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diff --git a/38232.txt b/38232.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1587aff --- /dev/null +++ b/38232.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7699 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Calvinistic Controversy, by Wilbur Fisk + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Calvinistic Controversy + Embracing a Sermon on Predestination and Election and + Several Numbers, Formally Published in the Christian + Advocate and Journal. + +Author: Wilbur Fisk + +Release Date: December 6, 2011 [EBook #38232] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + +CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY: + +EMBRACING A SERMON + +ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION, + +AND SEVERAL NUMBERS, + +FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL. + +BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D. + +NEW-YORK, + +PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON, + +For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200 +Mulberry-street. + +_J. Collord, Printer_. + +1835. + + + + +"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and +T. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern +District of New-York." + + + + +CONTENTS. + +Advertisement + +Sermon on Predestination and Election + +I. Reply to the Christian Spectator + +II. A proposition to Calvinists + +III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism + +IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in +this country + +V. Same subject continued + +VI. Predestination + +VII. Predestination, continued + +VIII. Moral agency and accountability + +IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued + +X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions +of grace + +XI. Same subject continued + +XII. Objections to gracious ability answered + +XIII. Regeneration + +XIV. Regeneration, continued + +XV. Regeneration, continued + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + +The numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were +written at different times, and in some instances at quite distant +intervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an +apology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the +reader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be +found in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now +presented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the +same reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision, +as it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the +more set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally +thought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware +that the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the +whole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has +been able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If +the public have it, therefore, it must go "with all its imperfections on +its head." Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The +publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The +doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture, +although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found +defective. + +It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election; +but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said +in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian +predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and +regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must +fall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire +question between us and the Calvinists. + +W. Fisk. + +_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835. + + + + +A DISCOURSE + +ON + +PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION. + +According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the +world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love. + +Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, +to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4, +5. + +In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election +are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting +them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational +view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present +discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole +ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the +various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the +most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that +can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form +and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the +circumstances of the present congregation. + +It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the +spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and +Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a +desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to +point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable +influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth +should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject, +nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these +views, we come to our subject, by examining, + +I. Predestination in general; + +II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of +election. + +I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to +bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has +knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future +events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be +used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is +that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity, +respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and +creatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this +kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be +no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to +which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this +subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by +the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was +ordained by him." The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--"God did, from +all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck +defines predestination to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for +his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass." With these +definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the +Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of +predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have +objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings, +so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not +definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose +and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe, +with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the +physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all +the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that +it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human +will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us, +they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon +them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of +their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1] + +The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a +threefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a +plan--and Scripture testimony. + +1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes +contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This, +however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is +self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations; +and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms, +they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct +operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind, +unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an +entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among +men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible +argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_ +predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to +come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every +thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had +not so determined it." "God," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what +he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says, +"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he +has decreed they shall come to pass." But to this idea there are +insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the +Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential +to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make +a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection +of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him, +that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be, +under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd, +then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend +upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend +upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument, +that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought, +and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute +preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be +exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous +conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with +it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine +events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent +on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived, +independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the +effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of +those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will +not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous +to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this +conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us, +therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of +cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent +upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of +his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth +from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords +with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did +predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according +to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages +predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on +foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows +in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to +foreknow.[2] + +But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The +foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because, +inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take +place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed shifting the +argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is +not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing +contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge, +which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at, +that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd. +Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's +foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse +than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would +mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect +according to the foreknowledge of God," would only mean, "that the +decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the +absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, +farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge +cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in +making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the +certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that +knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a +connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will +undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event +take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will +take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain +because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it +certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for +he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert +that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to +that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be +foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that +foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain. +Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not, +according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a +consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain, +no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the +doctrine that _God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_. + +2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. "It +cannot be conceived," it is said, "that God would leave things at +random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place +upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this +argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes +what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been +proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God +has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one +part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without +controlling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible, +and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the +necessity of a change, "on condition that his creatures act in this or +that way?" If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in +order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen +to be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity +and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities +and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his +plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does +not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of +his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no +knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and +extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government +undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of +the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of +the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate +the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The +truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the +perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the +imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords +well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and +through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in +every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long +eternity--and can such a God be disappointed? + +3. "But," say the advocates of this system, "supposing there are +difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which +at once prove the doctrine." If this is true, then indeed we must +submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a +strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one +unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single +passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever +comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in +Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God +hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all +things. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as +proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath +predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the +passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say +of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not _command_ +them, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems +altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however, +that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are +held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God's +predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are. +This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises; +nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from +Scripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of +his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward +off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is +consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for +one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same +principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all +were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, "As for you," says +Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, "ye thought +evil against me, but God meant it for good." Now without stopping here +to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are +ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures +which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God +had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them +subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power "to make the +wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath." But +does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary +to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that +because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer +from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government +decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of +the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and +control the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the +act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power. + +Again it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even +the wicked for the day of evil." That the Lord hath made all things for +his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust, +by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this +passage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted +at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked, +that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the +text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to +explain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil, +and this shall be for his glory. + +But there is another class of passages like the following:--"He doeth +according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants +of the earth." "He worketh all things after the counsel of his will." "I +will do all my pleasure." But these passages establish nothing, in +opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other +passages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleasure to +work _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures +prove that all _God's works_ are in accordance with his own will and +pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of +sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave +the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this +he will do, for "he will do all his pleasure." + +But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour +the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages +which seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the +wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--"And I will harden +Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go." "Now therefore +the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy +prophets." "He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts." "Him, +being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye +have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain." On these +and similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens +their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their +agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does +not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree +of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this +hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men +and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and +tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to +go abroad, "deceiving and being deceived." But how does this prove that +God hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits +the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and +finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of +affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this +hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit. + +As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ +was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or +any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ +by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it. + +Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in +favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against +this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient, +but also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and +formidable objections. + +1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some +acknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the "_efficient_ +cause" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word. +Take for instance the words of Calvin. "I will not scruple to own," he +says, "that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and that +every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass." In accordance with +this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that "God +procures adultery, cursings, and lyings"--"God is the author of that +act, which is evil"--"God, by his working on the hearts of the wicked, +binds them and stirs them to do evil." They deny, however, that God is +the author of sin, because they say, "God necessitates them to the +_act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:" or, that "God does not sin +when he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore +cannot sin." But these are miserable shifts. Has not the _deformity_ of +sin come to pass? Then God has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is +to give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as +much the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God +doubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it +came to pass as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the +direct procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are +nothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as certainly +as it made the world. + +We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that +these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that +they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we +make them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own +doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, "God foreordains +whatsoever comes to pass." For he that, by his will and decree, produces +and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the +author of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the +proper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of +common words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction +therefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_ +Calvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to +the consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge, +what is evidently deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient +cause of sin. + +2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of +course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen +and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the +opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them on this +subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the +Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, "a cursed doctrine"--"the +most God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day"--"one of +the prominent features of the beast"--"the enemy of God"--"the offspring +of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of hell." Others, and the greater +part of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the +ideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily, +because he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence +they exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they +will. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is +in their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to +think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the +Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is +not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. God, +according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his +decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, "every action +and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God." +The will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly +controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling +arrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency +under such a constitution; the very spring of motion to the whole +intellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible +power. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of +Omnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true, +but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the +result of God's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he +chooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon +him. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged +principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is +argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts +freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that +this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are +free--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath +deceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he +knows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in +fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does +not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the +Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man +is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be +free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will +any thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course +the whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences. + +3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays +God's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not to +sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before +them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express +purpose, as he informs us, "that they sin not;" but by his +predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an +opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us, +to secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct +opposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is +God at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his +creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are +false? When or where has God ever taught us, that he has two opposing +wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not, +without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable +Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is "of _one_ mind"--that +his "ways are equal;" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to +relieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the +mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_ +contradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a +palpable absurdity. _God prohibits the sinful act--God ordains and +procures the sinful act--God wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom +he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I +can embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can +believe that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less +than the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at +the same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God's +incomprehensible nature. + +4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added, +that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of +God. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes +laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for +their transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and +expostulates with sinners, saying, "How can I give thee up--my heart is +melted within me, my repentings are kindled together,"--"O Jerusalem! +Jerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,"--and +still he himself "impels the will of men," to all this wickedness--if I +say God does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where +is his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant? +What, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does +this doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out +into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough +to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters +of this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their +eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them +wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical +and practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which +leads to another objection to this doctrine. + +5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in +their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus: +Whatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And +God will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God decrees +is unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is +unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is governed +by the hidden counsel of God." Therefore God will not punish any of his +creatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in +this reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is +true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice. +And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is +prevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support +on the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought, +that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and +that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch +as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have +leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical +necessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the +doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that +the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian +predestination, is the element in which infidelity "lives and moves and +has its being." And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is +it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed +this Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are +incalculable. + +These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this +doctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you +may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is, +doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of +unconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists "the +doctrines of grace." But for unconditional election, predestination +would not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for +predestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence +these have very properly been called "twin doctrines," and must stand or +fall together. Let us pass then to the next proposition. + +II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to +election. + +Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an +election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by +God:--thus Christ was God's elect, for the redemption of the world; and +Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of +whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar +privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this +life:--thus Jacob and his descendants were God's chosen people, to the +enjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his +descendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and +thus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of partition, made by the +former decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down, +the Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the +new covenant, called the "election of grace." This election is +unconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and +many other passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more +particularly in another place. + +There is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is +the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the +Church.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us, +maintain that, "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his +glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and +others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are +predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath +chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of +faith or good works_." Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that +"God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all +that should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his +own goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that +God did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally +and obstinately continue in unbelief." Thus it is seen, from the +statement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character, +and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they +are foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates +directly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an +absolute act of sovereignty--God elects them for no other reason or +condition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency +or responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is +entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our +views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on +the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to +receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected, +because he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other +differences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself, +requires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be +also--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and +infallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands +intimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a +chain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we +acknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We +assert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is +unconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state +and answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and +finally, urge some objections against unconditional election and +reprobation. + +1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life, +is drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God +are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of +election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the +Divine prescience. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through +sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood +of Jesus Christ." "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be +conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us +decisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that +this election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on +the ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore, +that men are predestinated to eternal life, "without any foresight of +faith or good works," must be false. + +2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can +only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free +moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must +believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and +obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and +criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of +free agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it +has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its +responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will. +And if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter +impossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of God, +imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible, +in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral +agent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make +man a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be +controlled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so +controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining +principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being +established, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election +necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and +controlling the will. But this would be to counteract God's own work, +and to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such +irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And +since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures, +it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this +election is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one +overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of +salvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election. + +3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and +the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a +conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted "to take heed +lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in +departing from the living God?" "lest a promise being left of entering +into rest, any should come short?" lest _they_ should "also be cut off?" +Why should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he +should be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's +being lost. If not, then all these passages are not only without +meaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours +held out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear +is. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of +the elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be +cautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and +no promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand +fast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates +against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates +a very ungracious work for the "Spirit of grace" to be engaged in, +clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of +reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean? +Will it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions +are all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree +of election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is +fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election +is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and that "God's +decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills +necessarily comes to pass," and is therefore sure, "because he has +decreed it." The moment, therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes +sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a +falsehood, or that God's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I +presume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or +frustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the +elect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and +warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and +deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who +undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious +tales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is giving out these +intimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal, +unchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were +planned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a +God of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure," +_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail +of the grace of God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion +therefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of +election to eternal life, on conditions; "He that believeth: shall be +saved." + +4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces +much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he +feel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy, +or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is +founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit +of God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in +order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion +of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said, +that it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the +decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore, +it is conditional. + +5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have +time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, "For many are called, +but few are chosen." This passage, with the parable of the wedding that +precedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the +call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and +fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly +prepared. John xv, 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would love +you, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of +the world, therefore the world hateth you." This passage teaches that +Christ's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them +out of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when +they became of a different character from the world; for then it was, +and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2 +Thess. ii, 13, "Because God hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to +salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the +truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election +_unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification +and faith unto salvation. + +From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine +attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an +unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election. + +In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of +unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as +they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their +system. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is +proposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse, +however, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual +texts, but of classes of texts. + +1. The first class of passages that we will now examine, which are +supposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that +speak of a predestination _unto_ holiness. Our text is one of the +strongest instances of this kind, "He hath chosen us from the foundation +of the world, that we should be holy--having predestinated us unto the +adoption of sons," &c. See also Rom. viii, 29, "For whom he did +foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his +Son," and "whom he did predestinate--he called--justified--and +sanctified." The argument upon these and similar passages is, that the +decree of predestination could not be founded on their faith or +holiness; because they were predestinated to _become_ holy--the decree +of predestination had their holiness for its object and end. But if +these passages had an allusion to a personal election to eternal life, +they would not prove unconditional election, "because," to use the +language of another, "it would admit of being questioned, whether the +choosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here mentioned, +was a choice of certain persons _as men merely_, or as _believing_ men, +which is certainly the most rational." This exposition must necessarily +be given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were the +subjects of predestination, were first _foreknown_: foreknown, not +merely as existing, for in this sense _all_ were foreknown, but +foreknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why _they_ +should be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as believers +in Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of God, they +were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and +glory hereafter. And according to the same Divine plan, the order of +this work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. Glorification. And this +interpretation, which so obviously upon the face of it is the meaning of +the passage from Romans, would also be a good meaning to the passage in +Ephesians, if that passage should be understood in reference to personal +election. But I do not so understand it; and I think any unprejudiced +reader, by looking at the context, and especially from the 9th to the +11th verses inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter, +will perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of +God, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the Gentiles +as well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of grace, on equal +terms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of partition was to be broken +down between Jew and Gentile; and this was the mystery which was +concealed for ages, not being understood even by the Jews themselves, +but then by the Gospel was brought to light. According to this plan, the +Ephesians and all other Gentiles were chosen or elected to these +Christian privileges, the very design and purpose of which were to make +them holy; and in the improvement of which, according to the prescribed +conditions of faith in Christ, and repentance toward God, they should +become his adopted children. + +This fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gracious +covenant, is the election most spoken of in the New Testament.