselves, and defend Calvinists as a class; +notwithstanding, each one may think his fellow holds some errors, +and therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to +himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal points and +modes of statement which distinguish <i>Calvinists as a class</i>. And +when he has found these principles, we hope he will either confute +or embrace them.” +</p> + +<p> +I have copied the above for the farther notice of the public, not +only as a remarkable paragraph in itself, but also as having an +important bearing on the present controversy. There are several +things in it worthy of special notice. +</p> + +<p> +In the first place we see, if other editors think with this one, and +that they do, we are left to infer from their not offering their +periodicals for the controversy, there is no hope that my +proposition will be accepted. We then have the reason—because there +is one impracticable condition. But why impracticable? The editor +tells us, “Dr. F. exacts that some person should be designated by a +sort of common suffrage to be the champion of Calvinism.” I cannot +believe the editor means to misrepresent me; and yet he has done it. +My words are, “Provided that the Calvinistic <i>editor</i> shall, by +consenting to this arrangement, be considered as thereby +acknowledging that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man to manage the +controversy on the part of the Calvinists.” Here is nothing said +about a “sort of common suffrage.” In case of compliance by Mr. +Leavitt, or any other editor, the only vote to be polled and counted +would be his own. Not a very extensive suffrage this! And if Mr. L. +thinks the condition impracticable, it must be owing to <i>moral +inability</i> existing in his own mind, growing out of the belief that +Mr. Metcalf <i>is not a suitable person</i> to manage this controversy. +Hence it is well I took the precaution I did; for Mr. M. is a +stranger to me; and I do not wish to engage in a controversy on this +subject with any man who is not, by his class, considered +responsible. Perhaps Mr. Leavitt knows of some one, who would be +suitable, in his judgment, and who would accept of the offer; or +perhaps he himself would be willing to engage in the discussion. I +do not wish to confine it to Mr. M.; nor do I wish to be considered +in the light of a general challenger who is seeking an adventure. +The subject is an important one, and I am willing to discuss it with +any candid responsible man. We were most unjustly, as I believed, +accused of keeping our people in ignorance of Calvinism, and of +preventing them from reading on the other side, for the base purpose +of preventing them from being convinced of the truth. To render the +subject fair and equal, therefore, and to wipe off this aspersion, I +made the proposal; and if Mr. M. is not a suitable man, let some +other be found. +</p> + +<p> +But we are informed farther in this paragraph, that one great +difficulty in complying with my condition is, that “Calvinists, as a +class, are remarkable for thinking for themselves,” &c. If the +editor designs to say, as the natural construction would imply, that +the whole class are remarkable, in their character as Calvinists, +for thinking and believing differently and independently of each +other, then his proposition is a contradiction. They, <i>as a class</i>, +are remarkable <i>for not being a class at all</i>, having no properties +or qualities in common! His argument also would require this +construction, because he is showing why no one could be the proper +champion of the class, for the reason that, as a class, they did not +think alike. If <i>Calvinism</i> be a general term, it includes, in its +extension, all those individuals or sub-classes of individuals, and +only those, that hold certain doctrines in common, and it embraces +all those doctrines, and only those that are held in common by the +class. If, therefore, there is any such class, then most certainly +they think alike in all those things that constitute them a class; +and by consequence, any one of the number, otherwise competent, +would be qualified to represent and defend the class as such, +however much he might differ from many of “his fellows,” in other +things. If, therefore, there is any force in the argument, that it +is impracticable for any one of the number bearing the name, to +become the champion of <i>the class as such</i>, because they differ so +among themselves, it must arise from the fact, that there are no +“great principles” held in common among them, and, of course, there +is <i>no class</i>. All the writer says afterward, therefore, about +“great principles in which they all agree,” is mere verbiage, +signifying nothing. For if we give it any meaning, it would be a +contradiction of what he had stated before, and a complete +nullification of the only argument adduced as a reason for not +complying with my proposal. There is another reason why I think the +above a fair view of this subject. In the same paragraph it is said, +“Therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to +himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal facts and +modes of statement which distinguish <i>Calvinists as a class</i>.” This +is more unreasonable than the requisition of Nebuchadnezzar, when he +commanded the wise men to <i>make known the dream</i>, as well as the +interpretation. Would an intelligent and ingenuous man, such as we +have a right to expect a religious editor to be, give such an +answer, under such circumstances, if he could have told us what +Calvinism is? We have been accused, not by Mr. Metcalf only, but by +Calvinists of the old school, and the new school, and <i>all the +schools</i>, that we misrepresent them, that our preachers make it +their business to misrepresent them,—that my sermon was a most +scandalous misrepresentation, and that we studied to keep our people +ignorant of what Calvinism is. When this is replied to, by +entreating and conjuring those who bear the name of Calvinism, to +tell us what it is; and when we offer to discuss the subject, in +their own periodicals, and give them an opportunity to discuss it in +ours, and to inform our people, in their own way, on this doctrine +—a death-like silence on the subject reigns throughout the whole +<i>corps editorial;</i> until at length the Evangelist speaks,—We cannot +comply; we each and all, as a class, are so remarkable for thinking +for ourselves, it is impracticable for any one to state and defend +those doctrinal facts which <i>distinguish us as a class</i>, and +therefore Dr. F. must assume to himself the responsibility of +selecting them!! If Calvinists cannot agree in their own system, and +cannot trust any of their fraternity to state and defend it in behalf +of the class, why do they accuse us of willful misrepresentations, +in stating their system? Why, in short, do they not begin to doubt +whether, <i>as a class</i>, they have any system? It is time for those +who bear the name to know, and for the public to be distinctly +informed, whether there is any thing <i>real</i> represented by the term +Calvinism? If there is, then, whether the term is a common or a +proper noun? If it is a common noun, or a general name, then, what +are the qualities, the properties, or doctrines designated by it? +If no one can tell,—if those who “write about it, and about it,” +week after week, think it <i>impracticable</i> to define or describe +those doctrines for the class, because they think so differently, +of course it follows, if the name is retained, it is not a general, +but a <i>proper name</i>, and belongs only to individuals. And though it +has been assumed by many individuals, yet it has in each case an +individual definition, which by no means enters into the definition +of the term, as assumed by any other individual. And therefore it is +as inconsistent to talk about the <i>class of Calvinists</i>, as it is to +talk about the class of Johns or Joshuas, and as absurd to infer that +two men are in any of their real characteristics alike, because each +is called <i>Calvinist</i>, as to argue that the editor of the Evangelist +and Joshua, the son of Nun, belonged to the same class, because both +are called Joshua. And this appears to me to be very nearly the true +state of the case. Calvinism, as designating a class, has always been +rather vague and unsettled in its definition, from the days of John +Calvin himself. And this was one of the offensive objections brought +against it in my sermon—an objection, however, that has been +abundantly confirmed by recent events. As I wrote and published of +another doctrine some years since, so I may say of Calvinism now. +It is a proteus that changes its shape before one can describe it +—an <i>ignis fatuus</i>, that changes its place before one can get his +hand on it. And here I will stop to say, It will avail nothing for +any one to take offence at this statement. It is not because I +dislike men who are called Calvinists, that I thus speak. I know +many of them personally, and esteem them highly, but of their +doctrine, and their system, and their name, I must speak freely. +And the best refutation they can give, is to come out if they can, +and define and explain their system. I care not what shape it is +presented in; I am willing to meet it. If it puts on an Arminian +character and dress, like the review in the Christian Spectator, +I will only ask the privilege of baptizing it anew, and giving it +a legitimate name. But as there seems now little hope of being +permitted to meet it in the manner proposed, it only remains that +I proceed, according to promise, to “occupy the columns of the +Advocate with a few numbers, touching the present Calvinistic +controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and as +relates to the general question between them and us.” +</p> + +<p> +I cannot but think this an important moment to look into this +subject. The signs of the times indicate that the spirit of inquiry +is abroad, and the old platforms are shaken. In this breaking up of +erroneous systems, there is danger of extremes and extravagancies, +more to be dreaded, perhaps, than the old errors themselves. Hence, +the necessity for every man who <i>has</i> the truth to be on his guard +against the currents, new and unprovided for, that may otherwise +drive him from his safe moorings: and hence the necessity also, that +he who has weighed anchor, and is afloat upon the unexplored sea of +philosophic speculation should be aware of the rocks and the +quicksands on the opposite shore. An abler hand than mine is +certainly needed on this occasion; such a one I hope may be found. +But in the mean time I will, as I am able, say a <i>few things</i>, with +the sincere prayer that I and my readers may be led into all truth. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="IV" id="IV"> +NUMBER IV. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +SKETCH OF THE PAST CHANGES AND PRESENT STATE OF CALVINISM IN THIS +COUNTRY. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">In</span> the former No. it was seen that the indefiniteness and mutability +of the Calvinistic system had thrown a kind of irresponsibility +around it; which renders this controversy, in many respects, +extremely unsatisfactory. This might, at first, lead to the +conclusion, that farther discussion would be useless. On farther +thought, however, it <i>may</i> appear, that this very circumstance will +render the controversy both easier and more promising. This +diversity of opinions has produced serious discussion among the +predestinarians themselves, and has thrown the system open to public +view, and driven its advocates to a clearer statement of their +respective opinions. The effervescence, in short, growing out of +this excitement, has led to a more distinct analysis of the system, +and of course to a clearer discovery of its constituent parts. Their +arguments against each other, and the logical consequences which +they urge against each other’s views, are, in many cases, precisely +the same that we should advance, and have often urged, in opposition +to predestination. Much of the work, therefore, is prepared for us, +and brought forward in a way to produce an effect among Calvinists +themselves, where we could not be heard. +</p> + +<p> +To understand this subject however fully, and to follow out this +discussion advantageously, it will be necessary to glance at the +different changes and modifications of the Calvinistic system; and +to take a brief survey of the present state of the parties. +</p> + +<p> +The religious faith of our puritanical fathers is too well known to +need a delineation here. This faith was at an early day defined and +formally recognized, in the Cambridge and Saybrook platforms. The +first refinement (improvement it can hardly be called) upon this +ancient faith, was the metaphysical theory of Dr. Hopkins. The +leading dogmas of this theory were, that God was the <i>efficient +cause</i> of all moral action, holy and unholy; and that holiness +consisted in disinterested benevolence. Insomuch, that the answer to +the question, “Are you willing to be damned?” was deemed a very good +criterion by which to judge of a religious experience. While the +doctrine of predestination was in this manner <i>going to seed</i>, and +bearing its legitimate fruits, in one direction, it received a +remarkably plausible modification in another. The atonement, which +was formerly limited to the elect, was now extended to all; and the +invitations of the Gospel, instead of being restrained, as before, +to the world of the elect, were extended to the world of mankind. +But as it would be useless to hold out invitations to those who +could not accept of them, another refinement was introduced, and man +was found to possess a natural ability to receive salvation, +although he laboured under an invincible moral <i>inability</i>, which +would for ever keep him from Christ, until drawn by irresistible +grace. This discovery led to other refinements in language, so that +a kind of technical nomenclature was formed, out of words in popular +use, which words, by an accompanying glossary, were so defined as to +correspond with the Calvinistic system. Thus, “You can repent if you +will,” meaning, according to the technical definition, “You can +repent when God <i>makes</i> you willing,” and so of the rest. +</p> + +<p> +This theory, sustained as it was by Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Emmons, and +others, gained many proselytes, and seemed likely, at one time, to +become the universal creed. Its metaphysical abstrusities and +distinctions gave it an interest for the student; and its plausible +and commonsense terms gave it popularity with the people. In the +mean time, however, several causes conspired to introduce a great +revolution in the religious sentiments of many, which, as it has had +a very important influence in modifying Calvinism itself; I must +here stop to notice; I allude to the introduction of Unitarianism +and Universalism. The proximate causes of the introduction of these +sentiments were, among others, probably the following. The +Antinomian features of old Calvinism had introduced into the +Churches a heartless Christianity and a very lax discipline. It was +natural, therefore, when religion had come, in point of fact, to +consist chiefly in external performances, for its votaries to seek a +theory that would accord with their practice. Unitarianism was +precisely such a theory. It is also to be noticed, that the state of +formality and spiritual death that prevailed, was greatly increased +by the withering alliance which then existed between the Church and +civil government. This revolution was undoubtedly hastened also by +the ultraism, on the one part, and the technical inconsistencies on +the other, of the Hopkinsian theory. The elements had been long in +motion, and at length they united in an array of numbers and +influence that wrested the fairest portions of their ecclesiastical +domain from the orthodox Churches of Mass., and turned them over, +together with the richly endowed university of the state, into the +hands of the Unitarians. +</p> + +<p> +In Connecticut, Unitarianism, as that term is commonly understood +among us, has not prevailed. There is, I believe, but one Unitarian +pastor, properly so called, in the state. This sentiment, however, +prevails very extensively in this and all the other New-England +states, as well as in many other parts of the union, under the name +of Universalism; a sentiment which differs but little from +Socinianism, and had its origin doubtless from the same source. +About half a century since, a Calvinistic clergyman, as he was +supposed to be to the day of his death, left a posthumous work, +which was published, entitled, “Calvinism Improved.” It was merely +an extension of the doctrines of unconditional election and +irresistible grace to all instead of a part. From the premises, the +reasoning seemed fair, and the conclusions legitimate. This made +many converts. And this idea of universal salvation, when once it is +embraced, can easily be moulded into any shape, provided its <i>main +feature</i> is retained.—It has finally pretty generally run into the +semi infidel sentiments, of <i>no atonement—no Divine Saviour—no +Holy Ghost</i>, and <i>no supernatural change of heart;</i> as well as “no +hell—no devil—no angry God.” It may be a matter of some surprise, +perhaps, to a superficial observer, or to one not personally +acquainted with the circumstances of the case, why, in leaving +Calvinism, these men should go so far beyond the line of truth. But +in this we see the known tendency of the human mind to run into +extremes. The repulsive features of the old system drove them far +the other way. It ought to be remembered, also, that there were few, +if any, who were stationed on the medium line, to arrest and delay +the public mind in its fearful recoil from the “horrible decree.” +Had Methodism been as well known in New-England fifty years ago, as +it now is, it is doubtful whether Universalism or Unitarianism would +have gained much influence in this country. Late as it was +introduced, and much as it was opposed, it is believed to have done +much toward checking the progress of those sentiments. And perhaps +it is in part owing to the earlier introduction, and more extensive +spread of Methodism, in Connecticut, that Unitarianism has not +gained more influence in the state. This is undoubtedly the fact in +the states of Vermont, New-Hampshire, and Maine, where Methodism was +introduced nearly as early as those other sentiments. The result has +shown that the foregoing supposition is corroborated by facts in +those cases where the experiment has been tried. These remarks may +not now be credited, but the time will come, when the prejudices of +the day are worn out, that the candid historian will do the subject +justice. But to return—though Unitarianism and Universalism are +believed to be dangerous errors, yet, as is often the case, they +have contributed much, doubtless, to detect the errors and modify +the features of the opposite system. Simultaneously with them, the +Methodists have engaged in opposing the Calvinistic dogmas. This +close examination and thorough opposition, with such other causes as +may have cooperated in the work, have driven some of the +peculiarities of the Hopkinsian theory into disrepute, more suddenly +even than they rose into credit. The sublimated doctrine of +disinterested benevolence was so like “an airy nothing,” that even +the speculative minds of the shrewdest metaphysicians could not find +for it “a local habitation,” in heaven or on earth; and the almost +blasphemous dogma, that God was the efficient cause of sin, was more +abhorrent, if possible, than even the horrible decree of +reprobation. Both, therefore, with the exceptions hereafter +mentioned, disappeared. The former, being of an ethereal character, +silently evaporated into “thin air;” but the other, being of a +grosser nature, and withal more essential to the system itself, +<i>settled to the bottom</i>, and is now rarely visible, except when the +hand of controversy shakes up the sediment. The doctrine of +universal atonement, however, was retained, and the theological +vocabulary was not only retained, but enlarged and improved. So that +from that day to this, we hear but little of the doctrine of +reprobation, or of the decrees of God, but much is said of God’s +“electing love,” his “Divine sovereignty,” and “gracious purposes.” +By which is meant, according to the glossary, the doctrine of +unconditional election and reprobation, and of absolute +predestination. The scriptures, also, which used to be quoted to +prove the direct efficiency of God, in producing sin and securing +the condemnation of the reprobate, receive a different explanation, +varying but little, if any, from the Arminian interpretation of +those passages. It cannot be doubted, I think, but there has been +quite a change in the views of the great body of the Calvinists—and +yet not so great and so thorough a change as appearances and terms +might at first view seem to indicate. It is not easy to <i>eradicate</i> +old prejudices. And it is often found that the mind will cling to +the first principles of a favourite system, even after the other +parts are so modified as that the new principles would supplant the +old, if suffered to be carried out into a consistent whole. In every +such case, much labour and argument will be spent in trying to unite +the old with the new; but in every instance the rent becomes worse. +This leads to a kind of vacillating policy, and an ambiguous course +of argument, accompanied with reiterated complaints, that the +opposers of the system misunderstand and misrepresent it. And it +would be no wonder if the constant friction in the incongruous +machinery should chafe the mind, and lead to a dogmatic and an +impatient spirit. How far this corresponds with the existing facts, +in the Calvinistic controversy, others can judge. In my own view, +the peculiar circumstances of the case, connected with the known +character of the human mind, fully account for the <i>apparent</i> +tergiversation and changing of argument, in this controversy, +without criminating the <i>motives</i> of our predestinarian brethren, as +some have unjustly accused me of doing. The different parts of the +system have lost, in a measure, their original affinities, and yet +they have some partial and irregular attractions, which lead them to +unite in unnatural and grotesque forms. And as there is no common +consent and settled mode of operating among the many who are +experimenting upon the materials, there are various sectional and +individual formations, which are inconsistent with each other. And +their incongruity is the more apparent from the unanimous effort +(which I believe is the only work of union in “the class”) to +amalgamate each and every variety with the old substratum of the +system,—“God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.” +</p> + +<p> +The completion of this historical sketch, together with a view of +the present state of the Calvinistic parties, may be expected in the +next number. After which it is proposed to proceed to an examination +of the doctrines in dispute. +</p> +<hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="V" id="V"> +NUMBER V. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">One</span> modification of Calvinism remains to be mentioned. It is known +by the name of the “New Divinity.” The theological doctors connected +with Yale college are the reputed authors of this system. It is +evident, however, that the tendency of the Calvinistic theory has +been in this direction for a number of years. The “New Divinity,” so +alarming to some of the Calvinists, is only the ripe fruits of the +very plants which they have long cultivated with assiduous care. And +why should they start back at results which they have long laboured +to produce? This theory, in the first place, is an attempt to make +the doctrine, and the technical terms alluded to, coincide. In the +second place, it is designed, by a new philosophy of predestination, +to get rid of the “logical consequences” that have always pressed +heavily upon the old system. Finally, it is a device to reconcile +the doctrine of depravity with the former current sentiment, that +man has <i>natural ability</i> to convert himself and get to heaven +without grace. The two pillars of the new system are, 1. “Sin is not +a propagated property of the human soul, but consists wholly in +<i>moral exercise</i>.” 2. “Sin is not the necessary means of the +greatest good;” or, in other words, “Sin is not preferable to +holiness in its stead.” The Calvinistic opposers of this theory tell +us that these sentiments have been held and taught to some extent +for the last ten years. They were more fully and more openly +announced, however, by Dr. Taylor, of the theological school +belonging to Yale College, in a concio ad clerum preached Sept. +10th, 1828. From the time of the publication of this sermon the +alarm has been sounded, and the controversy has been carried on. The +opposers of the new doctrine call it heresy; and in a late +publication they seem to intimate that Dr. T. and his associates are +nearly if not quite as heretical as the author of the sermon on +predestination and election. The doctor and his friends, on the +other hand, strenuously maintain that they are orthodox; and to +prove it, they repeat, again and again, “We believe that God did, +for his own glory, foreordain whatsoever comes to pass.” The +Christian Spectator, an ably conducted quarterly journal, is devoted +chiefly to the defence of this theory, aided by the New-York +Evangelist, and several other minor periodicals, and by a very +respectable body of the clergy. What proportion, however, have +embraced this system is not known; but many, both in and out of +Connecticut, have espoused the cause with great zeal. The contest +waxes warmer each year. Against the theory, Dr. Woods, of the +Andover theological seminary, Dr. Griffin, of Williams college, Dr. +Tyler, of Portland, the Rev. Mr. Hervey, of Connecticut, and several +others have entered the lists of controversy; and last of all, a +pamphlet, supposed to be the joint labour of a number of clergymen, +has been published, in which the New Divinity is denounced as +heresy, a formal separation of the Churches is predicted, and a +withdrawal of patronage from Yale college is threatened on the +ground that “Yale will become in Connecticut what Harvard is in +Massachusetts.” It is uncertain, however, whether those ultra +measures will be responded to by the great body of the clergy in +New-England. There is a party which still adheres to the old—I may +say, perhaps, to the <i>oldest</i> modification of Calvinism in this +country. This party are for maintaining the old landmarks at all +hazards, rightly judging that these palliations and explanations of +the system will ultimate in its destruction. They are not numerous, +but still respectable as to numbers and talents. They are sustained +in Boston by the Boston Telegraph, so called, a weekly periodical, +which does not hesitate to go the whole length—<i>logical +consequences and all</i>. Witness the following quotation from a review +of my sermon, in the number for Jan. 23d. Speaking of the charge in +the sermon, that Calvinism makes God the author of sin, the writer +says:—“The word author is sometimes used to mean <i>efficient cause</i>. +Now I am willing to admit that those scriptures which teach that God +has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply that he is the +efficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory and the greatest +good he said, <i>Let there be sin, and there was sin!!!</i>” The +following is another specimen of Calvinism from the same periodical. +If any man “affirms that man really chooses, and that his acts of +will are caused by his own free, voluntary, and efficient mind, then +he is <i>no Calvinist</i>.” In this last quotation, as well as in the +preceding, there is the most direct opposition to Dr. Taylor, since +he maintains, if I understand him, that man’s is an independent +agency—that the human mind is the originator of thought and +volition. Thus are these two branches of the Calvinistic family +directly at variance with each other. And, in fact, the Telegraph +and its supporters are not only at variance with the newest +divinity, but with all the different degrees of <i>new, newer, +newest</i>, and denounce them all as heresy. +</p> + +<p> +The present advocates of predestination and particular election may +be divided into four classes:—1. The old school Calvinists. 2. +Hopkinsians. 3. Reformed Hopkinsians. 4. Advocates of the New +Divinity. By the reformed Hopkinsians I mean those who have left out +of their creed Dr. Hopkins’ doctrine of disinterested benevolence, +Divine efficiency in producing sin, &c, and yet hold to a general +atonement, natural ability, &c. These constitute, doubtless, the +largest division in the “class” in New-England. Next, as to numbers, +probably, are the new school, then Hopkinsians, and last, the old +school. These subdivisions doubtless run into each other in various +combinations; but the outlines of these four sub-classes are, I +think, distinctly marked. +</p> + +<p> +The preceding sketch has been confined mostly to the theological +changes in New-England; but it will apply, to a considerable extent, +to other parts of the nation. The Presbyterian Church, by reason of +its ecclesiastical government, is more consolidated, and of course +less liable to change than the independent Congregational Churches +of the eastern states. But the Presbyterian Church has felt the +changes of the east, and is coming more and more under their +influence. It is now a number of years since the “triangle,” as it +was called, was published in New-York. This was a most severe and +witty allegory, against the dogmas and bigotry of old Calvinism. +From this work this old theory has obtained the epithet of +“triangular.” Whenever a man advocates the doctrine of limited +atonement, imputed sin, and imputed righteousness, he is said to be +“triangular.” These old triangular notions are giving place very +rapidly to modern improvements. And although the most strenuous +opposition has been made in the General Assembly, in different +publications, and elsewhere, yet the votes in the last General +Assembly show, I think, that the whole Church is yielding herself up +to the resistless march of innovation. It may be doubted whether the +state of New-York is not emphatically the strong hold of the New +Divinity, so far as popular sentiment is concerned; and whether, +indeed, with the exception of New-Haven, there is not the greatest +moral influence enlisted there, for the propagation of the new +theory. +</p> + +<p> +Thus have I endeavoured to glance over the various modifications and +present characteristics of that mode of Christian doctrines called +Calvinism. Here a few suggestions present themselves, which, from +their relation to the present controversy, I will now set down. +</p> + +<p> +It seems singular that, differing as they profess to, so materially, +on many points, each individual of each sub-class should feel +himself injured whenever Calvinism, under this common name, is +opposed in any of its features. The sermon on predestination was +against <i>Calvinism</i>, and lo! all parties rise up against the sermon. +And yet, whether it object to Calvinistic policy or to Calvinistic +doctrine, the different parties accuse their opponents of being +guilty of the charge, but they themselves are clear. I cannot think +of a single important position assumed by the sermon against +predestination and election, which is not sustained by Calvinists +themselves in opposition to some of their brethren; nor yet of a +single charge against their policy, for their changes and ambiguous +methods of stating and defending their doctrines, which has not been +reiterated by professed Calvinists themselves against their +brethren. Thus the sermon is sustained by the Calvinists themselves, +and yet they all condemn it! If <i>some</i> Calvinists think that the +objections of the sermon lie against some modifications of their +system, is it not possible that these objections have a more +<i>general</i> application than any of them seem willing to acknowledge? +For example: it is objected to predestination that it “makes God the +author of sin, destroys free agency, arrays God’s decrees against +his revealed word, mars his moral attributes, puts an excuse into +the mouth of the impenitent sinner, implies unconditional +reprobation, makes God partial and a respecter of persons, +necessarily limits the atonement,” &c. These charges, say the +Calvinists, are very unjust, ungenerous—in fact, they bear false +witness against our neighbours. This is said by Mr. Metcalf, and by +others of the New-Haven school. And yet what says the Spectator, the +organ and oracle of that school? It says of Dr. Tyler, and of others +who oppose the peculiar views of Dr. Taylor, comprising, as we have +seen, the great majority of Calvinists, that their views “limit God +in power and goodness”—“make the worst kind of moral action the +best”—“if carried out in their legitimate consequences, would lead +to universalism, to infidelity, to atheism”—“they confound right +and wrong, and subvert all moral distinctions”—“according to these +views, mankind are bound to believe that they shall please and +glorify God more by sin than by obedience, and therefore to act +accordingly”—“nothing worse can be imputed to the worst of men than +this theory imputes to God”!!!<sup><a href="#n4" id="f4" title="see footnote" name="f4">[4]</a></sup> Has the author of the sermon said +more than this, and worse than this, of Calvinism? And shall he be +accused by these very men of bearing false witness against his +brethren? And let it be observed farther, in justification of the +sermon, that these charges in the Spectator are made by men who have +been brought up at the feet of the Calvinistic doctors, and have +themselves grown up to the character and rank of doctors in +theology. They know the system thoroughly; they have made it the +study of their lives, and have they testified to the truth +respecting this theory? <i>So then has the author of the sermon</i>. Such +is the testimony on the one side; and on the other we have decided +predestinarians acknowledging, as an article of their creed, what in +the sermon was urged as only a logical consequence. According to +this system, says the sermon, “the <i>fiat</i> of God brought forth sin +as certainly as it made the world.” Hear the Boston Telegraph: +—“God, for his own glory and for the good of the world, said, <i>Let +there be sin, and there was sin!</i>” Now I beg the reader to look at +this subject for a moment. For brevity’s sake we will call the +Boston Telegraph and its supporters No. 1; the Andover theological +seminary and its supporters, which constitute by far the larger body +of predestinarians in New-England, No. 2; and the New-Haven divines +and their supporters No. 3. The sermon charges predestination with +making God the author of sin. No. 2 says this is false: I neither +believe it, nor is it to be inferred from my premises. <i>It is true</i>, +says No. 1: I am willing to admit that God is the efficient cause of +sin. He said, Let there be sin, and there was sin. <i>It is true</i>, +responds No 3, that all who hold and explain predestination as Nos. +1 and 2 explain it, are exposed to the full force of the objections +in the sermon—against such views “the arguments of the sermon are +unanswerable.” No. 2, in vindication, says that No. 1 is on the old +plan—very few hold with him in these days. And as for No. 3, he is +already a rank Arminian; and if he would be consistent, he must give +up unconditional election, and embrace the whole Arminian theory. +Thus do they destroy each other, and confirm the doctrine of the +sermon. And shall we still be told that we do not understand this +doctrine? Have anti-predestinarians misunderstood this from John +Calvin’s day to the present? Does honest No. 1 misunderstand it? +Does well instructed No. 3 misunderstand it? What then is Calvinism, +that cannot, through the lapse of centuries, make itself understood +either by friend or foe? Is not this, of itself, a suspicious trait +in its character? Let us quote a Calvinistic writer, whose +sentiments are much in point, though aimed at the New Divinity:—“It +is a serious ground of suspicion,” says this writer, “that Dr. +Taylor has failed, according to his own repeated declarations, to +render his speculations intelligible to others. It must be granted +that a man of sense, who is acquainted with the power of language, +can, if he is disposed, make himself understood.” “Some of the most +intelligent men in the country have utterly failed to compass Dr. +T.‘s meaning in argument: so that he declares again and again, I am +not understood—I am misrepresented. Who under such circumstances +can refrain from suspicion?” “Another suspicious circumstance in the +case is, that Dr. Taylor expresses himself in ambiguous terms and +phrases, which, though they are designed to influence the mind of a +reader, afford him the opportunity to avoid responsibility.” See +pamphlet by Edwardian, pp. 28 and 29. If this is justly said of Dr. +Taylor’s <i>recent</i> theory, what shall we say of a system the +advocates of which, “according to their repeated declarations, have +not been able to render their speculations intelligible,” after the +theory has had exhausted upon it the highly cultivated intellects of +hosts of expositors through successive generations? “Who, under such +circumstances, can refrain from suspicion?” especially since these +advocates have learned “to express themselves in ambiguous terms and +phrases which, though they are designed to influence the mind of a +reader, afford them an opportunity to avoid responsibility.” To +Calvinism it may truly be said, “Out of thine own mouth will I judge +thee.” Let not the author of the sermon then be accused of bearing +false witness, when his testimony is predicated on principles which +Calvinists have laid down, and is also corroborated by men of their +“own class.” +</p> + +<p> +Will it be said, All this is not argument. I answer, The sermon, it +is supposed, contains arguments—arguments which professed +predestinarians themselves tell us are unanswerable against the +prevailing modes of stating and explaining the doctrine. Now let +them be answered, if they can be. Let them be answered, not by +giving up predestination, in the Calvinistic sense, and still +professing to hold it—not by attempting to avoid the logical +consequences, by giving the system the thousandth explanation, when +the nine hundred and ninety-nine already given have made it no +plainer, nor evaded at all the just consequences, so often charged +upon it; and when these are answered, it will then be time enough to +call for new arguments. +</p> + +<p> +Having prepared the way, as I hope, by the preceding numbers, for +the proper understanding of the controversy; and having, by the +remarks just made, attempted (with what success the reader must +judge) to repel the charges of misrepresentation and bearing false +witness, made against me, as the author of the sermon which gave +rise to the controversy, I am now prepared, in my next number to +commence an examination of some of the questions of doctrine, +connected with this discussion. In doing which, my object will be, +to let “Greek with Greek contend” so far as to show, if possible, +the inconsistency of both, and then present the doctrine which we +believe to be the true system, and show how it stands untouched by +the conflicting elements around it as the immovable foundation of +the Church of God. I shall begin with the Divine purposes including +foreknowledge; then take up human agency and responsibility; and +last, regeneration, connected with the doctrine of human depravity, +Divine and human agency, &c. May He that said, “Let light be, and +light was,” “shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge +of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ.” +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="VI" id="VI"> +NUMBER VI. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +PREDESTINATION. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">Definitions</span> are the foundations of reasoning. Hence in any reply to +my sermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair +that the first inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The +definition of predestination assumed in the sermon was, that +unalterable purpose and efficient decree of God, by which the moral +character and responsible acts of man were definitely fixed and +efficiently produced. On this point the sermon joined issue. To this +definition most of the notices and reviews, to the number of six or +seven, which I have seen, have taken exceptions. The review in the +Boston Telegraph, however, is not of this number.—That, as has +already been noticed, agrees with the charge in the sermon, that +“the <i>fiat</i> of God brought forth sin as directly as it made the +world.” We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord to that +sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of the +sermon—against the common sense of the world—against their own +convictions of right and wrong—and, I may add, against their own +brethren of “the class,” some of whom have already publicly +denounced the sentiment as “horrid blasphemy.” At this day of light, +in which <i>naked Calvinism</i> is abhorred by most of those who bear the +name of Calvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer +to such a review. We approve of the <i>logical consistency</i> of these +men—we admire the moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes +out a theory to its legitimate results without flinching; but we are +astonished at the <i>moral nerve</i> that can contemplate such results +with complacency. For myself I confess when I see this naked system +of Calvinism fulminating the curse of reprobation in the teeth of +the miserable wretch whose only crime is, that his God has made him +a sinner, my heart recoils with indescribable horror! Let him +contemplate this picture who can. I covet not his head or his heart. +</p> + +<p> +Of others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two +classes: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who +favour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called +Reformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of +Calvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their +views on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At +present I shall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and +to the first and second notices of the sermon in the Christian +Spectator. And here let me say, once for all, that I do not consider +either of these gentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible +for the doctrine of predestination as stated and opposed in the +sermon. This I hope will be satisfactory. If these gentlemen should +ask me why I published my sermon in terms that included Calvinists +generally, without making the exception in their favour, I answer, +1. The views of Dr. Taylor and “those who believe with him,” on this +particular point, were unknown to me at the time. Nor is this +strange, for it is but lately that those views have been fully +developed—never so fully before, probably, as in Dr. Fitch’s review +of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never occurred to me that +any man or any set of men holding, in respect to predestination, the +doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the whole body of +Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all the +apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must +judge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be +Methodistical on the subject of predestination, I by no means would +be understood to say this of their system as a whole—the +objectionable parts will be noticed in their place. But whatever is +true is none the less so for being mixed with error. There are some +things, however, to be regretted and exposed in the manner in which +these reviewers have expressed their doctrine of predestination, and +also in the manner in which they have opposed the sermon and +Arminianism generally. They complain of my definition of +predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness. The +reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they +themselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation +of predestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their +views. But what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the +determination with which these gentlemen persist in holding up the +idea that their views essentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in +his answer to my reply, says:— +</p> + +<p> +“There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the +Divine purposes in relation to a moral kingdom:— +</p> + +<p> +1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his +creatures, purposes merely to <i>treat them in a corresponding +manner</i>. +</p> + +<p> +2. That he, first of all, resolves <i>what the conduct of his +creatures shall be</i>, and next resolves on such measures as <i>shall +bring</i> them to that conduct. +</p> + +<p> +3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the +different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to +<i>pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best +possible results</i>.” +</p> + +<p> +“The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. +Fisk, in the sermon we reviewed.” The writer goes on farther to say +that his objection to this is, “that it is utterly deficient”—“that +it passes over in silence all those acts of God in creation and +government by which he determines character.” Of course he means to +say that the <i>sermon</i> advocated a theory which left out of the +question all the Divine influence in determining character. How +strangely he has misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have +read it. It teaches that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and +moral world: that he has a general plan, suited to all the various +circumstances and contingencies of government; that God gives the +sinner power to choose life; that his grace enlightens and +strengthens the sinner to seek after and obtain salvation. In short, +it must be obvious that no man who believes in the Divine government +and in Gospel provisions can leave this influence out of his system. +I will therefore venture upon the following declaration, which it is +presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay, namely, Dr. F. <i>never saw a man +and never heard of a man</i> that was a believer in revelation, who +left out of his creed all that conduct in God which determines +character. That such was not the character of my creed, the reviewer +might have learned in my reply to his first review, if he could not +from the sermon. In the reply it is said, “As God foresaw men would +sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference +to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own infinite +mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to ‘make +the wrath of man praise him,’ and <i>deduce the greatest possible +good from the best possible system</i>.”—And yet, strange to tell, in +his answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were +an undisputed truth, “Dr. Fisk advocates the first,” (meaning the +first view of the Divine purposes given above.) “We brought forward +the third,” (meaning the third view.) “Now since the third upholds +the fact of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we +have succeeded in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, +denies, and which Calvinists maintain.” Whereas he ought to have +said, for he had my statement for it directly before him, “Dr. Fisk +advocates the third,” and then he might have added, “Now since the +third destroys the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore +in assisting Dr. Fisk to sustain the third we have succeeded in +disproving the doctrine of foreordination, which Arminians deny, and +Calvinists have attempted to maintain.” In fact, as the reviewer +says, there can be but those three views taken of the Divine +purposes; and since neither I nor any other Arminian ever believed +in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself acknowledges we are directly +opposed to the second, it follows that we must believe the third. +But the third is the reviewer’s creed: therefore on this point he is +an Arminian, or we are Calvinists. +</p> + +<p> +That the reviewer’s theory on predestination is about the same with +the Methodists’ appears evident from the following quotations from +Mr. Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley’s +creed include all the Divine influence that goes “to determine +character,” but also that God “pursues measures which will certainly +lead to the best possible results;” nay, that he does all that he +<i>wisely can</i> to exclude sin from the moral universe. These are +points for which the advocates of the New-Haven theory strongly +contend. Let them see, then, how in this matter they have identified +themselves with Arminians. +</p> + +<p> +“To God,” says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, “all +things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his +power, as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only +he that can do all things else cannot deny himself—he cannot +counteract himself or oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he +would destroy all sin, with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in +so doing he would counteract himself, and undo all that he has been +doing since he created man upon the earth. For he created man in his +own image—a spirit endued with understanding, with will or +affections, and liberty, without which he would have been incapable +of either virtue or vice. He could not be a moral agent, any more +than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence be it spoken) the +Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus contradict +himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it would +imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence. Whereas +all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and +goodness) is displayed in governing man as man—as an intelligent +and free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil.” +</p> + +<p> +Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God’s Counsels: “In the +moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine +will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full +scope for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and +knowledge of God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of +men and all the subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, +the salvation of lost mankind.” Now let me ask the reviewer, is this +leaving out all the Divine influence that determines character? Is +not this maintaining that, “in view of the measures that it was +possible tor God to take, he purposes to pursue those measures that +will certainly lead to the best possible result?” Is Dr. Fitch +ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or is he unwilling to identify +himself with us? Ignorant of <i>my</i> views he could not be, I think, +after reading my reply.—Why, then, does he persist in talking of a +difference where there is none? +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After +reading my reply, he says, “if you will preach this doctrine to your +Methodist brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the +strong arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it +Calvinism, I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I +do. And if you will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they +too do not call it Calvinism, I will grant that even <i>they</i> too +sometimes differ about terms. If you will take this course, I think +when you shall see what the doctrine will be called, the +astonishment you express that it should be regarded as Calvinism +will wear away.” Now how surprised Mr. M. will be when he learns +that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly and +forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever +suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him +incorporated it into their creed, and <i>for some reason</i> unknown to +us, called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that +he who was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and +Journal, for the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, +and of disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this +subject, himself understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet +so it is, Calvinists themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. +Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author of “Views in Theology,” the author or +authors of the pamphlet by an Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven +theory of predestination as anti-Calvinistic, and as being +essentially Arminian. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first +principles. In reply to my answer he says, “It was certainly our +intention to place this contested doctrine on grounds which our +Wesleyan brethren <i>could not</i> dispute, and it gives us pleasure to +find that in this we have had complete success!” There are two +things a little remarkable connected with this sentiment. One is, +that the writer should so express himself as to convey the idea that +<i>he</i> has traced up the subject to first principles with much care, +and, to his <i>great satisfaction, has succeeded in convincing us</i> of +the correctness of his premises. Whereas it is evident from the +passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from the universal +sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven doctors +have <i>at length</i> come on to our ground; and it gives <i>us great +pleasure</i> to find that, from <i>some source</i>, arguments in favour of +our system have with them met with <i>complete success</i>. The other +thing that strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had +acknowledged that we were agreed in these first principles, he +should immediately go on to say, as has already been mentioned, that +I and the Arminians hold to the first view he has given of the three +possible views that might be taken of predestination, and deny the +third; when at the same time the third contains <i>those very first +principles</i> in which he says we are agreed. This looks so much like +a contradiction, almost in the same breath, that I really know not +what other name to give it. If these gentlemen are disposed to come +into the fortress of truth, and assist us in manning our guns and +working our artillery against error, we certainly can have no +objection. We are fond of help. But they must pardon us if we revolt +a little at the idea of their taking the lead in this business, and +accounting us as mere novices who have only learned, and that too +from themselves, some of the <i>elementary principles</i>. Nay, they must +not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our present +commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed in +front of our own batteries, merely to give our <i>new allies</i> an +opportunity to blow us up <i>with our own ordnance!</i> +</p> + +<p> +In reply to my objection to the reviewer that “it was an abuse of +terms to call the <i>permission of sin, not hindering it</i>, &c, a +foreordination or purpose that it shall be,” &c, he has said, “If an +evil, unavoidable and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come +into his kingdom, in one place and time rather than any other, and +is thus <i>particularly disposed of</i> by his providence, because it is +a disposition of it the best possible, is there no purpose of God in +relation to the thing? In doing his own pleasure, in this case, does +he not decide on the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom +just when and where it does?” Now I beg the reader to go over this +last paragraph once more, and then say if he does not agree with me +in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely occurs in any +writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a contested question +as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between a “purpose in +relation to a thing,” and the foreordaining or decreeing that the +thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God’s “deciding on the +fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?” You can make it mean +almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch’s theory on the +subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin +was unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to +suffer it to do the least harm possible—preferring holiness in its +stead in every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining +sin!! This is predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in +point. Cicero, a Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting +treason against the commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this <i>hated +treason</i>, though unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He +determined therefore to “make a disposition of it the best +possible.” He took his measures accordingly. By these Cataline and +the principal conspirators were driven out of the city, and +compelled, before their plans were matured, to resort to open +hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and united, and the +state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy were suffered +to come upon the commonwealth “in one place and time rather than any +other,” and “were thus <i>particularly disposed of</i>” by Cicero. In +this case the consul had a special “purpose about the thing.” He +determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than +suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the +city with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not +to the reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but +it is put to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman +consul ordain or foreordain, or predestinate the treason of +Cataline? If by common consent all answer, No, such a statement is a +libel upon the consul; and if, in addition to this common +understanding of the term, the theological use of the term will not +bear such a construction; if the great body of the Calvinists of the +present day, and of New-England even, use the term in a different +sense, it remains to be seen how the New-Haven divines can stand up +before the world and say, “We believe God hath foreordained +whatsoever comes to pass.” +</p> + +<p> +Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if +not in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning +in the sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is +antecedent to foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have +objected because, say they, God must first have determined to make +moral agents before he could know they would sin: therefore his +knowledge or his foreknowledge in this case must depend upon his +determination. This objection, at least so far as the New-Haven +theology is concerned, is founded in error. What says Dr. Fitch? +“That God, <i>foreseeing</i> the conduct which will certainly ensue on +the different measures it is possible for him to take, <i>purposes</i>,” +&c. The sermon says, “God knows all that is, or will be, or might +be, under any possible contingency,” and that “his plan is the +result of his infinite knowledge—the decrees of his throne flow +forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom.” Where is the +discrepancy here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he +resolved upon its adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) +he saw, if he made free moral agents, and governed them as such, sin +would ensue. And he also saw what he might do in that case to +counteract and overrule it to his own glory and the good of the +universe.—And he judged, in his infinite wisdom, that such a moral +universe, notwithstanding the sin that would certainly result from +it, would, on the whole, be the best; and therefore upon this +<i>foreknowledge</i> of the whole, God <i>founded</i> his determination to +create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God’s foreknowledge +of the <i>certainty</i> of any event in this universe, it must be +acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern +the universe. And in <i>this sense</i> his purpose was <i>causa sine qua +non</i>, a cause without which any given event would not have happened, +and therefore could not have been foreseen as <i>certain</i>. But then it +should be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all +this, and which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent +instances of knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense +in which the sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that +“God foreknows in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) +predestinate in order to foreknow.” +</p> + +<p> +To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one +class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable +with all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a +rapidly increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, +and, in all but the name, have in that point come on to the +Methodist ground. There is still another class, who are evidently +not Arminians, but still deny the correctness of my definition of +their doctrine. They say they are not chargeable with such a +doctrine, either directly or by inference. In the next number, +therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from their own +positions this definition. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="VII" id="VII"> +NUMBER VII. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">From</span> my last number the reader will perceive that there are two +classes of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to +contend; with one there is no cause of controversy, because they +have given up the doctrine; and with the other there is no <i>need</i> of +controversy, because their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, +<i>logical consequences and all</i>, renders any arguments against it +unnecessary. Its character is too monstrous and abhorrent to gain +much credit. There is yet another and a larger portion, who, while +they reject the views both of the New-Haven divines and of the old +school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are nevertheless strongly opposed +to the issue proposed in the sermon. They deny, as appears from some +public intimations and many private statements, that I have given a +fair representation of the doctrine. They appear to manifest as much +horror as an Arminian would to the idea, that “the responsible acts +of moral agents are definitely fixed and efficiently produced by the +purpose and decree of God,”—that these acts “are the result of an +overruling and controlling power,”—“that the will, in all its +operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret +impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement.” Hence, I +suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine +characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at +least, be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the +definition of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, +we sustain our own cause and refute the opposite. The present +inquiry then is, are these, in very deed, the characteristics of +absolute predestination? I shall endeavour to maintain that they +are. Let the intelligent and the candid judge. +</p> + +<p> +1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this +question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many +predestinarians themselves, have entertained these views of the +doctrine. With respect to anti-predestinarians, I know of no +exception; all unite, in charging these things, directly or by +consequence, upon the Calvinistic system. And will Calvinists say, +this is owing to prejudice and to a want of understanding the +subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume that they are +free from blinding prejudice in <i>favour</i> of their own doctrine, and +all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be asserted, +as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the pride +of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal +opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what +ought first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it +also exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism—a +spirit that says to a brother, “Stand by, for I am holier than +thou!” There have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians +as Calvinists, and how is it, that these men have never had this +doctrine so explained to them as to be able to see it free from +these charges? +</p> + +<p> +But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these +opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a +great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has +before been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against +free will, by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley’s day—and quotations +have also been given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how +decidedly they held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct +positive influence. To these we may add all the Hopkinsians of +modern days, who openly acknowledge “that those scriptures which +teach that God has decreed the sinful acts of men, do imply that he +is the efficient cause of moral evil.” (See review of my sermon in +the Boston Telegraph.) It should not be forgotten, moreover, that +the New-Haven divines, who have studied Calvinism all their lives, +with the best opportunities for understanding it, inform us that the +view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to holiness in its +stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections brought against +it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the Methodists in +New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated predestinarians; but +have revolted from the traditions of their fathers for the very +reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be. The +Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand +that this doctrine necessarily implies the <i>Divine efficiency</i> in +producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is +not angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled +by his decrees. +</p> + +<p> +Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments +on either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, +viz. that a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest +portion of predestinarians, and <i>all</i> anti-predestinarians, +understood the doctrine of absolute predestination, as involving +directly, or by consequence, certain specified principles; but that +a portion of predestinarians persisted in denying that these +principles were involved in the doctrine; and suppose this +intelligent person should be informed of the additional facts, that +these predestinarians had tried all their skill at explanation and +argument, generation after generation, but had never succeeded in +the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from these +charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very +many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, +for the <i>very reason</i> that they could not rid the system, in which +they had been educated, from those principles which were charged +upon it—and that even among those who had adhered to the old +doctrine there were new modes of explaining and stating the theory, +constantly springing up, until finally numbers of them <i>had +explained themselves entirely out of the doctrine</i>, and into the +opposite sentiment; and that very many others, by adhering to the +doctrine, and following out the principles involved in it, had come +to the conclusion that there was “no hell”—no judgment, and “no +angry God.” Suppose, I say, this intelligent man should be informed +of all these facts, and then be requested to <i>presume</i> whether or +not these contested principles were involved in the doctrine—what +would be his judgment? I need not answer this question. There is +<i>strong</i> presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are +correct. +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have +defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged +upon it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the +manner and circumstances in which these terms are used. The more +common terms are <i>decree, predestination, foreordination, +predetermination, purpose</i>, &c.—These are all authoritative terms, +and carry with them the idea of absolute sovereignty. But lest they +should not be sufficiently strong and imperious, they are, in this +theory, generally accompanied by some strong qualifying terms, such +as <i>sovereign decree, eternal and immutable purposes;</i> and without +any reference to other bearings, the whole is placed on the ground +of God’s absolute and sovereign will. These sovereign decrees, +however, are not proposed to his subjects in the light of a law +enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be broken. They are +the <i>secret counsels</i> of his own will; and so far from being law, +that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral world, they +are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When these +decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may +sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to +subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his +decrees he executes himself. It should also be understood that the +advocates of this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, +strenuously maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to +holiness in its stead, and is the <i>necessary means</i> of the <i>greatest +good</i>. The idea that God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, +under all possible circumstances, <i>so ordered his works</i> as to take +up and incorporate into his plan the foreseen volitions of moral +agents, and thus constitute a grand whole, as perfect as any system +which involves a moral government could be, they discard as rank +Arminianism. Now is it possible that decrees like these, concealed +in the eternal mind of him that conceived them—dependent solely on +Almighty power to execute them, not modified by subordinate +agencies, but made to control these agencies with absolute and +arbitrary sway; can it be <i>possible</i>, I say, that such decrees do +not efficiently control and actuate the human will. Must not he who, +in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form and +execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to +this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal +purposes, follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, +and carry on this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most +assuredly he must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, +that operative, controlling and propelling energy that +</p> + + <p class="p2"> +“Lives through all life, extends through all extent,</p> + <p class="p2s"> +Acts undivided, operates unspent.” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this +subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, +and is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:—“The Divine decree is +the determination to <i>produce</i> the universe, that is, the <i>whole +series</i> of <i>beings</i> and <i>events</i> that was then future.” Dr. +Chalmers, who has been esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some +had doubted whether he had not given up absolute predestination +altogether, comes out in his sermon on predestination in the +following language:—“Every step of every individual character, +receives as determinate a character from the hand, of God, as every +mile of a planet’s orbit, or every gust of wind, or every wave of +the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every rivulet of +flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is absolute +and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its +resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of +existence. It <i>reigns</i> and operates through all the secrecies of the +inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to +every desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It +wields an entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and +the will, and the fancy, and the understanding, with all the +countless variety of their hidden and fugitive operations, are +submitted to it. It gives movement and direction through every one +point of our pilgrimage. At no moment of time does it abandon us. It +follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place, and +to our everlasting destiny in the region beyond it!!!” These +quotations need no comment; if they do not come up to all we have +ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no definite meaning in +words. +</p> + +<p> +But we have another authority on this subject, which bears more +directly on the Calvinists of this country, the Assembly’s +Catechism. Dr. Fitch, who is certainly as well qualified to judge in +this matter as another man, informs us, through the medium of the +Christian Spectator, that “the articles of faith prepared by that +body, (the assembly of English and Scotch divines at Westminster,) +are considered as expressing essentially the views not only of the +Presbyterian Church in this country, but also of the orthodox +Congregational Churches of New-England.” It is known, also, that the +Shorter Catechism has been almost universally used by them in their +families, and in the religious instruction of their children. Here +then we have a standard of faith, which all the <i>classes</i>, I +suppose, will acknowledge,—and what saith it? After stating that +the decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel +of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained +whatsoever cometh to pass, it goes on to say, “God <i>executeth</i> his +decrees in the works of creation and providence,” and then for +farther explanation adds—“God’s works of providence are his most +holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures +and all their actions.” This is certainly an awkward sentence, if I +may be allowed to say this of the productions of an assembly which +has been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and +theology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must +be, that by his acts of providence God, in a most holy, wise, and +powerful manner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and +all their actions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk about +<i>preserving actions</i>, we will understand <i>preserving</i> to belong to +<i>creatures</i>, and <i>governing</i> to <i>actions</i>, and then it will be thus: +God powerfully preserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs +all their actions: and it is in this way he <i>executes</i> his decrees. +There are evidently two methods of governing. That control which is +made up of legal precepts, and sanctions, and retributions, is +called a government; not that all the subjects of such a government +always obey its ordinances, but if they violate them, they are +subjected to punishment. <i>This</i> is evidently not the kind of +government that the assembly contemplated. It was a government by +which God <i>executed his decrees;</i> but, as we have seen, his decrees +are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct opposition to +his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed, in respect +to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those demands +are coincident they differ greatly in the <i>manner</i> and <i>certainty</i> +of their fulfilment. Of course government, by <i>executing decrees</i>, +is another thing altogether from government by <i>executing laws</i>. But +there is another kind of government. It is that <i>efficient control</i> +of a superior, by which a being or an act is <i>made to be what it +is</i>, in opposition to <i>non-existence</i>, or a <i>different existence</i>. +Now this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to +when it said, “God <i>executes his decrees</i> by powerfully <i>governing</i> +all the actions of his creatures.” That is, he efficiently produces +and controls all the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the +moral universe. And what is this, but affirming all that the sermon +has affirmed on this subject? If any one is disposed to deny that +this is a fair exposition of the Catechism, let him reflect that as +he cannot pretend that <i>government</i> here means a <i>legal +administration</i>, it will be incumbent on him to show what other fair +construction can be put upon it than the one given above; to show +how God can execute a secret decree, by his own powerful act, in any +other way than in the one already explained. +</p> + +<p> +In corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in +mind, that the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms, +<i>decree, predestination</i>, &c, in the <i>same sense</i>, in reference to +<i>all events</i>. They say, God’s decrees extend to all events, physical +and moral, good and evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any +thing intelligible, that his predestination bears the same relation +to all events. If then his decree of election embraces the means to +the accomplishment of the end, so also must his decree of +reprobation. If his decree of election requires for its +accomplishment an <i>efficient</i> operation, so also does his decree of +reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently, requisite +to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the same +sense requisite to produce a sinful volition. +</p> + +<p> +To tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or +discrimination, that all things are <i>equally</i> the result of the +Divine decree, and then tell us that the relation between God’s +decree and sin is essentially different from the relation existing +between his decree and holiness, would certainly be a very singular +and unwarrantable use of language. How then, I inquire, does God +produce holy volitions?—Why, say the Calvinists, by a direct, +positive, and efficient influence upon the will, and in proof quote +—“Thy people <i>shall</i> be willing in the day of thy power.” Well, how, +I ask again, does God execute his decrees respecting unholy +volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But, says the +Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce unholy +volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful men +to sin. Indeed! and is not this <i>nature</i> the result of a decree? It +would seem God approaches his work of executing his decree +<i>respecting sin</i>, either more reluctantly or with greater +difficulty, so that it requires two steps to execute this, and only +one the other. It is in both cases, however, equally his work. This +will be seen more clearly if we turn our attention to the first sin; +for it is certainly as much against a perfectly holy nature to +commit sin, as it is against an unholy nature to have a holy +volition. Hence the one as much requires a direct and positive +influence as the other, and therefore the passage in the 110th +Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in +changing the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has +been generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:—Not only +shall thy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not +yet in a strict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become +holy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their will, but +also thy angels and thy first created human pair, who were before +their fall more truly thine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall +be made willing to become unholy in the day that thou dost +efficiently change their wills from submission to rebellion. For if +Divine efficiency is necessary to make a naturally perverse will +holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally holy will perverse. +</p> + +<p> +I am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although God +does efficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to +the nature of mind, and consistent with free agency, because he +operates upon the mind through the influence of moral suasion, or by +the power of motives. To this it may be answered, that the +Calvinists generally condemn Dr. Taylor’s views of conversion, +because they suspect him of holding that motives alone convert the +sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that the Holy Spirit should +act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I have shown above, it +is also necessary that there should be a direct Divine influence +upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And this more +especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in the +same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives +leads me to another argument, viz. +</p> + +<p> +3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears +evident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when +this doctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of +depravity. +</p> + +<p> +The doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that “the power of +volition is never excited, nor <i>can be</i>, except in the presence and +from the excitement of motives,” (see “Views in Theology,”) and that +the mind must necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by +what appears to the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, +following Leibnitz, incorporated this doctrine of philosophical +necessity with the Calvinistic theology. In this he has been +followed by a great portion, I believe, of the Calvinistic clergy. +Without stopping here to attempt a refutation of this theory, my +present object is to show that it necessarily fastens upon Calvinism +the charges brought against it, and sustains the definition that has +been given to predestination. For since God creates both the mind +and the motives, and brings them together for the <i>express purpose</i> +that the former should be swayed by the latter, it follows +conclusively that God <i>efficiently</i> controls the will, and produces +all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic +teaching:—“God,” says the author of “Views in Theology,” already +quoted, “God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are +the determiners of choices.” The inference therefore is plain and +unavoidable, <i>God is the determiner of choices</i>. The plea that God +does not produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, +through second causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, +or ten thousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our +Creator in such order as to produce the intellectual vibration +intended, whenever he pleases to give the impulse, what is the +difference? In point of efficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will +it alter the case to say, that “this effect is produced by God +through such a medium as is suited to the nature of the mind, and +therefore it cannot be said, that God does any violence to the will, +or to man’s free agency.” God created the <i>mind</i>, and the <i>means</i> +that were to influence it. He gave to mind its nature, and to +motives their influence and arrangement, for <i>this very purpose</i>. +Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he is <i>bound by the law of his +nature</i> to act in all cases as he does. Why talk about a <i>free</i> +agency when it is such an agency as <i>must</i>, by <i>the constitution</i> of +<i>God</i>, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the +premises, foolish reply, that man could do differently, <i>if he +chose</i>, does not help the case. It is only saying, the nature of man +is such that it is governed by his perceptions, and since “God is +the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions the determiners of +choices,” whenever God pleases to alter the perceptions so as +thereby to change the choice, <i>then</i>, and not before, man can do +differently. According to this doctrine is it possible, according to +the very nature of mind, for the choice to be different until the +perceptions are changed? And can the perceptions be changed, until +God changes them? To answer either or both of these questions in the +affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine of motives. To answer +them in the negative, would be to entail upon the doctrine all that +I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory may have their +choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this argument, +to say “man has an <i>unholy nature;</i> and this is the reason why the +motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is +chargeable upon himself, and God is clear.” For, in the first place, +this would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels +and the first human pair. +</p> + +<p> +This argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man’s +<i>unholy nature</i>, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be +valid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument +obviously affords no relief to the system, it follows that in these +uses, at least, God is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy +volitions—and therefore the charges against predestination are +established. But by a little farther attention we shall see that +this argument affords as little relief to the system in the case of +man as he now is. For this first sin, which was itself the necessary +result of the Divine arrangement and of positive Divine influence, +threw, if possible, a stronger and a more dire necessity over all +the coming generations of men. For this act entailed upon man a +depraved heart. Hence this corrupt nature came upon man without his +knowledge or agency. We trace it back then, thus:—Man’s love of sin +was produced by the unholy choice of the first pair—that choice was +produced by perceptions—these perceptions were produced by motives +—and these motives were brought by God to bear upon the minds which +he had made for this very purpose—therefore God, by design, and +because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and then, for +the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth +unholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, +which, from the unavoidable nature of those minds, <i>must produce</i> +the sin designed. It is thus that, according to his theory, our +Creator binds the human mind by the strong cords of depravity with +one hand, and with the other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of +motives, into all the excitement of unholy delirium; and then, for +his own glory, consigns the sinner over to the prison house of wo!! +Turn this system, then, as you will, you find this doctrine of +predestination binding the human mind, and efficiently producing all +the volitions of the moral universe. The strong arm of Jehovah not +more directly and irresistibly moves and binds the planets in their +orbits, than it moves and controls, in the mysterious circle of his +eternal decrees, “all the actions of all his creatures.” +</p> + +<p> +I know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our +inferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are +responsible, because <i>we are conscious of it</i>. This is a most +singular course of reasoning, and seems to have been adopted to +reconcile contradictions. If this doctrine be true, I am not <i>sure</i> +that I am free, and that I am responsible merely because I feel that +I am. I am at least <i>quite</i> as conscious that I ought not to be held +responsible for what is unavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of +moral liberty. Break down my consciousness in one case, and you +prepare the way for me to suspect it of fallacy in another. And if I +must give up my consciousness, between two alternatives I will +choose that which will not involve the government of God in +injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in unavoidable +perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards’ premises, which he holds in +common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship’s conclusion, +viz. that God never intended to hold men responsible, and the +universal feeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud—a +salutary delusion, imposed as a check and restraint upon man here, +but to be followed by no unpleasant consequences either here or +hereafter. But this would be charging our Creator with both +deception and folly—deception in the delusive consciousness of +responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord Kaimes and others to +disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine purpose! This cannot +be. The charge of deception and of fallacy, therefore, must be +rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of God upon the +doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should crush the +theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the Church and +to the world. +</p> + +<p> +To conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the +charges contained in the sermon against that modification of +Calvinism I am now opposing, are just; and the definition assumed, +is correct. If the advocates of the system can clear themselves, or +their doctrine, let it be done. If not, let one of two courses be +pursued—either let the system be abandoned, or <i>let us have it as +it is</i>. +</p> + +<p> +I have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I +believe we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, “You +misrepresent us!” “You mistake our doctrine!” +</p> + +<p> +In the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human +agency, and the ground of human responsibility, will be examined. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="VIII" id="VIII"> +NUMBER VIII. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">By</span> what has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, +it will be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity +of moral action as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, +I grant, to give to the terms <i>will, liberty, free agency</i>, such a +definition as will make these terms, <i>thus defined</i>, compatible with +the other peculiarities of the Calvinistic system.—Both parties +agree that man is a free moral agent; both maintain that he is +responsible; but we maintain that what the Calvinists call free +moral agency, is not such in fact as is commonly understood by the +term, nor such as is requisite to make man accountable. Here, +therefore, we are again thrown back upon our definitions, as the +starting point of argument. What is that power, or property, or +faculty of the mind, which constitutes man a free moral agent? It is +the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose either good or +evil. Both the <i>power</i> and <i>liberty</i> to choose either <i>good</i> or +<i>evil</i> are requisite to constitute the free agency of a probationer. +It has been contended that choice, though from the condition of the +moral agent it must of necessity be exclusively <i>on one side</i>, is +nevertheless free; since it implies a <i>voluntary</i> preference of the +mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels, +glorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined +in an impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and +invincible enmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With +respect to the free agency of these beings, a question might be +started, whether it is such as renders them responsible for their +<i>present acts</i>, the decision of which might have some bearing on the +subject under investigation; but not such bearing as would make it +important to discuss it here. If they are responsible for their +<i>present acts</i>, it must be on account of a former probation, which +by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any one thinks +otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is not, and +<i>never was</i> so circumstanced as to render the choice of good +possible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such +sense as renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I +have no controversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage +upon all the acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert +it would be a work of little profit. +</p> + +<p> +It is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose +states are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their +probationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency +unsuited to illustrate the agency of beings who are on probation. +Man, in this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are +presented before him as objects of choice; and upon this choice are +suspended eternal consequences of happiness or misery. Of a being +thus circumstanced, it is not enough to say he is free to choose as +he does, unless you can say, also, he is equally free to make an +opposite choice.—Hence, in defining the free agency of man, as a +probationer, we say, as above, that it implies a power of choice, +with full liberty to choose either good or evil. +</p> + +<p> +The foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all +practical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a +speculative philosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of +metaphysics for decomposition and analysis. It is doubtful whether +this process has subserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I +think, that it has produced many perplexing refinements and +speculations that have greatly aided the cause of error. Into these +abstrusities, therefore, it seems necessary to follow this question, +to try, if possible, to draw out and combine the elements of truth. +</p> + +<p> +Having defined free agency to mean <i>the power of choice</i>, &c, it is +asked again, <i>What is this power of choice?</i> It is probable that the +different answers given to this question constitute the fundamental +differences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question +some, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, “We cannot +tell.” And they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar +to that which influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer +will involve themselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a +very convenient way to avoid responsibility, but not indicative of +much fairness, or confidence in their cause. When men have involved +their system in apparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the +candid inquirer after truth to see them start aside from the very +point that is to give character to their whole system. We are told +by men who reason upon foreknowledge, &c, that “God hath decreed +whatsoever comes to pass;” and then we are told that all men are +free, and they enter into a great deal of metaphysical speculation +about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary action, &c, to prove +these positions; but when they are pressed upon this point, “How can +you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine efficiency +necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that kind of +dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?” the reply +is, “We cannot tell—the how in the case we cannot explain.” This +evasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following +cases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out +of what is <i>mysterious</i>, and not of what is <i>palpably contradictory;</i> +or, 2. If both propositions were so <i>clearly proved</i>, that it would +do greater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon +all acknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, +than it would to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. +With respect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless +it would so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, +that the want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack +of light in the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things +compared. When you say, “God executes his decrees by efficiently +controlling the will of man,” and say also, “The mind of man is free,” +both these propositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about +them. But you say, perhaps, “The mystery is in the want of light to +see the <i>agreement</i> of the two; we cannot <i>see</i> their agreement, but +we should not therefore infer that they do not agree.” I answer, What +is light, in this case, but a clear conception of the propositions? +This we have, and we see that they are, <i>in their nature</i>, +incompatible; and the more light you can pour upon this subject, the +more clearly must this incompatibility appear. If you say that +“perhaps neither you nor I fully understand the meaning of these +propositions;” then I reply, <i>We have no business to use them</i>. “Who +is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?” And this +is what I have already complained of; men will reason themselves +into propositions which they call doctrinal facts, but which seem to +the eye of common sense to have all the characteristics of +contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions in objection, +the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because we do not +fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions must be +received, <i>though we do not understand them!</i> and though, as far as +we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the +way to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more +consistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since +the doctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that +freedom, therefore this doctrine should be exploded! +</p> + +<p> +Or will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that +both of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them +would do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of +belief, than to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent +incongruity? Let us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, +unless we doubt all primary truths, viz. That the human mind is +free. It is presumed, if the question come to this, that they must +either give up human liberty or the dogma of predestination, candid +Calvinists themselves would not hesitate; they would say, the +<i>former</i> must stand, whatever becomes of the <i>latter</i>. If I am +correct here, it follows that, predestinarians themselves being +judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear as some other +moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man ought not +to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought not to +be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled by a +superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make +it, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, +then we come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the +compatibility of predestination with human liberty and accountability +does more violence to the laws of belief than it would to discard +predestination. Whatever, therefore, may <i>seem</i> to be favourable to +this doctrine, should be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our +belief in another direction. But, that the argument may be set in as +strong light as possible, let the evidence of predestination be +adduced. What is it? It is not consciousness certainly; and it is +almost as clear that it is not moral demonstration by a course of +reasoning. The most I believe that has ever been said, in the way of +moral demonstration, has been in an argument founded on foreknowledge, +which argument, it is supposed by the author, is fairly disposed of +in the sermon on predestination, by reasoning which has not, to his +knowledge, ever been refuted. A refutation has been attempted, I +grant, by some of the reviewers of the sermon, but the only apparent +success that attended those attempts was, as we have already seen, in +consequence of their taking the very ground of the sermon, and building +the decrees of God upon a prior view and knowledge of all possible +contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning are taken away from this +doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but testimony. And no +testimony but Divine will here be of any authority; and does revelation +prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination it was stated that +“there was not a single passage in the Bible which teaches directly that +God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;” and it is not known +to the writer, that among the different reviews of the sermon it has +even been attempted to show that the statement was incorrect. But if +a solitary passage could have been adduced, should we not have heard +of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any, is +indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony +is far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great +portion of believers in revelation think. +</p> + +<p> +Now, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of +thought thus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, +and honestly answer the following question—“Is there so much +evidence in favour of predestination, that I should do more violence +to my own reason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I +should by believing that this doctrine is compatible with free +agency and accountability?” Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so +felt the force of these difficulties, when the terms predestination +and free will have been understood in their common and obvious +sense, that they have attempted a variety of explanations of these +terms to do away, if possible, the apparent discrepancy. These +attempts have been the principal cause of those changes and +modifications in the Calvinistic system, alluded to in a former +number. The various explanations and definitions that have been +given to foreordination, have already been noticed. We have seen how +every effort failed of affording any relief to the system, until we +came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven divines. This +new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it only by +giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to nothing; +it stands forth still the “<i>absolute decree</i>,” fixed as fate, and +fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences. +Any <i>real</i> modification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a +substitution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of +Heaven, “He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not +shall be damned.” +</p> + +<p> +Not succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination +as would harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have +been made to define and explain <i>human liberty</i> and the <i>power of +choice</i>, so as to <i>bend</i> these into a coincidence with the +<i>inflexible decree</i>. This brings us back to the inquiry started +above: “What is this power of choice?” Now as this is a point more +metaphysical in its nature than the proposition embracing the +decrees, so there is more ground for laboured argument and refined +speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be particularly +noticed:—1. Because it is the most plausible of any other, so that +if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will; and 2. +Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and +perhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the +Calvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power +of choice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of +motives, and of deciding according to the strongest motive. The +strength and direction of volition are always in accordance with the +motive. And this relation between mind and motives is fixed by the +very constitution of our natures, so that it may be said there is a +constitutional necessity that the mind should be controlled by +motives. These motives are multitudinous and various.—All +conceptions and perceptions of the mind, from whatever cause, +productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions of love or +aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes of +these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind +there is such a connection, that the <i>former</i> not only excite, but +control the <i>latter</i>, in all its volitions. The nature of this +relation is of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all +we can say is, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is +the theory. The arguments by which it is defended are in substance +the following—experience and observation. We are conscious, it is +said, of acting from motives, and it is universally understood that +others also act from motives. It is on this principle that we govern +ourselves in our intercourse with men; by this we calculate with +moral certainty, in many instances, what will be the conduct of a +man in a given case; and, upon such calculations, we form most of +our maxims, and rules of conduct in social life: nay, it is said a +man that will act without a reason must be insane—that, on this +ground, whenever a man acts it is common to inquire what <i>induced</i> +him. What motive had he? That even children, at a very early age so +readily recognize this principle, that they are constantly inquiring +why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest arguments by +which this theory is sustained—arguments too strong it is supposed +to be overthrown. +</p> + +<p> +I object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in +offering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in +his senses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important +influence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in +order to oppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to +deny that the power of volition may have been waked up to action, in +the first instance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after +may, in all its volitions, be more or less under this influence. As +these are points which do not materially affect the question at +issue between us and the Calvinists, they may be left out of the +discussion for the present. The question is this—Has the mind a +self-determining power, by which it can spontaneously decide, +independent of the <i>control</i> of motives, or is the mind absolutely +controlled by motives? We maintain the former—our opponents the +latter. By establishing our position, we disprove theirs—by +disproving theirs we establish ours—and it is believed that theirs +can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at least +so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these extremely +difficult points. +</p> + +<p> +1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that +most of the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and +certainly prove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute +control of motives as that human minds are. It is argued, that to +maintain the doctrine of spontaneous volition, independent of the +<i>control</i> of motives, involves the absurdity, that “our volitions +are excited without any intelligent reasons whatever, and as the +effect, consequently, of nothing better than a mere brute or +senseless mechanism.” (<i>Views in Theology</i>, p. 163.)—Now if this +has any bearing on the question, it relates not to human mind and +human volition merely, but to <i>mind in general</i>, and must apply to +the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the +arguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists +are convinced of this—and hence this also is a part of their creed. +It was defended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor +Upham, in his System of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control +of motives, he says, “Our condition, in this respect, seems to be +essentially the same with that of the Supreme Being himself—he is +<i>inevitably</i> governed in all his doings, by what, in the great range +of events, is wisest and best.” (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine +Being is, according to this theory, and by the express showing of +the leading advocates of the theory, “<i>inevitably</i>” made a +subordinate to a superior. It is believed there is no avoiding this +conclusion; and what then? Why then the doctrine makes God a +necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is nearly, if not exactly, +the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate. The ancient heathens +supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent father of the gods and +men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach that there is a +certain fitness of things, certain constitutional relations, +existing independent of the Divine will, which God himself cannot +supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at once, +both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of his +wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain +fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by God himself, for +that would be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the +order of cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without +control of motive, if this law of motive influence did not exist +until the Divine volition willed it into being and if he could once +act independent of this control, he might so act for ever; and the +argument built on the absurdity of volition, without an intelligent +reason, is contradicted. But if that argument has any weight, it +fixes, in the order of cause and effect, a paramount influence +eternally antecedent to the exercise of the Divine mind, and +controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This is fate! This is +atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the Divine mind, +call that influence what you will, <i>fitness of things—fate—energy</i> +of nature—or necessary relation, and that moment you make God a +subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, and make +him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity? Might +we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under +the control of his own native influence he is led to create beings +susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to +the motives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are +“inevitably” led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, +that many Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives +is the very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the +<i>energy of nature!</i> The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and +his followers is the <i>energy of motives</i>, which exists in the nature +of things, anterior to the will of God. Can any one point out any +essential difference between the two systems? +</p> + +<p> +Such are the objections to <i>any arguments</i> in favour of the doctrine +that motives “inevitably” control the volitions of intelligent +beings <i>in general</i>, involving of course the highest intelligence. +But if any are disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to +intelligent volition in general, and choose to maintain it only in +respect to the volitions of some particular intelligent beings; then +they must give up all the strongest of their arguments. If God is +free from this <i>control</i>, they must acknowledge also, or give some +reason for their dissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and +sustain subordinate intelligences, having the same freedom from this +control; and if they acknowledge that there is nothing in the nature +of the case that renders this an impossibility, then they must show, +if they can, that though God <i>might</i> constitute beings otherwise, he +has <i>so constituted man</i> as to render him incapable of choice, +except <i>when</i> and <i>as</i> motives direct, by an inevitable influence. +But in attempting this they must meet other difficulties in their +course, which, it is believed, will greatly embarrass the system. +These difficulties, however, together with the arguments which I +design to advance directly in favour of the opposite view, must be +reserved for another number. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="IX" id="IX"> +NUMBER IX. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">Another</span> argument against the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is, +that it leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, +is this: When the mind is brought into connection with objects of +choice, it is <i>inevitably</i> led, by a law of its nature, to the +selection of one rather than of the other, unless there is a +<i>perfect equality</i> between them; in which case I suppose, of course, +the mind must remain in equilibrium; for if it moves only by the +influence of motives, and to the same degree and in the same +direction with motive influence, of course when it is equally +attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on this +ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two +particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, +being “inevitably” governed by motives in his decisions, he could +not determine where to place them, both having the same influence on +his mind for a location in the same place! The same writer +represents this motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, +but not the less effectual, and not the less voluntary! And to +illustrate it makes the following comparison:—“It is as if a needle, +touched with a loadstone, were sensible of and pleased with its +turning to the north, for it would believe that it turned itself +independent of any other cause, not perceiving the insensible +motions of the magnetic power.” This statement of Leibnitz, who had +paid great attention to this philosophical theory, is important in +several respects. It is, in the first place, an acknowledgment that +consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is also a concession +that the mind is <i>imposed upon</i>, in this matter, by the Creator. But +with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads to +materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one +of the most <i>philosophical</i>, if not one of the most <i>evangelical</i> of +the defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive +influence similar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only +in being accompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And +what says its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. +Edwards? He compares our volitions to the vibrations of a scale +beam, the different ends of which are respectively elevated or +depressed as the opposite weights may chance to vary. What is this +but teaching that motions of mind are governed by the same fixed +laws as those of matter, and that volitions are perfectly mechanical +states of mind? What the advocates of this doctrine charge on the +opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to their own system. +—<i>They</i>, not we, make choices the result of animal instinct, or +senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late exposition +of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and while he +contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for a +complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our +volitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference +between the laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do +we think. But we think that difference consists in the mind’s being +free from that control for which the professor contends; and we +believe when he contends for that control in the volitions of the +mind, he contends for that which, from the nature of the case, +entirely destroys the other part of his hypothesis, viz. that the +operations of the mind are free, and essentially different from +mechanical motion or the laws of attractive influence in the +material world. If the attractive power of motives over the mind is +any thing different from the law of gravitation or magnetic +attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I cannot +tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is <i>that very power</i> for +which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it +be said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is +consciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation +between motives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it +affects that relation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, +already alluded to, clearly illustrates. Look at that flowing +stream; it hastens on most freely, and by the law of its own nature +down the gentle declivities or more precipitous slopes of its +meandering channel. Suppose now that Omnipotence should impart +consciousness to the particles of the continuous current, it would +then wake up to perceive the action and feel the pleasure of its own +delightful motions. It would roll on still by the law of its own +nature, and would feel that it was free to move according to its own +<i>inclination</i> and voluntary tendency, for its will would of course +be in the direction of its <i>motive</i>, or in other phrase, its +<i>gravitating</i> influence. But could it turn its course and roll back +its waters to their fountains? It could if it was so <i>inclined</i>. But +its present <i>inclination</i> is toward the bottom of the valley or the +bosom of the ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between +its particles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls +on <i>with the utmost freedom</i>, though with the utter impossibility of +changing its own course, without an inversion of the gravitating +power. Let the hand of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, +and to! with the same freedom these very waters roll back again to +their original fountains! Thus it is with the human mind. It is +conscious of being free to move in the direction of its +inclinations, but require it to turn its course and move in the +current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it would be +utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the +motive influence.—“God is the determiner of perceptions, and +perceptions are the determiners of choices.” +</p> + +<p> +We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to +materialism, for it makes the analogy between mental and material +action so complete that it destroys all idea of <i>intellectual +power</i>. Philosophically speaking, there is no <i>power</i> in the laws of +nature. What we express by the <i>power</i> of attraction, or repulsion, +or decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine +agency. Does the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?—This +is not an energy inherent in nature; it is the God of nature acting +by a uniform law. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by +the power of nature. We, however, use the word <i>power</i> in an +accommodated sense in these cases, but always I think in connection +with that portion of matter that <i>appears</i> to act, and not <i>that</i> +which is acted upon. The magnet, we say, has power to attract iron, +because iron is attracted toward the magnet, and not the magnet +toward the iron. The antecedent, or that which takes the lead in the +motion, is more properly said to have the power, or is the efficient +cause. If then we allow of the use of the term power at all, to +express the relation of cause and effect, growing out of a +philosophical constitution of things, the term should be applied to +the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case before us, +mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive is the +cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have +<i>power</i> to act upon the mind, and the mind has a <i>susceptibility</i> of +being acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be +acted upon is no power, or “it is a <i>powerless power</i>,” which is +philosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the +mind has no <i>power</i> of <i>choice</i>, but has a <i>susceptibility</i> of being +drawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will +avail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a +difference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and +the susceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what +that difference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will +doubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive +theory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often +has to assume positions to keep itself in countenance, which +positions themselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the +New-Haven divines have done to support predestination, and to this +all Calvinists are driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, +or the power of choice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence +&c. We may be told in the case before us, that “when the mind is +acted upon it is then excited to action.” But how excited to action? +Is the action any stronger than the motive influence?—Is it carried +beyond this influence? or in a different direction? To answer any +<i>one</i> of these questions in the affirmative is to give up the +theory; but to answer them in the negative is to attribute to the +mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The <i>motives</i> are +(under God) the <i>agent</i>, the <i>mind</i> is the <i>passive object</i>, and the +<i>volition</i> is the <i>effect</i>. Can any one say then, on this theory, +that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in the first +place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical +necessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the +cause of its own volitions, but in these volitions it is the passive +subject of foreign influences. Now, so far as moral action is +concerned, how does this differ from materialism? It is true mental +action differs from material action in some associated circumstances; +it is accompanied by consciousness; but as consciousness of itself +cannot give accountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect +by being associated with such kind of mental action as results from +philosophical necessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; +and if not accountable, it is more than probable that he has no future +existence, and thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, +if not to atheism. +</p> + +<p> +That man is not <i>accountable</i> upon the principle we are opposing, +might have been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it +with the argument that this doctrine leads to materialism because +they imply each other. If materialism is true, we are not +accountable, and if we are not accountable, materialism is probably +true; and both are true, as I conceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine +of motives is true. +</p> + +<p> +It may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the +mind is not wholly passive, because we are conscious of putting +forth a mental energy and making a responsible volition; <i>that</i> I am +ready to grant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this +system be true; and on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this +system is false. I believe no one who pays attention to his own mind +will doubt of having this consciousness. But does that prove the +truth of this theory? It is one thing to be conscious of having this +energy of mind and responsible volition, and another to be conscious +that the theory in question is true; indeed this consciousness +destroys the theory. +</p> + +<p> +Should it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this +system to materialism, that different minds are not uniformly +influenced by the same motives, nor the same minds at different +times, and therefore, in this respect, it is evident that the laws +of mind and of matter differ; I reply, It is precisely so with +matter; for <i>that</i> attracts or repels according to its different +magnetic or electrical states; or should it be urged that mind +differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed of a peculiar +energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to review the +subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do without a +motive; and this it <i>must</i> do if the motive preponderate in that +direction, but not otherwise. +</p> + +<p> +To have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first +perception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act +otherwise than in coincidence with the motive influence of this +perception; or could it even suspend the volition this influence was +calculated to produce, until a second and more powerful motive was +introduced? If it could, then this doctrine is false; if it could +not, then the mind, like matter put in motion, must move on +invariably in the same direction, and with the same velocity of +thought for ever, or until a new motive should counteract the +influence of the former! This is emphatically the <i>vis inertia</i> of +matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to overthrow +the theory. +</p> + +<p> +Another objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the +notion of regeneration by <i>moral suasion</i> merely. There has been +much said of late, by the various writers in the old and the <i>new</i> +school, on this point. The new school are charged with holding that +the <i>truth alone</i>, without any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, +converts the sinner. This is considered by the old school Calvinists +as a fatal error. But why so? If motives <i>govern</i> the mind, with +absolute sway, all you <i>need</i> to convert a sinner, is to bring a +motive strong enough to induce him to choose God as his chief good, +and he is converted. Until you do this there is no conversion, it is +impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a sinner in any other way +than by motives, for choice of good we are told is conversion; there +is no choice without a motive, and the strongest motive governs +choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent power that +changes the sinner’s heart. This is the legitimate result of The +Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder +that Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; +here we have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of +“<i>natural ability</i>” unriddled. The human mind, by the constitution +of its nature, has the power of choosing according to the influence +of the strongest motive; and therefore, so far as this can be called +a power, it has the natural power to convert itself; and this is the +reason why “<i>make you a new heart</i>” is the burden of almost every +sermon and exhortation in modern preaching; all the sinner has to do +is to choose, in view of motives, and he is converted. And here, +too, is unravelled that other mystery which we have been so puzzled +to understand, viz. that although all possess the natural power to +convert themselves, yet no man ever did convert himself without the +special interposition of the Divine agency; for, observe, God keeps +the motives in his own hands; “God is the determiner of perceptions, +and perceptions are the determiners of <i>choices;</i>” that is, of +<i>conversions;</i> for to choose in a particular way, is to be +converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the sinner +convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he is +disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings +the motive and mind in contact, and <i>it is done</i>. Thus the sinner +has as much power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat +when he is hungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a +susceptibility of being operated upon, and controlled by the +strongest motive; and thus you see, also, that <i>God</i> converts the +sinner, because he supplies the motive that influences the choice; +and here, too, is seen the occasion for misquoting so frequently and +misapplying so universally, that passage in the Psalms: ”[My] people +shall be [made] willing in the day of [my] power.” That is, when God +applies the controlling motive to influence to a right choice, then +shall the sinner, by a law of his nature, <i>become willing to be +converted</i>. Such are the wonderful philosophical discoveries of +modern theology! This is the way for man to convert <i>himself</i> by +natural power, and this is the way for <i>God</i> to convert him, without +the aid of <i>super</i> natural power! Well might a divine of this cast, +whom I heard preach not long since, say of regeneration, “There is +nothing supernatural or miraculous in it.” For surely it is one of +the most natural things in the world, according to this theory, to +be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a motive, according +to the law of his natural constitution, and the man is converted. +</p> + +<p> +This <i>philosophy of Christian experience</i> has led modern orthodoxy +to the very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do +without a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the +philosopher in his study, and <i>work out</i> a religious experience, as +philosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; +we will show the <i>rationale</i> of the whole process, and demonstrate +it so clearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the +Gospel, and be induced to “<i>submit</i>” to God with scarcely a change +of theory. Hereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration +is a mystery—that in this work we cannot tell whence the +regenerating influence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes +through the philosophical channel of motive influence by which it +introduces a “governing purpose” into the mind, and the work is +done. Let no man hereafter say that his “faith stands not in the +wisdom of man, but in the power of God;” or “if any man would be +wise let him become a fool that he may be wise;” or “the wisdom of +man is foolishness with God;” for lo, the philosophy of regeneration +is at length explained! and the whole secret is found to consist in +the philosophical relation between motives and mind!! Can any one +wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in Germany, and in New-England, +Calvinism has finally resulted in Socinianism? And can any one help +trembling for a large portion of the orthodox Churches among us at +the present day? Grant that there is an increase of zeal, a greater +stir among the people, more revivals, &c; all these, with a good +foundation, would promise well for the Church; but we fear there is +a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to insinuate that the +work is always spurious and the professed conversions unsound. In +many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It might be +expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under the +paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and +<i>apparently</i> opposite theory should rouse many to action. “I had +been taught,” said a man not far from this, “that I must wait God’s +time to be converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more +recently I have been instructed that I might convert myself; I set +about the work, and I believe it is done!” Now this, which in the +relation borders upon the ludicrous, might have been a genuine +conversion. His new views might only have been sufficient to arouse +him to a co-operation with the Holy Spirit in his conversion; and +this may have been the case with thousands. In their practical +effects two opposite errors may, in individual cases, neutralize +each other.—But is either therefore safe? Will the general effect +be salutary? Let the history of the Church speak; and in view of +that record I confess I fear for our common Zion. But let not the +old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger upon the new +school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from that root +which they have cultivated with such assiduity and care. It grows +out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the +entire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions +upon the directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the +theory by which that influence is explained. +</p> + +<p> +Another argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the +consideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in +most of our calculations respecting human agents.—Though we may +judge something of what will be the conduct of men in given +circumstances, yet our calculations are very far from coming up to +mechanical exactness. Motives have some influence; but that +influence is very variable and uncertain. Why is this? It is not so +in matter; the same causes will produce the same effects to the end +of time. But we see many choose, without being able to give what, +<i>in their own estimation</i>, is a valid reason; they did thus because +they chose to do so; they act in defiance of the strongest motives, +drawn from whatever source. We see the greatest possible caprice in +the volitions of men; we see their minds starting aside, and putting +on the greatest possible and unaccountable mental states, in a way +and form that baffles all human calculation, and will for ever +baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to reduce to +uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to fix, in +an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his +labours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after +all, that living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we +call the human soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our +calculations. If this consideration should have no direct weight in +opposition to the theory I am opposing, it will at least show the +absurdity of defending this system by what is called the <i>known +regularity</i> and <i>uniform phenomena</i> of human volitions. To talk of +<i>uniformity</i> here, is to talk of, to say the least, what does not +exist. +</p> + +<p> +In the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in +favour of the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they +are not so much direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they +are attempts to show the absurdity of denying it. But when +statements of this kind are accompanied by no arguments, they need +only be met by a denial. “We are conscious,” say the theorists, “of +being controlled by motives:” I reply, we are not conscious of this +control, but we are conscious of the contrary fact. We know, indeed, +that motives have their influence; but we know also that the mind +has an influence over motives, and probably a greater influence than +motives have over <i>it</i>. The mind is conscious too of having an +influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing energy, a +spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is +predicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become +clearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have +an irresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as +certainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those +cases now, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the +result of the will. +</p> + +<p> +It is said again, that to deny this control “involves the absurdity +that our volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and +are the result of a brute or senseless mechanism.” It appears to me, +however, that a system which represents the will as mechanically +governed by motives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a +machine; while the theory that gives the mind a spontaneous power +and energy of its own, makes him what he is, <i>an intelligent, +responsible agent</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Since, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that +motives control the mind, are <i>assertions</i> and not <i>proofs;</i> and +since the theory itself leads to <i>fate</i>, to <i>atheism</i>, to +<i>materialism</i>, to <i>conversion</i> by mere <i>moral suasion</i>, to the +subversion of <i>human liberty</i> and <i>moral responsibility</i>, we must +believe the theory false. But against the theory of the spontaneous +power of the mind, none of these objections lie. It accords too with +consciousness; and is, in fact, the only theory on which the +responsibility of a moral agent can be predicated. The opposite view +claims our assent to two incongruous and apparently contradictory +propositions, between which there is not only no agreement, but an +evident repugnancy. This is the embarrassment in the one case, and +it is fatal to the theory. +</p> + +<p> +If there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of +mind or matter has not its <i>inexplicables?</i>—these embarrassments +are evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see +how two antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which +must be the more apparent as light increases, but it is from the +known limits to human knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the +theory we defend is, we cannot understand the <i>manner</i> in which this +faculty of the mind operates. But this is no more difficult than to +understand the manner in which other faculties of the mind operate. +To make this last statement clear, the reader is desired to +recollect that the mind is not divided into parts and members like +the body. When we talk of the <i>faculties</i> of the mind, we should +understand the power that the entire mind has to act in this or that +way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and of memory, +that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing, and of +calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me <i>how</i> +the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the +same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has +to ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be +said, the mind <i>remembers</i> and <i>wills</i> because this is its nature +—God <i>made it so</i>. When you analyze until you come to the original +elements, or when you trace back effects until you come to first +principles, you must stop.—And if you will not receive these first +principles because you cannot explain them farther, then indeed you +must turn universal skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell +<i>how</i> the mind acts in its volitions. And let it be understood that +the motive theory, with all its other embarrassments, has this one +in common with ours.—Can its advocates tell me <i>how</i> motives act +upon the mind? True philosophy is an analysis of constituent +principles, or of causes and effects, but the origin of these +relations and combinations is resolvable only into the will of the +Creator. <i>It is so, because God hath made it so</i>. And the nature of +these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However +impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond +which we <i>cannot</i> go; and our only duty in the case is, submission. +</p> + +<p> +I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther +explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of +philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important +concession to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that +in the material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as +<i>power;</i> that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the +Divine energy operating in a uniform way. “Let it be granted,” a +Calvinist might say, “that what we call the operation of second +causes is universally the supreme Intelligence operating in a +uniform way, and it is all we ask to defend our system. Then it will +be granted, that in each volition of the human mind the operation of +the will is nothing more than the energy of the Divine mind +operating in a uniform way.” +</p> + +<p> +To this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in +any proper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of +mind. If any one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not +power. In other words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot +act only as acted upon, there is no such thing as <i>power</i> in the +universe! and thus we again land in atheism. But if <i>mind</i> has +power, as all theists must grant, then the <i>human</i> mind may have +power. If any one can prove that it is impossible, in the nature of +things, for the Supreme Being to create and sustain subordinate +agents, with a spontaneous power of thought and moral action, to a +limited extent, in that case we must give up our theory. But it is +presumed no one can prove this, or will even attempt to prove it. We +say, God has created such agents, and that they act, in their +responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either directly +or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that God made +man “in his own image;” his <i>moral</i> image doubtless. Man, then, in +his own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, +the power of spontaneous moral action: this, <i>this only</i>, is the +ground of his responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man +entirely out of the control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. +It only puts him out of the control of such direct influences as +would destroy his moral liberty. Does the power of moral action, +independent of the magistracy and the laws, destroy all the control +of the civil government over malefactors? How much less in the other +case? God can prevent all the mischief that a vicious agent might +attempt, without throwing any restraint upon his responsible +volitions. It is thus that he “makes the wrath of man praise him, +and the remainder of wrath he restrains.” +</p> + +<p> +Let it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as +indeed it has been understood heretofore by those who have carefully +examined the subject, that when the Calvinists talk about “free +will,” and “human liberty,” they mean something <i>essentially +different</i> from what we mean by these terms; and, as it is believed, +something essentially different from the <i>popular</i> meaning of these +terms. They believe in human liberty, they say, and the power of +choice, and we are bound to believe them; but we are also bound not +to suffer ourselves to be deceived by terms. <i>Theirs</i> is a liberty +and power of a moral agent to will <i>as he does</i>, and <i>not +otherwise</i>. <i>Ours</i> is an unrestricted liberty, and a spontaneous +power in all responsible volitions, to <i>choose as we do</i>, or +<i>otherwise</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Thus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or +evil, according to its original constitution. How far this power has +been affected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is +a question that will claim attention in my next. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="X" id="X"> +NUMBER X. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +MORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS +OF GRACE. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">My</span> last number was an attempt to prove that God created man with a +spontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground +of his moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far +this power has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent +provisions of grace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these +points is very clearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of +religion in her book of Discipline. +</p> + +<p> +1. “Original sin standeth not in the <i>following</i> of Adam, (as the +Pelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of +every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, +whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his +own nature inclined to evil, and that continually.” +</p> + +<p> +2. “The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he +cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and +works, to faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to +do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of +God by Christ preventing us, (going before to assist us,) that we +may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good +will.” +</p> + +<p> +It is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by +sin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential +to mind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to +render man utterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient +and cooperating grace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an +external sense, may be weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so +the moral power of the mind or an inward sense may be weakened or +destroyed by moral disease. And it is in perfect accordance with +analogy, with universal language, and with the representations of +Scripture, to consider the mind as susceptible, in its essential +nature, of this moral deterioration. If any one should say he cannot +understand what this moral defect is, I would answer by asking him +if he can tell me what the essence of mind is? And if he chooses to +object to this kind of depravity, because he cannot understand it, +in its essence, he should turn materialist at once; and then, as he +will find equal difficulty to tell what the essence of matter is, +and in what its weakness and disorder essentially consist, he must +turn universal skeptic.—The simple statement is, <i>the soul has +become essentially disordered by sin;</i> and as no one can prove the +assertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I +think it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of +fallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is +such as to mar man’s free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which +all voluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. +But voluntary preference does not necessarily imply <i>such a free +agency</i> as involves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to +act in one direction, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral +equilibrium as to be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in +an opposite direction, and therefore not, in the full and +responsible sense, a free agent. It is not enough, therefore, to +say, “Free agency (of a responsible kind) consists in the possession +of understanding, conscience, and will;” (see Christian Spectator +for September, 1830;) unless by <i>will</i> is meant the spontaneous +power already alluded to. The understanding may be darkened, the +conscience may be seared or polluted, the will, that is, the power +of willing, may, to all good purposes, be inthralled; and this is +what we affirm to be the true state and condition of unaided human +nature. +</p> + +<p> +It will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does +not recognize the distinction of <i>natural</i> and <i>moral</i> ability. The +fact is, man’s inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, +because it is constitutional; and it is moral, because it relates to +the mind. To say a fallen man has natural power to make a right +choice, because he has the faculties of his mind entire, is the same +as to say that a paralytic man has the natural power to walk, +because he has his limbs entire. It appears to me that the whole of +this distinction, and the reasoning from it, proceed on the ground +of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind and an unwarranted +definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen man, <i>on the +whole</i>, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We say +without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the +responsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace. +</p> + +<p> +This view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily +acknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has +been held by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it +can be proved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine +has been generally received in the Church, entitles it to respect +and to a careful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those +who have only read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it +may be a matter of surprise to learn that not only the more ancient +fathers, but even St. Austin himself, the introducer of +predestination into the Church, and Calvin, and the synod of Dort, +were all supporters of sentiments substantially the same as are here +vindicated—I say, those who have only read modern Calvinistic +authors will be surprised to learn this, because these authors treat +this doctrine as though it were so unreasonable and absurd as +scarcely to be tolerated in the view of common sense. Though it may +have an influence with some, in a paucity of better reasons, to +scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it absurd, yet the +candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a new, without +good reason. +</p> + +<p> +I had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the +fathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their +views on this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the +statements here made should be denied. Let therefore one or two +quotations from Calvin and from the synod of Dort, both of which I +think Calvinists will acknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, +suffice. Calvin denies all power to man, in his apostasy, to choose +good, and says that, “surrounded on every side with the most +miserable necessity, he (man) should nevertheless be instructed to +aspire to the good of which he is destitute, and to <i>the liberty of +which he is deprived</i>.” The synod of Dort decided thus:—“We believe +that God—formed man after his own image, &c, <i>capable in all things +to will</i> agreeably to the will of God.” They then speak of the fall, +and say, “We reject all that is repugnant to this concerning the +free will of man, since man is but a <i>slave to sin</i>, and has nothing +of himself, unless it is given him from heaven.” And speaking of the +change by grace, they add, “The will thus renewed is not only +actuated and influenced by God, but <i>in consequence of this +influence becomes itself active</i>.” And to show that Calvin did not +consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free +will, he says, “Man <i>has not an equally free election of good and +evil</i>, and can only be said to have free will, because he does evil +voluntarily, and not by constraint;” and this he ironically calls +“egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but +yet is such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the +fettors of sin.” These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that +the early Calvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose +good by apostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they +generally believed that whenever this grace was imparted to an +extent to restore to the mind the power of choosing good, it was +regenerating grace. And herein they differ from the Arminians, who +believe that grace may and does restore the power to choose good +before regeneration. This, however, does not affect the point now +under examination, but involves a collateral question, which will be +examined in its proper place. One thought more, and I pass to the +arguments on the main questions in the articles quoted above. These +articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of the articles of the +Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the same as the +10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that article, +commencing, “Wherefore, &c,” is taken substantially from St. Austin +himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine we +defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from +Beza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient +fathers. Nay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the +synod of Dort, that this was “the judgment of all antiquity.” +</p> + +<p> +Let us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, +as is believed, since only this view of man’s condition will accord +with the Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach +that man is constitutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor +have come over his moral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, +and to death, how can it be otherwise than that this should affect +his power to choose good? Had man any too much moral power in the +first instance to constitute him an accountable moral agent? And if +he had not, has he enough now that his mind has become darkened, his +judgment perverted, and his moral powers corrupted and weakened? Or +will it be denied that the moral energies of his nature have been +impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected? Let any one spend +a thought on this question, and decide, if he can, what definite +vicious effect can be produced on man’s moral nature which will not +necessarily imply a weakening and an embarrassment of his original +power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is +somewhat weakened, but he has enough left to constitute him free to +choose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than +enough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man’s +moral nature was not <i>wholly</i> vitiated. It is said, I know, that all +the embarrassment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination +to moral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and +constitutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, +and is therefore the very thing we mean—it is this very thraldom of +the mind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked +whether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom +of the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most +unhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or +derived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is +not morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive +foreign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a +contrary choice. +</p> + +<p> +It follows then, I think, that we must either give up constitutional +depravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice +without Divine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the +precise point on which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New +Divinity theory of depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any +depravity of man’s moral constitution would either imply the +necessity of supernatural aid in order to a right choice, or else +free man from responsibility, Dr. Taylor and his associates have +resolved all depravity into <i>choice</i> or <i>voluntary preference</i>. They +deny that there is any thing in the nature of man, antecedently to +his act of willing, that possesses a moral character. Their idea is +perfectly consistent with the notion of natural ability; and that +the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this idea is +evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after +consistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, +that all who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow +them. The doctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than +a name, appears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, +and should never be separated from its counterpart—the doctrine of +self conversion and the natural perfectability of the human +character. But this clearly implies that there is no serious +derangement or radical viciousness of the moral man. Here, then, is +another instance in which Calvinists in general revolt at the +legitimate results of their own system. +</p> + +<p> +But while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an +important objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, +as it is believed, however little they may have designed it, set +themselves in fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of +depravity and salvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for +the introduction of numerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, +they will not own that they have gone very far from the old system. +They think the doctrine of natural depravity is asserted when they +say, “nature is <i>such</i> that he will sin, and only sin, in all the +appropriate circumstances of his being.” (See Dr. Taylor’s Sermon.) +But what this “nature” is, we are at a loss to determine; as also +what the “<i>such</i>” is that is predicated of this nature; nor has Dr. +T. told us how he knows that all men will sin and only sin, when in +fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in what other than “the +appropriate circumstances of their being” those are who become +regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox, and +thus to assimilate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged +one inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent, +must come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture +doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they +must go back to their old ground, and endure the manifest +inconsistency they are now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to +me better than either, come on to the Arminian ground, which shuns +all these difficulties, while it maintains constitutional depravity +and salvation by grace from the foundation to the top stone, +including of course a gracious ability to choose life and gain +heaven. +</p> + +<p> +2. Another argument in favour of the <i>necessity</i> of Divine grace, in +order to a right choice, is the fact, that God actually gives grace +to those who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of +this fact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in +general terms. Jesus Christ “is the true light that lighteth every +man that cometh into the world.” “The grace of God that bringeth +salvation hath appeared unto all men.” They speak in special terms +of the unregenerate—that they <i>grieve</i>, <i>resist</i>, and <i>quench</i> the +<i>Spirit</i> of <i>grace</i>, which certainly they could not do if they had +it not. But if they have the operations of the Spirit, what are +these operations? What is the Spirit doing to the inner man? Will it +be said he is bringing motives to bear upon the mind? But what +motives other than those found in the Gospel? These the sinner has +without the Spirit. If these motives can convert sinners, any of us +can convert our neighbours. “But,” it is said, “the Spirit makes the +heart <i>feel</i> these motives.” Aye, truly he does, and that not by +operating upon the motives, but upon the <i>heart</i>, and this is the +very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously +arouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to <i>feel</i>, and +excites it to <i>act</i>, in the great work of salvation. +</p> + +<p> +Since, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those +who are finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, +let me seriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On +the Calvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for +salvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without +grace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse +of that ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So +say the Calvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the +reprobates are justly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this +grace given? If we may establish a general principle by an induction +of particulars; if we may judge of the design of the God of +providence or grace, by noticing, in any given case, the uniform +results, then we can easily determine this point. <i>God gives grace +to the reprobates that their condemnation may be the more +aggravated</i>. The argument stands thus: God gives grace to the +reprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that +salvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved +without it; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this +it does not effect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable +effect of which is to increase their condemnation. The only +consistent inference; therefore is, that he gives grace to the +reprobates that they may have a more aggravated condemnation. Here, +then, we trace the Calvinistic theory to one of these <i>logical +consequences</i> charged upon it in the sermon, and which has been so +strenuously denied by the reviewers—a consequence which, revolting +as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon it still, unless its +advocates can show why grace is given to the reprobates when they +have all necessary ability to repent and believe without it. +</p> + +<p> +3. On the ground of this doctrine, also, there would be some +difficulty in accounting for the necessity of giving grace, in all +cases, even to the elect. Why may not some of these repent without +grace? Nay, why may not some of the reprobates, in the plenitude of +their natural ability, repent and be converted, in despite of the +decree of reprobation? Did God foresee that they would not, and on +that foresight predicate his decree of reprobation? But that would +be a <i>conditional</i> reprobation, and would therefore imply its +counterpart—a conditional election. This no class of Calvinists +will admit. How happens it, then, that some of these reprobates do +not get converted, since they not only have natural powers enough to +make a right choice but have some grace beside? Is it because God +has fixed the barrier in something else, by which this ability, +grace, and all are rendered nugatory? But this would render their +condemnation unjust, Calvinists themselves being judges. They tell +us that the only just ground of condemnation is, that <i>the sinner +will not come to Christ</i>. Here, then, is the most extraordinary +thing that angels or men ever knew; for almost six thousand years +there has been upon our earth a succession of generations of +sinners, and its the present generation of them there are eight +hundred millions. All of these, throughout all their generations, +have had no other obstruction to salvation but what exists in their +own will, and each and all have had by nature all needful ability in +the will to a right choice, and have had a measure of grace +super-added, and yet not a reprobate among them all has ever made a +right choice; and not one of the elect ever did or ever will make +such a choice until God, by an omnipotent act, “makes his elect +willing in the day of his power!!” This is a miracle to which all +the other miracles in the world are as nothing—a miracle which +Omnipotence alone can accomplish by a Divine constitution and an +all-controlling energy. Thus this doctrine destroys itself. It +assumes positions, with respect to free will, that cannot be +maintained, only on the supposition of an <i>efficient</i> superior +agency to direct the action of that <i>free will</i>, in a course of +sinful volition, in hundreds of millions of cases, without a single +variation, save where that variation is the result of the same +superior Power acting in the opposite direction. +</p> + +<p> +4. That the sinner receives aid by Divine grace to enable him to +repent; and that he could not repent, without this, appears evident +from the Scriptural representation of the ground of man’s +responsibility. “If I had not come,” says the Saviour, “ye had not +had sin.” “This is the condemnation, that light has come into the +world, and men loved darkness rather than light.” “He that believeth +not is condemned already, <i>because</i> he hath not believed in the only +begotten Son of God.” “<i>Because</i> I have called, and ye have refused, +&c, I also will laugh at your calamity.” These and many other +passages seem to imply that the sinner is rejected on the ground of +his neglecting offered grace. But if this is the ground of his +condemnation, it is not for the abuse of natural power. I see no way +for a plausible attempt even to get rid of this argument, unless it +should be attempted to raise a question respecting the nature of +this grace. It may be said that “these passages only relate to +gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the Scriptures of truth, +&c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious influence upon the +mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe, repent, &c, but +something must be presented to believe in; and some provision must +be made to make repentance available.” In reply I would say, First, +Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin without +grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in the +very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the +subject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because +none can be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, +leaving this for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the +above, that the Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined +to <i>external provisions</i>, but on the contrary speak of it as +operating upon and influencing the mind, and that, too, in the very +way for which we contend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, +promiscuously selected, and see how clearly they sustain our +position. In the first place, to give the argument full force, let +us notice the Scripture account of man’s natural condition. He is +“in darkness,” “asleep,” “dead,” “without strength,” “sick,” “deaf,” +“blind,” “lame,” “bound,” “helpless;” and all this in consequence of +sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his sinful character and +condition. If such language does not describe <i>utter inability</i> of +the sinner to serve God, then no language can do it. Now let us see +what grace does. Its very design is to “awake the sleeper;” to +unstop deaf ears, and “open blind eyes;” to “lighten every man;” to +“strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man.” “Christ +strengthens” the sinner, that he may “do all things.” It is on the +ground that “God worketh in him to will and to do,” that man is +exhorted to “work out his salvation with fear and trembling.” “Thou +strengthenedst me with strength <i>in my soul</i>.” But leaving farther +quotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the +stress which the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All +the efficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the +apostle declares that he “preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost +sent down from heaven;” that it “came, not in word, but in <i>power</i>.” +Indeed, “the letter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth +life.” Hence the frequent cautions not to “grieve” or “quench the +Spirit.” Now what, I ask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there +any plausibility in the idea, that by such expressions nothing is +meant but the general provisions of grace in the Gospel economy? +That no direct, gracious influence of the Spirit upon the heart is +intended? In fact, the new idea of conversion by motives and moral +suasion seems to be a device to meet this very difficulty. The old +Calvinists charge the advocates of the New Divinity with holding +that all the Spirit does in operating upon the heart, is not by +operating upon it directly, but indirectly <i>through the truth</i>: +which has given rise to the saying, “If I were as eloquent as the +Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he.” And if they do +hold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate +consequence of the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless +arrive at it thus:—According to the Scriptures, man’s responsibility +turns on his rejecting or improving the grace of God. That grace +cannot be an internal gracious influence upon man’s moral nature, +because that would conflict with the notion of responsibility, on the +ground of natural power. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing +more than that a gracious atonement is provided, and a record of +Divine truth made, and now, in the use of his natural power, the +sinner is required to judge of and embrace this truth, which if he +does, he in this sense improves the grace of God, and is converted; +but if he does it not, he grieves the Spirit, and is condemned. Thus +in the one case, if he is converted, it is in the use of his natural +power, “choosing in the view of motives;” and in the other case, if +he is not converted, it is in the use of his natural power, refusing +in view of motives. Is not this correct reasoning? And ought not the +New-Haven divines to be commended for carrying out the system to its +legitimate results? And ought not all to follow them in this, who hold +to natural ability? And yet no wonder that they hesitate here, for +cold and spiritless indeed must be that system of religious experience +that resolves the conversion of the soul into a mere natural operation +of choosing, through the influence of moral suasion. +</p> + +<p> +Leaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal +embarrassments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here +vindicated corresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with +itself; for it makes man’s responsibility turn upon grace improved +or misimproved, and it makes that grace an internal quickening +influence, and a strengthening energy upon the heart; and these +different features of the theory, when placed together, all seem at +once to be compatible with each other. +</p> + +<p> +5. Express passages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained. +</p> + +<p> +I need not now repeat the passages already referred to, in which the +state of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any +human language can show it, that man is naturally “without +strength.” But my object is to call the attention of the reader to +some very direct and express passages, to show that it is grace, and +grace alone, that enables the soul to do the will of God. “I can do +all things,” saith the apostle, “through Christ who strengtheneth +me.” Query: would not the apostle have thought it presumption to +have said, I can do all things without strength from Christ? Has he +ever intimated such a sentiment in all his writings? Does he not +rather say, “We are not sufficient of ourselves <i>to think any thing +as of ourselves</i>, but our <i>sufficiency is of God?</i>” This is the +apostle’s general language, and it is in perfect accordance with the +declaration of his Master, “Without me ye can do nothing.” “As the +branch <i>cannot</i> bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, +<i>no more can ye</i>, except ye abide in me.” “No man <i>can come</i> to me, +except the Father draw him.” “Likewise the Spirit Helpeth our +infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought.” “My +grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in +weakness.” “The God of all grace—stablish, strengthen, settle you.” +“For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would +grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened +with <i>might</i>, by his <i>Spirit</i>, in the <i>inner</i> man,” “according to +the power that worketh <i>in us</i>.” It is useless to quote farther. If +these passages do not show that our strength to do good is of grace, +then it appears to me the Holy Spirit must fail of an <i>ability</i> to +communicate that idea through human language. Will it be said that +some of these passages refer to the regenerate, and therefore are +not in point to meet the case of the unregenerate? I would ask, in +reply, whether regenerating grace takes away our natural ability? +Certainly if the regenerate can neither think nor do any thing +acceptable without grace, much more do the unregenerate need this +grace to enable them to make a right choice. And yet in the face of +these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly told that man has +natural power to make himself a new heart! +</p> + +<p> +To the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof +of our doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been +extended so far already, the universal experience of all Christians. +This appears, from their language, to be the experience of Bible +saints, under both the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what +Christian now living, but feels now, and felt when he first embraced +the Saviour, that the strength to do this was from God—directly +from God, through grace. Hear his prayers—he pleads his weakness +—he asks <i>for strength</i>. And what does he mean by that prayer? Does +he ask for some external accommodation and aid? No; he wants +strength, <i>by the Spirit, in the inner man</i>. And this is the prayer +of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion of natural +ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very +advocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of +dependence, are often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we +defend. A most striking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood’s +pamphlet (page 97) in opposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:—“The +common theory (of Calvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low +thoughts of ourselves, especially in a moral view; and to feel that +we are not of ourselves <i>sufficient for any thing spiritually good</i>, +and that, for whatever holiness we now possess, or may hereafter +attain, we are dependent on Divine grace.” What stronger gracious +ability do Arminians hold to, than this? “Not of ourselves +sufficient for any thing spiritually good.” And is this the common +theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other points, is +divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think, were +it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his +brothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this +moment. But he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he “does not +differ at all from the generality of ministers, in New-England, +respecting the natural powers and faculties of man, as a moral and +accountable being.” But he fears the “unqualified language” which +Dr. T. “employs respecting the natural state, the free will, and the +power of man.” On reading this last passage, I confess I am at a +loss to know what to say or believe of this Calvinistic opinion of +natural power. Dr. Taylor’s “unqualified language” respecting “the +power of man,” I take to be a frank statement of Dr. Wood’s opinion, +and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has natural power +<i>sufficient</i> to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say this? He +says he does not differ from “the generality;” and it is notorious +that this is the doctrine of the generality of those ministers. Dr. +Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood’s coadjutors in opposing Dr. +Taylor, says, in a sermon<sup><a href="#n5" id="f5" title="see footnote" name="f5">[5]</a></sup> on free salvation, “There is no +reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty, +or which impairs the sinner’s <i>natural power</i>. Every man is a free +moral agent. Life and death are set before him, and he is <i>capable</i> +of choosing between them.” What language can be more “unqualified” +than this? It teaches us that man has <i>natural power</i>, which renders +him <i>capable</i> to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and +“those who believe with him,” carry out this doctrine into its +legitimate and practical bearings. On the ground of this power, they +exhort sinners “to make themselves new hearts.” One of them, as +reported to me by a preacher, went so far as to say, in a public +address, that sinners ought to be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy +Spirit to convert them, since they had power to convert themselves. +And what objection can any, who hold to natural power to choose +life, urge against this? If, as Dr. Tyler teaches, in his +“Examination of Dr. Taylor’s Theological Views,” a right choice +implies regeneration; and if every man is <i>naturally capable</i> of a +right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the “generality” +of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see not how any +sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have natural +power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically +pleading their own weakness, before a <i>throne of grace</i>, and asking +for mercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought +to be crimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away +from their impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the <i>resources of +nature</i>, and regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen +believe it impossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their +whole theory together, this power is no power, and community, up to +this hour, has been deluded by unmeaning words—words which only +serve to conceal the deformity of a theological system, which, when +thoroughly examined, is found after all, to teach that the poor +reprobate has no adequate power by nature, and receives no available +aid from grace to choose salvation, and must therefore, from the +imperious necessity of his nature and condition, go down to +interminable death. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="XI" id="XI"> +NUMBER XI. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">It</span> is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of +the subject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, +morals, or religion, against which some apparently plausible +objection may not be urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, +Are those objections fatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in +the proposed system greater than in some other view of the subject? +For reasonable men will refuse to be driven into the vortex of +skepticism merely because there are some difficulties and +obscurities in all subjects of faith, which the limitations to human +vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form an enlightened +comparative view in the case before us, it will be important that we +glance at the different theories on the subject of depravity and the +ground of responsibility. +</p> + +<p> +1. One form in which this subject has been held is, “That the sin of +Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and +depravity that it is impossible for his descendants to make any +voluntary efforts toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to +correct and improve their moral and religious character, and that +faith and all the Christian graces are communicated by the sole and +irresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour +or concurrence on the part of man.” This of course makes the elect +entirely passive in their conversion; and consigns the reprobate to +destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is maintained, is imputed +to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at best gives him over to +unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for possessing a +nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and from +which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of this +system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the +standard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need +not here allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so +heavily upon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their +ingenuity and invention at defence, and have driven them finally +into all those changes and modifications so frequently alluded to in +this controversy. I will here say in advance that, in my opinion, +this, after all, is the strongest position Calvinism can assume. The +moment its advocates depart from this, they must either, to be +consistent with themselves, verge over into the other extreme of +Pelagianism, or strike off into the “golden mean” of Arminianism. +This may be more clearly seen in the sequel. +</p> + +<p> +2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety +of shades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, +however, relate to some minor modifications of the relation of the +human family to Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, +and greater exposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the +essential part of the theory, which is, that human nature is free +from sin or guilt until it becomes guilty by <i>intelligent, voluntary +exercise</i>. The objections to this theory are, among others, as +follows. It is in direct opposition to the Scripture doctrine of +native depravity—a doctrine which has been often and ably treated +of and defended by Calvinistic and, Arminian divines—a doctrine +which is embodied in a palpable form in every man’s own experience +—a doctrine which not only flashes upon the mind of the student in +every page of the history of man, but also upon the mind of the +unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the infant that +struggles in her arms. +</p> + +<p> +Another objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, +previous to intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. +Hence, should they die at this age, as multitudes doubtless do, they +would not be fit subjects either for the rewards of heaven or the +pains of hell. At the Judgment, as they will not be subjects of +praise or blame, they will neither be on the right hand nor the +left, and of course will neither be sentenced to “everlasting +punishment,” nor welcomed “into life eternal.” If, however, they by +any means go into a state of punishment, their sufferings will be +unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will not be a +salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration, nor +will their song be, “Unto Him that hath loved us,” &c. This is not +only contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct +opposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: “Therefore, as +by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; +so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men +unto justification of life.” It also leaves infants involved in the +natural evils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any +assignable cause, but also in direct opposition to the cause +assigned by the apostle—“And so death passed upon all men, for that +all have sinned.” +</p> + +<p> +A third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture +doctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, +in substance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by +the efficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine +makes sin consist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist +wholly in exercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a +mere change of volition; and this volition is not the result of a +preceding change of moral constitution, but it is, like any other +volition, produced by the native power of the mind, under the +exciting influence of motives. The Holy Spirit, therefore, may well +be dispensed with in this work. The supernatural character of the +change must be given up, and the whole work is resolvable into a +natural process. It is here worthy of remark that this is not mere +speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final result of this +theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been defended. +And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural efficacy +of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the +Redeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the +system, and somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other +parts, and are therefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, +as may be seen by the history of the Church, has been the practical +result wherever Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. +It has degenerated into Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one +word, that this doctrine of Pelagianism does, in its teachings, +tendencies, and practical results, supplant and overthrow all the +essential principles of the Gospel system. +</p> + +<p> +3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and +human responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the +preceding number. This system is presented, in part, in the very +language in which the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as +well as “Calvinists, say that the sin of Adam introduced into his +nature such a radical impotence and depravity that it is impossible +for his descendants [who, it is believed, are propagated in the +moral likeness of their fallen ancestor] to make any voluntary +efforts [unassisted by grace] toward piety and virtue, or in any +respect to correct and improve their moral and religious character.” +Thus far we go together; but this is a point of divergency, from +which we take very different directions. Instead of going on to say +“that the Christian graces are communicated by the irresistible +operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence +on the part of man,” we say that “the saving grace of God hath +appeared unto all Men;” and that this grace so enlightens, +strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to +make that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the +soul’s salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the +man, when he has this good will, is enabled “to work out his +salvation” unto the end. It is in this latter part of the statement +that we are at issue with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on +both parts with the Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, +the advocates of the New Divinity in our country. +</p> + +<p> +To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that +we believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and +in behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is +not imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he +makes the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the +Gospel; and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying +infant is entitled to all the promised blessings of the new +covenant, and will, of course, have wrought in him all that meetness +necessary to qualify him for the gracious rewards of the saints in +glory. Thus, according to this system, the dying infant, as well as +the dying adult believer, is sanctified by the blood of the +covenant, and saved by grace. +</p> + +<p> +These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer +after truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only +alternatives of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, +the doctrine of <i>natural ability</i> has been proposed as another +alternative, holding an intermediate place between the doctrines of +native impotency as first stated and of Pelagianism. And it may +therefore appear to some, that I ought, in my enumeration, to have +given this as a separate and distinct theory. My reason, however, +for not doing this is, that there cannot, in my opinion, be such a +resting place between the doctrines of derived constitutional +depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any thing more +than a name—that is, in fact, an <i>ability</i>, destroys the idea of +constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more than +a name—that is, in fact, <i>constitutional depravity</i>, destroys the +idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the +fact that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic +Churches who have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, +have gone over and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have +seen, abjures the doctrine of constitutional depravity. The New +-Haven divines are certainly gentlemen of talents and of close +thought; and they have been following up this doctrine for a number +of years, and it has landed them upon the logical conclusion that +<i>there is no such depravity</i>. But we need not trust to the +conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show that the notions +of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and sin +necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists +left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the +dogma of a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there +can be no guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of +his nature is unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can +have no guilt, and by consequence <i>no sin</i>, until he is capable of +an intelligent moral choice. Again: this same theory tells us that +where there is no natural ability there is no moral character. But +as the infant cannot be reasonably supposed to have ability to put +forth an intelligent holy volition, he can have no moral character, +and of course no sin. +</p> + +<p> +The only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the assumed +premises is, to maintain that “the infant, from his birth, is a +voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful.” +And would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort +to such an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? <i>And yet it is +even so</i>. A paper lately published under the sanction of the New +Divinity, purporting to be an inquiry into “what is the real +difference between the New-Haven divines and those who differ from +them,” says, “The ground has of late been taken (if we understand +the discussions on this subject) that mankind are literally <i>at +birth</i> voluntary and accountable agents, and actual sinners against +God; that the new-born infant is a responsible subject of God’s +moral government, and actually sins with a knowledge of his duty, +and in the same sense with the adult sinner violates moral +obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to change its +moral character.” And as a proof that this is the ground now +assumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, +who has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to +the New-Haven divines, in which he says, “A moral being, for aught +we know, may commence his existence in an <i>active</i>, <i>voluntary</i> +state of the will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and +thus, in fact, to a certain extent sinful, and that without +supposing that <i>depravity is seated in any thing but the will</i>.” +This same writer also states that Dr. Spring, in a treatise on +“native depravity,” a work which I have not at hand, has advanced +and defended the sentiment of “<i>actual</i> sin from birth.” And has it +indeed come to this at last, that this natural ability, for which +Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing more than the +power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the one hand, +or “make himself a new heart” on the other! Alas for Calvinism! To +what miserable shifts—yes, I must call them <i>miserable</i> shifts—is +this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself in +accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent, +learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains +me in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite +theory, is however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of +the greatest and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of +such a theory, and while we feel the necessity of taking heed to +ourselves, lest we also fall by the same example of prejudice, we +cannot suffer our common sense to be imposed upon by such gross +absurdities. In this, however, we see that, as before, in trying to +maintain their <i>ability</i>, they gave up their <i>depravity</i>: so here, +in trying to establish their <i>depravity</i>, they destroy their +<i>ability</i>. Nay, what is still worse for this theory, this very +attempt to prove that infants are “<i>actual</i> sinners from their +birth,” is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. +Why do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, +in order to show that men are <i>guilty</i> from their birth, which is an +acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only +by proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently +it is a concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of +their guilt. This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to +save itself, has gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can +the reader see the difference between this doctrine of actual sin +from the birth, viewed in connection with its origin and bearings, +and the New Divinity, which makes sin consist exclusively in moral +exercise? Let these old-side Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of +controversy which they have drawn against their brethren, and join +in with them to defend, if possible, the Pelagian doctrine which, it +would seem, after all, they hold in common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. +Harvey been so active in getting up an opposition theological school +in Connecticut to teach that the infant “commences his existence in +an <i>active voluntary</i> state of the will, and is thus (<i>on this +account</i>) to a certain extent sinful?” This is clearly a work of +supererogation—a useless expenditure of money and of talents. The +New-Haven Theological School is capable—alas! too capable of +carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will +cease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. +Harvey fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their “<i>moral +exercise</i>” early enough to make it <i>natural depravity?</i> They have +given assurances that they will not be particular on that point. +Only allow that there is no sin previous to the first intelligent +act of choice—previous to the corresponding power to make +themselves new hearts, and they will be satisfied. They have said +already that “this capableness of sinning, if it is not at the exact +moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it is not,] commences +so early in their existence, that it is proper, for all the great +purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from the +beginning of their days.” Hence we see nothing between these +gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be +important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral +suasion should not put the commencement of these “moral exercises” +so far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; +otherwise they may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the +one they are trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very +distinctly shown, I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists +themselves, and from the nature of the case, that there can be no +such intermediate theory as they contend for, between the native +impotency of old Calvinism and Pelagianism. But as this is an +important point, I will illustrate it farther by an examination of +the <i>seat</i> of this Calvinistic depravity. It is seen, by the +quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers “depravity as +seated in nothing but the will.” And this is avowedly the sentiment +of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural ability. It +is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, “You can if you +will;” “There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse +will.” It is on this ground, also, that they tell us “a right choice +is conversion.” They do not say a right choice is a <i>condition</i> or a +fruit of the new birth; but <i>it is itself the new birth</i>. But to +understand this subject clearly, it is important to know what they +mean by the will. It appears to me they use this term with great +indefiniteness, if not latitude of meaning. If they mean by this +what I understand to be the legitimate meaning of the term “the +mental power or susceptibility of putting forth volitions;” then to +say that all depravity is seated in the will, is to be guilty of the +gross absurdity of teaching that the affections have not a moral +character. If by the will, however, they mean, as they frequently +seem to mean, the affections themselves going out in desire after +some proposed good, then indeed they establish the New-Haven theory, +that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by placing all +depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of +willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case, +exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm +the doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something +different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly +confess I know not what they mean. Should they however, change their +ground, and place the seat of this depravity in the constitution of +man’s moral nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, +then and in that case they throw the subject back on the old ground +of natural impotency; for to talk of a natural power to change the +moral constitution, as it existed prior to choice, and which +constitution must, by the law of its nature, exercise a controlling +influence over the mind, is the same as to talk of a natural power +to alter one’s own nature, or to unmake and remake himself. In this +case we must have supernatural aid, or we must remain as we are. +</p> + +<p> +We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject +until we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is +the precise meaning that we are to attach to the terms, <i>natural</i> +and <i>moral ability</i>, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I +have examined such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I +have been particular to consult <i>recent</i> authors, that I might not +be accused of charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; +and <i>various</i> authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that +appertain to the different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the +author of “Views in Theology;” Dr. Griffin, in a late work on +“Divine Efficiency;” Rev. Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; +and a doctrinal tract, entitled, “Man a Free Agent without the Aid +of Divine Grace,” written, it is presumed, by one of the divines of +the New-Haven school have been consulted. There is among them all a +remarkable uniformity on this point. If I understand them, the +substance of what they say is, “Natural power consists in the +possession of understanding, conscience, and will; and moral power +is the <i>exercise</i> of these faculties.” Mr. Thatcher says this in so +many words.—The tract alluded to gives this definition of natural +power. Dr. Griffin says “their [sinners’] faculties constitute a +natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if +their hearts are well disposed.” It certainly must appear, at the +first glance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, +that either the <i>possession</i> of faculties, or the <i>exercise</i> of +faculties, should be called <i>power</i>. The idea of <i>power</i> is +supposed, by the best philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from +the fact that it is a simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we +have it analyzed in two different forms. Faculties are power—the +exercise of faculties is power. Now, although we cannot define +power, every one doubtless has a clear conception of it; and I +humbly conceive that the common sense of every man will decide that +neither of the above definitions embraces the true idea of power. +The <i>exercise</i> of faculties <i>implies</i> power, it is granted; but +every one must see that it is not power itself. And although the +<i>faculties</i> of the mind are sometimes called the <i>powers</i> of the +mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the limbs +or muscles are called the <i>powers</i> of the body, yet it requires very +little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of +the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to +some of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers +or faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that +moral strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of +these faculties does not even <i>imply</i> power adequate to a holy +choice; much less are they <i>power itself</i>. I marvel therefore at +these definitions of moral and natural power, and am thereby +confirmed in the opinion advanced in my former number, viz. “That +the whole of this distinction (of natural and moral ability) and the +reasoning from it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical +analysis of mind, and an unwarranted definition of terms.” This may +seem a strong statement from so humble an individual as myself, in +view of the many able minds that have adopted the opinions here +opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh much, in this +controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments; and by +such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look +then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself +seems to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When +he wishes to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their +error, he says, “If you mean by power, an ability that works without +Divine efficiency, I hope I shall be the last to believe that.” “And +every body knows that the mass of the New-England divines, from the +beginning, have acknowledged no such doctrine.” +</p> + +<p> +And why is <i>Divine efficiency</i> necessary?