--And the +reason why it was so often introduced, especially in the writings of +Paul, who was the chief apostle to the Gentiles, was, because the Jews +so uniformly and earnestly opposed this feature of Christianity. They +could not be reconciled to the idea, that the peculiar and distinctive +character of their theocracy and ecclesiastical policy should be so +changed, or that the dealings of God with the world should be explained +in such a manner as to give _them_ no superior claims, in the privileges +of the Divine covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to +be God's elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates. +The apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose +these notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a +barrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus the +designs of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also because +these Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the grace of God. +They implied, that the original design of God in favouring the Jews, was +founded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, but upon some goodness in +them or their fathers. Hence they not only limited the blessings of the +Gospel, but they also corrupted its gracious character, and thereby fed +their own Pharisaic pride, and dishonoured God. This will open the way +for explaining many other scriptures which the Calvinists press into +their service. + +2. Especially will it assist in explaining those passages which speak of +election as depending solely on the sovereign will of God. The strongest +of these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. This +portion of revelation is the strong hold, as is supposed, of Calvinism. +Whereas, we humbly conceive that _there is not one word_ in the whole +chapter, of unconditional and personal election to eternal life. It is +only necessary to read that epistle carefully, to see that the apostle +is combatting that exclusive and Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already +alluded to, and is proving in a forcible strain of argumentation, from +reason and Scripture, that the foundation of the plan of salvation for +sinners, was the goodness and unmerited love of God--that all, both Jews +and Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to +God--all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, be +saved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, that +God's favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness in them, +but of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his covenant of +favour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which embraced the +Gentiles, was "not of works, lest any man should boast," "not of him +that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." +The apostle shows them, too, that the covenant made with Abraham was not +for circumcision, nor for the works of the law, so far as it affected +him or his posterity, because it was made while Abraham was in +uncircumcision, and on the condition of faith. He argues farther, that +this election of the Jews to the enjoyment of these national and +ecclesiastical privileges, was not because they were children of +Abraham, for Ishmael was a child of Abraham, and yet he and his +posterity were rejected; nor yet because they were the children of +Abraham through Isaac, because Esau and his posterity were reprobated +from these national privileges, while Jacob and his posterity were the +chosen seed--not chosen to eternal life, because many of them perished +in sin and unbelief, but to the peculiar privileges of God's covenant +people. And all this because it was the good pleasure of his will. And +as a sovereign, he had the same right to elect the Gentiles to the +enjoyment of the covenant of mercy, and upon the same conditions of +faith. The apostle concludes this reasoning by an argument which cuts +off entirely the idea of unconditional personal election and +reprobation. He informs us, that the reason why the unbelieving Jews did +not attain to personal righteousness, was "because they sought it not by +faith, but as it were by the works of the law;" and the Gentiles +attained to personal righteousness, because they sought it by faith. +Hence, those that were not his people, became his people, and those that +were not beloved, became beloved--and these, "not of the Jews only, but +also of the Gentiles." Whereas, if the doctrine we oppose be true, the +elect were _always_ his people, and _always_ beloved, and that because +he pleased to have it so. That portion of Scripture, therefore, on which +Calvinism leans for its greatest support, not only affords it no aid, +but actually teaches a different doctrine. There is indeed something of +mystery hanging over the providence of God, in bestowing peculiar +advantages on some, and withholding them from others. But on this +subject much light is cast from various considerations which we have not +time to enlarge upon; but especially from that wholesome and consistent +Scripture doctrine, that "it is required of a man according to what he +hath, and not according to what he hath not." This removes at once all +complaint of Jew and Gentile, and authorizes the reply, so often +misapplied, "Who art thou that repliest against God?" As a sovereign, +God has a right to make his creatures differ in these things, so long as +he requires only as he gives. But this differs as widely from the +Calvinistic idea of sovereignty, as _justice_ from _injustice_, as +_equity_ from _iniquity_. In fact, God no where in the Scripture, places +the election of individuals to eternal life, solely on the ground of his +sovereignty, but uniformly on the ground of their complying with the +conditions of the covenant of grace. Hence his people are a _peculiar +people_--his sheep _hear his voice and follow him_--they are _chosen out +of the world_--they are _in Christ_, not by an eternal decree of +election, but _by faith_--for "if any man be _in Christ_, he is a _new +creature_"--and of course, he is not _in him_, until he is a "new +creature"--then, and not before, they become his, and he seals them as +such, "In whom, _after that ye believed_, ye were sealed with the Holy +Spirit of promise." But if they were elected from eternity, they would +be his when they did not _hear his voice_, and were not _new creatures_. + +3. From what has been said, we can easily answer a third class of +scriptures which the Calvinists dwell upon to support their system +--viz, those which declare salvation to be of _grace_ and not of +_works_. Of these there is evidently a large catalogue of very express +and unequivocal passages. Take two or three for an example of the whole, +"Even so then, at the present time, there is a remnant, according to the +election of grace, and if it be by grace then it is no more of works, +otherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, then it is no +more grace, otherwise work is no more work." "By grace ye are saved." +"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of his children, &c, to the +praise of the glory of his grace." "Not by works of righteousness which +we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of +regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Now we profess to believe +these scriptures as unqualifiedly and as cordially as the Calvinists; +and we think them perfectly in accordance with our views of election. +For we believe, as has been already stated, that God's plan for saving +sinners originated entirely in his love to his undeserving creatures. +There was nothing in all the character and circumstances of the fallen +family, except their sin and deserved misery, that could claim the +interposition of God's saving power. The way of executing his gracious +plan, and rendering it available in any case, he of course, as a +sovereign, reserved to himself. And if he saw that a conditional +election was best suited to the principles of his government, and the +responsibility of man, shall it be said, this cannot be, for it destroys +the idea of grace? _Cannot_ a conditional election be of grace? Let the +intelligent and candid answer. Even many of the Calvinists acknowledge +that _salvation_ is conditional, and yet it is of grace; for "by grace +ye are saved." Now if salvation is conditional and yet of grace, why not +election? Let Calvinists answer this question. + +But that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident, I +think, from the following considerations. 1. It was pure unmerited love +that moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The Gospel plan, +therefore, with all its _provisions_ and _conditions_, is of grace. Not +a step in that whole system, but rests in grace, is presented by grace, +and is executed through grace. 3. Even the power of the will to choose +life, and the conditions of life, is a _gracious power_. A fallen man, +without grace, could no more choose to submit to God than a fallen +angel. Herein we differ widely from the Calvinists. They tell us man has +a _natural_ power to choose life. If so, he has power to get to heaven +without grace! We say, on the contrary, that man is utterly unable to +choose the way to heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace +of God. It is grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and +strengthens him to seek after and obtain salvation, for "without Christ +we _can do nothing_." Let the candid judge between us, then, and decide +which system most robs our gracious Redeemer of his glory, that which +gives man a _native_ and _inherent_ power to get to heaven of himself, +or that which attributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the sinner +repents and believes, there is no merit in these acts to procure +forgiveness and regeneration, and therefore, though he is _now_, and _on +these conditions_, elected, and made an heir of salvation, yet it is for +Christ's sake, and "not for works of righteousness which he has done." +Thus we "bring forth the top stone with shouting, crying _grace_, +_grace_, unto it." Having gone over and examined the arguments in favour +of unconditional election, we come to the last part of our subject; +which was to urge some objections against this doctrine. + +1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, necessarily +implies the unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who hold +to the former, seem to deny the latter; for they represent God as +reprobating sinners, in view of their sins. When all were sinners, they +say God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, they say the decree +of damnation against the reprobates is just, because it is against +_sinners_. But this explanation is virtually giving up the system, +inasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is +supported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on +foreknowledge; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and +then predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case then, in which +the argument for Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own +supporters. But again if God must fix by his decree all parts of his +plan, in order to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny +of the reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do +this, then the Calvinistic argument in favour of predestination, drawn +from the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more: this explanation +of the decree of reprobation destroys all the strongest Scripture +arguments which the Calvinists urge in favour of unconditional election. +The passages, for instance, in the ninth of Romans, which are so often +quoted in favour of Calvinian election, are connected with others, +equally strong, in favour of unconditional reprobation. When it is said, +"He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy," it is said also, "Whom +he will he hardeneth." He that "makes one vessel unto honour, maketh +another unto dishonour." He that says, "Jacob have I loved," says also +in the same manner, "Esau have I hated." Now if these relate to personal +election to eternal life, they relate also to personal reprobation to +eternal death. But if there is any explanation, by which these are +showed not to prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same +principle of explanation will, and _must_ show, that they do not prove +Calvinistic election. From henceforth, therefore, let all those +Calvinists who profess not to believe in unconditional reprobation, +cease to urge, in favour of their system, any arguments drawn from the +foreknowledge of God, or the necessity of a Divine plan, or from those +scriptures that are most commonly quoted in favour of their doctrine. +But when they do this, their system must necessarily fall; for all its +main pillars will be removed. But I have not done with this objection +yet. Whoever maintains that "God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to +pass," must also hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to +pass, that some are lost? Then this was ordained. Was sin necessary, as +a pretence to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these and other +views of the subject, Calvin was led to say, that "election could not +stand without reprobation," and that it was "quite silly and childish" +to attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the +unconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, _must_, to +be consistent with themselves, take into their creed, the "horrible +decree" of reprobation.--They must believe that in the ages of eternity +God determined to create men and angels for the express purpose to damn +them eternally! That he determined to introduce sin, and influence men +to commit sin, and harden them in it, that they might be fit subjects of +his wrath! That for doing as they were impelled to do, by the +irresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie down for ever, under the +scalding phials of his vengeance in the pit of hell! To state this +doctrine in its true character, is enough to chill one's blood--and we +are drawn by all that is rational within us, to turn away from such a +God with horror, as from the presence of an Almighty Tyrant. + +2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free grace +and the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the reprobates, there +is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very existence, connected +as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite curse. The +temporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere offers that are held +out to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if +they can be termed grace at all, must be called _damning grace_. For all +this is only fattening them for the slaughter, and fitting them to +suffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments +that await them. Hence Calvin's sentiment, that "God calls to the +reprobates, that they may be more deaf--kindles a light, that they may +be more blind--brings his doctrine to them, that they may be more +ignorant--and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be healed," +is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this system. Surely, +then, no one will pretend, that, according to this doctrine, there is +any grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will show, +that there is little or none for the elect. It is said, that God, out of +his mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him +thereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there is nothing in +the creature to move him thereto, how can it be called _mercy_ or +_compassion?_ He did not determine to elect them because they were +miserable, but because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the +exciting cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have +elected them all. Is such a decree of election founded in love to the +suffering object? No: _it is the result of the most absolute and +omnipotent selfishness conceivable_. It is the exhibition of a character +that sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Almighty power, +_to create, to damn, and to save_. + +Some indeed pretend that, at any rate, _salvation_ is of grace, if +election is not, because God saves _miserable_, _perishing_ sinners. But +who made them miserable perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of +God's decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a +constitution which necessarily and unavoidably involves them in sin and +suffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign honour of saving +them? Surely the _tenderest_ mercies of this system are cruel--its +brightest parts are dark--its boasted mercy hardly comes up to sheer +justice, even to the elect; since they only receive back what God had +deprived them of, and for the want of which they had suffered perhaps +for years; and to obtain which, they could do nothing even as a +condition, until God by his sovereign power bestowed it upon them. And +as for the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably to them, a savour of +death unto death. To them Christ came, that they might have death, and +that they might have it more abundantly. Thus, turn this system as you +will, it sweeps away the mercy and goodness of God, destroys the grace +of the Gospel, and in most cases, transforms even the invitations and +promises into scalding messages of aggravated wrath. + +3. The doctrine we oppose makes God partial and a respecter of persons; +contrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. For it +represents God as determining to save some and damn others, without +reference to their character, all being precisely in the same state. To +deny this, is to acknowledge that the decree of election and reprobation +had respect to character, which is to give up the doctrine. Some indeed +pretend, that the decree of election was unconditional, but not the +decree of reprobation. But this is impossible; for there could be no +decree of election, only in view of the whole number from which the +choice was to be made; and the very determination to select such a +number, and those only, implied the exclusion of all the rest. If it be +said, as the Sublapsarians contend, that the decree of election did not +come in until all were fallen, or viewed in the mind of God as fallen; +and therefore since all might have been justly damned, there was no +injustice to those who were left, though some of the guilty were taken +and saved; we reply, That even this would not wholly remove the +objection of partiality. But we need not dwell here, because we have a +shorter and more decisive way to dispose of this argument. The truth is, +it does not cover the whole ground of our objection. Had God nothing to +do with man until his prescient eye beheld the whole race in a ruined +state? How came man in this state? He was plunged there by the sin of +his federal head. But how came _he_ to sin? "Adam sinned," says Calvin, +"because God so ordained." And so every one must say, that believes God +foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. Taking all the links together, +they stand thus:--God decreed to create intelligent beings--he decreed +that they should all become sinners and children of wrath--and it was +so. He then decreed that part of those whom he had constituted heirs of +wrath, should be taken, and washed, and saved, and the others left to +perish; and then we are told there is no unjust partiality in God, since +they all deserve to be damned! What a singular evasion is this! God +wishes to damn a certain portion of his creatures, and save the rest; +but he cannot do this without subjecting himself to the charge of +partiality. To avoid this, he plunges them all into sin and ruin, and +forthwith he declares them all children of wrath, and heirs of hell. But +in the plenitude of his grace, he snatches some from the pit of ruin, +and leaves the rest in remediless wo! Is such a supposition worthy of +our righteous God?--Does it accord either with his justice or wisdom? +Reason, with half an eye, can see through the flimsy veil, and discover +the weakness of the device. I know an attempt has been often made to +charge these consequences upon our system, as well as upon the +Calvinistic doctrine. For if it is acknowledged that man is born +depraved, and this depravity is damning in its nature, does it not +follow, it is asked, that all deserve to perish? And therefore God may +elect some and justly pass by the rest. I answer--Although all moral +depravity, derived or contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by +virtue of the atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity +are counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until by a voluntary +rejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his nature +the object of his own choice.--Hence, although abstractly considered, +this depravity is destructive to the possessors, yet through the grace +of the Gospel, _all_ are born free from condemnation. So the Apostle +Paul, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to +condemnation, so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon +all men, unto justification of life." In accordance with these views +also, the ground of condemnation, according to the Scriptures, is not +our native depravity; but the sinner is condemned for _rejecting +Christ_,--for _refusing_ to occupy upon the _talents given_,--for +_rejecting light_,--for _quenching the Spirit_,--for _unbelief_. Here +then is the difference on this point between the Calvinists and us. They +hold that God, by his decree, plunged Adam and all his race into the pit +of sin, from which none of them had the means of escape; but by an +omnipotent act of partial grace, he delivers a part, and the remainder +are left unavoidably to perish. We, on the contrary, believe that by +Adam's unnecessitated sin he, and in him all his posterity, became +obnoxious to the curse of the Divine law. As the first man sinned +personally and actively, he was personally condemned; but as his +posterity had no agency or personal existence, they could only have +perished seminally in him. By the promise of a Saviour however, our +federal head was restored to the possibility of obtaining salvation, +through faith in the Redeemer. And in this restoration, _all_ the +seminal generations of men were included. Their possible and prospective +existence was restored; and their personal and active existence secured. +And with this also, the possibility of salvation was secured to all. To +such as never come to a personally responsible age, this salvation was +secured unconditionally by Christ; to _all_ those who arrived to the age +of accountability, salvation was made possible, on equal and impartial +conditions. Thus, while on our principle, there is not the slightest +ground for a charge of partiality; on the Calvinistic principle, the +charge seems to lie with all its weight. It makes God, in the worst +sense of the terms, _partial, and a respecter of persons_. + +4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express and +repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. It +will surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that Christ +"tasted death for every man"--that he "gave himself a ransom for +all"--that he "died for all"--that he became "a propitiation for the +sins of the whole world"--because, these are so many express Scripture +propositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. And while these +stand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional election must fall, +for the two doctrines are incompatible. That particular election and +partial redemption must stand or fall together, has been acknowledged, +and is still maintained by most Calvinists; and therefore they have +endeavoured to explain away those passages, which so clearly declare +that "Christ died for all." But in this work they have found so many +difficulties, that others, and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy +in New-England, have acknowledged a general redemption, and have +undertaken to reconcile with it the doctrine of particular election and +reprobation. But this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To +say nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the +reprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation +more aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let +these very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its object +was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be +saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be +saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of +unconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement +has only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made +only for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn +of this dilemma they please; either will destroy their doctrine. For as +it is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and Gospel provisions, +_sufficient_ to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded +from these blessings, so it is idle to talk about a redemption for +_all_, which includes provisions sufficient only to save the _elect_. +Not even the fiction of a _natural ability_ in all men to serve God and +get to heaven, will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument, +that the reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without +grace, and in spite of God's decree, still, as this is called a +_natural_ ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It +is equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be +universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if they +would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravity +which renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For this +is the same as to say, that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal +his patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive +weakness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which +the medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this it is no +medicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for +man's extreme depravity, it is no provision for him. If it does not give +a gracious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has +accomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate. Since, therefore, +according to Calvinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate neither +natural nor moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to +be saved, it follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But +as this is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this +conclusion must be false. + +5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several +objections to this doctrine:--Such as that it takes away all motives to +repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, "If I am to be +saved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I must be, +do what I can;"--it leads to the idea of infant damnation--it weakens +the zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and benevolence--it +destroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to +prevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely +for the glory of God; and sin was ordained for the purpose of giving God +an opportunity of glorifying himself in punishing it. These and others +might be dwelt upon with effect; but passing them all, I hasten to the +conclusion of my arguments, by urging only one more objection to the +system I am opposing. + +6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates themselves +seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of its features, +and are constantly changing their manner of stating and defending their +system. A little attention to the history of the controversy between +predestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and force of +this objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps out of +sight some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much against +its advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the +exception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable upon +the system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early +defenders of unconditional election came out boldly and fearlessly with +their doctrine. If modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need +no other refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of +Calvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various forms of +explanation and modes of proof, and also to various modifications of the +system itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, "Agreement of Brethren," +&c, says:--"The question, as to the object of the decrees, has gone out +among our Calvinistic brethren into endless digladiations and +irreconcilable divisions," and then goes on to mention nine of these +"irreconcilable divisions" that prevailed at his day. At the present day +these school subtleties are not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a +more popular cast, and such as are suited to cover up the offensive +features of the system, are now introduced. The modern defence of this +doctrine consists chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous +technicalities which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common +language another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now +a common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their +pastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to some, at +least, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves to spread the +sentiment. + +This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more +reluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. To +represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren +of insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth would +induce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an excessive but +honest zeal for their system, or whether it is supposed the cause is so +important, and at the same time so difficult to be sustained, that the +end will justify what, in other cases, would be judged questionable +policy, and hardly reconcilable with the spirit of a guileless +Christianity, is certainly not for me to decide. With respect to their +motives, they will stand or fall by the judgment of Him that trieth the +reins. But the course, at any rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one +instance:--All sinners, we are told, may come to Christ _if they will;_ +and therefore they are criminal if they do not.--Now this mode of speech +corresponds very well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not +been specially instructed in the dialect of this theology, would +understand that this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics, +implied an inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And +yet this is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a +will to come to Christ, we _may_, yet by a _Divine constitution_ it is +as much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of +Jehovah,--Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; they +have a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, and another +thing in popular language. It never occurs to the generality of mankind, +when they are told they may do thus and thus, _if they will_, that there +is a secret omnipotent influence impelling and controlling the will. +They suppose these expressions, therefore, mean that, independent of all +irresistible foreign influences, they have, within themselves, the power +to choose or not to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker +differs as much from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative. + +In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation that +is given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is +kept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern +Calvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too; but it +is taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned Calvinism, in +its primitive plain dress, we are told _these are old authors;_ we do +not believe with them: "if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we +would not have been partakers with them in _their errors_," and yet +"they are witnesses unto themselves, that they _are the children_ of +them" who taught these errors. They recommend their writings, they +garnish their sepulchres, they teach their catechisms to the rising +generation; they say, even in their Church articles of faith, "We +believe in the doctrines of grace, as held and taught by the _fathers_ +and _reformers_ in the Church,"--and especially do they hold to that +root and foundation of the whole system, "God hath, from all eternity, +foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." + +Since I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of this +objection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of this +same ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of +Scripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different +constructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the +subscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of faith +have been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous +candidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for +professorships, in their theological institutions, are required to +subscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected, +doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, though +in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How would +honest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the same +sentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches that bear his +name! He would not only call them "silly and childish," but he would, +doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenuousness +and cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shunning and +smoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of their +system. How would he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing +their system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same +foundation of predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of +them what they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates, +may come to Christ and be saved?--why they pretended to hold to +election, and not to reprobation?--how they could reconcile general +redemption with particular election?--and especially would he frown +indignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in +what has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New +-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any taint +or sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists, +exclusively and entirely, in _moral exercise!_ But probably he would get +little satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear his name. +They would tell him that the old forms of this system were so repulsive, +the people would not receive them; and that, being hard pressed by their +antagonists, they had thrown up these new redoubts, and assumed these +new positions, not only to conceal their doctrine, but if possible to +defend it. And as he could get little satisfaction of _them_, he would +get less from us.--Could we meet the venerable reformer, we would thank +him for his successful zeal and labour in the Protestant cause; but we +would expostulate with him for giving sanction and currency to his +"horrible decree." We would tell him he had committed to his followers a +system so abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by +Scripture, that they had been _driven_ into all these changes in hope of +finding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we +considered this as a striking and convincing argument against the +doctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; that +these changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms that the +doctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away. + +But I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration, +Christian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. Whatever +you may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I think, of +escaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments here defended, +will of course approve; and those who believe in predestination will of +course be reconciled to the preaching because God hath decreed it. It +hath come to pass that I have preached as I have, and therefore it is a +part of the Divine plan. It hath come pass that Arminianism exists, and +therefore this is a part of the Divine plan. We beg our brethren who +differ from us, not to fight against God's plan if they say it is right +for us to fight against it, because this also is decreed--I answer, This +only confirms our objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity +against himself. From all such inconsistencies, _may the God of truth +deliver us_. Amen. + + + + +NUMBER I. + +REPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.[3] + +This sermon had been before the public almost two years before it +received any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of the +advocates of predestination. After the third edition was announced, +there were several passing acrimonious censures in some of the +Calvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of the question +at issue between us and the predestinarians. At length the Rev. Mr. +Tyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a sermon which was +evidently written in reference to the sermon on predestination. This +sermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but its general positions were +so indefinite, and its modes of illustration so vague, it seemed hardly +calculated to narrow the field of controversy or hasten a decision of +the question at issue. For example: Mr. T. defines election to be "the +eternal purpose of God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he +wisely can, and no others." With such a proposition there certainly can +be no controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point +in dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There +are two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all controversy, +and especially religious controversy, ought to be carefully guarded +against. The one is an attempt to make the subjects of difference more +numerous and consequential than they are in truth; and the other is an +attempt to cover up real differences under indefinite propositions and +ambiguous terms. Both these errors may be the result of honest motives: +the former may arise from a jealous regard to the truth, and the latter +from a love of peace. Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the +one promote the cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent +peace. Indeed, bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an +additional impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union +produces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the +Church, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and injurious; +yet, as an individual, I never can sign a _union creed_ of doubtful +terms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my while to +contend about such terms and articles. I should fear the searching +interrogatory of Him who questioned Job: "Who is this that darkeneth +counsel by words without knowledge?" In the present controversy there is +danger of this ambiguity also from a less commendable principle than a +love of peace, viz. an adherence to old symbols of faith to avoid the +imputation of a change; while, at the same time, to escape the force of +unanswerable argument, vague propositions, ambiguous definitions, and +equivocal terms are made the bulwark of defence. This principle was +alluded to in the sermon on predestination; and although it has given +great offence to some of the Calvinists, and is represented by the +author of the review which we are about to notice as being "utterly +unworthy of the attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after +truth;" yet it seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks +himself incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem _utterly unworthy_ +of an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon +systems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the arguments +urged against them, show the strength of the one and the weakness of the +other. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer Mr. Tyler's sermon, +my strictures would consist chiefly in pointing out its indefiniteness +and incongruity. But this, without convincing, might give offence. And +although I see no way of continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists +now manage it, without alluding to this course of the advocates of +predestination, yet I am happy to say there is less of it in the +"review" before us than is common in modern treatises on that subject. +Though it is a laboured article of about forty-three pages, yet it is +generally in a manly style, and sustained by a train of close and +skilful argumentation. It would afford me great pleasure to be able to +equal the reviewer's ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply +the serenity of his spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the +present case, to dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I +understand the reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the +"rugged," at least the decided "aspect of controversy" with my sermon, +he is nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more +especially to his views of predestination. On election there is +evidently a greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a +man discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that +the peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At any +rate, as the settling of the former question will have a very strong +bearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this article to +predestination. I am not certain that I understand the reviewer; but his +candour authorizes me to believe that he will explain himself frankly, +and correct me if I misunderstand him. If we are agreed on this point we +ought to know it, and give over the controversy. If we are not, let us +know the precise ground of difference. And in either case we shall be +the better prepared to pursue the question of election. + +The question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there between +the decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of man? The +Arminian views on this question, as I understand them, are these: God, +as a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right to determine on +such a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely wise and good, he +would of course choose, in the contemplation of all possible systems, to +create such a one as, all things considered, would bring the most glory +to himself, and the greatest good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he +decided that such a system would be a _moral government_, consisting of +himself, as the supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent +subjects, having full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the +mandates of their Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable +incidents of such a government would be the possible existence of moral +evil; and, in glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that +moral evil would _certainly_ exist, involving innumerable multitudes in +its ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not +decree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a +decree of his: for although he foresaw that _if_ he made such free +agents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would certainly +sin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this _certainty_, to make these +agents and govern them as proposed. He determined, however, that they +should be under no necessity of sinning, either by his decree, or by the +circumstances in which they should be placed; but if they sinned, it +should be their own free choice. As he foresaw they would sin, he also +determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as +sinners, and arranged, in the counsels of his own infinite mind, the +extended concatenation of causes and effects, so as to make the "wrath +of man praise him," and deduce the greatest possible good from the best +possible system. Such, it is believed, is Arminianism--such is +Methodism--such is the doctrine of the sermon--and such are the dictates +of the Bible and of sound philosophy. + +The next question is, What is the doctrine of the reviewer? He shall +speak for himself. On page 612, of the review, he asks the question, +"But in what sense are we to understand the position that he (God) +purposes the existence of sin?" He proceeds to answer: "Not necessarily, +in the sense of his preferring its existence in his kingdom to its +non-existence, &c. In affirming the doctrine of predestination we affirm +no more necessarily than that God, with the knowledge that these beings +would sin in despite of the best measures of providence and government +he could take, purposed to create them and pursue those measures, not +for the sake of their sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it +was possible to secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose +with respect to the existence of sin, a purpose to permit its existence, +rather than to have no moral system."