—Because man has no +ability that will “work,” without it. Thus the moment he sets up a +guard against Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our +doctrine, or upon the old Calvinistic doctrine of “native +impotency.” There is no standing place any where else. The New-Haven +divines are right, if natural ability is right; and the time cannot +be far distant when the love of consistency will drive all, who hold +to natural ability, either on to the New Divinity ground, or back to +old Calvinism. From this remark the reader will see how much +depends, if my views are correct, upon the proper adjustment of this +question. It is in fact the turning point, which is to give a +character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not then be in +haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. “Now if you ask me +what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine +efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, +it is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision +of common sense, must be called a power.” The doctor had a little +before told us, that this power was faculties—he is not satisfied +with this; and what well instructed mind, like the doctor’s, could +be? It is something that forms the “basis of obligation,” he knows +not what it is. He merely infers there is such a power, because men +are held responsible. But this inference will flow quite as +naturally, by taking the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and +save the other difficulties beside. At any rate, it will save the +absurdity of holding to an ability, that will not “work,” without +being strengthened by Divine aid, and yet that this same ability is +sufficient for all purposes of obligation without that aid. +</p> + +<p> +We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this +definition of <i>moral</i> power. It is “the exercise of natural power.” +But these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural +power sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, +“we are entirely dependent upon God’s grace for moral power”—in +other words, according to the definition of moral power, we are +dependent upon grace for the <i>exercise</i> of our natural power—and +since natural power means the faculties of the understanding, will, +and conscience—the statement is simply and evidently this: we are +dependent upon Divine grace for the exercise of our understanding, +conscience, and will, in making a holy choice. Why? Because the +understanding, conscience, and will are so depraved by nature, that +it is not in their nature to “work” in this exercise, without this +Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious ability after all? Is +it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in another place +—“They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at once, <i>but +they are not bound to go</i> alone: it is their privilege and duty to +cast themselves <i>instantly</i> on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a +single step in their own <i>strength?</i>” Or is it any wonder that the +Christian Spectator should say, that “this statement of Dr. Griffin +brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?” And +is this the ability that “the mass of the New-England divines have +held to from the beginning?” Not exactly. They only slide over on +this ground occasionally, when they are pressed hard with +Pelagianism on the one hand, and the old doctrine of passivity on +the other. For the truth is, as before remarked, they have not a +single point to balance themselves upon between these two, only as +they light upon our ground. +</p> + +<p> +There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is +called. It implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is +obedience itself. For a right exercise of our natural powers is +obedience. But the right exercise of our natural power is moral +power—therefore +</p> + +<p> +Our moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a +clue to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic +saying—“You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly +disposed,” or in short hand—“You can if you will.” Now the verb +<i>will</i> here evidently means the right <i>exercise</i> of the natural +faculties—that is, as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the +whole and proper meaning of this notable saying is—“You have power +to obey God, <i>if you obey him</i>.” “You <i>can</i> if you <i>do</i>.” This is a +sort of logic which, when scanned down to its naked character, one +would get as little credit in refuting, as its abettors are entitled +to for its invention and use. And yet this is the logic which, in +its borrowed and fictitious costume has led thousands in our land to +suppose that Calvinism, as it is now modified, is the same, or +nearly the same with Methodism. +</p> + +<p> +There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with +this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual +existence, until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of +cause and effect, natural power effects the act of obedience; and +this effect of natural power, producing obedience, gives existence +to moral power. Thus we have power to obey, super-added to the power +that has actually obeyed! If, however, Calvinists say this is +treating the subject unfairly, because their very definition shows +that they do not mean by it any thing which <i>enables</i> man to obey—I +answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground, that it was what +they call it—<i>power;</i> and if they do not mean power, that is only +acknowledging the position I started upon, that this Calvinistic +power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of candour, +What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What confusion and +error may not be introduced by applying common and well defined +terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are +applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are +worse than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct +way to bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into +distrust and reproach. +</p> + +<p> +One thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pass +on. The doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that God +controls the natural power of men, by means of their moral power. +This some of them expressly affirm. And to show that I am not +mistaken with respect to the others, let the reader carefully attend +to the following considerations. What is it secures the fulfilment +of the Divine decrees, in respect to the elect and the reprobate? +Why do not some of the reprobates, in the use of natural ability, +repent and get to heaven? Because they have not the moral power. Why +do not some of the elect, in the use of the same ability, fall into +sin and finally perish? Because God makes and keeps them willing in +the day of his power—that is, he irresistibly imparts to them this +moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his own hands +he executes his decrees. For God, of set purpose, so constituted +this natural power, that it does not “work” without Divine +efficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. +Now, to say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and +irresistibly controlling one power by another, and yet calling that +other the essence of free agency, and the basis of obligation—look +at the absurdity in another point of view. Since moral power is the +exercise of natural power, the former must be the <i>effect</i> of the +latter. And since, according to Calvinism, natural power is +controlled by moral power, it follows conclusively; that the effect +controls its cause!! And since the cause must act, before the effect +is produced, it follows that the effect, before it has an existence, +acts upon its cause to produce its own existence!!! This is +certainly a nullification of both cause and effect: Such are some of +the difficulties of these definitions of power—definitions as +contrary to the common understandings of men, and the common laws +of language, as they are to sound philosophy—definitions which, if +they were always understood, when the terms were used; would make +the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very +differently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to +appear, that “this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the +reasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical analysis +of mind and an unwarranted definition of terms,” and that, after all +the efforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they +will be under the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of +going back to the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, +or of advancing on to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or +they must accept of the Arminian theory of gracious ability. And +that the reader may be prepared to make his selection, I will here +remind him of the arguments adduced in favour of the latter +doctrine, in the last number, while I next proceed to answer more +specifically the objections that have been urged against it, which +however for an obvious reason must be withheld until the next +number. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="XII" id="XII"> +NUMBER XII. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +OBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">In</span> consulting different authors to find the strongest objections +that have been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I +have fixed upon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, entitled, +“Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace,” as concentrating +in a small compass, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of +these objections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, +and possibly shall pass over some of his remarks as of minor +importance, but the substance of his reasoning shall receive such +notice as I shall be able to give it. +</p> + +<p> +1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a +free agent man cannot be <i>man;</i> that free agency in fact enters into +the very definition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; +and therefore he must be such by nature. +</p> + +<p> +This objection gains all its plausibility from the writer’s +definition of free agency. “It consists,” he says, “in the +possession of <i>understanding</i>, <i>conscience</i>, and <i>will</i>.” Now we +grant that the being who possesses these is an intelligent voluntary +agent. But these faculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so +that, for all holy purposes, they may be defective. The +understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared, the +power to choose good may be weakened either positively or +relatively. <i>Liberty</i> is a distinct faculty of the soul; and as such +is as subject to derangement as any other mental susceptibility. It +has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that man has not +his original aptitude or facility to good. And whether we consider +this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the will +itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is +probably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral +equilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the +passions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result +are the same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy +declination from righteousness to an extent which none but God can +rectify. With this view of the subject, the writer may call man a +free agent if he pleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, +and not to holiness. +</p> + +<p> +Our objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in +this way; and hence in a note he says, “Some writers speak of man, +in his natural state, as <i>free only</i> to evil. But in what does such +freedom differ from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, +how is he who murders a fellow creature more criminal than the +tiger, or even a falling rock that destroys him?” The fallacy of +this argument consists chiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. +Instead of holding that man “has no power to do otherwise,” we +believe, as much as this author, that man has ample power at his +command to do otherwise; but that this power is of grace, and not of +nature. Any farther supposed difficulties growing out of this view +of the subject will be explained, I trust satisfactorily, as we +advance.<sup><a href="#n6" id="f6" title="see footnote" name="f6">[6]</a></sup> +</p> + +<p> +2. “Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which +constitute free agency.”—Here again we must keep in view the +writer’s definition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that +every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties of +understanding, conscience, and will; but that these, unaided by +grace, constitute man free to a holy choice, is denied; and this is +the very question in debate. To affirm it therefore in argument is +begging the question. +</p> + +<p> +It however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point +seems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the +responsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this +does not touch the question whether this power is of grace or of +nature. But, says the writer, “When man, under the influence of +grace, does choose the good, he is not conscious of any new faculty +or power to choose, but only he uses that power in a different +manner. The power or faculty which chooses evil and which chooses +good, is the same power differently used.” Whoever disputed this? +—understanding by power a faculty of the soul, as this author +evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul gets no new +faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the exercise of +its natural faculties, is assisted by grace to make a right choice. +But, says the writer, in this connection, “Power to choose between +two objects is power to choose either.” If the writer means to say +that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects <i>is</i> +power to choose either—this is an identical proposition: it is only +saying, <i>If a thing is, it is</i>. But if he means to say, when two +objects are presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself +possessed of a power to attach itself voluntarily to one, that +therefore it has the <i>same power</i> to attach itself to the other, +this is denied; and as no proof is given or pretended by the +objector, nothing but a denial is necessary. On this point the +founder of the Calvinistic school was undoubtedly correct +—philosophically and theologically correct—when he said, “Man has +not an equally free election of good and evil.” +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +But that I may meet this objection founded on consciousness, full in +the face, I am prepared to assert, and I think prove, that man, so +far from being conscious that he has by nature adequate power to +serve God, is conscious of the very reverse of this. What truly +awakened sinner has not a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? +How many experiences of intelligent and pious Calvinists could I +quote on this point? As a specimen take that of the Rev. David +Brainerd, who stands high in the Church, not only among Calvinists, +but among all Christians who know him. I quote a passage from his +experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: “I saw that it was utterly +impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or delivering +myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for ever +miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never +been sensible of it before.”—This passage is very strong; too +unqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak +sinner, convinced, as all must be before they <i>can become strong</i>, +of their utter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one +prove the truth of Scripture, that “the <i>natural</i> man receiveth not +the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, +neither <i>can</i> he know them, for they are spiritually discerned;” +that “no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son +shall reveal him.” Hence the necessity that “the Spirit should take +of the things of Jesus Christ, and show them unto them.” Indeed, but +for this darkness and weakness of the understanding, the penitent +sinner would not feel the necessity of the agency of the Spirit: nor +would it in fact be necessary. It is on this ground that the +doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of conversion by +<i>moral suasion</i>. Thus it is evident that a man may be conscious of +having an understanding, but at the same time be as <i>fully</i> +conscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy +purposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience. +Experience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and +needs quickening. Hence the Christian often prays— +</p> + + <p class="p2"> +“Quick as the apple of an eye, +</p> + <p class="p3"> +O God! my conscience make; +</p> + <p class="p2"> +Awake my soul when sin is nigh, +</p> + <p class="p3s"> +And keep it still awake.” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +Hence also we pray God to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also +we learn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs +purging “from dead works,” for the very object that we may be able +“to serve God with filial fear;” we learn also that we may have +“defiled consciences,” “weak consciences,” “seared consciences,” &c. +And here let it be noticed, that whether we understand these +passages as applying to the regenerate or unregenerate, to derived +depravity or contracted depravity, the argument against the objector +will in every case apply with resistless force, viz. it shows that +this faculty of the soul may become so disordered as to have its +original healthy action impaired, and that in this case nothing can +give it its original sensibility and strength but the God who made +it. If sin does disorder the conscience, it disordered Adam’s: and +if he begat children in his own moral likeness, then his posterity +had a similar conscience. And therefore it is necessary that, as by +the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so by the obedience of +the second, grace may abound in a way directly to meet the evil. +</p> + +<p> +Let us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is +weak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! +until he becomes deeply impressed that he is “without strength!” He +tries to keep the law, but cannot; for he finds that “the carnal +mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed <i>can be</i>.” +Hear his complaint! and that we may be sure of taking a genuine +case, let us select a Bible experience from Rom. vii; “I am carnal, +sold under sin.” (How much liberty to serve God has a bond slave to +sin?) “That which I do I allow not; for what I would do that I do +not, but what I hate that do I.” “To will is present with me, but +how to perform that which is good, I find not,” &c. (See through the +chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self despair, “Who shall +deliver me from the body of this death?” Why, Saul of Tarsus! are +you not conscious that you have understanding, conscience, and will? +Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver you? <i>Deliver +yourself</i>. No! such philosophy and such theology were not known to +this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired +apostle. “I thank God, through Jesus Christ my Lord.”—“The law of the +spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the +controlling power] of sin and death.” +</p> + +<p> +Should any one say that the apostle was not describing his +<i>conversion</i> here, but his experience as a Christian believer, I +reply: If any thing, <i>that</i> would make the passage so much the +stronger for my present purpose; for “if these things are done in +the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?” If a saint—one who +has been washed and renewed—finds nevertheless that his will is so +weak as to need the continued grace of God to enable him to do the +things that he would, much more is this true of the unrenewed +sinner. If this account of the apostle’s experience means any thing, +<i>it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that we have +natural strength to serve God, as could be put into words</i>. And I am +bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it +presents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which +no metaphysical reasoning can overthrow—not indeed an argument to +prove that we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to +show that, having these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace +is indispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. +How often soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the +Divine law, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the +unholy passions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus +Christ. <i>We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power +to keep the Divine law</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. But it is objected again, “that the Scriptures require us to use +our natural faculties in the service of God;” and hence the +inference is, that these faculties are adequate to this service. +</p> + +<p> +It is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures, +dealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to +serve God. With what other powers should he serve him? I again +repeat that the question is not, whether we have <i>mental faculties</i>, +nor whether man may or can serve God with these faculties, but +simply whether the command to obey is given independently of the +considerations of grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the +Scriptures, which give a promise corresponding with every command, +and assurances of gracious aid suited to every duty—all of which +most explicitly imply, not only man’s need, but also the ground on +which the command is predicated. And with this idea agrees the +alleged condemnation, so often presented in the Scriptures: “This is +the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men have +loved darkness.” “He that believeth not is condemned already.” “But +they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore he is turned to be their +enemy.” “How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation.” +These, and many other passages, show that the turning point of guilt +and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural powers, as the +neglect and abuse of grace bestowed. +</p> + +<p> +This point may be illustrated by Christ’s healing the withered hand. +He commanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of +that command, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that +aid would be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch +forth a palsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was +understood that the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or +bones, to accomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, +assisted, as they would be, by the gracious power of God. So man, it +is true, is commanded to use his natural powers in obeying God; but +not without Divine aid, the promise of which is always either +expressed or implied in the command. +</p> + +<p> +4. “The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey God, +but that which consists in or results from the perversion of those +faculties which constitute him a moral agent.” +</p> + +<p> +It is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability—for +inability they certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin +abounded grace has much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and +unprepared for holy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their +own fault, for grace has been beforehand with them. It met them at +the very threshold of their moral agency, with every thing necessary +to meet their case. It has dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has +laid the foundation to say justly, “What more could I have done for +my vineyard?” If the sinner has rejected all this, and has increased +his depravity by actual transgression, then indeed is he justly +chargeable for all his embarrassments and moral weakness, for he has +voluntarily assumed to himself the responsibility of his native +depravity, and he has added to this the accumulated guilt of his +repeated sins. +</p> + +<p> +5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that +Arminians, after all, make man’s natural power the ground and +measure of his guilt, since “no part of his free agency arises from +furnished grace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse +that grace, and of course in an ability distinct from, and not +produced by the grace.” +</p> + +<p> +Let us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here. +Arminians do not mean that man’s ability to use grace is independent +of, and separate from the grace itself. They say that man’s powers +are directly assisted by grace, so that through this assistance they +have ability or strength <i>in those powers</i> which before they had +not, to make a right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious +ability, in any other sense, would be absurd. It would be like +talking of <i>strength</i> to use <i>strength</i>—of <i>being able to be able</i>. +This absurdity, however, appears to me justly chargeable upon the +natural ability theory, taken in connection with the Scripture +account of this matter. The Scriptures instruct us to look to God +for strength; that he gives us “power to become the children of +God;” that he “strengthens with might in the inner man, that we may +be <i>able</i>,” &c. This theory, however, tells us that we have an +ability back of this; an ability on which our responsibility turns, +and by means of which we can become partakers of the grace of the +Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being as taking +measures to make <i>ability able</i>, and adding power to make <i>adequate +strength sufficiently strong</i>.—Such is the work of supererogation +which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its advocates +alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground, +attempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest +objections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to +come. They are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical +character, and are therefore more tangible, and will, for this +reason, perhaps, be more interesting to the generality of readers. +Let us have patience, then, to follow them out. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Doctrinal Objections</i>.—On the ground of gracious ability it is +objected that, 1. “As the consequence of Adam’s fall, Adam himself +and all his posterity became incapable of committing another sin.” +2. “Every sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of +Adam, has been the effect of supernatural grace.” 3. “Man needed the +grace of God, not because he was wicked, but because he was weak.” +4. “The moral difference between one man and another is not to be +ascribed to God.” 5. “The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to +atone for actual sin.” 6. “This opinion is inconsistent with the +doctrine of grace.” 7. “There can be no guilt in the present +rebellion of the infernal regions.” 8. “Is not this grace a greater +calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?” +</p> + +<p> +I have thrown these objections together, and presented them in +connection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly +on one or two erroneous assumptions, to correct which will be +substantially to answer them all. +</p> + +<p> +One erroneous assumption of this writer is, that “there is no free +agency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right.” This writer +seems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no +proof; for although he has used it in argument a number of times, he +has left it unsustained by any thing but his naked assertion. This +proposition has already been denied, and an unqualified denial is +all that in fairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an +unqualified assertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not +victory. Let me request you then, reader, to look at this +proposition. Can you see any self-evident proof of this assertion? +If the Creator should give existence to an intelligent being, and +infuse into his created nature the elements of unrighteousness, and +give to his faculties an irresistible bias to sin, and all this +without providing a remedy, or a way for escape, then indeed all our +notions of justice would decide that such a being ought not to be +held responsible. But this is not the case with any of the sinful +beings of God’s moral government.—Not of the fallen angels, for +they had original power to stand, but abused it and fell—not of +fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created depravity; +but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary +transgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his +posterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of +generation: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which +meets the exigencies of man’s moral condition, at the very +commencement of his being. This it does by graciously preventing the +imputation of guilt until man is capable of an intelligent survey of +his moral condition; for “as by the offence of one, judgment came +upon all men unto condemnation: even so, by the righteousness of +one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.” +And when man becomes capable of moral action, this same gracious +remedy is suited to remove his native depravity, and to justify him +from the guilt of actual transgression; for “if we confess our sins, +he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from +all unrighteousness.” It does not appear, then, either from the +obvious character of the proposition itself; or from the condition +of sinful beings, that “the same free agency which enables a man to +do wrong, will enable him also to do right.” Hence it is not true +that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to sin, or that there is now +no sin in the infernal regions. It is true, the writer tries to +sustain this idea farther, by asserting that “<i>that</i> ceases to be a +moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be held +responsible for doing what is unavoidable.” This is little better, +however, than a reiteration of the former assumption. If the +character and conduct of a being are not <i>now</i>, and never <i>have +been</i> avoidable, then indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to +him. But to say that there is “no moral wrong” in the case, is to +say that characters and actions are not wrong in themselves, even +where it would not be just to impute guilt. And this is an idea +which is implied also in another part of this writer’s reasoning; +for he tells us that, according to the doctrine of gracious ability +“every sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of +Adam, has been the effect of supernatural grace;” and that “man +needed the grace of God, not because he was wicked, but because he +was weak,” &c. This reasoning, or rather these propositions, are +predicated on the assumption, that there is no <i>moral wrong</i> where +there is no <i>existing</i> ability to do right: in other words, that +dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not <i>in themselves</i> +holy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the <i>existing</i> power +of the being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts. +</p> + +<p> +But is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be +just to impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that +“until the law sin was in the world;” and yet he adds, “Sin is not +imputed (he does not say sin does not exist,) where there is no +law.” The fact there are certain dispositions and acts that are <i>in +their nature</i> opposite to holiness, whatever may be the power of the +subject <i>at the time</i> he possesses this character or performs these +acts. Sin is sin, and holiness is holiness, under all circumstances. +They have a positive, and not merely a relative existence. And +although they have not existence abstract from an agent possessing +understanding, conscience, and will, still they may have an +existence abstractly from the power of being or doing otherwise at +the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no moral character, +or he has power to become holy with his first breath. Whether the +subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it, is a +question to be decided by circumstances. If a being has had power, +and lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible +for his impotency—his very weakness becomes his crime, and every +act of omission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is +justly imputed to him, the assertion of our objector to the contrary +notwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now “no guilt +in the rebellion of the infernal regions.” It is of little +consequence whether, in this case, you assume that all the guilt is +in the first act, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in +each successive act of sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of +the first. In either case, the acts that follow are the measure of +the guilt; and hence, according to the nature of the mind, the +consciousness of guilt will be constantly felt, as the acts occur. +For all practical purposes, therefore, the sense of guilt, and the +Divine administration of justice will be the same in either view of +the subject. The writer supposes the case of “a servant’s cutting +off his hands to avoid his daily task,” and says, “this he is to +blame, and ought to be punished;” but thinks he ought not to be +punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How much is he +to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt and +punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he +has done his master—that is, by every act of omission consequent +upon this act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore +he is justly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer +this whole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the +acts separately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical +administration of government and of justice. Indeed, to say that +each succeeding act is to be brought up and taken into the estimate, +in order to fix the quantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that +these succeeding acts are sins; else why should they be brought into +the account at all, in estimating guilt and punishment? Take another +case. The drunkard destroys or suspends the right use of his reason, +and then murders. Is he to be held innocent of the murder because he +was drunk? or was the whole guilt of the murder to be referred to +the act of getting intoxicated? If you say the former, then no man +is to be punished for any crime committed in a fit of intoxication; +and one has only to get intoxicated in order to be innocent. If you +say the latter, then, as getting drunk is the same in one case as +another, <i>every</i> inebriate is guilty of murder, and whatever other +crimes drunkeness <i>may</i> occasion, or has occasioned. Is either of +these suppositions correct? Shall we not rather say that the +inebriate’s guilt is to be measured by the aggregate of crimes +flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so in the +case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles +“there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal +regions,” I would say that their present rebellion is the fruits and +measure of their guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power +and lost it, is guilty of his present acts. +</p> + +<p> +And by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the +estimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from +the acts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and +say, the acts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? +Evidently because you have taken the amount of that guilt and +attached it to the first act. And does this make these acts in +themselves innocent? The idea is preposterous. As well may you say +that the filthy streams of a polluted fountain are not impure in +themselves, because but for the fountain they would not be impure; +as to say that the current of unholy volitions which unavoidably +flows from a perverted heart is not unholy and criminal. +</p> + +<p> +Another clearly erroneous assumption of this writer is, that if it +would be unjust for the Divine Being to leave his plan <i>unfinished</i>, +after it is begun, the <i>whole</i> plan must be predicated on justice, +and not on grace. It is true, he has not said this, in so many +words, but his reasoning implies it. For he says this scheme of +gracious ability “annihilates the whole doctrine of grace.” Because +God, if he held man accountable, was bound to give him this ability, +as a matter of justice; hence it is not an ability by grace, but an +ability by justice. The whole of this reasoning, and much more, goes +upon the principle, that the <i>completion</i> of a plan of grace, after +it is begun, cannot be claimed on the scale of justice, without +making the whole a plan of justice. But is this true? Is not a +father, after he has been instrumental of bringing a son into the +world, bound <i>in justice</i> to provide for and educate him? And yet +does not the son owe a debt of gratitude to that father, when he has +done all this? If a physician should cut off the limb of a poor man, +to save his life, is he not bound <i>in justice</i>, after he has +commenced the operation, to take up the arteries and save the man +from dying, by the operation. And if he should not do it, would he +not be called a wanton and cruel wretch? And yet in both these cases +the persons may be unworthy. The son may show much obliquity of +moral principle, and yet the father should bear with him, and +discipline him. The man on whom the physician operated may be poor +and perverse. Here then are cases in which <i>justice demands that un +merited favour begun should be continued</i>, or else what was favour +in the commencement, and what would be favour in the whole, would +nevertheless by its incompleteness, be most manifest injustice. Such +is the state of the question in respect to the Divine administration. +The whole race of man had become obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, +in their representative and federal head, by reason of <i>his</i> sin. +This is expressly stated: “By the offence of one, judgment came upon +all men to condemnation.” “In Adam all die.” In this situation we may +suppose that the strict justice of the law required punishment in the +very character in which the offence was committed. Adam personally and +consciously sinned; and so, according to justice, he must suffer. The +prospective generations of men, existing seminally in him, as they had +not consciously and personally sinned, could, in justice, only +experience the effects of the curse in the same character in which +they sinned, viz. passively and seminally, unless provision could be +made, by which, in their personal existence, they might free +themselves from the effects of sin. Now God, in the plenitude of his +wisdom and grace, saw fit to make provision for a new probation for +man, on the basis of a covenant of grace, the different parts of which +are all to be viewed together, in order to judge of their character. +In this covenant Adam had a <i>new trial;</i> and when the promise was made +to him he stood in the same relation to his posterity as he did when he +sinned, and the curse was out against him. If, by the latter, the +prospective generations of men were justly cut off from possible +existence; by the former this existence was mercifully secured to +them. If by the corruption of the race, through sin, the possibility +of salvation was cut off, on all known principles of administrative +justice; by the provisions of grace the possibility of salvation was +secured to the whole race; and this possibility implies every +necessary provision to render grace available and efficient, in +accordance with moral responsibility. If “God, who spared not his +own Son, but freely gave him up for us all,” had not “with him also +freely given us all things” necessary for our salvation, would not +the Divine procedure have been characterized both by folly and +injustice? If his plan of grace had only gone so far as to have +given us a conscious being, without giving us the means of making +that existence happy, would it not have been wanton cruelty? And +yet, taking the whole together, who does not see that it is a most +stupendous system of grace, from the foundation to the top-stone? +Let us not then be guilty of such manifest folly, as to take a part +of the Divine administration, and make up a judgment upon that, as +viewed independently of the rest, and then transfer this abstract +character to the whole. As in chemical combinations, though one of +the ingredients taken alone might be deleterious, yet the compound +may be nutritious or salutary, so in the new covenant, if we +separate legal exactions and penalties from gracious provisions, the +operations of the former may be unjust and cruel, yet the whole, +united as God hath combined them, may be an administration of +unparalleled grace. It is in this heavenly combination that “mercy +and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each +other.” Now, therefore, “if we confess our sins, he is faithful and +<i>just</i> to forgive us our sins,” for on this ground he can be “<i>just</i> +and the justifier of them that believe.” Although justice is thus +involved in the system, and to leave out part of the system would be +manifest injustice, yet the whole is the “blessed Gospel;” “the +Gospel of the grace of God.” It is objected, I know, that the idea +that, but for the provisions of the Gospel, man would not have +propagated his species, is fanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. +The Scriptures, I grant, do not strike off into speculations about +what God might have done, or would have done, if he had not done as +he has. This is foreign from their design; and I am perfectly +willing to let the whole stand as the Scriptures present it. But +when our opponents set the example of raising an objection to what +we think the true system, by passing judgment on a part, viewed +abstractly, we must meet them. On their own ground, then, I would +say, the idea that man would have been allowed to propagate his +species, without any provisions of grace, is altogether fanciful and +unauthorized by Scripture. Will it be said, that it seems more +reasonable, and in accordance with the course of nature, to suppose +that he would? I answer, It seems to me more reasonable, and in +accordance with the course of justice, to suppose that he would not. +Whoever maintains that the personal existence of Adam’s posterity +was not implied and included in the provisions of grace, in the new +covenant, must take into his theory one of the following +appendages;—he must either believe that the whole race could justly +be consigned to personal and unavoidable wo, for the sin of Adam, or +that all could be justly condemned for the sin of their own nature, +entailed upon them without their agency, and therefore equally +unavoidable; or he must believe that each would have a personal +trial on the ground of the covenant of works, as Adam had. If there +is another alternative, it must be some system of probation which +God has never intimated, and man, in all his inventions has never +devised. Whoever is prepared to adopt either of the two former +propositions is prepared to go all lengths in the doctrine of +predestination and reprobation charged upon Calvinism in the sermon +that gave rise to this controversy, and, of course, will find his +system subject to all the objections there urged against it. If any +one chooses to adopt the third alternative, and consider all the +posterity of Adam as standing or falling solely on the ground of the +covenant of works, such a one need not be answered in a discussion +purporting to be a “<i>Calvinistic</i> controversy.” He is a Socinian, +and must be answered in another place. All that need be done here, +is to show the embarrassments of <i>Calvinism proper</i>, the utter +futility of all its changes to relieve itself from these +embarrassments, unless it plunge into Pelagianism and Socinianism, +or rest itself upon the Arminian foundation of gracious ability. It +is on this latter ground we choose to rest, because here, and here +alone, we find the doctrines of natural depravity, human ability and +responsibility, and salvation by grace, blending in beautiful +harmony. +</p> + +<p> +Having noticed some of the erroneous assumptions on which the +doctrinal objections to our theory are based, the objections +themselves, I think, may all be disposed of in a summary way. We +see, on our plan, that, 1. Adam did not render himself incapable of +sinning, by the fall, but rather rendered himself and his posterity +incapable of any other moral exercise but what was sinful; and it +was on this account that a gracious ability is necessary, in order +to a second probation. 2. Sin, since the fall, has not been the +result of supernatural grace, but the natural fruit of the fall; and +supernatural grace is all that has counteracted sin. 3. “Man needed +the grace of God,” <i>both</i> “because he was wicked,” <i>and</i> “because he +was weak.”—4. “The moral difference between one man and another is +—to be ascribed to God.” How any one could think a contrary opinion +chargeable upon us, is to me surprising. It is more properly +Calvinism that is chargeable with this sentiment. Calvinism says, +Regeneration is a right choice. It says, also, that power to sin +implies power to be holy; and of course we become holy by the same +power as that by which we sin. And it farther says, that the power +is of nature and not of grace. Now let the reader put all these +together, and see if it does not follow most conclusively, that “the +moral difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed +to God.” But, on the contrary, <i>we</i> say the sinful nature of man is +changed in regeneration by the power of the Holy Ghost. 5. “The +posterity of Adam” <i>did</i> “need a Saviour to atone for actual sin.” +For actual sin is the result, not of gracious power, as this author +supposes, but of a sinful nature voluntarily retained and indulged. +If our opponents charge us with the sentiment, that grace is the +cause of the actual sin of Adam’s posterity, because we hold that +grace was the cause of their personal existence, we grant that, in +that sense, grace was a cause without which the posterity of Adam +would not have sinned. But if this makes God the author of sin, by +the same rule we could prove that God is the author of sin, because +he created moral agents—and if there is any difficulty here, it +presses on them as heavily as on us. But in any other sense, grace +is not the cause of sin. 6. “This opinion is,” as we have seen, +perfectly “with the doctrine of grace.” 7. “There is” <i>constant</i> +“guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions.” 8. “This +grace is a greater” <i>blessing</i> “to our race than the fall of Adam” +was a “calamity;” for “where sin abounded, grace did much more +abound.” +</p> + +<p> +Thus I have endeavoured to <i>explain</i>, <i>prove</i>, and <i>defend</i> the +doctrine of gracious ability, a doctrine always maintained in the +orthodox Church, until the refinements of Calvinism made it +necessary to call it in question; and a doctrine on which, viewed in +its different bearings, the orthodox Arminian system must stand or +fall. I have been the more minute and extended in my remarks from +this consideration; and also from the consideration that while this +doctrine has of late been most violently assailed by all classes of +Calvinists, very little has been published in its defence. If the +reader has had patience to follow the subject through, he is now +perhaps prepared to judge whether our holy volitions are the result +of a gracious ability or of natural power. +</p> + +<p> +Should I find time to pursue this subject farther, it would be in +place now to examine the doctrine of regeneration; in which +examination the nature of inherent depravity, and of that choice +which is conditional to the new birth, would be more fully noticed. +“This will I do if God permit.” +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="XIII" id="XIII"> +NUMBER XIII. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +REGENERATION. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">An</span> important error in any one cardinal doctrine of the Gospel will +make a glaring deformity in the entire system. Hence when one of +these doctrines is marred or perverted, a corresponding change must +be made in most or all of the others to keep up the appearance of +consistency. +</p> + +<p> +These remarks apply with special emphasis to the doctrine of +regeneration. As this is a focal point, in which many other leading +doctrines centre, this doctrine must of necessity give a character +to the whole Gospel plan. This might be inferred <i>a priori</i> from the +knowledge of the relation of <i>this</i> to the other parts of the +Christian system, and it is practically illustrated in the history +of the Church. There are those who believe, that by the various +terms used in Scripture to express the change commonly called +regeneration or the new birth, nothing is intended but some outward +ceremony, or some change of opinion in matters of speculative belief +or the like. Some say it is baptism, or a public profession of +faith; others that it is a mere speculative renunciation of heathen +idolatry, and an acknowledgment of the Christian faith; others that +it is merely a reformed life; and a few maintain that it is the +change that we shall undergo by death, or by the resurrection of the +body. These persons, and all in fact who make the new birth +something short of a radical change of heart, are obliged, for +consistency’s sake, to accommodate the other doctrines to their +views of regeneration. Hence they very generally deny constitutional +or derived depravity, the inflexibility and rigorous exactions of +the Divine law, the destructive character of sin, the atonement, the +supernatural agency of the Spirit upon the human heart, +justification by faith, and the like. Thus a radical error on one +point actually leads to <i>another gospel</i>—if gospel it may be +called. +</p> + +<p> +It does not come within the scope of my present design to enter into +a refutation of the foregoing errors. But from the disastrous +results of these errors we may infer the importance of guarding +carefully and of understanding clearly the Scripture doctrine of the +new birth. Even where the error is not so radical, as in the +instances above alluded to, the evil may be considerable, and in +some cases fatal. +</p> + +<p> +The Arminians and Calvinists agree in this doctrine, in so far as +that they both make it a radical change of moral nature, by the +supernatural agency of the Holy Ghost. But they differ in respect to +the <i>order</i> in which the several parts of the change take place—in +respect to the manner and degree of the agency of the Holy Spirit, +and also in respect to the part which human agency has in the +accomplishment of this change. And in some, if not all of these +points, Calvinists differ as much from each other as they do from +us. +</p> + +<p> +It is my present purpose to point out some of the more prominent +Calvinistic modes of stating and explaining this doctrine, with the +difficulties attending them: after which I shall endeavour to +present and defend what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine of +regeneration. +</p> + +<p> +<i>First Theory</i>.—The notion that the mind is entirely passive in +this change, that is, that nothing is done by the subject of it, +which is preparative or conditional, or in any way co-operative in +its accomplishment, has been a prevailing sentiment in the various +modifications of the old Calvinistic school. It is not indeed +pretended that the mind is inactive, either before or at the time +this renovation is effected by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it +is said that the sinner is resisting with all the power of the mind, +and with all the obstinacy of the most inveterate enmity, up to the +very moment, and in the very act of conversion. So that the sinner +is regenerated, not only <i>without</i> his <i>co-operation</i>, but also in +<i>spite</i> of his <i>utmost resistance</i>. Hence it is maintained, that, +but for the <i>irresistible</i> influence of the Holy Ghost upon the +heart, no sinner would be converted. +</p> + +<p> +1. One of the leading objections to this view of conversion is, that +it is inseparably connected with the doctrine of particular and +unconditional election. The two reciprocally imply each other, and +must therefore, stand or fall together. But this doctrine of +particular and unconditional election has been sufficiently refuted, +it is hoped, in the sermon that gave rise to this controversy; if +so, then the doctrine of passivity and irresistible grace is not +true. +</p> + +<p> +2. Another very serious difficulty which this theory of conversion +has to contend with is, that the Scriptures, in numerous passages, +declare that the Spirit of God may be <i>resisted, grieved, quenched</i>, +and utterly disregarded; and that the grace of God may be abused, or +received in vain. The passages to establish these propositions are +so frequent that I need not stop to point them out. But if this be +so, then the grace of God and the Spirit of grace are not +irresistible. +</p> + +<p> +3. It may be yet farther objected to this doctrine of the mind’s +passivity in conversion, that it is a virtual denial of all gracious +influence upon the heart before regeneration. It has been shown in +previous numbers that man was not able to comply with the conditions +of salvation without grace—and that the gracious influences of the +Divine Spirit are given to every sinner previous to regeneration. +But there would be no necessity for this, and no consistency in it, +if there are no conditions and no co-operation on the part of the +sinner in the process of the new birth. Hence the advocates of this +doctrine very consistently maintain that the first act of grace upon +the heart of the sinner is that which regenerates him. Since then +this theory conflicts with the Bible doctrine of a gracious +influence anterior to conversion, it cannot be admitted. +</p> + +<p> +4. This theory of regeneration removes all conditions on the part of +the sinner to the removal of the power and guilt of sin. It teaches +that if the sinner should do any thing acceptable to God, <i>as a +condition</i> to his conversion, it would imply he did not need +converting; that such an idea, in fact, would be inconsistent with +the doctrine of depravity, and irreconcilable with the idea of +salvation <i>by grace</i>. And this is the ground on which the old +Calvinists have so repeatedly charged us with the denial of the +doctrines of grace, and with holding that we may be justified by our +works. +</p> + +<p> +There is something very singular in these notions respecting the +necessity of <i>unconditional</i> regeneration, in order that it may be +by grace. These same Calvinists tell us that the sinner <i>can</i> +repent, and ought to repent, and that the Scriptures require it at +his hand. What! is the sinner able and obliged to do that which +would destroy the whole economy of grace! which would blot out the +Gospel and nullify the atonement itself? Ought he to do that which +would prove him a practical Pelagian and an operative workmonger? Is +he indeed, according to Calvinists themselves, required in Scripture +to do that which would prove Calvinism false, and a conditional +regeneration true? So it would seem. Put together these two dogmas +of Calvinism. 1. <i>The sinner is able, and ought to repent.</i> 2. <i>The +idea that the sinner does any thing toward his regeneration destroys +the doctrine of depravity and of salvation by grace.</i> I say put +these two together, and you have almost all the contradictions of +Calvinism converged to a focus—and what is most fatal to the +system, you have the authority of Calvinism itself to prove that +every intelligent probationer on the earth not only has the ability, +but is authoritatively required to give practical demonstration that +the system is false!! What is this but to say, “You <i>can</i>, and you +<i>cannot;</i>”—if you <i>do</i> not, you will be justly condemned—if you +<i>do</i>, you will ruin the Gospel system, and yourself with it? Where +such glaring paradoxes appear, there must be something materially +wrong in, at least, some parts of the system. +</p> + +<p> +5. But the inconsistency of this theory is not its only, and +certainly not its most injurious characteristic. In the same +proportion as men are made to believe that there are no conditions +on their part to their regeneration, they will be likely to fall +into one of the two extremes of carelessness or despair, either of +which, persisted in, would be ruinous. I cannot doubt but that, in +this way, tens of thousands have been ruined. We should infer that +such would be the result of the doctrine, from only understanding +its character; and I am fully satisfied that, in my own personal +acquaintance, I have met with hundreds who have been lulled in the +cradle of Antinomianism on the one hand, or paralyzed with despair +on the other, by this same doctrine of passive, unconditional +conversion. Calvinists, it is true, tell us this is the abuse of the +doctrine; but it appears to me to be the legitimate fruit. What else +could we expect? A man might as well attempt to dethrone the +Mediator, as to do any thing toward his own conversion. Teach this, +and carelessness ensues, Antinomian feelings will follow—or if you +arouse the mind by the curse of the law, and by the fearful doom +that awaits the unregenerate, what can he do? Nothing! Hell rises +from beneath to meet him, but he can do <i>nothing</i>. He looks until he +is excited to phrensy, from which he very probably passes over to +raving madness, or settles down into a state of gloomy despair. +</p> + +<p> +6. Another very decisive objection to this doctrine is, the +frequent, and I may say uniform language of Scripture. The +Scriptures require us to <i>seek—ask—knock—come to Christ—look +unto God—repent—believe—open the door</i> of the heart—<i>receive +Christ</i>, &c. No one can fail to notice how these instructions are +sprinkled over the whole volume of revelation. And what is specially +in point here, all these are spoken of and urged upon us as +conditions of blessings that shall follow—even the blessings of +salvation, of regeneration—and as conditions, too, without which we +cannot expect these blessings. Take one passage of many—“As many as +received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even +to them that believe on his name.” If any one doubts whether +“becoming the sons of God,” as expressed in this text, means +regeneration, the next verse will settle it—“Which were born not of +blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of +God,” John i, 12, 13. The latter verse I may have occasion to remark +upon hereafter; it is quoted here to show that the new birth is +undoubtedly the subject here spoken of. And we are here expressly +taught, in language that will bear no other interpretation, that +<i>receiving</i> Christ and <i>believing</i> on his name are the conditions of +regeneration. If there were no other passage in the Bible to direct +our minds on this subject, this plain unequivocal text ought to be +decisive. But the truth is, this is the uniform language of +Scripture. And are there any passages against these, any that say we +cannot come, cannot believe, seek, &c? or any that say, this work of +personal regeneration is performed independent of conditions? I know +of none which will not fairly admit of a different construction. We +are often met with this passage—“It is not of him that willeth, nor +of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” See Rom. ix, +16. But whoever interpreteth this of personal and individual +regeneration can hardly have examined the passage carefully and +candidly. But we are told again, it is God that renews the heart; +and if it is his work, it is not the work of the sinner. I grant +this; this is the very sentiment I mean to maintain; but then there +may be conditions—<i>there are conditions</i>—or else we should not +hear the psalmist <i>praying</i> for this, in language that has been +preserved for the edification of all subsequent generations, “Create +in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me.” +This is a practical comment on Christ’s conditional salvation, “Ask +and ye shall receive.” +</p> + +<p> +Since then this doctrine of passive and unconditional regeneration +implies unconditional election—since it is in opposition to those +scriptures which teach that the Spirit and grace of God may be +resisted and received in vain—since it is a virtual denial of all +gracious influences upon the heart before regeneration—since it +leads the abettors of the theory into gross contradictions, by their +endeavours to reconcile the can and the <i>cannot</i> of their system +—since its practical tendency is to make sinners careless, or drive +them to despair—and finally, since it contradicts that numerous +class of scriptures, some of which are very unequivocal, that +predicate the blessings of regeneration and justification upon +certain preparatory and conditional acts of the sinner—<i>therefore</i> +we conclude that this theory cannot be true. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Second Theory</i>.—To avoid these difficulties, to make the sinner +feel his responsibility, and to bring him into action, a new theory +of regeneration is proposed. This constitutes a leading +characteristic of the New Divinity. It is the theory of <i>self +-conversion</i>. Its advocates maintain that there is no more mystery or +supernatural agency in the process of the change, called the new +birth, than there is in any other leading purpose or decision of the +mind. It is true, they do not wholly exclude the Holy Spirit from +this work, but his agency is mediate and indirect. He acts in some +undefinable way, through the truth as an instrument. The truth acts +upon the mind, in the way of <i>moral suasion</i>, and the sinner, in the +view and by the influence of truth, resolves to give himself up to +God and to his service—and <i>this is regeneration</i>. The preparation +is of God—but the actual change is man’s own work. The God of +providence reveals the truth and arranges the means for its +promulgation, the Spirit of grace applies it to the understanding, +the sinner looks at it, reflects upon it, and at length is persuaded +to set about the work, and regenerates himself! +</p> + +<p> +That we may be the better prepared to meet this hypothesis, it +should be noticed that it is inseparable from the notion that all +sin consists in voluntary exercise, or in other words, in a series +of sinful volitions. Regeneration is a change from sin to holiness +—and hence a regenerate state is the opposite of a sinful state. If +then a regenerate state is nothing more than a series of holy +volitions, an unregenerate state, which is its opposite, is nothing +more than a series of unholy volitions. Thus it appears that this +doctrine of regeneration by the act of the will must stand or fall +with the notion that all sin consists in voluntary exercise. Any +argument, therefore, brought against this latter theory will bear +with equal weight against this new idea of regeneration. Bearing +this in mind, we are prepared to object to this doctrine, +</p> + +<p> +1. That it is inconsistent with the doctrine of constitutional +depravity. This is granted by the supporters of the theory, and +hence constitutional depravity is no part of their system. All the +arguments therefore that have been adduced in favour of derived, +inherent depravity, or that can be urged in favour of this doctrine, +will stand directly opposed to this view of regeneration. The +arguments in favour of our views of depravity need not be repeated; +and the reader is referred to a previous number in which this point +has been discussed. +</p> + +<p> +2. Another objection to this theory of regeneration is, that it +makes <i>entire</i> sanctification take place at the time of +regeneration. Conversion, holiness, are nothing more than a decision +of the will; and since the will can never be <i>more than decided</i>, of +course the decision at regeneration is the <i>perfection of holiness</i>. +On this ground, therefore, though Christians are exhorted to +“cleanse themselves from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, +<i>perfecting holiness</i> in the fear of the Lord;” though the saints +are commanded to “grow in grace,” to “confess their sins,” that they +may be “cleansed from <i>all unrighteousness</i>,” though some of the +Corinthian Christians were “carnal and walked as men,” and for that +reason were, after years of experience, only <i>babes</i> in Christ +—still, if we embrace this sentiment, we must call the convert, at +his first spiritual breath, as holy as he ever <i>can be</i> in any of +the subsequent stages of his experience! Surely the apostles taught +not this! And yet so strongly are men impelled forward by their +systems, this doctrine of perfect holiness at conversion is the very +sentiment that many of the advocates of the New Divinity are now +propagating—a clear proof that it necessarily follows from their +theory of conversion. This of itself, it strikes me, ought to +destroy the doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +3. Another bearing of this hypothesis, and one which I think must +prove fatal to it, is, that the Scriptures represent this change to +be chiefly in the affections, whereas this doctrine makes it +exclusively in the will. That the Scriptures place the change in the +affections chiefly, I suppose will not be denied. If it should be, +without stopping here to quote specific passages, or use many +arguments, one consideration alone will be sufficient to set the +question at rest.—True evangelical holiness consists in love to God +and man; and sin is loving the creature rather than the Creator. The +apostle brings into view both the regenerate and the unregenerate +state in this passage—“Set your affection on things above, and not +on things on the earth.” Numerous are the passages which teach that +love to God is the essence of the Christian character. The +affections, therefore, are the seat of this change. But we are told +by this new theory the change is in the will. It is only to resolve +to serve God, and we are converted.—Either this theory, therefore, +or the Bible account of this matter must be wrong. +</p> + +<p> +To avoid this difficulty, it may be said, that a change of the will +implies a change of the affections. But this is changing the +position—which is, that a decision of the will is regeneration. If +however this new position be insisted upon, it can be reconciled +with the phraseology used only by making a change of the affections +a mere <i>subordinate</i> part of regeneration, whereas the Scriptures +make the change consist essentially in this. But there is still a +more serious difficulty in this idea, that the change of the will +implies a change in the affections. It necessarily implies that the +affections are at all times under the control of the will. But this +is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural. It is even directly +contrary to the observation and knowledge of men who have paid only +common and casual attention to mental phenomena. The will is oftener +enthralled by the affections, than the affections by the will. Even +in common and worldly matters let a man try by an effort of the will +to beget love where it does not exist, or to transfer the affections +from one object to another, and how will he succeed? Will love and +hatred go or come at his bidding? You might as well attempt, by an +act of the will, to make sweet bitter, or bitter sweet to the +physical taste. How much less can a man, by an act of the will, make +all things new, and transfer the heart from the grossness of +creature love to the purity of supreme love to God. The Apostle Paul +has taught us his failure in this matter. When he “would do good, +evil was present with him.” “For,” says he, “the good that I would +do, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.” And this +is the fact in most cases of genuine awakening. Resolutions are +formed, but the current of the unsanctified affections sweeps them +away. Over the untowardness of the unregenerate heart the will has, +in fact, but a feeble influence; and this is the reason why the man, +struggling with the corruptions of his heart, is driven to despair, +and exclaims, “O! wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from +the body of this death?” +</p> + +<p> +We shall see hereafter how the action of the will is indispensable +in regeneration; but not in this <i>direct</i> way to change and control +the affections, by the power of its own decisions. When I find my +will capable of doing this, I must have an essentially different +intellectual character from the one I now have. +</p> + +<p> +Since the Scriptures make the new birth a change of affections, and +this theory makes it a change of volitions; and especially since the +affections cannot be transferred from <i>earth</i> to <i>heaven</i> by a <i>mere +act of the will</i>, therefore the doctrine which teaches and implies +these views must be false. +</p> + +<p> +4. This idea of the character of sin and of the new birth makes man +sinless, at particular times, even <i>without</i> regeneration. I do not +mean by this that he is not obnoxious to punishment for past unholy +volitions. But if sin consists only in voluntary exercise, whenever +the mind does not act; or whenever its action is not under the +control of the will, there is nothing of sin personally appertaining +to the man.—When the action of the will is suspended by an all +-absorbing emotion of wonder or surprise—in sound sleep when the +mental states, if there are any, are not under the control of the +will—in cases of suspended animation, by drowning, fainting, or +otherwise—in short, whenever the mind is necessarily wholly +engrossed, as is often the case, by some scientific investigation, +or matter of worldly business, not of a moral character, then, and +in every such case, whatever may be the guilt for past transgressions, +there is no personal unholiness. And by the same reasoning we may +show that the regenerate pass a great portion of their time without +any personal holiness! +</p> + +<p> +5. According to the theory we are opposing, regeneration, strictly +speaking, means nothing. The work of grace, by which a sinner is +made meet for heaven, embraces two essential points, <i>pardon</i> and +<i>renewal</i>. The former is not a positive change of character, but a +relative change, from a state of condemnation to a state of +acquittal. But as regeneration, if it have any appropriate meaning, +cannot mean a mere change of relation, any construction or system +that forces such a meaning upon it does, in fact, do it away. Hence, +being <i>born again, being renewed, being created anew, being +sanctified, being translated from darkness to light, being raised +from the dead</i>, and numerous other scripture expressions, are +figurative forms of speech, so foreign from the idea they are used +to express, that they are worse than unmeaning—they lead to error. +But if these expressions mean any thing more than pardon, what is +that meaning? This doctrine makes the principal change take place in +the <i>neighbourhood</i> of the will; not in the will itself, meaning by +that, the mental power by which we put forth volitions. This +<i>faculty</i> of the mind is sound, and needs no change—all the other +mental susceptibilities are sound, the essence of the mind and the +susceptibilities of the mind are perfectly free from any moral +perversion. It is the mental <i>action</i> that is bad.—What is there +then in the man that is to be changed? Do you say his volitions? But +these he changes every hour. Do you say, he must leave off wrong +volitions, and have right ones? This too he often does. “But he must +do it with right motives,” you say, “this acting from <i>right +motives</i> is the regenerate state.” Indeed! Suppose then that he has +resolved to serve God, from right motives, what if he should +afterward resolve, from false shame or fear, to neglect a duty, is +he now unregenerate? This is changing from regenerate to +unregenerate, from <i>entire</i> holiness to <i>entire</i> unholiness with a +breath. Truly such a regeneration is <i>nothing</i>. But you say, after +he has once submitted, he now has a “governing purpose” to serve +God, and this constitutes him regenerate; aye, a <i>governing</i> purpose +that <i>does not govern</i> him. Let it be understood, you cannot divide +a volition; it has an entire character in itself; and if it be +unholy, no preceding holy volition can sanctify it. Hence every +change of volition from wrong to right, and from right to wrong, is +a change of state, so that regeneracy and unregeneracy play in and +out of the human bosom in the alternation of every criminal thought +or every pious aspiration. Is this the Bible doctrine of the new +birth? And yet this is all you can make of it, if you resolve it +into the mere action of the will. +</p> + +<p> +6. This doctrine of self-conversion, by an act of the will, is +directly contrary to Scripture. It would be tedious to me and my +readers to quote all those passages that attribute this work +directly to the Holy Spirit, and that speak of it as a work which +<i>God himself</i> accomplishes for, and in us. There is one passage +which is much in point, however, and is sufficient of itself to +settle this question. “But as many as received him, to them gave he +power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his +name. Who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor +of the will of man, but of God,” John i, 12, 13. This is a two-edged +sword—it cuts off, as we have remarked before, passive and +unconditional regeneration on the one hand; and also, as we may now +see, self conversion by an act of the will, on the other. I know not +how words can be put together, in so small a compass, better to +answer the true objects of destroying these two opposite theories of +regeneration, and asserting the true theory. Here is, first—the +<i>receiving of Christ,</i> the <i>believing on his name</i>—this is the +condition. Second, Christ gives the “power,” viz. strength and +privilege, to become the sons of God. This is the regeneration. +Third—This becoming “the sons of God,” or being “born,” is not in a +<i>physical way</i>, by flesh and blood, nor yet by <i>human will</i>, but of +or by God. Can any thing be clearer or more decisive? +</p> + +<p> +Indeed the very terms, <i>regeneration, born, birth</i>, &c, imply of +themselves another and an efficient agent; and then to connect these +with the Divine agency, as the Scriptures have done some half dozen +times in the phrase, “born of God,” and several other times in the +phrase, “of the Spirit:” to have this called being “begotten again,” +and the like, is enough, one would think, if words have any meaning, +to show that man does not change his own heart. The same may be said +of the terms <i>resurrection, translation, creation, renewal</i>, and +various other terms the Scriptures use to express this change. Jesus +Christ claimed that he had “power to lay down his life, and <i>to take +it again;</i>” but this is the only instance of self-resurrection power +that we read of; and even this was by his Divine nature; for he was +“quickened by the Spirit,” and raised “by the power of God.” But +these theorists teach that man has power to lay down his life, and +then, after he is “dead in trespasses and sins,” he has power to +take his life again. Truly this is giving man a power that +approaches very near to one of the Divine attributes. To Christ +alone does it belong “to quicken whom he will.” To change the heart +of the sinner is one of the Divine prerogatives, and he that +attempts to convert himself; and trusts to this, will find in the +end that he is <i>carnal</i> still. For “whatsoever is born of the flesh +is flesh, but whatsoever is born of the Spirit is spirit.” +</p> + +<p> +Let me not here be misunderstood. I shall endeavour to show, in its +proper place, the conditional agency of man in this work. I have +only time to add, in this number, that I consider those scriptures +which press duties upon the sinner as applying to this conditional +agency. And even those strong expressions which sometimes occur in +the Bible, requiring the sinner to “make himself a new heart”—“to +cleanse his hands and purify his heart,” &c, will find an easy +solution and a pertinent application in this view of the subject. +For if there are certain pending conditions, without which the work +will not be accomplished, then there would be a propriety, while +pressing this duty, to use expressions showing that this work was +conditionally, though not <i>efficiently</i>, resting upon the agency of +the sinner. +</p> + +<p> +In my next I shall endeavour to show that there is no intermediate +<i>Calvinistic</i> ground between the two theories examined in this +number. If that attempt prove successful, and if in this it has been +found that the two theories examined are encumbered with too many +embarrassments to be admitted, then we shall be the better prepared +to listen to the teachings of the Scriptures on this important and +leading doctrine of the Christian faith. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="XIV" id="XIV"> +NUMBER XIV. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">An</span> inconsistency in any received theory is constantly driving its +supporters to some modification of their system. This is a redeeming +principle in the human mind, and greatly encourages the hope that +truth will finally triumph. +</p> + +<p> +It has already been noticed that the doctrine of entire passivity, +in regeneration, is so pressed with difficulties that it has sought +relief in the opposite notion of self-conversion. But this latter +hypothesis is, in turn, encumbered, if possible, with still greater +embarrassments. The presumption therefore is, that the truth lies +between them; and it will doubtless be found, by a fair and thorough +investigation, that this is the fact. But here the question arises, +Can <i>Calvinists</i> consistently occupy any such middle ground? In +other words, retaining the other peculiarities of Calvinism, can our +Calvinistic brethren assume any position between these two extremes +which will avoid the difficulties of both? A brief examination, it +is hoped, will decide this question. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Third Theory</i>.—Dr. Tyler is a highly respectable clergyman of the +Calvinistic faith, and is now at the head of the theological school +in East Windsor, Conn., which was got up with the avowed purpose of +counteracting the New-Haven theology. We should not therefore +suspect him of leaning too much toward the New Divinity. He tells us +that the only depravity is to be unwilling to serve God—that there +is “no other obstacle in the way of the sinner’s salvation except +what lies in his own will”—that “to be born again is simply to be +made willing to do what God requires.” What is this but the New +Divinity? The will is here made, most explicitly, the sole seat of +depravity; and regeneration is an act of the will. But every act of +the will is the sinner’s <i>own act</i>, and therefore the agent, by that +act of the will which constitutes regeneration, converts himself. +—Perhaps Dr. Tyler will say, the sinner in this case does not convert +himself, because he is “<i>made willing</i>.” God makes him willing “in +the day of his power.” It is remarkable what a favourite phrase this +is with the Calvinists. It is borrowed from the third verse of the +hundred and tenth Psalm, “Thy people shall be willing in the day of +thy power.” Now although the word “made” is not in the text; +although there is not the <i>slightest</i> evidence that the text speaks +of regeneration at all, but on the contrary, it is most evidently +intended to describe the character and conduct of God’s people, viz. +the regenerate; and although every scholar, at least, among the +Calvinists, knows this as well as he knows his right hand from the +left, yet we hear it repeated by the learned and the ignorant, at +all times and places—“God’s people are made willing in the day of +his power.” It is not only a gross perversion of a Scripture phrase, +but its repetition, in this perverted sense, renders it wearisome +and sickening. But, waiving this, it becomes us to ask whether there +is any more rational or Scriptural ground for the idea itself than +there is for this use of the text. What is meant by making the soul +willing? I confess I cannot understand it. Is it meant that God +<i>forces</i> the soul to be willing? This is a contradiction in terms. +To say that God acts directly on the will, and thus changes its +determination by superior force, is to destroy its freedom—is to +produce a volition without motive or reason—which would, at any +rate, be an anomalous action of the will. And what is still more +fatal to the theory, it implies <i>no act</i> of the sinner whatever, but +an irresistible act of the Divine power, which therefore necessarily +throws the theory back upon the doctrine of passive conversion. +There is no avoiding this conclusion, I think, on the ground that +God changes the action of the will, by an exertion of power upon the +will itself. If, to avoid this, it should be said that the will is +not changed by a direct act of power, but influenced to a holy +determination indirectly, through the medium of motives, presented +by the Holy Spirit—then and in that case we should be thrown +forward on to the self-conversion system. The sinner’s voluntary +act, by which he regenerated himself, would be as truly and entirely +<i>his own</i> as any other act of the will; therefore he would be self +-regenerated. This also would be regeneration, not by the Holy +Spirit, but <i>by the truth;</i> which is another feature of the New +Divinity. This also would make all depravity consist in the will, or +rather in its <i>acts;</i> which has been shown in the preceding number +to be unscriptural as well as unphilosophical. This objection is +valid, whether the depravity is supposed to be in the <i>power</i> of +willing, or in the <i>acts</i> of the will. But since, in Dr. Tyler’s +view, to will in one direction is depravity, and to will in another +direction is regeneration, and since all that motives <i>can</i> do is, +not to change the will itself, but only prompt it to new voluntary +states, it follows conclusively that Dr. T. makes all holiness and +all unholiness consist in volitions; and therefore the <i>moral +-exercise</i> system is true; which is another feature of the New +Divinity. Truly I may repeat, we do not need another theological +seminary in Connecticut to teach this doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +Finally, according to this theory of Dr. T., he and all those who +reason like him, are chargeable, I think, with a palpable paralogism +they reason in a circle. They say, in the express language of Dr. +Tyler, “All men may be saved if they will”—“No man is hindered from +coming to Christ who is willing to come”—that is, since to will and +to be willing is to be regenerated, this language gravely teaches +us, “All men may be saved, if they <i>are regenerated</i>”—“No man is +hindered from coming to Christ (to be regenerated) who <i>is +regenerated!</i>” And indeed this view of regeneration not only makes +learned divines talk nonsense, but the Scriptures also. The +invitation, “Whosoever will, let him come,” &c, must mean, +“Whosoever <i>is regenerate</i>, let him come,” and so of other passages. +Thus this theory of Dr. Tyler, and of the many who hold with him, is +so closely hemmed in on both sides, that it must throw itself for +support, either upon the doctrine of passivity, or self-conversion; +at the same time that in other respects it involves itself in +inconsistent and anti-scriptural dogmas. +</p> + +<p> +But that we may leave no position unexamined, let us take another +view of the subject. Suppose, instead of saying regeneration is +simply a change of the will, it should be argued that a change of +the will implies a change of the affections, and this therefore is +included in regeneration. Then I would ask, whether this change of +the affections is in the order of cause and effect, or in the order +of time, <i>prior</i> or <i>subsequent</i> to the act of the will. If this +change is prior to any action of the will in the case, then the +sinner has no voluntary co-operation in the work; and this brings us +up once more upon the doctrine of passive regeneration. The heart is +changed before the subject of the change acts. If the action of the +will precedes the change of the heart, then this change will be +effected in one of two ways. Either this anterior volition does +itself change the heart; or it is a mere preparatory condition, on +<i>occasion of which</i> God changes the heart. In the former case the +man himself would change his own heart, and this is self-conversion; +and in the latter alternative we have a conditional regeneration +wrought by the Holy Ghost, and this is the very doctrine for which +<i>we contend</i>, in opposition to Calvinism. If it should be said, this +change of the will and this change of the heart take place +independent of each other, that would not help the matter, since in +this view the change of <i>heart</i> would be passive and unconditional. +Thus whichever way this system turns, its difficulties press upon it +still, and it finds no relief. Indeed there can, as I conceive, be +no intermediate Calvinistic theory of regeneration, and there <i>can +be</i> but two other alternatives—either God must renew the heart, +independent of all co-operation on the part of the subject of this +change—and this is the old doctrine of unconditional Divine +efficiency—or the first acceptable act of the will must be +regeneration; and this is the new doctrine of <i>self-conversion</i>. Let +the reader, let any one reflect closely on this subject, and I +cannot doubt but he will say with me, <i>There is no third +alternative</i>. The nature of the case will admit of none. The former +theory may not contradict many of those scriptures that speak of +<i>Divine efficiency</i> in the work of grace upon the heart, but it is +utterly incompatible with those that urge the sinner to duty.—The +latter theory corresponds well with the urgent injunctions to duty, +so abundant in the Scriptures, but is wholly irreconcilable with +those that speak of Divine efficiency. The true theory must answer +to both; and must also correspond with all the other parts of the +Christian system. Is there such a theory? Every honest inquirer +after truth will embrace it doubtless, if it can be presented—for +truth, wherever, and whenever, and by whomsoever discovered, is +infinitely to be preferred to error, however long and fondly it may +have been cherished. Such a theory I will now try to present—and +although I may fail in making it very explicit, and in bringing +forward all its defences, yet if the general outlines can be seen +and be defended, it will, I trust, commend itself to the favourable +notice of the reader. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration</i>.—I approach this subject by +laying down the two following fundamental principles:— +</p> + +<p> +1. The work of regeneration is performed by the direct and efficient +operations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. +</p> + +<p> +2. The Holy Spirit exerts this regenerating power only on +conditions, to be first complied with by the subject of the change. +</p> + +<p> +The first principle I deem it unnecessary to defend farther than it +has been defended in the foregoing remarks. It is not objected to by +any orthodox Christians that I know of, only so far as the new views +of self-conversion, and of conversion by moral suasion, may be +thought an exception. And this we have reason to hope will be an +exception of limited extent and short duration. The sentiment +conflicts so directly with such a numerous class of scriptures, and +with the most approved principles of mental philosophy; and has, at +the same time, such a direct tendency to annihilate all the +essential features of regeneration, it cannot long find +encouragement in a spiritual Church. It may however make many +converts for a time, for men are fond of taking the work of +salvation into their own hands; but if it should, between such +converts and the true Church there will ultimately be a separation +as wide as that which now separates orthodoxy and Socinianism. +</p> + +<p> +The other fundamental principle seems to follow, almost of +necessity, from the scriptures that so abundantly point out the +sinner’s duty and agency, in connection with his conversion. The +principle, however, is strenuously opposed by all classes of +Calvinists. The opposite of this is in fact the essential +characteristic of Calvinism, if any <i>one</i> notion can be so called; +for however much the Calvinistic system may be modified, in other +respects, this is clung to as the elementary germ which constitutes +the identity of the system. Even the New Divinity, which makes so +much of human agency, does not allow it a <i>conditional action</i>—it +allows of no intermediate volition between the mental states of +worldly love and Divine love, as the occasion on which the transfer +is made, or the conditional hinge on which the important revolution +is accomplished. On the contrary, it considers the volition itself +as the transfer—the volition constitutes the <i>entire change</i>. Thus +warily does Calvinism, in all its changes, avoid conditional +regeneration. Hence if I were called upon to give a general +definition of Calvinism, that should include all the species that +claim the name, I would say, <i>Calvinists are those who believe in +unconditional regeneration</i>. For the moment this point is given up +by any one, all parties agree that he is not a Calvinist. +</p> + +<p> +But why is conditional regeneration so offensive? Is it because the +Scriptures directly oppose it? This is hardly pretended. It is +supposed, however, by the Calvinists, that to acknowledge this +doctrine would require the renunciation of certain other doctrines +which are taught in the Scriptures. This lays the foundation for the +objections that have been made against this doctrine. It is objected +that <i>a depraved sinner cannot perform an acceptable condition until +he is regenerated</i>—that <i>God cannot consistently accept of any act +short of that which constitutes regeneration</i>—that <i>the idea of a +conditional regeneration implies salvation by works, in part at +least, and not wholly by grace</i>. +</p> + +<p> +I have mentioned these objections in this connection, not so much to +attempt, at this moment, a direct refutation of them, as to advert +to what I conceive to be the ground of the difficulty in the minds +of those making the objections. It appears to me that the difference +between us results principally from a difference of our views in +respect to the constitution and the constitutional action of the +mind itself. The philosophical part of our theology will be modified +very much by our views of the philosophy of mind. Let it be granted +then:— +</p> + +<p> +1. That the mind is possessed of a moral susceptibility, generally +called <i>conscience</i>, which lays the foundation of the notions of +right and wrong, and by which we feel the emotions of approval or +disapproval for our past conduct, and the feelings of obligation +with respect to the present and the future; and that even in an +unregenerate state this susceptibility often operates in accordance +with its original design, and therefore agreeably with the Divine +will. +</p> + +<p> +2. That the understanding or intellect, which is a general division +of the mind, containing in itself several distinct susceptibilities +or powers, may, in an unregenerate state of the mind, be so +enlightened and informed on the subjects of Divine truth as to +perceive the right and the wrong; and as to perceive also, to some +extent at least, the way of salvation pointed out in the Gospel. +</p> + +<p> +3. That the affections and propensities (sometimes called the heart) +are the principal seat of depravity—and these are often arrayed in +direct hostility to the convictions of the judgment and the feelings +of moral obligation. +</p> + +<p> +4. That the will, or that mental power by which we put forth +volitions, and make decisions, while it is more or less, directly or +indirectly, influenced by the judgment, the conscience, and the +affections, is in fact designed to give direction and unity to the +whole mental action; and it always accomplishes this, where there is +a proper harmony in the mental powers. But by sin this harmony has +been disturbed, and the unholy affections have gained an undue +ascendancy, so that, in the unregenerate, in all questions of +preference between God and the world, in spite of the judgment, of +conscience, and of the will, the world is loved and God is hated. +</p> + +<p> +5. That in those cases where we cannot control our affections by a +direct volition, we may, nevertheless, under the promptings of +conscience, and in the light of the judgment, resolve against sin +—but these resolutions, however firmly and repeatedly made, will be +carried away and overruled by the strength of the carnal mind. This +shows us our own weakness, drives us to self-despair, until, under +the enlightening influences of grace, and the drawings of the +Spirit, the soul is led to prayer and to an abdication of itself +into the hands of Divine mercy, through Christ; and <i>then</i>, and on +<i>these conditions</i>, the Holy Spirit changes the character and +current of the unholy affections—and <i>this is regeneration</i>. +</p> + +<p> +In laying down the preceding postulates I have endeavoured to +express myself with as much brevity, and with as little metaphysical +technicality as possible; for the reason that they are designed to +be understood by all. Bating the deficiencies that may on this +account be noticed by the philosophical reader, I think it may be +assumed that these, so far as the powers and operations of the mind +are concerned, embrace the basis and general outlines of what we +call <i>conditional regeneration</i>. I am not aware that they are in +opposition to an one principle of Scripture theology, or mental +philosophy. And if this process is found consonant with reason and +Scripture, in its general features, it will be easy to show that its +relative bearings are such as most happily harmonize all the +doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel system. +</p> + +<p> +We plant ourselves then upon these general positions, and as ability +will permit, or truth may seem to justify, shall endeavour to defend +them against such objections as may be anticipated, or are known to +have been made against any of the principles here assumed. +</p> + +<p> +1. It may be objected perhaps that this is making too broad a +distinction between the different mental powers, giving to each such +a distinctive action and operation as to infringe upon the doctrine +of the mind’s unity and simplicity. It is believed, however, the +more this point is reflected upon by an attentive observance of our +own minds, or the minds of others, the more satisfied shall we be +that the principles here assumed are correct. That there are these +distinct properties of mind no one doubts. It is in accordance with +universal language, to speak of the intellect, of the conscience, of +the will, and of the affections, as distinct properties of the mind. +The properties of mind are as clearly marked by our consciousness, +as the properties of matter by our senses. And although, in +consequence of the invisibility of mind, there is doubtless a more +perfect unity in each individual mental property, than in each +distinct quality of matter, still each of the mental qualities has +its appropriate and distinctive character. Calvinists themselves +acknowledge this. They allow we have a moral sense which tests good +or evil, even in an unregenerate state; they allow the intellect may +perceive and approve of truth, even when the heart rejects it; they +allow that to perceive and to judge, to feel moral obligation and to +will, are distinct operations of the mind; and that our perceptions +and our conscience may be right, when our affections are wrong. So +far then we are agreed, and so far they make distinctions in the +mind, as wide as any that have been claimed in the principles above +laid down. Theologians, I grant, have, in many instances, confounded +in their reasonings the will and the affections. And this has also +sometimes been done by writers on the philosophy of the mind. But it +is most evident, I think, they have done this without good reason. +Mr. Locke says, “I find the will often confounded with several of +the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other.” This +he thinks is an error, of which “any one who turns his thoughts +inward upon what passes in his own mind” will be convinced. Rev. +Professor Upham, of Bowdoin College, Maine, himself a Calvinist, as +is generally supposed, in a late excellent treatise on the will, +asserts, and clearly proves, I think, that “<i>the state of the mind, +which we term volition, is entirely distinct from that which we term +desire</i>.” Nay, he proves that desires and volitions are often in +direct opposition. Hence as love implies desire, our volitions may +often conflict with our love. And this is precisely the state the +awakened sinner is in when he “would do good, but evil is present +with him.” +</p> + +<p> +2. It may be said, and has sometimes been said, that this view of +the subject involves a contradiction; that it is the same as to say, +the man wills against his preference, or in other words, he wills +what he does not choose. I cannot answer this objection better than +by an argument in Professor Upham’s work, already alluded to, in +which he says, of a similar objection on this very subject, “It will +be found on examination to resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and +naturally vanishes as soon as that fallacy is detected.” “It is +undoubtedly true that the common usage of language authorizes us to +apply the terms choice and choosing indiscriminately to either the +desire or volition; but it does not follow, and is not true, that we +apply them to these different parts of our nature in precisely the +same sense.” “When the word choice implies desire at all, it has +reference to a number of desirable objects brought before the mind +at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or predominant +desire.” “At other times we use the terms choice and choosing in +application to the will—when it is applied to that power, it +expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the +exception, as in the other case, that more than one object of +volition was present, in view of the mind, before the putting forth +of the voluntary act. It is in fact the circumstance that two or +more objects are present, which suggests the use of the word choice +or choosing, in either case.” “But the acts are entirely different +in their nature, although under certain circumstances the same name +is applied to them.” Hence he adds, “The contradiction is not a +real, but merely a verbal one. If we ever choose against choosing, +it will be found merely that choice which is volition, placed +against that choice which is desire.” And this is nothing more than +to say that volitions and desires may conflict with each other, +which we know to be the fact in numerous instances. +</p> + +<p> +If in reply to the foregoing, and in farther defence of the +objection, it should be urged, that there could be not only no +motive for the volition in this case, but that it would in fact be +put forth against all motive, since the feelings of the heart would +be of a directly opposite character, I reply, that it is not true +that there would be no motive for the action of the will, in +opposition to the sinful affections. It is seen already that the +judgment in the awakened sinner is against continuing in sin, and +the rebukes of the conscience for the past, and its admonitions for +the future, are powerful motives in opposition to the unholy +affections. The feelings of compunction and of moral obligation gain +great accessions of strength, moreover, from the terrors of the +Divine law, which alarm the fears, and from the promises of the +Gospel, which encourage the hopes of the awakened sinner. And it is +especially and emphatically true that under the existing influence +of these fears and hopes, the voice of conscience is most effectual +in prompting the sinner to “flee from the wrath to come,” and “lay +hold on the hope set before him.” Can it be said then that there is +no motive for a volition, or a mental effort that shall conflict +with the unsanctified affections? +</p> + +<p> +3. Again it is said, for every inch of this ground is disputed, that +the action of the mind under such motives is purely selfish, and +cannot therefore perform conditions acceptable to God. To this it +may be replied, that to be influenced by motives of self +preservation and personal salvation is not criminal; nay, it is +commendable. In proof of this but one argument is necessary. God +moves upon our fears and hopes, for the <i>express purpose</i> of +inducing us to forsake sin, and serve him; and he applies these +motives to man in his unregenerate state. This is so obvious a fact, +it is presumed none will deny it. But is it wrong for us to be +prompted to action by those considerations which God himself urges +upon us? If he attempts to excite our fears and hopes to prompt us +to a course of self preservation, can it be wrong for us to be +influenced by this means, and in this direction? I should hardly +know how to hold an argument with a man that should assert this +—and yet this sentiment is implied in the objection now under +examination. Beside, these acts conditional to regeneration are not +wholly, perhaps not chiefly, from motives of personal interest. Our +moral feelings have a great part in this work. And it is principally +by arousing an accusing conscience that fear and hope aid in the +performance of the conditions of regeneration. But whatever +proportion there may be of the ingredients of personal fear and hope +in the feelings that enter into this conditional action of the mind, +it is certain that the fear of the consequences of sin, and the hope +to escape them, are not themselves criminal, much less then are they +capable of rendering a complex state of the mind, of which they are +but a part, unacceptable to God. Indeed this objection to a mental +act, merely because it is prompted by self love, has always been to +me a matter of wonder. Selfishness is a term which we generally use +in a bad sense, and we mean by it that form of self love that leads +us to seek our own gratification at the expense and the injury of +others, or in opposition to the will of God. But that self love +which leads us to seek our own highest interests, and especially our +eternal interests, without injury to others, and in accordance with +the Divine will, is never thought criminal, I believe, except where +one has a particular system to support by such a notion. But that +system is itself of a doubtful character which requires such an +argument to sustain it. +</p> + +<p> +4. Another objection which has been made to one of the principles +above laid down is, that “it is the province of the will to control +the affections, and not the affections the will; and that the will +always possesses the power to do this, even in an unregenerate +state.” If so, then man has power, at any time, by an act of the +will, to love God. Let him try—let that unholy sinner try. Can he +succeed? You say perhaps, for so the Calvinists have said, “He can +if he will;” that is, he can will to love God if he does will to +love God! This is no great discovery surely, and it is certainly no +proper answer to the question. I ask it again, Can he, by a direct +act of the will, love God? Do you say, by varying the form of the +answer, “He can if he chooses?” If you mean by choice the act of the +will, this is the same answer over again, the folly of which is so +apparent. But if you mean by choice the desires of his heart, then +your answer amounts to this: If the desires of the heart are in +favour of loving God, he can, by an act of the will, love him. But +if the desires of the heart are in favour of loving God, the love is +already begotten, and there is no need of the act of the will to +produce it. In that case your proposition would be, the sinner can +love God by an act of the will, <i>if he loves him!</i> the absurdity of +which is too evident to require comment. It is thus that the coils +of error run into each other in endless circles. +</p> + +<p> +But, perhaps, to help the argument, if possible, it may be urged +that the will can decide in favour of a closer examination, and by +voluntary attention may get such strong perceptions of truth as will +give it the voluntary power over the heart. To this I would reply, +in the first place, this is giving up the argument, it is +acknowledging that certain preparatory acts of the will are +necessary before the mind can love God—but <i>this is conditional +regeneration</i>. And it may be farther maintained, in opposition to +this sentiment that the mere perception of truth, even when united +with conscience, and personal fear and hope, is not sufficient to +give the will power over the unrenewed affections. In proof of this, +Scripture might be adduced; but reserving the Scripture argument for +the present, we may quote good Calvinistic authority in proof that +the will may be enthralled by the affections. Professor Upham says, +“Whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always a +greater or less degree of enthralment.” And then he proceeds to show +how the mind may be enslaved by the <i>propensities</i>, <i>appetites</i>, +<i>affections,</i> and <i>passions</i>. He illustrates; for example, the +progress of this enthralment in the case of an appetite for strong +drink; which, “like a strong man armed, violently seizes the will, +binds it hand and foot, and hurls it into the dust.” Again he says, +“There are not unfrequently cases where the propensities and +passions have become so intense, after years of repetition, as to +control, or in other words, enthral the voluntary power almost +entirely.” (Treatise on the Will.) Dr. Griffin, also an able +Calvinistic writer, says, in decided terms, “The judgment of the +intellect and the decisions of the will are both controlled by the +heart.” +</p> + +<p> +The idea of the enthralment of the will, however, may be objected to +on another ground, viz. that if admitted it would destroy +accountability, since none are accountable for what they cannot +avoid. But I have not said they cannot avoid it; neither have I said +we are not voluntary either in keeping or discarding the unholy +heart. I assert directly the contrary. Every probationer decides +whether he will be holy or happy. But his decisions to be holy are +effectual only when he seeks that from God which he cannot do for +himself. Then, and then only, will God give him the victory over the +old man, with the deceitful lusts of the heart. <i>But this is +conditional regeneration</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Having said thus much in defence of the philosophy of the principles +laid down, the way is prepared to show that they accord with +Scripture, and to defend them with the doctrine which we build upon +them from the supposed Scripture objections which have been urged +against them. But this will furnish matter for another number. +</p><hr style="width:3em; margin-top:1.7em; margin-bottom:1.5em"> + + + + +<h1><a name="XV" id="XV"> +NUMBER XV. +</a></h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. +</p> + +<p> +<span class="sc">In</span> proposing and vindicating, in the preceding number, those views +of the philosophy of mind which are supposed to throw light upon the +process of regeneration, it was not intended to be intimated that a +knowledge of this theory is necessary in order to experience the new +birth. In the practical purposes of life men do not ordinarily stop +to analyze their mental states before they <i>judge</i>, <i>feel</i>, and +<i>act</i>. They have the <i>practical</i> use of their mental faculties, and +that suffices. In this way the most ignorant and the most +unphilosophical may be saved. Why, then, it may be asked, is it +necessary to enter into this analysis at all? To this it may be +replied, that whenever we can trace the adaptation of the provisions +of grace and the reason of the Divine requirements to the known +facts and laws of the human mind, it will strengthen our confidence +in the economy of grace, increase our admiration of the wisdom and +goodness of God, and sharpen our weapons of defence against the +cavils and assaults of an opposing skepticism. But especially is +this philosophical examination necessary whenever a superficial or +an erroneous philosophy would force upon us an erroneous theology. +The metaphysical mist with which some theories have veiled the +doctrine of regeneration, and the delusive and distorted views that +have resulted from this obscuration, may be removed and corrected by +the radiance of a pure philosophy. But as human philosophy is, at +best, more likely to err on these subjects than revelation, the +former should always be corrected or confirmed by the latter. How is +it in the case under examination? How do the assumed opinions +correspond with revelation? +</p> + +<p> +Let us glance again at our positions. The principal points assumed +are—that there is often a conflict between the feelings of moral +obligation on the one hand, enlightened as they are by reason and by +grace, sanctioned as they are by fear and hope, and the unholy +affections on the other; that under the promptings of the moral +feelings the will frequently puts forth its strength to resist and +subdue the unholy affections, but in every such case the effort +fails when unaided by the sanctifying grace of God—and that victory +is finally gained by a conditional act of the will, through which, +or on occasion of which, God subdues the passions and changes the +heart. These views have been vindicated, as being in accordance with +the philosophy of mind. The question now is, Are they sustained by +Scripture? I answer, <i>Yes, most clearly</i>. +</p> + +<p> +If the Apostle Paul had attempted, by a set argument, to illustrate +and affirm these views, he could not have done it better or more +explicitly than he has done in the latter part of the 7th, and the +first part of the 8th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. “I +see,” says the apostle, “another law in my members, warring against +the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of +sin, which is in my members.” <i>The law of sin in his members</i> was +undoubtedly the carnal mind, the unholy affections. These <i>warred</i> +against the <i>law of his mind</i>, his enlightened judgment, his +feelings of moral obligation; and in this warfare the former were +victorious, and carried captive the will; so that “the good that he +would, he did not, and the evil that he would not, that he did.” “To +will was present with him,” but “how to perform, he knew not.” See +the entire passage, for it beautifully illustrates our whole theory. +Here is the conflict, the struggle between conscience and sin; here +is pointed out the seat of sin, viz. the “flesh” or carnal mind, +which is but another name for the unsanctified affections and +appetites; here is the will struggling to turn the contest on the +side of duty, but struggling in vain; every effort results in +defeat—<i>it is taken captive, and overcome</i>.—Despair finally +settles down upon the mind, as far as personal strength is +concerned, and the anxious soul looks abroad for help, and cries +out, “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death!” Then it is +that deliverance comes! Jesus Christ, the Saviour of sinners, sets +him free! +</p> + +<p> +Professor Stuart, of Andover, himself a Calvinist, has shown most +conclusively, what Arminians have long contended for, that this +portion of revelation refers specifically to the work of +regeneration. But whether this be granted by every Calvinist or not, +no man can deny but that the grand philosophical principles +heretofore contended for, are here fully illustrated—the same +<i>division</i> of the mind—the same <i>conflict</i>—the same <i>thraldom</i> of +the <i>will</i>, and the same <i>deliverance</i>, through <i>faith</i> in Jesus +Christ our Lord. +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +The same principles, in part at least, are recognized in Gal. v, 17, +“For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against +the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye +<i>cannot</i> do the things that ye <i>would</i>.” In short, all those +passages where the difficulty of subduing the carnal mind, of +keeping the body under, of crucifying the old man, all those +passages that speak of a <i>warfare</i>, an <i>internal conflict</i>, and the +like, recognize the principles here contended for. These principles, +so frequently adverted to in the Scriptures, are proved to be in +exact conformity with experience. Who that has passed through this +change, but remembers this conflict, this war in the members? Who +but recollects how his best resolutions were broken as often as +made; and how, after various and vigorous efforts, his heart seemed +to himself to grow worse and worse? He found secret treason lurking +in his bosom even when he was trying to repent of his past +disloyalty. +</p> + + <p class="p2"> +“The more he strove against its power, +</p> + <p class="p2s"> +He felt the guilt and sin the more.” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +Every additional effort sunk him apparently but the lower in “the +horrible pit and miry clay,” until “the Lord heard his <i>cry</i>,” until +“the Lord brought him up, and set his feet upon a rock, and +established his goings, and put a new song in his mouth.” +</p> + +<p> +That the Scriptures speak of a conditional action of the mind, +preparatory to the work of regeneration, appears from express +passages, as well as from the general tenor of that numerous class +of scriptures which enjoin duty upon the sinner, and predicate +justification and salvation upon those duties. John i, 12, has +already been quoted and commented upon, in which the new birth is +suspended upon <i>receiving</i> Christ, or <i>believing</i> on his name. The +many cases of healing the body, by Christ, are evident illustrations +of the healing of the soul. In fact, we have good reasons for +supposing that, in most of these cases at least, the soul and body +were healed at the same time; and this was always on the condition +of <i>asking</i> and <i>believing</i>. John iii, 14, 13, “As Moses lifted up +the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted +up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have +everlasting life.” Here our Saviour shows the analogy between the +cure of the Israelites by looking at the brazen serpent, and of +sinners by looking to Christ. But how were the Israelites healed? By +the conditional act of <i>looking</i> at the brazen serpent. So looking +at Christ is the condition of healing the soul. Take away this +condition and the whole analogy is destroyed. Let this condition be +understood, and the text will accord with others, equally expressive +of conditions. “Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the +earth.” “Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.” “Seek +the Lord while he may be found.” God hath determined that all +nations “should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, +and find him, though he be not far from every one of us.” Will any +one pretend to say that this looking and seeking implies +regeneration? This is mere assumption; where is the proof? who would +ever infer this idea from the Scriptures themselves? What! is the +sinner regenerated before the malady of his soul, the poisonous bite +of sin, is healed? Has he found the Lord before he has sought him? +And must he seek after he has found him? The <i>kingdom of God</i> is +religion in the soul—it is “righteousness, peace, and joy in the +Holy Ghost;” and when we are regenerated, we have it in possession, +and have therefore no need to seek it. But we are commanded to +<i>seek</i> the kingdom of God; this, therefore, must be a work +preparatory to, and conditional of regeneration. “Come unto me all +ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.” “Take +my yoke upon you,” &c. To be <i>restless</i>, and not to have on the yoke +of Christ, is to be unregenerate; but such are to <i>come</i> and <i>take</i> +the yoke, and then, and on that condition, they will find rest to +their souls. “The Spirit and the bride say, Come, &c, and whosoever +will, let him come and take of the water of life freely.” To take of +the water of life is to be regenerate; but to this end we must +<i>come</i>, and must first <i>will</i> in order to <i>come</i>. “Behold, I stand +at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and open the door, I +will come in and sup with him, and he with me.” Before Christ is +<i>in</i> the soul, there is no regeneration; but before he will <i>come</i> +in, he knocks, and the sinner must first <i>hear</i>, and then <i>open the +door</i>, and on this condition Christ comes in and imparts his grace. +</p> + +<p> +But it is useless to proceed farther in quoting particular texts. +They might be extended indefinitely, with a force and pertinency +that cannot be evaded: all going to establish the fact that the work +of grace on the heart is conditional. +</p> + +<p> +Will any one pretend to deny, that the unregenerate sinner is called +upon to <i>seek</i>, <i>ask</i>, <i>repent</i>, <i>believe</i>, &c? And what do such +scriptures mean? The acts of the mind here enjoined must +<i>constitute</i> regeneration, or they must follow regeneration as an +effect of that work, or they must precede it as a necessary and +required condition. To say that these acts are the very definition +of regeneration itself—are only synonymous terms to express this +renewal of the heart, is to make regeneration consist in <i>exercises</i> +merely—is in fact to make it the sinner’s appropriate and exclusive +work; unless it can be shown that this commanding the sinner to ask, +&c, is nothing more nor less than a promise that God will ask, seek, +repent, and believe for him! But this will hardly be pretended; and +the idea that these acts do themselves <i>constitute</i> the new birth, +has already been seen to be defective and indefensible. +</p> + +<p> +To suppose that these acts follow regeneration, as an effect or +fruit of the change itself, is to deny them that position and +relation in which they are actually placed by the word of God. It +makes one seek, after he has found; ask, after he has received; +repent and believe, after he is possessed of that salvation, to +obtain which these duties are enjoined. The phraseology to suit this +theory, should evidently be of an entirely different character. When +the sinner asks what he shall do to be saved, the answer should be +—“<i>Nothing</i> until God renews the heart; and then as a fruit of this +you will of course <i>seek</i>, <i>ask</i>, <i>believe</i>,” &c. If, indeed, the +sinner is to do nothing until God renews him, why is it necessary +that he should first be awakened? Why is the command addressed to +him at all? Why does not the Holy Spirit immediately renew the +heart, while the transgressor is stupid in his wickedness, instead +of calling after him to <i>awake</i>, <i>flee</i>, and <i>escape</i> for his life? +Do you say you can give no other reason than that it pleases God to +take this course with the sinner, and to call up his attention to +the subject before he renews him? I answer, then it pleases God that +there should be certain preparatory acts of the mind in order to +regeneration: and this is in fact admitting the principle for which +we contend, and this more especially if it be acknowledged, as it +evidently must be, that these preparatory mental states or acts are, +to any extent, voluntary. Thus, not only is the absurdity of making +these acts the <i>result</i> of regeneration most apparent; but in +tracing out the consistent meaning and practical bearing of those +scriptures that are addressed to the unconverted, we find them +establishing the third alternative, that these acts of the mind are +<i>preparatory</i> to regeneration, and are the prescribed conditions on +which God will accomplish the work. Thus the Scripture argument is +found to confirm the philosophical view of the subject, and both are +strengthened by Christian experience. The doctrine of conditional +regeneration, therefore, is confirmed by a threefold argument, no +part of which, it is believed, can be easily overthrown. Against it, +however, there are several strong objections urged, which have +already been mentioned, and which we are now prepared to hear and +examine. +</p> + +<p> +1. It has been objected, that to admit human agency and co-operation +in this change, is to deny salvation by <i>grace</i>. But how does this +appear? Suppose the very conditions are by a gracious appointment +—suppose the operations of a gracious system are in this way better +adapted to a moral government—suppose this conditional action of +the mind to be itself the result of a gracious influence, +enlightening the understanding, and quickening and arousing the +moral sense—finally, suppose these conditions not to be +<i>efficient</i>, much less <i>meritorious</i> causes, by which the mind +either changes itself, or renders itself more morally deserving of +the Divine favour—I say suppose all this, and then show if you can, +how such conditions can detract at all from the grace of this +salvation. +</p> + +<p> +2. It has been objected, that “since man never is what he ought to +be until he is renewed and made holy, therefore any act short of +that which either constitutes or implies regeneration cannot be +acceptable to God—God cannot consistently approve of any step that +falls short of man’s duty. It is his duty to be holy, and therefore +any thing short of this is sin, and consequently cannot be accepted +as a condition.” We should be careful to discriminate between things +closely related, and yet actually distinct from each other. It is +one thing to be pleased with the character of the mind as a whole, +in view of its relations to the Divine law and its necessary +qualifications for heaven, and another thing to be pleased with a +particular mental state, or conditional volition, in reference to +its adaptation to a proposed end, or a specific object. For +instance: the Calvinists think that an awakened and an anxiously +inquiring sinner is in a more suitable state of mind to receive the +blessing of regeneration, than one perfectly stupid and thoughtless. +If they do not, why do they try to bring sinners to thoughtfulness? +Why do they try to awaken them to a sense of their danger, and make +them tremble under the view of the Divine displeasure? Or why do +they call their attention to Gospel provisions and a crucified +Saviour? Is not this a preparatory process? And have they the Divine +warrant for such a course? Is this the method which the Divine Being +takes to save his rebellious subjects? Then, doubtless, this method +is well pleasing to him: and in reference to this specific end he +has in view, he is pleased with each successive step in the process. +He is pleased when the shiner pays attention to the word; he is +pleased when he is awakened, and when he begins to tremble and +inquire, “What shall I do to be saved?” This is just as he would +have it, and just as he designed; although the entire character of +the sinner is not acceptable to him until he is made holy. The very +principle, then, objected to by the Calvinists is recognized by +their own theory and practice. Now if we say God is pleased to +accept of the sinner’s prayer, and faith, and sorrow for sin, as a +condition of what he will do for him, what propriety is there in +replying, God cannot accept of any thing short of a holy heart? We +know he cannot approve of a heart until it is holy; but he can +approve of certain feelings and volitions as suited, according to +the Divine appointment, to be the condition on which he will make +the heart holy. Do you ask on what ground he accepts of this? I +answer, on the ground of the merits of Christ; the ground on which +the whole process rests. God does not accept of the prayer, +repentance, and faith of the <i>regenerate</i>, because they are +regenerate, and by reason of their holiness; but their acceptance is +wholly and continually through Christ. Through the same medium and +merits the prayer of the inquiring sinner is heard and answered. +</p> + +<p> +If your servant had left you unjustly, and deserted the service he +was obligated to perform, and you should finally tell him, if he +would return and resume his duties you would forgive the past, and +accept of him for the future, would it be inconsistent to say, you +were pleased when he began to listen to the proposal, and pleased +when he took the first and every succeeding step, as being suitable +and necessary to the end proposed, although, in view of <i>his</i> duty +and <i>your</i> claim, you would not be pleased with him, as your +acceptable servant, until he was actually and faithfully employed in +your service? +</p> + +<p> +Let it not be inferred from the above that I advocate a gradual +conversion. I do not. I believe when God renews the heart he does it +at once; but the preparatory steps are nevertheless indispensable to +the accomplishment of this work. And God is well pleased with the +first step of attention on the part of the sinner, and with every +succeeding step of prayer, anxious inquiry, feeling of moral +obligation, purpose to forsake sin, looking after and attempting to +believe in Christ, not because these are <i>all</i> that he requires, but +because they are the necessary preparatives for what is to follow. +</p> + +<p> +3. The foregoing remarks will prepare the way to meet a similar +objection to the last, and one to some extent the same in substance. +It is this: “Are these conditional acts of the mind holy or unholy +exercises? If holy, then the work of regeneration is accomplished +already, and therefore these cannot be the <i>conditions</i> of that +change. If unholy, then they can be no other than offensive to a +holy God, and therefore cannot be conditions well pleasing to him.” +In addition to what has been already said, having a bearing upon +this question, it may be stated that the terms holy and unholy may +be equivocal, as used in this connection; and thus the supposed +dilemma would be more in words than in fact, more in appearance than +in reality. This dilemma is urged in the argument under the idea +that there can be but the two kinds of exercises, holy and unholy. +And this may be true enough, only let us understand what is meant. +If by holy exercises are meant those in which the entire feeling is +on the side of God, I readily answer, <i>No</i>, the mind before +regeneration has no such exercises. If by holiness is meant, that +the judgment and conscience are on the side of truth, I answer, +<i>Yes</i>, this is the state of the mind when it is truly awakened by +the Holy Spirit and by Divine truth. It is entirely immaterial to +me, therefore, whether the objector call the exercise holy or +unholy, provided he draw no special inferences from the use of a +general term that the positions here assumed do not authorize. Sure +I am that the objector cannot say there is nothing in the exercises +of the unregenerate, awakened sinner, such as God would have for the +end proposed, until he is prepared to say that a fear of the +consequences of sin, an enlightened judgment, the remorse of +conscience for the past, the feelings of obligation for the future, +and the hope of victory over sin through Christ, all combining to +induce the sinner to flee for refuge, and lay hold upon the hope set +before him, are all wrong, and not as God would have them? But when +a man is prepared to say this, it is difficult to see how he could +be reasoned with farther, for he would seem to have given up reason +and Scripture. And yet who does not know that these are the +exercises of the soul awakened to a sense of sin and its +consequences, even while as yet his unholy affections hang upon him +like a <i>body of death</i>:—Yea, who does not know that it is this body +of death, from which he cannot escape, and this abhorrence of sin +and its consequences, that rein him up, and incline him to a +surrender of his soul into the hands of Christ, from whom, as a +consequence, he receives <i>power</i> to become a son of God. “But what +is the motive?” it is asked, “is not this unholy?” And pray what +does this inquiry mean? If by motive is meant the moving cause <i>out</i> +of the mind; <i>that</i> cannot be unholy, for it is the Holy Spirit, and +the holy word of God, that are thus urging the sinner to Christ. If +by motive is meant the judgments and feelings of the mind, that +prompt to these voluntary efforts to avoid sin and its consequences, +these are the enlightened understanding and the feelings of +obligation, already alluded to, which, I repeat, the objector is +welcome to call holy or unholy as he pleases; all I claim is, they +are what God approves of, and are the necessary conditions of his +subsequent work of renewing the heart. +</p> + +<p> +But perhaps it may be asked here, Is not the sinner, in the +performance of these conditions, <i>partly</i> converted? I answer, This +again depends entirely upon what you mean by conversion. If by +conversion you understand the whole of the preparatory work of +awakening and seeking, as well as the <i>change</i> of the <i>heart</i>—then +of course you would say he is <i>partly</i> converted. If you mean by +conversion only a change of views and a consequent change of +purpose, by which the sinner determines to seek, that he may find +the pearl of great price—the blessing of a new heart and of +forgiveness, then you would say he is <i>wholly</i> converted. But if you +mean, by conversion, the change of heart itself, the washing of +regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, then not only is +not the work done, but it is not begun. The way of the Lord is +prepared and the renewal will follow. +</p> + +<p> +Thus the objections that have been thought so formidable against the +doctrine of conditional regeneration are found, on a closer +inspection, to be more in appearance than in reality. They receive +their influence, as objections, rather from their indefiniteness and +the ambiguity of terms, than from any intrinsic force. +</p> + +<p> +There is, however, one form more in which an objection may be urged +in a general way against the ideas of the new birth here advanced. +And as I wish fearlessly and candidly to state and meet, if +possible, every difficulty, it will be necessary to touch upon this. +It may be urged that “the only exercises that can be claimed as +conditions of regeneration on Bible grounds are <i>repentance</i> and +<i>faith;</i> for ‘repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus +Christ’ are laid at the foundation of all Gospel requirements. +Whenever the awakened sinner came to the apostles to know what he +should do to be saved, they always met him with, ‘Believe on the +Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.’ Whenever the apostles +went out to preach the Gospel, they preached ‘every where that men +should repent.’” “But,” continues the objector, “if repentance and +faith are the only duties or exercises which can be claimed as +conditions, it is evident there are no such conditions; for +repentance and faith, so far from being conditions of regeneration, +are either the new birth itself, or are Christian graces, implying +the new birth.” +</p> + +<p class="ps"> +The premises, in the above objection, will not be denied. Repentance +and faith are supposed to be the Gospel conditions of regeneration. +But it is denied that these are necessarily regeneration itself, or +that they imply regeneration in any other sense, than as antecedents +to it. There are, it is acknowledged, a repentance and a faith that +are Christian graces, and imply the new birth. This is the faith +that “is the substance of things hoped for.” It is that principle of +spiritual life which the Christian has in his soul when he can say, +“The life that I now live I live by faith in the Son of God.” This +is that repentance, also, which keeps the soul continually at the +foot of the cross, and leads it constantly to feel, +</p> + + <p class="p2"> +“Every moment, Lord, I need +</p> + <p class="p2s"> +The merit of thy death.” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +But because repentance and faith are the necessary characteristics +of the Christian, and because they are the more perfect as the +Christian character ripens, it does not therefore follow that there +are no repentance and faith conditional to the new birth. The very +fact that repentance and faith were urged by Christ and his +apostles, as the initiatory step to salvation, proves the opposite +of this. They do not say, Repent and believe the Gospel, and this is +salvation, but, “Repent and believe, and ye shall (on this +condition) be saved.” And surely it is unnecessary to prove here +that salvation in the New Testament generally means a meetness for +heaven or holiness. Our blessed Saviour was called Jesus, because he +<i>saved</i> his people <i>from their sins</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Beside, it may well be argued, that faith and repentance are acts of +the mind, and cannot therefore be considered as the new birth +itself, unless the mind converts itself, especially since they are +<i>enjoined duties</i>, and must therefore be <i>voluntary</i> acts. It is no +where said that God repents and believes for us; but it is expressly +and repeatedly taught, that God <i>renews</i> us.—Repentance and faith, +then, are our work, but regeneration is his. I know it is said in +one place, Acts v, 31, that Christ was exalted “to <i>give repentance</i> +to Israel.” But the <i>act</i> itself of repentance cannot be said to be +<i>given</i>. This would be an absurdity. How can any one give me a +mental <i>act?</i> Hence Dr. Doddridge, although a Calvinist, very +candidly and very justly remarks, on this passage, that “to <i>give +repentance</i> signifies to <i>give place</i>, or <i>room</i> for repentance,” to +sustain which interpretation he quotes Josephus and others who use +the phrase in this sense. If then repentance and faith are enjoined +upon us, as <i>our duties</i>, and if they are every where spoken of as +prerequisites in the work of salvation, and as preparatory steps and +conditions to the process of holiness, how can it be otherwise than +that these are antecedent, in the order of nature, to regeneration? +</p> + +<p> +It may farther be argued, in support of this view of faith and +repentance, that no sin can be forgiven until repented of +—repentance therefore must precede remission of sins. This I suppose +Calvinists allow, but they say that, in the order of nature, the +heart is renewed before sin is forgiven—and that repentance, +therefore, which is either the new birth itself, or the immediate +fruit of it, is a condition of justification, but not of +regeneration. If this be correct, then the soul is made holy before +it is forgiven. But St. Paul informs us, Romans iv, 5, that God +through faith “justifieth the <i>ungodly</i>.” If then there be any +antecedence in the order of the two parts of the work of grace, we +must suppose that justification has the precedence, and that +regeneration follows, and hence repentance and faith precede +regeneration. Indeed I cannot see why repentance is not as necessary +to remove the sin of the heart as to forgive the sin of the life. If +God will not forgive sin without repentance, will he renew the heart +without it? Has he any where promised this? If not, but if, on the +contrary, he every where seems to have suspended the working out of +our salvation <i>in us</i>, upon our repentance, then may we safely +conclude—nay, then we must necessarily believe that we repent in +order to be renewed. The same may be said of faith. Faith in fact +seems to be the exclusive channel through which every gracious +effect is produced upon the mind. The sinner cannot be awakened +without faith, for it precedes every judgment in favour of truth, +and every motion of moral feeling, and of course every favourable +concurrence of the will. The sinner never could throw himself upon +the Divine mercy, never would embrace Christ as his Saviour, until +he believed. Hence the Scriptures lay such great stress upon faith, +and make it the grand, and indeed the only <i>immediate</i> condition of +the work of grace upon the heart. Repentance is a condition only +remotely, <i>in order</i> to justifying faith; agreeable to the teaching +of Christ, “And ye, when ye had heard, afterward <i>repented</i> not that +ye <i>might believe</i> on him.” But faith is necessary <i>immediately</i>, as +that mental state directly antecedent to the giving up of the soul +into the hands of Divine mercy. And shall we still be told that +faith is not the condition of regeneration? The order of the work +seems to be—1. A degree of faith in order to repentance. 2. +Repentance, in order to such an increase of faith as will lead the +soul to throw itself upon Christ.—3. The giving up of the soul to +Christ as the only ground of hope. 4. The change of heart by the +efficient operation of the Holy Spirit.—Now on whichever of these +four stages of the process, except the first, the objector lays his +finger and says, <i>That</i> is not a condition of regeneration, for it +is regeneration itself, it will be seen that <i>that</i> very part is +conditional. If, for instance, he fix on the second stage, and +contend that that is regeneration, which I call repentance <i>in +order</i> to regenerating faith; even <i>that</i> would be <i>conditional</i> +regeneration, for it is preceded by faith—and so of all that +follow. And surely no one will pretend that what I call the first +stage, the faith which precedes awakening and remorse of conscience, +and the exciting alternations of fear and hope in the anxious and +inquiring sinner, is regeneration. And if this first degree of faith +is not the change, then it is utterly inconsistent to talk of +unconditional regeneration, for this faith stands at the head of all +that follows—it is a mental act necessarily preparatory to the +whole work. And as we shall presently see, it is an act that depends +upon the agency of the will. Hence we are brought again to our +conclusion, that the change called the new birth is effected by the +Holy Spirit, on the ground of certain conditional acts of him who is +the subject of the change. +</p> + +<p> +“But the very <i>nature</i> of repentance and of faith, the very +<i>definition</i> of the two mental states expressed by these terms,” it +is said, “proves that a person, to possess them, must be regenerate; +or at any rate, that these states cannot be conditions of +regeneration, to be performed by the sinner.” Let us attend for a +moment to this objection in detail. +</p> + +<p> +What is repentance? “It is,” say some Calvinistic writers, “a +<i>change of mind</i>. The original means this, and so it should have +been rendered; and if it had been so rendered, it would have set +this controversy at rest.” But what if we should grant (what I do +not believe) that the original word means this, and this only, still +it would not follow that the change of mind called the new birth is +meant by this term. A change of judgment is a change of mind—a +change of purpose is a change of mind—any change of the general +current of feeling, such as that from carelessness and stupidity in +to a state of anxiety and earnest inquiry, what shall I do to be +saved? is a change of mind.—And such a change of mind indispensably +precedes regeneration. No person ever, from being a careless, +hardened sinner, becomes an anxious and earnest inquirer after +salvation, without an important change in his judgment, moral +feeling, and volitions. Hence this definition does not at all help +the objector, unless he can prove that the Scriptures always mean by +this term that change which they elsewhere call the new birth. +Indeed, since we have already shown that repentance is our work, and +the renewing of the heart exclusively God’s work, it follows +incontrovertibly, that the change of mind called repentance is not +the new birth. +</p> + +<p> +If repentance meant that change of mind called the new birth, then +the regenerate would be <i>often born again</i>, and that, too, without +backsliding; for those who are growing the fastest in grace repent +the most constantly and the most deeply. +</p> + +<p> +Again: it is objected, that “faith is not a voluntary state of mind, +and therefore cannot be considered a condition, performed by the +sinner, in order to regeneration.” To believe is doubtless, in many +instances, perfectly involuntary. There are numerous cases in which +a man is obliged to believe, both against his will and against his +desires. There are other cases, again, in which the will is not only +much concerned in believing, but in which its action is +indispensable in order to believe. And the faith of the Gospel is +pre-eminently an instance of this kind. “Faith,” saith the word, +“cometh by hearing.” But hearing implies attention; and every +deliberate act of attention implies an act of the will. A man can no +more leap, by one transition, from a state of entire carelessness +into the faith that justifies the soul, than he can make a world. +But he can take the steps that lead to this result. To believe to +the saving of the soul requires <i>consideration</i>, <i>self examination</i>, +a <i>knowledge</i> of the object of faith, or the truth to be believed, +<i>earnest looking</i>, and <i>prayerful seeking</i>. But is there no act of +the will in all these? It is said that “the Spirit takes of the +things of Jesus Christ, and shows them unto us.” And it is doubtless +true, that the soul cannot get such a view of Christ as encourages +him to throw himself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Saviour, +until the Spirit makes, to the mind’s eye, this special exhibition +of the “things of Christ.” But when does he do this? Does he come to +the sinner when he is careless and inattentive, and show him the +<i>things of Christ?</i> No! it is only to the inquiring and self +-despairing sinner, who is earnestly groaning out the sentiment in +the bitterness of his heart, “Who shall deliver me from the body of +this death?” And is there no voluntary action in all this? +</p> + +<p> +But it will perhaps be wearisome to the reader to pursue these +objections farther. I should not have gone so fully into this part +of the subject, but for the fact, that this sentiment of +unconditional regeneration is considered the strong hold of +Calvinism. This point moreover appears to have been but slightly +handled by most of the anti-Calvinistic writers; and therefore I +have felt it the more necessary to attempt an answer to all the most +important arguments that are adduced in opposition to our view of +this doctrine. I am far from thinking I have done the subject +justice, and may have cause perhaps hereafter to acknowledge that +some of my minor positions are untenable, and that some of my +expressions need modifying or explaining, although I have used what +care and circumspection my time and circumstances would permit in +reference not only to the doctrine itself, but also in reference to +the forms of expression. And as it respects the leading doctrines +here inculcated, I repose upon them with entire confidence. However +the theory clashes with that of many great and good men, it is +believed to be the only theory that will consistently explain the +practice and preaching of these very men. It is, in my view, the +only theory that will satisfactorily and consistently explain those +great and leading principles by which evangelical Christians expect +to convert the world to Christ. And, if this be true, the sooner the +Christian Church is established on this foundation, the better. We +have already seen that a mixture of error in the essential doctrines +leads to various mutations from extreme to extreme of dangerous +heresy. How long before the Church shall be <i>rooted and grounded in +the truth!</i> May He who said, <span class="sc">Let light be; and light was</span>, hasten +that glorious day! +</p> + + + + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:9em"> +THE END. +</p> + + + + +<h1><a name="Footnotes" id="Footnotes">Footnotes +</a></h1> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f1" id="n1" name="n1">[1]</a></sup> Many objections have been made, by the reviewers, to my manner +of stating the doctrine of predestination. It is objected, that the +great body of Calvinists believe, no more than the Arminians, that +God “efficiently controls and actuates the human will.” On a +careful, and I hope, candid revision of the subject, however, I +cannot satisfy myself that the objection is valid. I am quite sure +God must control the will, or he cannot, as Calvinists teach, secure +the proposed end, by the prescribed means. It is readily granted +that Calvinists deny <i>such a control</i> as destroys the freedom of the +will. But it is the object of the sermon and of the following +controversy to show that Calvinistic predestination is, on any +ground of consistency, utterly irreconcilable with mental freedom. +How far this has been done, of course, each will judge for himself. +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f2" id="n2" name="n2">[2]</a></sup> It seems, to the author of the sermon, but little better than +trifling, to object, as some have, to this argument on foreknowledge, +that “God must predetermine his works before he could certainly know +what would take place; and hence, in the order of cause and effect, +he must decree in order to know.” It is readily conceded, that, in +the order of nature, the Divine Being could not foreknow that a world +would certainly exist, until he had determined to create it. But was +there no prescience back of this? Did he determine to create a +universe, independent of a view of all the bearings in the case? If +so, he created at random and in ignorance. If not, then a view of all +the results preceded his determination to create; and thus we are led +irresistibly to the doctrine of the sermon, that “God foreknows in +order to predestinate,” +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f3" id="n3" name="n3">[3]</a></sup> The review of the sermon, in the Christian Spectator, is +understood to be from the pen of Doctor Fitch, professor of divinity +in Yale College. +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f4" id="n4" name="n4">[4]</a></sup> See Christian Spectator, Vol. iv, No. 3. +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f5" id="n5" name="n5">[5]</a></sup> A part of this sermon has lately been published, in a tract +form, and circulated with the <i>avowed</i> purpose of counteracting the +influence of the sermon “on predestination.” +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f6" id="n6" name="n6">[6]</a></sup> A man was afflicted with the hydrophobia. When his paroxysms +were coming on he was aware of it, and gave warning to his friends +to be on their guard, that he might not injure them. Suppose, +however, he knew of a sure remedy, but voluntarily neglected to +avail himself of it. Would he not in that case be guilty, not only +of all the evils that might result to others from his malady; but +also of self murder? And yet this man’s madness was entirely beyond +the direct control of his will. +</p> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Calvinistic Controversy, by Wilbur Fisk + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + +***** This file should be named 38232-h.htm or 38232-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/3/38232/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Calvinistic Controversy + Embracing a Sermon on Predestination and Election and + Several Numbers, Formally Published in the Christian + Advocate and Journal. + +Author: Wilbur Fisk + +Release Date: December 6, 2011 [EBook #38232] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + +CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY: + +EMBRACING A SERMON + +ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION, + +AND SEVERAL NUMBERS, + +FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL. + +BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D. + +NEW-YORK, + +PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON, + +For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200 +Mulberry-street. + +_J. Collord, Printer_. + +1835. + + + + +"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and +T. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern +District of New-York." + + + + +CONTENTS. + +Advertisement + +Sermon on Predestination and Election + +I. Reply to the Christian Spectator + +II. A proposition to Calvinists + +III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism + +IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in +this country + +V. Same subject continued + +VI. Predestination + +VII. Predestination, continued + +VIII. Moral agency and accountability + +IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued + +X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions +of grace + +XI. Same subject continued + +XII. Objections to gracious ability answered + +XIII. Regeneration + +XIV. Regeneration, continued + +XV. Regeneration, continued + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + +The numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were +written at different times, and in some instances at quite distant +intervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an +apology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the +reader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be +found in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now +presented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the +same reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision, +as it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the +more set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally +thought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware +that the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the +whole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has +been able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If +the public have it, therefore, it must go "with all its imperfections on +its head." Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The +publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The +doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture, +although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found +defective. + +It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election; +but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said +in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian +predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and +regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must +fall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire +question between us and the Calvinists. + +W. Fisk. + +_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835. + + + + +A DISCOURSE + +ON + +PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION. + +According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the +world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love. + +Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, +to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4, +5. + +In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election +are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting +them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational +view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present +discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole +ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the +various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the +most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that +can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form +and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the +circumstances of the present congregation. + +It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the +spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and +Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a +desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to +point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable +influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth +should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject, +nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these +views, we come to our subject, by examining, + +I. Predestination in general; + +II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of +election. + +I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to +bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has +knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future +events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be +used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is +that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity, +respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and +creatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this +kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be +no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to +which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this +subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by +the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was +ordained by him." The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--"God did, from +all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck +defines predestination to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for +his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass." With these +definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the +Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of +predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have +objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings, +so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not +definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose +and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe, +with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the +physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all +the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that +it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human +will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us, +they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon +them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of +their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1] + +The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a +threefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a +plan--and Scripture testimony. + +1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes +contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This, +however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is +self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations; +and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms, +they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct +operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind, +unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an +entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among +men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible +argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_ +predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to +come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every +thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had +not so determined it." "God," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what +he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says, +"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he +has decreed they shall come to pass." But to this idea there are +insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the +Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential +to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make +a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection +of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him, +that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be, +under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd, +then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend +upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend +upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument, +that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought, +and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute +preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be +exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous +conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with +it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine +events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent +on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived, +independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the +effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of +those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will +not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous +to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this +conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us, +therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of +cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent +upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of +his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth +from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords +with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did +predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according +to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages +predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on +foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows +in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to +foreknow.[2] + +But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The +foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because, +inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take +place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed shifting the +argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is +not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing +contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge, +which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at, +that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd. +Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's +foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse +than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would +mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect +according to the foreknowledge of God," would only mean, "that the +decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the +absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, +farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge +cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in +making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the +certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that +knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a +connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will +undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event +take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will +take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain +because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it +certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for +he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert +that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to +that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be +foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that +foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain. +Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not, +according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a +consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain, +no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the +doctrine that _God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_. + +2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. "It +cannot be conceived," it is said, "that God would leave things at +random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place +upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this +argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes +what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been +proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God +has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one +part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without +controlling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible, +and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the +necessity of a change, "on condition that his creatures act in this or +that way?" If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in +order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen +to be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity +and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities +and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his +plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does +not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of +his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no +knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and +extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government +undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of +the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of +the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate +the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The +truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the +perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the +imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords +well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and +through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in +every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long +eternity--and can such a God be disappointed? + +3. "But," say the advocates of this system, "supposing there are +difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which +at once prove the doctrine." If this is true, then indeed we must +submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a +strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one +unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single +passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever +comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in +Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God +hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all +things. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as +proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath +predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the +passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say +of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not _command_ +them, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems +altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however, +that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are +held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God's +predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are. +This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises; +nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from +Scripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of +his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward +off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is +consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for +one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same +principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all +were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, "As for you," says +Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, "ye thought +evil against me, but God meant it for good." Now without stopping here +to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are +ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures +which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God +had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them +subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power "to make the +wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath." But +does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary +to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that +because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer +from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government +decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of +the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and +control the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the +act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power. + +Again it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even +the wicked for the day of evil." That the Lord hath made all things for +his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust, +by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this +passage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted +at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked, +that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the +text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to +explain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil, +and this shall be for his glory. + +But there is another class of passages like the following:--"He doeth +according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants +of the earth." "He worketh all things after the counsel of his will." "I +will do all my pleasure." But these passages establish nothing, in +opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other +passages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleasure to +work _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures +prove that all _God's works_ are in accordance with his own will and +pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of +sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave +the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this +he will do, for "he will do all his pleasure." + +But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour +the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages +which seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the +wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--"And I will harden +Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go." "Now therefore +the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy +prophets." "He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts." "Him, +being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye +have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain." On these +and similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens +their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their +agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does +not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree +of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this +hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men +and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and +tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to +go abroad, "deceiving and being deceived." But how does this prove that +God hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits +the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and +finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of +affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this +hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit. + +As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ +was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or +any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ +by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it. + +Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in +favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against +this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient, +but also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and +formidable objections. + +1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some +acknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the "_efficient_ +cause" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word. +Take for instance the words of Calvin. "I will not scruple to own," he +says, "that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and that +every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass." In accordance with +this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that "God +procures adultery, cursings, and lyings"--"God is the author of that +act, which is evil"--"God, by his working on the hearts of the wicked, +binds them and stirs them to do evil." They deny, however, that God is +the author of sin, because they say, "God necessitates them to the +_act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:" or, that "God does not sin +when he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore +cannot sin." But these are miserable shifts. Has not the _deformity_ of +sin come to pass? Then God has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is +to give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as +much the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God +doubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it +came to pass as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the +direct procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are +nothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as certainly +as it made the world. + +We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that +these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that +they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we +make them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own +doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, "God foreordains +whatsoever comes to pass." For he that, by his will and decree, produces +and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the +author of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the +proper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of +common words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction +therefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_ +Calvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to +the consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge, +what is evidently deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient +cause of sin. + +2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of +course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen +and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the +opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them on this +subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the +Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, "a cursed doctrine"--"the +most God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day"--"one of +the prominent features of the beast"--"the enemy of God"--"the offspring +of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of hell." Others, and the greater +part of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the +ideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily, +because he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence +they exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they +will. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is +in their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to +think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the +Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is +not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. God, +according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his +decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, "every action +and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God." +The will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly +controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling +arrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency +under such a constitution; the very spring of motion to the whole +intellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible +power. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of +Omnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true, +but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the +result of God's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he +chooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon +him. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged +principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is +argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts +freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that +this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are +free--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath +deceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he +knows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in +fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does +not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the +Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man +is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be +free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will +any thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course +the whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences. + +3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays +God's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not to +sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before +them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express +purpose, as he informs us, "that they sin not;" but by his +predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an +opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us, +to secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct +opposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is +God at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his +creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are +false? When or where has God ever taught us, that he has two opposing +wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not, +without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable +Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is "of _one_ mind"--that +his "ways are equal;" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to +relieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the +mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_ +contradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a +palpable absurdity. _God prohibits the sinful act--God ordains and +procures the sinful act--God wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom +he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I +can embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can +believe that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less +than the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at +the same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God's +incomprehensible nature. + +4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added, +that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of +God. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes +laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for +their transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and +expostulates with sinners, saying, "How can I give thee up--my heart is +melted within me, my repentings are kindled together,"--"O Jerusalem! +Jerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,"--and +still he himself "impels the will of men," to all this wickedness--if I +say God does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where +is his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant? +What, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does +this doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out +into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough +to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters +of this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their +eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them +wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical +and practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which +leads to another objection to this doctrine. + +5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in +their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus: +Whatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And +God will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God decrees +is unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is +unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is governed +by the hidden counsel of God." Therefore God will not punish any of his +creatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in +this reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is +true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice. +And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is +prevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support +on the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought, +that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and +that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch +as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have +leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical +necessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the +doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that +the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian +predestination, is the element in which infidelity "lives and moves and +has its being." And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is +it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed +this Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are +incalculable. + +These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this +doctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you +may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is, +doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of +unconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists "the +doctrines of grace." But for unconditional election, predestination +would not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for +predestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence +these have very properly been called "twin doctrines," and must stand or +fall together. Let us pass then to the next proposition. + +II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to +election. + +Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an +election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by +God:--thus Christ was God's elect, for the redemption of the world; and +Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of +whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar +privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this +life:--thus Jacob and his descendants were God's chosen people, to the +enjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his +descendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and +thus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of partition, made by the +former decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down, +the Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the +new covenant, called the "election of grace." This election is +unconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and +many other passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more +particularly in another place. + +There is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is +the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the +Church.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us, +maintain that, "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his +glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and +others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are +predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath +chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of +faith or good works_." Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that +"God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all +that should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his +own goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that +God did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally +and obstinately continue in unbelief." Thus it is seen, from the +statement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character, +and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they +are foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates +directly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an +absolute act of sovereignty--God elects them for no other reason or +condition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency +or responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is +entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our +views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on +the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to +receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected, +because he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other +differences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself, +requires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be +also--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and +infallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands +intimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a +chain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we +acknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We +assert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is +unconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state +and answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and +finally, urge some objections against unconditional election and +reprobation. + +1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life, +is drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God +are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of +election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the +Divine prescience. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through +sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood +of Jesus Christ." "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be +conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us +decisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that +this election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on +the ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore, +that men are predestinated to eternal life, "without any foresight of +faith or good works," must be false. + +2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can +only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free +moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must +believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and +obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and +criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of +free agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it +has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its +responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will. +And if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter +impossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of God, +imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible, +in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral +agent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make +man a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be +controlled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so +controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining +principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being +established, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election +necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and +controlling the will. But this would be to counteract God's own work, +and to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such +irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And +since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures, +it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this +election is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one +overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of +salvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election. + +3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and +the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a +conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted "to take heed +lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in +departing from the living God?" "lest a promise being left of entering +into rest, any should come short?" lest _they_ should "also be cut off?" +Why should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he +should be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's +being lost. If not, then all these passages are not only without +meaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours +held out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear +is. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of +the elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be +cautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and +no promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand +fast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates +against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates +a very ungracious work for the "Spirit of grace" to be engaged in, +clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of +reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean? +Will it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions +are all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree +of election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is +fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election +is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and that "God's +decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills +necessarily comes to pass," and is therefore sure, "because he has +decreed it." The moment, therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes +sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a +falsehood, or that God's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I +presume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or +frustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the +elect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and +warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and +deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who +undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious +tales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is giving out these +intimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal, +unchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were +planned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a +God of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure," +_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail +of the grace of God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion +therefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of +election to eternal life, on conditions; "He that believeth: shall be +saved." + +4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces +much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he +feel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy, +or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is +founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit +of God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in +order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion +of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said, +that it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the +decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore, +it is conditional. + +5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have +time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, "For many are called, +but few are chosen." This passage, with the parable of the wedding that +precedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the +call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and +fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly +prepared. John xv, 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would love +you, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of +the world, therefore the world hateth you." This passage teaches that +Christ's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them +out of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when +they became of a different character from the world; for then it was, +and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2 +Thess. ii, 13, "Because God hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to +salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the +truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election +_unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification +and faith unto salvation. + +From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine +attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an +unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election. + +In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of +unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as +they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their +system. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is +proposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse, +however, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual +texts, but of classes of texts. + +1. The first class of passages that we will now examine, which are +supposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that +speak of a predestination _unto_ holiness. Our text is one of the +strongest instances of this kind, "He hath chosen us from the foundation +of the world, that we should be holy--having predestinated us unto the +adoption of sons," &c. See also Rom. viii, 29, "For whom he did +foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his +Son," and "whom he did predestinate--he called--justified--and +sanctified." The argument upon these and similar passages is, that the +decree of predestination could not be founded on their faith or +holiness; because they were predestinated to _become_ holy--the decree +of predestination had their holiness for its object and end. But if +these passages had an allusion to a personal election to eternal life, +they would not prove unconditional election, "because," to use the +language of another, "it would admit of being questioned, whether the +choosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here mentioned, +was a choice of certain persons _as men merely_, or as _believing_ men, +which is certainly the most rational." This exposition must necessarily +be given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were the +subjects of predestination, were first _foreknown_: foreknown, not +merely as existing, for in this sense _all_ were foreknown, but +foreknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why _they_ +should be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as believers +in Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of God, they +were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and +glory hereafter. And according to the same Divine plan, the order of +this work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. Glorification. And this +interpretation, which so obviously upon the face of it is the meaning of +the passage from Romans, would also be a good meaning to the passage in +Ephesians, if that passage should be understood in reference to personal +election. But I do not so understand it; and I think any unprejudiced +reader, by looking at the context, and especially from the 9th to the +11th verses inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter, +will perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of +God, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the Gentiles +as well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of grace, on equal +terms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of partition was to be broken +down between Jew and Gentile; and this was the mystery which was +concealed for ages, not being understood even by the Jews themselves, +but then by the Gospel was brought to light. According to this plan, the +Ephesians and all other Gentiles were chosen or elected to these +Christian privileges, the very design and purpose of which were to make +them holy; and in the improvement of which, according to the prescribed +conditions of faith in Christ, and repentance toward God, they should +become his adopted children. + +This fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gracious +covenant, is the election most spoken of in the New Testament.--And the +reason why it was so often introduced, especially in the writings of +Paul, who was the chief apostle to the Gentiles, was, because the Jews +so uniformly and earnestly opposed this feature of Christianity. They +could not be reconciled to the idea, that the peculiar and distinctive +character of their theocracy and ecclesiastical policy should be so +changed, or that the dealings of God with the world should be explained +in such a manner as to give _them_ no superior claims, in the privileges +of the Divine covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to +be God's elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates. +The apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose +these notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a +barrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus the +designs of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also because +these Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the grace of God. +They implied, that the original design of God in favouring the Jews, was +founded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, but upon some goodness in +them or their fathers. Hence they not only limited the blessings of the +Gospel, but they also corrupted its gracious character, and thereby fed +their own Pharisaic pride, and dishonoured God. This will open the way +for explaining many other scriptures which the Calvinists press into +their service. + +2. Especially will it assist in explaining those passages which speak of +election as depending solely on the sovereign will of God. The strongest +of these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. This +portion of revelation is the strong hold, as is supposed, of Calvinism. +Whereas, we humbly conceive that _there is not one word_ in the whole +chapter, of unconditional and personal election to eternal life. It is +only necessary to read that epistle carefully, to see that the apostle +is combatting that exclusive and Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already +alluded to, and is proving in a forcible strain of argumentation, from +reason and Scripture, that the foundation of the plan of salvation for +sinners, was the goodness and unmerited love of God--that all, both Jews +and Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to +God--all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, be +saved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, that +God's favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness in them, +but of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his covenant of +favour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which embraced the +Gentiles, was "not of works, lest any man should boast," "not of him +that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." +The apostle shows them, too, that the covenant made with Abraham was not +for circumcision, nor for the works of the law, so far as it affected +him or his posterity, because it was made while Abraham was in +uncircumcision, and on the condition of faith. He argues farther, that +this election of the Jews to the enjoyment of these national and +ecclesiastical privileges, was not because they were children of +Abraham, for Ishmael was a child of Abraham, and yet he and his +posterity were rejected; nor yet because they were the children of +Abraham through Isaac, because Esau and his posterity were reprobated +from these national privileges, while Jacob and his posterity were the +chosen seed--not chosen to eternal life, because many of them perished +in sin and unbelief, but to the peculiar privileges of God's covenant +people. And all this because it was the good pleasure of his will. And +as a sovereign, he had the same right to elect the Gentiles to the +enjoyment of the covenant of mercy, and upon the same conditions of +faith. The apostle concludes this reasoning by an argument which cuts +off entirely the idea of unconditional personal election and +reprobation. He informs us, that the reason why the unbelieving Jews did +not attain to personal righteousness, was "because they sought it not by +faith, but as it were by the works of the law;" and the Gentiles +attained to personal righteousness, because they sought it by faith. +Hence, those that were not his people, became his people, and those that +were not beloved, became beloved--and these, "not of the Jews only, but +also of the Gentiles." Whereas, if the doctrine we oppose be true, the +elect were _always_ his people, and _always_ beloved, and that because +he pleased to have it so. That portion of Scripture, therefore, on which +Calvinism leans for its greatest support, not only affords it no aid, +but actually teaches a different doctrine. There is indeed something of +mystery hanging over the providence of God, in bestowing peculiar +advantages on some, and withholding them from others. But on this +subject much light is cast from various considerations which we have not +time to enlarge upon; but especially from that wholesome and consistent +Scripture doctrine, that "it is required of a man according to what he +hath, and not according to what he hath not." This removes at once all +complaint of Jew and Gentile, and authorizes the reply, so often +misapplied, "Who art thou that repliest against God?" As a sovereign, +God has a right to make his creatures differ in these things, so long as +he requires only as he gives. But this differs as widely from the +Calvinistic idea of sovereignty, as _justice_ from _injustice_, as +_equity_ from _iniquity_. In fact, God no where in the Scripture, places +the election of individuals to eternal life, solely on the ground of his +sovereignty, but uniformly on the ground of their complying with the +conditions of the covenant of grace. Hence his people are a _peculiar +people_--his sheep _hear his voice and follow him_--they are _chosen out +of the world_--they are _in Christ_, not by an eternal decree of +election, but _by faith_--for "if any man be _in Christ_, he is a _new +creature_"--and of course, he is not _in him_, until he is a "new +creature"--then, and not before, they become his, and he seals them as +such, "In whom, _after that ye believed_, ye were sealed with the Holy +Spirit of promise." But if they were elected from eternity, they would +be his when they did not _hear his voice_, and were not _new creatures_. + +3. From what has been said, we can easily answer a third class of +scriptures which the Calvinists dwell upon to support their system +--viz, those which declare salvation to be of _grace_ and not of +_works_. Of these there is evidently a large catalogue of very express +and unequivocal passages. Take two or three for an example of the whole, +"Even so then, at the present time, there is a remnant, according to the +election of grace, and if it be by grace then it is no more of works, +otherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, then it is no +more grace, otherwise work is no more work." "By grace ye are saved." +"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of his children, &c, to the +praise of the glory of his grace." "Not by works of righteousness which +we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of +regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Now we profess to believe +these scriptures as unqualifiedly and as cordially as the Calvinists; +and we think them perfectly in accordance with our views of election. +For we believe, as has been already stated, that God's plan for saving +sinners originated entirely in his love to his undeserving creatures. +There was nothing in all the character and circumstances of the fallen +family, except their sin and deserved misery, that could claim the +interposition of God's saving power. The way of executing his gracious +plan, and rendering it available in any case, he of course, as a +sovereign, reserved to himself. And if he saw that a conditional +election was best suited to the principles of his government, and the +responsibility of man, shall it be said, this cannot be, for it destroys +the idea of grace? _Cannot_ a conditional election be of grace? Let the +intelligent and candid answer. Even many of the Calvinists acknowledge +that _salvation_ is conditional, and yet it is of grace; for "by grace +ye are saved." Now if salvation is conditional and yet of grace, why not +election? Let Calvinists answer this question. + +But that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident, I +think, from the following considerations. 1. It was pure unmerited love +that moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The Gospel plan, +therefore, with all its _provisions_ and _conditions_, is of grace. Not +a step in that whole system, but rests in grace, is presented by grace, +and is executed through grace. 