--Again, page 613: "Nothing more +(touching free agency) is implied in the purpose spoken of than a +CERTAINTY _foreseen_ of God, that if he creates and upholds that being, +and pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at +a given time, fully choose in a given way." In page 612 he says, "God +confers on them (mankind) in their creation the powers of free agency, +and he uses _no influence_ in his providence or government to procure +their sin." Page 614, "He (God) most obviously has no will opposed to +his law, though with a foresight of their conduct he should purpose to +permit their sin, rather than dispense with the existence of a moral +kingdom." But it is useless to multiply quotations. Suffice it to say +that the reviewer's whole ground of defence against the arguments of the +sermon, on the question of predestination, is solely this Arminian +explanation of the doctrine of predestination. He acknowledges, nay +boldly asserts, in a strain "of rugged controversy" with his brethren +who may differ from this view of the subject, that there is no other +explanation by which the arguments of the sermon can be avoided--that +is, as I understand it, the only way to avoid the arguments against the +doctrine of Calvinian predestination is to give it up, and assume the +Arminian sentiment on this subject. If the reviewer does not mean this, +he will of course explain himself fully, and point out the precise +difference between his views and those of the Arminians. If, on this +subject, the reviewer is an Arminian, he has too much candor, I trust, +not to acknowledge it frankly, and too much moral courage to be afraid +of the name. If he is not, the cause of truth and his own consistency of +character imperiously demand an explanation. Until this point, +therefore, is decided, farther arguments on the merits of the question +in which we are supposed to be at issue, are useless. + +I am not, however, quite ready to dismiss the review. I stated at the +commencement it was difficult to pursue this controversy without +alluding to the manner in which it had been conducted on the part of our +Calvinistic brethren; but that there was less ground for objection in +this article in the Spectator than in most others. There are some things +in this article, however, that I cannot justify. I will state them +frankly, though I trust in Christian friendship. I cannot approve of the +reviewer's use of terms: though, to my understanding, he has evidently +given the doctrine of predestination not merely a new _dress_, but a new +_character_, yet he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with +only a new method of explanation; and seriously and repeatedly complains +of the author of the sermon for "confounding the _fact_ of God's +foreordaining the voluntary actions of men with this or any other +_solution_ of that fact or theory as to the _mode_ in which it comes to +pass." And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in the +_fact_ of predestination, in the old Calvinistic sense, that in stating +his sentiments on this subject he uses the same forms of expression +which Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as distant from his +as the two poles from each other. He tells us, for instance, that "God +determined that the events which take place should take place in the +very manner in which they do, and for the very ends." Now if the writer +mean what the words naturally imply, then he believes that, in the case +of a finally impenitent sinner, God predetermined that all his sins +_should_ take place in the manner they did, and for the very end that he +might be damned! Again he tells us, "God, in his eternal purpose, has +predetermined all events." And, quoting from the Assembly's Catechism, +"God, from all eternity, did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever +comes to pass," he tells us that this expresses essentially the views +entertained by the orthodox Congregationalists of New-England, among +whom, I suppose of course, he would include himself. Now, after what I +have said of the reviewer's Arminianism, I doubt not but some of my +readers will be startled at these quotations, and be ready to accuse me +of great credulity in the judgment I have formed of the writer's +sentiments. I shall exculpate myself, however, by saying, in the first +place, that if there is any contradiction in the writer's sentiments or +language, it is not my fault, but his; and if I should attempt to +reconcile them, perhaps the reviewer would not thank me for my +officiousness. Beside, after what has been said, I feel safer in +understanding the reviewer in an _Arminian sense_, because he and some +others take it very ill of me that I have represented them as +Calvinists. But, in fairness to the reviewer, it is presumed that he +will not consider himself justly chargeable with contradiction. He has +used these old terms, it is true, and thus has _subscribed_ to the +Calvinistic creed as positively as the staunchest Calvinist; but then, +let it be understood, he has _explained_ that creed, and defined the +terms, and protests against being held responsible for any other +construction than his own. Hence by God's predetermining that sin +_should_ take place, in the very manner, and for the very ends it +does--by God's foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass--he only means +that God foresaw that sin would certainly take place, and predetermined +that he would not hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral +agents, or by throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their +free agency. In short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably +incident to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely +could to prevent it! This is _foreordaining sin!!_ This is +_predetermining_ that it _should be!!!_ I cannot but express my _deepest +regret_ that a gentleman of the reviewer's standing and learning should +lend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language--to +such a confusion of tongues. We do not complain of the doctrine +contained in the _explanation;_ but we protest, in the name of all that +is pure in language, in the name of all that is important in the +sentiments conveyed by language, against such an abuse of terms. Alas +for us! When will the watchmen see eye to eye! when will the Church be +at peace! while our spiritual guides, our doctors in divinity, pursue +this course? By what authority will the reviewer support this +definition? Do the words _predestinate_, or _foreordain_, or _decree_ +mean, in common language, or even in their radical and critical +definition, nothing more than _to permit--not absolutely to hinder--to +submit to as an unavoidable but offensive evil?_ The reviewer certainly +will not pretend this. Much less do they mean this when used in a +magisterial or authoritative sense, to express the mind and will of a +superior or governor toward an inferior or a subject.--What is the +_decree_ of a king? What is the _ordinance_ of a senate? What is the +official determination of a legislative body? Let common sense and +common usage answer the question. Not a man probably can be found, from +the philosopher to the peasant, who would say these words would bear the +explanation of the reviewer. Yet it is in this official and +authoritative sense that theologians, and our reviewer among them, use +these terms. The Assembly's Catechism, as quoted by himself, says, "God, +from all eternity, _did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own +will, freely and unchangeably ordain_," &c. Now it would be a gross +insult to common sense to say of such language as this, in the mouth of +an earthly potentate, that the sovereign meant by this nothing more than +that he permitted the existence of certain unavoidable, and in +themselves, highly offensive evils in his kingdom, because he could not +remove them without embarrassing the essential operations of his +government. There is not, probably, a clearer case in the whole range of +philology. + +But the use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the +reviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are used by +most Calvinistic authors in a different sense.--Why, then, should the +reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of +his faith? Different persons might give different answers to such a +question. For one, I would prefer he should answer it himself. + +I cannot approve of the reviewer's censures upon my manner of treating +the doctrine of predestination. He accuses me of confounding the +_doctrine_ itself, with _modes_ of explanation. He says they are +perfectly distinct; and though some may have been unfortunate in their +modes of explanation, and though he acknowledges my arguments bear +against such, yet the _fact_ of the doctrine itself is not thereby +affected. His mode of explanation, for example, he thinks untouched by +the arguments of the sermon. But his mode of explanation, as we have +seen, turns the doctrine into _Arminianism_. And it would, perhaps, be +no difficult matter to show, that any explanation of the doctrine, short +of doing it away, would be exposed to all the weight of the arguments +urged in the sermon. But the sermon was never written to oppose those +who hold to the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the +reviewer complain of the sermon? Why does he so "deeply regret" that the +author of the sermon "should come before the public with an attack on +the faith of a _large part_ of the Christian community, conducted in a +way so obviously erroneous and unjust?" The sermon was against +Calvinism, not Arminianism. It is true, the reviewer may say, the sermon +alludes, in some parts, to the Calvinism of New-England, and therefore +he felt himself implicated. But he certainly was not unless he is a +New-England _Calvinist_--unless he believes that "God foreordains +whatsoever comes to pass," in the proper sense of those terms. Indeed, +it seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is as obnoxious to the +reviewer, as to the author of the sermon; and the former seems to have +taken this opportunity to show the _nakedness_ of the system, and bring +into notice a better doctrine. If so, is it safe that the reviewer +should still accord to them their old symbols of faith? And is it just, +that the author of the sermon should be held the defendant on the +record, when the execution is issued against Calvinism itself? In answer +to the former question, I would say, it is utterly _unsafe_, and never +will be approved of, I believe, by Arminians. With respect to the latter +question, if it is _safer_ to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, I +will not object, though it may seem at present to my disadvantage. But I +cannot see that it would be safer--an open bold front always ends best. +What if it should subject the reviewer, and the theological doctors in +New-Haven generally, to the charge of heresy? Still they ought not to +shrink from their responsibilities--they occupy a commanding influence +among the Churches and over the candidates of their theological school, +and that influence should be openly and decidedly directed to +discountenance error. They should remove it, root and branch. Especially +should they discard those old symbols of faith, which are not only in +themselves, in _their true and proper meaning_, a reflection upon the +clerical character, and a _black spot_ upon an otherwise orthodox creed, +but are also especially obnoxious, because they are the very articles +which the great body of the Calvinists have maintained, in a sense +widely different from that of the reviewer. At the head of these stands +Calvin, the author of the system, in the Protestant Church. Calvin, who +says, "I will not scruple to own that the will of God lays a necessity +on all things, and that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pass." +"Adam fell, not only by the _permission_, but also by the _appointment_ +of God. He not only _foresaw_ that Adam would fall, but also _ordained_ +that he should." "The devil and wicked men are so held in on every side, +with the hand of God, that they cannot conceive or contrive or execute +any mischief, any farther than God himself doth not _permit_ only, but +_command_--nor are they held in fetters, but compelled also, as with a +bridle, to perform obedience to those commands." Calvin, it seems, was +far from thinking that _appointment_ only meant _permission_, or that to +_ordain_ only meant certainty _foreseen_. In this he was correct: in +this he has been followed by a host of writers down to the present day, +and copied in numerous ecclesiastical symbols, in different parts of +Christendom; and does not the reviewer know that these terms are +understood by Hopkins and Emmons, and all the Calvinists of that school, +in a sense widely different from his explanation, and in a sense, too, +much more in accordance with the _proper meaning_ of the terms? Does he +not know that a great majority of the Calvinists of the United States, +and perhaps in New-England, even understand these terms, as indeed they +ought to be understood, when used in reference to sin, as expressing a +preference of sin, in that part of the Divine plan where sin occurs, to +holiness in its stead? Indeed, as I understand the reviewer, from the +days of John Calvin down to the present hour, there is, on this point, +between the great body of Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness, +except in the use of words. Theirs is one doctrine--his another. Why, +then, does he oppose the opposers of Calvinism, and thus keep error in +countenance? Especially, why does he hail from that party, and hoist +their signals, and then, alter _seeming_ to get the victory, by +espousing the very cause of the assailed, encourage the _Calvinists_ to +triumph, as if _their_ cause had been successful? Is this justice to the +author of the sermon? Is it the best way to promote truth? But I +forbear. The reviewer's subsequent explanations may remove these +difficulties. At any rate, the cause of truth will doubtless advance. +The appearance of this review has given additional strength to the +sentiment, Calvinism "is waxing old, and is ready to vanish away." The +dogma that "God has predetermined all events, and elected (in a +Calvinistic sense) out of our guilty world all who shall be heirs of +salvation," withers at the touch of advancing truth, and is fast losing +credit in the Christian Church. + +Since writing the above, I have seen an inquiry of a correspondent in +one of the Calvinistic papers, in these words, "Why do our Calvinistic +writers retain the words which seem so sadly to perplex our Arminian +brethren, when it is certain that we do not attach the signification to +them which they always pretend?" and then instances in the word +"foreordain." The editor, in reply, gives as a reason for using these +words, that they are Scriptural; and seems to deem it necessary that +they should _persist_ in this use until we submit. This reply of the +editor reminded me of a remark of Mr. Tyler, in his sermon already +alluded to: "The Calvinist contends that God resolved, from eternity, to +permit all the sins and miseries which were to take place; and this he +calls, in the language of the Bible, _foreordination_." Now, not to stop +here, to show that no true Calvinist would ever call _foreordination_ +and _permission_ the same thing, for Calvin has, as we have seen, +clearly distinguished the two words from each other, I beg the privilege +of adding a thought or two on this idea of Scripture authority for the +use or these terms. For if it is only because the Scriptures use these +words in this sense, that they _persist_ in using them, I think we may +easily settle this question. Let it be shown that the Scriptures use +"foreordination," or "predestination," in the sense of mere +_permission--not absolutely hindering_. Again: let _one passage_ be +shown in which it is said, God "predestinates" all things, or +"foreordains" whatsoever comes to pass. If this cannot be done, how +futile, how more than absurd is it, to talk about using these words, +because the Scriptures use them! To use Scripture words out of the +Scripture sense, and then appeal to Scripture to sanction this use, is +as sad a perversion of the Scriptures as it is of logic. Indeed, to give +such a meaning to the word predestinate, is at once to take away the +principal scriptures quoted by the reviewer, and others, to prove +Calvinistic election. See Eph. i, 5; ii, 10; Rom. viii, 29. Does +predestination in these passages mean merely _to permit_, or not _to +hinder?_ and do these passages teach a personal election to eternal +life? Is this all the Calvinists mean by the _election_ of _sovereign +grace_, not of man, nor of the will of mans but of God? Alas! for the +elect! If man does not elect himself, and God _only predestinates_, that +is, _permits--does not hinder_ his election; who, we ask, will elect +him? How does error destroy itself! These gentlemen may take which +ground they please; they may either acknowledge that Bible +predestination means an _efficient purpose of God_ to accomplish an +object, and then meet the sermon on the issue there proposed; or they +may interpret these words as the reviewer has, and then give up those +passages which they consider their strong hold, in favour of Calvinian +election. In either case their system must suffer serious loss. Nothing +could be more unfortunate, I think, than this appeal to the Bible to +sanction such an abuse of terms. As to the word foreordain, I do not +recollect that it occurs in our translation. Jude 4, has "before of old +ordained," &c, but it is in the original very different from the word +rendered predestinate. The allusion is to characters that were +proscribed for their sins, and designated for deserved punishment. The +original for predestinate, proorizo, is used in only one place, so far +as I can find, with any direct reference to a sinful act, Acts iv, 28. +This passage is quoted by the reviewer. But the determination here +spoken of, he himself informs us, relates to "the purpose of God to make +an atonement for the sin of the world, by means of the death of Jesus +Christ." Hence the predetermination of God, in this instance, probably +refers to the _work_ of atonement, without including therein any special +decree in respect to the means of the suffering. Christ _could_ have +suffered, even unto death, in the garden without any human means. But +inasmuch as these men had the murderous purpose, God "chose to leave +Christ to their power," &c, therefore _decreed_ the atonement, but +_permitted_ the means. This seems to be the most rational construction. +But whatever Calvinists may think of this passage, the Scriptural use of +the word is clearly on the side of its _proper_ meaning--an +_authoritative ordinance_ that the thing predestinated _shall be_. + +I will avail myself of this opportunity to correct one or two errors of +the reviewer, respecting the sentiment of the sermon, which had escaped +my notice. He says, my "view of predestination is a determination of God +to produce a given result by his _own immediate_ and _efficient_ +energy." This is a mistake. I said nothing about _immediate energy;_ +this is an essential misrepresentation of the sermon. Again: "On Dr. +Fisk's principle, it is impossible for God to use the voluntary agency +of any creature, to accomplish any valuable end in his kingdom, and yet +leave that creature accountable for his conduct." This is so manifestly +incorrect and unjust, that I am sure I need only call the attention of +the reviewer to it a second time, to secure a correction from himself. + + + + +NUMBER II. + +A PROPOSITION TO CALVINISTS. + +The communication below contains a proposition from Dr. W. Fisk, which, +however much we dislike theological controversies, we believe is +appropriate and interesting at this time. Such a discussion, under such +arrangements, will give the merits of the controversy to both sides; and +will, at least, convince all of one truth--that the Methodist Episcopal +Church seeks not concealment from the world or her members, as charged +by her adversaries. But it will develop a still more important truth, +and that is, what are the settled and definite opinions of the old or +the new school in the Calvinistic Churches. It is known to all the +world, that there is great difficulty in ascertaining what are the +theological opinions of those ancient Churches of the land. They seem to +be as far apart from each other as they are from Arminianism; and their +replies and rejoinders to each other are as severe as if directed +against us. The discussion must be interesting and profitable, carried +on by two such persons as Dr. Fisk and his opponent, and under the +steady supervision, as to temper and manner, of third parties as +proposed.--Eds. + +I have just received a pamphlet of about forty-eight pages, containing a +series of letters, in answer to my sermon on predestination and +election. These letters are written by the Rev. David Metcalf, of +Lebanon, Connecticut, and purport to be an answer, not only to the +doctrinal part of the sermon, but to the "charges," as the writer is +pleased to call them, contained in the sermon, and published afterward +in a specific form, first in the Connecticut Observer, and then in the +Christian Advocate and Journal. + +It will be recollected by your readers, that I pledged myself to +vindicate my statements against any responsible person, who, with his +own proper signature, would come forward and deny them: or if I failed +to support them, I would retract what I had written. This pledge Mr. +Metcalf calls upon me to redeem; not indeed by bringing forward my +proofs, or by making a reply; but, having thrown in his plea, he +supposes that the cause is decided, and has himself made up the +judgment, and issued the execution, and forthwith comes forward, and +claims his damage. His words are--"Of the author of the sermon we claim +a public acknowledgment of his errors, and make justice and equity the +ground of our claim." Again, "If Dr. F. makes no public retraction from +the ground taken in his sermon--if after he shall receive these letters, +[!!] remembering also what is said in the Christian Spectator's review +of his sermon, he shall allow another copy of it to be printed, I think +he will find it difficult to convince any intelligent candid man, that +he is not guilty of breaking the ninth commandment," &c. The intelligent +reader, who has studied human nature, will know how to make suitable +allowances for the dogmatical and premature decisions, and high claims +contained in the foregoing extracts. It is not an uncommon thing, that a +zealous advocate succeeds in _convincing himself_ of the truth of his +cause; but utterly fails with respect to all others. I do not say, that +this writer will not gain his argument; but it requires more +"foreknowledge" than I am disposed to accord to him, to affirm this as a +"certainty." I demur against this hasty manner of making up the +judgment. I wish to be heard in defence of my statements, and have +objections also to bring against his statements, and supposed proofs and +arguments. + +In the first place, I object to him, that he has not come out and joined +issue specifically and directly on any one of my "charges," but talks +for most part in general terms, about the unfairness, injustice, and +misrepresentations of the sermon. This circumstance would, of itself, +free me from any obligation to notice these letters, on the ground of my +pledge in the Observer. But yet, as I feel the most perfect readiness to +discuss this subject, and as I hope the cause of righteousness may be +served thereby, I will willingly proceed in this controversy, both as to +doctrine and policy, provided we can secure some suitable public medium, +through which to prosecute the discussion. And on this point Mr. M. +complains bitterly of the former editors of the Advocate and +Journal--for he had applied, it seems, for the privilege of having his +letters inserted in that paper, and was refused, on the ground that "the +sermon was not published in the Advocate, and therefore justice did not +require that its answer should be." Now, since these letters are +professedly an answer to the _whole sermon_, the editors, I think, were +perfectly consistent with their former statements, in refusing to +publish them. If Mr. M. had confined himself to the charges in the +Observer, the editors would undoubtedly have given the subject a place +in the columns of the Advocate: as it was, however, I think the charge +of injustice and unfairness made against the editors by Mr. M. is +entirely gratuitous and _unjustifiable_. If it was expected to produce +an _effect_ on the public, by such a complaint, I think such an +expectation will be disappointed in all places where the subject is +understood. And that this was the expectation appears evident from +another charge against Methodist preachers, in the following words:--"It +is supposed to be the common sentiment, if not 'the common talk in our +land,' that the Methodist preachers have a strong aversion against their +hearers reading our writings. The reason of this, in part, is supposed +to be, that they choose to have their people receive all their knowledge +of our creed from their statements of it, instead of ours; lest they +should be convinced, by our arguments, of the truth of our belief." Now +this charge we wholly and positively deny, and challenge the writer for +the proofs of what we know to be, not only an ungenerous, but an unjust +allegation. Nothing can be farther from the whole genius of Methodism +than this. Does not the reverend gentleman know, that a great portion of +our members in New England are those who were once members of +Calvinistic congregations? Does he not know that they were trained up in +these doctrines from their infancy, and have heard them explained and +defended from their earliest recollections? Does he not know that +Methodism has made its way against the impressions of the nursery, the +catechetical instruction of the priest and the school master--the +influence of the pulpit and the press, and in maturer age against the +still stronger influence of academies and colleges? Does he not know, +also, that all this has been done in this generation? And shall we now +be told that Methodists examine but one side of the question? How +astonishing such a charge, from a man who can make any pretension to a +knowledge of ecclesiastical matters in our country! Does not this writer +know, also, that the editors of the Advocate, and others, have called +loudly, and almost continually, for information upon this subject, that +we might know what the Calvinistic standards are, and ascertain what +Calvinism is? and shall we now be told, that Methodists are ignorant of +the Calvinistic faith, and, what is worse, the preachers strive to keep +them in ignorance, and that with the base purpose of keeping them from a +conviction of the truth! We say, if Calvinism is essentially what it was +from five to thirty years ago, we know its character as well as we ever +can know it. If we do not understand it now, it is either because we +have not _natural ability_ to understand it, (and therefore. Calvinism +itself being judge, we are not criminal,) or it is because the teachers +of Calvinism have not had _natural ability_ to make it plain. But if +Calvinism is not essentially what it was, we ask what it now is? If it +is changed in the hands of its supporters, how much has it changed? Is +it Calvinism still, or has it lost its identity? In what does the +identity of Calvinism consist? Shall we take the Rev. Mr. Metcalf's +answer to these questions? Shall we take the Christian Spectator's +answers? Mr. M. appears fully to agree with the Spectator, for he makes +frequent reference to it, with great apparent approbation. And yet two +numbers of this periodical have been issued since my reply to the review +of my sermon in that work, in which reply I stated my understanding of +the reviewer's doctrine of predestination, and requested to be informed +if I was incorrect; and neither my reply nor my request has been +noticed. And yet, let it be understood, that in the last number there is +a very laboured article, to show that Dr. Taylor does not differ +essentially from the orthodox Calvinistic faith heretofore received. + +It is also known, that though Drs. Woods, Griffin, Tyler, Green, and +various others, come out and charge a portion of their brethren with a +serious and dangerous dereliction from the Calvinistic faith, yet the +accused, in their turn, strenuously maintain that they preserve the old +landmarks unremoved, and the essential principles of Calvinism +unimpaired; and that it is a calumnious charge to say they have departed +from the faith of the party. + +How shall we judge in this matter? If we think, from our understanding +of their writings, that some of them have changed their views, and we +ask them if they have, they are silent. If their brethren charge them +with changing, they deny it; and, standing up before the world and +before the Churches, and before their God, pronounce _deliberately_ and +_emphatically_, the old symbols of faith, as a test oath to prove their +orthodoxy. Should we doubt their repeated asseverations? Mr. M., or +somebody else, might write another pamphlet to screw us into repentance +and confession, for bearing false witness against our neighbour. But if +we hold them to the old doctrine, which we have had a good opportunity +of learning, from our youth up, we are accused of misrepresentation, and +of bearing false witness. None but the advocates of the New-Haven +divinity have, to my knowledge, taken a public stand against my sermon; +and _they_ oppose it because _they_ say it is a misrepresentation of +their doctrine. + +This, therefore, seems to us to be the state of the case with respect to +these gentlemen--We make a representation of Calvinism as we have found +it, and have heretofore understood it--they object, because this is not +their belief, and therefore we break the ninth commandment! Their own +brethren charge _them_ with a departure from the old doctrines, and they +deny it! and charge them in turn with bearing false witness! In the +midst of our perplexity on this subject, while we are looking every way +for light, up comes Mr. M. and tells us, we are unwilling our people +should know what Calvinists believe!! Is this generous, or just? We +repel the charge, and demand proof. And in the mean time, as a farther +proof that the charge is unfounded, I will, Messrs. Editors, with your +consent and approbation, make a proposition to Mr. Metcalf. It is +certainly desirable, that both Calvinists and Methodists should hear +_both sides_. Mr. M. seems very desirous to enlighten the Methodists. +This is very well. But we also wish to enlighten the Calvinists. To +accomplish this, the discussion on both sides should be put into the +hands of the people on both sides. If, then, some reputable and +extensively circulated Calvinistic periodical will publish my sermon, +and the discussion which _has_ arisen, or _may_ arise out of it, on both +sides, the Christian Advocate and Journal will publish Mr. M.'s letters +and the discussions which shall follow; provided always, that it shall +be submitted to the respective editors, whether the pieces are written +in respectful and becoming style and language; and provided also, that +the Calvinistic editor shall, by consenting to this arrangement, he +considered as thereby acknowledging, that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man +to manage the controversy in behalf of the Calvinists, and that you, +Messrs. Editors, by consenting to the arrangement, will thereby consent +that you are willing to trust the controversy in my hands, to be managed +in behalf of the Methodists. To give an opportunity for the Calvinistic +periodical to be prepared, I shall wait a reasonable time, when, if the +offer is not complied with, I shall want the privilege, perhaps, of +occupying the columns of the Advocate, by the insertion of a few numbers +touching the present Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their +own differences, and also as relates to the general question between +them and us. + + + + +NUMBER III. + +INDEFINITENESS OF CALVINISM. + +THE readers of the Christian Advocate and Journal will recollect the +proposition, made to the Rev. David Metcalf, in the 8th No. of the +present volume, on the subject of his review of my sermon. This +proposition has not been complied with on the part of Mr. M., and +according to the following extract from the New-York Evangelist, no +compliance can be expected:-- + +"We have seen," says the editor of the Evangelist, "in the Advocate, +since Mr. Metcalf's work was published, a letter from Dr. F., in which +he shows his desire that the discussion shall still go forward. There is +one condition he exacts, however, which we think impracticable. It is, +that some person should be designated, by a sort of common suffrage, as +the champion of Calvinism. Now the truth is, Calvinists, as a class, are +rather remarkable for thinking for themselves; and of course, while +there are great principles on which, as a class, they all agree, there +are many things which will be held or stated differently, by different +minds. Consequently, we can, each of us, defend ourselves, and defend +Calvinists as a class; notwithstanding, each one may think his fellow +holds some errors, and therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. +must assume to himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal +points and modes of statement which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_. +And when he has found these principles, we hope he will either confute +or embrace them." + +I have copied the above for the farther notice of the public, not only +as a remarkable paragraph in itself, but also as having an important +bearing on the present controversy. There are several things in it +worthy of special notice. + +In the first place we see, if other editors think with this one, and +that they do, we are left to infer from their not offering their +periodicals for the controversy, there is no hope that my proposition +will be accepted. We then have the reason--because there is one +impracticable condition. But why impracticable? The editor tells us, +"Dr. F. exacts that some person should be designated by a sort of common +suffrage to be the champion of Calvinism." I cannot believe the editor +means to misrepresent me; and yet he has done it. My words are, +"Provided that the Calvinistic _editor_ shall, by consenting to this +arrangement, be considered as thereby acknowledging that Mr. Metcalf is +a suitable man to manage the controversy on the part of the Calvinists." +Here is nothing said about a "sort of common suffrage." In case of +compliance by Mr. Leavitt, or any other editor, the only vote to be +polled and counted would be his own. Not a very extensive suffrage this! +And if Mr. L. thinks the condition impracticable, it must be owing to +_moral inability_ existing in his own mind, growing out of the belief +that Mr. Metcalf _is not a suitable person_ to manage this controversy. +Hence it is well I took the precaution I did; for Mr. M. is a stranger +to me; and I do not wish to engage in a controversy on this subject with +any man who is not, by his class, considered responsible. Perhaps Mr. +Leavitt knows of some one, who would be suitable, in his judgment, and +who would accept of the offer; or perhaps he himself would be willing to +engage in the discussion. I do not wish to confine it to Mr. M.; nor do +I wish to be considered in the light of a general challenger who is +seeking an adventure. The subject is an important one, and I am willing +to discuss it with any candid responsible man. We were most unjustly, as +I believed, accused of keeping our people in ignorance of Calvinism, and +of preventing them from reading on the other side, for the base purpose +of preventing them from being convinced of the truth. To render the +subject fair and equal, therefore, and to wipe off this aspersion, I +made the proposal; and if Mr. M. is not a suitable man, let some other +be found. + +But we are informed farther in this paragraph, that one great difficulty +in complying with my condition is, that "Calvinists, as a class, are +remarkable for thinking for themselves," &c. If the editor designs to +say, as the natural construction would imply, that the whole class are +remarkable, in their character as Calvinists, for thinking and believing +differently and independently of each other, then his proposition is a +contradiction. They, _as a class_, are remarkable _for not being a class +at all_, having no properties or qualities in common! His argument also +would require this construction, because he is showing why no one could +be the proper champion of the class, for the reason that, as a class, +they did not think alike. If _Calvinism_ be a general term, it includes, +in its extension, all those individuals or sub-classes of individuals, +and only those, that hold certain doctrines in common, and it embraces +all those doctrines, and only those that are held in common by the +class. If, therefore, there is any such class, then most certainly they +think alike in all those things that constitute them a class; and by +consequence, any one of the number, otherwise competent, would be +qualified to represent and defend the class as such, however much he +might differ from many of "his fellows," in other things. If, therefore, +there is any force in the argument, that it is impracticable for any one +of the number bearing the name, to become the champion of _the class as +such_, because they differ so among themselves, it must arise from the +fact, that there are no "great principles" held in common among them, +and, of course, there is _no class_. All the writer says afterward, +therefore, about "great principles in which they all agree," is mere +verbiage, signifying nothing. For if we give it any meaning, it would be +a contradiction of what he had stated before, and a complete +nullification of the only argument adduced as a reason for not complying +with my proposal. There is another reason why I think the above a fair +view of this subject. In the same paragraph it is said, "Therefore, in +his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to himself the +responsibility of selecting those doctrinal facts and modes of statement +which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_." This is more unreasonable +than the requisition of Nebuchadnezzar, when he commanded the wise men +to _make known the dream_, as well as the interpretation. Would an +intelligent and ingenuous man, such as we have a right to expect a +religious editor to be, give such an answer, under such circumstances, +if he could have told us what Calvinism is? We have been accused, not by +Mr. Metcalf only, but by Calvinists of the old school, and the new +school, and _all the schools_, that we misrepresent them, that our +preachers make it their business to misrepresent them,--that my sermon +was a most scandalous misrepresentation, and that we studied to keep our +people ignorant of what Calvinism is. When this is replied to, by +entreating and conjuring those who bear the name of Calvinism, to tell +us what it is; and when we offer to discuss the subject, in their own +periodicals, and give them an opportunity to discuss it in ours, and to +inform our people, in their own way, on this doctrine--a death-like +silence on the subject reigns throughout the whole _corps editorial;_ +until at length the Evangelist speaks,--We cannot comply; we each and +all, as a class, are so remarkable for thinking for ourselves, it is +impracticable for any one to state and defend those doctrinal facts +which _distinguish us as a class_, and therefore Dr. F. must assume to +himself the responsibility of selecting them!! If Calvinists cannot +agree in their own system, and cannot trust any of their fraternity to +state and defend it in behalf of the class, why do they accuse us of +willful misrepresentations, in stating their system? Why, in short, do +they not begin to doubt whether, _as a class_, they have any system? It +is time for those who bear the name to know, and for the public to be +distinctly informed, whether there is any thing _real_ represented by +the term Calvinism? If there is, then, whether the term is a common or a +proper noun? If it is a common noun, or a general name, then, what are +the qualities, the properties, or doctrines designated by it? If no one +can tell,--if those who "write about it, and about it," week after week, +think it _impracticable_ to define or describe those doctrines for the +class, because they think so differently, of course it follows, if the +name is retained, it is not a general, but a _proper name_, and belongs +only to individuals. And though it has been assumed by many individuals, +yet it has in each case an individual definition, which by no means +enters into the definition of the term, as assumed by any other +individual. And therefore it is as inconsistent to talk about the _class +of Calvinists_, as it is to talk about the class of Johns or Joshuas, +and as absurd to infer that two men are in any of their real +characteristics alike, because each is called _Calvinist_, as to argue +that the editor of the Evangelist and Joshua, the son of Nun, belonged +to the same class, because both are called Joshua. And this appears to +me to be very nearly the true state of the case. Calvinism, as +designating a class, has always been rather vague and unsettled in its +definition, from the days of John Calvin himself. And this was one of +the offensive objections brought against it in my sermon--an objection, +however, that has been abundantly confirmed by recent events. As I wrote +and published of another doctrine some years since, so I may say of +Calvinism now. It is a proteus that changes its shape before one can +describe it--an _ignis fatuus_, that changes its place before one can +get his hand on it. And here I will stop to say, It will avail nothing +for any one to take offence at this statement. It is not because I +dislike men who are called Calvinists, that I thus speak. I know many of +them personally, and esteem them highly, but of their doctrine, and +their system, and their name, I must speak freely. And the best +refutation they can give, is to come out if they can, and define and +explain their system. I care not what shape it is presented in; I am +willing to meet it. If it puts on an Arminian character and dress, like +the review in the Christian Spectator, I will only ask the privilege of +baptizing it anew, and giving it a legitimate name. But as there seems +now little hope of being permitted to meet it in the manner proposed, it +only remains that I proceed, according to promise, to "occupy the +columns of the Advocate with a few numbers, touching the present +Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and +as relates to the general question between them and us." + +I cannot but think this an important moment to look into this subject. +The signs of the times indicate that the spirit of inquiry is abroad, +and the old platforms are shaken. In this breaking up of erroneous +systems, there is danger of extremes