3. Even the power of the will to choose +life, and the conditions of life, is a _gracious power_. A fallen man, +without grace, could no more choose to submit to God than a fallen +angel. Herein we differ widely from the Calvinists. They tell us man has +a _natural_ power to choose life. If so, he has power to get to heaven +without grace! We say, on the contrary, that man is utterly unable to +choose the way to heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace +of God. It is grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and +strengthens him to seek after and obtain salvation, for "without Christ +we _can do nothing_." Let the candid judge between us, then, and decide +which system most robs our gracious Redeemer of his glory, that which +gives man a _native_ and _inherent_ power to get to heaven of himself, +or that which attributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the sinner +repents and believes, there is no merit in these acts to procure +forgiveness and regeneration, and therefore, though he is _now_, and _on +these conditions_, elected, and made an heir of salvation, yet it is for +Christ's sake, and "not for works of righteousness which he has done." +Thus we "bring forth the top stone with shouting, crying _grace_, +_grace_, unto it." Having gone over and examined the arguments in favour +of unconditional election, we come to the last part of our subject; +which was to urge some objections against this doctrine. + +1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, necessarily +implies the unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who hold +to the former, seem to deny the latter; for they represent God as +reprobating sinners, in view of their sins. When all were sinners, they +say God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, they say the decree +of damnation against the reprobates is just, because it is against +_sinners_. But this explanation is virtually giving up the system, +inasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is +supported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on +foreknowledge; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and +then predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case then, in which +the argument for Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own +supporters. But again if God must fix by his decree all parts of his +plan, in order to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny +of the reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do +this, then the Calvinistic argument in favour of predestination, drawn +from the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more: this explanation +of the decree of reprobation destroys all the strongest Scripture +arguments which the Calvinists urge in favour of unconditional election. +The passages, for instance, in the ninth of Romans, which are so often +quoted in favour of Calvinian election, are connected with others, +equally strong, in favour of unconditional reprobation. When it is said, +"He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy," it is said also, "Whom +he will he hardeneth." He that "makes one vessel unto honour, maketh +another unto dishonour." He that says, "Jacob have I loved," says also +in the same manner, "Esau have I hated." Now if these relate to personal +election to eternal life, they relate also to personal reprobation to +eternal death. But if there is any explanation, by which these are +showed not to prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same +principle of explanation will, and _must_ show, that they do not prove +Calvinistic election. From henceforth, therefore, let all those +Calvinists who profess not to believe in unconditional reprobation, +cease to urge, in favour of their system, any arguments drawn from the +foreknowledge of God, or the necessity of a Divine plan, or from those +scriptures that are most commonly quoted in favour of their doctrine. +But when they do this, their system must necessarily fall; for all its +main pillars will be removed. But I have not done with this objection +yet. Whoever maintains that "God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to +pass," must also hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to +pass, that some are lost? Then this was ordained. Was sin necessary, as +a pretence to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these and other +views of the subject, Calvin was led to say, that "election could not +stand without reprobation," and that it was "quite silly and childish" +to attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the +unconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, _must_, to +be consistent with themselves, take into their creed, the "horrible +decree" of reprobation.--They must believe that in the ages of eternity +God determined to create men and angels for the express purpose to damn +them eternally! That he determined to introduce sin, and influence men +to commit sin, and harden them in it, that they might be fit subjects of +his wrath! That for doing as they were impelled to do, by the +irresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie down for ever, under the +scalding phials of his vengeance in the pit of hell! To state this +doctrine in its true character, is enough to chill one's blood--and we +are drawn by all that is rational within us, to turn away from such a +God with horror, as from the presence of an Almighty Tyrant. + +2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free grace +and the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the reprobates, there +is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very existence, connected +as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite curse. The +temporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere offers that are held +out to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if +they can be termed grace at all, must be called _damning grace_. For all +this is only fattening them for the slaughter, and fitting them to +suffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments +that await them. Hence Calvin's sentiment, that "God calls to the +reprobates, that they may be more deaf--kindles a light, that they may +be more blind--brings his doctrine to them, that they may be more +ignorant--and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be healed," +is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this system. Surely, +then, no one will pretend, that, according to this doctrine, there is +any grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will show, +that there is little or none for the elect. It is said, that God, out of +his mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him +thereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there is nothing in +the creature to move him thereto, how can it be called _mercy_ or +_compassion?_ He did not determine to elect them because they were +miserable, but because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the +exciting cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have +elected them all. Is such a decree of election founded in love to the +suffering object? No: _it is the result of the most absolute and +omnipotent selfishness conceivable_. It is the exhibition of a character +that sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Almighty power, +_to create, to damn, and to save_. + +Some indeed pretend that, at any rate, _salvation_ is of grace, if +election is not, because God saves _miserable_, _perishing_ sinners. But +who made them miserable perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of +God's decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a +constitution which necessarily and unavoidably involves them in sin and +suffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign honour of saving +them? Surely the _tenderest_ mercies of this system are cruel--its +brightest parts are dark--its boasted mercy hardly comes up to sheer +justice, even to the elect; since they only receive back what God had +deprived them of, and for the want of which they had suffered perhaps +for years; and to obtain which, they could do nothing even as a +condition, until God by his sovereign power bestowed it upon them. And +as for the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably to them, a savour of +death unto death. To them Christ came, that they might have death, and +that they might have it more abundantly. Thus, turn this system as you +will, it sweeps away the mercy and goodness of God, destroys the grace +of the Gospel, and in most cases, transforms even the invitations and +promises into scalding messages of aggravated wrath. + +3. The doctrine we oppose makes God partial and a respecter of persons; +contrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. For it +represents God as determining to save some and damn others, without +reference to their character, all being precisely in the same state. To +deny this, is to acknowledge that the decree of election and reprobation +had respect to character, which is to give up the doctrine. Some indeed +pretend, that the decree of election was unconditional, but not the +decree of reprobation. But this is impossible; for there could be no +decree of election, only in view of the whole number from which the +choice was to be made; and the very determination to select such a +number, and those only, implied the exclusion of all the rest. If it be +said, as the Sublapsarians contend, that the decree of election did not +come in until all were fallen, or viewed in the mind of God as fallen; +and therefore since all might have been justly damned, there was no +injustice to those who were left, though some of the guilty were taken +and saved; we reply, That even this would not wholly remove the +objection of partiality. But we need not dwell here, because we have a +shorter and more decisive way to dispose of this argument. The truth is, +it does not cover the whole ground of our objection. Had God nothing to +do with man until his prescient eye beheld the whole race in a ruined +state? How came man in this state? He was plunged there by the sin of +his federal head. But how came _he_ to sin? "Adam sinned," says Calvin, +"because God so ordained." And so every one must say, that believes God +foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. Taking all the links together, +they stand thus:--God decreed to create intelligent beings--he decreed +that they should all become sinners and children of wrath--and it was +so. He then decreed that part of those whom he had constituted heirs of +wrath, should be taken, and washed, and saved, and the others left to +perish; and then we are told there is no unjust partiality in God, since +they all deserve to be damned! What a singular evasion is this! God +wishes to damn a certain portion of his creatures, and save the rest; +but he cannot do this without subjecting himself to the charge of +partiality. To avoid this, he plunges them all into sin and ruin, and +forthwith he declares them all children of wrath, and heirs of hell. But +in the plenitude of his grace, he snatches some from the pit of ruin, +and leaves the rest in remediless wo! Is such a supposition worthy of +our righteous God?--Does it accord either with his justice or wisdom? +Reason, with half an eye, can see through the flimsy veil, and discover +the weakness of the device. I know an attempt has been often made to +charge these consequences upon our system, as well as upon the +Calvinistic doctrine. For if it is acknowledged that man is born +depraved, and this depravity is damning in its nature, does it not +follow, it is asked, that all deserve to perish? And therefore God may +elect some and justly pass by the rest. I answer--Although all moral +depravity, derived or contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by +virtue of the atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity +are counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until by a voluntary +rejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his nature +the object of his own choice.--Hence, although abstractly considered, +this depravity is destructive to the possessors, yet through the grace +of the Gospel, _all_ are born free from condemnation. So the Apostle +Paul, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to +condemnation, so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon +all men, unto justification of life." In accordance with these views +also, the ground of condemnation, according to the Scriptures, is not +our native depravity; but the sinner is condemned for _rejecting +Christ_,--for _refusing_ to occupy upon the _talents given_,--for +_rejecting light_,--for _quenching the Spirit_,--for _unbelief_. Here +then is the difference on this point between the Calvinists and us. They +hold that God, by his decree, plunged Adam and all his race into the pit +of sin, from which none of them had the means of escape; but by an +omnipotent act of partial grace, he delivers a part, and the remainder +are left unavoidably to perish. We, on the contrary, believe that by +Adam's unnecessitated sin he, and in him all his posterity, became +obnoxious to the curse of the Divine law. As the first man sinned +personally and actively, he was personally condemned; but as his +posterity had no agency or personal existence, they could only have +perished seminally in him. By the promise of a Saviour however, our +federal head was restored to the possibility of obtaining salvation, +through faith in the Redeemer. And in this restoration, _all_ the +seminal generations of men were included. Their possible and prospective +existence was restored; and their personal and active existence secured. +And with this also, the possibility of salvation was secured to all. To +such as never come to a personally responsible age, this salvation was +secured unconditionally by Christ; to _all_ those who arrived to the age +of accountability, salvation was made possible, on equal and impartial +conditions. Thus, while on our principle, there is not the slightest +ground for a charge of partiality; on the Calvinistic principle, the +charge seems to lie with all its weight. It makes God, in the worst +sense of the terms, _partial, and a respecter of persons_. + +4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express and +repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. It +will surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that Christ +"tasted death for every man"--that he "gave himself a ransom for +all"--that he "died for all"--that he became "a propitiation for the +sins of the whole world"--because, these are so many express Scripture +propositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. And while these +stand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional election must fall, +for the two doctrines are incompatible. That particular election and +partial redemption must stand or fall together, has been acknowledged, +and is still maintained by most Calvinists; and therefore they have +endeavoured to explain away those passages, which so clearly declare +that "Christ died for all." But in this work they have found so many +difficulties, that others, and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy +in New-England, have acknowledged a general redemption, and have +undertaken to reconcile with it the doctrine of particular election and +reprobation. But this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To +say nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the +reprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation +more aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let +these very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its object +was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be +saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be +saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of +unconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement +has only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made +only for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn +of this dilemma they please; either will destroy their doctrine. For as +it is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and Gospel provisions, +_sufficient_ to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded +from these blessings, so it is idle to talk about a redemption for +_all_, which includes provisions sufficient only to save the _elect_. +Not even the fiction of a _natural ability_ in all men to serve God and +get to heaven, will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument, +that the reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without +grace, and in spite of God's decree, still, as this is called a +_natural_ ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It +is equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be +universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if they +would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravity +which renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For this +is the same as to say, that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal +his patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive +weakness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which +the medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this it is no +medicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for +man's extreme depravity, it is no provision for him. If it does not give +a gracious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has +accomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate. Since, therefore, +according to Calvinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate neither +natural nor moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to +be saved, it follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But +as this is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this +conclusion must be false. + +5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several +objections to this doctrine:--Such as that it takes away all motives to +repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, "If I am to be +saved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I must be, +do what I can;"--it leads to the idea of infant damnation--it weakens +the zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and benevolence--it +destroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to +prevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely +for the glory of God; and sin was ordained for the purpose of giving God +an opportunity of glorifying himself in punishing it. These and others +might be dwelt upon with effect; but passing them all, I hasten to the +conclusion of my arguments, by urging only one more objection to the +system I am opposing. + +6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates themselves +seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of its features, +and are constantly changing their manner of stating and defending their +system. A little attention to the history of the controversy between +predestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and force of +this objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps out of +sight some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much against +its advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the +exception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable upon +the system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early +defenders of unconditional election came out boldly and fearlessly with +their doctrine. If modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need +no other refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of +Calvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various forms of +explanation and modes of proof, and also to various modifications of the +system itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, "Agreement of Brethren," +&c, says:--"The question, as to the object of the decrees, has gone out +among our Calvinistic brethren into endless digladiations and +irreconcilable divisions," and then goes on to mention nine of these +"irreconcilable divisions" that prevailed at his day. At the present day +these school subtleties are not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a +more popular cast, and such as are suited to cover up the offensive +features of the system, are now introduced. The modern defence of this +doctrine consists chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous +technicalities which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common +language another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now +a common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their +pastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to some, at +least, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves to spread the +sentiment. + +This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more +reluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. To +represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren +of insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth would +induce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an excessive but +honest zeal for their system, or whether it is supposed the cause is so +important, and at the same time so difficult to be sustained, that the +end will justify what, in other cases, would be judged questionable +policy, and hardly reconcilable with the spirit of a guileless +Christianity, is certainly not for me to decide. With respect to their +motives, they will stand or fall by the judgment of Him that trieth the +reins. But the course, at any rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one +instance:--All sinners, we are told, may come to Christ _if they will;_ +and therefore they are criminal if they do not.--Now this mode of speech +corresponds very well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not +been specially instructed in the dialect of this theology, would +understand that this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics, +implied an inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And +yet this is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a +will to come to Christ, we _may_, yet by a _Divine constitution_ it is +as much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of +Jehovah,--Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; they +have a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, and another +thing in popular language. It never occurs to the generality of mankind, +when they are told they may do thus and thus, _if they will_, that there +is a secret omnipotent influence impelling and controlling the will. +They suppose these expressions, therefore, mean that, independent of all +irresistible foreign influences, they have, within themselves, the power +to choose or not to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker +differs as much from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative. + +In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation that +is given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is +kept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern +Calvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too; but it +is taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned Calvinism, in +its primitive plain dress, we are told _these are old authors;_ we do +not believe with them: "if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we +would not have been partakers with them in _their errors_," and yet +"they are witnesses unto themselves, that they _are the children_ of +them" who taught these errors. They recommend their writings, they +garnish their sepulchres, they teach their catechisms to the rising +generation; they say, even in their Church articles of faith, "We +believe in the doctrines of grace, as held and taught by the _fathers_ +and _reformers_ in the Church,"--and especially do they hold to that +root and foundation of the whole system, "God hath, from all eternity, +foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." + +Since I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of this +objection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of this +same ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of +Scripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different +constructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the +subscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of faith +have been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous +candidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for +professorships, in their theological institutions, are required to +subscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected, +doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, though +in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How would +honest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the same +sentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches that bear his +name! He would not only call them "silly and childish," but he would, +doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenuousness +and cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shunning and +smoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of their +system. How would he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing +their system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same +foundation of predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of +them what they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates, +may come to Christ and be saved?--why they pretended to hold to +election, and not to reprobation?--how they could reconcile general +redemption with particular election?--and especially would he frown +indignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in +what has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New +-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any taint +or sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists, +exclusively and entirely, in _moral exercise!_ But probably he would get +little satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear his name. +They would tell him that the old forms of this system were so repulsive, +the people would not receive them; and that, being hard pressed by their +antagonists, they had thrown up these new redoubts, and assumed these +new positions, not only to conceal their doctrine, but if possible to +defend it. And as he could get little satisfaction of _them_, he would +get less from us.--Could we meet the venerable reformer, we would thank +him for his successful zeal and labour in the Protestant cause; but we +would expostulate with him for giving sanction and currency to his +"horrible decree." We would tell him he had committed to his followers a +system so abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by +Scripture, that they had been _driven_ into all these changes in hope of +finding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we +considered this as a striking and convincing argument against the +doctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; that +these changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms that the +doctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away. + +But I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration, +Christian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. Whatever +you may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I think, of +escaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments here defended, +will of course approve; and those who believe in predestination will of +course be reconciled to the preaching because God hath decreed it. It +hath come to pass that I have preached as I have, and therefore it is a +part of the Divine plan. It hath come pass that Arminianism exists, and +therefore this is a part of the Divine plan. We beg our brethren who +differ from us, not to fight against God's plan if they say it is right +for us to fight against it, because this also is decreed--I answer, This +only confirms our objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity +against himself. From all such inconsistencies, _may the God of truth +deliver us_. Amen. + + + + +NUMBER I. + +REPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.[3] + +This sermon had been before the public almost two years before it +received any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of the +advocates of predestination. After the third edition was announced, +there were several passing acrimonious censures in some of the +Calvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of the question +at issue between us and the predestinarians. At length the Rev. Mr. +Tyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a sermon which was +evidently written in reference to the sermon on predestination. This +sermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but its general positions were +so indefinite, and its modes of illustration so vague, it seemed hardly +calculated to narrow the field of controversy or hasten a decision of +the question at issue. For example: Mr. T. defines election to be "the +eternal purpose of God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he +wisely can, and no others." With such a proposition there certainly can +be no controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point +in dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There +are two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all controversy, +and especially religious controversy, ought to be carefully guarded +against. The one is an attempt to make the subjects of difference more +numerous and consequential than they are in truth; and the other is an +attempt to cover up real differences under indefinite propositions and +ambiguous terms. Both these errors may be the result of honest motives: +the former may arise from a jealous regard to the truth, and the latter +from a love of peace. Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the +one promote the cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent +peace. Indeed, bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an +additional impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union +produces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the +Church, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and injurious; +yet, as an individual, I never can sign a _union creed_ of doubtful +terms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my while to +contend about such terms and articles. I should fear the searching +interrogatory of Him who questioned Job: "Who is this that darkeneth +counsel by words without knowledge?" In the present controversy there is +danger of this ambiguity also from a less commendable principle than a +love of peace, viz. an adherence to old symbols of faith to avoid the +imputation of a change; while, at the same time, to escape the force of +unanswerable argument, vague propositions, ambiguous definitions, and +equivocal terms are made the bulwark of defence. This principle was +alluded to in the sermon on predestination; and although it has given +great offence to some of the Calvinists, and is represented by the +author of the review which we are about to notice as being "utterly +unworthy of the attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after +truth;" yet it seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks +himself incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem _utterly unworthy_ +of an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon +systems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the arguments +urged against them, show the strength of the one and the weakness of the +other. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer Mr. Tyler's sermon, +my strictures would consist chiefly in pointing out its indefiniteness +and incongruity. But this, without convincing, might give offence. And +although I see no way of continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists +now manage it, without alluding to this course of the advocates of +predestination, yet I am happy to say there is less of it in the +"review" before us than is common in modern treatises on that subject. +Though it is a laboured article of about forty-three pages, yet it is +generally in a manly style, and sustained by a train of close and +skilful argumentation. It would afford me great pleasure to be able to +equal the reviewer's ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply +the serenity of his spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the +present case, to dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I +understand the reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the +"rugged," at least the decided "aspect of controversy" with my sermon, +he is nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more +especially to his views of predestination. On election there is +evidently a greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a +man discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that +the peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At any +rate, as the settling of the former question will have a very strong +bearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this article to +predestination. I am not certain that I understand the reviewer; but his +candour authorizes me to believe that he will explain himself frankly, +and correct me if I misunderstand him. If we are agreed on this point we +ought to know it, and give over the controversy. If we are not, let us +know the precise ground of difference. And in either case we shall be +the better prepared to pursue the question of election. + +The question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there between +the decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of man? The +Arminian views on this question, as I understand them, are these: God, +as a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right to determine on +such a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely wise and good, he +would of course choose, in the contemplation of all possible systems, to +create such a one as, all things considered, would bring the most glory +to himself, and the greatest good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he +decided that such a system would be a _moral government_, consisting of +himself, as the supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent +subjects, having full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the +mandates of their Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable +incidents of such a government would be the possible existence of moral +evil; and, in glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that +moral evil would _certainly_ exist, involving innumerable multitudes in +its ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not +decree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a +decree of his: for although he foresaw that _if_ he made such free +agents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would certainly +sin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this _certainty_, to make these +agents and govern them as proposed. He determined, however, that they +should be under no necessity of sinning, either by his decree, or by the +circumstances in which they should be placed; but if they sinned, it +should be their own free choice. As he foresaw they would sin, he also +determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as +sinners, and arranged, in the counsels of his own infinite mind, the +extended concatenation of causes and effects, so as to make the "wrath +of man praise him," and deduce the greatest possible good from the best +possible system. Such, it is believed, is Arminianism--such is +Methodism--such is the doctrine of the sermon--and such are the dictates +of the Bible and of sound philosophy. + +The next question is, What is the doctrine of the reviewer? He shall +speak for himself. On page 612, of the review, he asks the question, +"But in what sense are we to understand the position that he (God) +purposes the existence of sin?" He proceeds to answer: "Not necessarily, +in the sense of his preferring its existence in his kingdom to its +non-existence, &c. In affirming the doctrine of predestination we affirm +no more necessarily than that God, with the knowledge that these beings +would sin in despite of the best measures of providence and government +he could take, purposed to create them and pursue those measures, not +for the sake of their sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it +was possible to secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose +with respect to the existence of sin, a purpose to permit its existence, +rather than to have no moral system."--Again, page 613: "Nothing more +(touching free agency) is implied in the purpose spoken of than a +CERTAINTY _foreseen_ of God, that if he creates and upholds that being, +and pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at +a given time, fully choose in a given way." In page 612 he says, "God +confers on them (mankind) in their creation the powers of free agency, +and he uses _no influence_ in his providence or government to procure +their sin." Page 614, "He (God) most obviously has no will opposed to +his law, though with a foresight of their conduct he should purpose to +permit their sin, rather than dispense with the existence of a moral +kingdom." But it is useless to multiply quotations. Suffice it to say +that the reviewer's whole ground of defence against the arguments of the +sermon, on the question of predestination, is solely this Arminian +explanation of the doctrine of predestination. He acknowledges, nay +boldly asserts, in a strain "of rugged controversy" with his brethren +who may differ from this view of the subject, that there is no other +explanation by which the arguments of the sermon can be avoided--that +is, as I understand it, the only way to avoid the arguments against the +doctrine of Calvinian predestination is to give it up, and assume the +Arminian sentiment on this subject. If the reviewer does not mean this, +he will of course explain himself fully, and point out the precise +difference between his views and those of the Arminians. If, on this +subject, the reviewer is an Arminian, he has too much candor, I trust, +not to acknowledge it frankly, and too much moral courage to be afraid +of the name. If he is not, the cause of truth and his own consistency of +character imperiously demand an explanation. Until this point, +therefore, is decided, farther arguments on the merits of the question +in which we are supposed to be at issue, are useless. + +I am not, however, quite ready to dismiss the review. I stated at the +commencement it was difficult to pursue this controversy without +alluding to the manner in which it had been conducted on the part of our +Calvinistic brethren; but that there was less ground for objection in +this article in the Spectator than in most others. There are some things +in this article, however, that I cannot justify. I will state them +frankly, though I trust in Christian friendship. I cannot approve of the +reviewer's use of terms: though, to my understanding, he has evidently +given the doctrine of predestination not merely a new _dress_, but a new +_character_, yet he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with +only a new method of explanation; and seriously and repeatedly complains +of the author of the sermon for "confounding the _fact_ of God's +foreordaining the voluntary actions of men with this or any other +_solution_ of that fact or theory as to the _mode_ in which it comes to +pass." And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in the +_fact_ of predestination, in the old Calvinistic sense, that in stating +his sentiments on this subject he uses the same forms of expression +which Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as distant from his +as the two poles from each other. He tells us, for instance, that "God +determined that the events which take place should take place in the +very manner in which they do, and for the very ends." Now if the writer +mean what the words naturally imply, then he believes that, in the case +of a finally impenitent sinner, God predetermined that all his sins +_should_ take place in the manner they did, and for the very end that he +might be damned! Again he tells us, "God, in his eternal purpose, has +predetermined all events." And, quoting from the Assembly's Catechism, +"God, from all eternity, did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever +comes to pass," he tells us that this expresses essentially the views +entertained by the orthodox Congregationalists of New-England, among +whom, I suppose of course, he would include himself. Now, after what I +have said of the reviewer's Arminianism, I doubt not but some of my +readers will be startled at these quotations, and be ready to accuse me +of great credulity in the judgment I have formed of the writer's +sentiments. I shall exculpate myself, however, by saying, in the first +place, that if there is any contradiction in the writer's sentiments or +language, it is not my fault, but his; and if I should attempt to +reconcile them, perhaps the reviewer would not thank me for my +officiousness. Beside, after what has been said, I feel safer in +understanding the reviewer in an _Arminian sense_, because he and some +others take it very ill of me that I have represented them as +Calvinists. But, in fairness to the reviewer, it is presumed that he +will not consider himself justly chargeable with contradiction. He has +used these old terms, it is true, and thus has _subscribed_ to the +Calvinistic creed as positively as the staunchest Calvinist; but then, +let it be understood, he has _explained_ that creed, and defined the +terms, and protests against being held responsible for any other +construction than his own. Hence by God's predetermining that sin +_should_ take place, in the very manner, and for the very ends it +does--by God's foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass--he only means +that God foresaw that sin would certainly take place, and predetermined +that he would not hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral +agents, or by throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their +free agency. In short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably +incident to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely +could to prevent it! This is _foreordaining sin!!_ This is +_predetermining_ that it _should be!!!_ I cannot but express my _deepest +regret_ that a gentleman of the reviewer's standing and learning should +lend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language--to +such a confusion of tongues. We do not complain of the doctrine +contained in the _explanation;_ but we protest, in the name of all that +is pure in language, in the name of all that is important in the +sentiments conveyed by language, against such an abuse of terms. Alas +for us! When will the watchmen see eye to eye! when will the Church be +at peace! while our spiritual guides, our doctors in divinity, pursue +this course? By what authority will the reviewer support this +definition? Do the words _predestinate_, or _foreordain_, or _decree_ +mean, in common language, or even in their radical and critical +definition, nothing more than _to permit--not absolutely to hinder--to +submit to as an unavoidable but offensive evil?_ The reviewer certainly +will not pretend this. Much less do they mean this when used in a +magisterial or authoritative sense, to express the mind and will of a +superior or governor toward an inferior or a subject.--What is the +_decree_ of a king? What is the _ordinance_ of a senate? What is the +official determination of a legislative body? Let common sense and +common usage answer the question. Not a man probably can be found, from +the philosopher to the peasant, who would say these words would bear the +explanation of the reviewer. Yet it is in this official and +authoritative sense that theologians, and our reviewer among them, use +these terms. The Assembly's Catechism, as quoted by himself, says, "God, +from all eternity, _did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own +will, freely and unchangeably ordain_," &c. Now it would be a gross +insult to common sense to say of such language as this, in the mouth of +an earthly potentate, that the sovereign meant by this nothing more than +that he permitted the existence of certain unavoidable, and in +themselves, highly offensive evils in his kingdom, because he could not +remove them without embarrassing the essential operations of his +government. There is not, probably, a clearer case in the whole range of +philology. + +But the use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the +reviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are used by +most Calvinistic authors in a different sense.--Why, then, should the +reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of +his faith? Different persons might give different answers to such a +question. For one, I would prefer he should answer it himself. + +I cannot approve of the reviewer's censures upon my manner of treating +the doctrine of predestination. He accuses me of confounding the +_doctrine_ itself, with _modes_ of explanation. He says they are +perfectly distinct; and though some may have been unfortunate in their +modes of explanation, and though he acknowledges my arguments bear +against such, yet the _fact_ of the doctrine itself is not thereby +affected. His mode of explanation, for example, he thinks untouched by +the arguments of the sermon. But his mode of explanation, as we have +seen, turns the doctrine into _Arminianism_. And it would, perhaps, be +no difficult matter to show, that any explanation of the doctrine, short +of doing it away, would be exposed to all the weight of the arguments +urged in the sermon. But the sermon was never written to oppose those +who hold to the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the +reviewer complain of the sermon? Why does he so "deeply regret" that the +author of the sermon "should come before the public with an attack on +the faith of a _large part_ of the Christian community, conducted in a +way so obviously erroneous and unjust?" The sermon was against +Calvinism, not Arminianism. It is true, the reviewer may say, the sermon +alludes, in some parts, to the Calvinism of New-England, and therefore +he felt himself implicated. But he certainly was not unless he is a +New-England _Calvinist_--unless he believes that "God foreordains +whatsoever comes to pass," in the proper sense of those terms. Indeed, +it seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is as obnoxious to the +reviewer, as to the author of the sermon; and the former seems to have +taken this opportunity to show the _nakedness_ of the system, and bring +into notice a better doctrine. If so, is it safe that the reviewer +should still accord to them their old symbols of faith? And is it just, +that the author of the sermon should be held the defendant on the +record, when the execution is issued against Calvinism itself? In answer +to the former question, I would say, it is utterly _unsafe_, and never +will be approved of, I believe, by Arminians. With respect to the latter +question, if it is _safer_ to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, I +will not object, though it may seem at present to my disadvantage. But I +cannot see that it would be safer--an open bold front always ends best. +What if it should subject the reviewer, and the theological doctors in +New-Haven generally, to the charge of heresy? Still they ought not to +shrink from their responsibilities--they occupy a commanding influence +among the Churches and over the candidates of their theological school, +and that influence should be openly and decidedly directed to +discountenance error. They should remove it, root and branch. Especially +should they discard those old symbols of faith, which are not only in +themselves, in _their true and proper meaning_, a reflection upon the +clerical character, and a _black spot_ upon an otherwise orthodox creed, +but are also especially obnoxious, because they are the very articles +which the great body of the Calvinists have maintained, in a sense +widely different from that of the reviewer. At the head of these stands +Calvin, the author of the system, in the Protestant Church. Calvin, who +says, "I will not scruple to own that the will of God lays a necessity +on all things, and that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pass." +"Adam fell, not only by the _permission_, but also by the _appointment_ +of God. He not only _foresaw_ that Adam would fall, but also _ordained_ +that he should." "The devil and wicked men are so held in on every side, +with the hand of God, that they cannot conceive or contrive or execute +any mischief, any farther than God himself doth not _permit_ only, but +_command_--nor are they held in fetters, but compelled also, as with a +bridle, to perform obedience to those commands." Calvin, it seems, was +far from thinking that _appointment_ only meant _permission_, or that to +_ordain_ only meant certainty _foreseen_. In this he was correct: in +this he has been followed by a host of writers down to the present day, +and copied in numerous ecclesiastical symbols, in different parts of +Christendom; and does not the reviewer know that these terms are +understood by Hopkins and Emmons, and all the Calvinists of that school, +in a sense widely different from his explanation, and in a sense, too, +much more in accordance with the _proper meaning_ of the terms? Does he +not know that a great majority of the Calvinists of the United States, +and perhaps in New-England, even understand these terms, as indeed they +ought to be understood, when used in reference to sin, as expressing a +preference of sin, in that part of the Divine plan where sin occurs, to +holiness in its stead? Indeed, as I understand the reviewer, from the +days of John Calvin down to the present hour, there is, on this point, +between the great body of Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness, +except in the use of words. Theirs is one doctrine--his another. Why, +then, does he oppose the opposers of Calvinism, and thus keep error in +countenance? Especially, why does he hail from that party, and hoist +their signals, and then, alter _seeming_ to get the victory, by +espousing the very cause of the assailed, encourage the _Calvinists_ to +triumph, as if _their_ cause had been successful? Is this justice to the +author of the sermon? Is it the best way to promote truth? But I +forbear. The reviewer's subsequent explanations may remove these +difficulties. At any rate, the cause of truth will doubtless advance. +The appearance of this review has given additional strength to the +sentiment, Calvinism "is waxing old, and is ready to vanish away." The +dogma that "God has predetermined all events, and elected (in a +Calvinistic sense) out of our guilty world all who shall be heirs of +salvation," withers at the touch of advancing truth, and is fast losing +credit in the Christian Church. + +Since writing the above, I have seen an inquiry of a correspondent in +one of the Calvinistic papers, in these words, "Why do our Calvinistic +writers retain the words which seem so sadly to perplex our Arminian +brethren, when it is certain that we do not attach the signification to +them which they always pretend?" and then instances in the word +"foreordain." The editor, in reply, gives as a reason for using these +words, that they are Scriptural; and seems to deem it necessary that +they should _persist_ in this use until we submit. This reply of the +editor reminded me of a remark of Mr. Tyler, in his sermon already +alluded to: "The Calvinist contends that God resolved, from eternity, to +permit all the sins and miseries which were to take place; and this he +calls, in the language of the Bible, _foreordination_." Now, not to stop +here, to show that no true Calvinist would ever call _foreordination_ +and _permission_ the same thing, for Calvin has, as we have seen, +clearly distinguished the two words from each other, I beg the privilege +of adding a thought or two on this idea of Scripture authority for the +use or these terms. For if it is only because the Scriptures use these +words in this sense, that they _persist_ in using them, I think we may +easily settle this question. Let it be shown that the Scriptures use +"foreordination," or "predestination," in the sense of mere +_permission--not absolutely hindering_. Again: let _one passage_ be +shown in which it is said, God "predestinates" all things, or +"foreordains" whatsoever comes to pass. If this cannot be done, how +futile, how more than absurd is it, to talk about using these words, +because the Scriptures use them! To use Scripture words out of the +Scripture sense, and then appeal to Scripture to sanction this use, is +as sad a perversion of the Scriptures as it is of logic. Indeed, to give +such a meaning to the word predestinate, is at once to take away the +principal scriptures quoted by the reviewer, and others, to prove +Calvinistic election. See Eph. i, 5; ii, 10; Rom. viii, 29. Does +predestination in these passages mean merely _to permit_, or not _to +hinder?_ and do these passages teach a personal election to eternal +life? Is this all the Calvinists mean by the _election_ of _sovereign +grace_, not of man, nor of the will of mans but of God? Alas! for the +elect! If man does not elect himself, and God _only predestinates_, that +is, _permits--does not hinder_ his election; who, we ask, will elect +him? How does error destroy itself! These gentlemen may take which +ground they please; they may either acknowledge that Bible +predestination means an _efficient purpose of God_ to accomplish an +object, and then meet the sermon on the issue there proposed; or they +may interpret these words as the reviewer has, and then give up those +passages which they consider their strong hold, in favour of Calvinian +election. In either case their system must suffer serious loss. Nothing +could be more unfortunate, I think, than this appeal to the Bible to +sanction such an abuse of terms. As to the word foreordain, I do not +recollect that it occurs in our translation. Jude 4, has "before of old +ordained," &c, but it is in the original very different from the word +rendered predestinate. The allusion is to characters that were +proscribed for their sins, and designated for deserved punishment. The +original for predestinate, proorizo, is used in only one place, so far +as I can find, with any direct reference to a sinful act, Acts iv, 28. +This passage is quoted by the reviewer. But the determination here +spoken of, he himself informs us, relates to "the purpose of God to make +an atonement for the sin of the world, by means of the death of Jesus +Christ." Hence the predetermination of God, in this instance, probably +refers to the _work_ of atonement, without including therein any special +decree in respect to the means of the suffering. Christ _could_ have +suffered, even unto death, in the garden without any human means. But +inasmuch as these men had the murderous purpose, God "chose to leave +Christ to their power," &c, therefore _decreed_ the atonement, but +_permitted_ the means. This seems to be the most rational construction. +But whatever Calvinists may think of this passage, the Scriptural use of +the word is clearly on the side of its _proper_ meaning--an +_authoritative ordinance_ that the thing predestinated _shall be_. + +I will avail myself of this opportunity to correct one or two errors of +the reviewer, respecting the sentiment of the sermon, which had escaped +my notice. He says, my "view of predestination is a determination of God +to produce a given result by his _own immediate_ and _efficient_ +energy." This is a mistake. I said nothing about _immediate energy;_ +this is an essential misrepresentation of the sermon. Again: "On Dr. +Fisk's principle, it is impossible for God to use the voluntary agency +of any creature, to accomplish any valuable end in his kingdom, and yet +leave that creature accountable for his conduct." This is so manifestly +incorrect and unjust, that I am sure I need only call the attention of +the reviewer to it a second time, to secure a correction from himself. + + + + +NUMBER II. + +A PROPOSITION TO CALVINISTS. + +The communication below contains a proposition from Dr. W. Fisk, which, +however much we dislike theological controversies, we believe is +appropriate and interesting at this time. Such a discussion, under such +arrangements, will give the merits of the controversy to both sides; and +will, at least, convince all of one truth--that the Methodist Episcopal +Church seeks not concealment from the world or her members, as charged +by her adversaries. But it will develop a still more important truth, +and that is, what are the settled and definite opinions of the old or +the new school in the Calvinistic Churches. It is known to all the +world, that there is great difficulty in ascertaining what are the +theological opinions of those ancient Churches of the land. They seem to +be as far apart from each other as they are from Arminianism; and their +replies and rejoinders to each other are as severe as if directed +against us. The discussion must be interesting and profitable, carried +on by two such persons as Dr. Fisk and his opponent, and under the +steady supervision, as to temper and manner, of third parties as +proposed.--Eds. + +I have just received a pamphlet of about forty-eight pages, containing a +series of letters, in answer to my sermon on predestination and +election. These letters are written by the Rev. David Metcalf, of +Lebanon, Connecticut, and purport to be an answer, not only to the +doctrinal part of the sermon, but to the "charges," as the writer is +pleased to call them, contained in the sermon, and published afterward +in a specific form, first in the Connecticut Observer, and then in the +Christian Advocate and Journal. + +It will be recollected by your readers, that I pledged myself to +vindicate my statements against any responsible person, who, with his +own proper signature, would come forward and deny them: or if I failed +to support them, I would retract what I had written. This pledge Mr. +Metcalf calls upon me to redeem; not indeed by bringing forward my +proofs, or by making a reply; but, having thrown in his plea, he +supposes that the cause is decided, and has himself made up the +judgment, and issued the execution, and forthwith comes forward, and +claims his damage. His words are--"Of the author of the sermon we claim +a public acknowledgment of his errors, and make justice and equity the +ground of our claim." Again, "If Dr. F. makes no public retraction from +the ground taken in his sermon--if after he shall receive these letters, +[!!] remembering also what is said in the Christian Spectator's review +of his sermon, he shall allow another copy of it to be printed, I think +he will find it difficult to convince any intelligent candid man, that +he is not guilty of breaking the ninth commandment," &c. The intelligent +reader, who has studied human nature, will know how to make suitable +allowances for the dogmatical and premature decisions, and high claims +contained in the foregoing extracts. It is not an uncommon thing, that a +zealous advocate succeeds in _convincing himself_ of the truth of his +cause; but utterly fails with respect to all others. I do not say, that +this writer will not gain his argument; but it requires more +"foreknowledge" than I am disposed to accord to him, to affirm this as a +"certainty." I demur against this hasty manner of making up the +judgment. I wish to be heard in defence of my statements, and have +objections also to bring against his statements, and supposed proofs and +arguments. + +In the first place, I object to him, that he has not come out and joined +issue specifically and directly on any one of my "charges," but talks +for most part in general terms, about the unfairness, injustice, and +misrepresentations of the sermon. This circumstance would, of itself, +free me from any obligation to notice these letters, on the ground of my +pledge in the Observer. But yet, as I feel the most perfect readiness to +discuss this subject, and as I hope the cause of righteousness may be +served thereby, I will willingly proceed in this controversy, both as to +doctrine and policy, provided we can secure some suitable public medium, +through which to prosecute the discussion. And on this point Mr. M. +complains bitterly of the former editors of the Advocate and +Journal--for he had applied, it seems, for the privilege of having his +letters inserted in that paper, and was refused, on the ground that "the +sermon was not published in the Advocate, and therefore justice did not +require that its answer should be." Now, since these letters are +professedly an answer to the _whole sermon_, the editors, I think, were +perfectly consistent with their former statements, in refusing to +publish them. If Mr. M. had confined himself to the charges in the +Observer, the editors would undoubtedly have given the subject a place +in the columns of the Advocate: as it was, however, I think the charge +of injustice and unfairness made against the editors by Mr. M. is +entirely gratuitous and _unjustifiable_. If it was expected to produce +an _effect_ on the public, by such a complaint, I think such an +expectation will be disappointed in all places where the subject is +understood. And that this was the expectation appears evident from +another charge against Methodist preachers, in the following words:--"It +is supposed to be the common sentiment, if not 'the common talk in our +land,' that the Methodist preachers have a strong aversion against their +hearers reading our writings. The reason of this, in part, is supposed +to be, that they choose to have their people receive all their knowledge +of our creed from their statements of it, instead of ours; lest they +should be convinced, by our arguments, of the truth of our belief." Now +this charge we wholly and positively deny, and challenge the writer for +the proofs of what we know to be, not only an ungenerous, but an unjust +allegation. Nothing can be farther from the whole genius of Methodism +than this. Does not the reverend gentleman know, that a great portion of +our members in New England are those who were once members of +Calvinistic congregations? Does he not know that they were trained up in +these doctrines from their infancy, and have heard them explained and +defended from their earliest recollections? Does he not know that +Methodism has made its way against the impressions of the nursery, the +catechetical instruction of the priest and the school master--the +influence of the pulpit and the press, and in maturer age against the +still stronger influence of academies and colleges? Does he not know, +also, that all this has been done in this generation? And shall we now +be told that Methodists examine but one side of the question? How +astonishing such a charge, from a man who can make any pretension to a +knowledge of ecclesiastical matters in our country! Does not this writer +know, also, that the editors of the Advocate, and others, have called +loudly, and almost continually, for information upon this subject, that +we might know what the Calvinistic standards are, and ascertain what +Calvinism is? and shall we now be told, that Methodists are ignorant of +the Calvinistic faith, and, what is worse, the preachers strive to keep +them in ignorance, and that with the base purpose of keeping them from a +conviction of the truth! We say, if Calvinism is essentially what it was +from five to thirty years ago, we know its character as well as we ever +can know it. If we do not understand it now, it is either because we +have not _natural ability_ to understand it, (and therefore. Calvinism +itself being judge, we are not criminal,) or it is because the teachers +of Calvinism have not had _natural ability_ to make it plain. But if +Calvinism is not essentially what it was, we ask what it now is? If it +is changed in the hands of its supporters, how much has it changed? Is +it Calvinism still, or has it lost its identity? In what does the +identity of Calvinism consist? Shall we take the Rev. Mr. Metcalf's +answer to these questions? Shall we take the Christian Spectator's +answers? Mr. M. appears fully to agree with the Spectator, for he makes +frequent reference to it, with great apparent approbation. And yet two +numbers of this periodical have been issued since my reply to the review +of my sermon in that work, in which reply I stated my understanding of +the reviewer's doctrine of predestination, and requested to be informed +if I was incorrect; and neither my reply nor my request has been +noticed. And yet, let it be understood, that in the last number there is +a very laboured article, to show that Dr. Taylor does not differ +essentially from the orthodox Calvinistic faith heretofore received. + +It is also known, that though Drs. Woods, Griffin, Tyler, Green, and +various others, come out and charge a portion of their brethren with a +serious and dangerous dereliction from the Calvinistic faith, yet the +accused, in their turn, strenuously maintain that they preserve the old +landmarks unremoved, and the essential principles of Calvinism +unimpaired; and that it is a calumnious charge to say they have departed +from the faith of the party. + +How shall we judge in this matter? If we think, from our understanding +of their writings, that some of them have changed their views, and we +ask them if they have, they are silent. If their brethren charge them +with changing, they deny it; and, standing up before the world and +before the Churches, and before their God, pronounce _deliberately_ and +_emphatically_, the old symbols of faith, as a test oath to prove their +orthodoxy. Should we doubt their repeated asseverations? Mr. M., or +somebody else, might write another pamphlet to screw us into repentance +and confession, for bearing false witness against our neighbour. But if +we hold them to the old doctrine, which we have had a good opportunity +of learning, from our youth up, we are accused of misrepresentation, and +of bearing false witness. None but the advocates of the New-Haven +divinity have, to my knowledge, taken a public stand against my sermon; +and _they_ oppose it because _they_ say it is a misrepresentation of +their doctrine. + +This, therefore, seems to us to be the state of the case with respect to +these gentlemen--We make a representation of Calvinism as we have found +it, and have heretofore understood it--they object, because this is not +their belief, and therefore we break the ninth commandment! Their own +brethren charge _them_ with a departure from the old doctrines, and they +deny it! and charge them in turn with bearing false witness! In the +midst of our perplexity on this subject, while we are looking every way +for light, up comes Mr. M. and tells us, we are unwilling our people +should know what Calvinists believe!! Is this generous, or just? We +repel the charge, and demand proof. And in the mean time, as a farther +proof that the charge is unfounded, I will, Messrs. Editors, with your +consent and approbation, make a proposition to Mr. Metcalf. It is +certainly desirable, that both Calvinists and Methodists should hear +_both sides_. Mr. M. seems very desirous to enlighten the Methodists. +This is very well. But we also wish to enlighten the Calvinists. To +accomplish this, the discussion on both sides should be put into the +hands of the people on both sides. If, then, some reputable and +extensively circulated Calvinistic periodical will publish my sermon, +and the discussion which _has_ arisen, or _may_ arise out of it, on both +sides, the Christian Advocate and Journal will publish Mr. M.'s letters +and the discussions which shall follow; provided always, that it shall +be submitted to the respective editors, whether the pieces are written +in respectful and becoming style and language; and provided also, that +the Calvinistic editor shall, by consenting to this arrangement, he +considered as thereby acknowledging, that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man +to manage the controversy in behalf of the Calvinists, and that you, +Messrs. Editors, by consenting to the arrangement, will thereby consent +that you are willing to trust the controversy in my hands, to be managed +in behalf of the Methodists. To give an opportunity for the Calvinistic +periodical to be prepared, I shall wait a reasonable time, when, if the +offer is not complied with, I shall want the privilege, perhaps, of +occupying the columns of the Advocate, by the insertion of a few numbers +touching the present Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their +own differences, and also as relates to the general question between +them and us. + + + + +NUMBER III. + +INDEFINITENESS OF CALVINISM. + +THE readers of the Christian Advocate and Journal will recollect the +proposition, made to the Rev. David Metcalf, in the 8th No. of the +present volume, on the subject of his review of my sermon. This +proposition has not been complied with on the part of Mr. M., and +according to the following extract from the New-York Evangelist, no +compliance can be expected:-- + +"We have seen," says the editor of the Evangelist, "in the Advocate, +since Mr. Metcalf's work was published, a letter from Dr. F., in which +he shows his desire that the discussion shall still go forward. There is +one condition he exacts, however, which we think impracticable. It is, +that some person should be designated, by a sort of common suffrage, as +the champion of Calvinism. Now the truth is, Calvinists, as a class, are +rather remarkable for thinking for themselves; and of course, while +there are great principles on which, as a class, they all agree, there +are many things which will be held or stated differently, by different +minds. Consequently, we can, each of us, defend ourselves, and defend +Calvinists as a class; notwithstanding, each one may think his fellow +holds some errors, and therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. +must assume to himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal +points and modes of statement which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_. +And when he has found these principles, we hope he will either confute +or embrace them." + +I have copied the above for the farther notice of the public, not only +as a remarkable paragraph in itself, but also as having an important +bearing on the present controversy. There are several things in it +worthy of special notice. + +In the first place we see, if other editors think with this one, and +that they do, we are left to infer from their not offering their +periodicals for the controversy, there is no hope that my proposition +will be accepted. We then have the reason--because there is one +impracticable condition. But why impracticable? The editor tells us, +"Dr. F. exacts that some person should be designated by a sort of common +suffrage to be the champion of Calvinism." I cannot believe the editor +means to misrepresent me; and yet he has done it. My words are, +"Provided that the Calvinistic _editor_ shall, by consenting to this +arrangement, be considered as thereby acknowledging that Mr. Metcalf is +a suitable man to manage the controversy on the part of the Calvinists." +Here is nothing said about a "sort of common suffrage." In case of +compliance by Mr. Leavitt, or any other editor, the only vote to be +polled and counted would be his own. Not a very extensive suffrage this! +And if Mr. L. thinks the condition impracticable, it must be owing to +_moral inability_ existing in his own mind, growing out of the belief +that Mr. Metcalf _is not a suitable person_ to manage this controversy. +Hence it is well I took the precaution I did; for Mr. M. is a stranger +to me; and I do not wish to engage in a controversy on this subject with +any man who is not, by his class, considered responsible. Perhaps Mr. +Leavitt knows of some one, who would be suitable, in his judgment, and +who would accept of the offer; or perhaps he himself would be willing to +engage in the discussion. I do not wish to confine it to Mr. M.; nor do +I wish to be considered in the light of a general challenger who is +seeking an adventure. The subject is an important one, and I am willing +to discuss it with any candid responsible man. We were most unjustly, as +I believed, accused of keeping our people in ignorance of Calvinism, and +of preventing them from reading on the other side, for the base purpose +of preventing them from being convinced of the truth. To render the +subject fair and equal, therefore, and to wipe off this aspersion, I +made the proposal; and if Mr. M. is not a suitable man, let some other +be found. + +But we are informed farther in this paragraph, that one great difficulty +in complying with my condition is, that "Calvinists, as a class, are +remarkable for thinking for themselves," &c. If the editor designs to +say, as the natural construction would imply, that the whole class are +remarkable, in their character as Calvinists, for thinking and believing +differently and independently of each other, then his proposition is a +contradiction. They, _as a class_, are remarkable _for not being a class +at all_, having no properties or qualities in common! His argument also +would require this construction, because he is showing why no one could +be the proper champion of the class, for the reason that, as a class, +they did not think alike. If _Calvinism_ be a general term, it includes, +in its extension, all those individuals or sub-classes of individuals, +and only those, that hold certain doctrines in common, and it embraces +all those doctrines, and only those that are held in common by the +class. If, therefore, there is any such class, then most certainly they +think alike in all those things that constitute them a class; and by +consequence, any one of the number, otherwise competent, would be +qualified to represent and defend the class as such, however much he +might differ from many of "his fellows," in other things. If, therefore, +there is any force in the argument, that it is impracticable for any one +of the number bearing the name, to become the champion of _the class as +such_, because they differ so among themselves, it must arise from the +fact, that there are no "great principles" held in common among them, +and, of course, there is _no class_. All the writer says afterward, +therefore, about "great principles in which they all agree," is mere +verbiage, signifying nothing. For if we give it any meaning, it would be +a contradiction of what he had stated before, and a complete +nullification of the only argument adduced as a reason for not complying +with my proposal. There is another reason why I think the above a fair +view of this subject. In the same paragraph it is said, "Therefore, in +his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to himself the +responsibility of selecting those doctrinal facts and modes of statement +which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_." This is more unreasonable +than the requisition of Nebuchadnezzar, when he commanded the wise men +to _make known the dream_, as well as the interpretation. Would an +intelligent and ingenuous man, such as we have a right to expect a +religious editor to be, give such an answer, under such circumstances, +if he could have told us what Calvinism is? We have been accused, not by +Mr. Metcalf only, but by Calvinists of the old school, and the new +school, and _all the schools_, that we misrepresent them, that our +preachers make it their business to misrepresent them,--that my sermon +was a most scandalous misrepresentation, and that we studied to keep our +people ignorant of what Calvinism is. When this is replied to, by +entreating and conjuring those who bear the name of Calvinism, to tell +us what it is; and when we offer to discuss the subject, in their own +periodicals, and give them an opportunity to discuss it in ours, and to +inform our people, in their own way, on this doctrine--a death-like +silence on the subject reigns throughout the whole _corps editorial;_ +until at length the Evangelist speaks,--We cannot comply; we each and +all, as a class, are so remarkable for thinking for ourselves, it is +impracticable for any one to state and defend those doctrinal facts +which _distinguish us as a class_, and therefore Dr. F. must assume to +himself the responsibility of selecting them!! If Calvinists cannot +agree in their own system, and cannot trust any of their fraternity to +state and defend it in behalf of the class, why do they accuse us of +willful misrepresentations, in stating their system? Why, in short, do +they not begin to doubt whether, _as a class_, they have any system? It +is time for those who bear the name to know, and for the public to be +distinctly informed, whether there is any thing _real_ represented by +the term Calvinism? If there is, then, whether the term is a common or a +proper noun? If it is a common noun, or a general name, then, what are +the qualities, the properties, or doctrines designated by it? If no one +can tell,--if those who "write about it, and about it," week after week, +think it _impracticable_ to define or describe those doctrines for the +class, because they think so differently, of course it follows, if the +name is retained, it is not a general, but a _proper name_, and belongs +only to individuals. And though it has been assumed by many individuals, +yet it has in each case an individual definition, which by no means +enters into the definition of the term, as assumed by any other +individual. And therefore it is as inconsistent to talk about the _class +of Calvinists_, as it is to talk about the class of Johns or Joshuas, +and as absurd to infer that two men are in any of their real +characteristics alike, because each is called _Calvinist_, as to argue +that the editor of the Evangelist and Joshua, the son of Nun, belonged +to the same class, because both are called Joshua. And this appears to +me to be very nearly the true state of the case. Calvinism, as +designating a class, has always been rather vague and unsettled in its +definition, from the days of John Calvin himself. And this was one of +the offensive objections brought against it in my sermon--an objection, +however, that has been abundantly confirmed by recent events. As I wrote +and published of another doctrine some years since, so I may say of +Calvinism now. It is a proteus that changes its shape before one can +describe it--an _ignis fatuus_, that changes its place before one can +get his hand on it. And here I will stop to say, It will avail nothing +for any one to take offence at this statement. It is not because I +dislike men who are called Calvinists, that I thus speak. I know many of +them personally, and esteem them highly, but of their doctrine, and +their system, and their name, I must speak freely. And the best +refutation they can give, is to come out if they can, and define and +explain their system. I care not what shape it is presented in; I am +willing to meet it. If it puts on an Arminian character and dress, like +the review in the Christian Spectator, I will only ask the privilege of +baptizing it anew, and giving it a legitimate name. But as there seems +now little hope of being permitted to meet it in the manner proposed, it +only remains that I proceed, according to promise, to "occupy the +columns of the Advocate with a few numbers, touching the present +Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and +as relates to the general question between them and us." + +I cannot but think this an important moment to look into this subject. +The signs of the times indicate that the spirit of inquiry is abroad, +and the old platforms are shaken. In this breaking up of erroneous +systems, there is danger of extremes and extravagancies, more to be +dreaded, perhaps, than the old errors themselves. Hence, the necessity +for every man who _has_ the truth to be on his guard against the +currents, new and unprovided for, that may otherwise drive him from his +safe moorings: and hence the necessity also, that he who has weighed +anchor, and is afloat upon the unexplored sea of philosophic speculation +should be aware of the rocks and the quicksands on the opposite shore. +An abler hand than mine is certainly needed on this occasion; such a one +I hope may be found. But in the mean time I will, as I am able, say a +_few things_, with the sincere prayer that I and my readers may be led +into all truth. + + + + +NUMBER IV. + +SKETCH OF THE PAST CHANGES AND PRESENT STATE OF CALVINISM IN THIS +COUNTRY. + +In the former No. it was seen that the indefiniteness and mutability of +the Calvinistic system had thrown a kind of irresponsibility around it; +which renders this controversy, in many respects, extremely +unsatisfactory. This might, at first, lead to the conclusion, that +farther discussion would be useless. On farther thought, however, it +_may_ appear, that this very circumstance will render the controversy +both easier and more promising. This diversity of opinions has produced +serious discussion among the predestinarians themselves, and has thrown +the system open to public view, and driven its advocates to a clearer +statement of their respective opinions. The effervescence, in short, +growing out of this excitement, has led to a more distinct analysis of +the system, and of course to a clearer discovery of its constituent +parts. Their arguments against each other, and the logical consequences +which they urge against each other's views, are, in many cases, +precisely the same that we should advance, and have often urged, in +opposition to predestination. Much of the work, therefore, is prepared +for us, and brought forward in a way to produce an effect among +Calvinists themselves, where we could not be heard. + +To understand this subject however fully, and to follow out this +discussion advantageously, it will be necessary to glance at the +different changes and modifications of the Calvinistic system; and to +take a brief survey of the present state of the parties. + +The religious faith of our puritanical fathers is too well known to need +a delineation here. This faith was at an early day defined and formally +recognized, in the Cambridge and Saybrook platforms. The first +refinement (improvement it can hardly be called) upon this ancient +faith, was the metaphysical theory of Dr. Hopkins. The leading dogmas of +this theory were, that God was the _efficient cause_ of all moral +action, holy and unholy; and that holiness consisted in disinterested +benevolence. Insomuch, that the answer to the question, "Are you willing +to be damned?" was deemed a very good criterion by which to judge of a +religious experience. While the doctrine of predestination was in this +manner _going to seed_, and bearing its legitimate fruits, in one +direction, it received a remarkably plausible modification in another. +The atonement, which was formerly limited to the elect, was now extended +to all; and the invitations of the Gospel, instead of being restrained, +as before, to the world of the elect, were extended to the world of +mankind. But as it would be useless to hold out invitations to those who +could not accept of them, another refinement was introduced, and man was +found to possess a natural ability to receive salvation, although he +laboured under an invincible moral _inability_, which would for ever +keep him from Christ, until drawn by irresistible grace. This discovery +led to other refinements in language, so that a kind of technical +nomenclature was formed, out of words in popular use, which words, by an +accompanying glossary, were so defined as to correspond with the +Calvinistic system. Thus, "You can repent if you will," meaning, +according to the technical definition, "You can repent when God _makes_ +you willing," and so of the rest. + +This theory, sustained as it was by Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Emmons, and others, +gained many proselytes, and seemed likely, at one time, to become the +universal creed. Its metaphysical abstrusities and distinctions gave it +an interest for the student; and its plausible and commonsense terms +gave it popularity with the people. In the mean time, however, several +causes conspired to introduce a great revolution in the religious +sentiments of many, which, as it has had a very important influence in +modifying Calvinism itself; I must here stop to notice; I allude to the +introduction of Unitarianism and Universalism. The proximate causes of +the introduction of these sentiments were, among others, probably the +following. The Antinomian features of old Calvinism had introduced into +the Churches a heartless Christianity and a very lax discipline. It was +natural, therefore, when religion had come, in point of fact, to consist +chiefly in external performances, for its votaries to seek a theory that +would accord with their practice. Unitarianism was precisely such a +theory. It is also to be noticed, that the state of formality and +spiritual death that prevailed, was greatly increased by the withering +alliance which then existed between the Church and civil government. +This revolution was undoubtedly hastened also by the ultraism, on the +one part, and the technical inconsistencies on the other, of the +Hopkinsian theory. The elements had been long in motion, and at length +they united in an array of numbers and influence that wrested the +fairest portions of their ecclesiastical domain from the orthodox +Churches of Mass., and turned them over, together with the richly +endowed university of the state, into the hands of the Unitarians. + +In Connecticut, Unitarianism, as that term is commonly understood among +us, has not prevailed. There is, I believe, but one Unitarian pastor, +properly so called, in the state. This sentiment, however, prevails very +extensively in this and all the other New-England states, as well as in +many other parts of the union, under the name of Universalism; a +sentiment which differs but little from Socinianism, and had its origin +doubtless from the same source. About half a century since, a +Calvinistic clergyman, as he was supposed to be to the day of his death, +left a posthumous work, which was published, entitled, "Calvinism +Improved." It was merely an extension of the doctrines of unconditional +election and irresistible grace to all instead of a part. From the +premises, the reasoning seemed fair, and the conclusions legitimate. +This made many converts. And this idea of universal salvation, when once +it is embraced, can easily be moulded into any shape, provided its _main +feature_ is retained.--It has finally pretty generally run into the semi +infidel sentiments, of _no atonement--no Divine Saviour--no Holy Ghost_, +and _no supernatural change of heart;_ as well as "no hell--no devil--no +angry God." It may be a matter of some surprise, perhaps, to a +superficial observer, or to one not personally acquainted with the +circumstances of the case, why, in leaving Calvinism, these men should +go so far beyond the line of truth. But in this we see the known +tendency of the human mind to run into extremes. The repulsive features +of the old system drove them far the other way. It ought to be +remembered, also, that there were few, if any, who were stationed on the +medium line, to arrest and delay the public mind in its fearful recoil +from the "horrible decree." Had Methodism been as well known in +New-England fifty years ago, as it now is, it is doubtful whether +Universalism or Unitarianism would have gained much influence in this +country. Late as it was introduced, and much as it was opposed, it is +believed to have done much toward checking the progress of those +sentiments. And perhaps it is in part owing to the earlier introduction, +and more extensive spread of Methodism, in Connecticut, that +Unitarianism has not gained more influence in the state. This is +undoubtedly the fact in the states of Vermont, New-Hampshire, and Maine, +where Methodism was introduced nearly as early as those other +sentiments. The result has shown that the foregoing supposition is +corroborated by facts in those cases where the experiment has been +tried. These remarks may not now be credited, but the time will come, +when the prejudices of the day are worn out, that the candid historian +will do the subject justice. But to return--though Unitarianism and +Universalism are believed to be dangerous errors, yet, as is often the +case, they have contributed much, doubtless, to detect the errors and +modify the features of the opposite system. Simultaneously with them, +the Methodists have engaged in opposing the Calvinistic dogmas. This +close examination and thorough opposition, with such other causes as may +have cooperated in the work, have driven some of the peculiarities of +the Hopkinsian theory into disrepute, more suddenly even than they rose +into credit. The sublimated doctrine of disinterested benevolence was so +like "an airy nothing," that even the speculative minds of the shrewdest +metaphysicians could not find for it "a local habitation," in heaven or +on earth; and the almost blasphemous dogma, that God was the efficient +cause of sin, was more abhorrent, if possible, than even the horrible +decree of reprobation. Both, therefore, with the exceptions hereafter +mentioned, disappeared. The former, being of an ethereal character, +silently evaporated into "thin air;" but the other, being of a grosser +nature, and withal more essential to the system itself, _settled to the +bottom_, and is now rarely visible, except when the hand of controversy +shakes up the sediment. The doctrine of universal atonement, however, +was retained, and the theological vocabulary was not only retained, but +enlarged and improved. So that from that day to this, we hear but little +of the doctrine of reprobation, or of the decrees of God, but much is +said of God's "electing love," his "Divine sovereignty," and "gracious +purposes." By which is meant, according to the glossary, the doctrine of +unconditional election and reprobation, and of absolute predestination. +The scriptures, also, which used to be quoted to prove the direct +efficiency of God, in producing sin and securing the condemnation of the +reprobate, receive a different explanation, varying but little, if any, +from the Arminian interpretation of those passages. It cannot be +doubted, I think, but there has been quite a change in the views of the +great body of the Calvinists--and yet not so great and so thorough a +change as appearances and terms might at first view seem to indicate. It +is not easy to _eradicate_ old prejudices. And it is often found that +the mind will cling to the first principles of a favourite system, even +after the other parts are so modified as that the new principles would +supplant the old, if suffered to be carried out into a consistent whole. +In every such case, much labour and argument will be spent in trying to +unite the old with the new; but in every instance the rent becomes +worse. This leads to a kind of vacillating policy, and an ambiguous +course of argument, accompanied with reiterated complaints, that the +opposers of the system misunderstand and misrepresent it. And it would +be no wonder if the constant friction in the incongruous machinery +should chafe the mind, and lead to a dogmatic and an impatient spirit. +How far this corresponds with the existing facts, in the Calvinistic +controversy, others can judge. In my own view, the peculiar +circumstances of the case, connected with the known character of the +human mind, fully account for the _apparent_ tergiversation and changing +of argument, in this controversy, without criminating the _motives_ of +our predestinarian brethren, as some have unjustly accused me of doing. +The different parts of the system have lost, in a measure, their +original affinities, and yet they have some partial and irregular +attractions, which lead them to unite in unnatural and grotesque forms. +And as there is no common consent and settled mode of operating among +the many who are experimenting upon the materials, there are various +sectional and individual formations, which are inconsistent with each +other. And their incongruity is the more apparent from the unanimous +effort (which I believe is the only work of union in "the class") to +amalgamate each and every variety with the old substratum of the +system,--"God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass." + +The completion of this historical sketch, together with a view of the +present state of the Calvinistic parties, may be expected in the next +number. After which it is proposed to proceed to an examination of the +doctrines in dispute. + + + + +NUMBER V. + +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. + +One modification of Calvinism remains to be mentioned. It is known by +the name of the "New Divinity." The theological doctors connected with +Yale college are the reputed authors of this system. It is evident, +however, that the tendency of the Calvinistic theory has been in this +direction for a number of years. The "New Divinity," so alarming to some +of the Calvinists, is only the ripe fruits of the very plants which they +have long cultivated with assiduous care. And why should they start back +at results which they have long laboured to produce? This theory, in the +first place, is an attempt to make the doctrine, and the technical terms +alluded to, coincide. In the second place, it is designed, by a new +philosophy of predestination, to get rid of the "logical consequences" +that have always pressed heavily upon the old system. Finally, it is a +device to reconcile the doctrine of depravity with the former current +sentiment, that man has _natural ability_ to convert himself and get to +heaven without grace. The two pillars of the new system are, 1. "Sin is +not a propagated property of the human soul, but consists wholly in +_moral exercise_." 2. "Sin is not the necessary means of the greatest +good;" or, in other words, "Sin is not preferable to holiness in its +stead." The Calvinistic opposers of this theory tell us that these +sentiments have been held and taught to some extent for the last ten +years. They were more fully and more openly announced, however, by Dr. +Taylor, of the theological school belonging to Yale College, in a concio +ad clerum preached Sept. 10th, 1828. From the time of the publication of +this sermon the alarm has been sounded, and the controversy has been +carried on. The opposers of the new doctrine call it heresy; and in a +late publication they seem to intimate that Dr. T. and his associates +are nearly if not quite as heretical as the author of the sermon on +predestination and election. The doctor and his friends, on the other +hand, strenuously maintain that they are orthodox; and to prove it, they +repeat, again and again, "We believe that God did, for his own glory, +foreordain whatsoever comes to pass." The Christian Spectator, an ably +conducted quarterly journal, is devoted chiefly to the defence of this +theory, aided by the New-York Evangelist, and several other minor +periodicals, and by a very respectable body of the clergy. What +proportion, however, have embraced this system is not known; but many, +both in and out of Connecticut, have espoused the cause with great zeal. +The contest waxes warmer each year. Against the theory, Dr. Woods, of +the Andover theological seminary, Dr. Griffin, of Williams college, Dr. +Tyler, of Portland, the Rev. Mr. Hervey, of Connecticut, and several +others have entered the lists of controversy; and last of all, a +pamphlet, supposed to be the joint labour of a number of clergymen, has +been published, in which the New Divinity is denounced as heresy, a +formal separation of the Churches is predicted, and a withdrawal of +patronage from Yale college is threatened on the ground that "Yale will +become in Connecticut what Harvard is in Massachusetts." It is +uncertain, however, whether those ultra measures will be responded to by +the great body of the clergy in New-England. There is a party which +still adheres to the old--I may say, perhaps, to the _oldest_ +modification of Calvinism in this country. This party are for +maintaining the old landmarks at all hazards, rightly judging that these +palliations and explanations of the system will ultimate in its +destruction. They are not numerous, but still respectable as to numbers +and talents. They are sustained in Boston by the Boston Telegraph, so +called, a weekly periodical, which does not hesitate to go the whole +length--_logical consequences and all_. Witness the following quotation +from a review of my sermon, in the number for Jan. 23d. Speaking of the +charge in the sermon, that Calvinism makes God the author of sin, the +writer says:--"The word author is sometimes used to mean _efficient +cause_. Now I am willing to admit that those scriptures which teach that +God has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply that he is the +efficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory and the greatest good +he said, _Let there be sin, and there was sin!!!_" The following is +another specimen of Calvinism from the same periodical. If any man +"affirms that man really chooses, and that his acts of will are caused +by his own free, voluntary, and efficient mind, then he is _no +Calvinist_." In this last quotation, as well as in the preceding, there +is the most direct opposition to Dr. Taylor, since he maintains, if I +understand him, that man's is an independent agency--that the human mind +is the originator of thought and volition. Thus are these two branches +of the Calvinistic family directly at variance with each other. And, in +fact, the Telegraph and its supporters are not only at variance with the +newest divinity, but with all the different degrees of _new, newer, +newest_, and denounce them all as heresy. + +The present advocates of predestination and particular election may be +divided into four classes:--1. The old school Calvinists. 2. +Hopkinsians. 3. Reformed Hopkinsians. 4. Advocates of the New Divinity. +By the reformed Hopkinsians I mean those who have left out of their +creed Dr. Hopkins' doctrine of disinterested benevolence, Divine +efficiency in producing sin, &c, and yet hold to a general atonement, +natural ability, &c. These constitute, doubtless, the largest division +in the "class" in New-England. Next, as to numbers, probably, are the +new school, then Hopkinsians, and last, the old school. These +subdivisions doubtless run into each other in various combinations; but +the outlines of these four sub-classes are, I think, distinctly marked. + +The preceding sketch has been confined mostly to the theological changes +in New-England; but it will apply, to a considerable extent, to other +parts of the nation. The Presbyterian Church, by reason of its +ecclesiastical government, is more consolidated, and of course less +liable to change than the independent Congregational Churches of the +eastern states. But the Presbyterian Church has felt the changes of the +east, and is coming more and more under their influence. It is now a +number of years since the "triangle," as it was called, was published in +New-York. This was a most severe and witty allegory, against the dogmas +and bigotry of old Calvinism. From this work this old theory has +obtained the epithet of "triangular." Whenever a man advocates the +doctrine of limited atonement, imputed sin, and imputed righteousness, +he is said to be "triangular." These old triangular notions are giving +place very rapidly to modern improvements. And although the most +strenuous opposition has been made in the General Assembly, in different +publications, and elsewhere, yet the votes in the last General Assembly +show, I think, that the whole Church is yielding herself up to the +resistless march of innovation. It may be doubted whether the state of +New-York is not emphatically the strong hold of the New Divinity, so far +as popular sentiment is concerned; and whether, indeed, with the +exception of New-Haven, there is not the greatest moral influence +enlisted there, for the propagation of the new theory. + +Thus have I endeavoured to glance over the various modifications and +present characteristics of that mode of Christian doctrines called +Calvinism. Here a few suggestions present themselves, which, from their +relation to the present controversy, I will now set down. + +It seems singular that, differing as they profess to, so materially, on +many points, each individual of each sub-class should feel himself +injured whenever Calvinism, under this common name, is opposed in any of +its features. The sermon on predestination was against _Calvinism_, and +lo! all parties rise up against the sermon. And yet, whether it object +to Calvinistic policy or to Calvinistic doctrine, the different parties +accuse their opponents of being guilty of the charge, but they +themselves are clear. I cannot think of a single important position +assumed by the sermon against predestination and election, which is not +sustained by Calvinists themselves in opposition to some of their +brethren; nor yet of a single charge against their policy, for their +changes and ambiguous methods of stating and defending their doctrines, +which has not been reiterated by professed Calvinists themselves against +their brethren. Thus the sermon is sustained by the Calvinists +themselves, and yet they all condemn it! If _some_ Calvinists think that +the objections of the sermon lie against some modifications of their +system, is it not possible that these objections have a more _general_ +application than any of them seem willing to acknowledge? For example: +it is objected to predestination that it "makes God the author of sin, +destroys free agency, arrays God's decrees against his revealed word, +mars his moral attributes, puts an excuse into the mouth of the +impenitent sinner, implies unconditional reprobation, makes God partial +and a respecter of persons, necessarily limits the atonement," &c. These +charges, say the Calvinists, are very unjust, ungenerous--in fact, they +bear false witness against our neighbours. This is said by Mr. Metcalf, +and by others of the New-Haven school. And yet what says the Spectator, +the organ and oracle of that school? It says of Dr. Tyler, and of others +who oppose the peculiar views of Dr. Taylor, comprising, as we have +seen, the great majority of Calvinists, that their views "limit God in +power and goodness"--"make the worst kind of moral action the best"--"if +carried out in their legitimate consequences, would lead to +universalism, to infidelity, to atheism"--"they confound right and +wrong, and subvert all moral distinctions"--"according to these views, +mankind are bound to believe that they shall please and glorify God more +by sin than by obedience, and therefore to act accordingly"--"nothing +worse can be imputed to the worst of men than this theory imputes to +God"!!![4] Has the author of the sermon said more than this, and worse +than this, of Calvinism? And shall he be accused by these very men of +bearing false witness against his brethren? And let it be observed +farther, in justification of the sermon, that these charges in the +Spectator are made by men who have been brought up at the feet of the +Calvinistic doctors, and have themselves grown up to the character and +rank of doctors in theology. They know the system thoroughly; they have +made it the study of their lives, and have they testified to the truth +respecting this theory? _So then has the author of the sermon_. Such is +the testimony on the one side; and on the other we have decided +predestinarians acknowledging, as an article of their creed, what in the +sermon was urged as only a logical consequence. According to this +system, says the sermon, "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as +certainly as it made the world." Hear the Boston Telegraph:--"God, for +his own glory and for the good of the world, said, _Let there be sin, +and there was sin!_" Now I beg the reader to look at this subject for a +moment. For brevity's sake we will call the Boston Telegraph and its +supporters No. 1; the Andover theological seminary and its supporters, +which constitute by far the larger body of predestinarians in +New-England, No. 2; and the New-Haven divines and their supporters No. +3. The sermon charges predestination with making God the author of sin. +No. 2 says this is false: I neither believe it, nor is it to be inferred +from my premises. _It is true_, says No. 1: I am willing to admit that +God is the efficient cause of sin. He said, Let there be sin, and there +was sin. _It is true_, responds No 3, that all who hold and explain +predestination as Nos. 1 and 2 explain it, are exposed to the full force +of the objections in the sermon--against such views "the arguments of +the sermon are unanswerable." No. 2, in vindication, says that No. 1 is +on the old plan--very few hold with him in these days. And as for No. 3, +he is already a rank Arminian; and if he would be consistent, he must +give up unconditional election, and embrace the whole Arminian theory. +Thus do they destroy each other, and confirm the doctrine of the sermon. +And shall we still be told that we do not understand this doctrine? Have +anti-predestinarians misunderstood this from John Calvin's day to the +present? Does honest No. 1 misunderstand it? Does well instructed No. 3 +misunderstand it? What then is Calvinism, that cannot, through the lapse +of centuries, make itself understood either by friend or foe? Is not +this, of itself, a suspicious trait in its character? Let us quote a +Calvinistic writer, whose sentiments are much in point, though aimed at +the New Divinity:--"It is a serious ground of suspicion," says this +writer, "that Dr. Taylor has failed, according to his own repeated +declarations, to render his speculations intelligible to others. It must +be granted that a man of sense, who is acquainted with the power of +language, can, if he is disposed, make himself understood." "Some of the +most intelligent men in the country have utterly failed to compass Dr. +T.'s meaning in argument: so that he declares again and again, I am not +understood--I am misrepresented. Who under such circumstances can +refrain from suspicion?" "Another suspicious circumstance in the case +is, that Dr. Taylor expresses himself in ambiguous terms and phrases, +which, though they are designed to influence the mind of a reader, +afford him the opportunity to avoid responsibility." See pamphlet by +Edwardian, pp. 28 and 29. If this is justly said of Dr. Taylor's +_recent_ theory, what shall we say of a system the advocates of which, +"according to their repeated declarations, have not been able to render +their speculations intelligible," after the theory has had exhausted +upon it the highly cultivated intellects of hosts of expositors through +successive generations? "Who, under such circumstances, can refrain from +suspicion?" especially since these advocates have learned "to express +themselves in ambiguous terms and phrases which, though they are +designed to influence the mind of a reader, afford them an opportunity +to avoid responsibility." To Calvinism it may truly be said, "Out of +thine own mouth will I judge thee." Let not the author of the sermon +then be accused of bearing false witness, when his testimony is +predicated on principles which Calvinists have laid down, and is also +corroborated by men of their "own class." + +Will it be said, All this is not argument. I answer, The sermon, it is +supposed, contains arguments--arguments which professed predestinarians +themselves tell us are unanswerable against the prevailing modes of +stating and explaining the doctrine. Now let them be answered, if they +can be. Let them be answered, not by giving up predestination, in the +Calvinistic sense, and still professing to hold it--not by attempting to +avoid the logical consequences, by giving the system the thousandth +explanation, when the nine hundred and ninety-nine already given have +made it no plainer, nor evaded at all the just consequences, so often +charged upon it; and when these are answered, it will then be time +enough to call for new arguments. + +Having prepared the way, as I hope, by the preceding numbers, for the +proper understanding of the controversy; and having, by the remarks just +made, attempted (with what success the reader must judge) to repel the +charges of misrepresentation and bearing false witness, made against me, +as the author of the sermon which gave rise to the controversy, I am now +prepared, in my next number to commence an examination of some of the +questions of doctrine, connected with this discussion. In doing which, +my object will be, to let "Greek with Greek contend" so far as to show, +if possible, the inconsistency of both, and then present the doctrine +which we believe to be the true system, and show how it stands untouched +by the conflicting elements around it as the immovable foundation of the +Church of God. I shall begin with the Divine purposes including +foreknowledge; then take up human agency and responsibility; and last, +regeneration, connected with the doctrine of human depravity, Divine and +human agency, &c. May He that said, "Let light be, and light was," +"shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of +God, in the face of Jesus Christ." + + + + +NUMBER VI. + +PREDESTINATION. + +Definitions are the foundations of reasoning. Hence in any reply to my +sermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair that the +first inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The definition of +predestination assumed in the sermon was, that unalterable purpose and +efficient decree of God, by which the moral character and responsible +acts of man were definitely fixed and efficiently produced. On this +point the sermon joined issue. To this definition most of the notices +and reviews, to the number of six or seven, which I have seen, have +taken exceptions. The review in the Boston Telegraph, however, is not of +this number.--That, as has already been noticed, agrees with the charge +in the sermon, that "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as directly as +it made the world." We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord +to that sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of +the sermon--against the common sense of the world--against their own +convictions of right and wrong--and, I may add, against their own +brethren of "the class," some of whom have already publicly denounced +the sentiment as "horrid blasphemy." At this day of light, in which +_naked Calvinism_ is abhorred by most of those who bear the name of +Calvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer to such a +review. We approve of the _logical consistency_ of these men--we admire +the moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes out a theory to +its legitimate results without flinching; but we are astonished at the +_moral nerve_ that can contemplate such results with complacency. For +myself I confess when I see this naked system of Calvinism fulminating +the curse of reprobation in the teeth of the miserable wretch whose only +crime is, that his God has made him a sinner, my heart recoils with +indescribable horror! Let him contemplate this picture who can. I covet +not his head or his heart. + +Of others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two +classes: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who +favour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called +Reformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of +Calvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their +views on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At present I +shall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and to the first +and second notices of the sermon in the Christian Spectator. And here +let me say, once for all, that I do not consider either of these +gentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible for the doctrine of +predestination as stated and opposed in the sermon. This I hope will be +satisfactory. If these gentlemen should ask me why I published my sermon +in terms that included Calvinists generally, without making the +exception in their favour, I answer, 1. The views of Dr. Taylor and +"those who believe with him," on this particular point, were unknown to +me at the time. Nor is this strange, for it is but lately that those +views have been fully developed--never so fully before, probably, as in +Dr. Fitch's review of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never +occurred to me that any man or any set of men holding, in respect to +predestination, the doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the +whole body of Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all +the apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must +judge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be Methodistical +on the subject of predestination, I by no means would be understood to +say this of their system as a whole--the objectionable parts will be +noticed in their place. But whatever is true is none the less so for +being mixed with error. There are some things, however, to be regretted +and exposed in the manner in which these reviewers have expressed their +doctrine of predestination, and also in the manner in which they have +opposed the sermon and Arminianism generally. They complain of my +definition of predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness. +The reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they +themselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation of +predestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their views. +But what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the determination with +which these gentlemen persist in holding up the idea that their views +essentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in his answer to my reply, +says:-- + +"There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the Divine +purposes in relation to a moral kingdom:-- + +1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures, +purposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_. + +2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures +shall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to +that conduct. + +3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the +different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to +_pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible +results_." + +"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk, +in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his +objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it passes +over in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by +which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the +_sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the +Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has +misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches +that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he +has a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and +contingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose +life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after +and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who +believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave +this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the +following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay, +namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a +believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in +God which determines character. That such was not the character of my +creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review, +if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As God +foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue +in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own +infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to +'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible +good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his +answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an +undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first +view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the +third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact +of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded +in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which +Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my +statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third," +and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the +Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk +to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of +foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to +maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three +views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other +Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself +acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we +must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore +on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists. + +That the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the +Methodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr. +Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed +include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but +also that God "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best +possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude +sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of +the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this +matter they have identified themselves with Arminians. + +"To God," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all +things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power, +as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can +do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or +oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin, +with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would +counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created +man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued +with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which +he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a +moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence +be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus +contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it +would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence. +Whereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and +goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and +free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil." + +Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: "In the +moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine +will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope +for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of +God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the +subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of +lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the +Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining +that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he +purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best +possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or +is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he +could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he +persist in talking of a difference where there is none? + +Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading +my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist +brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong +arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism, +I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you +will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it +Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about +terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the +doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be +regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be +when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly +and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever +suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him +incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us, +called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who +was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for +the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of +disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself +understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists +themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author +of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an +Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as +anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian. + +Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In +reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place +this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could +not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had +complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected +with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself +as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first +principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has +succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas +it is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from +the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven +doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great +pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our +system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that +strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged +that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go +on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold +to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be +taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the +third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are +agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same +breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these +gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us +in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we +certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must +pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in +this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned, +and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay, +they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our +present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed +in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an +opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_ + +In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms +to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination +or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable +and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one +place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed +of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best +possible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing +his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the +entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg +the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he +does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely +occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a +contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between +a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing +that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's "deciding on +the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean +almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the +subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was +unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer +it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in +every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is +predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a +Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the +commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though +unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to +"make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures +accordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were +driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured, +to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and +united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy +were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time +rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by +Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing." +He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than +suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city +with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the +reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put +to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or +foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common +consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and +if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the +theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the +great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England +even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the +New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe God +hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." + +Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not +in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the +sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to +foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because, +say they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he +could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge +in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at +least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in +error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which +will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to +take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "God knows all that is, or will +be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is +the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow +forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy +here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its +adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free +moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also +saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his +own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite +wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would +certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and +therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his +determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's +foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must +be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern +the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_, +a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and +therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should +be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and +which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of +knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the +sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "God foreknows +in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in +order to foreknow." + +To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one +class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with +all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly +increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all +but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There +is still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny +the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are +not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In +the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from +their own positions this definition. + + + + +NUMBER VII. + +PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED. + +From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes +of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one +there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the +doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because +their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and +all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too +monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a +larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven +divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are +nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They +deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private +statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine. +They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea, +that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and +efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,"--that these acts +"are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the +will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by +some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence, +I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine +characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least, +be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition +of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our +own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are +these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I +shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the +candid judge. + +1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this +question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians +themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect +to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging +these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system. +And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of +understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume +that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own +doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be +asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the +pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal +opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought +first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also +exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit +that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There +have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and +how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to +them as to be able to see it free from these charges? + +But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these +opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a +great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before +been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will, +by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been +given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they +held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To +these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly +acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the +sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral +evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not +be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied +Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding +it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to +holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections +brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the +Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated +predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers +for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be. +The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand +that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in +producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not +angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his +decrees. + +Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on +either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that +a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of +predestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine +of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence, +certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians +persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the +doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the +additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill +at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never +succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from +these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very +many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for +the _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had +been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and +that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new +modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up, +until finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of +the doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many +others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles +involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was "no hell"--no +judgment, and "no angry God." Suppose, I say, this intelligent man +should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to +_presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the +doctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question. +There is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are +correct. + +2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have +defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon +it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and +circumstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms are +_decree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose_, +&c.--These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of +absolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong +and imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some +strong qualifying terms, such as _sovereign decree, eternal and +immutable purposes;_ and without any reference to other bearings, the +whole is placed on the ground of God's absolute and sovereign will. +These sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in +the light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be +broken. They are the _secret counsels_ of his own will; and so far from +being law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral +world, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When +these decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may +sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to +subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he +executes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of +this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously +maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its +stead, and is the _necessary means_ of the _greatest good_. The idea +that God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible +circumstances, _so ordered his works_ as to take up and incorporate into +his plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus constitute a +grand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government +could be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that +decrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived +them--dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified +by subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with +absolute and arbitrary sway; can it be _possible_, I say, that such +decrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will? Must not +he who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form +and execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to +this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes, +follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on +this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most assuredly he +must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative, +controlling and propelling energy that + + "Lives through all life, extends through all extent, + Acts undivided, operates unspent." + +And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this +subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and +is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:--"The Divine decree is the +determination to _produce_ the universe, that is, the _whole series_ of +_beings_ and _events_ that was then future." Dr. Chalmers, who has been +esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had +not given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon +on predestination in the following language:--"Every step of every +individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand, +of God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or +every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every +rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is +absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its +resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of +existence. It _reigns_ and operates through all the secrecies of the +inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every +desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an +entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and +the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of +their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives +movement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no +moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, +and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the +region beyond it!!!" These quotations need no comment; if they do not +come up to all we have ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no +definite meaning in words. + +But we have another authority on this subject, which bears more directly +on the Calvinists of this country, the Assembly's Catechism. Dr. Fitch, +who is certainly as well qualified to judge in this matter as another +man, informs us, through the medium of the Christian Spectator, that +"the articles of faith prepared by that body, (the assembly of English +and Scotch divines at Westminster,) are considered as expressing +essentially the views not only of the Presbyterian Church in this +country, but also of the orthodox Congregational Churches of +New-England." It is known, also, that the Shorter Catechism has been +almost universally used by them in their families, and in the religious +instruction of their children. Here then we have a standard of faith, +which all the _classes_, I suppose, will acknowledge,--and what saith +it? After stating that the decrees of God are his eternal purpose, +according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he +hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass, it goes on to say, "God +_executeth_ his decrees in the works of creation and providence," and +then for farther explanation adds--"God's works of providence are his +most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his +creatures and all their actions." This is certainly an awkward sentence, +if I may be allowed to say this of the productions of an assembly which +has been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and +theology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must be, +that by his acts of providence God, in a most holy, wise, and powerful +manner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and all their +actions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk about _preserving +actions_, we will understand _preserving_ to belong to _creatures_, and +_governing_ to _actions_, and then it will be thus: God powerfully +preserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs all their actions: +and it is in this way he _executes_ his decrees. There are evidently two +methods of governing. That control which is made up of legal precepts, +and sanctions, and retributions, is called a government; not that all +the subjects of such a government always obey its ordinances, but if +they violate them, they are subjected to punishment. _This_ is evidently +not the kind of government that the assembly contemplated. It was a +government by which God _executed his decrees;_ but, as we have seen, +his decrees are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct +opposition to his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed, +in respect to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those +demands are coincident they differ greatly in the _manner_ and +_certainty_ of their fulfilment. Of course government, by _executing +decrees_, is another thing altogether from government by _executing +laws_. But there is another kind of government. It is that _efficient +control_ of a superior, by which a being or an act is _made to be what +it is_, in opposition to _non-existence_, or a _different existence_. +Now this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to when +it said, "God _executes his decrees_ by powerfully _governing_ all the +actions of his creatures." That is, he efficiently produces and controls +all the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the moral universe. And +what is this, but affirming all that the sermon has affirmed on this +subject? If any one is disposed to deny that this is a fair exposition +of the Catechism, let him reflect that as he cannot pretend that +_government_ here means a _legal administration_, it will be incumbent +on him to show what other fair construction can be put upon it than the +one given above; to show how God can execute a secret decree, by his own +powerful act, in any other way than in the one already explained. + +In corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in mind, +that the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms, _decree, +predestination_, &c, in the _same sense_, in reference to _all events_. +They say, God's decrees extend to all events, physical and moral, good +and evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any thing intelligible, +that his predestination bears the same relation to all events. If then +his decree of election embraces the means to the accomplishment of the +end, so also must his decree of reprobation. If his decree of election +requires for its accomplishment an _efficient_ operation, so also does +his decree of reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently, +requisite to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the +same sense requisite to produce a sinful volition. + +To tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or discrimination, +that all things are _equally_ the result of the Divine decree, and then +tell us that the relation between God's decree and sin is essentially +different from the relation existing between his decree and holiness, +would certainly be a very singular and unwarrantable use of language. +How then, I inquire, does God produce holy volitions?--Why, say the +Calvinists, by a direct, positive, and efficient influence upon the +will, and in proof quote--"Thy people _shall_ be willing in the day of +thy power." Well, how, I ask again, does God execute his decrees +respecting unholy volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But, +says the Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce +unholy volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful +men to sin. Indeed! and is not this _nature_ the result of a decree? It +would seem God approaches his work of executing his decree _respecting +sin_, either more reluctantly or with greater difficulty, so that it +requires two steps to execute this, and only one the other. It is in +both cases, however, equally his work. This will be seen more clearly if +we turn our attention to the first sin; for it is certainly as much +against a perfectly holy nature to commit sin, as it is against an +unholy nature to have a holy volition. Hence the one as much requires a +direct and positive influence as the other, and therefore the passage in +the 110th Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in +changing the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has +been generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:--Not only shall +thy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not yet in a +strict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become holy in the day +that thou dost efficiently change their will, but also thy angels and +thy first created human pair, who were before their fall more truly +thine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall be made willing to become +unholy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their wills from +submission to rebellion. For if Divine efficiency is necessary to make a +naturally perverse will holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally +holy will perverse. + +I am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although God does +efficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to the nature +of mind, and consistent with free agency, because he operates upon the +mind through the influence of moral suasion, or by the power of motives. +To this it may be answered, that the Calvinists generally condemn Dr. +Taylor's views of conversion, because they suspect him of holding that +motives alone convert the sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that +the Holy Spirit should act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I +have shown above, it is also necessary that there should be a direct +Divine influence upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And +this more especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in +the same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives +leads me to another argument, viz. + +3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears +evident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when this +doctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of +depravity. + +The doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that "the power of +volition is never excited, nor _can be_, except in the presence and from +the excitement of motives," (see "Views in Theology,") and that the mind +must necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by what appears +to the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, following Leibnitz, +incorporated this doctrine of philosophical necessity with the +Calvinistic theology. In this he has been followed by a great portion, I +believe, of the Calvinistic clergy. Without stopping here to attempt a +refutation of this theory, my present object is to show that it +necessarily fastens upon Calvinism the charges brought against it, and +sustains the definition that has been given to predestination. For since +God creates both the mind and the motives, and brings them together for +the _express purpose_ that the former should be swayed by the latter, it +follows conclusively that God _efficiently_ controls the will, and +produces all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic +teaching:--"God," says the author of "Views in Theology," already +quoted, "God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the +determiners of choices." The inference therefore is plain and +unavoidable, _God is the determiner of choices_. The plea that God does +not produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, through +second causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, or ten +thousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our Creator in +such order as to produce the intellectual vibration intended, whenever +he pleases to give the impulse, what is the difference? In point of +efficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will it alter the case to say, +that "this effect is produced by God through such a medium as is suited +to the nature of the mind, and therefore it cannot be said, that God +does any violence to the will, or to man's free agency." God created the +_mind_, and the _means_ that were to influence it. He gave to mind its +nature, and to motives their influence and arrangement, for _this very +purpose_. Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he is _bound by the law +of his nature_ to act in all cases as he does. Why talk about a _free_ +agency when it is such an agency as _must_, by _the constitution_ of +_God_, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the premises, +foolish reply, that man could do differently, _if he chose_, does not +help the case. It is only saying, the nature of man is such that it is +governed by his perceptions, and since "God is the determiner of +perceptions, and perceptions the determiners of choices," whenever God +pleases to alter the perceptions so as thereby to change the choice, +_then_, and not before, man can do differently. According to this +doctrine is it possible, according to the very nature of mind, for the +choice to be different until the perceptions are changed? And can the +perceptions be changed, until God changes them? To answer either or both +of these questions in the affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine +of motives. To answer them in the negative, would be to entail upon the +doctrine all that I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory +may have their choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this +argument, to say "man has an _unholy nature;_ and this is the reason why +the motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is +chargeable upon himself, and God is clear." For, in the first place, +this would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels and +the first human pair. + +This argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man's +_unholy nature_, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be +valid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument obviously +affords no relief to the system, it follows that in these uses, at +least, God is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy volitions--and +therefore the charges against predestination are established. But by a +little farther attention we shall see that this argument affords as +little relief to the system in the case of man as he now is. For this +first sin, which was itself the necessary result of the Divine +arrangement and of positive Divine influence, threw, if possible, a +stronger and a more dire necessity over all the coming generations of +men. For this act entailed upon man a depraved heart. Hence this corrupt +nature came upon man without his knowledge or agency. We trace it back +then, thus:--Man's love of sin was produced by the unholy choice of the +first pair--that choice was produced by perceptions--these perceptions +were produced by motives--and these motives were brought by God to bear +upon the minds which he had made for this very purpose--therefore God, +by design, and because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and +then, for the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth +unholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, which, +from the unavoidable nature of those minds, _must produce_ the sin +designed. It is thus that, according to his theory, our Creator binds +the human mind by the strong cords of depravity with one hand, and with +the other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of motives, into all the +excitement of unholy delirium; and then, for his own glory, consigns the +sinner over to the prison house of wo!! Turn this system, then, as you +will, you find this doctrine of predestination binding the human mind, +and efficiently producing all the volitions of the moral universe. The +strong arm of Jehovah not more directly and irresistibly moves and binds +the planets in their orbits, than it moves and controls, in the +mysterious circle of his eternal decrees, "all the actions of all his +creatures." + +I know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our +inferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are responsible, +because _we are conscious of it_. This is a most singular course of +reasoning, and seems to have been adopted to reconcile contradictions. +If this doctrine be true, I am not _sure_ that I am free, and that I am +responsible merely because I feel that I am. I am at least _quite_ as +conscious that I ought not to be held responsible for what is +unavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of moral liberty. Break down my +consciousness in one case, and you prepare the way for me to suspect it +of fallacy in another. And if I must give up my consciousness, between +two alternatives I will choose that which will not involve the +government of God in injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in +unavoidable perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards' premises, which he holds +in common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship's conclusion, +viz. that God never intended to hold men responsible, and the universal +feeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud--a salutary delusion, +imposed as a check and restraint upon man here, but to be followed by no +unpleasant consequences either here or hereafter. But this would be +charging our Creator with both deception and folly--deception in the +delusive consciousness of responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord +Kaimes and others to disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine +purpose! This cannot be. The charge of deception and of fallacy, +therefore, must be rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of +God upon the doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should +crush the theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the +Church and to the world. + +To conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the +charges contained in the sermon against that modification of Calvinism I +am now opposing, are just; and the definition assumed, is correct. If +the advocates of the system can clear themselves, or their doctrine, let +it be done. If not, let one of two courses be pursued--either let the +system be abandoned, or _let us have it as it is_. + +I have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I +believe we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, "You +misrepresent us!" "You mistake our doctrine!" + +In the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human agency, +and the ground of human responsibility, will be examined. + + + + +NUMBER VIII. + +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. + +BY what has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, it +will be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity of moral +action as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, I grant, to +give to the terms _will, liberty, free agency_, such a definition as +will make these terms, _thus defined_, compatible with the other +peculiarities of the Calvinistic system.--Both parties agree that man is +a free moral agent; both maintain that he is responsible; but we +maintain that what the Calvinists call free moral agency, is not such in +fact as is commonly understood by the term, nor such as is requisite to +make man accountable. Here, therefore, we are again thrown back upon our +definitions, as the starting point of argument. What is that power, or +property, or faculty of the mind, which constitutes man a free moral +agent? It is the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose +either good or evil. Both the _power_ and _liberty_ to choose either +_good_ or _evil_ are requisite to constitute the free agency of a +probationer. It has been contended that choice, though from the +condition of the moral agent it must of necessity be exclusively _on one +side_, is nevertheless free; since it implies a _voluntary_ preference +of the mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels, +glorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined in +an impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and invincible +enmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With respect to the free +agency of these beings, a question might be started, whether it is such +as renders them responsible for their _present acts_, the decision of +which might have some bearing on the subject under investigation; but +not such bearing as would make it important to discuss it here. If they +are responsible for their _present acts_, it must be on account of a +former probation, which by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any +one thinks otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is +not, and _never was_ so circumstanced as to render the choice of good +possible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such sense +as renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I have no +controversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage upon all +the acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert it would be a +work of little profit. + +It is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose +states are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their +probationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency +unsuited to illustrate the agency of beings who are on probation. Man, +in this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are presented before +him as objects of choice; and upon this choice are suspended eternal +consequences of happiness or misery. Of a being thus circumstanced, it +is not enough to say he is free to choose as he does, unless you can +say, also, he is equally free to make an opposite choice.--Hence, in +defining the free agency of man, as a probationer, we say, as above, +that it implies a power of choice, with full liberty to choose either +good or evil. + +The foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all +practical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a speculative +philosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of metaphysics for +decomposition and analysis. It is doubtful whether this process has +subserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I think, that it has +produced many perplexing refinements and speculations that have greatly +aided the cause of error. Into these abstrusities, therefore, it seems +necessary to follow this question, to try, if possible, to draw out and +combine the elements of truth. + +Having defined free agency to mean _the power of choice_, &c, it is +asked again, _What is this power of choice?_ It is probable that the +different answers given to this question constitute the fundamental +differences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question +some, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, "We cannot tell." +And they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar to that +which influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer will involve +themselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a very convenient way +to avoid responsibility, but not indicative of much fairness, or +confidence in their cause. When men have involved their system in +apparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the candid inquirer +after truth to see them start aside from the very point that is to give +character to their whole system. We are told by men who reason upon +foreknowledge, &c, that "God hath decreed whatsoever comes to pass;" and +then we are told that all men are free, and they enter into a great deal +of metaphysical speculation about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary +action, &c, to prove these positions; but when they are pressed upon +this point, "How can you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine +efficiency necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that +kind of dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?" the +reply is, "We cannot tell--the how in the case we cannot explain." This +evasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following +cases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out of +what is _mysterious_, and not of what is _palpably contradictory;_ or, +2. If both propositions were so _clearly proved_, that it would do +greater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon all +acknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, than it +would to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. With +respect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless it +would so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, that +the want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack of light +in the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things compared. +When you say, "God executes his decrees by efficiently controlling the +will of man," and say also, "The mind of man is free," both these +propositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about them. But you +say, perhaps, "The mystery is in the want of light to see the +_agreement_ of the two; we cannot _see_ their agreement, but we should +not therefore infer that they do not agree." I answer, What is light, in +this case, but a clear conception of the propositions? This we have, and +we see that they are, _in their nature_, incompatible; and the more +light you can pour upon this subject, the more clearly must this +incompatibility appear. If you say that "perhaps neither you nor I fully +understand the meaning of these propositions;" then I reply, _We have no +business to use them_. "Who is this that darkens counsel by words +without knowledge?" And this is what I have already complained of; men +will reason themselves into propositions which they call doctrinal +facts, but which seem to the eye of common sense to have all the +characteristics of contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions +in objection, the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because +we do not fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions +must be received, _though we do not understand them!_ and though, as far +as we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the +way to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more +consistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since the +doctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that freedom, +therefore this doctrine should be exploded! + +Or will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that +both of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them +would do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of belief, +than to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent incongruity? +Let us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, unless we doubt all +primary truths, viz. That the human mind is free. It is presumed, if the +question come to this, that they must either give up human liberty or +the dogma of predestination, candid Calvinists themselves would not +hesitate; they would say, the _former_ must stand, whatever becomes of +the _latter_. If I am correct here, it follows that, predestinarians +themselves being judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear +as some other moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man +ought not to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought +not to be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled +by a superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make +it, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, then +we come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the compatibility +of predestination with human liberty and accountability does more +violence to the laws of belief than it would to discard predestination. +Whatever, therefore, may _seem_ to be favourable to this doctrine, +should be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our belief in another +direction. But, that the argument may be set in as strong light as +possible, let the evidence of predestination be adduced. What is it? It +is not consciousness certainly; and it is almost as clear that it is not +moral demonstration by a course of reasoning. The most I believe that +has ever been said, in the way of moral demonstration, has been in an +argument founded on foreknowledge, which argument, it is supposed by the +author, is fairly disposed of in the sermon on predestination, by +reasoning which has not, to his knowledge, ever been refuted. A +refutation has been attempted, I grant, by some of the reviewers of the +sermon, but the only apparent success that attended those attempts was, +as we have already seen, in consequence of their taking the very ground +of the sermon, and building the decrees of God upon a prior view and +knowledge of all possible contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning +are taken away from this doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but +testimony. And no testimony but Divine will here be of any authority; +and does revelation prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination +it was stated that "there was not a single passage in the Bible which +teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;" +and it is not known to the writer, that among the different reviews of +the sermon it has even been attempted to show that the statement was +incorrect. But if a solitary passage could have been adduced, should we +not have heard of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any, +is indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony +is far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great portion of +believers in revelation think. + +Now, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of thought +thus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, and +honestly answer the following question--"Is there so much evidence in +favour of predestination, that I should do more violence to my own +reason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I should by +believing that this doctrine is compatible with free agency and +accountability?" Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so felt the force of +these difficulties, when the terms predestination and free will have +been understood in their common and obvious sense, that they have +attempted a variety of explanations of these terms to do away, if +possible, the apparent discrepancy. These attempts have been the +principal cause of those changes and modifications in the Calvinistic +system, alluded to in a former number. The various explanations and +definitions that have been given to foreordination, have already been +noticed. We have seen how every effort failed of affording any relief to +the system, until we came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven +divines. This new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it +only by giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to +nothing; it stands forth still the "_absolute decree_," fixed as fate, +and fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences. +Any _real_ modification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a +substitution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of Heaven, +"He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be +damned." + +Not succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination as +would harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have been +made to define and explain _human liberty_ and the _power of choice_, so +as to _bend_ these into a coincidence with the _inflexible decree_. This +brings us back to the inquiry started above: "What is this power of +choice?" Now as this is a point more metaphysical in its nature than the +proposition embracing the decrees, so there is more ground for laboured +argument and refined speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be +particularly noticed:--1. Because it is the most plausible of any other, +so that if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will; +and 2. Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and +perhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the +Calvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power of +choice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of motives, +and of deciding according to the strongest motive. The strength and +direction of volition are always in accordance with the motive. And this +relation between mind and motives is fixed by the very constitution of +our natures, so that it may be said there is a constitutional necessity +that the mind should be controlled by motives. These motives are +multitudinous and various.--All conceptions and perceptions of the mind, +from whatever cause, productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions +of love or aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes +of these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind +there is such a connection, that the _former_ not only excite, but +control the _latter_, in all its volitions. The nature of this relation +is of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all we can say +is, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is the theory. The +arguments by which it is defended are in substance the following +--experience and observation. We are conscious, it is said, of acting +from motives, and it is universally understood that others also act from +motives. It is on this principle that we govern ourselves in our +intercourse with men; by this we calculate with moral certainty, in many +instances, what will be the conduct of a man in a given case; and, upon +such calculations, we form most of our maxims, and rules of conduct in +social life: nay, it is said a man that will act without a reason must +be insane--that, on this ground, whenever a man acts it is common to +inquire what _induced_ him. What motive had he? That even children, at a +very early age so readily recognize this principle, that they are +constantly inquiring why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest +arguments by which this theory is sustained--arguments too strong it is +supposed to be overthrown. + +I object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in +offering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in his +senses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important +influence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in order to +oppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to deny that +the power of volition may have been waked up to action, in the first +instance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after may, in all +its volitions, be more or less under this influence. As these are points +which do not materially affect the question at issue between us and the +Calvinists, they may be left out of the discussion for the present. The +question is this--Has the mind a self-determining power, by which it can +spontaneously decide, independent of the _control_ of motives, or is the +mind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former--our +opponents the latter. By establishing our position, we disprove +theirs--by disproving theirs we establish ours--and it is believed that +theirs can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at +least so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these +extremely difficult points. + +1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that most +of the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and certainly +prove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute control of motives +as that human minds are. It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of +spontaneous volition, independent of the _control_ of motives, involves +the absurdity, that "our volitions are excited without any intelligent +reasons whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better +than a mere brute or senseless mechanism." (_Views in Theology_, p. +163.)--Now if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to +human mind and human volition merely, but to _mind in general_, and must +apply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the +arguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists are +convinced of this--and hence this also is a part of their creed. It was +defended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor Upham, in his +System of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he +says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same +with that of the Supreme Being himself--he is _inevitably_ governed in +all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and +best." (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine Being is, according to this +theory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the +theory, "_inevitably_" made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed +there is no avoiding this conclusion; and what then? Why then the +doctrine makes God a necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is +nearly, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate. +The ancient heathens supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent +father of the gods and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach +that there is a certain fitness of things, certain constitutional +relations, existing independent of the Divine will, which God himself +cannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at +once, both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of +his wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain +fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by God himself, for that +would be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the order of +cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of +motive, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine +volition willed it into being and if he could once act independent of +this control, he might so act for ever; and the argument built on the +absurdity of volition, without an intelligent reason, is contradicted. +But if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and +effect, a paramount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of +the Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This +is fate! This is atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the +Divine mind, call that influence what you will, _fitness of +things--fate--energy_ of nature--or necessary relation, and that moment +you make God a subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, +and make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity? +Might we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under +the control of his own native influence he is led to create beings +susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the +motives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are +"inevitably" led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, that +many Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives is the +very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the _energy of +nature!_ The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his followers +is the _energy of motives_, which exists in the nature of things, +anterior to the will of God. Can any one point out any essential +difference between the two systems? + +Such are the objections to _any arguments_ in favour of the doctrine +that motives "inevitably" control the volitions of intelligent beings +_in general_, involving of course the highest intelligence. But if any +are disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to intelligent +volition in general, and choose to maintain it only in respect to the +volitions of some particular intelligent beings; then they must give up +all the strongest of their arguments. If God is free from this +_control_, they must acknowledge also, or give some reason for their +dissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and sustain subordinate +intelligences, having the same freedom from this control; and if they +acknowledge that there is nothing in the nature of the case that renders +this an impossibility, then they must show, if they can, that though God +_might_ constitute beings otherwise, he has _so constituted man_ as to +render him incapable of choice, except _when_ and _as_ motives direct, +by an inevitable influence. But in attempting this they must meet other +difficulties in their course, which, it is believed, will greatly +embarrass the system. These difficulties, however, together with the +arguments which I design to advance directly in favour of the opposite +view, must be reserved for another number. + + + + +NUMBER IX. + +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED. + +Another argument against the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is, that it +leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this: +When the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is +_inevitably_ led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather +than of the other, unless there is a _perfect equality_ between them; in +which case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium; +for if it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the same degree +and in the same direction with motive influence, of course when it is +equally attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on +this ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two +particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being +"inevitably" governed by motives in his decisions, he could not +determine where to place them, both having the same influence on his +mind for a location in the same place! The same writer represents this +motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less +effectual, and not the less voluntary! And to illustrate it makes the +following comparison:--"It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone, +were sensible of and pleased with its turning to the north, for it would +believe that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not +perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic power." This statement +of Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory, +is important in several respects. It is, in the first place, an +acknowledgment that consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is +also a concession that the mind is _imposed upon_, in this matter, by +the Creator. But with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads +to materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one +of the most _philosophical_, if not one of the most _evangelical_ of the +defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence +similar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only in being +accompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And what says +its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards? He compares +our volitions to the vibrations of a scale beam, the different ends of +which are respectively elevated or depressed as the opposite weights may +chance to vary. What is this but teaching that motions of mind are +governed by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions +are perfectly mechanical states of mind? What the advocates of this +doctrine charge on the opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to +their own system.--_They_, not we, make choices the result of animal +instinct, or senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late +exposition of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and +while he contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for +a complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our +volitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference between +the laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do we think. +But we think that difference consists in the mind's being free from that +control for which the professor contends; and we believe when he +contends for that control in the volitions of the mind, he contends for +that which, from the nature of the case, entirely destroys the other +part of his hypothesis, viz. that the operations of the mind are free, +and essentially different from mechanical motion or the laws of +attractive influence in the material world. If the attractive power of +motives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation +or magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I +cannot tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is _that very power_ +for which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it +be said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is +consciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation between +motives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it affects that +relation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, already alluded +to, clearly illustrates. Look at that flowing stream; it hastens on most +freely, and by the law of its own nature down the gentle declivities or +more precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Suppose now that +Omnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the +continuous current, it would then wake up to perceive the action and +feel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It would roll on still +by the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move +according to its own _inclination_ and voluntary tendency, for its will +would of course be in the direction of its _motive_, or in other phrase, +its _gravitating_ influence. But could it turn its course and roll back +its waters to their fountains? It could if it was so _inclined_. But its +present _inclination_ is toward the bottom of the valley or the bosom of +the ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between its +particles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls on _with +the utmost freedom_, though with the utter impossibility of changing its +own course, without an inversion of the gravitating power. Let the hand +of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and to! with the same +freedom these very waters roll back again to their original fountains! +Thus it is with the human mind. It is conscious of being free to move in +the direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course and +move in the current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it +would be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the +motive influence.--"God is the determiner of perceptions, and +perceptions are the determiners of choices." + +We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to +materialism, for it makes the analogy between mental and material action +so complete that it destroys all idea of _intellectual power_. +Philosophically speaking, there is no _power_ in the laws of nature. +What we express by the _power_ of attraction, or repulsion, or +decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency. +Does the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?--This is not an +energy inherent in nature; it is the God of nature acting by a uniform +law. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by the power of +nature. We, however, use the word _power_ in an accommodated sense in +these cases, but always I think in connection with that portion of +matter that _appears_ to act, and not _that_ which is acted upon. The +magnet, we say, has power to attract iron, because iron is attracted +toward the magnet, and not the magnet toward the iron. The antecedent, +or that which takes the lead in the motion, is more properly said to +have the power, or is the efficient cause. If then we allow of the use +of the term power at all, to express the relation of cause and effect, +growing out of a philosophical constitution of things, the term should +be applied to the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case +before us, mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive +is the cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have +_power_ to act upon the mind, and the mind has a _susceptibility_ of +being acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be acted +upon is no power, or "it is a _powerless power_," which is +philosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the +mind has no _power_ of _choice_, but has a _susceptibility_ of being +drawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will +avail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a +difference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and the +susceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what that +difference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will +doubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive +theory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often has +to assume positions to keep itself in countenance, which positions +themselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the New-Haven +divines have done to support predestination, and to this all Calvinists +are driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, or the power of +choice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence &c. We may be told in +the case before us, that "when the mind is acted upon it is then excited +to action." But how excited to action? Is the action any stronger than +the motive influence?--Is it carried beyond this influence? or in a +different direction? To answer any _one_ of these questions in the +affirmative is to give up the theory; but to answer them in the negative +is to attribute to the mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The +_motives_ are (under God) the _agent_, the _mind_ is the _passive +object_, and the _volition_ is the _effect_. Can any one say then, on +this theory, that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in +the first place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical +necessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the cause of +its own volitions, but in these volitions it is the passive subject of +foreign influences. Now, so far as moral action is concerned, how does +this differ from materialism? It is true mental action differs from +material action in some associated circumstances; it is accompanied by +consciousness; but as consciousness of itself cannot give +accountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect by being +associated with such kind of mental action as results from philosophical +necessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; and if not +accountable, it is more than probable that he has no future existence, +and thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, if not to +atheism. + +That man is not _accountable_ upon the principle we are opposing, might +have been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it with the +argument that this doctrine leads to materialism because they imply each +other. If materialism is true, we are not accountable, and if we are not +accountable, materialism is probably true; and both are true, as I +conceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is true. + +It may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the mind +is not wholly passive, because we are conscious of putting forth a +mental energy and making a responsible volition; _that_ I am ready to +grant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this system be true; +and on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this system is false. I +believe no one who pays attention to his own mind will doubt of having +this consciousness. But does that prove the truth of this theory? It is +one thing to be conscious of having this energy of mind and responsible +volition, and another to be conscious that the theory in question is +true; indeed this consciousness destroys the theory. + +Should it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this system +to materialism, that different minds are not uniformly influenced by the +same motives, nor the same minds at different times, and therefore, in +this respect, it is evident that the laws of mind and of matter differ; +I reply, It is precisely so with matter; for _that_ attracts or repels +according to its different magnetic or electrical states; or should it +be urged that mind differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed +of a peculiar energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to +review the subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do +without a motive; and this it _must_ do if the motive preponderate in +that direction, but not otherwise. + +To have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first +perception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act otherwise +than in coincidence with the motive influence of this perception; or +could it even suspend the volition this influence was calculated to +produce, until a second and more powerful motive was introduced? If it +could, then this doctrine is false; if it could not, then the mind, like +matter put in motion, must move on invariably in the same direction, and +with the same velocity of thought for ever, or until a new motive should +counteract the influence of the former! This is emphatically the _vis +inertia_ of matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to +overthrow the theory. + +Another objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the notion +of regeneration by _moral suasion_ merely. There has been much said of +late, by the various writers in the old and the _new_ school, on this +point. The new school are charged with holding that the _truth alone_, +without any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, converts the sinner. +This is considered by the old school Calvinists as a fatal error. But +why so? If motives _govern_ the mind, with absolute sway, all you _need_ +to convert a sinner, is to bring a motive strong enough to induce him to +choose God as his chief good, and he is converted. Until you do this +there is no conversion, it is impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a +sinner in any other way than by motives, for choice of good we are told +is conversion; there is no choice without a motive, and the strongest +motive governs choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent +power that changes the sinner's heart. This is the legitimate result of +The Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder +that Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; here +we have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of "_natural +ability_" unriddled. The human mind, by the constitution of its nature, +has the power of choosing according to the influence of the strongest +motive; and therefore, so far as this can be called a power, it has the +natural power to convert itself; and this is the reason why "_make you a +new heart_" is the burden of almost every sermon and exhortation in +modern preaching; all the sinner has to do is to choose, in view of +motives, and he is converted. And here, too, is unravelled that other +mystery which we have been so puzzled to understand, viz. that although +all possess the natural power to convert themselves, yet no man ever did +convert himself without the special interposition of the Divine agency; +for, observe, God keeps the motives in his own hands; "God is the +determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of +_choices;_" that is, of _conversions;_ for to choose in a particular +way, is to be converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the +sinner convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he +is disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings +the motive and mind in contact, and _it is done_. Thus the sinner has as +much power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat when he is +hungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a susceptibility of +being operated upon, and controlled by the strongest motive; and thus +you see, also, that _God_ converts the sinner, because he supplies the +motive that influences the choice; and here, too, is seen the occasion +for misquoting so frequently and misapplying so universally, that +passage in the Psalms: "[My] people shall be [made] willing in the day +of [my] power." That is, when God applies the controlling motive to +influence to a right choice, then shall the sinner, by a law of his +nature, _become willing to be converted_. Such are the wonderful +philosophical discoveries of modern theology! This is the way for man to +convert _himself_ by natural power, and this is the way for _God_ to +convert him, without the aid of _super_ natural power! Well might a +divine of this cast, whom I heard preach not long since, say of +regeneration, "There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in it." For +surely it is one of the most natural things in the world, according to +this theory, to be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a +motive, according to the law of his natural constitution, and the man is +converted. + +This _philosophy of Christian experience_ has led modern orthodoxy to +the very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do +without a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the +philosopher in his study, and _work out_ a religious experience, as +philosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; we +will show the _rationale_ of the whole process, and demonstrate it so +clearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the Gospel, +and be induced to "_submit_" to God with scarcely a change of theory. +Hereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration is a +mystery--that in this work we cannot tell whence the regenerating +influence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes through the +philosophical channel of motive influence by which it introduces a +"governing purpose" into the mind, and the work is done. Let no man +hereafter say that his "faith stands not in the wisdom of man, but in +the power of God;" or "if any man would be wise let him become a fool +that he may be wise;" or "the wisdom of man is foolishness with God;" +for lo, the philosophy of regeneration is at length explained! and the +whole secret is found to consist in the philosophical relation between +motives and mind!! Can any one wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in +Germany, and in New-England, Calvinism has finally resulted in +Socinianism? And can any one help trembling for a large portion of the +orthodox Churches among us at the present day? Grant that there is an +increase of zeal, a greater stir among the people, more revivals, &c; +all these, with a good foundation, would promise well for the Church; +but we fear there is a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to +insinuate that the work is always spurious and the professed conversions +unsound. In many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It +might be expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under +the paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and +_apparently_ opposite theory should rouse many to action. "I had been +taught," said a man not far from this, "that I must wait God's time to +be converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more recently I have +been instructed that I might convert myself; I set about the work, and I +believe it is done!" Now this, which in the relation borders upon the +ludicrous, might have been a genuine conversion. His new views might +only have been sufficient to arouse him to a co-operation with the Holy +Spirit in his conversion; and this may have been the case with +thousands. In their practical effects two opposite errors may, in +individual cases, neutralize each other.--But is either therefore safe? +Will the general effect be salutary? Let the history of the Church +speak; and in view of that record I confess I fear for our common Zion. +But let not the old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger +upon the new school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from +that root which they have cultivated with such assiduity and care. It +grows out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the +entire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions upon +the directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the theory by +which that influence is explained. + +Another argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the +consideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in most +of our calculations respecting human agents.--Though we may judge +something of what will be the conduct of men in given circumstances, yet +our calculations are very far from coming up to mechanical exactness. +Motives have some influence; but that influence is very variable and +uncertain. Why is this? It is not so in matter; the same causes will +produce the same effects to the end of time. But we see many choose, +without being able to give what, _in their own estimation_, is a valid +reason; they did thus because they chose to do so; they act in defiance +of the strongest motives, drawn from whatever source. We see the +greatest possible caprice in the volitions of men; we see their minds +starting aside, and putting on the greatest possible and unaccountable +mental states, in a way and form that baffles all human calculation, and +will for ever baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to +reduce to uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to +fix, in an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his +labours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after all, +that living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we call the +human soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our calculations. If +this consideration should have no direct weight in opposition to the +theory I am opposing, it will at least show the absurdity of defending +this system by what is called the _known regularity_ and _uniform +phenomena_ of human volitions. To talk of _uniformity_ here, is to talk +of, to say the least, what does not exist. + +In the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in favour +of the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they are not so +much direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they are attempts to +show the absurdity of denying it. But when statements of this kind are +accompanied by no arguments, they need only be met by a denial. "We are +conscious," say the theorists, "of being controlled by motives:" I +reply, we are not conscious of this control, but we are conscious of the +contrary fact. We know, indeed, that motives have their influence; but +we know also that the mind has an influence over motives, and probably a +greater influence than motives have over _it_. The mind is conscious too +of having an influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing +energy, a spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is +predicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become +clearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have an +irresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as +certainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those cases +now, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the result of the +will. + +It is said again, that to deny this control "involves the absurdity that +our volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and are the +result of a brute or senseless mechanism." It appears to me, however, +that a system which represents the will as mechanically governed by +motives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a machine; while the +theory that gives the mind a spontaneous power and energy of its own, +makes him what he is, _an intelligent, responsible agent_. + +Since, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that +motives control the mind, are _assertions_ and not _proofs;_ and since +the theory itself leads to _fate_, to _atheism_, to _materialism_, to +_conversion_ by mere _moral suasion_, to the subversion of _human +liberty_ and _moral responsibility_, we must believe the theory false. +But against the theory of the spontaneous power of the mind, none of +these objections lie. It accords too with consciousness; and is, in +fact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can +be predicated. The opposite view claims our assent to two incongruous +and apparently contradictory propositions, between which there is not +only no agreement, but an evident repugnancy. This is the embarrassment +in the one case, and it is fatal to the theory. + +If there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of mind +or matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarrassments are +evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two +antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the +more apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to +human knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the theory we defend is, +we cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind +operates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in +which other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement +clear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided +into parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of +the mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act +in this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and +of memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing, +and of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me +_how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the +same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to +ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the +mind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--God _made it +so_. When you analyze until you come to the original elements, or when +you trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must +stop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you +cannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal +skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its +volitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its +other embarrassments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its +advocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an +analysis of constituent principles, or of causes and effects, but the +origin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the +will of the Creator. _It is so, because God hath made it so_. And the +nature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However +impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which +we _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission. + +I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther +explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of +philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession +to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the +material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_ +that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy +operating in a uniform way. "Let it be granted," a Calvinist might say, +"that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the +supreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to +defend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the +human mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of +the Divine mind operating in a uniform way." + +To this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in any +proper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of mind. If +any one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not power. In +other words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot act only as +acted upon, there is no such thing as _power_ in the universe! and thus +we again land in atheism. But if _mind_ has power, as all theists must +grant, then the _human_ mind may have power. If any one can prove that +it is impossible, in the nature of things, for the Supreme Being to +create and sustain subordinate agents, with a spontaneous power of +thought and moral action, to a limited extent, in that case we must give +up our theory. But it is presumed no one can prove this, or will even +attempt to prove it. We say, God has created such agents, and that they +act, in their responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either +directly or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that God +made man "in his own image;" his _moral_ image doubtless. Man, then, in +his own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, the +power of spontaneous moral action: this, _this only_, is the ground of +his responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man entirely out of +the control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. It only puts him out +of the control of such direct influences as would destroy his moral +liberty. Does the power of moral action, independent of the magistracy +and the laws, destroy all the control of the civil government over +malefactors? How much less in the other case? God can prevent all the +mischief that a vicious agent might attempt, without throwing any +restraint upon his responsible volitions. It is thus that he "makes the +wrath of man praise him, and the remainder of wrath he restrains." + +Let it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as indeed it +has been understood heretofore by those who have carefully examined the +subject, that when the Calvinists talk about "free will," and "human +liberty," they mean something _essentially different_ from what we mean +by these terms; and, as it is believed, something essentially different +from the _popular_ meaning of these terms. They believe in human +liberty, they say, and the power of choice, and we are bound to believe +them; but we are also bound not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by +terms. _Theirs_ is a liberty and power of a moral agent to will _as he +does_, and _not otherwise_. _Ours_ is an unrestricted liberty, and a +spontaneous power in all responsible volitions, to _choose as we do_, or +_otherwise_. + +Thus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or evil, +according to its original constitution. How far this power has been +affected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is a +question that will claim attention in my next. + + + + +NUMBER X. + +MORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS OF +GRACE. + +MY last number was an attempt to prove that God created man with a +spontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground of +his moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far this +power has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions of +grace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these points is very +clearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of religion in her book of +Discipline. + +1. "Original sin standeth not in the _following_ of Adam, (as the +Pelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every +man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man +is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature +inclined to evil, and that continually." + +2. "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot +turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to +faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works +pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ +preventing us, (going before to assist us,) that we may have a good +will, and working with us when we have that good will." + +It is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by +sin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential to +mind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to render man +utterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient and cooperating +grace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an external sense, may +be weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so the moral power of the +mind or an inward sense may be weakened or destroyed by moral disease. +And it is in perfect accordance with analogy, with universal language, +and with the representations of Scripture, to consider the mind as +susceptible, in its essential nature, of this moral deterioration. If +any one should say he cannot understand what this moral defect is, I +would answer by asking him if he can tell me what the essence of mind +is? And if he chooses to object to this kind of depravity, because he +cannot understand it, in its essence, he should turn materialist at +once; and then, as he will find equal difficulty to tell what the +essence of matter is, and in what its weakness and disorder essentially +consist, he must turn universal skeptic.