and extravagancies, more to be +dreaded, perhaps, than the old errors themselves. Hence, the necessity +for every man who _has_ the truth to be on his guard against the +currents, new and unprovided for, that may otherwise drive him from his +safe moorings: and hence the necessity also, that he who has weighed +anchor, and is afloat upon the unexplored sea of philosophic speculation +should be aware of the rocks and the quicksands on the opposite shore. +An abler hand than mine is certainly needed on this occasion; such a one +I hope may be found. But in the mean time I will, as I am able, say a +_few things_, with the sincere prayer that I and my readers may be led +into all truth. + + + + +NUMBER IV. + +SKETCH OF THE PAST CHANGES AND PRESENT STATE OF CALVINISM IN THIS +COUNTRY. + +In the former No. it was seen that the indefiniteness and mutability of +the Calvinistic system had thrown a kind of irresponsibility around it; +which renders this controversy, in many respects, extremely +unsatisfactory. This might, at first, lead to the conclusion, that +farther discussion would be useless. On farther thought, however, it +_may_ appear, that this very circumstance will render the controversy +both easier and more promising. This diversity of opinions has produced +serious discussion among the predestinarians themselves, and has thrown +the system open to public view, and driven its advocates to a clearer +statement of their respective opinions. The effervescence, in short, +growing out of this excitement, has led to a more distinct analysis of +the system, and of course to a clearer discovery of its constituent +parts. Their arguments against each other, and the logical consequences +which they urge against each other's views, are, in many cases, +precisely the same that we should advance, and have often urged, in +opposition to predestination. Much of the work, therefore, is prepared +for us, and brought forward in a way to produce an effect among +Calvinists themselves, where we could not be heard. + +To understand this subject however fully, and to follow out this +discussion advantageously, it will be necessary to glance at the +different changes and modifications of the Calvinistic system; and to +take a brief survey of the present state of the parties. + +The religious faith of our puritanical fathers is too well known to need +a delineation here. This faith was at an early day defined and formally +recognized, in the Cambridge and Saybrook platforms. The first +refinement (improvement it can hardly be called) upon this ancient +faith, was the metaphysical theory of Dr. Hopkins. The leading dogmas of +this theory were, that God was the _efficient cause_ of all moral +action, holy and unholy; and that holiness consisted in disinterested +benevolence. Insomuch, that the answer to the question, "Are you willing +to be damned?" was deemed a very good criterion by which to judge of a +religious experience. While the doctrine of predestination was in this +manner _going to seed_, and bearing its legitimate fruits, in one +direction, it received a remarkably plausible modification in another. +The atonement, which was formerly limited to the elect, was now extended +to all; and the invitations of the Gospel, instead of being restrained, +as before, to the world of the elect, were extended to the world of +mankind. But as it would be useless to hold out invitations to those who +could not accept of them, another refinement was introduced, and man was +found to possess a natural ability to receive salvation, although he +laboured under an invincible moral _inability_, which would for ever +keep him from Christ, until drawn by irresistible grace. This discovery +led to other refinements in language, so that a kind of technical +nomenclature was formed, out of words in popular use, which words, by an +accompanying glossary, were so defined as to correspond with the +Calvinistic system. Thus, "You can repent if you will," meaning, +according to the technical definition, "You can repent when God _makes_ +you willing," and so of the rest. + +This theory, sustained as it was by Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Emmons, and others, +gained many proselytes, and seemed likely, at one time, to become the +universal creed. Its metaphysical abstrusities and distinctions gave it +an interest for the student; and its plausible and commonsense terms +gave it popularity with the people. In the mean time, however, several +causes conspired to introduce a great revolution in the religious +sentiments of many, which, as it has had a very important influence in +modifying Calvinism itself; I must here stop to notice; I allude to the +introduction of Unitarianism and Universalism. The proximate causes of +the introduction of these sentiments were, among others, probably the +following. The Antinomian features of old Calvinism had introduced into +the Churches a heartless Christianity and a very lax discipline. It was +natural, therefore, when religion had come, in point of fact, to consist +chiefly in external performances, for its votaries to seek a theory that +would accord with their practice. Unitarianism was precisely such a +theory. It is also to be noticed, that the state of formality and +spiritual death that prevailed, was greatly increased by the withering +alliance which then existed between the Church and civil government. +This revolution was undoubtedly hastened also by the ultraism, on the +one part, and the technical inconsistencies on the other, of the +Hopkinsian theory. The elements had been long in motion, and at length +they united in an array of numbers and influence that wrested the +fairest portions of their ecclesiastical domain from the orthodox +Churches of Mass., and turned them over, together with the richly +endowed university of the state, into the hands of the Unitarians. + +In Connecticut, Unitarianism, as that term is commonly understood among +us, has not prevailed. There is, I believe, but one Unitarian pastor, +properly so called, in the state. This sentiment, however, prevails very +extensively in this and all the other New-England states, as well as in +many other parts of the union, under the name of Universalism; a +sentiment which differs but little from Socinianism, and had its origin +doubtless from the same source. About half a century since, a +Calvinistic clergyman, as he was supposed to be to the day of his death, +left a posthumous work, which was published, entitled, "Calvinism +Improved." It was merely an extension of the doctrines of unconditional +election and irresistible grace to all instead of a part. From the +premises, the reasoning seemed fair, and the conclusions legitimate. +This made many converts. And this idea of universal salvation, when once +it is embraced, can easily be moulded into any shape, provided its _main +feature_ is retained.--It has finally pretty generally run into the semi +infidel sentiments, of _no atonement--no Divine Saviour--no Holy Ghost_, +and _no supernatural change of heart;_ as well as "no hell--no devil--no +angry God." It may be a matter of some surprise, perhaps, to a +superficial observer, or to one not personally acquainted with the +circumstances of the case, why, in leaving Calvinism, these men should +go so far beyond the line of truth. But in this we see the known +tendency of the human mind to run into extremes. The repulsive features +of the old system drove them far the other way. It ought to be +remembered, also, that there were few, if any, who were stationed on the +medium line, to arrest and delay the public mind in its fearful recoil +from the "horrible decree." Had Methodism been as well known in +New-England fifty years ago, as it now is, it is doubtful whether +Universalism or Unitarianism would have gained much influence in this +country. Late as it was introduced, and much as it was opposed, it is +believed to have done much toward checking the progress of those +sentiments. And perhaps it is in part owing to the earlier introduction, +and more extensive spread of Methodism, in Connecticut, that +Unitarianism has not gained more influence in the state. This is +undoubtedly the fact in the states of Vermont, New-Hampshire, and Maine, +where Methodism was introduced nearly as early as those other +sentiments. The result has shown that the foregoing supposition is +corroborated by facts in those cases where the experiment has been +tried. These remarks may not now be credited, but the time will come, +when the prejudices of the day are worn out, that the candid historian +will do the subject justice. But to return--though Unitarianism and +Universalism are believed to be dangerous errors, yet, as is often the +case, they have contributed much, doubtless, to detect the errors and +modify the features of the opposite system. Simultaneously with them, +the Methodists have engaged in opposing the Calvinistic dogmas. This +close examination and thorough opposition, with such other causes as may +have cooperated in the work, have driven some of the peculiarities of +the Hopkinsian theory into disrepute, more suddenly even than they rose +into credit. The sublimated doctrine of disinterested benevolence was so +like "an airy nothing," that even the speculative minds of the shrewdest +metaphysicians could not find for it "a local habitation," in heaven or +on earth; and the almost blasphemous dogma, that God was the efficient +cause of sin, was more abhorrent, if possible, than even the horrible +decree of reprobation. Both, therefore, with the exceptions hereafter +mentioned, disappeared. The former, being of an ethereal character, +silently evaporated into "thin air;" but the other, being of a grosser +nature, and withal more essential to the system itself, _settled to the +bottom_, and is now rarely visible, except when the hand of controversy +shakes up the sediment. The doctrine of universal atonement, however, +was retained, and the theological vocabulary was not only retained, but +enlarged and improved. So that from that day to this, we hear but little +of the doctrine of reprobation, or of the decrees of God, but much is +said of God's "electing love," his "Divine sovereignty," and "gracious +purposes." By which is meant, according to the glossary, the doctrine of +unconditional election and reprobation, and of absolute predestination. +The scriptures, also, which used to be quoted to prove the direct +efficiency of God, in producing sin and securing the condemnation of the +reprobate, receive a different explanation, varying but little, if any, +from the Arminian interpretation of those passages. It cannot be +doubted, I think, but there has been quite a change in the views of the +great body of the Calvinists--and yet not so great and so thorough a +change as appearances and terms might at first view seem to indicate. It +is not easy to _eradicate_ old prejudices. And it is often found that +the mind will cling to the first principles of a favourite system, even +after the other parts are so modified as that the new principles would +supplant the old, if suffered to be carried out into a consistent whole. +In every such case, much labour and argument will be spent in trying to +unite the old with the new; but in every instance the rent becomes +worse. This leads to a kind of vacillating policy, and an ambiguous +course of argument, accompanied with reiterated complaints, that the +opposers of the system misunderstand and misrepresent it. And it would +be no wonder if the constant friction in the incongruous machinery +should chafe the mind, and lead to a dogmatic and an impatient spirit. +How far this corresponds with the existing facts, in the Calvinistic +controversy, others can judge. In my own view, the peculiar +circumstances of the case, connected with the known character of the +human mind, fully account for the _apparent_ tergiversation and changing +of argument, in this controversy, without criminating the _motives_ of +our predestinarian brethren, as some have unjustly accused me of doing. +The different parts of the system have lost, in a measure, their +original affinities, and yet they have some partial and irregular +attractions, which lead them to unite in unnatural and grotesque forms. +And as there is no common consent and settled mode of operating among +the many who are experimenting upon the materials, there are various +sectional and individual formations, which are inconsistent with each +other. And their incongruity is the more apparent from the unanimous +effort (which I believe is the only work of union in "the class") to +amalgamate each and every variety with the old substratum of the +system,--"God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass." + +The completion of this historical sketch, together with a view of the +present state of the Calvinistic parties, may be expected in the next +number. After which it is proposed to proceed to an examination of the +doctrines in dispute. + + + + +NUMBER V. + +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. + +One modification of Calvinism remains to be mentioned. It is known by +the name of the "New Divinity." The theological doctors connected with +Yale college are the reputed authors of this system. It is evident, +however, that the tendency of the Calvinistic theory has been in this +direction for a number of years. The "New Divinity," so alarming to some +of the Calvinists, is only the ripe fruits of the very plants which they +have long cultivated with assiduous care. And why should they start back +at results which they have long laboured to produce? This theory, in the +first place, is an attempt to make the doctrine, and the technical terms +alluded to, coincide. In the second place, it is designed, by a new +philosophy of predestination, to get rid of the "logical consequences" +that have always pressed heavily upon the old system. Finally, it is a +device to reconcile the doctrine of depravity with the former current +sentiment, that man has _natural ability_ to convert himself and get to +heaven without grace. The two pillars of the new system are, 1. "Sin is +not a propagated property of the human soul, but consists wholly in +_moral exercise_." 2. "Sin is not the necessary means of the greatest +good;" or, in other words, "Sin is not preferable to holiness in its +stead." The Calvinistic opposers of this theory tell us that these +sentiments have been held and taught to some extent for the last ten +years. They were more fully and more openly announced, however, by Dr. +Taylor, of the theological school belonging to Yale College, in a concio +ad clerum preached Sept. 10th, 1828. From the time of the publication of +this sermon the alarm has been sounded, and the controversy has been +carried on. The opposers of the new doctrine call it heresy; and in a +late publication they seem to intimate that Dr. T. and his associates +are nearly if not quite as heretical as the author of the sermon on +predestination and election. The doctor and his friends, on the other +hand, strenuously maintain that they are orthodox; and to prove it, they +repeat, again and again, "We believe that God did, for his own glory, +foreordain whatsoever comes to pass." The Christian Spectator, an ably +conducted quarterly journal, is devoted chiefly to the defence of this +theory, aided by the New-York Evangelist, and several other minor +periodicals, and by a very respectable body of the clergy. What +proportion, however, have embraced this system is not known; but many, +both in and out of Connecticut, have espoused the cause with great zeal. +The contest waxes warmer each year. Against the theory, Dr. Woods, of +the Andover theological seminary, Dr. Griffin, of Williams college, Dr. +Tyler, of Portland, the Rev. Mr. Hervey, of Connecticut, and several +others have entered the lists of controversy; and last of all, a +pamphlet, supposed to be the joint labour of a number of clergymen, has +been published, in which the New Divinity is denounced as heresy, a +formal separation of the Churches is predicted, and a withdrawal of +patronage from Yale college is threatened on the ground that "Yale will +become in Connecticut what Harvard is in Massachusetts." It is +uncertain, however, whether those ultra measures will be responded to by +the great body of the clergy in New-England. There is a party which +still adheres to the old--I may say, perhaps, to the _oldest_ +modification of Calvinism in this country. This party are for +maintaining the old landmarks at all hazards, rightly judging that these +palliations and explanations of the system will ultimate in its +destruction. They are not numerous, but still respectable as to numbers +and talents. They are sustained in Boston by the Boston Telegraph, so +called, a weekly periodical, which does not hesitate to go the whole +length--_logical consequences and all_. Witness the following quotation +from a review of my sermon, in the number for Jan. 23d. Speaking of the +charge in the sermon, that Calvinism makes God the author of sin, the +writer says:--"The word author is sometimes used to mean _efficient +cause_. Now I am willing to admit that those scriptures which teach that +God has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply that he is the +efficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory and the greatest good +he said, _Let there be sin, and there was sin!!!_" The following is +another specimen of Calvinism from the same periodical. If any man +"affirms that man really chooses, and that his acts of will are caused +by his own free, voluntary, and efficient mind, then he is _no +Calvinist_." In this last quotation, as well as in the preceding, there +is the most direct opposition to Dr. Taylor, since he maintains, if I +understand him, that man's is an independent agency--that the human mind +is the originator of thought and volition. Thus are these two branches +of the Calvinistic family directly at variance with each other. And, in +fact, the Telegraph and its supporters are not only at variance with the +newest divinity, but with all the different degrees of _new, newer, +newest_, and denounce them all as heresy. + +The present advocates of predestination and particular election may be +divided into four classes:--1. The old school Calvinists. 2. +Hopkinsians. 3. Reformed Hopkinsians. 4. Advocates of the New Divinity. +By the reformed Hopkinsians I mean those who have left out of their +creed Dr. Hopkins' doctrine of disinterested benevolence, Divine +efficiency in producing sin, &c, and yet hold to a general atonement, +natural ability, &c. These constitute, doubtless, the largest division +in the "class" in New-England. Next, as to numbers, probably, are the +new school, then Hopkinsians, and last, the old school. These +subdivisions doubtless run into each other in various combinations; but +the outlines of these four sub-classes are, I think, distinctly marked. + +The preceding sketch has been confined mostly to the theological changes +in New-England; but it will apply, to a considerable extent, to other +parts of the nation. The Presbyterian Church, by reason of its +ecclesiastical government, is more consolidated, and of course less +liable to change than the independent Congregational Churches of the +eastern states. But the Presbyterian Church has felt the changes of the +east, and is coming more and more under their influence. It is now a +number of years since the "triangle," as it was called, was published in +New-York. This was a most severe and witty allegory, against the dogmas +and bigotry of old Calvinism. From this work this old theory has +obtained the epithet of "triangular." Whenever a man advocates the +doctrine of limited atonement, imputed sin, and imputed righteousness, +he is said to be "triangular." These old triangular notions are giving +place very rapidly to modern improvements. And although the most +strenuous opposition has been made in the General Assembly, in different +publications, and elsewhere, yet the votes in the last General Assembly +show, I think, that the whole Church is yielding herself up to the +resistless march of innovation. It may be doubted whether the state of +New-York is not emphatically the strong hold of the New Divinity, so far +as popular sentiment is concerned; and whether, indeed, with the +exception of New-Haven, there is not the greatest moral influence +enlisted there, for the propagation of the new theory. + +Thus have I endeavoured to glance over the various modifications and +present characteristics of that mode of Christian doctrines called +Calvinism. Here a few suggestions present themselves, which, from their +relation to the present controversy, I will now set down. + +It seems singular that, differing as they profess to, so materially, on +many points, each individual of each sub-class should feel himself +injured whenever Calvinism, under this common name, is opposed in any of +its features. The sermon on predestination was against _Calvinism_, and +lo! all parties rise up against the sermon. And yet, whether it object +to Calvinistic policy or to Calvinistic doctrine, the different parties +accuse their opponents of being guilty of the charge, but they +themselves are clear. I cannot think of a single important position +assumed by the sermon against predestination and election, which is not +sustained by Calvinists themselves in opposition to some of their +brethren; nor yet of a single charge against their policy, for their +changes and ambiguous methods of stating and defending their doctrines, +which has not been reiterated by professed Calvinists themselves against +their brethren. Thus the sermon is sustained by the Calvinists +themselves, and yet they all condemn it! If _some_ Calvinists think that +the objections of the sermon lie against some modifications of their +system, is it not possible that these objections have a more _general_ +application than any of them seem willing to acknowledge? For example: +it is objected to predestination that it "makes God the author of sin, +destroys free agency, arrays God's decrees against his revealed word, +mars his moral attributes, puts an excuse into the mouth of the +impenitent sinner, implies unconditional reprobation, makes God partial +and a respecter of persons, necessarily limits the atonement," &c. These +charges, say the Calvinists, are very unjust, ungenerous--in fact, they +bear false witness against our neighbours. This is said by Mr. Metcalf, +and by others of the New-Haven school. And yet what says the Spectator, +the organ and oracle of that school? It says of Dr. Tyler, and of others +who oppose the peculiar views of Dr. Taylor, comprising, as we have +seen, the great majority of Calvinists, that their views "limit God in +power and goodness"--"make the worst kind of moral action the best"--"if +carried out in their legitimate consequences, would lead to +universalism, to infidelity, to atheism"--"they confound right and +wrong, and subvert all moral distinctions"--"according to these views, +mankind are bound to believe that they shall please and glorify God more +by sin than by obedience, and therefore to act accordingly"--"nothing +worse can be imputed to the worst of men than this theory imputes to +God"!!![4] Has the author of the sermon said more than this, and worse +than this, of Calvinism? And shall he be accused by these very men of +bearing false witness against his brethren? And let it be observed +farther, in justification of the sermon, that these charges in the +Spectator are made by men who have been brought up at the feet of the +Calvinistic doctors, and have themselves grown up to the character and +rank of doctors in theology. They know the system thoroughly; they have +made it the study of their lives, and have they testified to the truth +respecting this theory? _So then has the author of the sermon_. Such is +the testimony on the one side; and on the other we have decided +predestinarians acknowledging, as an article of their creed, what in the +sermon was urged as only a logical consequence. According to this +system, says the sermon, "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as +certainly as it made the world." Hear the Boston Telegraph:--"God, for +his own glory and for the good of the world, said, _Let there be sin, +and there was sin!_" Now I beg the reader to look at this subject for a +moment. For brevity's sake we will call the Boston Telegraph and its +supporters No. 1; the Andover theological seminary and its supporters, +which constitute by far the larger body of predestinarians in +New-England, No. 2; and the New-Haven divines and their supporters No. +3. The sermon charges predestination with making God the author of sin. +No. 2 says this is false: I neither believe it, nor is it to be inferred +from my premises. _It is true_, says No. 1: I am willing to admit that +God is the efficient cause of sin. He said, Let there be sin, and there +was sin. _It is true_, responds No 3, that all who hold and explain +predestination as Nos. 1 and 2 explain it, are exposed to the full force +of the objections in the sermon--against such views "the arguments of +the sermon are unanswerable." No. 2, in vindication, says that No. 1 is +on the old plan--very few hold with him in these days. And as for No. 3, +he is already a rank Arminian; and if he would be consistent, he must +give up unconditional election, and embrace the whole Arminian theory. +Thus do they destroy each other, and confirm the doctrine of the sermon. +And shall we still be told that we do not understand this doctrine? Have +anti-predestinarians misunderstood this from John Calvin's day to the +present? Does honest No. 1 misunderstand it? Does well instructed No. 3 +misunderstand it? What then is Calvinism, that cannot, through the lapse +of centuries, make itself understood either by friend or foe? Is not +this, of itself, a suspicious trait in its character? Let us quote a +Calvinistic writer, whose sentiments are much in point, though aimed at +the New Divinity:--"It is a serious ground of suspicion," says this +writer, "that Dr. Taylor has failed, according to his own repeated +declarations, to render his speculations intelligible to others. It must +be granted that a man of sense, who is acquainted with the power of +language, can, if he is disposed, make himself understood." "Some of the +most intelligent men in the country have utterly failed to compass Dr. +T.'s meaning in argument: so that he declares again and again, I am not +understood--I am misrepresented. Who under such circumstances can +refrain from suspicion?" "Another suspicious circumstance in the case +is, that Dr. Taylor expresses himself in ambiguous terms and phrases, +which, though they are designed to influence the mind of a reader, +afford him the opportunity to avoid responsibility." See pamphlet by +Edwardian, pp. 28 and 29. If this is justly said of Dr. Taylor's +_recent_ theory, what shall we say of a system the advocates of which, +"according to their repeated declarations, have not been able to render +their speculations intelligible," after the theory has had exhausted +upon it the highly cultivated intellects of hosts of expositors through +successive generations? "Who, under such circumstances, can refrain from +suspicion?" especially since these advocates have learned "to express +themselves in ambiguous terms and phrases which, though they are +designed to influence the mind of a reader, afford them an opportunity +to avoid responsibility." To Calvinism it may truly be said, "Out of +thine own mouth will I judge thee." Let not the author of the sermon +then be accused of bearing false witness, when his testimony is +predicated on principles which Calvinists have laid down, and is also +corroborated by men of their "own class." + +Will it be said, All this is not argument. I answer, The sermon, it is +supposed, contains arguments--arguments which professed predestinarians +themselves tell us are unanswerable against the prevailing modes of +stating and explaining the doctrine. Now let them be answered, if they +can be. Let them be answered, not by giving up predestination, in the +Calvinistic sense, and still professing to hold it--not by attempting to +avoid the logical consequences, by giving the system the thousandth +explanation, when the nine hundred and ninety-nine already given have +made it no plainer, nor evaded at all the just consequences, so often +charged upon it; and when these are answered, it will then be time +enough to call for new arguments. + +Having prepared the way, as I hope, by the preceding numbers, for the +proper understanding of the controversy; and having, by the remarks just +made, attempted (with what success the reader must judge) to repel the +charges of misrepresentation and bearing false witness, made against me, +as the author of the sermon which gave rise to the controversy, I am now +prepared, in my next number to commence an examination of some of the +questions of doctrine, connected with this discussion. In doing which, +my object will be, to let "Greek with Greek contend" so far as to show, +if possible, the inconsistency of both, and then present the doctrine +which we believe to be the true system, and show how it stands untouched +by the conflicting elements around it as the immovable foundation of the +Church of God. I shall begin with the Divine purposes including +foreknowledge; then take up human agency and responsibility; and last, +regeneration, connected with the doctrine of human depravity, Divine and +human agency, &c. May He that said, "Let light be, and light was," +"shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of +God, in the face of Jesus Christ." + + + + +NUMBER VI. + +PREDESTINATION. + +Definitions are the foundations of reasoning. Hence in any reply to my +sermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair that the +first inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The definition of +predestination assumed in the sermon was, that unalterable purpose and +efficient decree of God, by which the moral character and responsible +acts of man were definitely fixed and efficiently produced. On this +point the sermon joined issue. To this definition most of the notices +and reviews, to the number of six or seven, which I have seen, have +taken exceptions. The review in the Boston Telegraph, however, is not of +this number.--That, as has already been noticed, agrees with the charge +in the sermon, that "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as directly as +it made the world." We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord +to that sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of +the sermon--against the common sense of the world--against their own +convictions of right and wrong--and, I may add, against their own +brethren of "the class," some of whom have already publicly denounced +the sentiment as "horrid blasphemy." At this day of light, in which +_naked Calvinism_ is abhorred by most of those who bear the name of +Calvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer to such a +review. We approve of the _logical consistency_ of these men--we admire +the moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes out a theory to +its legitimate results without flinching; but we are astonished at the +_moral nerve_ that can contemplate such results with complacency. For +myself I confess when I see this naked system of Calvinism fulminating +the curse of reprobation in the teeth of the miserable wretch whose only +crime is, that his God has made him a sinner, my heart recoils with +indescribable horror! Let him contemplate this picture who can. I covet +not his head or his heart. + +Of others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two +classes: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who +favour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called +Reformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of +Calvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their +views on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At present I +shall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and to the first +and second notices of the sermon in the Christian Spectator. And here +let me say, once for all, that I do not consider either of these +gentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible for the doctrine of +predestination as stated and opposed in the sermon. This I hope will be +satisfactory. If these gentlemen should ask me why I published my sermon +in terms that included Calvinists generally, without making the +exception in their favour, I answer, 1. The views of Dr. Taylor and +"those who believe with him," on this particular point, were unknown to +me at the time. Nor is this strange, for it is but lately that those +views have been fully developed--never so fully before, probably, as in +Dr. Fitch's review of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never +occurred to me that any man or any set of men holding, in respect to +predestination, the doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the +whole body of Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all +the apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must +judge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be Methodistical +on the subject of predestination, I by no means would be understood to +say this of their system as a whole--the objectionable parts will be +noticed in their place. But whatever is true is none the less so for +being mixed with error. There are some things, however, to be regretted +and exposed in the manner in which these reviewers have expressed their +doctrine of predestination, and also in the manner in which they have +opposed the sermon and Arminianism generally. They complain of my +definition of predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness. +The reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they +themselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation of +predestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their views. +But what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the determination with +which these gentlemen persist in holding up the idea that their views +essentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in his answer to my reply, +says:-- + +"There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the Divine +purposes in relation to a moral kingdom:-- + +1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures, +purposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_. + +2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures +shall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to +that conduct. + +3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the +different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to +_pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible +results_." + +"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk, +in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his +objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it passes +over in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by +which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the +_sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the +Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has +misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches +that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he +has a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and +contingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose +life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after +and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who +believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave +this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the +following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay, +namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a +believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in +God which determines character. That such was not the character of my +creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review, +if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As God +foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue +in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own +infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to +'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible +good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his +answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an +undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first +view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the +third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact +of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded +in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which +Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my +statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third," +and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the +Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk +to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of +foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to +maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three +views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other +Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself +acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we +must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore +on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists. + +That the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the +Methodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr. +Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed +include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but +also that God "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best +possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude +sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of +the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this +matter they have identified themselves with Arminians. + +"To God," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all +things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power, +as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can +do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or +oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin, +with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would +counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created +man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued +with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which +he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a +moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence +be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus +contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it +would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence. +Whereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and +goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and +free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil." + +Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: "In the +moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine +will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope +for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of +God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the +subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of +lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the +Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining +that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he +purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best +possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or +is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he +could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he +persist in talking of a difference where there is none? + +Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading +my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist +brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong +arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism, +I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you +will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it +Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about +terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the +doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be +regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be +when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly +and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever +suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him +incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us, +called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who +was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for +the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of +disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself +understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists +themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author +of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an +Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as +anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian. + +Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In +reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place +this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could +not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had +complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected +with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself +as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first +principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has +succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas +it is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from +the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven +doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great +pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our +system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that +strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged +that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go +on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold +to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be +taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the +third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are +agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same +breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these +gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us +in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we +certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must +pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in +this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned, +and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay, +they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our +present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed +in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an +opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_ + +In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms +to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination +or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable +and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one +place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed +of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best +possible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing +his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the +entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg +the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he +does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely +occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a +contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between +a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing +that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's "deciding on +the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean +almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the +subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was +unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer +it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in +every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is +predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a +Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the +commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though +unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to +"make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures +accordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were +driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured, +to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and +united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy +were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time +rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by +Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing." +He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than +suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city +with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the +reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put +to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or +foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common +consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and +if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the +theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the +great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England +even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the +New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe God +hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." + +Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not +in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the +sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to +foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because, +say they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he +could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge +in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at +least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in +error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which +will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to +take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "God knows all that is, or will +be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is +the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow +forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy +here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its +adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free +moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also +saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his +own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite +wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would +certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and +therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his +determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's +foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must +be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern +the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_, +a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and +therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should +be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and +which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of +knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the +sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "God foreknows +in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in +order to foreknow." + +To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one +class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with +all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly +increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all +but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There +is still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny +the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are +not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In +the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from +their own positions this definition. + + + + +NUMBER VII. + +PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED. + +From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes +of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one +there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the +doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because +their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and +all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too +monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a +larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven +divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are +nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They +deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private +statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine. +They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea, +that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and +efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,"--that these acts +"are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the +will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by +some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence, +I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine +characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least, +be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition +of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our +own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are +these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I +shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the +candid judge. + +1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this +question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians +themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect +to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging +these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system. +And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of +understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume +that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own +doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be +asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the +pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal +opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought +first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also +exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit +that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There +have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and +how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to +them as to be able to see it free from these charges? + +But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these +opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a +great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before +been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will, +by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been +given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they +held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To +these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly +acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the +sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral +evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not +be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied +Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding +it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to +holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections +brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the +Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated +predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers +for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be. +The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand +that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in +producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not +angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his +decrees. + +Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on +either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that +a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of +predestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine +of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence, +certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians +persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the +doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the +additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill +at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never +succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from +these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very +many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for +the _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had +been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and +that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new +modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up, +until finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of +the doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many +others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles +involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was "no hell"--no +judgment, and "no angry God." Suppose, I say, this intelligent man +should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to +_presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the +doctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question. +There is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are +correct. + +2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have +defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon +it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and +circumstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms are +_decree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose_, +&c.--These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of +absolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong +and imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some +strong qualifying terms, such as _sovereign decree, eternal and +immutable purposes;_ and without any reference to other bearings, the +whole is placed on the ground of God's absolute and sovereign will. +These sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in +the light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be +broken. They are the _secret counsels_ of his own will; and so far from +being law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral +world, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When +these decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may +sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to +subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he +executes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of +this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously +maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its +stead, and is the _necessary means_ of the _greatest good_. The idea +that God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible +circumstances, _so ordered his works_ as to take up and incorporate into +his plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus constitute a +grand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government +could be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that +decrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived +them--dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified +by subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with +absolute and arbitrary sway; can it be _possible_, I say, that such +decrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will? Must not +he who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form +and execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to +this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes, +follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on +this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most assuredly he +must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative, +controlling and propelling energy that + + "Lives through all life, extends through all extent, + Acts undivided, operates unspent." + +And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this +subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and +is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:--"The Divine decree is the +determination to _produce_ the universe, that is, the _whole series_ of +_beings_ and _events_ that was then future." Dr. Chalmers, who has been +esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had +not given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon +on predestination in the following language:--"Every step of every +individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand, +of God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or +every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every +rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is +absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its +resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of +existence. It _reigns_ and operates through all the secrecies of the +inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every +desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an +entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and +the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of +their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives +movement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no +moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, +and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the +region beyond it!!!" These quotations need no comment; if they do not +come up to all we have ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no +definite meaning in words. + +But we have another authority on this subject, which bears more directly +on the Calvinists of this country, the Assembly's Catechism. Dr. Fitch, +who is certainly as well qualified to judge in this matter as another +man, informs us, through the medium of the Christian Spectator, that +"the articles of faith prepared by that body, (the assembly of English +and Scotch divines at Westminster,) are considered as expressing +essentially the views not only of the Presbyterian Church in this +country, but also of the orthodox Congregational Churches of +New-England." It is known, also, that the Shorter Catechism has been +almost universally used by them in their families, and in the religious +instruction of their children. Here then we have a standard of faith, +which all the _classes_, I suppose, will acknowledge,--and what saith +it? After stating that the decrees of God are his eternal purpose, +according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he +hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass, it goes on to say, "God +_executeth_ his decrees in the works of creation and providence," and +then for farther explanation adds--"God's works of providence are his +most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his +creatures and all their actions." This is certainly an awkward sentence, +if I may be allowed to say this of the productions of an assembly which +has been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and +theology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must be, +that by his acts of providence God, in a most holy, wise, and powerful +manner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and all their +actions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk about _preserving +actions_, we will understand _preserving_ to belong to _creatures_, and +_governing_ to _actions_, and then it will be thus: God powerfully +preserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs all their actions: +and it is in this way he _executes_ his decrees. There are evidently two +methods of governing. That control which is made up of legal precepts, +and sanctions, and retributions, is called a government; not that all +the subjects of such a government always obey its ordinances, but if +they violate them, they are subjected to punishment. _This_ is evidently +not the kind of government that the assembly contemplated. It was a +government by which God _executed his decrees;_ but, as we have seen, +his decrees are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct +opposition to his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed, +in respect to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those +demands are coincident they differ greatly in the _manner_ and +_certainty_ of their fulfilment. Of course government, by _executing +decrees_, is another thing altogether from government by _executing +laws_. But there is another kind of government. It is that _efficient +control_ of a superior, by which a being or an act is _made to be what +it is_, in opposition to _non-existence_, or a _different existence_. +Now this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to when +it said, "God _executes his decrees_ by powerfully _governing_ all the +actions of his creatures." That is, he efficiently produces and controls +all the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the moral universe. And +what is this, but affirming all that the sermon has affirmed on this +subject? If any one is disposed to deny that this is a fair exposition +of the Catechism, let him reflect that as he cannot pretend that +_government_ here means a _legal administration_, it will be incumbent +on him to show what other fair construction can be put upon it than the +one given above; to show how God can execute a secret decree, by his own +powerful act, in any other way than in the one already explained. + +In corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in mind, +that the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms, _decree, +predestination_, &c, in the _same sense_, in reference to _all events_. +They say, God's decrees extend to all events, physical and moral, good +and evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any thing intelligible, +that his predestination bears the same relation to all events. If then +his decree of election embraces the means to the accomplishment of the +end, so also must his decree of reprobation. If his decree of election +requires for its accomplishment an _efficient_ operation, so also does +his decree of reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently, +requisite to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the +same sense requisite to produce a sinful volition. + +To tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or discrimination, +that all things are _equally_ the result of the Divine decree, and then +tell us that the relation between God's decree and sin is essentially +different from the relation existing between his decree and holiness, +would certainly be a very singular and unwarrantable use of language. +How then, I inquire, does God produce holy volitions?--Why, say the +Calvinists, by a direct, positive, and efficient influence upon the +will, and in proof quote--"Thy people _shall_ be willing in the day of +thy power." Well, how, I ask again, does God execute his decrees +respecting unholy volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But, +says the Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce +unholy volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful +men to sin. Indeed! and is not this _nature_ the result of a decree? It +would seem God approaches his work of executing his decree _respecting +sin_, either more reluctantly or with greater difficulty, so that it +requires two steps to execute this, and only one the other. It is in +both cases, however, equally his work. This will be seen more clearly if +we turn our attention to the first sin; for it is certainly as much +against a perfectly holy nature to commit sin, as it is against an +unholy nature to have a holy volition. Hence the one as much requires a +direct and positive influence as the other, and therefore the passage in +the 110th Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in +changing the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has +been generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:--Not only shall +thy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not yet in a +strict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become holy in the day +that thou dost efficiently change their will, but also thy angels and +thy first created human pair, who were before their fall more truly +thine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall be made willing to become +unholy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their wills from +submission to rebellion. For if Divine efficiency is necessary to make a +naturally perverse will holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally +holy will perverse. + +I am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although God does +efficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to the nature +of mind, and consistent with free agency, because he operates upon the +mind through the influence of moral suasion, or by the power of motives. +To this it may be answered, that the Calvinists generally condemn Dr. +Taylor's views of conversion, because they suspect him of holding that +motives alone convert the sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that +the Holy Spirit should act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I +have shown above, it is also necessary that there should be a direct +Divine influence upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And +this more especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in +the same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives +leads me to another argument, viz. + +3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears +evident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when this +doctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of +depravity. + +The doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that "the power of +volition is never excited, nor _can be_, except in the presence and from +the excitement of motives," (see "Views in Theology,") and that the mind +must necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by what appears +to the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, following Leibnitz, +incorporated this doctrine of philosophical necessity with the +Calvinistic theology. In this he has been followed by a great portion, I +believe, of the Calvinistic clergy. Without stopping here to attempt a +refutation of this theory, my present object is to show that it +necessarily fastens upon Calvinism the charges brought against it, and +sustains the definition that has been given to predestination. For since +God creates both the mind and the motives, and brings them together for +the _express purpose_ that the former should be swayed by the latter, it +follows conclusively that God _efficiently_ controls the will, and +produces all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic +teaching:--"God," says the author of "Views in Theology," already +quoted, "God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the +determiners of choices." The inference therefore is plain and +unavoidable, _God is the determiner of choices_. The plea that God does +not produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, through +second causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, or ten +thousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our Creator in +such order as to produce the intellectual vibration intended, whenever +he pleases to give the impulse, what is the difference? In point of +efficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will it alter the case to say, +that "this effect is produced by God through such a medium as is suited +to the nature of the mind, and therefore it cannot be said, that God +does any violence to the will, or to man's free agency." God created the +_mind_, and the _means_ that were to influence it. He gave to mind its +nature, and to motives their influence and arrangement, for _this very +purpose_. Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he is _bound by the law +of his nature_ to act in all cases as he does. Why talk about a _free_ +agency when it is such an agency as _must_, by _the constitution_ of +_God_, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the premises, +foolish reply, that man could do differently, _if he chose_, does not +help the case. It is only saying, the nature of man is such that it is +governed by his perceptions, and since "God is the determiner of +perceptions, and perceptions the determiners of choices," whenever God +pleases to alter the perceptions so as thereby to change the choice, +_then_, and not before, man can do differently. According to this +doctrine is it possible, according to the very nature of mind, for the +choice to be different until the perceptions are changed? And can the +perceptions be changed, until God changes them? To answer either or both +of these questions in the affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine +of motives. To answer them in the negative, would be to entail upon the +doctrine all that I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory +may have their choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this +argument, to say "man has an _unholy nature;_ and this is the reason why +the motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is +chargeable upon himself, and God is clear." For, in the first place, +this would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels and +the first human pair. + +This argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man's +_unholy nature_, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be +valid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument obviously +affords no relief to the system, it follows that in these uses, at +least, God is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy volitions--and +therefore the charges against predestination are established. But by a +little farther attention we shall see that this argument affords as +little relief to the system in the case of man as he now is. For this +first sin, which was itself the necessary result of the Divine +arrangement and of positive Divine influence, threw, if possible, a +stronger and a more dire necessity over all the coming generations of +men. For this act entailed upon man a depraved heart. Hence this corrupt +nature came upon man without his knowledge or agency. We trace it back +then, thus:--Man's love of sin was produced by the unholy choice of the +first pair--that choice was produced by perceptions--these perceptions +were produced by motives--and these motives were brought by God to bear +upon the minds which he had made for this very purpose--therefore God, +by design, and because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and +then, for the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth +unholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, which, +from the unavoidable nature of those minds, _must produce_ the sin +designed. It is thus that, according to his theory, our Creator binds +the human mind by the strong cords of depravity with one hand, and with +the other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of motives, into all the +excitement of unholy delirium; and then, for his own glory, consigns the +sinner over to the prison house of wo!! Turn this system, then, as you +will, you find this doctrine of predestination binding the human mind, +and efficiently producing all the volitions of the moral universe. The +strong arm of Jehovah not more directly and irresistibly moves and binds +the planets in their orbits, than it moves and controls, in the +mysterious circle of his eternal decrees, "all the actions of all his +creatures." + +I know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our +inferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are responsible, +because _we are conscious of it_. This is a most singular course of +reasoning, and seems to have been adopted to reconcile contradictions. +If this doctrine be true, I am not _sure_ that I am free, and that I am +responsible merely because I feel that I am. I am at least _quite_ as +conscious that I ought not to be held responsible for what is +unavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of moral liberty. Break down my +consciousness in one case, and you prepare the way for me to suspect it +of fallacy in another. And if I must give up my consciousness, between +two alternatives I will choose that which will not involve the +government of God in injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in +unavoidable perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards' premises, which he holds +in common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship's conclusion, +viz. that God never intended to hold men responsible, and the universal +feeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud--a salutary delusion, +imposed as a check and restraint upon man here, but to be followed by no +unpleasant consequences either here or hereafter. But this would be +charging our Creator with both deception and folly--deception in the +delusive consciousness of responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord +Kaimes and others to disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine +purpose! This cannot be. The charge of deception and of fallacy, +therefore, must be rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of +God upon the doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should +crush the theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the +Church and to the world. + +To conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the +charges contained in the sermon against that modification of Calvinism I +am now opposing, are just; and the definition assumed, is correct. If +the advocates of the system can clear themselves, or their doctrine, let +it be done. If not, let one of two courses be pursued--either let the +system be abandoned, or _let us have it as it is_. + +I have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I +believe we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, "You +misrepresent us!" "You mistake our doctrine!" + +In the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human agency, +and the ground of human responsibility, will be examined. + + + + +NUMBER VIII. + +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. + +BY what has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, it +will be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity of moral +action as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, I grant, to +give to the terms _will, liberty, free agency_, such a definition as +will make these terms, _thus defined_, compatible with the other +peculiarities of the Calvinistic system.--Both parties agree that man is +a free moral agent; both maintain that he is responsible; but we +maintain that what the Calvinists call free moral agency, is not such in +fact as is commonly understood by the term, nor such as is requisite to +make man accountable. Here, therefore, we are again thrown back upon our +definitions, as the starting point of argument. What is that power, or +property, or faculty of the mind, which constitutes man a free moral +agent? It is the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose +either good or evil. Both the _power_ and _liberty_ to choose either +_good_ or _evil_ are requisite to constitute the free agency of a +probationer. It has been contended that choice, though from the +condition of the moral agent it must of necessity be exclusively _on one +side_, is nevertheless free; since it implies a _voluntary_ preference +of the mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels, +glorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined in +an impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and invincible +enmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With respect to the free +agency of these beings, a question might be started, whether it is such +as renders them responsible for their _present acts_, the decision of +which might have some bearing on the subject under investigation; but +not such bearing as would make it important to discuss it here. If they +are responsible for their _present acts_, it must be on account of a +former probation, which by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any +one thinks otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is +not, and _never was_ so circumstanced as to render the choice of good +possible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such sense +as renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I have no +controversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage upon all +the acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert it would be a +work of little profit. + +It is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose +states are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their +probationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency +unsuited to illustrate the agency of beings who are on probation. Man, +in this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are presented before +him as objects of choice; and upon this choice are suspended eternal +consequences of happiness or misery. Of a being thus circumstanced, it +is not enough to say he is free to choose as he does, unless you can +say, also, he is equally free to make an opposite choice.--Hence, in +defining the free agency of man, as a probationer, we say, as above, +that it implies a power of choice, with full liberty to choose either +good or evil. + +The foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all +practical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a speculative +philosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of metaphysics for +decomposition and analysis. It is doubtful whether this process has +subserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I think, that it has +produced many perplexing refinements and speculations that have greatly +aided the cause of error. Into these abstrusities, therefore, it seems +necessary to follow this question, to try, if possible, to draw out and +combine the elements of truth. + +Having defined free agency to mean _the power of choice_, &c, it is +asked again, _What is this power of choice?_ It is probable that the +different answers given to this question constitute the fundamental +differences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question +some, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, "We cannot tell." +And they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar to that +which influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer will involve +themselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a very convenient way +to avoid responsibility, but not indicative of much fairness, or +confidence in their cause. When men have involved their system in +apparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the candid inquirer +after truth to see them start aside from the very point that is to give +character to their whole system. We are told by men who reason upon +foreknowledge, &c, that "God hath decreed whatsoever comes to pass;" and +then we are told that all men are free, and they enter into a great deal +of metaphysical speculation about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary +action, &c, to prove these positions; but when they are pressed upon +this point, "How can you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine +efficiency necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that +kind of dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?" the +reply is, "We cannot tell--the how in the case we cannot explain." This +evasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following +cases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out of +what is _mysterious_, and not of what is _palpably contradictory;_ or, +2. If both propositions were so _clearly proved_, that it would do +greater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon all +acknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, than it +would to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. With +respect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless it +would so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, that +the want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack of light +in the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things compared. +When you say, "God executes his decrees by efficiently controlling the +will of man," and say also, "The mind of man is free," both these +propositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about them. But you +say, perhaps, "The mystery is in the want of light to see the +_agreement_ of the two; we cannot _see_ their agreement, but we should +not therefore infer that they do not agree." I answer, What is light, in +this case, but a clear conception of the propositions? This we have, and +we see that they are, _in their nature_, incompatible; and the more +light you can pour upon this subject, the more clearly must this +incompatibility appear. If you say that "perhaps neither you nor I fully +understand the meaning of these propositions;" then I reply, _We have no +business to use them_. "Who is this that darkens counsel by words +without knowledge?" And this is what I have already complained of; men +will reason themselves into propositions which they call doctrinal +facts, but which seem to the eye of common sense to have all the +characteristics of contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions +in objection, the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because +we do not fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions +must be received, _though we do not understand them!_ and though, as far +as we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the +way to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more +consistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since the +doctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that freedom, +therefore this doctrine should be exploded! + +Or will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that +both of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them +would do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of belief, +than to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent incongruity? +Let us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, unless we doubt all +primary truths, viz. That the human mind is free. It is presumed, if the +question come to this, that they must either give up human liberty or +the dogma of predestination, candid Calvinists themselves would not +hesitate; they would say, the _former_ must stand, whatever becomes of +the _latter_. If I am correct here, it follows that, predestinarians +themselves being judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear +as some other moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man +ought not to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought +not to be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled +by a superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make +it, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, then +we come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the compatibility +of predestination with human liberty and accountability does more +violence to the laws of belief than it would to discard predestination. +Whatever, therefore, may _seem_ to be favourable to this doctrine, +should be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our belief in another +direction. But, that the argument may be set in as strong light as +possible, let the evidence of predestination be adduced. What is it? It +is not consciousness certainly; and it is almost as clear that it is not +moral demonstration by a course of reasoning. The most I believe that +has ever been said, in the way of moral demonstration, has been in an +argument founded on foreknowledge, which argument, it is supposed by the +author, is fairly disposed of in the sermon on predestination, by +reasoning which has not, to his knowledge, ever been refuted. A +refutation has been attempted, I grant, by some of the reviewers of the +sermon, but the only apparent success that attended those attempts was, +as we have already seen, in consequence of their taking the very ground +of the sermon, and building the decrees of God upon a prior view and +knowledge of all possible contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning +are taken away from this doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but +testimony. And no testimony but Divine will here be of any authority; +and does revelation prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination +it was stated that "there was not a single passage in the Bible which +teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;" +and it is not known to the writer, that among the different reviews of +the sermon it has even been attempted to show that the statement was +incorrect. But if a solitary passage could have been adduced, should we +not have heard of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any, +is indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony +is far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great portion of +believers in revelation think. + +Now, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of thought +thus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, and +honestly answer the following question--"Is there so much evidence in +favour of predestination, that I should do more violence to my own +reason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I should by +believing that this doctrine is compatible with free agency and +accountability?" Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so felt the force of +these difficulties, when the terms predestination and free will have +been understood in their common and obvious sense, that they have +attempted a variety of explanations of these terms to do away, if +possible, the apparent discrepancy. These attempts have been the +principal cause of those changes and modifications in the Calvinistic +system, alluded to in a former number. The various explanations and +definitions that have been given to foreordination, have already been +noticed. We have seen how every effort failed of affording any relief to +the system, until we came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven +divines. This new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it +only by giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to +nothing; it stands forth still the "_absolute decree_," fixed as fate, +and fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences. +Any _real_ modification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a +substitution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of Heaven, +"He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be +damned." + +Not succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination as +would harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have been +made to define and explain _human liberty_ and the _power of choice_, so +as to _bend_ these into a coincidence with the _inflexible decree_. This +brings us back to the inquiry started above: "What is this power of +choice?" Now as this is a point more metaphysical in its nature than the +proposition embracing the decrees, so there is more ground for laboured +argument and refined speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be +particularly noticed:--1. Because it is the most plausible of any other, +so that if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will; +and 2. Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and +perhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the +Calvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power of +choice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of motives, +and of deciding according to the strongest motive. The strength and +direction of volition are always in accordance with the motive. And this +relation between mind and motives is fixed by the very constitution of +our natures, so that it may be said there is a constitutional necessity +that the mind should be controlled by motives. These motives are +multitudinous and various.