--The simple statement is, _the +soul has become essentially disordered by sin;_ and as no one can prove +the assertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I +think it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of +fallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is such +as to mar man's free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which all +voluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. But +voluntary preference does not necessarily imply _such a free agency_ as +involves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to act in one +direction, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral equilibrium as +to be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in an opposite +direction, and therefore not, in the full and responsible sense, a free +agent. It is not enough, therefore, to say, "Free agency (of a +responsible kind) consists in the possession of understanding, +conscience, and will;" (see Christian Spectator for September, 1830;) +unless by _will_ is meant the spontaneous power already alluded to. The +understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared or polluted, +the will, that is, the power of willing, may, to all good purposes, be +inthralled; and this is what we affirm to be the true state and +condition of unaided human nature. + +It will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does not +recognize the distinction of _natural_ and _moral_ ability. The fact is, +man's inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, because it is +constitutional; and it is moral, because it relates to the mind. To say +a fallen man has natural power to make a right choice, because he has +the faculties of his mind entire, is the same as to say that a paralytic +man has the natural power to walk, because he has his limbs entire. It +appears to me that the whole of this distinction, and the reasoning from +it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind and +an unwarranted definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen +man, _on the whole_, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We +say without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the +responsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace. + +This view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily +acknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has been +held by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it can be +proved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine has been +generally received in the Church, entitles it to respect and to a +careful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those who have +only read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it may be a matter +of surprise to learn that not only the more ancient fathers, but even +St. Austin himself, the introducer of predestination into the Church, +and Calvin, and the synod of Dort, were all supporters of sentiments +substantially the same as are here vindicated--I say, those who have +only read modern Calvinistic authors will be surprised to learn this, +because these authors treat this doctrine as though it were so +unreasonable and absurd as scarcely to be tolerated in the view of +common sense. Though it may have an influence with some, in a paucity of +better reasons, to scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it +absurd, yet the candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a +new, without good reason. + +I had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the +fathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their views +on this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the statements here +made should be denied. Let therefore one or two quotations from Calvin +and from the synod of Dort, both of which I think Calvinists will +acknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, suffice. Calvin denies all +power to man, in his apostasy, to choose good, and says that, +"surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, he (man) +should nevertheless be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is +destitute, and to _the liberty of which he is deprived_." The synod of +Dort decided thus:--"We believe that God--formed man after his own +image, &c, _capable in all things to will_ agreeably to the will of +God." They then speak of the fall, and say, "We reject all that is +repugnant to this concerning the free will of man, since man is but a +_slave to sin_, and has nothing of himself, unless it is given him from +heaven." And speaking of the change by grace, they add, "The will thus +renewed is not only actuated and influenced by God, but _in consequence +of this influence becomes itself active_." And to show that Calvin did +not consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free +will, he says, "Man _has not an equally free election of good and evil_, +and can only be said to have free will, because he does evil +voluntarily, and not by constraint;" and this he ironically calls +"egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but yet +is such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the fettors +of sin." These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that the early +Calvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose good by +apostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they generally +believed that whenever this grace was imparted to an extent to restore +to the mind the power of choosing good, it was regenerating grace. And +herein they differ from the Arminians, who believe that grace may and +does restore the power to choose good before regeneration. This, +however, does not affect the point now under examination, but involves a +collateral question, which will be examined in its proper place. One +thought more, and I pass to the arguments on the main questions in the +articles quoted above. These articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of +the articles of the Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the +same as the 10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that +article, commencing, "Wherefore, &c," is taken substantially from St. +Austin himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine +we defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from +Beza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient fathers. +Nay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the synod of Dort, +that this was "the judgment of all antiquity." + +Let us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine. + +1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, as +is believed, since only this view of man's condition will accord with +the Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach that man is +constitutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor have come over his +moral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, and to death, how can it +be otherwise than that this should affect his power to choose good? Had +man any too much moral power in the first instance to constitute him an +accountable moral agent? And if he had not, has he enough now that his +mind has become darkened, his judgment perverted, and his moral powers +corrupted and weakened? Or will it be denied that the moral energies of +his nature have been impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected? +Let any one spend a thought on this question, and decide, if he can, +what definite vicious effect can be produced on man's moral nature which +will not necessarily imply a weakening and an embarrassment of his +original power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is +somewhat weakened, but he has enough left to constitute him free to +choose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than +enough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man's +moral nature was not _wholly_ vitiated. It is said, I know, that all the +embarrassment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination to +moral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and +constitutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, and +is therefore the very thing we mean--it is this very thraldom of the +mind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked +whether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom +of the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most +unhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or +derived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is +not morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive +foreign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a +contrary choice. + +It follows then, I think, that we must either give up constitutional +depravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice without +Divine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the precise point +on which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New Divinity theory +of depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any depravity of man's +moral constitution would either imply the necessity of supernatural aid +in order to a right choice, or else free man from responsibility, Dr. +Taylor and his associates have resolved all depravity into _choice_ or +_voluntary preference_. They deny that there is any thing in the nature +of man, antecedently to his act of willing, that possesses a moral +character. Their idea is perfectly consistent with the notion of natural +ability; and that the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this +idea is evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after +consistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, that +all who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow them. The +doctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than a name, +appears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, and should +never be separated from its counterpart--the doctrine of self conversion +and the natural perfectability of the human character. But this clearly +implies that there is no serious derangement or radical viciousness of +the moral man. Here, then, is another instance in which Calvinists in +general revolt at the legitimate results of their own system. + +But while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an +important objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, as +it is believed, however little they may have designed it, set themselves +in fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of depravity and +salvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for the introduction of +numerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, they will not own that they +have gone very far from the old system. They think the doctrine of +natural depravity is asserted when they say, "nature is _such_ that he +will sin, and only sin, in all the appropriate circumstances of his +being." (See Dr. Taylor's Sermon.) But what this "nature" is, we are at +a loss to determine; as also what the "_such_" is that is predicated of +this nature; nor has Dr. T. told us how he knows that all men will sin +and only sin, when in fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in +what other than "the appropriate circumstances of their being" those are +who become regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox, +and thus to assimilate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged +one inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent, +must come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture +doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they must +go back to their old ground, and endure the manifest inconsistency they +are now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to me better than either, +come on to the Arminian ground, which shuns all these difficulties, +while it maintains constitutional depravity and salvation by grace from +the foundation to the top stone, including of course a gracious ability +to choose life and gain heaven. + +2. Another argument in favour of the _necessity_ of Divine grace, in +order to a right choice, is the fact, that God actually gives grace to +those who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of this +fact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in general terms. +Jesus Christ "is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into +the world." "The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto +all men." They speak in special terms of the unregenerate--that they +_grieve_, _resist_, and _quench_ the _Spirit_ of _grace_, which +certainly they could not do if they had it not. But if they have the +operations of the Spirit, what are these operations? What is the Spirit +doing to the inner man? Will it be said he is bringing motives to bear +upon the mind? But what motives other than those found in the Gospel? +These the sinner has without the Spirit. If these motives can convert +sinners, any of us can convert our neighbours. "But," it is said, "the +Spirit makes the heart _feel_ these motives." Aye, truly he does, and +that not by operating upon the motives, but upon the _heart_, and this +is the very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously +arouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to _feel_, and excites +it to _act_, in the great work of salvation. + +Since, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those who +are finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, let me +seriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On the +Calvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for +salvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without +grace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse of +that ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So say the +Calvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the reprobates are +justly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this grace given? If we may +establish a general principle by an induction of particulars; if we may +judge of the design of the God of providence or grace, by noticing, in +any given case, the uniform results, then we can easily determine this +point. _God gives grace to the reprobates that their condemnation may be +the more aggravated_. The argument stands thus: God gives grace to the +reprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that +salvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved without +it; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this it does not +effect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable effect of which +is to increase their condemnation. The only consistent inference; +therefore is, that he gives grace to the reprobates that they may have a +more aggravated condemnation. Here, then, we trace the Calvinistic +theory to one of these _logical consequences_ charged upon it in the +sermon, and which has been so strenuously denied by the reviewers--a +consequence which, revolting as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon +it still, unless its advocates can show why grace is given to the +reprobates when they have all necessary ability to repent and believe +without it. + +3. On the ground of this doctrine, also, there would be some difficulty +in accounting for the necessity of giving grace, in all cases, even to +the elect. Why may not some of these repent without grace? Nay, why may +not some of the reprobates, in the plenitude of their natural ability, +repent and be converted, in despite of the decree of reprobation? Did +God foresee that they would not, and on that foresight predicate his +decree of reprobation? But that would be a _conditional_ reprobation, +and would therefore imply its counterpart--a conditional election. This +no class of Calvinists will admit. How happens it, then, that some of +these reprobates do not get converted, since they not only have natural +powers enough to make a right choice but have some grace beside? Is it +because God has fixed the barrier in something else, by which this +ability, grace, and all are rendered nugatory? But this would render +their condemnation unjust, Calvinists themselves being judges. They tell +us that the only just ground of condemnation is, that _the sinner will +not come to Christ_. Here, then, is the most extraordinary thing that +angels or men ever knew; for almost six thousand years there has been +upon our earth a succession of generations of sinners, and its the +present generation of them there are eight hundred millions. All of +these, throughout all their generations, have had no other obstruction +to salvation but what exists in their own will, and each and all have +had by nature all needful ability in the will to a right choice, and +have had a measure of grace super-added, and yet not a reprobate among +them all has ever made a right choice; and not one of the elect ever did +or ever will make such a choice until God, by an omnipotent act, "makes +his elect willing in the day of his power!!" This is a miracle to which +all the other miracles in the world are as nothing--a miracle which +Omnipotence alone can accomplish by a Divine constitution and an +all-controlling energy. Thus this doctrine destroys itself. It assumes +positions, with respect to free will, that cannot be maintained, only on +the supposition of an _efficient_ superior agency to direct the action +of that _free will_, in a course of sinful volition, in hundreds of +millions of cases, without a single variation, save where that variation +is the result of the same superior Power acting in the opposite +direction. + +4. That the sinner receives aid by Divine grace to enable him to repent; +and that he could not repent, without this, appears evident from the +Scriptural representation of the ground of man's responsibility. "If I +had not come," says the Saviour, "ye had not had sin." "This is the +condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men loved darkness +rather than light." "He that believeth not is condemned already, +_because_ he hath not believed in the only begotten Son of God." +"_Because_ I have called, and ye have refused, &c, I also will laugh at +your calamity." These and many other passages seem to imply that the +sinner is rejected on the ground of his neglecting offered grace. But if +this is the ground of his condemnation, it is not for the abuse of +natural power. I see no way for a plausible attempt even to get rid of +this argument, unless it should be attempted to raise a question +respecting the nature of this grace. It may be said that "these passages +only relate to gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the +Scriptures of truth, &c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious +influence upon the mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe, +repent, &c, but something must be presented to believe in; and some +provision must be made to make repentance available." In reply I would +say, First, Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin +without grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in +the very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the +subject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because none +can be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, leaving +this for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the above, that +the Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined to _external +provisions_, but on the contrary speak of it as operating upon and +influencing the mind, and that, too, in the very way for which we +contend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, promiscuously selected, +and see how clearly they sustain our position. In the first place, to +give the argument full force, let us notice the Scripture account of +man's natural condition. He is "in darkness," "asleep," "dead," "without +strength," "sick," "deaf," "blind," "lame," "bound," "helpless;" and all +this in consequence of sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his +sinful character and condition. If such language does not describe +_utter inability_ of the sinner to serve God, then no language can do +it. Now let us see what grace does. Its very design is to "awake the +sleeper;" to unstop deaf ears, and "open blind eyes;" to "lighten every +man;" to "strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man." "Christ +strengthens" the sinner, that he may "do all things." It is on the +ground that "God worketh in him to will and to do," that man is exhorted +to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling." "Thou +strengthenedst me with strength _in my soul_." But leaving farther +quotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the stress +which the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All the +efficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the apostle +declares that he "preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost sent down +from heaven;" that it "came, not in word, but in _power_." Indeed, "the +letter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Hence the +frequent cautions not to "grieve" or "quench the Spirit." Now what, I +ask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there any plausibility in the +idea, that by such expressions nothing is meant but the general +provisions of grace in the Gospel economy? That no direct, gracious +influence of the Spirit upon the heart is intended? In fact, the new +idea of conversion by motives and moral suasion seems to be a device to +meet this very difficulty. The old Calvinists charge the advocates of +the New Divinity with holding that all the Spirit does in operating upon +the heart, is not by operating upon it directly, but indirectly _through +the truth_: which has given rise to the saying, "If I were as eloquent +as the Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he." And if they do +hold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate consequence +of the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless arrive at it +thus:--According to the Scriptures, man's responsibility turns on his +rejecting or improving the grace of God. That grace cannot be an +internal gracious influence upon man's moral nature, because that would +conflict with the notion of responsibility, on the ground of natural +power. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing more than that a +gracious atonement is provided, and a record of Divine truth made, and +now, in the use of his natural power, the sinner is required to judge of +and embrace this truth, which if he does, he in this sense improves the +grace of God, and is converted; but if he does it not, he grieves the +Spirit, and is condemned. Thus in the one case, if he is converted, it +is in the use of his natural power, "choosing in the view of motives;" +and in the other case, if he is not converted, it is in the use of his +natural power, refusing in view of motives. Is not this correct +reasoning? And ought not the New-Haven divines to be commended for +carrying out the system to its legitimate results? And ought not all to +follow them in this, who hold to natural ability? And yet no wonder that +they hesitate here, for cold and spiritless indeed must be that system +of religious experience that resolves the conversion of the soul into a +mere natural operation of choosing, through the influence of moral +suasion. + +Leaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal +embarrassments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here vindicated +corresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with itself; for it +makes man's responsibility turn upon grace improved or misimproved, and +it makes that grace an internal quickening influence, and a +strengthening energy upon the heart; and these different features of the +theory, when placed together, all seem at once to be compatible with +each other. + +5. Express passages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained. + +I need not now repeat the passages already referred to, in which the +state of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any human +language can show it, that man is naturally "without strength." But my +object is to call the attention of the reader to some very direct and +express passages, to show that it is grace, and grace alone, that +enables the soul to do the will of God. "I can do all things," saith the +apostle, "through Christ who strengtheneth me." Query: would not the +apostle have thought it presumption to have said, I can do all things +without strength from Christ? Has he ever intimated such a sentiment in +all his writings? Does he not rather say, "We are not sufficient of +ourselves _to think any thing as of ourselves_, but our _sufficiency is +of God?_" This is the apostle's general language, and it is in perfect +accordance with the declaration of his Master, "Without me ye can do +nothing." "As the branch _cannot_ bear fruit of itself, except it abide +in the vine, _no more can ye_, except ye abide in me." "No man _can +come_ to me, except the Father draw him." "Likewise the Spirit Helpeth +our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought." "My +grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in +weakness." "The God of all grace--stablish, strengthen, settle you." +"For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would grant +you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with +_might_, by his _Spirit_, in the _inner_ man," "according to the power +that worketh _in us_." It is useless to quote farther. If these passages +do not show that our strength to do good is of grace, then it appears to +me the Holy Spirit must fail of an _ability_ to communicate that idea +through human language. Will it be said that some of these passages +refer to the regenerate, and therefore are not in point to meet the case +of the unregenerate? I would ask, in reply, whether regenerating grace +takes away our natural ability? Certainly if the regenerate can neither +think nor do any thing acceptable without grace, much more do the +unregenerate need this grace to enable them to make a right choice. And +yet in the face of these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly +told that man has natural power to make himself a new heart! + +To the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof of +our doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been extended so +far already, the universal experience of all Christians. This appears, +from their language, to be the experience of Bible saints, under both +the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what Christian now living, +but feels now, and felt when he first embraced the Saviour, that the +strength to do this was from God--directly from God, through grace. Hear +his prayers--he pleads his weakness--he asks _for strength_. And what +does he mean by that prayer? Does he ask for some external accommodation +and aid? No; he wants strength, _by the Spirit, in the inner man_. And +this is the prayer of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion +of natural ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very +advocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of dependence, +are often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we defend. A most +striking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood's pamphlet (page 97) in +opposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:--"The common theory (of +Calvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves, +especially in a moral view; and to feel that we are not of ourselves +_sufficient for any thing spiritually good_, and that, for whatever +holiness we now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on +Divine grace." What stronger gracious ability do Arminians hold to, than +this? "Not of ourselves sufficient for any thing spiritually good." And +is this the common theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other +points, is divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think, +were it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his +brothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this moment. +But he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he "does not differ at all +from the generality of ministers, in New-England, respecting the natural +powers and faculties of man, as a moral and accountable being." But he +fears the "unqualified language" which Dr. T. "employs respecting the +natural state, the free will, and the power of man." On reading this +last passage, I confess I am at a loss to know what to say or believe of +this Calvinistic opinion of natural power. Dr. Taylor's "unqualified +language" respecting "the power of man," I take to be a frank statement +of Dr. Wood's opinion, and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has +natural power _sufficient_ to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say +this? He says he does not differ from "the generality;" and it is +notorious that this is the doctrine of the generality of those +ministers. Dr. Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood's coadjutors in +opposing Dr. Taylor, says, in a sermon[5] on free salvation, "There is +no reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty, +or which impairs the sinner's _natural power_. Every man is a free moral +agent. Life and death are set before him, and he is _capable_ of +choosing between them." What language can be more "unqualified" than +this? It teaches us that man has _natural power_, which renders him +_capable_ to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and "those who +believe with him," carry out this doctrine into its legitimate and +practical bearings. On the ground of this power, they exhort sinners "to +make themselves new hearts." One of them, as reported to me by a +preacher, went so far as to say, in a public address, that sinners ought +to be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy Spirit to convert them, since +they had power to convert themselves. And what objection can any, who +hold to natural power to choose life, urge against this? If, as Dr. +Tyler teaches, in his "Examination of Dr. Taylor's Theological Views," a +right choice implies regeneration; and if every man is _naturally +capable_ of a right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the +"generality" of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see +not how any sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have +natural power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically +pleading their own weakness, before a _throne of grace_, and asking for +mercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought to be +crimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away from +their impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the _resources of nature_, +and regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen believe it +impossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their whole theory +together, this power is no power, and community, up to this hour, has +been deluded by unmeaning words--words which only serve to conceal the +deformity of a theological system, which, when thoroughly examined, is +found after all, to teach that the poor reprobate has no adequate power +by nature, and receives no available aid from grace to choose salvation, +and must therefore, from the imperious necessity of his nature and +condition, go down to interminable death. + + + + +NUMBER XI. + +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. + +It is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of the +subject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, morals, +or religion, against which some apparently plausible objection may not +be urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, Are those objections +fatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in the proposed system +greater than in some other view of the subject? For reasonable men will +refuse to be driven into the vortex of skepticism merely because there +are some difficulties and obscurities in all subjects of faith, which +the limitations to human vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form +an enlightened comparative view in the case before us, it will be +important that we glance at the different theories on the subject of +depravity and the ground of responsibility. + +1. One form in which this subject has been held is, "That the sin of +Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity +that it is impossible for his descendants to make any voluntary efforts +toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their +moral and religious character, and that faith and all the Christian +graces are communicated by the sole and irresistible operation of the +Spirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man." +This of course makes the elect entirely passive in their conversion; and +consigns the reprobate to destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is +maintained, is imputed to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at +best gives him over to unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for +possessing a nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and +from which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of +this system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the +standard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need not +here allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so heavily +upon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their ingenuity and +invention at defence, and have driven them finally into all those +changes and modifications so frequently alluded to in this controversy. +I will here say in advance that, in my opinion, this, after all, is the +strongest position Calvinism can assume. The moment its advocates depart +from this, they must either, to be consistent with themselves, verge +over into the other extreme of Pelagianism, or strike off into the +"golden mean" of Arminianism. This may be more clearly seen in the +sequel. + +2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety of +shades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, however, +relate to some minor modifications of the relation of the human family +to Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, and greater +exposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the essential part +of the theory, which is, that human nature is free from sin or guilt +until it becomes guilty by _intelligent, voluntary exercise_. The +objections to this theory are, among others, as follows. It is in direct +opposition to the Scripture doctrine of native depravity--a doctrine +which has been often and ably treated of and defended by Calvinistic +and, Arminian divines--a doctrine which is embodied in a palpable form +in every man's own experience--a doctrine which not only flashes upon +the mind of the student in every page of the history of man, but also +upon the mind of the unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the +infant that struggles in her arms. + +Another objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, previous +to intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. Hence, should +they die at this age, as multitudes doubtless do, they would not be fit +subjects either for the rewards of heaven or the pains of hell. At the +Judgment, as they will not be subjects of praise or blame, they will +neither be on the right hand nor the left, and of course will neither be +sentenced to "everlasting punishment," nor welcomed "into life eternal." +If, however, they by any means go into a state of punishment, their +sufferings will be unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will +not be a salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration, +nor will their song be, "Unto Him that hath loved us," &c. This is not +only contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct +opposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: "Therefore, as by +the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so, by +the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto +justification of life." It also leaves infants involved in the natural +evils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any assignable +cause, but also in direct opposition to the cause assigned by the +apostle--"And so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." + +A third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture +doctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, in +substance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by the +efficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine makes sin +consist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist wholly in +exercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a mere change of +volition; and this volition is not the result of a preceding change of +moral constitution, but it is, like any other volition, produced by the +native power of the mind, under the exciting influence of motives. The +Holy Spirit, therefore, may well be dispensed with in this work. The +supernatural character of the change must be given up, and the whole +work is resolvable into a natural process. It is here worthy of remark +that this is not mere speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final +result of this theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been +defended. And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural +efficacy of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the +Redeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the system, +and somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other parts, and are +therefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, as may be seen by +the history of the Church, has been the practical result wherever +Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. It has degenerated +into Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one word, that this doctrine +of Pelagianism does, in its teachings, tendencies, and practical +results, supplant and overthrow all the essential principles of the +Gospel system. + +3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human +responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding +number. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which +the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as "Calvinists, +say that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical +impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who, +it is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen +ancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [unassisted by grace] toward +piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral +and religious character." Thus far we go together; but this is a point +of divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of +going on to say "that the Christian graces are communicated by the +irresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or +concurrence on the part of man," we say that "the saving grace of God +hath appeared unto all Men;" and that this grace so enlightens, +strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make +that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul's +salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when +he has this good will, is enabled "to work out his salvation" unto the +end. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue +with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the +Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New +Divinity in our country. + +To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we +believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in +behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not +imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes +the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel; +and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is +entitled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of +course, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him +for the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this +system, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is +sanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace. + +These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after +truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives +of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of +_natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an +intermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first +stated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I +ought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct +theory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in +my opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived +constitutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any +thing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the +idea of constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more +than a name--that is, in fact, _constitutional depravity_, destroys the +idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact +that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who +have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over +and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the +doctrine of constitutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are +certainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been +following up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them +upon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we +need not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show +that the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and +sin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists +left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of +a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no +guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is +unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and +by consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral +choice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural +ability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be +reasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy +volition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin. + +The only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the assumed +premises is, to maintain that "the infant, from his birth, is a +voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful." And +would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such +an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A +paper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity, +purporting to be an inquiry into "what is the real difference between +the New-Haven divines and those who differ from them," says, "The ground +has of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this +subject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable +agents, and actual sinners against God; that the new-born infant is a +responsible subject of God's moral government, and actually sins with a +knowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner +violates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to +change its moral character." And as a proof that this is the ground now +assumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who +has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the +New-Haven divines, in which he says, "A moral being, for aught we know, +may commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the +will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to +a certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is +seated in any thing but the will_." This same writer also states that +Dr. Spring, in a treatise on "native depravity," a work which I have not +at hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of "_actual_ sin from +birth." And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural +ability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing +more than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the +one hand, or "make himself a new heart" on the other! Alas for +Calvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_ +shifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself +in accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent, +learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me +in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is +however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest +and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and +while we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also +fall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense +to be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see +that, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up +their _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_, +they destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory, +this very attempt to prove that infants are "_actual_ sinners from their +birth," is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why +do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order +to show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an +acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by +proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a +concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt. +This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has +gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the +difference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in +connection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which +makes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side +Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn +against their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible, +the Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in +common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an +opposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant +"commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and +is thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?" This is clearly +a work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents. +The New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of +carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will +cease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. Harvey +fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their "_moral exercise_" +early enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given assurances +that they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is +no sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the +corresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be +satisfied. They have said already that "this capableness of sinning, if +it is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it +is not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for +all the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from +the beginning of their days." Hence we see nothing between these +gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be +important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral +suasion should not put the commencement of these "moral exercises" so +far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they +may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are +trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown, +I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the +nature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as +they contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and +Pelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will illustrate it +farther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity. +It is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers +"depravity as seated in nothing but the will." And this is avowedly the +sentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural +ability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, "You can +if you will;" "There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse +will." It is on this ground, also, that they tell us "a right choice is +conversion." They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit +of the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand +this subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the +will. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if +not latitude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be +the legitimate meaning of the term "the mental power or susceptibility +of putting forth volitions;" then to say that all depravity is seated in +the will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the +affections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they +mean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going +out in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the +New-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by +placing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of +willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case, +exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the +doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something +different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I +know not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and +place the seat of this depravity in the constitution of man's moral +nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that +case they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency; +for to talk of a natural power to change the moral constitution, as it +existed prior to choice, and which constitution must, by the law of its +nature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as +to talk of a natural power to alter one's own nature, or to unmake and +remake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must +remain as we are. + +We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until +we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise +meaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral +ability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined +such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been +particular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of +charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_ +authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the +different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of "Views in +Theology;" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on "Divine Efficiency;" Rev. +Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract, +entitled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," written, +it is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been +consulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this +point. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, "Natural +power consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will; +and moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties." Mr. Thatcher says +this in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of +natural power. Dr. Griffin says "their [sinners'] faculties constitute a +natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if their +hearts are well disposed." It certainly must appear, at the first +glance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, that +either the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties, +should be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best +philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a +simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it analyzed in two +different forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is +power. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a +clear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of +every man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the +true idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is +granted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And +although the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_ +of the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the +limbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires +very little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of +the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some +of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or +faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral +strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these +faculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much +less are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of +moral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion +advanced in my former number, viz. "That the whole of this distinction +(of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the +ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind, and an unwarranted +definition of terms." This may seem a strong statement from so humble an +individual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted +the opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh +much, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments; +and by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look +then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems +to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes +to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says, +"If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency, +I hope I shall be the last to believe that." "And every body knows that +the mass of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have +acknowledged no such doctrine." + +And why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability +that will "work," without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against +Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon +the old Calvinistic doctrine of "native impotency." There is no standing +place any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural +ability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of +consistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to +the New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the +reader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the +proper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point, +which is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not +then be in haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. "Now if you +ask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine +efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it +is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of +common sense, must be called a power." The doctor had a little before +told us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this; +and what well instructed mind, like the doctor's, could be? It is +something that forms the "basis of obligation," he knows not what it is. +He merely infers there is such a power, because men are held +responsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking +the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties +beside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an +ability, that will not "work," without being strengthened by Divine aid, +and yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of +obligation without that aid. + +We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this +definition of _moral_ power. It is "the exercise of natural power." But +these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power +sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, "we are +entirely dependent upon God's grace for moral power"--in other words, +according to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace +for the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means +the faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement +is simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the +exercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy +choice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so +depraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to "work" in this +exercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious +ability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in +another place--"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at +once, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and +duty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a +single step in their own _strength?_" Or is it any wonder that the +Christian Spectator should say, that "this statement of Dr. Griffin +brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?" And is +this the ability that "the mass of the New-England divines have held to +from the beginning?" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground +occasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one +hand, and the old doctrine of passivity on the other. For the truth is, +as before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves +upon between these two, only as they light upon our ground. + +There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called. +It implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is obedience itself. +For a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right +exercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore + +Our moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a clue +to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic +saying--"You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly disposed," +or in short hand--"You can if you will." Now the verb _will_ here +evidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is, +as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning +of this notable saying is--"You have power to obey God, _if you obey +him_." "You _can_ if you _do_." This is a sort of logic which, when +scanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in +refuting, as its abettors are entitled to for its invention and use. And +yet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fictitious costume has +led thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now +modified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism. + +There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with +this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence, +until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect, +natural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural +power, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have +power to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If, +however, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because +their very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which +_enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground, +that it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power, +that is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this +Calvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of +candour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What +confusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well +defined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are +applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse +than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to +bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and +reproach. + +One thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pass on. +The doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that God controls the +natural power of men, by means of their moral power. This some of them +expressly affirm. And to show that I am not mistaken with respect to the +others, let the reader carefully attend to the following considerations. +What is it secures the fulfilment of the Divine decrees, in respect to +the elect and the reprobate? Why do not some of the reprobates, in the +use of natural ability, repent and get to heaven? Because they have not +the moral power. Why do not some of the elect, in the use of the same +ability, fall into sin and finally perish? Because God makes and keeps +them willing in the day of his power--that is, he irresistibly imparts +to them this moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his +own hands he executes his decrees. For God, of set purpose, so +constituted this natural power, that it does not "work" without Divine +efficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. Now, +to say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and irresistibly +controlling one power by another, and yet calling that other the essence +of free agency, and the basis of obligation--look at the absurdity in +another point of view. Since moral power is the exercise of natural +power, the former must be the _effect_ of the latter. And since, +according to Calvinism, natural power is controlled by moral power, it +follows conclusively; that the effect controls its cause!! And since the +cause must act, before the effect is produced, it follows that the +effect, before it has an existence, acts upon its cause to produce its +own existence!!! This is certainly a nullification of both cause and +effect: Such are some of the difficulties of these definitions of +power--definitions as contrary to the common understandings of men, and +the common laws of language, as they are to sound philosophy--definitions +which, if they were always understood, when the terms were used; would +make the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very +differently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to +appear, that "this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the +reasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical analysis of +mind and an unwarranted definition of terms," and that, after all the +efforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they will be +under the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of going back +to the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, or of advancing +on to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or they must accept of +the Arminian theory of gracious ability. And that the reader may be +prepared to make his selection, I will here remind him of the arguments +adduced in favour of the latter doctrine, in the last number, while I +next proceed to answer more specifically the objections that have been +urged against it, which however for an obvious reason must be withheld +until the next number. + + + + +NUMBER XII. + +OBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED. + +In consulting different authors to find the strongest objections that +have been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I have fixed +upon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, entitled, "Man a Free +Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," as concentrating in a small +compass, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of these +objections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, and +possibly shall pass over some of his remarks as of minor importance; but +the substance of his reasoning shall receive such notice as I shall be +able to give it. + +1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a free +agent man cannot be _man;_ that free agency in fact enters into the very +definition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; and therefore +he must be such by nature. + +This objection gains all its plausibility from the writer's definition +of free agency. "It consists," he says, "in the possession of +_understanding_, _conscience_, and _will_." Now we grant that the being +who possesses these is an intelligent voluntary agent. But these +faculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so that, for all holy +purposes, they may be defective. The understanding may be darkened, the +conscience may be seared, the power to choose good may be weakened +either positively or relatively. _Liberty_ is a distinct faculty of the +soul; and as such is as subject to derangement as any other mental +susceptibility. It has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that +man has not his original aptitude or facility to good. And whether we +consider this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the +will itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is +probably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral +equilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the +passions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result are +the same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy declination +from righteousness to an extent which none but God can rectify. With +this view of the subject, the writer may call man a free agent if he +pleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, and not to holiness. + +Our objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in this +way; and hence in a note he says, "Some writers speak of man, in his +natural state, as _free only_ to evil. But in what does such freedom +differ from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, how is he who +murders a fellow creature more criminal than the tiger, or even a +falling rock that destroys him?" The fallacy of this argument consists +chiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. Instead of holding that +man "has no power to do otherwise," we believe, as much as this author, +that man has ample power at his command to do otherwise; but that this +power is of grace, and not of nature. Any farther supposed difficulties +growing out of this view of the subject will be explained, I trust +satisfactorily, as we advance.[6] + +2. "Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which +constitute free agency."--Here again we must keep in view the writer's +definition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that every man is +conscious that he possesses the faculties of understanding, conscience, +and will; but that these, unaided by grace, constitute man free to a +holy choice, is denied; and this is the very question in debate. To +affirm it therefore in argument is begging the question. + +It however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point +seems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the +responsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this does +not touch the question whether this power is of grace or of nature. But, +says the writer, "When man, under the influence of grace, does choose +the good, he is not conscious of any new faculty or power to choose, but +only he uses that power in a different manner. The power or faculty +which chooses evil and which chooses good, is the same power differently +used." Whoever disputed this?--understanding by power a faculty of the +soul, as this author evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul +gets no new faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the +exercise of its natural faculties, is assisted by grace to make a right +choice. But, says the writer, in this connection, "Power to choose +between two objects is power to choose either." If the writer means to +say that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects _is_ +power to choose either--this is an identical proposition: it is only +saying, _If a thing is, it is_. But if he means to say, when two objects +are presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself possessed of a +power to attach itself voluntarily to one, that therefore it has the +_same power_ to attach itself to the other, this is denied; and as no +proof is given or pretended by the objector, nothing but a denial is +necessary. On this point the founder of the Calvinistic school was +undoubtedly correct--philosophically and theologically correct--when he +said, "Man has not an equally free election of good and evil." + +But that I may meet this objection founded on consciousness, full in the +face, I am prepared to assert, and I think prove, that man, so far from +being conscious that he has by nature adequate power to serve God, is +conscious of the very reverse of this. What truly awakened sinner has +not a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? How many experiences of +intelligent and pious Calvinists could I quote on this point? As a +specimen take that of the Rev. David Brainerd, who stands high in the +Church, not only among Calvinists, but among all Christians who know +him. I quote a passage from his experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: "I saw +that it was utterly impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or +delivering myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for +ever miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never +been sensible of it before."--This passage is very strong; too +unqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak sinner, +convinced, as all must be before they _can become strong_, of their +utter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one prove the +truth of Scripture, that "the _natural_ man receiveth not the things of +the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither _can_ he +know them, for they are spiritually discerned;" that "no man knoweth the +Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him." Hence the +necessity that "the Spirit should take of the things of Jesus Christ, +and show them unto them." Indeed, but for this darkness and weakness of +the understanding, the penitent sinner would not feel the necessity of +the agency of the Spirit: nor would it in fact be necessary. It is on +this ground that the doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of +conversion by _moral suasion_. Thus it is evident that a man may be +conscious of having an understanding, but at the same time be as _fully_ +conscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy +purposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience. +Experience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and needs +quickening. Hence the Christian often prays-- + + "Quick as the apple of an eye, + O God! my conscience make; + Awake my soul when sin is nigh, + And keep it still awake." + +Hence also we pray God to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also we +learn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs purging +"from dead works," for the very object that we may be able "to serve God +with filial fear;" we learn also that we may have "defiled consciences," +"weak consciences," "seared consciences," &c. And here let it be +noticed, that whether we understand these passages as applying to the +regenerate or unregenerate, to derived depravity or contracted +depravity, the argument against the objector will in every case apply +with resistless force, viz. it shows that this faculty of the soul may +become so disordered as to have its original healthy action impaired, +and that in this case nothing can give it its original sensibility and +strength but the God who made it. If sin does disorder the conscience, +it disordered Adam's: and if he begat children in his own moral +likeness, then his posterity had a similar conscience. And therefore it +is necessary that, as by the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so +by the obedience of the second, grace may abound in a way directly to +meet the evil. + +Let us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is +weak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! until he +becomes deeply impressed that he is "without strength!" He tries to keep +the law, but cannot; for he finds that "the carnal mind is not subject +to the law of God, neither indeed _can be_." Hear his complaint! and +that we may be sure of taking a genuine case, let us select a Bible +experience from Rom. vii; "I am carnal, sold under sin." (How much +liberty to serve God has a bond slave to sin?) "That which I do I allow +not; for what I would do that I do not, but what I hate that do I." "To +will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find +not," &c. (See through the chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self +despair, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Why, Saul +of Tarsus! are you not conscious that you have understanding, +conscience, and will? Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver +you? _Deliver yourself_. No! such philosophy and such theology were not +known to this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired +apostle. "I thank God, through Jesus Christ my Lord."--"The law of the +spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the +controlling power] of sin and death." + +Should any one say that the apostle was not describing his _conversion_ +here, but his experience as a Christian believer, I reply: If any thing, +_that_ would make the passage so much the stronger for my present +purpose; for "if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be +done in the dry?" If a saint--one who has been washed and renewed--finds +nevertheless that his will is so weak as to need the continued grace of +God to enable him to do the things that he would, much more is this true +of the unrenewed sinner. If this account of the apostle's experience +means any thing, _it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that +we have natural strength to serve God, as could be put into words_. And +I am bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it +presents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which no +metaphysical reasoning can overthrow--not indeed an argument to prove +that we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to show that, +having these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace is +indispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. How +often soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the Divine +law, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the unholy +passions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. +_We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power to keep the +Divine law_. + +3. But it is objected again, "that the Scriptures require us to use our +natural faculties in the service of God;" and hence the inference is, +that these faculties are adequate to this service. + +It is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures, +dealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to +serve God. With what other powers should he serve him? I again repeat +that the question is not, whether we have _mental faculties_, nor +whether man may or can serve God with these faculties, but simply +whether the command to obey is given independently of the considerations +of grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the Scriptures, which +give a promise corresponding with every command, and assurances of +gracious aid suited to every duty--all of which most explicitly imply, +not only man's need, but also the ground on which the command is +predicated. And with this idea agrees the alleged condemnation, so often +presented in the Scriptures: "This is the condemnation, that light has +come into the world, and men have loved darkness." "He that believeth +not is condemned already." "But they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore +he is turned to be their enemy." "How shall we escape, if we neglect so +great salvation." These, and many other passages, show that the turning +point of guilt and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural +powers, as the neglect and abuse of grace bestowed. + +This point may be illustrated by Christ's healing the withered hand. He +commanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of that +command, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that aid +would be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch forth a +palsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was understood +that the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or bones, to +accomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, assisted, as they +would be, by the gracious power of God. So man, it is true, is commanded +to use his natural powers in obeying God; but not without Divine aid, +the promise of which is always either expressed or implied in the +command. + +4. "The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey God, but +that which consists in or results from the perversion of those faculties +which constitute him a moral agent." + +It is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability--for inability +they certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin abounded grace +has much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and unprepared for +holy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their own fault, for grace +has been beforehand with them. It met them at the very threshold of +their moral agency, with every thing necessary to meet their case. It +has dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has laid the foundation to say +justly, "What more could I have done for my vineyard?" If the sinner has +rejected all this, and has increased his depravity by actual +transgression, then indeed is he justly chargeable for all his +embarrassments and moral weakness, for he has voluntarily assumed to +himself the responsibility of his native depravity, and he has added to +this the accumulated guilt of his repeated sins. + +5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that +Arminians, after all, make man's natural power the ground and measure of +his guilt, since "no part of his free agency arises from furnished +grace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse that grace, and +of course in an ability distinct from, and not produced by the grace." + +Let us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here. +Arminians do not mean that man's ability to use grace is independent of, +and separate from the grace itself. They say that man's powers are +directly assisted by grace, so that through this assistance they have +ability or strength _in those powers_ which before they had not, to make +a right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious ability, in any other +sense, would be absurd. It would be like talking of _strength_ to use +_strength_--of _being able to be able_. This absurdity, however, appears +to me justly chargeable upon the natural ability theory, taken in +connection with the Scripture account of this matter. The Scriptures +instruct us to look to God for strength; that he gives us "power to +become the children of God;" that he "strengthens with might in the +inner man, that we may be _able_," &c. This theory, however, tells us +that we have an ability back of this; an ability on which our +responsibility turns, and by means of which we can become partakers of +the grace of the Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being +as taking measures to make _ability able_, and adding power to make +_adequate strength sufficiently strong_.--Such is the work of +supererogation which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its +advocates alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground, +attempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest +objections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to come. +They are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical character, and +are therefore more tangible, and will, for this reason, perhaps, be more +interesting to the generality of readers. Let us have patience, then, to +follow them out. + +6. _Doctrinal Objections_.--On the ground of gracious ability it is +objected that, 1. "As the consequence of Adam's fall, Adam himself and +all his posterity became incapable of committing another sin." 2. "Every +sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been +the effect of supernatural grace." 3. "Man needed the grace of God, not +because he was wicked, but because he was weak." 4. "The moral +difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God." 5. +"The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to atone for actual sin." 6. +"This opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There can +be no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "Is +not this grace a greater calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?" + +I have thrown these objections together, and presented them in +connection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly on +one or two erroneous assumptions, to correct which will be substantially +to answer them all. + +One erroneous assumption of this writer is, that "there is no free +agency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right." This writer +seems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no proof; +for although he has used it in argument a number of times, he has left +it unsustained by any thing but his naked assertion. This proposition +has already been denied, and an unqualified denial is all that in +fairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an unqualified +assertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not victory. Let me +request you then, reader, to look at this proposition. Can you see any +self-evident proof of this assertion? If the Creator should give +existence to an intelligent being, and infuse into his created nature +the elements of unrighteousness, and give to his faculties an +irresistible bias to sin, and all this without providing a remedy, or a +way for escape, then indeed all our notions of justice would decide that +such a being ought not to be held responsible. But this is not the case +with any of the sinful beings of God's moral government.--Not of the +fallen angels, for they had original power to stand, but abused it and +fell--not of fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created +depravity; but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary +transgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his +posterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of +generation: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which meets +the exigencies of man's moral condition, at the very commencement of his +being. This it does by graciously preventing the imputation of guilt +until man is capable of an intelligent survey of his moral condition; +for "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto +condemnation: even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came +upon all men unto justification of life." And when man becomes capable +of moral action, this same gracious remedy is suited to remove his +native depravity, and to justify him from the guilt of actual +transgression; for "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to +forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness." It does +not appear, then, either from the obvious character of the proposition +itself; or from the condition of sinful beings, that "the same free +agency which enables a man to do wrong, will enable him also to do +right." Hence it is not true that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to +sin, or that there is now no sin in the infernal regions. It is true, +the writer tries to sustain this idea farther, by asserting that "_that_ +ceases to be a moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be +held responsible for doing what is unavoidable." This is little better, +however, than a reiteration of the former assumption. If the character +and conduct of a being are not _now_, and never _have been_ avoidable, +then indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to him. But to say that +there is "no moral wrong" in the case, is to say that characters and +actions are not wrong in themselves, even where it would not be just to +impute guilt. And this is an idea which is implied also in another part +of this writer's reasoning; for he tells us that, according to the +doctrine of gracious ability "every sinful action performed in this +world, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural +grace;" and that "man needed the grace of God, not because he was +wicked, but because he was weak," &c. This reasoning, or rather these +propositions, are predicated on the assumption, that there is no _moral +wrong_ where there is no _existing_ ability to do right: in other words, +that dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not _in themselves_ +holy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the _existing_ power of +the being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts. + +But is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be just +to impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that "until the law +sin was in the world;" and yet he adds, "Sin is not imputed (he does not +say sin does not exist,) where there is no law." The fact there are +certain dispositions and acts that are _in their nature_ opposite to +holiness, whatever may be the power of the subject _at the time_ he +possesses this character or performs these acts. Sin is sin, and +holiness is holiness, under all circumstances. They have a positive, and +not merely a relative existence. And although they have not existence +abstract from an agent possessing understanding, conscience, and will, +still they may have an existence abstractly from the power of being or +doing otherwise at the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no +moral character, or he has power to become holy with his first breath. +Whether the subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it, +is a question to be decided by circumstances. If a being has had power, +and lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible for +his impotency--his very weakness becomes his crime, and every act of +omission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is justly +imputed to him, the assertion of our objector to the contrary +notwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now "no guilt in +the rebellion of the infernal regions." It is of little consequence +whether, in this case, you assume that all the guilt is in the first +act, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in each successive act +of sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of the first. In either +case, the acts that follow are the measure of the guilt; and hence, +according to the nature of the mind, the consciousness of guilt will be +constantly felt, as the acts occur. For all practical purposes, +therefore, the sense of guilt, and the Divine administration of justice +will be the same in either view of the subject. The writer supposes the +case of "a servant's cutting off his hands to avoid his daily task," and +says, "this he is to blame, and ought to be punished;" but thinks he +ought not to be punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How +much is he to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt +and punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he +has done his master--that is, by every act of omission consequent upon +this act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore he is +justly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer this +whole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the acts +separately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical administration +of government and of justice. Indeed, to say that each succeeding act is +to be brought up and taken into the estimate, in order to fix the +quantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that these succeeding acts are +sins; else why should they be brought into the account at all, in +estimating guilt and punishment? Take another case. The drunkard +destroys or suspends the right use of his reason, and then murders. Is +he to be held innocent of the murder because he was drunk? or was the +whole guilt of the murder to be referred to the act of getting +intoxicated? If you say the former, then no man is to be punished for +any crime committed in a fit of intoxication; and one has only to get +intoxicated in order to be innocent. If you say the latter, then, as +getting drunk is the same in one case as another, _every_ inebriate is +guilty of murder, and whatever other crimes drunkeness _may_ occasion, +or has occasioned. Is either of these suppositions correct? Shall we not +rather say that the inebriate's guilt is to be measured by the aggregate +of crimes flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so +in the case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles +"there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions," I +would say that their present rebellion is the fruits and measure of +their guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power and lost it, is +guilty of his present acts. + +And by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the +estimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from the +acts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and say, the +acts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? Evidently +because you have taken the amount of that guilt and attached it to the +first act. And does this make these acts in themselves innocent? The +idea is preposterous. As well may you say that the filthy streams of a +polluted fountain are not impure in themselves, because but for the +fountain they would not be impure; as to say that the current of unholy +volitions which unavoidably flows from a perverted heart is not unholy +and criminal. + +Another clearly erroneous assumption of this writer is, that if it would +be unjust for the Divine Being to leave his plan _unfinished_, after it +is begun, the _whole_ plan must be predicated on justice, and not on +grace. It is true, he has not said this, in so many words, but his +reasoning implies it. For he says this scheme of gracious ability +"annihilates the whole doctrine of grace." Because God, if he held man +accountable, was bound to give him this ability, as a matter of justice; +hence it is not an ability by grace, but an ability by justice. The +whole of this reasoning, and much more, goes upon the principle, that +the _completion_ of a plan of grace, after it is begun, cannot be +claimed on the scale of justice, without making the whole a plan of +justice. But is this true? Is not a father, after he has been +instrumental of bringing a son into the world, bound _in justice_ to +provide for and educate him? And yet does not the son owe a debt of +gratitude to that father, when he has done all this? If a physician +should cut off the limb of a poor man, to save his life, is he not bound +_in justice_, after he has commenced the operation, to take up the +arteries and save the man from dying, by the operation. And if he should +not do it, would he not be called a wanton and cruel wretch? And yet in +both these cases the persons may be unworthy. The son may show much +obliquity of moral principle, and yet the father should bear with him, +and discipline him. The man on whom the physician operated may be poor +and perverse. Here then are cases in which _justice demands that un +merited favour begun should be continued_, or else what was favour in +the commencement, and what would be favour in the whole, would +nevertheless by its incompleteness, be most manifest injustice. Such is +the state of the question in respect to the Divine administration. The +whole race of man had become obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, in +their representative and federal head, by reason of _his_ sin. This is +expressly stated: "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to +condemnation." "In Adam all die." In this situation we may suppose that +the strict justice of the law required punishment in the very character +in which the offence was committed. Adam personally and consciously +sinned; and so, according to justice, he must suffer. The prospective +generations of men, existing seminally in him, as they had not +consciously and personally sinned, could, in justice, only experience +the effects of the curse in the same character in which they sinned, +viz. passively and seminally, unless provision could be made, by which, +in their personal existence, they might free themselves from the effects +of sin. Now God, in the plenitude of his wisdom and grace, saw fit to +make provision for a new probation for man, on the basis of a covenant +of grace, the different parts of which are all to be viewed together, in +order to judge of their character. In this covenant Adam had a _new +trial;_ and when the promise was made to him he stood in the same +relation to his posterity as he did when he sinned, and the curse was +out against him. If, by the latter, the prospective generations of men +were justly cut off from possible existence; by the former this +existence was mercifully secured to them. If by the corruption of the +race, through sin, the possibility of salvation was cut off, on all +known principles of administrative justice; by the provisions of grace +the possibility of salvation was secured to the whole race; and this +possibility implies every necessary provision to render grace available +and efficient, in accordance with moral responsibility. If "God, who +spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all," had not +"with him also freely given us all things" necessary for our salvation, +would not the Divine procedure have been characterized both by folly and +injustice? If his plan of grace had only gone so far as to have given us +a conscious being, without giving us the means of making that existence +happy, would it not have been wanton cruelty? And yet, taking the whole +together, who does not see that it is a most stupendous system of grace, +from the foundation to the top-stone? Let us not then be guilty of such +manifest folly, as to take a part of the Divine administration, and make +up a judgment upon that, as viewed independently of the rest, and then +transfer this abstract character to the whole. As in chemical +combinations, though one of the ingredients taken alone might be +deleterious, yet the compound may be nutritious or salutary, so in the +new covenant, if we separate legal exactions and penalties from gracious +provisions, the operations of the former may be unjust and cruel, yet +the whole, united as God hath combined them, may be an administration of +unparalleled grace. It is in this heavenly combination that "mercy and +truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other." +Now, therefore, "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and _just_ to +forgive us our sins," for on this ground he can be "_just_ and the +justifier of them that believe." Although justice is thus involved in +the system, and to leave out part of the system would be manifest +injustice, yet the whole is the "blessed Gospel;" "the Gospel of the +grace of God." It is objected, I know, that the idea that, but for the +provisions of the Gospel, man would not have propagated his species, is +fanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. The Scriptures, I grant, do not +strike off into speculations about what God might have done, or would +have done, if he had not done as he has. This is foreign from their +design; and I am perfectly willing to let the whole stand as the +Scriptures present it. But when our opponents set the example of raising +an objection to what we think the true system, by passing judgment on a +part, viewed abstractly, we must meet them. On their own ground, then, I +would say, the idea that man would have been allowed to propagate his +species, without any provisions of grace, is altogether fanciful and +unauthorized by Scripture. Will it be said, that it seems more +reasonable, and in accordance with the course of nature, to suppose that +he would? I answer, It seems to me more reasonable, and in accordance +with the course of justice, to suppose that he would not. Whoever +maintains that the personal existence of Adam's posterity was not +implied and included in the provisions of grace, in the new covenant, +must take into his theory one of the following appendages;--he must +either believe that the whole race could justly be consigned to personal +and unavoidable wo, for the sin of Adam, or that all could be justly +condemned for the sin of their own nature, entailed upon them without +their agency, and therefore equally unavoidable; or he must believe that +each would have a personal trial on the ground of the covenant of works, +as Adam had. If there is another alternative, it must be some system of +probation which God has never intimated, and man, in all his inventions +has never devised. Whoever is prepared to adopt either of the two former +propositions is prepared to go all lengths in the doctrine of +predestination and reprobation charged upon Calvinism in the sermon that +gave rise to this controversy, and, of course, will find his system +subject to all the objections there urged against it. If any one chooses +to adopt the third alternative, and consider all the posterity of Adam +as standing or falling solely on the ground of the covenant of works, +such a one need not be answered in a discussion purporting to be a +"_Calvinistic_ controversy." He is a Socinian, and must be answered in +another place. All that need be done here, is to show the embarrassments +of _Calvinism proper_, the utter futility of all its changes to relieve +itself from these embarrassments, unless it plunge into Pelagianism and +Socinianism, or rest itself upon the Arminian foundation of gracious +ability. It is on this latter ground we choose to rest, because here, +and here alone, we find the doctrines of natural depravity, human +ability and responsibility, and salvation by grace, blending in +beautiful harmony. + +Having noticed some of the erroneous assumptions on which the doctrinal +objections to our theory are based, the objections themselves, I think, +may all be disposed of in a summary way. We see, on our plan, that, 1. +Adam did not render himself incapable of sinning, by the fall, but +rather rendered himself and his posterity incapable of any other moral +exercise but what was sinful; and it was on this account that a gracious +ability is necessary, in order to a second probation. 2. Sin, since the +fall, has not been the result of supernatural grace, but the natural +fruit of the fall; and supernatural grace is all that has counteracted +sin. 3. "Man needed the grace of God," _both_ "because he was wicked," +_and_ "because he was weak."--4. "The moral difference between one man +and another is--to be ascribed to God." How any one could think a +contrary opinion chargeable upon us, is to me surprising. It is more +properly Calvinism that is chargeable with this sentiment. Calvinism +says, Regeneration is a right choice. It says, also, that power to sin +implies power to be holy; and of course we become holy by the same power +as that by which we sin. And it farther says, that the power is of +nature and not of grace. Now let the reader put all these together, and +see if it does not follow most conclusively, that "the moral difference +between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God." But, on the +contrary, _we_ say the sinful nature of man is changed in regeneration +by the power of the Holy Ghost. 5. "The posterity of Adam" _did_ "need a +Saviour to atone for actual sin." For actual sin is the result, not of +gracious power, as this author supposes, but of a sinful nature +voluntarily retained and indulged. If our opponents charge us with the +sentiment, that grace is the cause of the actual sin of Adam's +posterity, because we hold that grace was the cause of their personal +existence, we grant that, in that sense, grace was a cause without which +the posterity of Adam would not have sinned. But if this makes God the +author of sin, by the same rule we could prove that God is the author of +sin, because he created moral agents--and if there is any difficulty +here, it presses on them as heavily as on us. But in any other sense, +grace is not the cause of sin. 6. "This opinion is," as we have seen, +perfectly "with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There is" _constant_ "guilt +in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "This grace is a +greater" _blessing_ "to our race than the fall of Adam" was a +"calamity;" for "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." + +Thus I have endeavoured to _explain_, _prove_, and _defend_ the doctrine +of gracious ability, a doctrine always maintained in the orthodox +Church, until the refinements of Calvinism made it necessary to call it +in question; and a doctrine on which, viewed in its different bearings, +the orthodox Arminian system must stand or fall. I have been the more +minute and extended in my remarks from this consideration; and also from +the consideration that while this doctrine has of late been most +violently assailed by all classes of Calvinists, very little has been +published in its defence. If the reader has had patience to follow the +subject through, he is now perhaps prepared to judge whether our holy +volitions are the result of a gracious ability or of natural power. + +Should I find time to pursue this subject farther, it would be in place +now to examine the doctrine of regeneration; in which examination the +nature of inherent depravity, and of that choice which is conditional to +the new birth, would be more fully noticed. "This will I do if God +permit." + + + + +NUMBER XIII. + +REGENERATION. + +An important error in any one cardinal doctrine of the Gospel will make +a glaring deformity in the entire system. Hence when one of these +doctrines is marred or perverted, a corresponding change must be made in +most or all of the others to keep up the appearance of consistency. + +These remarks apply with special emphasis to the doctrine of +regeneration. As this is a focal point, in which many other leading +doctrines centre, this doctrine must of necessity give a character to +the whole Gospel plan. This might be inferred _a priori_ from the +knowledge of the relation of _this_ to the other parts of the Christian +system, and it is practically illustrated in the history of the Church. +There are those who believe, that by the various terms used in Scripture +to express the change commonly called regeneration or the new birth, +nothing is intended but some outward ceremony, or some change of opinion +in matters of speculative belief or the like. Some say it is baptism, or +a public profession of faith; others that it is a mere speculative +renunciation of heathen idolatry, and an acknowledgment of the Christian +faith; others that it is merely a reformed life; and a few maintain that +it is the change that we shall undergo by death, or by the resurrection +of the body. These persons, and all in fact who make the new birth +something short of a radical change of heart, are obliged, for +consistency's sake, to accommodate the other doctrines to their views of +regeneration. Hence they very generally deny constitutional or derived +depravity, the inflexibility and rigorous exactions of the Divine law, +the destructive character of sin, the atonement, the supernatural agency +of the Spirit upon the human heart, justification by faith, and the +like. Thus a radical error on one point actually leads to _another +gospel_--if gospel it may be called. + +It does not come within the scope of my present design to enter into a +refutation of the foregoing errors. But from the disastrous results of +these errors we may infer the importance of guarding carefully and of +understanding clearly the Scripture doctrine of the new birth. Even +where the error is not so radical, as in the instances above alluded to, +the evil may be considerable, and in some cases fatal. + +The Arminians and Calvinists agree in this doctrine, in so far as that +they both make it a radical change of moral nature, by the supernatural +agency of the Holy Ghost. But they differ in respect to the _order_ in +which the several parts of the change take place--in respect to the +manner and degree of the agency of the Holy Spirit, and also in respect +to the part which human agency has in the accomplishment of this change. +And in some, if not all of these points, Calvinists differ as much from +each other as they do from us. + +It is my present purpose to point out some of the more prominent +Calvinistic modes of stating and explaining this doctrine, with the +difficulties attending them: after which I shall endeavour to present +and defend what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine of regeneration. + +_First Theory_.--The notion that the mind is entirely passive in this +change, that is, that nothing is done by the subject of it, which is +preparative or conditional, or in any way co-operative in its +accomplishment, has been a prevailing sentiment in the various +modifications of the old Calvinistic school. It is not indeed pretended +that the mind is inactive, either before or at the time this renovation +is effected by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it is said that the +sinner is resisting with all the power of the mind, and with all the +obstinacy of the most inveterate enmity, up to the very moment, and in +the very act of conversion. So that the sinner is regenerated, not only +_without_ his _co-operation_, but also in _spite_ of his _utmost +resistance_. Hence it is maintained, that, but for the _irresistible_ +influence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart, no sinner would be +converted. + +1. One of the leading objections to this view of conversion is, that it +is inseparably connected with the doctrine of particular and +unconditional election. The two reciprocally imply each other, and must +therefore, stand or fall together. But this doctrine of particular and +unconditional election has been sufficiently refuted, it is hoped, in +the sermon that gave rise to this controversy; if so, then the doctrine +of passivity and irresistible grace is not true. + +2. Another very serious difficulty which this theory of conversion has +to contend with is, that the Scriptures, in numerous passages, declare +that the Spirit of God may be _resisted, grieved, quenched_, and utterly +disregarded; and that the grace of God may be abused, or received in +vain. The passages to establish these propositions are so frequent that +I need not stop to point them out. But if this be so, then the grace of +God and the Spirit of grace are not irresistible. + +3. It may be yet farther objected to this doctrine of the mind's +passivity in conversion, that it is a virtual denial of all gracious +influence upon the heart before regeneration. It has been shown in +previous numbers that man was not able to comply with the conditions of +salvation without grace--and that the gracious influences of the Divine +Spirit are given to every sinner previous to regeneration. But there +would be no necessity for this, and no consistency in it, if there are +no conditions and no co-operation on the part of the sinner in the +process of the new birth. Hence the advocates of this doctrine very +consistently maintain that the first act of grace upon the heart of the +sinner is that which regenerates him. Since then this theory conflicts +with the Bible doctrine of a gracious influence anterior to conversion, +it cannot be admitted. + +4. This theory of regeneration removes all conditions on the part of the +sinner to the removal of the power and guilt of sin. It teaches that if +the sinner should do any thing acceptable to God, _as a condition_ to +his conversion, it would imply he did not need converting; that such an +idea, in fact, would be inconsistent with the doctrine of depravity, and +irreconcilable with the idea of salvation _by grace_. And this is the +ground on which the old Calvinists have so repeatedly charged us with +the denial of the doctrines of grace, and with holding that we may be +justified by our works. + +There is something very singular in these notions respecting the +necessity of _unconditional_ regeneration, in order that it may be by +grace. These same Calvinists tell us that the sinner _can_ repent, and +ought to repent, and that the Scriptures require it at his hand. What! +is the sinner able and obliged to do that which would destroy the whole +economy of grace! which would blot out the Gospel and nullify the +atonement itself? Ought he to do that which would prove him a practical +Pelagian and an operative workmonger? Is he indeed, according to +Calvinists themselves, required in Scripture to do that which would +prove Calvinism false, and a conditional regeneration true? So it would +seem. Put together these two dogmas of Calvinism. 1. _The sinner is +able, and ought to repent._ 2. _The idea that the sinner does any thing +toward his regeneration destroys the doctrine of depravity and of +salvation by grace._ I say put these two together, and you have almost +all the contradictions of Calvinism converged to a focus--and what is +most fatal to the system, you have the authority of Calvinism itself to +prove that every intelligent probationer on the earth not only has the +ability, but is authoritatively required to give practical demonstration +that the system is false!! What is this but to say, "You _can_, and you +_cannot;_"--if you _do_ not, you will be justly condemned--if you _do_, +you will ruin the Gospel system, and yourself with it? Where such +glaring paradoxes appear, there must be something materially wrong in, +at least, some parts of the system. + +5. But the inconsistency of this theory is not its only, and certainly +not its most injurious characteristic. In the same proportion as men are +made to believe that there are no conditions on their part to their +regeneration, they will be likely to fall into one of the two extremes +of carelessness or despair, either of which, persisted in, would be +ruinous. I cannot doubt but that, in this way, tens of thousands have +been ruined. We should infer that such would be the result of the +doctrine, from only understanding its character; and I am fully +satisfied that, in my own personal acquaintance, I have met with +hundreds who have been lulled in the cradle of Antinomianism on the one +hand, or paralyzed with despair on the other, by this same doctrine of +passive, unconditional conversion. Calvinists, it is true, tell us this +is the abuse of the doctrine; but it appears to me to be the legitimate +fruit. What else could we expect? A man might as well attempt to +dethrone the Mediator, as to do any thing toward his own conversion. +Teach this, and carelessness ensues, Antinomian feelings will follow--or +if you arouse the mind by the curse of the law, and by the fearful doom +that awaits the unregenerate, what can he do? Nothing! Hell rises from +beneath to meet him, but he can do _nothing_. He looks until he is +excited to phrensy, from which he very probably passes over to raving +madness, or settles down into a state of gloomy despair. + +6. Another very decisive objection to this doctrine is, the frequent, +and I may say uniform language of Scripture. The Scriptures require us +to _seek--ask--knock--come to Christ--look unto God--repent--believe +--open the door_ of the heart--_receive Christ_, &c. No one can fail to +notice how these instructions are sprinkled over the whole volume of +revelation. And what is specially in point here, all these are spoken of +and urged upon us as conditions of blessings that shall follow--even the +blessings of salvation, of regeneration--and as conditions, too, without +which we cannot expect these blessings. Take one passage of many--"As +many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, +even to them that believe on his name." If any one doubts whether +"becoming the sons of God," as expressed in this text, means +regeneration, the next verse will settle it--"Which were born not of +blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of +God," John i, 12, 13. The latter verse I may have occasion to remark +upon hereafter; it is quoted here to show that the new birth is +undoubtedly the subject here spoken of. And we are here expressly +taught, in language that will bear no other interpretation, that +_receiving_ Christ and _believing_ on his name are the conditions of +regeneration. If there were no other passage in the Bible to direct our +minds on this subject, this plain unequivocal text ought to be decisive. +But the truth is, this is the uniform language of Scripture. And are +there any passages against these, any that say we cannot come, cannot +believe, seek, &c? or any that say, this work of personal regeneration +is performed independent of conditions? I know of none which will not +fairly admit of a different construction. We are often met with this +passage--"It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of +God that showeth mercy." See Rom. ix, 16. But whoever interpreteth this +of personal and individual regeneration can hardly have examined the +passage carefully and candidly. But we are told again, it is God that +renews the heart; and if it is his work, it is not the work of the +sinner. I grant this; this is the very sentiment I mean to maintain; but +then there may be conditions--_there are conditions_--or else we should +not hear the psalmist _praying_ for this, in language that has been +preserved for the edification of all subsequent generations, "Create in +me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." This is a +practical comment on Christ's conditional salvation, "Ask and ye shall +receive." + +Since then this doctrine of passive and unconditional regeneration +implies unconditional election--since it is in opposition to those +scriptures which teach that the Spirit and grace of God may be resisted +and received in vain--since it is a virtual denial of all gracious +influences upon the heart before regeneration--since it leads the +abettors of the theory into gross contradictions, by their endeavours to +reconcile the can and the _cannot_ of their system--since its practical +tendency is to make sinners careless, or drive them to despair--and +finally, since it contradicts that numerous class of scriptures, some of +which are very unequivocal, that predicate the blessings of regeneration +and justification upon certain preparatory and conditional acts of the +sinner--_therefore_ we conclude that this theory cannot be true. + +_Second Theory_.--To avoid these difficulties, to make the sinner feel +his responsibility, and to bring him into action, a new theory of +regeneration is proposed. This constitutes a leading characteristic of +the New Divinity. It is the theory of _self-conversion_. Its advocates +maintain that there is no more mystery or supernatural agency in the +process of the change, called the new birth, than there is in any other +leading purpose or decision of the mind. It is true, they do not wholly +exclude the Holy Spirit from this work, but his agency is mediate and +indirect. He acts in some undefinable way, through the truth as an +instrument. The truth acts upon the mind, in the way of _moral suasion_, +and the sinner, in the view and by the influence of truth, resolves to +give himself up to God and to his service--and _this is regeneration_. +The preparation is of God--but the actual change is man's own work. The +God of providence reveals the truth and arranges the means for its +promulgation, the Spirit of grace applies it to the understanding, the +sinner looks at it, reflects upon it, and at length is persuaded to set +about the work, and regenerates himself! + +That we may be the better prepared to meet this hypothesis, it should be +noticed that it is inseparable from the notion that all sin consists in +voluntary exercise, or in other words, in a series of sinful volitions. +Regeneration is a change from sin to holiness--and hence a regenerate +state is the opposite of a sinful state. If then a regenerate state is +nothing more than a series of holy volitions, an unregenerate state, +which is its opposite, is nothing more than a series of unholy +volitions. Thus it appears that this doctrine of regeneration by the act +of the will must stand or fall with the notion that all sin consists in +voluntary exercise. Any argument, therefore, brought against this latter +theory will bear with equal weight against this new idea of +regeneration. Bearing this in mind, we are prepared to object to this +doctrine, + +1. That it is inconsistent with the doctrine of constitutional +depravity. This is granted by the supporters of the theory, and hence +constitutional depravity is no part of their system. All the arguments +therefore that have been adduced in favour of derived, inherent +depravity, or that can be urged in favour of this doctrine, will stand +directly opposed to this view of regeneration. The arguments in favour +of our views of depravity need not be repeated; and the reader is +referred to a previous number in which this point has been discussed. + +2. Another objection to this theory of regeneration is, that it makes +_entire_ sanctification take place at the time of regeneration. +Conversion, holiness, are nothing more than a decision of the will; and +since the will can never be _more than decided_, of course the decision +at regeneration is the _perfection of holiness_. On this ground, +therefore, though Christians are exhorted to "cleanse themselves from +all filthiness of flesh and spirit, _perfecting holiness_ in the fear of +the Lord;" though the saints are commanded to "grow in grace," to +"confess their sins," that they may be "cleansed from _all +unrighteousness_," though some of the Corinthian Christians were "carnal +and walked as men," and for that reason were, after years of experience, +only _babes_ in Christ--still, if we embrace this sentiment, we must +call the convert, at his first spiritual breath, as holy as he ever _can +be_ in any of the subsequent stages of his experience! Surely the +apostles taught not this! And yet so strongly are men impelled forward +by their systems, this doctrine of perfect holiness at conversion is the +very sentiment that many of the advocates of the New Divinity are now +propagating--a clear proof that it necessarily follows from their theory +of conversion. This of itself, it strikes me, ought to destroy the +doctrine. + +3. Another bearing of this hypothesis, and one which I think must prove +fatal to it, is, that the Scriptures represent this change to be chiefly +in the affections, whereas this doctrine makes it exclusively in the +will. That the Scriptures place the change in the affections chiefly, I +suppose will not be denied. If it should be, without stopping here to +quote specific passages, or use many arguments, one consideration alone +will be sufficient to set the question at rest.--True evangelical +holiness consists in love to God and man; and sin is loving the creature +rather than the Creator. The apostle brings into view both the +regenerate and the unregenerate state in this passage--"Set your +affection on things above, and not on things on the earth." Numerous are +the passages which teach that love to God is the essence of the +Christian character. The affections, therefore, are the seat of this +change. But we are told by this new theory the change is in the will. It +is only to resolve to serve God, and we are converted.--Either this +theory, therefore, or the Bible account of this matter must be wrong. + +To avoid this difficulty, it may be said, that a change of the will +implies a change of the affections. But this is changing the +position--which is, that a decision of the will is regeneration. If +however this new position be insisted upon, it can be reconciled with +the phraseology used only by making a change of the affections a mere +_subordinate_ part of regeneration, whereas the Scriptures make the +change consist essentially in this. But there is still a more serious +difficulty in this idea, that the change of the will implies a change in +the affections. It necessarily implies that the affections are at all +times under the control of the will. But this is as unphilosophical as +it is unscriptural. It is even directly contrary to the observation and +knowledge of men who have paid only common and casual attention to +mental phenomena. The will is oftener enthralled by the affections, than +the affections by the will. Even in common and worldly matters let a man +try by an effort of the will to beget love where it does not exist, or +to transfer the affections from one object to another, and how will he +succeed? Will love and hatred go or come at his bidding? You might as +well attempt, by an act of the will, to make sweet bitter, or bitter +sweet to the physical taste. How much less can a man, by an act of the +will, make all things new, and transfer the heart from the grossness of +creature love to the purity of supreme love to God. The Apostle Paul has +taught us his failure in this matter. When he "would do good, evil was +present with him." "For," says he, "the good that I would do, I do not; +but the evil which I would not, that I do." And this is the fact in most +cases of genuine awakening. Resolutions are formed, but the current of +the unsanctified affections sweeps them away. Over the untowardness of +the unregenerate heart the will has, in fact, but a feeble influence; +and this is the reason why the man, struggling with the corruptions of +his heart, is driven to despair, and exclaims, "O! wretched man that I +am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" + +We shall see hereafter how the action of the will is indispensable in +regeneration; but not in this _direct_ way to change and control the +affections, by the power of its own decisions. When I find my will +capable of doing this, I must have an essentially different intellectual +character from the one I now have. + +Since the Scriptures make the new birth a change of affections, and this +theory makes it a change of volitions; and especially since the +affections cannot be transferred from _earth_ to _heaven_ by a _mere act +of the will_, therefore the doctrine which teaches and implies these +views must be false. + +4. This idea of the character of sin and of the new birth makes man +sinless, at particular times, even _without_ regeneration. I do not mean +by this that he is not obnoxious to punishment for past unholy +volitions. But if sin consists only in voluntary exercise, whenever the +mind does not act; or whenever its action is not under the control of +the will, there is nothing of sin personally appertaining to the +man.--When the action of the will is suspended by an all-absorbing +emotion of wonder or surprise--in sound sleep when the mental states, if +there are any, are not under the control of the will--in cases of +suspended animation, by drowning, fainting, or otherwise--in short, +whenever the mind is necessarily wholly engrossed, as is often the case, +by some scientific investigation, or matter of worldly business, not of +a moral character, then, and in every such case, whatever may be the +guilt for past transgressions, there is no personal unholiness. And by +the same reasoning we may show that the regenerate pass a great portion +of their time without any personal holiness! + +5. According to the theory we are opposing, regeneration, strictly +speaking, means nothing. The work of grace, by which a sinner is made +meet for heaven, embraces two essential points, _pardon_ and _renewal_. +The former is not a positive change of character, but a relative change, +from a state of condemnation to a state of acquittal. But as +regeneration, if it have any appropriate meaning, cannot mean a mere +change of relation, any construction or system that forces such a +meaning upon it does, in fact, do it away. Hence, being _born again, +being renewed, being created anew, being sanctified, being translated +from darkness to light, being raised from the dead_, and numerous other +scripture expressions, are figurative forms of speech, so foreign from +the idea they are used to express, that they are worse than +unmeaning--they lead to error. But if these expressions mean any thing +more than pardon, what is that meaning? This doctrine makes the +principal change take place in the _neighbourhood_ of the will; not in +the will itself, meaning by that, the mental power by which we put forth +volitions. This _faculty_ of the mind is sound, and needs no change--all +the other mental susceptibilities are sound, the essence of the mind and +the susceptibilities of the mind are perfectly free from any moral +perversion. It is the mental _action_ that is bad.--What is there then +in the man that is to be changed? Do you say his volitions? But these he +changes every hour. Do you say, he must leave off wrong volitions, and +have right ones? This too he often does. "But he must do it with right +motives," you say, "this acting from _right motives_ is the regenerate +state." Indeed! Suppose then that he has resolved to serve God, from +right motives, what if he should afterward resolve, from false shame or +fear, to neglect a duty, is he now unregenerate? This is changing from +regenerate to unregenerate, from _entire_ holiness to _entire_ +unholiness with a breath. Truly such a regeneration is _nothing_. But +you say, after he has once submitted, he now has a "governing purpose" +to serve God, and this constitutes him regenerate; aye, a _governing_ +purpose that _does not govern_ him. Let it be understood, you cannot +divide a volition; it has an entire character in itself; and if it be +unholy, no preceding holy volition can sanctify it. Hence every change +of volition from wrong to right, and from right to wrong, is a change of +state, so that regeneracy and unregeneracy play in and out of the human +bosom in the alternation of every criminal thought or every pious +aspiration. Is this the Bible doctrine of the new birth? And yet this is +all you can make of it, if you resolve it into the mere action of the +will. + +6. This doctrine of self-conversion, by an act of the will, is directly +contrary to Scripture. It would be tedious to me and my readers to quote +all those passages that attribute this work directly to the Holy Spirit, +and that speak of it as a work which _God himself_ accomplishes for, and +in us. There is one passage which is much in point, however, and is +sufficient of itself to settle this question. "But as many as received +him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that +believe on his name. Who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the +flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," John i, 12, 13. This is a +two-edged sword--it cuts off, as we have remarked before, passive and +unconditional regeneration on the one hand; and also, as we may now see, +self conversion by an act of the will, on the other. I know not how +words can be put together, in so small a compass, better to answer the +true objects of destroying these two opposite theories of regeneration, +and asserting the true theory. Here is, first--the _receiving of +Christ,_ the _believing on his name_--this is the condition. Second, +Christ gives the "power," viz. strength and privilege, to become the +sons of God. This is the regeneration. Third--This becoming "the sons of +God," or being "born," is not in a _physical way_, by flesh and blood, +nor yet by _human will_, but of or by God. Can any thing be clearer or +more decisive? + +Indeed the very terms, _regeneration, born, birth_, &c, imply of +themselves another and an efficient agent; and then to connect these +with the Divine agency, as the Scriptures have done some half dozen +times in the phrase, "born of God," and several other times in the +phrase, "of the Spirit:" to have this called being "begotten again," and +the like, is enough, one would think, if words have any meaning, to show +that man does not change his own heart. The same may be said of the +terms _resurrection, translation, creation, renewal_, and various other +terms the Scriptures use to express this change. Jesus Christ claimed +that he had "power to lay down his life, and _to take it again;_" but +this is the only instance of self-resurrection power that we read of; +and even this was by his Divine nature; for he was "quickened by the +Spirit," and raised "by the power of God." But these theorists teach +that man has power to lay down his life, and then, after he is "dead in +trespasses and sins," he has power to take his life again. Truly this is +giving man a power that approaches very near to one of the Divine +attributes. To Christ alone does it belong "to quicken whom he will." To +change the heart of the sinner is one of the Divine prerogatives, and he +that attempts to convert himself; and trusts to this, will find in the +end that he is _carnal_ still. For "whatsoever is born of the flesh is +flesh, but whatsoever is born of the Spirit is spirit." + +Let me not here be misunderstood. I shall endeavour to show, in its +proper place, the conditional agency of man in this work. I have only +time to add, in this number, that I consider those scriptures which +press duties upon the sinner as applying to this conditional agency. And +even those strong expressions which sometimes occur in the Bible, +requiring the sinner to "make himself a new heart"--"to cleanse his +hands and purify his heart," &c, will find an easy solution and a +pertinent application in this view of the subject. For if there are +certain pending conditions, without which the work will not be +accomplished, then there would be a propriety, while pressing this duty, +to use expressions showing that this work was conditionally, though not +_efficiently_, resting upon the agency of the sinner. + +In my next I shall endeavour to show that there is no intermediate +_Calvinistic_ ground between the two theories examined in this number. +If that attempt prove successful, and if in this it has been found that +the two theories examined are encumbered with too many embarrassments to +be admitted, then we shall be the better prepared to listen to the +teachings of the Scriptures on this important and leading doctrine of +the Christian faith. + + + + +NUMBER XIV. + +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. + +An inconsistency in any received theory is constantly driving its +supporters to some modification of their system. This is a redeeming +principle in the human mind, and greatly encourages the hope that truth +will finally triumph. + +It has already been noticed that the doctrine of entire passivity, in +regeneration, is so pressed with difficulties that it has sought relief +in the opposite notion of self-conversion. But this latter hypothesis +is, in turn, encumbered, if possible, with still greater embarrassments. +The presumption therefore is, that the truth lies between them; and it +will doubtless be found, by a fair and thorough investigation, that this +is the fact. But here the question arises, Can _Calvinists_ consistently +occupy any such middle ground? In other words, retaining the other +peculiarities of Calvinism, can our Calvinistic brethren assume any +position between these two extremes which will avoid the difficulties of +both? A brief examination, it is hoped, will decide this question. + +_Third Theory_.--Dr. Tyler is a highly respectable clergyman of the +Calvinistic faith, and is now at the head of the theological school in +East Windsor, Conn., which was got up with the avowed purpose of +counteracting the New-Haven theology. We should not therefore suspect +him of leaning too much toward the New Divinity. He tells us that the +only depravity is to be unwilling to serve God--that there is "no other +obstacle in the way of the sinner's salvation except what lies in his +own will"--that "to be born again is simply to be made willing to do +what God requires." What is this but the New Divinity? The will is here +made, most explicitly, the sole seat of depravity; and regeneration is +an act of the will. But every act of the will is the sinner's _own act_, +and therefore the agent, by that act of the will which constitutes +regeneration, converts himself.--Perhaps Dr. Tyler will say, the sinner +in this case does not convert himself, because he is "_made willing_." +God makes him willing "in the day of his power." It is remarkable what a +favourite phrase this is with the Calvinists. It is borrowed from the +third verse of the hundred and tenth Psalm, "Thy people shall be willing +in the day of thy power." Now although the word "made" is not in the +text; although there is not the _slightest_ evidence that the text +speaks of regeneration at all, but on the contrary, it is most evidently +intended to describe the character and conduct of God's people, viz. the +regenerate; and although every scholar, at least, among the Calvinists, +knows this as well as he knows his right hand from the left, yet we hear +it repeated by the learned and the ignorant, at all times and +places--"God's people are made willing in the day of his power." It is +not only a gross perversion of a Scripture phrase, but its repetition, +in this perverted sense, renders it wearisome and sickening. But, +waiving this, it becomes us to ask whether there is any more rational or +Scriptural ground for the idea itself than there is for this use of the +text. What is meant by making the soul willing? I confess I cannot +understand it. Is it meant that God _forces_ the soul to be willing? +This is a contradiction in terms. To say that God acts directly on the +will, and thus changes its determination by superior force, is to +destroy its freedom--is to produce a volition without motive or +reason--which would, at any rate, be an anomalous action of the will. +And what is still more fatal to the theory, it implies _no act_ of the +sinner whatever, but an irresistible act of the Divine power, which +therefore necessarily throws the theory back upon the doctrine of +passive conversion. There is no avoiding this conclusion, I think, on +the ground that God changes the action of the will, by an exertion of +power upon the will itself. If, to avoid this, it should be said that +the will is not changed by a direct act of power, but influenced to a +holy determination indirectly, through the medium of motives, presented +by the Holy Spirit--then and in that case we should be thrown forward on +to the self-conversion system. The sinner's voluntary act, by which he +regenerated himself, would be as truly and entirely _his own_ as any +other act of the will; therefore he would be self-regenerated. This +also would be regeneration, not by the Holy Spirit, but _by the truth;_ +which is another feature of the New Divinity. This also would make all +depravity consist in the will, or rather in its _acts;_ which has been +shown in the preceding number to be unscriptural as well as +unphilosophical. This objection is valid, whether the depravity is +supposed to be in the _power_ of willing, or in the _acts_ of the will. +But since, in Dr. Tyler's view, to will in one direction is depravity, +and to will in another direction is regeneration, and since all that +motives _can_ do is, not to change the will itself, but only prompt it +to new voluntary states, it follows conclusively that Dr. T. makes all +holiness and all unholiness consist in volitions; and therefore the +_moral-exercise_ system is true; which is another feature of the New +Divinity. Truly I may repeat, we do not need another theological +seminary in Connecticut to teach this doctrine. + +Finally, according to this theory of Dr. T., he and all those who reason +like him, are chargeable, I think, with a palpable paralogism--they +reason in a circle. They say, in the express language of Dr. Tyler, "All +men may be saved if they will"--"No man is hindered from coming to +Christ who is willing to come"--that is, since to will and to be willing +is to be regenerated, this language gravely teaches us, "All men may be +saved, if they _are regenerated_"--"No man is hindered from coming to +Christ (to be regenerated) who _is regenerated!_" And indeed this view +of regeneration not only makes learned divines talk nonsense, but the +Scriptures also. The invitation, "Whosoever will, let him come," &c, +must mean, "Whosoever _is regenerate_, let him come," and so of other +passages. Thus this theory of Dr. Tyler, and of the many who hold with +him, is so closely hemmed in on both sides, that it must throw itself +for support, either upon the doctrine of passivity, or self-conversion; +at the same time that in other respects it involves itself in +inconsistent and anti-scriptural dogmas. + +But that we may leave no position unexamined, let us take another view +of the subject. Suppose, instead of saying regeneration is simply a +change of the will, it should be argued that a change of the will +implies a change of the affections, and this therefore is included in +regeneration. Then I would ask, whether this change of the affections is +in the order of cause and effect, or in the order of time, _prior_ or +_subsequent_ to the act of the will. If this change is prior to any +action of the will in the case, then the sinner has no voluntary +co-operation in the work; and this brings us up once more upon the +doctrine of passive regeneration. The heart is changed before the +subject of the change acts. If the action of the will precedes the +change of the heart, then this change will be effected in one of two +ways. Either this anterior volition does itself change the heart; or it +is a mere preparatory condition, on _occasion of which_ God changes the +heart. In the former case the man himself would change his own heart, +and this is self-conversion; and in the latter alternative we have a +conditional regeneration wrought by the Holy Ghost, and this is the very +doctrine for which _we contend_, in opposition to Calvinism. If it +should be said, this change of the will and this change of the heart +take place independent of each other, that would not help the matter, +since in this view the change of _heart_ would be passive and +unconditional. Thus whichever way this system turns, its difficulties +press upon it still, and it finds no relief. Indeed there can, as I +conceive, be no intermediate Calvinistic theory of regeneration, and +there _can be_ but two other alternatives--either God must renew the +heart, independent of all co-operation on the part of the subject of +this change--and this is the old doctrine of unconditional Divine +efficiency--or the first acceptable act of the will must be +regeneration; and this is the new doctrine of _self-conversion_. Let the +reader, let any one reflect closely on this subject, and I cannot doubt +but he will say with me, _There is no third alternative_. The nature of +the case will admit of none. The former theory may not contradict many +of those scriptures that speak of _Divine efficiency_ in the work of +grace upon the heart, but it is utterly incompatible with those that +urge the sinner to duty.--The latter theory corresponds well with the +urgent injunctions to duty, so abundant in the Scriptures, but is wholly +irreconcilable with those that speak of Divine efficiency. The true +theory must answer to both; and must also correspond with all the other +parts of the Christian system. Is there such a theory? Every honest +inquirer after truth will embrace it doubtless, if it can be +presented--for truth, wherever, and whenever, and by whomsoever +discovered, is infinitely to be preferred to error, however long and +fondly it may have been cherished. Such a theory I will now try to +present--and although I may fail in making it very explicit, and in +bringing forward all its defences, yet if the general outlines can be +seen and be defended, it will, I trust, commend itself to the favourable +notice of the reader. + +_Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration_.--I approach this subject by laying +down the two following fundamental principles:-- + +1. The work of regeneration is performed by the direct and efficient +operations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. + +2. The Holy Spirit exerts this regenerating power only on conditions, to +be first complied with by the subject of the change. + +The first principle I deem it unnecessary to defend farther than it has +been defended in the foregoing remarks. It is not objected to by any +orthodox Christians that I know of, only so far as the new views of +self-conversion, and of conversion by moral suasion, may be thought an +exception. And this we have reason to hope will be an exception of +limited extent and short duration. The sentiment conflicts so directly +with such a numerous class of scriptures, and with the most approved +principles of mental philosophy; and has, at the same time, such a +direct tendency to annihilate all the essential features of +regeneration, it cannot long find encouragement in a spiritual Church. +It may however make many converts for a time, for men are fond of taking +the work of salvation into their own hands; but if it should, between +such converts and the true Church there will ultimately be a separation +as wide as that which now separates orthodoxy and Socinianism. + +The other fundamental principle seems to follow, almost of necessity, +from the scriptures that so abundantly point out the sinner's duty and +agency, in connection with his conversion. The principle, however, is +strenuously opposed by all classes of Calvinists. The opposite of this +is in fact the essential characteristic of Calvinism, if any _one_ +notion can be so called; for however much the Calvinistic system may be +modified, in other respects, this is clung to as the elementary germ +which constitutes the identity of the system. Even the New Divinity, +which makes so much of human agency, does not allow it a _conditional +action_--it allows of no intermediate volition between the mental states +of worldly love and Divine love, as the occasion on which the transfer +is made, or the conditional hinge on which the important revolution is +accomplished. On the contrary, it considers the volition itself as the +transfer--the volition constitutes the _entire change_. Thus warily does +Calvinism, in all its changes, avoid conditional regeneration. Hence if +I were called upon to give a general definition of Calvinism, that +should include all the species that claim the name, I would say, +_Calvinists are those who believe in unconditional regeneration_. For +the moment this point is given up by any one, all parties agree that he +is not a Calvinist. + +But why is conditional regeneration so offensive? Is it because the +Scriptures directly oppose it? This is hardly pretended. It is supposed, +however, by the Calvinists, that to acknowledge this doctrine would +require the renunciation of certain other doctrines which are taught in +the Scriptures. This lays the foundation for the objections that have +been made against this doctrine. It is objected that _a depraved sinner +cannot perform an acceptable condition until he is regenerated_--that +_God cannot consistently accept of any act short of that which +constitutes regeneration_--that _the idea of a conditional regeneration +implies salvation by works, in part at least, and not wholly by grace_. + +I have mentioned these objections in this connection, not so much to +attempt, at this moment, a direct refutation of them, as to advert to +what I conceive to be the ground of the difficulty in the minds of those +making the objections. It appears to me that the difference between us +results principally from a difference of our views in respect to the +constitution and the constitutional action of the mind itself. The +philosophical part of our theology will be modified very much by our +views of the philosophy of mind. Let it be granted then:-- + +1. That the mind is possessed of a moral susceptibility, generally +called _conscience_, which lays the foundation of the notions of right +and wrong, and by which we feel the emotions of approval or disapproval +for our past conduct, and the feelings of obligation with respect to the +present and the future; and that even in an unregenerate state this +susceptibility often operates in accordance with its original design, +and therefore agreeably with the Divine will. + +2. That the understanding or intellect, which is a general division of +the mind, containing in itself several distinct susceptibilities or +powers, may, in an unregenerate state of the mind, be so enlightened and +informed on the subjects of Divine truth as to perceive the right and +the wrong; and as to perceive also, to some extent at least, the way of +salvation pointed out in the Gospel. + +3. That the affections and propensities (sometimes called the heart) are +the principal seat of depravity--and these are often arrayed in direct +hostility to the convictions of the judgment and the feelings of moral +obligation. + +4. That the will, or that mental power by which we put forth volitions, +and make decisions, while it is more or less, directly or indirectly, +influenced by the judgment, the conscience, and the affections, is in +fact designed to give direction and unity to the whole mental action; +and it always accomplishes this, where there is a proper harmony in the +mental powers. But by sin this harmony has been disturbed, and the +unholy affections have gained an undue ascendancy, so that, in the +unregenerate, in all questions of preference between God and the world, +in spite of the judgment, of conscience, and of the will, the world is +loved and God is hated. + +5. That in those cases where we cannot control our affections by a +direct volition, we may, nevertheless, under the promptings of +conscience, and in the light of the judgment, resolve against sin--but +these resolutions, however firmly and repeatedly made, will be carried +away and overruled by the strength of the carnal mind. This shows us our +own weakness, drives us to self-despair, until, under the enlightening +influences of grace, and the drawings of the Spirit, the soul is led to +prayer and to an abdication of itself into the hands of Divine mercy, +through Christ; and _then_, and on _these conditions_, the Holy Spirit +changes the character and current of the unholy affections--and _this is +regeneration_. + +In laying down the preceding postulates I have endeavoured to express +myself with as much brevity, and with as little metaphysical +technicality as possible; for the reason that they are designed to be +understood by all. Bating the deficiencies that may on this account be +noticed by the philosophical reader, I think it may be assumed that +these, so far as the powers and operations of the mind are concerned, +embrace the basis and general outlines of what we call _conditional +regeneration_. I am not aware that they are in opposition to an one +principle of Scripture theology, or mental philosophy. And if this +process is found consonant with reason and Scripture, in its general +features, it will be easy to show that its relative bearings are such as +most happily harmonize all the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel system. + +We plant ourselves then upon these general positions, and as ability +will permit, or truth may seem to justify, shall endeavour to defend +them against such objections as may be anticipated, or are known to have +been made against any of the principles here assumed. + +1. It may be objected perhaps that this is making too broad a +distinction between the different mental powers, giving to each such a +distinctive action and operation as to infringe upon the doctrine of the +mind's unity and simplicity. It is believed, however, the more this +point is reflected upon by an attentive observance of our own minds, or +the minds of others, the more satisfied shall we be that the principles +here assumed are correct. That there are these distinct properties of +mind no one doubts. It is in accordance with universal language, to +speak of the intellect, of the conscience, of the will, and of the +affections, as distinct properties of the mind. The properties of mind +are as clearly marked by our consciousness, as the properties of matter +by our senses. And although, in consequence of the invisibility of mind, +there is doubtless a more perfect unity in each individual mental +property, than in each distinct quality of matter, still each of the +mental qualities has its appropriate and distinctive character. +Calvinists themselves acknowledge this. They allow we have a moral sense +which tests good or evil, even in an unregenerate state; they allow the +intellect may perceive and approve of truth, even when the heart rejects +it; they allow that to perceive and to judge, to feel moral obligation +and to will, are distinct operations of the mind; and that our +perceptions and our conscience may be right, when our affections are +wrong. So far then we are agreed, and so far they make distinctions in +the mind, as wide as any that have been claimed in the principles above +laid down. Theologians, I grant, have, in many instances, confounded in +their reasonings the will and the affections. And this has also +sometimes been done by writers on the philosophy of the mind. But it is +most evident, I think, they have done this without good reason. Mr. +Locke says, "I find the will often confounded with several of the +affections, especially desire, and one put for the other." This he +thinks is an error, of which "any one who turns his thoughts inward upon +what passes in his own mind" will be convinced. Rev. Professor Upham, of +Bowdoin College, Maine, himself a Calvinist, as is generally supposed, +in a late excellent treatise on the will, asserts, and clearly proves, I +think, that "_the state of the mind, which we term volition, is entirely +distinct from that which we term desire_." Nay, he proves that desires +and volitions are often in direct opposition. Hence as love implies +desire, our volitions may often conflict with our love. And this is +precisely the state the awakened sinner is in when he "would do good, +but evil is present with him." + +2. It may be said, and has sometimes been said, that this view of the +subject involves a contradiction; that it is the same as to say, the man +wills against his preference, or in other words, he wills what he does +not choose. I cannot answer this objection better than by an argument in +Professor Upham's work, already alluded to, in which he says, of a +similar objection on this very subject, "It will be found on examination +to resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and naturally vanishes as soon +as that fallacy is detected." "It is undoubtedly true that the common +usage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice and choosing +indiscriminately to either the desire or volition; but it does not +follow, and is not true, that we apply them to these different parts of +our nature in precisely the same sense." "When the word choice implies +desire at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects brought +before the mind at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or +predominant desire." "At other times we use the terms choice and +choosing in application to the will--when it is applied to that power, +it expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the +exception, as in the other case, that more than one object of volition +was present, in view of the mind, before the putting forth of the +voluntary act. It is in fact the circumstance that two or more objects +are present, which suggests the use of the word choice or choosing, in +either case." "But the acts are entirely different in their nature, +although under certain circumstances the same name is applied to them." +Hence he adds, "The contradiction is not a real, but merely a verbal +one. If we ever choose against choosing, it will be found merely that +choice which is volition, placed against that choice which is desire." +And this is nothing more than to say that volitions and desires may +conflict with each other, which we know to be the fact in numerous +instances. + +If in reply to the foregoing, and in farther defence of the objection, +it should be urged, that there could be not only no motive for the +volition in this case, but that it would in fact be put forth against +all motive, since the feelings of the heart would be of a directly +opposite character, I reply, that it is not true that there would be no +motive for the action of the will, in opposition to the sinful +affections. It is seen already that the judgment in the awakened sinner +is against continuing in sin, and the rebukes of the conscience for the +past, and its admonitions for the future, are powerful motives in +opposition to the unholy affections. The feelings of compunction and of +moral obligation gain great accessions of strength, moreover, from the +terrors of the Divine law, which alarm the fears, and from the promises +of the Gospel, which encourage the hopes of the awakened sinner. And it +is especially and emphatically true that under the existing influence of +these fears and hopes, the voice of conscience is most effectual in +prompting the sinner to "flee from the wrath to come," and "lay hold on +the hope set before him." Can it be said then that there is no motive +for a volition, or a mental effort that shall conflict with the +unsanctified affections? + +3. Again it is said, for every inch of this ground is disputed, that the +action of the mind under such motives is purely selfish, and cannot +therefore perform conditions acceptable to God. To this it may be +replied, that to be influenced by motives of self preservation and +personal salvation is not criminal; nay, it is commendable. In proof of +this but one argument is necessary. God moves upon our fears and hopes, +for the _express purpose_ of inducing us to forsake sin, and serve him; +and he applies these motives to man in his unregenerate state. This is +so obvious a fact, it is presumed none will deny it. But is it wrong for +us to be prompted to action by those considerations which God himself +urges upon us? If he attempts to excite our fears and hopes to prompt us +to a course of self preservation, can it be wrong for us to be +influenced by this means, and in this direction? I should hardly know +how to hold an argument with a man that should assert this--and yet +this sentiment is implied in the objection now under examination. +Beside, these acts conditional to regeneration are not wholly, perhaps +not chiefly, from motives of personal interest. Our moral feelings have +a great part in this work. And it is principally by arousing an accusing +conscience that fear and hope aid in the performance of the conditions +of regeneration. But whatever proportion there may be of the ingredients +of personal fear and hope in the feelings that enter into this +conditional action of the mind, it is certain that the fear of the +consequences of sin, and the hope to escape them, are not themselves +criminal, much less then are they capable of rendering a complex state +of the mind, of which they are but a part, unacceptable to God. Indeed +this objection to a mental act, merely because it is prompted by self +love, has always been to me a matter of wonder. Selfishness is a term +which we generally use in a bad sense, and we mean by it that form of +self love that leads us to seek our own gratification at the expense and +the injury of others, or in opposition to the will of God. But that self +love which leads us to seek our own highest interests, and especially +our eternal interests, without injury to others, and in accordance with +the Divine will, is never thought criminal, I believe, except where one +has a particular system to support by such a notion. But that system is +itself of a doubtful character which requires such an argument to +sustain it. + +4. Another objection which has been made to one of the principles above +laid down is, that "it is the province of the will to control the +affections, and not the affections the will; and that the will always +possesses the power to do this, even in an unregenerate state." If so, +then man has power, at any time, by an act of the will, to love God. Let +him try--let that unholy sinner try. Can he succeed? You say perhaps, +for so the Calvinists have said, "He can if he will;" that is, he can +will to love God if he does will to love God! This is no great discovery +surely, and it is certainly no proper answer to the question. I ask it +again, Can he, by a direct act of the will, love God? Do you say, by +varying the form of the answer, "He can if he chooses?" If you mean by +choice the act of the will, this is the same answer over again, the +folly of which is so apparent. But if you mean by choice the desires of +his heart, then your answer amounts to this: If the desires of the heart +are in favour of loving God, he can, by an act of the will, love him. +But if the desires of the heart are in favour of loving God, the love is +already begotten, and there is no need of the act of the will to produce +it. In that case your proposition would be, the sinner can love God by +an act of the will, _if he loves him!_ the absurdity of which is too +evident to require comment. It is thus that the coils of error run into +each other in endless circles. + +But, perhaps, to help the argument, if possible, it may be urged that +the will can decide in favour of a closer examination, and by voluntary +attention may get such strong perceptions of truth as will give it the +voluntary power over the heart. To this I would reply, in the first +place, this is giving up the argument, it is acknowledging that certain +preparatory acts of the will are necessary before the mind can love +God--but _this is conditional regeneration_. And it may be farther +maintained, in opposition to this sentiment that the mere perception of +truth, even when united with conscience, and personal fear and hope, is +not sufficient to give the will power over the unrenewed affections. In +proof of this, Scripture might be adduced; but reserving the Scripture +argument for the present, we may quote good Calvinistic authority in +proof that the will may be enthralled by the affections. Professor Upham +says, "Whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always +a greater or less degree of enthralment." And then he proceeds to show +how the mind may be enslaved by the _propensities_, _appetites_, +_affections,_ and _passions_. He illustrates; for example, the progress +of this enthralment in the case of an appetite for strong drink; which, +"like a strong man armed, violently seizes the will, binds it hand and +foot, and hurls it into the dust." Again he says, "There are not +unfrequently cases where the propensities and passions have become so +intense, after years of repetition, as to control, or in other words, +enthral the voluntary power almost entirely." (Treatise on the Will.) +Dr. Griffin, also an able Calvinistic writer, says, in decided terms, +"The judgment of the intellect and the decisions of the will are both +controlled by the heart." + +The idea of the enthralment of the will, however, may be objected to on +another ground, viz. that if admitted it would destroy accountability, +since none are accountable for what they cannot avoid. But I have not +said they cannot avoid it; neither have I said we are not voluntary +either in keeping or discarding the unholy heart. I assert directly the +contrary. Every probationer decides whether he will be holy or happy. +But his decisions to be holy are effectual only when he seeks that from +God which he cannot do for himself. Then, and then only, will God give +him the victory over the old man, with the deceitful lusts of the heart. +_But this is conditional regeneration_. + +Having said thus much in defence of the philosophy of the principles +laid down, the way is prepared to show that they accord with Scripture, +and to defend them with the doctrine which we build upon them from the +supposed Scripture objections which have been urged against them. But +this will furnish matter for another number. + + + + +NUMBER XV. + +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. + +In proposing and vindicating, in the preceding number, those views of +the philosophy of mind which are supposed to throw light upon the +process of regeneration, it was not intended to be intimated that a +knowledge of this theory is necessary in order to experience the new +birth. In the practical purposes of life men do not ordinarily stop to +analyze their mental states before they _judge_, _feel_, and _act_. They +have the _practical_ use of their mental faculties, and that suffices. +In this way the most ignorant and the most unphilosophical may be saved. +Why, then, it may be asked, is it necessary to enter into this analysis +at all? To this it may be replied, that whenever we can trace the +adaptation of the provisions of grace and the reason of the Divine +requirements to the known facts and laws of the human mind, it will +strengthen our confidence in the economy of grace, increase our +admiration of the wisdom and goodness of God, and sharpen our weapons of +defence against the cavils and assaults of an opposing skepticism. But +especially is this philosophical examination necessary whenever a +superficial or an erroneous philosophy would force upon us an erroneous +theology. The metaphysical mist with which some theories have veiled the +doctrine of regeneration, and the delusive and distorted views that have +resulted from this obscuration, may be removed and corrected by the +radiance of a pure philosophy. But as human philosophy is, at best, more +likely to err on these subjects than revelation, the former should +always be corrected or confirmed by the latter. How is it in the case +under examination? How do the assumed opinions correspond with +revelation? + +Let us glance again at our positions. The principal points assumed +are--that there is often a conflict between the feelings of moral +obligation on the one hand, enlightened as they are by reason and by +grace, sanctioned as they are by fear and hope, and the unholy +affections on the other; that under the promptings of the moral feelings +the will frequently puts forth its strength to resist and subdue the +unholy affections, but in every such case the effort fails when unaided +by the sanctifying grace of God--and that victory is finally gained by a +conditional act of the will, through which, or on occasion of which, God +subdues the passions and changes the heart. These views have been +vindicated, as being in accordance with the philosophy of mind. The +question now is, Are they sustained by Scripture? I answer, _Yes, most +clearly_. + +If the Apostle Paul had attempted, by a set argument, to illustrate and +affirm these views, he could not have done it better or more explicitly +than he has done in the latter part of the 7th, and the first part of +the 8th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. "I see," says the +apostle, "another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, +and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my +members." _The law of sin in his members_ was undoubtedly the carnal +mind, the unholy affections. These _warred_ against the _law of his +mind_, his enlightened judgment, his feelings of moral obligation; and +in this warfare the former were victorious, and carried captive the +will; so that "the good that he would, he did not, and the evil that he +would not, that he did." "To will was present with him," but "how to +perform, he knew not." See the entire passage, for it beautifully +illustrates our whole theory. Here is the conflict, the struggle between +conscience and sin; here is pointed out the seat of sin, viz. the +"flesh" or carnal mind, which is but another name for the unsanctified +affections and appetites; here is the will struggling to turn the +contest on the side of duty, but struggling in vain; every effort +results in defeat--_it is taken captive, and overcome_.--Despair finally +settles down upon the mind, as far as personal strength is concerned, +and the anxious soul looks abroad for help, and cries out, "Who shall +deliver me from the body of this death!" Then it is that deliverance +comes! Jesus Christ, the Saviour of sinners, sets him free! + +Professor Stuart, of Andover, himself a Calvinist, has shown most +conclusively, what Arminians have long contended for, that this portion +of revelation refers specifically to the work of regeneration. But +whether this be granted by every Calvinist or not, no man can deny but +that the grand philosophical principles heretofore contended for, are +here fully illustrated--the same _division_ of the mind--the same +_conflict_--the same _thraldom_ of the _will_, and the same +_deliverance_, through _faith_ in Jesus Christ our Lord. + +The same principles, in part at least, are recognized in Gal. v, 17, +"For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the +flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye _cannot_ +do the things that ye _would_." In short, all those passages where the +difficulty of subduing the carnal mind, of keeping the body under, of +crucifying the old man, all those passages that speak of a _warfare_, an +_internal conflict_, and the like, recognize the principles here +contended for. These principles, so frequently adverted to in the +Scriptures, are proved to be in exact conformity with experience. Who +that has passed through this change, but remembers this conflict, this +war in the members? Who but recollects how his best resolutions were +broken as often as made; and how, after various and vigorous efforts, +his heart seemed to himself to grow worse and worse? He found secret +treason lurking in his bosom even when he was trying to repent of his +past disloyalty. + + "The more he strove against its power, + He felt the guilt and sin the more." + +Every additional effort sunk him apparently but the lower in "the +horrible pit and miry clay," until "the Lord heard his _cry_," until +"the Lord brought him up, and set his feet upon a rock, and established +his goings, and put a new song in his mouth." + +That the Scriptures speak of a conditional action of the mind, +preparatory to the work of regeneration, appears from express passages, +as well as from the general tenor of that numerous class of scriptures +which enjoin duty upon the sinner, and predicate justification and +salvation upon those duties. John i, 12, has already been quoted and +commented upon, in which the new birth is suspended upon _receiving_ +Christ, or _believing_ on his name. The many cases of healing the body, +by Christ, are evident illustrations of the healing of the soul. In +fact, we have good reasons for supposing that, in most of these cases at +least, the soul and body were healed at the same time; and this was +always on the condition of _asking_ and _believing_. John iii, 14, 13, +"As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son +of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, +but have everlasting life." Here our Saviour shows the analogy between +the cure of the Israelites by looking at the brazen serpent, and of +sinners by looking to Christ. But how were the Israelites healed? By the +conditional act of _looking_ at the brazen serpent. So looking at Christ +is the condition of healing the soul. Take away this condition and the +whole analogy is destroyed. Let this condition be understood, and the +text will accord with others, equally expressive of conditions. "Look +unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." "Seek first the +kingdom of God and his righteousness." "Seek the Lord while he may be +found." God hath determined that all nations "should seek the Lord, if +haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from +every one of us." Will any one pretend to say that this looking and +seeking implies regeneration? This is mere assumption; where is the +proof? who would ever infer this idea from the Scriptures themselves? +What! is the sinner regenerated before the malady of his soul, the +poisonous bite of sin, is healed? Has he found the Lord before he has +sought him? And must he seek after he has found him? The _kingdom of +God_ is religion in the soul--it is "righteousness, peace, and joy in +the Holy Ghost;" and when we are regenerated, we have it in possession, +and have therefore no need to seek it. But we are commanded to _seek_ +the kingdom of God; this, therefore, must be a work preparatory to, and +conditional of regeneration. "Come unto me all ye that labour and are +heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Take my yoke upon you," &c. To +be _restless_, and not to have on the yoke of Christ, is to be +unregenerate; but such are to _come_ and _take_ the yoke, and then, and +on that condition, they will find rest to their souls. "The Spirit and +the bride say, Come, &c, and whosoever will, let him come and take of +the water of life freely." To take of the water of life is to be +regenerate; but to this end we must _come_, and must first _will_ in +order to _come_. "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear +my voice and open the door, I will come in and sup with him, and he with +me." Before Christ is _in_ the soul, there is no regeneration; but +before he will _come_ in, he knocks, and the sinner must first _hear_, +and then _open the door_, and on this condition Christ comes in and +imparts his grace. + +But it is useless to proceed farther in quoting particular texts. They +might be extended indefinitely, with a force and pertinency that cannot +be evaded: all going to establish the fact that the work of grace on the +heart is conditional. + +Will any one pretend to deny, that the unregenerate sinner is called +upon to _seek_, _ask_, _repent_, _believe_, &c? And what do such +scriptures mean? The acts of the mind here enjoined must _constitute_ +regeneration, or they must follow regeneration as an effect of that +work, or they must precede it as a necessary and required condition. To +say that these acts are the very definition of regeneration itself--are +only synonymous terms to express this renewal of the heart, is to make +regeneration consist in _exercises_ merely--is in fact to make it the +sinner's appropriate and exclusive work; unless it can be shown that +this commanding the sinner to ask, &c, is nothing more nor less than a +promise that God will ask, seek, repent, and believe for him! But this +will hardly be pretended; and the idea that these acts do themselves +_constitute_ the new birth, has already been seen to be defective and +indefensible. + +To suppose that these acts follow regeneration, as an effect or fruit of +the change itself, is to deny them that position and relation in which +they are actually placed by the word of God. It makes one seek, after he +has found; ask, after he has received; repent and believe, after he is +possessed of that salvation, to obtain which these duties are enjoined. +The phraseology to suit this theory, should evidently be of an entirely +different character. When the sinner asks what he shall do to be saved, +the answer should be--"_Nothing_ until God renews the heart; and then +as a fruit of this you will of course _seek_, _ask_, _believe_," &c. If, +indeed, the sinner is to do nothing until God renews him, why is it +necessary that he should first be awakened? Why is the command addressed +to him at all? Why does not the Holy Spirit immediately renew the heart, +while the transgressor is stupid in his wickedness, instead of calling +after him to _awake_, _flee_, and _escape_ for his life? Do you say you +can give no other reason than that it pleases God to take this course +with the sinner, and to call up his attention to the subject before he +renews him? I answer, then it pleases God that there should be certain +preparatory acts of the mind in order to regeneration: and this is in +fact admitting the principle for which we contend, and this more +especially if it be acknowledged, as it evidently must be, that these +preparatory mental states or acts are, to any extent, voluntary. Thus, +not only is the absurdity of making these acts the _result_ of +regeneration most apparent; but in tracing out the consistent meaning +and practical bearing of those scriptures that are addressed to the +unconverted, we find them establishing the third alternative, that these +acts of the mind are _preparatory_ to regeneration, and are the +prescribed conditions on which God will accomplish the work. Thus the +Scripture argument is found to confirm the philosophical view of the +subject, and both are strengthened by Christian experience. The doctrine +of conditional regeneration, therefore, is confirmed by a threefold +argument, no part of which, it is believed, can be easily overthrown. +Against it, however, there are several strong objections urged, which +have already been mentioned, and which we are now prepared to hear and +examine. + +1. It has been objected, that to admit human agency and co-operation in +this change, is to deny salvation by _grace_. But how does this appear? +Suppose the very conditions are by a gracious appointment--suppose the +operations of a gracious system are in this way better adapted to a +moral government--suppose this conditional action of the mind to be +itself the result of a gracious influence, enlightening the +understanding, and quickening and arousing the moral sense--finally, +suppose these conditions not to be _efficient_, much less _meritorious_ +causes, by which the mind either changes itself, or renders itself more +morally deserving of the Divine favour--I say suppose all this, and then +show if you can, how such conditions can detract at all from the grace +of this salvation. + +2. It has been objected, that "since man never is what he ought to be +until he is renewed and made holy, therefore any act short of that which +either constitutes or implies regeneration cannot be acceptable to +God--God cannot consistently approve of any step that falls short of +man's duty. It is his duty to be holy, and therefore any thing short of +this is sin, and consequently cannot be accepted as a condition." We +should be careful to discriminate between things closely related, and +yet actually distinct from each other. It is one thing to be pleased +with the character of the mind as a whole, in view of its relations to +the Divine law and its necessary qualifications for heaven, and another +thing to be pleased with a particular mental state, or conditional +volition, in reference to its adaptation to a proposed end, or a +specific object. For instance: the Calvinists think that an awakened and +an anxiously inquiring sinner is in a more suitable state of mind to +receive the blessing of regeneration, than one perfectly stupid and +thoughtless. If they do not, why do they try to bring sinners to +thoughtfulness? Why do they try to awaken them to a sense of their +danger, and make them tremble under the view of the Divine displeasure? +Or why do they call their attention to Gospel provisions and a crucified +Saviour? Is not this a preparatory process? And have they the Divine +warrant for such a course? Is this the method which the Divine Being +takes to save his rebellious subjects? Then, doubtless, this method is +well pleasing to him: and in reference to this specific end he has in +view, he is pleased with each successive step in the process. He is +pleased when the shiner pays attention to the word; he is pleased when +he is awakened, and when he begins to tremble and inquire, "What shall I +do to be saved?" This is just as he would have it, and just as he +designed; although the entire character of the sinner is not acceptable +to him until he is made holy. The very principle, then, objected to by +the Calvinists is recognized by their own theory and practice. Now if we +say God is pleased to accept of the sinner's prayer, and faith, and +sorrow for sin, as a condition of what he will do for him, what +propriety is there in replying, God cannot accept of any thing short of +a holy heart? We know he cannot approve of a heart until it is holy; but +he can approve of certain feelings and volitions as suited, according to +the Divine appointment, to be the condition on which he will make the +heart holy. Do you ask on what ground he accepts of this? I answer, on +the ground of the merits of Christ; the ground on which the whole +process rests. God does not accept of the prayer, repentance, and faith +of the _regenerate_, because they are regenerate, and by reason of their +holiness; but their acceptance is wholly and continually through Christ. +Through the same medium and merits the prayer of the inquiring sinner is +heard and answered. + +If your servant had left you unjustly, and deserted the service he was +obligated to perform, and you should finally tell him, if he would +return and resume his duties you would forgive the past, and accept of +him for the future, would it be inconsistent to say, you were pleased +when he began to listen to the proposal, and pleased when he took the +first and every succeeding step, as being suitable and necessary to the +end proposed, although, in view of _his_ duty and _your_ claim, you +would not be pleased with him, as your acceptable servant, until he was +actually and faithfully employed in your service? + +Let it not be inferred from the above that I advocate a gradual +conversion. I do not. I believe when God renews the heart he does it at +once; but the preparatory steps are nevertheless indispensable to the +accomplishment of this work. And God is well pleased with the first step +of attention on the part of the sinner, and with every succeeding step +of prayer, anxious inquiry, feeling of moral obligation, purpose to +forsake sin, looking after and attempting to believe in Christ, not +because these are _all_ that he requires, but because they are the +necessary preparatives for what is to follow. + +3. The foregoing remarks will prepare the way to meet a similar +objection to the last, and one to some extent the same in substance. It +is this: "Are these conditional acts of the mind holy or unholy +exercises? If holy, then the work of regeneration is accomplished +already, and therefore these cannot be the _conditions_ of that change. +If unholy, then they can be no other than offensive to a holy God, and +therefore cannot be conditions well pleasing to him." In addition to +what has been already said, having a bearing upon this question, it may +be stated that the terms holy and unholy may be equivocal, as used in +this connection; and thus the supposed dilemma would be more in words +than in fact, more in appearance than in reality. This dilemma is urged +in the argument under the idea that there can be but the two kinds of +exercises, holy and unholy. And this may be true enough, only let us +understand what is meant. If by holy exercises are meant those in which +the entire feeling is on the side of God, I readily answer, _No_, the +mind before regeneration has no such exercises. If by holiness is meant, +that the judgment and conscience are on the side of truth, I answer, +_Yes_, this is the state of the mind when it is truly awakened by the +Holy Spirit and by Divine truth. It is entirely immaterial to me, +therefore, whether the objector call the exercise holy or unholy, +provided he draw no special inferences from the use of a general term +that the positions here assumed do not authorize. Sure I am that the +objector cannot say there is nothing in the exercises of the +unregenerate, awakened sinner, such as God would have for the end +proposed, until he is prepared to say that a fear of the consequences of +sin, an enlightened judgment, the remorse of conscience for the past, +the feelings of obligation for the future, and the hope of victory over +sin through Christ, all combining to induce the sinner to flee for +refuge, and lay hold upon the hope set before him, are all wrong, and +not as God would have them? But when a man is prepared to say this, it +is difficult to see how he could be reasoned with farther, for he would +seem to have given up reason and Scripture. And yet who does not know +that these are the exercises of the soul awakened to a sense of sin and +its consequences, even while as yet his unholy affections hang upon him +like a _body of death_:--Yea, who does not know that it is this body of +death, from which he cannot escape, and this abhorrence of sin and its +consequences, that rein him up, and incline him to a surrender of his +soul into the hands of Christ, from whom, as a consequence, he receives +_power_ to become a son of God. "But what is the motive?" it is asked, +"is not this unholy?" And pray what does this inquiry mean? If by motive +is meant the moving cause _out_ of the mind; _that_ cannot be unholy, +for it is the Holy Spirit, and the holy word of God, that are thus +urging the sinner to Christ. If by motive is meant the judgments and +feelings of the mind, that prompt to these voluntary efforts to avoid +sin and its consequences, these are the enlightened understanding and +the feelings of obligation, already alluded to, which, I repeat, the +objector is welcome to call holy or unholy as he pleases; all I claim +is, they are what God approves of, and are the necessary conditions of +his subsequent work of renewing the heart. + +But perhaps it may be asked here, Is not the sinner, in the performance +of these conditions, _partly_ converted? I answer, This again depends +entirely upon what you mean by conversion. If by conversion you +understand the whole of the preparatory work of awakening and seeking, +as well as the _change_ of the _heart_--then of course you would say he +is _partly_ converted. If you mean by conversion only a change of views +and a consequent change of purpose, by which the sinner determines to +seek, that he may find the pearl of great price--the blessing of a new +heart and of forgiveness, then you would say he is _wholly_ converted. +But if you mean, by conversion, the change of heart itself, the washing +of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, then not only is +not the work done, but it is not begun. The way of the Lord is prepared +and the renewal will follow. + +Thus the objections that have been thought so formidable against the +doctrine of conditional regeneration are found, on a closer inspection, +to be more in appearance than in reality. They receive their influence, +as objections, rather from their indefiniteness and the ambiguity of +terms, than from any intrinsic force. + +There is, however, one form more in which an objection may be urged in a +general way against the ideas of the new birth here advanced. And as I +wish fearlessly and candidly to state and meet, if possible, every +difficulty, it will be necessary to touch upon this. It may be urged +that "the only exercises that can be claimed as conditions of +regeneration on Bible grounds are _repentance_ and _faith;_ for +'repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ' are laid at +the foundation of all Gospel requirements. Whenever the awakened sinner +came to the apostles to know what he should do to be saved, they always +met him with, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be +saved.' Whenever the apostles went out to preach the Gospel, they +preached 'every where that men should repent.'" "But," continues the +objector, "if repentance and faith are the only duties or exercises +which can be claimed as conditions, it is evident there are no such +conditions; for repentance and faith, so far from being conditions of +regeneration, are either the new birth itself, or are Christian graces, +implying the new birth." + +The premises, in the above objection, will not be denied. Repentance and +faith are supposed to be the Gospel conditions of regeneration. But it +is denied that these are necessarily regeneration itself, or that they +imply regeneration in any other sense, than as antecedents to it. There +are, it is acknowledged, a repentance and a faith that are Christian +graces, and imply the new birth. This is the faith that "is the +substance of things hoped for." It is that principle of spiritual life +which the Christian has in his soul when he can say, "The life that I +now live I live by faith in the Son of God." This is that repentance, +also, which keeps the soul continually at the foot of the cross, and +leads it constantly to feel, + + "Every moment, Lord, I need + The merit of thy death." + +But because repentance and faith are the necessary characteristics of +the Christian, and because they are the more perfect as the Christian +character ripens, it does not therefore follow that there are no +repentance and faith conditional to the new birth. The very fact that +repentance and faith were urged by Christ and his apostles, as the +initiatory step to salvation, proves the opposite of this. They do not +say, Repent and believe the Gospel, and this is salvation, but, "Repent +and believe, and ye shall (on this condition) be saved." And surely it +is unnecessary to prove here that salvation in the New Testament +generally means a meetness for heaven or holiness. Our blessed Saviour +was called Jesus, because he _saved_ his people _from their sins_. + +Beside, it may well be argued, that faith and repentance are acts of the +mind, and cannot therefore be considered as the new birth itself, unless +the mind converts itself, especially since they are _enjoined duties_, +and must therefore be _voluntary_ acts. It is no where said that God +repents and believes for us; but it is expressly and repeatedly taught, +that God _renews_ us.--Repentance and faith, then, are our work, but +regeneration is his. I know it is said in one place, Acts v, 31, that +Christ was exalted "to _give repentance_ to Israel." But the _act_ +itself of repentance cannot be said to be _given_. This would be an +absurdity. How can any one give me a mental _act?_ Hence Dr. Doddridge, +although a Calvinist, very candidly and very justly remarks, on this +passage, that "to _give repentance_ signifies to _give place_, or _room_ +for repentance," to sustain which interpretation he quotes Josephus and +others who use the phrase in this sense. If then repentance and faith +are enjoined upon us, as _our duties_, and if they are every where +spoken of as prerequisites in the work of salvation, and as preparatory +steps and conditions to the process of holiness, how can it be otherwise +than that these are antecedent, in the order of nature, to regeneration? + +It may farther be argued, in support of this view of faith and +repentance, that no sin can be forgiven until repented of--repentance +therefore must precede remission of sins. This I suppose Calvinists +allow, but they say that, in the order of nature, the heart is renewed +before sin is forgiven--and that repentance, therefore, which is either +the new birth itself, or the immediate fruit of it, is a condition of +justification, but not of regeneration. If this be correct, then the +soul is made holy before it is forgiven. But St. Paul informs us, Romans +iv, 5, that God through faith "justifieth the _ungodly_." If then there +be any antecedence in the order of the two parts of the work of grace, +we must suppose that justification has the precedence, and that +regeneration follows, and hence repentance and faith precede +regeneration. Indeed I cannot see why repentance is not as necessary to +remove the sin of the heart as to forgive the sin of the life. If God +will not forgive sin without repentance, will he renew the heart without +it? Has he any where promised this? If not, but if, on the contrary, he +every where seems to have suspended the working out of our salvation _in +us_, upon our repentance, then may we safely conclude--nay, then we must +necessarily believe that we repent in order to be renewed. The same may +be said of faith. Faith in fact seems to be the exclusive channel +through which every gracious effect is produced upon the mind. The +sinner cannot be awakened without faith, for it precedes every judgment +in favour of truth, and every motion of moral feeling, and of course +every favourable concurrence of the will. The sinner never could throw +himself upon the Divine mercy, never would embrace Christ as his +Saviour, until he believed. Hence the Scriptures lay such great stress +upon faith, and make it the grand, and indeed the only _immediate_ +condition of the work of grace upon the heart. Repentance is a condition +only remotely, _in order_ to justifying faith; agreeable to the teaching +of Christ, "And ye, when ye had heard, afterward _repented_ not that ye +_might believe_ on him." But faith is necessary _immediately_, as that +mental state directly antecedent to the giving up of the soul into the +hands of Divine mercy. And shall we still be told that faith is not the +condition of regeneration? The order of the work seems to be--1. A +degree of faith in order to repentance. 2. Repentance, in order to such +an increase of faith as will lead the soul to throw itself upon +Christ.--3. The giving up of the soul to Christ as the only ground of +hope. 4. The change of heart by the efficient operation of the Holy +Spirit.--Now on whichever of these four stages of the process, except +the first, the objector lays his finger and says, _That_ is not a +condition of regeneration, for it is regeneration itself, it will be +seen that _that_ very part is conditional. If, for instance, he fix on +the second stage, and contend that that is regeneration, which I call +repentance _in order_ to regenerating faith; even _that_ would be +_conditional_ regeneration, for it is preceded by faith--and so of all +that follow. And surely no one will pretend that what I call the first +stage, the faith which precedes awakening and remorse of conscience, and +the exciting alternations of fear and hope in the anxious and inquiring +sinner, is regeneration. And if this first degree of faith is not the +change, then it is utterly inconsistent to talk of unconditional +regeneration, for this faith stands at the head of all that follows--it +is a mental act necessarily preparatory to the whole work. And as we +shall presently see, it is an act that depends upon the agency of the +will. Hence we are brought again to our conclusion, that the change +called the new birth is effected by the Holy Spirit, on the ground of +certain conditional acts of him who is the subject of the change. + +"But the very _nature_ of repentance and of faith, the very _definition_ +of the two mental states expressed by these terms," it is said, "proves +that a person, to possess them, must be regenerate; or at any rate, that +these states cannot be conditions of regeneration, to be performed by +the sinner." Let us attend for a moment to this objection in detail. + +What is repentance? "It is," say some Calvinistic writers, "a _change of +mind_. The original means this, and so it should have been rendered; and +if it had been so rendered, it would have set this controversy at rest." +But what if we should grant (what I do not believe) that the original +word means this, and this only, still it would not follow that the +change of mind called the new birth is meant by this term. A change of +judgment is a change of mind--a change of purpose is a change of +mind--any change of the general current of feeling, such as that from +carelessness and stupidity in to a state of anxiety and earnest inquiry, +what shall I do to be saved? is a change of mind.--And such a change of +mind indispensably precedes regeneration. No person ever, from being a +careless, hardened sinner, becomes an anxious and earnest inquirer after +salvation, without an important change in his judgment, moral feeling, +and volitions. Hence this definition does not at all help the objector, +unless he can prove that the Scriptures always mean by this term that +change which they elsewhere call the new birth. Indeed, since we have +already shown that repentance is our work, and the renewing of the heart +exclusively God's work, it follows incontrovertibly, that the change of +mind called repentance is not the new birth. + +If repentance meant that change of mind called the new birth, then the +regenerate would be _often born again_, and that, too, without +backsliding; for those who are growing the fastest in grace repent the +most constantly and the most deeply. + +Again: it is objected, that "faith is not a voluntary state of mind, and +therefore cannot be considered a condition, performed by the sinner, in +order to regeneration." To believe is doubtless, in many instances, +perfectly involuntary. There are numerous cases in which a man is +obliged to believe, both against his will and against his desires. There +are other cases, again, in which the will is not only much concerned in +believing, but in which its action is indispensable in order to believe. +And the faith of the Gospel is pre-eminently an instance of this kind. +"Faith," saith the word, "cometh by hearing." But hearing implies +attention; and every deliberate act of attention implies an act of the +will. A man can no more leap, by one transition, from a state of entire +carelessness into the faith that justifies the soul, than he can make a +world. But he can take the steps that lead to this result. To believe to +the saving of the soul requires _consideration_, _self examination_, a +_knowledge_ of the object of faith, or the truth to be believed, +_earnest looking_, and _prayerful seeking_. But is there no act of the +will in all these? It is said that "the Spirit takes of the things of +Jesus Christ, and shows them unto us." And it is doubtless true, that +the soul cannot get such a view of Christ as encourages him to throw +himself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Saviour, until the Spirit +makes, to the mind's eye, this special exhibition of the "things of +Christ." But when does he do this? Does he come to the sinner when he is +careless and inattentive, and show him the _things of Christ?_ No! it is +only to the inquiring and self-despairing sinner, who is earnestly +groaning out the sentiment in the bitterness of his heart, "Who shall +deliver me from the body of this death?" And is there no voluntary +action in all this? + +But it will perhaps be wearisome to the reader to pursue these +objections farther. I should not have gone so fully into this part of +the subject, but for the fact, that this sentiment of unconditional +regeneration is considered the strong hold of Calvinism. This point +moreover appears to have been but slightly handled by most of the +anti-Calvinistic writers; and therefore I have felt it the more +necessary to attempt an answer to all the most important arguments that +are adduced in opposition to our view of this doctrine. I am far from +thinking I have done the subject justice, and may have cause perhaps +hereafter to acknowledge that some of my minor positions are untenable, +and that some of my expressions need modifying or explaining, although I +have used what care and circumspection my time and circumstances would +permit in reference not only to the doctrine itself, but also in +reference to the forms of expression. And as it respects the leading +doctrines here inculcated, I repose upon them with entire confidence. +However the theory clashes with that of many great and good men, it is +believed to be the only theory that will consistently explain the +practice and preaching of these very men. It is, in my view, the only +theory that will satisfactorily and consistently explain those great and +leading principles by which evangelical Christians expect to convert the +world to Christ. And, if this be true, the sooner the Christian Church +is established on this foundation, the better. We have already seen that +a mixture of error in the essential doctrines leads to various mutations +from extreme to extreme of dangerous heresy. How long before the Church +shall be _rooted and grounded in the truth!_ May He who said, LET LIGHT +BE; AND LIGHT WAS, hasten that glorious day! + +THE END. + + + + +Footnotes + +[1] Many objections have been made, by the reviewers, to my manner of +stating the doctrine of predestination. It is objected, that the great +body of Calvinists believe, no more than the Arminians, that God +"efficiently controls and actuates the human will." On a careful, and I +hope, candid revision of the subject, however, I cannot satisfy myself +that the objection is valid. I am quite sure God must control the will, +or he cannot, as Calvinists teach, secure the proposed end, by the +prescribed means. It is readily granted that Calvinists deny _such a +control_ as destroys the freedom of the will. But it is the object of +the sermon and of the following controversy to show that Calvinistic +predestination is, on any ground of consistency, utterly irreconcilable +with mental freedom. How far this has been done, of course, each will +judge for himself. + +[2] It seems, to the author of the sermon, but little better than +trifling, to object, as some have, to this argument on foreknowledge, +that "God must predetermine his works before he could certainly know +what would take place; and hence, in the order of cause and effect, he +must decree in order to know." It is readily conceded, that, in the +order of nature, the Divine Being could not foreknow that a world would +certainly exist, until he had determined to create it. But was there no +prescience back of this? Did he determine to create a universe, +independent of a view of all the bearings in the case? If so, he created +at random and in ignorance. If not, then a view of all the results +preceded his determination to create; and thus we are led irresistibly +to the doctrine of the sermon, that "God foreknows in order to +predestinate." + +[3] The review of the sermon, in the Christian Spectator, is understood +to be from the pen of Doctor Fitch, professor of divinity in Yale +College. + +[4] See Christian Spectator, Vol. iv, No. 3. + +[5] A part of this sermon has lately been published, in a tract form, +and circulated with the _avowed_ purpose of counteracting the influence +of the sermon "on predestination." + +[6] A man was afflicted with the hydrophobia. When his paroxysms were +coming on he was aware of it, and gave warning to his friends to be on +their guard, that he might not injure them. Suppose, however, he knew of +a sure remedy, but voluntarily neglected to avail himself of it. Would +he not in that case be guilty, not only of all the evils that might +result to others from his malady; but also of self murder? And yet this +man's madness was entirely beyond the direct control of his will. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Calvinistic Controversy, by Wilbur Fisk + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + +***** This file should be named 38232.txt or 38232.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/3/38232/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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