--All conceptions and perceptions of the mind, +from whatever cause, productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions +of love or aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes +of these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind +there is such a connection, that the _former_ not only excite, but +control the _latter_, in all its volitions. The nature of this relation +is of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all we can say +is, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is the theory. The +arguments by which it is defended are in substance the following +--experience and observation. We are conscious, it is said, of acting +from motives, and it is universally understood that others also act from +motives. It is on this principle that we govern ourselves in our +intercourse with men; by this we calculate with moral certainty, in many +instances, what will be the conduct of a man in a given case; and, upon +such calculations, we form most of our maxims, and rules of conduct in +social life: nay, it is said a man that will act without a reason must +be insane--that, on this ground, whenever a man acts it is common to +inquire what _induced_ him. What motive had he? That even children, at a +very early age so readily recognize this principle, that they are +constantly inquiring why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest +arguments by which this theory is sustained--arguments too strong it is +supposed to be overthrown. + +I object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in +offering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in his +senses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important +influence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in order to +oppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to deny that +the power of volition may have been waked up to action, in the first +instance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after may, in all +its volitions, be more or less under this influence. As these are points +which do not materially affect the question at issue between us and the +Calvinists, they may be left out of the discussion for the present. The +question is this--Has the mind a self-determining power, by which it can +spontaneously decide, independent of the _control_ of motives, or is the +mind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former--our +opponents the latter. By establishing our position, we disprove +theirs--by disproving theirs we establish ours--and it is believed that +theirs can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at +least so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these +extremely difficult points. + +1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that most +of the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and certainly +prove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute control of motives +as that human minds are. It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of +spontaneous volition, independent of the _control_ of motives, involves +the absurdity, that "our volitions are excited without any intelligent +reasons whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better +than a mere brute or senseless mechanism." (_Views in Theology_, p. +163.)--Now if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to +human mind and human volition merely, but to _mind in general_, and must +apply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the +arguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists are +convinced of this--and hence this also is a part of their creed. It was +defended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor Upham, in his +System of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he +says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same +with that of the Supreme Being himself--he is _inevitably_ governed in +all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and +best." (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine Being is, according to this +theory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the +theory, "_inevitably_" made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed +there is no avoiding this conclusion; and what then? Why then the +doctrine makes God a necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is +nearly, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate. +The ancient heathens supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent +father of the gods and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach +that there is a certain fitness of things, certain constitutional +relations, existing independent of the Divine will, which God himself +cannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at +once, both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of +his wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain +fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by God himself, for that +would be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the order of +cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of +motive, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine +volition willed it into being and if he could once act independent of +this control, he might so act for ever; and the argument built on the +absurdity of volition, without an intelligent reason, is contradicted. +But if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and +effect, a paramount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of +the Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This +is fate! This is atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the +Divine mind, call that influence what you will, _fitness of +things--fate--energy_ of nature--or necessary relation, and that moment +you make God a subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, +and make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity? +Might we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under +the control of his own native influence he is led to create beings +susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the +motives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are +"inevitably" led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, that +many Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives is the +very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the _energy of +nature!_ The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his followers +is the _energy of motives_, which exists in the nature of things, +anterior to the will of God. Can any one point out any essential +difference between the two systems? + +Such are the objections to _any arguments_ in favour of the doctrine +that motives "inevitably" control the volitions of intelligent beings +_in general_, involving of course the highest intelligence. But if any +are disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to intelligent +volition in general, and choose to maintain it only in respect to the +volitions of some particular intelligent beings; then they must give up +all the strongest of their arguments. If God is free from this +_control_, they must acknowledge also, or give some reason for their +dissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and sustain subordinate +intelligences, having the same freedom from this control; and if they +acknowledge that there is nothing in the nature of the case that renders +this an impossibility, then they must show, if they can, that though God +_might_ constitute beings otherwise, he has _so constituted man_ as to +render him incapable of choice, except _when_ and _as_ motives direct, +by an inevitable influence. But in attempting this they must meet other +difficulties in their course, which, it is believed, will greatly +embarrass the system. These difficulties, however, together with the +arguments which I design to advance directly in favour of the opposite +view, must be reserved for another number. + + + + +NUMBER IX. + +MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED. + +Another argument against the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is, that it +leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this: +When the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is +_inevitably_ led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather +than of the other, unless there is a _perfect equality_ between them; in +which case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium; +for if it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the same degree +and in the same direction with motive influence, of course when it is +equally attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on +this ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two +particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being +"inevitably" governed by motives in his decisions, he could not +determine where to place them, both having the same influence on his +mind for a location in the same place! The same writer represents this +motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less +effectual, and not the less voluntary! And to illustrate it makes the +following comparison:--"It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone, +were sensible of and pleased with its turning to the north, for it would +believe that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not +perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic power." This statement +of Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory, +is important in several respects. It is, in the first place, an +acknowledgment that consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is +also a concession that the mind is _imposed upon_, in this matter, by +the Creator. But with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads +to materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one +of the most _philosophical_, if not one of the most _evangelical_ of the +defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence +similar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only in being +accompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And what says +its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards? He compares +our volitions to the vibrations of a scale beam, the different ends of +which are respectively elevated or depressed as the opposite weights may +chance to vary. What is this but teaching that motions of mind are +governed by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions +are perfectly mechanical states of mind? What the advocates of this +doctrine charge on the opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to +their own system.--_They_, not we, make choices the result of animal +instinct, or senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late +exposition of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and +while he contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for +a complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our +volitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference between +the laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do we think. +But we think that difference consists in the mind's being free from that +control for which the professor contends; and we believe when he +contends for that control in the volitions of the mind, he contends for +that which, from the nature of the case, entirely destroys the other +part of his hypothesis, viz. that the operations of the mind are free, +and essentially different from mechanical motion or the laws of +attractive influence in the material world. If the attractive power of +motives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation +or magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I +cannot tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is _that very power_ +for which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it +be said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is +consciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation between +motives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it affects that +relation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, already alluded +to, clearly illustrates. Look at that flowing stream; it hastens on most +freely, and by the law of its own nature down the gentle declivities or +more precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Suppose now that +Omnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the +continuous current, it would then wake up to perceive the action and +feel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It would roll on still +by the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move +according to its own _inclination_ and voluntary tendency, for its will +would of course be in the direction of its _motive_, or in other phrase, +its _gravitating_ influence. But could it turn its course and roll back +its waters to their fountains? It could if it was so _inclined_. But its +present _inclination_ is toward the bottom of the valley or the bosom of +the ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between its +particles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls on _with +the utmost freedom_, though with the utter impossibility of changing its +own course, without an inversion of the gravitating power. Let the hand +of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and to! with the same +freedom these very waters roll back again to their original fountains! +Thus it is with the human mind. It is conscious of being free to move in +the direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course and +move in the current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it +would be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the +motive influence.--"God is the determiner of perceptions, and +perceptions are the determiners of choices." + +We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to +materialism, for it makes the analogy between mental and material action +so complete that it destroys all idea of _intellectual power_. +Philosophically speaking, there is no _power_ in the laws of nature. +What we express by the _power_ of attraction, or repulsion, or +decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency. +Does the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?--This is not an +energy inherent in nature; it is the God of nature acting by a uniform +law. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by the power of +nature. We, however, use the word _power_ in an accommodated sense in +these cases, but always I think in connection with that portion of +matter that _appears_ to act, and not _that_ which is acted upon. The +magnet, we say, has power to attract iron, because iron is attracted +toward the magnet, and not the magnet toward the iron. The antecedent, +or that which takes the lead in the motion, is more properly said to +have the power, or is the efficient cause. If then we allow of the use +of the term power at all, to express the relation of cause and effect, +growing out of a philosophical constitution of things, the term should +be applied to the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case +before us, mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive +is the cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have +_power_ to act upon the mind, and the mind has a _susceptibility_ of +being acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be acted +upon is no power, or "it is a _powerless power_," which is +philosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the +mind has no _power_ of _choice_, but has a _susceptibility_ of being +drawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will +avail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a +difference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and the +susceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what that +difference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will +doubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive +theory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often has +to assume positions to keep itself in countenance, which positions +themselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the New-Haven +divines have done to support predestination, and to this all Calvinists +are driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, or the power of +choice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence &c. We may be told in +the case before us, that "when the mind is acted upon it is then excited +to action." But how excited to action? Is the action any stronger than +the motive influence?--Is it carried beyond this influence? or in a +different direction? To answer any _one_ of these questions in the +affirmative is to give up the theory; but to answer them in the negative +is to attribute to the mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The +_motives_ are (under God) the _agent_, the _mind_ is the _passive +object_, and the _volition_ is the _effect_. Can any one say then, on +this theory, that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in +the first place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical +necessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the cause of +its own volitions, but in these volitions it is the passive subject of +foreign influences. Now, so far as moral action is concerned, how does +this differ from materialism? It is true mental action differs from +material action in some associated circumstances; it is accompanied by +consciousness; but as consciousness of itself cannot give +accountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect by being +associated with such kind of mental action as results from philosophical +necessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; and if not +accountable, it is more than probable that he has no future existence, +and thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, if not to +atheism. + +That man is not _accountable_ upon the principle we are opposing, might +have been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it with the +argument that this doctrine leads to materialism because they imply each +other. If materialism is true, we are not accountable, and if we are not +accountable, materialism is probably true; and both are true, as I +conceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is true. + +It may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the mind +is not wholly passive, because we are conscious of putting forth a +mental energy and making a responsible volition; _that_ I am ready to +grant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this system be true; +and on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this system is false. I +believe no one who pays attention to his own mind will doubt of having +this consciousness. But does that prove the truth of this theory? It is +one thing to be conscious of having this energy of mind and responsible +volition, and another to be conscious that the theory in question is +true; indeed this consciousness destroys the theory. + +Should it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this system +to materialism, that different minds are not uniformly influenced by the +same motives, nor the same minds at different times, and therefore, in +this respect, it is evident that the laws of mind and of matter differ; +I reply, It is precisely so with matter; for _that_ attracts or repels +according to its different magnetic or electrical states; or should it +be urged that mind differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed +of a peculiar energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to +review the subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do +without a motive; and this it _must_ do if the motive preponderate in +that direction, but not otherwise. + +To have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first +perception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act otherwise +than in coincidence with the motive influence of this perception; or +could it even suspend the volition this influence was calculated to +produce, until a second and more powerful motive was introduced? If it +could, then this doctrine is false; if it could not, then the mind, like +matter put in motion, must move on invariably in the same direction, and +with the same velocity of thought for ever, or until a new motive should +counteract the influence of the former! This is emphatically the _vis +inertia_ of matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to +overthrow the theory. + +Another objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the notion +of regeneration by _moral suasion_ merely. There has been much said of +late, by the various writers in the old and the _new_ school, on this +point. The new school are charged with holding that the _truth alone_, +without any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, converts the sinner. +This is considered by the old school Calvinists as a fatal error. But +why so? If motives _govern_ the mind, with absolute sway, all you _need_ +to convert a sinner, is to bring a motive strong enough to induce him to +choose God as his chief good, and he is converted. Until you do this +there is no conversion, it is impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a +sinner in any other way than by motives, for choice of good we are told +is conversion; there is no choice without a motive, and the strongest +motive governs choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent +power that changes the sinner's heart. This is the legitimate result of +The Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder +that Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; here +we have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of "_natural +ability_" unriddled. The human mind, by the constitution of its nature, +has the power of choosing according to the influence of the strongest +motive; and therefore, so far as this can be called a power, it has the +natural power to convert itself; and this is the reason why "_make you a +new heart_" is the burden of almost every sermon and exhortation in +modern preaching; all the sinner has to do is to choose, in view of +motives, and he is converted. And here, too, is unravelled that other +mystery which we have been so puzzled to understand, viz. that although +all possess the natural power to convert themselves, yet no man ever did +convert himself without the special interposition of the Divine agency; +for, observe, God keeps the motives in his own hands; "God is the +determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of +_choices;_" that is, of _conversions;_ for to choose in a particular +way, is to be converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the +sinner convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he +is disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings +the motive and mind in contact, and _it is done_. Thus the sinner has as +much power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat when he is +hungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a susceptibility of +being operated upon, and controlled by the strongest motive; and thus +you see, also, that _God_ converts the sinner, because he supplies the +motive that influences the choice; and here, too, is seen the occasion +for misquoting so frequently and misapplying so universally, that +passage in the Psalms: "[My] people shall be [made] willing in the day +of [my] power." That is, when God applies the controlling motive to +influence to a right choice, then shall the sinner, by a law of his +nature, _become willing to be converted_. Such are the wonderful +philosophical discoveries of modern theology! This is the way for man to +convert _himself_ by natural power, and this is the way for _God_ to +convert him, without the aid of _super_ natural power! Well might a +divine of this cast, whom I heard preach not long since, say of +regeneration, "There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in it." For +surely it is one of the most natural things in the world, according to +this theory, to be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a +motive, according to the law of his natural constitution, and the man is +converted. + +This _philosophy of Christian experience_ has led modern orthodoxy to +the very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do +without a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the +philosopher in his study, and _work out_ a religious experience, as +philosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; we +will show the _rationale_ of the whole process, and demonstrate it so +clearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the Gospel, +and be induced to "_submit_" to God with scarcely a change of theory. +Hereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration is a +mystery--that in this work we cannot tell whence the regenerating +influence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes through the +philosophical channel of motive influence by which it introduces a +"governing purpose" into the mind, and the work is done. Let no man +hereafter say that his "faith stands not in the wisdom of man, but in +the power of God;" or "if any man would be wise let him become a fool +that he may be wise;" or "the wisdom of man is foolishness with God;" +for lo, the philosophy of regeneration is at length explained! and the +whole secret is found to consist in the philosophical relation between +motives and mind!! Can any one wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in +Germany, and in New-England, Calvinism has finally resulted in +Socinianism? And can any one help trembling for a large portion of the +orthodox Churches among us at the present day? Grant that there is an +increase of zeal, a greater stir among the people, more revivals, &c; +all these, with a good foundation, would promise well for the Church; +but we fear there is a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to +insinuate that the work is always spurious and the professed conversions +unsound. In many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It +might be expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under +the paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and +_apparently_ opposite theory should rouse many to action. "I had been +taught," said a man not far from this, "that I must wait God's time to +be converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more recently I have +been instructed that I might convert myself; I set about the work, and I +believe it is done!" Now this, which in the relation borders upon the +ludicrous, might have been a genuine conversion. His new views might +only have been sufficient to arouse him to a co-operation with the Holy +Spirit in his conversion; and this may have been the case with +thousands. In their practical effects two opposite errors may, in +individual cases, neutralize each other.--But is either therefore safe? +Will the general effect be salutary? Let the history of the Church +speak; and in view of that record I confess I fear for our common Zion. +But let not the old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger +upon the new school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from +that root which they have cultivated with such assiduity and care. It +grows out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the +entire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions upon +the directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the theory by +which that influence is explained. + +Another argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the +consideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in most +of our calculations respecting human agents.--Though we may judge +something of what will be the conduct of men in given circumstances, yet +our calculations are very far from coming up to mechanical exactness. +Motives have some influence; but that influence is very variable and +uncertain. Why is this? It is not so in matter; the same causes will +produce the same effects to the end of time. But we see many choose, +without being able to give what, _in their own estimation_, is a valid +reason; they did thus because they chose to do so; they act in defiance +of the strongest motives, drawn from whatever source. We see the +greatest possible caprice in the volitions of men; we see their minds +starting aside, and putting on the greatest possible and unaccountable +mental states, in a way and form that baffles all human calculation, and +will for ever baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to +reduce to uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to +fix, in an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his +labours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after all, +that living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we call the +human soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our calculations. If +this consideration should have no direct weight in opposition to the +theory I am opposing, it will at least show the absurdity of defending +this system by what is called the _known regularity_ and _uniform +phenomena_ of human volitions. To talk of _uniformity_ here, is to talk +of, to say the least, what does not exist. + +In the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in favour +of the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they are not so +much direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they are attempts to +show the absurdity of denying it. But when statements of this kind are +accompanied by no arguments, they need only be met by a denial. "We are +conscious," say the theorists, "of being controlled by motives:" I +reply, we are not conscious of this control, but we are conscious of the +contrary fact. We know, indeed, that motives have their influence; but +we know also that the mind has an influence over motives, and probably a +greater influence than motives have over _it_. The mind is conscious too +of having an influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing +energy, a spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is +predicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become +clearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have an +irresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as +certainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those cases +now, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the result of the +will. + +It is said again, that to deny this control "involves the absurdity that +our volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and are the +result of a brute or senseless mechanism." It appears to me, however, +that a system which represents the will as mechanically governed by +motives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a machine; while the +theory that gives the mind a spontaneous power and energy of its own, +makes him what he is, _an intelligent, responsible agent_. + +Since, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that +motives control the mind, are _assertions_ and not _proofs;_ and since +the theory itself leads to _fate_, to _atheism_, to _materialism_, to +_conversion_ by mere _moral suasion_, to the subversion of _human +liberty_ and _moral responsibility_, we must believe the theory false. +But against the theory of the spontaneous power of the mind, none of +these objections lie. It accords too with consciousness; and is, in +fact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can +be predicated. The opposite view claims our assent to two incongruous +and apparently contradictory propositions, between which there is not +only no agreement, but an evident repugnancy. This is the embarrassment +in the one case, and it is fatal to the theory. + +If there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of mind +or matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarrassments are +evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two +antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the +more apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to +human knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the theory we defend is, +we cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind +operates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in +which other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement +clear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided +into parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of +the mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act +in this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and +of memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing, +and of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me +_how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the +same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to +ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the +mind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--God _made it +so_. When you analyze until you come to the original elements, or when +you trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must +stop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you +cannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal +skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its +volitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its +other embarrassments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its +advocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an +analysis of constituent principles, or of causes and effects, but the +origin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the +will of the Creator. _It is so, because God hath made it so_. And the +nature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However +impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which +we _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission. + +I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther +explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of +philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession +to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the +material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_ +that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy +operating in a uniform way. "Let it be granted," a Calvinist might say, +"that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the +supreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to +defend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the +human mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of +the Divine mind operating in a uniform way." + +To this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in any +proper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of mind. If +any one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not power. In +other words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot act only as +acted upon, there is no such thing as _power_ in the universe! and thus +we again land in atheism. But if _mind_ has power, as all theists must +grant, then the _human_ mind may have power. If any one can prove that +it is impossible, in the nature of things, for the Supreme Being to +create and sustain subordinate agents, with a spontaneous power of +thought and moral action, to a limited extent, in that case we must give +up our theory. But it is presumed no one can prove this, or will even +attempt to prove it. We say, God has created such agents, and that they +act, in their responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either +directly or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that God +made man "in his own image;" his _moral_ image doubtless. Man, then, in +his own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, the +power of spontaneous moral action: this, _this only_, is the ground of +his responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man entirely out of +the control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. It only puts him out +of the control of such direct influences as would destroy his moral +liberty. Does the power of moral action, independent of the magistracy +and the laws, destroy all the control of the civil government over +malefactors? How much less in the other case? God can prevent all the +mischief that a vicious agent might attempt, without throwing any +restraint upon his responsible volitions. It is thus that he "makes the +wrath of man praise him, and the remainder of wrath he restrains." + +Let it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as indeed it +has been understood heretofore by those who have carefully examined the +subject, that when the Calvinists talk about "free will," and "human +liberty," they mean something _essentially different_ from what we mean +by these terms; and, as it is believed, something essentially different +from the _popular_ meaning of these terms. They believe in human +liberty, they say, and the power of choice, and we are bound to believe +them; but we are also bound not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by +terms. _Theirs_ is a liberty and power of a moral agent to will _as he +does_, and _not otherwise_. _Ours_ is an unrestricted liberty, and a +spontaneous power in all responsible volitions, to _choose as we do_, or +_otherwise_. + +Thus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or evil, +according to its original constitution. How far this power has been +affected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is a +question that will claim attention in my next. + + + + +NUMBER X. + +MORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS OF +GRACE. + +MY last number was an attempt to prove that God created man with a +spontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground of +his moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far this +power has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions of +grace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these points is very +clearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of religion in her book of +Discipline. + +1. "Original sin standeth not in the _following_ of Adam, (as the +Pelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every +man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man +is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature +inclined to evil, and that continually." + +2. "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot +turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to +faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works +pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ +preventing us, (going before to assist us,) that we may have a good +will, and working with us when we have that good will." + +It is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by +sin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential to +mind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to render man +utterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient and cooperating +grace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an external sense, may +be weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so the moral power of the +mind or an inward sense may be weakened or destroyed by moral disease. +And it is in perfect accordance with analogy, with universal language, +and with the representations of Scripture, to consider the mind as +susceptible, in its essential nature, of this moral deterioration. If +any one should say he cannot understand what this moral defect is, I +would answer by asking him if he can tell me what the essence of mind +is? And if he chooses to object to this kind of depravity, because he +cannot understand it, in its essence, he should turn materialist at +once; and then, as he will find equal difficulty to tell what the +essence of matter is, and in what its weakness and disorder essentially +consist, he must turn universal skeptic.--The simple statement is, _the +soul has become essentially disordered by sin;_ and as no one can prove +the assertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I +think it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of +fallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is such +as to mar man's free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which all +voluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. But +voluntary preference does not necessarily imply _such a free agency_ as +involves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to act in one +direction, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral equilibrium as +to be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in an opposite +direction, and therefore not, in the full and responsible sense, a free +agent. It is not enough, therefore, to say, "Free agency (of a +responsible kind) consists in the possession of understanding, +conscience, and will;" (see Christian Spectator for September, 1830;) +unless by _will_ is meant the spontaneous power already alluded to. The +understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared or polluted, +the will, that is, the power of willing, may, to all good purposes, be +inthralled; and this is what we affirm to be the true state and +condition of unaided human nature. + +It will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does not +recognize the distinction of _natural_ and _moral_ ability. The fact is, +man's inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, because it is +constitutional; and it is moral, because it relates to the mind. To say +a fallen man has natural power to make a right choice, because he has +the faculties of his mind entire, is the same as to say that a paralytic +man has the natural power to walk, because he has his limbs entire. It +appears to me that the whole of this distinction, and the reasoning from +it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind and +an unwarranted definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen +man, _on the whole_, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We +say without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the +responsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace. + +This view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily +acknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has been +held by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it can be +proved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine has been +generally received in the Church, entitles it to respect and to a +careful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those who have +only read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it may be a matter +of surprise to learn that not only the more ancient fathers, but even +St. Austin himself, the introducer of predestination into the Church, +and Calvin, and the synod of Dort, were all supporters of sentiments +substantially the same as are here vindicated--I say, those who have +only read modern Calvinistic authors will be surprised to learn this, +because these authors treat this doctrine as though it were so +unreasonable and absurd as scarcely to be tolerated in the view of +common sense. Though it may have an influence with some, in a paucity of +better reasons, to scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it +absurd, yet the candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a +new, without good reason. + +I had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the +fathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their views +on this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the statements here +made should be denied. Let therefore one or two quotations from Calvin +and from the synod of Dort, both of which I think Calvinists will +acknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, suffice. Calvin denies all +power to man, in his apostasy, to choose good, and says that, +"surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, he (man) +should nevertheless be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is +destitute, and to _the liberty of which he is deprived_." The synod of +Dort decided thus:--"We believe that God--formed man after his own +image, &c, _capable in all things to will_ agreeably to the will of +God." They then speak of the fall, and say, "We reject all that is +repugnant to this concerning the free will of man, since man is but a +_slave to sin_, and has nothing of himself, unless it is given him from +heaven." And speaking of the change by grace, they add, "The will thus +renewed is not only actuated and influenced by God, but _in consequence +of this influence becomes itself active_." And to show that Calvin did +not consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free +will, he says, "Man _has not an equally free election of good and evil_, +and can only be said to have free will, because he does evil +voluntarily, and not by constraint;" and this he ironically calls +"egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but yet +is such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the fettors +of sin." These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that the early +Calvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose good by +apostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they generally +believed that whenever this grace was imparted to an extent to restore +to the mind the power of choosing good, it was regenerating grace. And +herein they differ from the Arminians, who believe that grace may and +does restore the power to choose good before regeneration. This, +however, does not affect the point now under examination, but involves a +collateral question, which will be examined in its proper place. One +thought more, and I pass to the arguments on the main questions in the +articles quoted above. These articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of +the articles of the Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the +same as the 10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that +article, commencing, "Wherefore, &c," is taken substantially from St. +Austin himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine +we defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from +Beza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient fathers. +Nay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the synod of Dort, +that this was "the judgment of all antiquity." + +Let us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine. + +1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, as +is believed, since only this view of man's condition will accord with +the Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach that man is +constitutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor have come over his +moral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, and to death, how can it +be otherwise than that this should affect his power to choose good? Had +man any too much moral power in the first instance to constitute him an +accountable moral agent? And if he had not, has he enough now that his +mind has become darkened, his judgment perverted, and his moral powers +corrupted and weakened? Or will it be denied that the moral energies of +his nature have been impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected? +Let any one spend a thought on this question, and decide, if he can, +what definite vicious effect can be produced on man's moral nature which +will not necessarily imply a weakening and an embarrassment of his +original power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is +somewhat weakened, but he has enough left to constitute him free to +choose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than +enough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man's +moral nature was not _wholly_ vitiated. It is said, I know, that all the +embarrassment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination to +moral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and +constitutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, and +is therefore the very thing we mean--it is this very thraldom of the +mind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked +whether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom +of the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most +unhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or +derived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is +not morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive +foreign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a +contrary choice. + +It follows then, I think, that we must either give up constitutional +depravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice without +Divine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the precise point +on which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New Divinity theory +of depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any depravity of man's +moral constitution would either imply the necessity of supernatural aid +in order to a right choice, or else free man from responsibility, Dr. +Taylor and his associates have resolved all depravity into _choice_ or +_voluntary preference_. They deny that there is any thing in the nature +of man, antecedently to his act of willing, that possesses a moral +character. Their idea is perfectly consistent with the notion of natural +ability; and that the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this +idea is evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after +consistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, that +all who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow them. The +doctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than a name, +appears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, and should +never be separated from its counterpart--the doctrine of self conversion +and the natural perfectability of the human character. But this clearly +implies that there is no serious derangement or radical viciousness of +the moral man. Here, then, is another instance in which Calvinists in +general revolt at the legitimate results of their own system. + +But while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an +important objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, as +it is believed, however little they may have designed it, set themselves +in fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of depravity and +salvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for the introduction of +numerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, they will not own that they +have gone very far from the old system. They think the doctrine of +natural depravity is asserted when they say, "nature is _such_ that he +will sin, and only sin, in all the appropriate circumstances of his +being." (See Dr. Taylor's Sermon.) But what this "nature" is, we are at +a loss to determine; as also what the "_such_" is that is predicated of +this nature; nor has Dr. T. told us how he knows that all men will sin +and only sin, when in fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in +what other than "the appropriate circumstances of their being" those are +who become regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox, +and thus to assimilate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged +one inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent, +must come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture +doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they must +go back to their old ground, and endure the manifest inconsistency they +are now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to me better than either, +come on to the Arminian ground, which shuns all these difficulties, +while it maintains constitutional depravity and salvation by grace from +the foundation to the top stone, including of course a gracious ability +to choose life and gain heaven. + +2. Another argument in favour of the _necessity_ of Divine grace, in +order to a right choice, is the fact, that God actually gives grace to +those who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of this +fact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in general terms. +Jesus Christ "is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into +the world." "The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto +all men." They speak in special terms of the unregenerate--that they +_grieve_, _resist_, and _quench_ the _Spirit_ of _grace_, which +certainly they could not do if they had it not. But if they have the +operations of the Spirit, what are these operations? What is the Spirit +doing to the inner man? Will it be said he is bringing motives to bear +upon the mind? But what motives other than those found in the Gospel? +These the sinner has without the Spirit. If these motives can convert +sinners, any of us can convert our neighbours. "But," it is said, "the +Spirit makes the heart _feel_ these motives." Aye, truly he does, and +that not by operating upon the motives, but upon the _heart_, and this +is the very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously +arouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to _feel_, and excites +it to _act_, in the great work of salvation. + +Since, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those who +are finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, let me +seriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On the +Calvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for +salvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without +grace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse of +that ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So say the +Calvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the reprobates are +justly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this grace given? If we may +establish a general principle by an induction of particulars; if we may +judge of the design of the God of providence or grace, by noticing, in +any given case, the uniform results, then we can easily determine this +point. _God gives grace to the reprobates that their condemnation may be +the more aggravated_. The argument stands thus: God gives grace to the +reprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that +salvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved without +it; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this it does not +effect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable effect of which +is to increase their condemnation. The only consistent inference; +therefore is, that he gives grace to the reprobates that they may have a +more aggravated condemnation. Here, then, we trace the Calvinistic +theory to one of these _logical consequences_ charged upon it in the +sermon, and which has been so strenuously denied by the reviewers--a +consequence which, revolting as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon +it still, unless its advocates can show why grace is given to the +reprobates when they have all necessary ability to repent and believe +without it. + +3. On the ground of this doctrine, also, there would be some difficulty +in accounting for the necessity of giving grace, in all cases, even to +the elect. Why may not some of these repent without grace? Nay, why may +not some of the reprobates, in the plenitude of their natural ability, +repent and be converted, in despite of the decree of reprobation? Did +God foresee that they would not, and on that foresight predicate his +decree of reprobation? But that would be a _conditional_ reprobation, +and would therefore imply its counterpart--a conditional election. This +no class of Calvinists will admit. How happens it, then, that some of +these reprobates do not get converted, since they not only have natural +powers enough to make a right choice but have some grace beside? Is it +because God has fixed the barrier in something else, by which this +ability, grace, and all are rendered nugatory? But this would render +their condemnation unjust, Calvinists themselves being judges. They tell +us that the only just ground of condemnation is, that _the sinner will +not come to Christ_. Here, then, is the most extraordinary thing that +angels or men ever knew; for almost six thousand years there has been +upon our earth a succession of generations of sinners, and its the +present generation of them there are eight hundred millions. All of +these, throughout all their generations, have had no other obstruction +to salvation but what exists in their own will, and each and all have +had by nature all needful ability in the will to a right choice, and +have had a measure of grace super-added, and yet not a reprobate among +them all has ever made a right choice; and not one of the elect ever did +or ever will make such a choice until God, by an omnipotent act, "makes +his elect willing in the day of his power!!" This is a miracle to which +all the other miracles in the world are as nothing--a miracle which +Omnipotence alone can accomplish by a Divine constitution and an +all-controlling energy. Thus this doctrine destroys itself. It assumes +positions, with respect to free will, that cannot be maintained, only on +the supposition of an _efficient_ superior agency to direct the action +of that _free will_, in a course of sinful volition, in hundreds of +millions of cases, without a single variation, save where that variation +is the result of the same superior Power acting in the opposite +direction. + +4. That the sinner receives aid by Divine grace to enable him to repent; +and that he could not repent, without this, appears evident from the +Scriptural representation of the ground of man's responsibility. "If I +had not come," says the Saviour, "ye had not had sin." "This is the +condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men loved darkness +rather than light." "He that believeth not is condemned already, +_because_ he hath not believed in the only begotten Son of God." +"_Because_ I have called, and ye have refused, &c, I also will laugh at +your calamity." These and many other passages seem to imply that the +sinner is rejected on the ground of his neglecting offered grace. But if +this is the ground of his condemnation, it is not for the abuse of +natural power. I see no way for a plausible attempt even to get rid of +this argument, unless it should be attempted to raise a question +respecting the nature of this grace. It may be said that "these passages +only relate to gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the +Scriptures of truth, &c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious +influence upon the mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe, +repent, &c, but something must be presented to believe in; and some +provision must be made to make repentance available." In reply I would +say, First, Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin +without grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in +the very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the +subject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because none +can be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, leaving +this for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the above, that +the Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined to _external +provisions_, but on the contrary speak of it as operating upon and +influencing the mind, and that, too, in the very way for which we +contend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, promiscuously selected, +and see how clearly they sustain our position. In the first place, to +give the argument full force, let us notice the Scripture account of +man's natural condition. He is "in darkness," "asleep," "dead," "without +strength," "sick," "deaf," "blind," "lame," "bound," "helpless;" and all +this in consequence of sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his +sinful character and condition. If such language does not describe +_utter inability_ of the sinner to serve God, then no language can do +it. Now let us see what grace does. Its very design is to "awake the +sleeper;" to unstop deaf ears, and "open blind eyes;" to "lighten every +man;" to "strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man." "Christ +strengthens" the sinner, that he may "do all things." It is on the +ground that "God worketh in him to will and to do," that man is exhorted +to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling." "Thou +strengthenedst me with strength _in my soul_." But leaving farther +quotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the stress +which the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All the +efficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the apostle +declares that he "preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost sent down +from heaven;" that it "came, not in word, but in _power_." Indeed, "the +letter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Hence the +frequent cautions not to "grieve" or "quench the Spirit." Now what, I +ask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there any plausibility in the +idea, that by such expressions nothing is meant but the general +provisions of grace in the Gospel economy? That no direct, gracious +influence of the Spirit upon the heart is intended? In fact, the new +idea of conversion by motives and moral suasion seems to be a device to +meet this very difficulty. The old Calvinists charge the advocates of +the New Divinity with holding that all the Spirit does in operating upon +the heart, is not by operating upon it directly, but indirectly _through +the truth_: which has given rise to the saying, "If I were as eloquent +as the Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he." And if they do +hold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate consequence +of the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless arrive at it +thus:--According to the Scriptures, man's responsibility turns on his +rejecting or improving the grace of God. That grace cannot be an +internal gracious influence upon man's moral nature, because that would +conflict with the notion of responsibility, on the ground of natural +power. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing more than that a +gracious atonement is provided, and a record of Divine truth made, and +now, in the use of his natural power, the sinner is required to judge of +and embrace this truth, which if he does, he in this sense improves the +grace of God, and is converted; but if he does it not, he grieves the +Spirit, and is condemned. Thus in the one case, if he is converted, it +is in the use of his natural power, "choosing in the view of motives;" +and in the other case, if he is not converted, it is in the use of his +natural power, refusing in view of motives. Is not this correct +reasoning? And ought not the New-Haven divines to be commended for +carrying out the system to its legitimate results? And ought not all to +follow them in this, who hold to natural ability? And yet no wonder that +they hesitate here, for cold and spiritless indeed must be that system +of religious experience that resolves the conversion of the soul into a +mere natural operation of choosing, through the influence of moral +suasion. + +Leaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal +embarrassments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here vindicated +corresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with itself; for it +makes man's responsibility turn upon grace improved or misimproved, and +it makes that grace an internal quickening influence, and a +strengthening energy upon the heart; and these different features of the +theory, when placed together, all seem at once to be compatible with +each other. + +5. Express passages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained. + +I need not now repeat the passages already referred to, in which the +state of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any human +language can show it, that man is naturally "without strength." But my +object is to call the attention of the reader to some very direct and +express passages, to show that it is grace, and grace alone, that +enables the soul to do the will of God. "I can do all things," saith the +apostle, "through Christ who strengtheneth me." Query: would not the +apostle have thought it presumption to have said, I can do all things +without strength from Christ? Has he ever intimated such a sentiment in +all his writings? Does he not rather say, "We are not sufficient of +ourselves _to think any thing as of ourselves_, but our _sufficiency is +of God?_" This is the apostle's general language, and it is in perfect +accordance with the declaration of his Master, "Without me ye can do +nothing." "As the branch _cannot_ bear fruit of itself, except it abide +in the vine, _no more can ye_, except ye abide in me." "No man _can +come_ to me, except the Father draw him." "Likewise the Spirit Helpeth +our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought." "My +grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in +weakness." "The God of all grace--stablish, strengthen, settle you." +"For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would grant +you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with +_might_, by his _Spirit_, in the _inner_ man," "according to the power +that worketh _in us_." It is useless to quote farther. If these passages +do not show that our strength to do good is of grace, then it appears to +me the Holy Spirit must fail of an _ability_ to communicate that idea +through human language. Will it be said that some of these passages +refer to the regenerate, and therefore are not in point to meet the case +of the unregenerate? I would ask, in reply, whether regenerating grace +takes away our natural ability? Certainly if the regenerate can neither +think nor do any thing acceptable without grace, much more do the +unregenerate need this grace to enable them to make a right choice. And +yet in the face of these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly +told that man has natural power to make himself a new heart! + +To the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof of +our doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been extended so +far already, the universal experience of all Christians. This appears, +from their language, to be the experience of Bible saints, under both +the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what Christian now living, +but feels now, and felt when he first embraced the Saviour, that the +strength to do this was from God--directly from God, through grace. Hear +his prayers--he pleads his weakness--he asks _for strength_. And what +does he mean by that prayer? Does he ask for some external accommodation +and aid? No; he wants strength, _by the Spirit, in the inner man_. And +this is the prayer of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion +of natural ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very +advocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of dependence, +are often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we defend. A most +striking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood's pamphlet (page 97) in +opposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:--"The common theory (of +Calvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves, +especially in a moral view; and to feel that we are not of ourselves +_sufficient for any thing spiritually good_, and that, for whatever +holiness we now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on +Divine grace." What stronger gracious ability do Arminians hold to, than +this? "Not of ourselves sufficient for any thing spiritually good." And +is this the common theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other +points, is divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think, +were it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his +brothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this moment. +But he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he "does not differ at all +from the generality of ministers, in New-England, respecting the natural +powers and faculties of man, as a moral and accountable being." But he +fears the "unqualified language" which Dr. T. "employs respecting the +natural state, the free will, and the power of man." On reading this +last passage, I confess I am at a loss to know what to say or believe of +this Calvinistic opinion of natural power. Dr. Taylor's "unqualified +language" respecting "the power of man," I take to be a frank statement +of Dr. Wood's opinion, and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has +natural power _sufficient_ to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say +this? He says he does not differ from "the generality;" and it is +notorious that this is the doctrine of the generality of those +ministers. Dr. Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood's coadjutors in +opposing Dr. Taylor, says, in a sermon[5] on free salvation, "There is +no reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty, +or which impairs the sinner's _natural power_. Every man is a free moral +agent. Life and death are set before him, and he is _capable_ of +choosing between them." What language can be more "unqualified" than +this? It teaches us that man has _natural power_, which renders him +_capable_ to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and "those who +believe with him," carry out this doctrine into its legitimate and +practical bearings. On the ground of this power, they exhort sinners "to +make themselves new hearts." One of them, as reported to me by a +preacher, went so far as to say, in a public address, that sinners ought +to be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy Spirit to convert them, since +they had power to convert themselves. And what objection can any, who +hold to natural power to choose life, urge against this? If, as Dr. +Tyler teaches, in his "Examination of Dr. Taylor's Theological Views," a +right choice implies regeneration; and if every man is _naturally +capable_ of a right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the +"generality" of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see +not how any sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have +natural power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically +pleading their own weakness, before a _throne of grace_, and asking for +mercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought to be +crimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away from +their impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the _resources of nature_, +and regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen believe it +impossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their whole theory +together, this power is no power, and community, up to this hour, has +been deluded by unmeaning words--words which only serve to conceal the +deformity of a theological system, which, when thoroughly examined, is +found after all, to teach that the poor reprobate has no adequate power +by nature, and receives no available aid from grace to choose salvation, +and must therefore, from the imperious necessity of his nature and +condition, go down to interminable death. + + + + +NUMBER XI. + +SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. + +It is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of the +subject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, morals, +or religion, against which some apparently plausible objection may not +be urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, Are those objections +fatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in the proposed system +greater than in some other view of the subject? For reasonable men will +refuse to be driven into the vortex of skepticism merely because there +are some difficulties and obscurities in all subjects of faith, which +the limitations to human vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form +an enlightened comparative view in the case before us, it will be +important that we glance at the different theories on the subject of +depravity and the ground of responsibility. + +1. One form in which this subject has been held is, "That the sin of +Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity +that it is impossible for his descendants to make any voluntary efforts +toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their +moral and religious character, and that faith and all the Christian +graces are communicated by the sole and irresistible operation of the +Spirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man." +This of course makes the elect entirely passive in their conversion; and +consigns the reprobate to destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is +maintained, is imputed to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at +best gives him over to unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for +possessing a nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and +from which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of +this system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the +standard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need not +here allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so heavily +upon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their ingenuity and +invention at defence, and have driven them finally into all those +changes and modifications so frequently alluded to in this controversy. +I will here say in advance that, in my opinion, this, after all, is the +strongest position Calvinism can assume. The moment its advocates depart +from this, they must either, to be consistent with themselves, verge +over into the other extreme of Pelagianism, or strike off into the +"golden mean" of Arminianism. This may be more clearly seen in the +sequel. + +2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety of +shades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, however, +relate to some minor modifications of the relation of the human family +to Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, and greater +exposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the essential part +of the theory, which is, that human nature is free from sin or guilt +until it becomes guilty by _intelligent, voluntary exercise_. The +objections to this theory are, among others, as follows. It is in direct +opposition to the Scripture doctrine of native depravity--a doctrine +which has been often and ably treated of and defended by Calvinistic +and, Arminian divines--a doctrine which is embodied in a palpable form +in every man's own experience--a doctrine which not only flashes upon +the mind of the student in every page of the history of man, but also +upon the mind of the unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the +infant that struggles in her arms. + +Another objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, previous +to intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. Hence, should +they die at this age, as multitudes doubtless do, they would not be fit +subjects either for the rewards of heaven or the pains of hell. At the +Judgment, as they will not be subjects of praise or blame, they will +neither be on the right hand nor the left, and of course will neither be +sentenced to "everlasting punishment," nor welcomed "into life eternal." +If, however, they by any means go into a state of punishment, their +sufferings will be unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will +not be a salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration, +nor will their song be, "Unto Him that hath loved us," &c. This is not +only contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct +opposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: "Therefore, as by +the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so, by +the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto +justification of life." It also leaves infants involved in the natural +evils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any assignable +cause, but also in direct opposition to the cause assigned by the +apostle--"And so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." + +A third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture +doctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, in +substance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by the +efficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine makes sin +consist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist wholly in +exercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a mere change of +volition; and this volition is not the result of a preceding change of +moral constitution, but it is, like any other volition, produced by the +native power of the mind, under the exciting influence of motives. The +Holy Spirit, therefore, may well be dispensed with in this work. The +supernatural character of the change must be given up, and the whole +work is resolvable into a natural process. It is here worthy of remark +that this is not mere speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final +result of this theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been +defended. And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural +efficacy of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the +Redeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the system, +and somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other parts, and are +therefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, as may be seen by +the history of the Church, has been the practical result wherever +Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. It has degenerated +into Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one word, that this doctrine +of Pelagianism does, in its teachings, tendencies, and practical +results, supplant and overthrow all the essential principles of the +Gospel system. + +3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human +responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding +number. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which +the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as "Calvinists, +say that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical +impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who, +it is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen +ancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [unassisted by grace] toward +piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral +and religious character." Thus far we go together; but this is a point +of divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of +going on to say "that the Christian graces are communicated by the +irresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or +concurrence on the part of man," we say that "the saving grace of God +hath appeared unto all Men;" and that this grace so enlightens, +strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make +that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul's +salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when +he has this good will, is enabled "to work out his salvation" unto the +end. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue +with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the +Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New +Divinity in our country. + +To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we +believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in +behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not +imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes +the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel; +and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is +entitled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of +course, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him +for the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this +system, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is +sanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace. + +These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after +truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives +of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of +_natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an +intermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first +stated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I +ought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct +theory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in +my opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived +constitutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any +thing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the +idea of constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more +than a name--that is, in fact, _constitutional depravity_, destroys the +idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact +that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who +have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over +and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the +doctrine of constitutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are +certainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been +following up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them +upon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we +need not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show +that the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and +sin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists +left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of +a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no +guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is +unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and +by consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral +choice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural +ability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be +reasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy +volition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin. + +The only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the assumed +premises is, to maintain that "the infant, from his birth, is a +voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful." And +would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such +an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A +paper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity, +purporting to be an inquiry into "what is the real difference between +the New-Haven divines and those who differ from them," says, "The ground +has of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this +subject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable +agents, and actual sinners against God; that the new-born infant is a +responsible subject of God's moral government, and actually sins with a +knowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner +violates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to +change its moral character." And as a proof that this is the ground now +assumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who +has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the +New-Haven divines, in which he says, "A moral being, for aught we know, +may commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the +will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to +a certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is +seated in any thing but the will_." This same writer also states that +Dr. Spring, in a treatise on "native depravity," a work which I have not +at hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of "_actual_ sin from +birth." And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural +ability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing +more than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the +one hand, or "make himself a new heart" on the other! Alas for +Calvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_ +shifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself +in accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent, +learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me +in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is +however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest +and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and +while we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also +fall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense +to be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see +that, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up +their _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_, +they destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory, +this very attempt to prove that infants are "_actual_ sinners from their +birth," is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why +do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order +to show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an +acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by +proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a +concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt. +This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has +gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the +difference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in +connection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which +makes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side +Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn +against their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible, +the Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in +common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an +opposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant +"commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and +is thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?" This is clearly +a work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents. +The New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of +carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will +cease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. Harvey +fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their "_moral exercise_" +early enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given assurances +that they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is +no sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the +corresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be +satisfied. They have said already that "this capableness of sinning, if +it is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it +is not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for +all the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from +the beginning of their days." Hence we see nothing between these +gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be +important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral +suasion should not put the commencement of these "moral exercises" so +far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they +may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are +trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown, +I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the +nature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as +they contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and +Pelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will illustrate it +farther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity. +It is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers +"depravity as seated in nothing but the will." And this is avowedly the +sentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural +ability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, "You can +if you will;" "There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse +will." It is on this ground, also, that they tell us "a right choice is +conversion." They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit +of the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand +this subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the +will. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if +not latitude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be +the legitimate meaning of the term "the mental power or susceptibility +of putting forth volitions;" then to say that all depravity is seated in +the will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the +affections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they +mean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going +out in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the +New-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by +placing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of +willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case, +exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the +doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something +different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I +know not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and +place the seat of this depravity in the constitution of man's moral +nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that +case they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency; +for to talk of a natural power to change the moral constitution, as it +existed prior to choice, and which constitution must, by the law of its +nature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as +to talk of a natural power to alter one's own nature, or to unmake and +remake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must +remain as we are. + +We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until +we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise +meaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral +ability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined +such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been +particular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of +charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_ +authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the +different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of "Views in +Theology;" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on "Divine Efficiency;" Rev. +Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract, +entitled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," written, +it is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been +consulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this +point. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, "Natural +power consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will; +and moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties." Mr. Thatcher says +this in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of +natural power. Dr. Griffin says "their [sinners'] faculties constitute a +natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if their +hearts are well disposed." It certainly must appear, at the first +glance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, that +either the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties, +should be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best +philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a +simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it analyzed in two +different forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is +power. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a +clear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of +every man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the +true idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is +granted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And +although the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_ +of the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the +limbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires +very little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of +the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some +of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or +faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral +strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these +faculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much +less are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of +moral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion +advanced in my former number, viz. "That the whole of this distinction +(of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the +ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind, and an unwarranted +definition of terms." This may seem a strong statement from so humble an +individual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted +the opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh +much, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments; +and by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look +then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems +to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes +to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says, +"If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency, +I hope I shall be the last to believe that." "And every body knows that +the mass of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have +acknowledged no such doctrine." + +And why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability +that will "work," without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against +Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon +the old Calvinistic doctrine of "native impotency." There is no standing +place any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural +ability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of +consistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to +the New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the +reader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the +proper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point, +which is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not +then be in haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. "Now if you +ask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine +efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it +is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of +common sense, must be called a power." The doctor had a little before +told us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this; +and what well instructed mind, like the doctor's, could be? It is +something that forms the "basis of obligation," he knows not what it is. +He merely infers there is such a power, because men are held +responsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking +the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties +beside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an +ability, that will not "work," without being strengthened by Divine aid, +and yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of +obligation without that aid. + +We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this +definition of _moral_ power. It is "the exercise of natural power." But +these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power +sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, "we are +entirely dependent upon God's grace for moral power"--in other words, +according to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace +for the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means +the faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement +is simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the +exercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy +choice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so +depraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to "work" in this +exercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious +ability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in +another place--"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at +once, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and +duty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a +single step in their own _strength?_" Or is it any wonder that the +Christian Spectator should say, that "this statement of Dr. Griffin +brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?" And is +this the ability that "the mass of the New-England divines have held to +from the beginning?" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground +occasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one +hand, and the old doctrine of passivity on the other. For the truth is, +as before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves +upon between these two, only as they light upon our ground. + +There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called. +It implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is obedience itself. +For a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right +exercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore + +Our moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a clue +to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic +saying--"You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly disposed," +or in short hand--"You can if you will." Now the verb _will_ here +evidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is, +as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning +of this notable saying is--"You have power to obey God, _if you obey +him_." "You _can_ if you _do_." This is a sort of logic which, when +scanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in +refuting, as its abettors are entitled to for its invention and use. And +yet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fictitious costume has +led thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now +modified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism. + +There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with +this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence, +until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect, +natural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural +power, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have +power to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If, +however, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because +their very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which +_enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground, +that it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power, +that is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this +Calvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of +candour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What +confusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well +defined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are +applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse +than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to +bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and +reproach. + +One thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pass on. +The doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that God controls the +natural power of men, by means of their moral power. This some of them +expressly affirm. And to show that I am not mistaken with respect to the +others, let the reader carefully attend to the following considerations. +What is it secures the fulfilment of the Divine decrees, in respect to +the elect and the reprobate? Why do not some of the reprobates, in the +use of natural ability, repent and get to heaven? Because they have not +the moral power. Why do not some of the elect, in the use of the same +ability, fall into sin and finally perish? Because God makes and keeps +them willing in the day of his power--that is, he irresistibly imparts +to them this moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his +own hands he executes his decrees. For God, of set purpose, so +constituted this natural power, that it does not "work" without Divine +efficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. Now, +to say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and irresistibly +controlling one power by another, and yet calling that other the essence +of free agency, and the basis of obligation--look at the absurdity in +another point of view. Since moral power is the exercise of natural +power, the former must be the _effect_ of the latter. And since, +according to Calvinism, natural power is controlled by moral power, it +follows conclusively; that the effect controls its cause!! And since the +cause must act, before the effect is produced, it follows that the +effect, before it has an existence, acts upon its cause to produce its +own existence!!! This is certainly a nullification of both cause and +effect: Such are some of the difficulties of these definitions of +power--definitions as contrary to the common understandings of men, and +the common laws of language, as they are to sound philosophy--definitions +which, if they were always understood, when the terms were used; would +make the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very +differently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to +appear, that "this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the +reasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical analysis of +mind and an unwarranted definition of terms," and that, after all the +efforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they will be +under the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of going back +to the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, or of advancing +on to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or they must accept of +the Arminian theory of gracious ability. And that the reader may be +prepared to make his selection, I will here remind him of the arguments +adduced in favour of the latter doctrine, in the last number, while I +next proceed to answer more specifically the objections that have been +urged against it, which however for an obvious reason must be withheld +until the next number. + + + + +NUMBER XII. + +OBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED. + +In consulting different authors to find the strongest objections that +have been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I have fixed +upon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, entitled, "Man a Free +Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," as concentrating in a small +compass, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of these +objections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, and +possibly shall pass over some of his remarks as of minor importance; but +the substance of his reasoning shall receive such notice as I shall be +able to give it. + +1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a free +agent man cannot be _man;_ that free agency in fact enters into the very +definition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; and therefore +he must be such by nature. + +This objection gains all its plausibility from the writer's definition +of free agency. "It consists," he says, "in the possession of +_understanding_, _conscience_, and _will_." Now we grant that the being +who possesses these is an intelligent voluntary agent. But these +faculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so that, for all holy +purposes, they may be defective. The understanding may be darkened, the +conscience may be seared, the power to choose good may be weakened +either positively or relatively. _Liberty_ is a distinct faculty of the +soul; and as such is as subject to derangement as any other mental +susceptibility. It has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that +man has not his original aptitude or facility to good. And whether we +consider this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the +will itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is +probably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral +equilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the +passions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result are +the same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy declination +from righteousness to an extent which none but God can rectify. With +this view of the subject, the writer may call man a free agent if he +pleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, and not to holiness. + +Our objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in this +way; and hence in a note he says, "Some writers speak of man, in his +natural state, as _free only_ to evil. But in what does such freedom +differ from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, how is he who +murders a fellow creature more criminal than the tiger, or even a +falling rock that destroys him?" The fallacy of this argument consists +chiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. Instead of holding that +man "has no power to do otherwise," we believe, as much as this author, +that man has ample power at his command to do otherwise; but that this +power is of grace, and not of nature. Any farther supposed difficulties +growing out of this view of the subject will be explained, I trust +satisfactorily, as we advance.[6] + +2. "Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which +constitute free agency."--Here again we must keep in view the writer's +definition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that every man is +conscious that he possesses the faculties of understanding, conscience, +and will; but that these, unaided by grace, constitute man free to a +holy choice, is denied; and this is the very question in debate. To +affirm it therefore in argument is begging the question. + +It however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point +seems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the +responsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this does +not touch the question whether this power is of grace or of nature. But, +says the writer, "When man, under the influence of grace, does choose +the good, he is not conscious of any new faculty or power to choose, but +only he uses that power in a different manner. The power or faculty +which chooses evil and which chooses good, is the same power differently +used." Whoever disputed this?--understanding by power a faculty of the +soul, as this author evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul +gets no new faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the +exercise of its natural faculties, is assisted by grace to make a right +choice. But, says the writer, in this connection, "Power to choose +between two objects is power to choose either." If the writer means to +say that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects _is_ +power to choose either--this is an identical proposition: it is only +saying, _If a thing is, it is_. But if he means to say, when two objects +are presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself possessed of a +power to attach itself voluntarily to one, that therefore it has the +_same power_ to attach itself to the other, this is denied; and as no +proof is given or pretended by the objector, nothing but a denial is +necessary. On this point the founder of the Calvinistic school was +undoubtedly correct--philosophically and theologically correct--when he +said, "Man has not an equally free election of good and evil." + +But that I may meet this objection founded on consciousness, full in the +face, I am prepared to assert, and I think prove, that man, so far from +being conscious that he has by nature adequate power to serve God, is +conscious of the very reverse of this. What truly awakened sinner has +not a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? How many experiences of +intelligent and pious Calvinists could I quote on this point? As a +specimen take that of the Rev. David Brainerd, who stands high in the +Church, not only among Calvinists, but among all Christians who know +him. I quote a passage from his experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: "I saw +that it was utterly impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or +delivering myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for +ever miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never +been sensible of it before."--This passage is very strong; too +unqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak sinner, +convinced, as all must be before they _can become strong_, of their +utter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one prove the +truth of Scripture, that "the _natural_ man receiveth not the things of +the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither _can_ he +know them, for they are spiritually discerned;" that "no man knoweth the +Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him." Hence the +necessity that "the Spirit should take of the things of Jesus Christ, +and show them unto them." Indeed, but for this darkness and weakness of +the understanding, the penitent sinner would not feel the necessity of +the agency of the Spirit: nor would it in fact be necessary. It is on +this ground that the doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of +conversion by _moral suasion_. Thus it is evident that a man may be +conscious of having an understanding, but at the same time be as _fully_ +conscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy +purposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience. +Experience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and needs +quickening. Hence the Christian often prays-- + + "Quick as the apple of an eye, + O God! my conscience make; + Awake my soul when sin is nigh, + And keep it still awake." + +Hence also we pray God to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also we +learn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs purging +"from dead works," for the very object that we may be able "to serve God +with filial fear;" we learn also that we may have "defiled consciences," +"weak consciences," "seared consciences," &c. And here let it be +noticed, that whether we understand these passages as applying to the +regenerate or unregenerate, to derived depravity or contracted +depravity, the argument against the objector will in every case apply +with resistless force, viz. it shows that this faculty of the soul may +become so disordered as to have its original healthy action impaired, +and that in this case nothing can give it its original sensibility and +strength but the God who made it. If sin does disorder the conscience, +it disordered Adam's: and if he begat children in his own moral +likeness, then his posterity had a similar conscience. And therefore it +is necessary that, as by the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so +by the obedience of the second, grace may abound in a way directly to +meet the evil. + +Let us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is +weak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! until he +becomes deeply impressed that he is "without strength!" He tries to keep +the law, but cannot; for he finds that "the carnal mind is not subject +to the law of God, neither indeed _can be_." Hear his complaint! and +that we may be sure of taking a genuine case, let us select a Bible +experience from Rom. vii; "I am carnal, sold under sin." (How much +liberty to serve God has a bond slave to sin?) "That which I do I allow +not; for what I would do that I do not, but what I hate that do I." "To +will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find +not," &c. (See through the chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self +despair, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Why, Saul +of Tarsus! are you not conscious that you have understanding, +conscience, and will? Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver +you? _Deliver yourself_. No! such philosophy and such theology were not +known to this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired +apostle. "I thank God, through Jesus Christ my Lord."--"The law of the +spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the +controlling power] of sin and death." + +Should any one say that the apostle was not describing his _conversion_ +here, but his experience as a Christian believer, I reply: If any thing, +_that_ would make the passage so much the stronger for my present +purpose; for "if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be +done in the dry?" If a saint--one who has been washed and renewed--finds +nevertheless that his will is so weak as to need the continued grace of +God to enable him to do the things that he would, much more is this true +of the unrenewed sinner. If this account of the apostle's experience +means any thing, _it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that +we have natural strength to serve God, as could be put into words_. And +I am bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it +presents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which no +metaphysical reasoning can overthrow--not indeed an argument to prove +that we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to show that, +having these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace is +indispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. How +often soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the Divine +law, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the unholy +passions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. +_We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power to keep the +Divine law_. + +3. But it is objected again, "that the Scriptures require us to use our +natural faculties in the service of God;" and hence the inference is, +that these faculties are adequate to this service. + +It is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures, +dealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to +serve God. With what other powers should he serve him? I again repeat +that the question is not, whether we have _mental faculties_, nor +whether man may or can serve God with these faculties, but simply +whether the command to obey is given independently of the considerations +of grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the Scriptures, which +give a promise corresponding with every command, and assurances of +gracious aid suited to every duty--all of which most explicitly imply, +not only man's need, but also the ground on which the command is +predicated. And with this idea agrees the alleged condemnation, so often +presented in the Scriptures: "This is the condemnation, that light has +come into the world, and men have loved darkness." "He that believeth +not is condemned already." "But they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore +he is turned to be their enemy." "How shall we escape, if we neglect so +great salvation." These, and many other passages, show that the turning +point of guilt and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural +powers, as the neglect and abuse of grace bestowed. + +This point may be illustrated by Christ's healing the withered hand. He +commanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of that +command, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that aid +would be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch forth a +palsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was understood +that the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or bones, to +accomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, assisted, as they +would be, by the gracious power of God. So man, it is true, is commanded +to use his natural powers in obeying God; but not without Divine aid, +the promise of which is always either expressed or implied in the +command. + +4. "The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey God, but +that which consists in or results from the perversion of those faculties +which constitute him a moral agent." + +It is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability--for inability +they certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin abounded grace +has much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and unprepared for +holy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their own fault, for grace +has been beforehand with them. It met them at the very threshold of +their moral agency, with every thing necessary to meet their case. It +has dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has laid the foundation to say +justly, "What more could I have done for my vineyard?" If the sinner has +rejected all this, and has increased his depravity by actual +transgression, then indeed is he justly chargeable for all his +embarrassments and moral weakness, for he has voluntarily assumed to +himself the responsibility of his native depravity, and he has added to +this the accumulated guilt of his repeated sins. + +5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that +Arminians, after all, make man's natural power the ground and measure of +his guilt, since "no part of his free agency arises from furnished +grace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse that grace, and +of course in an ability distinct from, and not produced by the grace." + +Let us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here. +Arminians do not mean that man's ability to use grace is independent of, +and separate from the grace itself. They say that man's powers are +directly assisted by grace, so that through this assistance they have +ability or strength _in those powers_ which before they had not, to make +a right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious ability, in any other +sense, would be absurd. It would be like talking of _strength_ to use +_strength_--of _being able to be able_. This absurdity, however, appears +to me justly chargeable upon the natural ability theory, taken in +connection with the Scripture account of this matter. The Scriptures +instruct us to look to God for strength; that he gives us "power to +become the children of God;" that he "strengthens with might in the +inner man, that we may be _able_," &c. This theory, however, tells us +that we have an ability back of this; an ability on which our +responsibility turns, and by means of which we can become partakers of +the grace of the Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being +as taking measures to make _ability able_, and adding power to make +_adequate strength sufficiently strong_.--Such is the work of +supererogation which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its +advocates alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground, +attempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest +objections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to come. +They are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical character, and +are therefore more tangible, and will, for this reason, perhaps, be more +interesting to the generality of readers. Let us have patience, then, to +follow them out. + +6. _Doctrinal Objections_.--On the ground of gracious ability it is +objected that, 1. "As the consequence of Adam's fall, Adam himself and +all his posterity became incapable of committing another sin." 2. "Every +sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been +the effect of supernatural grace." 3. "Man needed the grace of God, not +because he was wicked, but because he was weak." 4. "The moral +difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God." 5. +"The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to atone for actual sin." 6. +"This opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There can +be no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "Is +not this grace a greater calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?" + +I have thrown these objections together, and presented them in +connection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly on +one or two erroneous assumptions, to correct which will be substantially +to answer them all. + +One erroneous assumption of this writer is, that "there is no free +agency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right." This writer +seems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no proof; +for although he has used it in argument a number of times, he has left +it unsustained by any thing but his naked assertion. This proposition +has already been denied, and an unqualified denial is all that in +fairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an unqualified +assertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not victory. Let me +request you then, reader, to look at this proposition. Can you see any +self-evident proof of this assertion? If the Creator should give +existence to an intelligent being, and infuse into his created nature +the elements of unrighteousness, and give to his faculties an +irresistible bias to sin, and all this without providing a remedy, or a +way for escape, then indeed all our notions of justice would decide that +such a being ought not to be held responsible. But this is not the case +with any of the sinful beings of God's moral government.--Not of the +fallen angels, for they had original power to stand, but abused it and +fell--not of fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created +depravity; but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary +transgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his +posterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of +generation: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which meets +the exigencies of man's moral condition, at the very commencement of his +being. This it does by graciously preventing the imputation of guilt +until man is capable of an intelligent survey of his moral condition; +for "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto +condemnation: even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came +upon all men unto justification of life." And when man becomes capable +of moral action, this same gracious remedy is suited to remove his +native depravity, and to justify him from the guilt of actual +transgression; for "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to +forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness." It does +not appear, then, either from the obvious character of the proposition +itself; or from the condition of sinful beings, that "the same free +agency which enables a man to do wrong, will enable him also to do +right." Hence it is not true that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to +sin, or that there is now no sin in the infernal regions. It is true, +the writer tries to sustain this idea farther, by asserting that "_that_ +ceases to be a moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be +held responsible for doing what is unavoidable." This is little better, +however, than a reiteration of the former assumption. If the character +and conduct of a being are not _now_, and never _have been_ avoidable, +then indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to him. But to say that +there is "no moral wrong" in the case, is to say that characters and +actions are not wrong in themselves, even where it would not be just to +impute guilt. And this is an idea which is implied also in another part +of this writer's reasoning; for he tells us that, according to the +doctrine of gracious ability "every sinful action performed in this +world, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural +grace;" and that "man needed the grace of God, not because he was +wicked, but because he was weak," &c. This reasoning, or rather these +propositions, are predicated on the assumption, that there is no _moral +wrong_ where there is no _existing_ ability to do right: in other words, +that dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not _in themselves_ +holy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the _existing_ power of +the being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts. + +But is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be just +to impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that "until the law +sin was in the world;" and yet he adds, "Sin is not imputed (he does not +say sin does not exist,) where there is no law." The fact there are +certain dispositions and acts that are _in their nature_ opposite to +holiness, whatever may be the power of the subject _at the time_ he +possesses this character or performs these acts. Sin is sin, and +holiness is holiness, under all circumstances. They have a positive, and +not merely a relative existence. And although they have not existence +abstract from an agent possessing understanding, conscience, and will, +still they may have an existence abstractly from the power of being or +doing otherwise at the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no +moral character, or he has power to become holy with his first breath. +Whether the subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it, +is a question to be decided by circumstances. If a being has had power, +and lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible for +his impotency--his very weakness becomes his crime, and every act of +omission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is justly +imputed to him, the assertion of our objector to the contrary +notwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now "no guilt in +the rebellion of the infernal regions." It is of little consequence +whether, in this case, you assume that all the guilt is in the first +act, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in each successive act +of sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of the first. In either +case, the acts that follow are the measure of the guilt; and hence, +according to the nature of the mind, the consciousness of guilt will be +constantly felt, as the acts occur. For all practical purposes, +therefore, the sense of guilt, and the Divine administration of justice +will be the same in either view of the subject. The writer supposes the +case of "a servant's cutting off his hands to avoid his daily task," and +says, "this he is to blame, and ought to be punished;" but thinks he +ought not to be punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How +much is he to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt +and punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he +has done his master--that is, by every act of omission consequent upon +this act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore he is +justly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer this +whole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the acts +separately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical administration +of government and of justice. Indeed, to say that each succeeding act is +to be brought up and taken into the estimate, in order to fix the +quantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that these succeeding acts are +sins; else why should they be brought into the account at all, in +estimating guilt and punishment? Take another case. The drunkard +destroys or suspends the right use of his reason, and then murders. Is +he to be held innocent of the murder because he was drunk? or was the +whole guilt of the murder to be referred to the act of getting +intoxicated? If you say the former, then no man is to be punished for +any crime committed in a fit of intoxication; and one has only to get +intoxicated in order to be innocent. If you say the latter, then, as +getting drunk is the same in one case as another, _every_ inebriate is +guilty of murder, and whatever other crimes drunkeness _may_ occasion, +or has occasioned. Is either of these suppositions correct? Shall we not +rather say that the inebriate's guilt is to be measured by the aggregate +of crimes flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so +in the case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles +"there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions," I +would say that their present rebellion is the fruits and measure of +their guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power and lost it, is +guilty of his present acts. + +And by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the +estimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from the +acts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and say, the +acts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? Evidently +because you have taken the amount of that guilt and attached it to the +first act. And does this make these acts in themselves innocent? The +idea is preposterous. As well may you say that the filthy streams of a +polluted fountain are not impure in themselves, because but for the +fountain they would not be impure; as to say that the current of unholy +volitions which unavoidably flows from a perverted heart is not unholy +and criminal. + +Another clearly erroneous assumption of this writer is, that if it would +be unjust for the Divine Being to leave his plan _unfinished_, after it +is begun, the _whole_ plan must be predicated on justice, and not on +grace. It is true, he has not said this, in so many words, but his +reasoning implies it. For he says this scheme of gracious ability +"annihilates the whole doctrine of grace." Because God, if he held man +accountable, was bound to give him this ability, as a matter of justice; +hence it is not an ability by grace, but an ability by justice. The +whole of this reasoning, and much more, goes upon the principle, that +the _completion_ of a plan of grace, after it is begun, cannot be +claimed on the scale of justice, without making the whole a plan of +justice. But is this true? Is not a father, after he has been +instrumental of bringing a son into the world, bound _in justice_ to +provide for and educate him? And yet does not the son owe a debt of +gratitude to that father, when he has done all this? If a physician +should cut off the limb of a poor man, to save his life, is he not bound +_in justice_, after he has commenced the operation, to take up the +arteries and save the man from dying, by the operation. And if he should +not do it, would he not be called a wanton and cruel wretch? And yet in +both these cases the persons may be unworthy. The son may show much +obliquity of moral principle, and yet the father should bear with him, +and discipline him. The man on whom the physician operated may be poor +and perverse. Here then are cases in which _justice demands that un +merited favour begun should be continued_, or else what was favour in +the commencement, and what would be favour in the whole, would +nevertheless by its incompleteness, be most manifest injustice. Such is +the state of the question in respect to the Divine administration. The +whole race of man had become obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, in +their representative and federal head, by reason of _his_ sin. This is +expressly stated: "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to +condemnation." "In Adam all die." In this situation we may suppose that +the strict justice of the law required punishment in the very character +in which the offence was committed. Adam personally and consciously +sinned; and so, according to justice, he must suffer. The prospective +generations of men, existing seminally in him, as they had not +consciously and personally sinned, could, in justice, only experience +the effects of the curse in the same character in which they sinned, +viz. passively and seminally, unless provision could be made, by which, +in their personal existence, they might free themselves from the effects +of sin. Now God, in the plenitude of his wisdom and grace, saw fit to +make provision for a new probation for man, on the basis of a covenant +of grace, the different parts of which are all to be viewed together, in +order to judge of their character. In this covenant Adam had a _new +trial;_ and when the promise was made to him he stood in the same +relation to his posterity as he did when he sinned, and the curse was +out against him. If, by the latter, the prospective generations of men +were justly cut off from possible existence; by the former this +existence was mercifully secured to them. If by the corruption of the +race, through sin, the possibility of salvation was cut off, on all +known principles of administrative justice; by the provisions of grace +the possibility of salvation was secured to the whole race; and this +possibility implies every necessary provision to render grace available +and efficient, in accordance with moral responsibility. If "God, who +spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all," had not +"with him also freely given us all things" necessary for our salvation, +would not the Divine procedure have been characterized both by folly and +injustice? If his plan of grace had only gone so far as to have given us +a conscious being, without giving us the means of making that existence +happy, would it not have been wanton cruelty? And yet, taking the whole +together, who does not see that it is a most stupendous system of grace, +from the foundation to the top-stone? Let us not then be guilty of such +manifest folly, as to take a part of the Divine administration, and make +up a judgment upon that, as viewed independently of the rest, and then +transfer this abstract character to the whole. As in chemical +combinations, though one of the ingredients taken alone might be +deleterious, yet the compound may be nutritious or salutary, so in the +new covenant, if we separate legal exactions and penalties from gracious +provisions, the operations of the former may be unjust and cruel, yet +the whole, united as God hath combined them, may be an administration of +unparalleled grace. It is in this heavenly combination that "mercy and +truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other." +Now, therefore, "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and _just_ to +forgive us our sins," for on this ground he can be "_just_ and the +justifier of them that believe." Although justice is thus involved in +the system, and to leave out part of the system would be manifest +injustice, yet the whole is the "blessed Gospel;" "the Gospel of the +grace of God." It is objected, I know, that the idea that, but for the +provisions of the Gospel, man would not have propagated his species, is +fanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. The Scriptures, I grant, do not +strike off into speculations about what God might have done, or would +have done, if he had not done as he has. This is foreign from their +design; and I am perfectly willing to let the whole stand as the +Scriptures present it. But when our opponents set the example of raising +an objection to what we think the true system, by passing judgment on a +part, viewed abstractly, we must meet them. On their own ground, then, I +would say, the idea that man would have been allowed to propagate his +species, without any provisions of grace, is altogether fanciful and +unauthorized by Scripture. Will it be said, that it seems more +reasonable, and in accordance with the course of nature, to suppose that +he would? I answer, It seems to me more reasonable, and in accordance +with the course of justice, to suppose that he would not. Whoever +maintains that the personal existence of Adam's posterity was not +implied and included in the provisions of grace, in the new covenant, +must take into his theory one of the following appendages;--he must +either believe that the whole race could justly be consigned to personal +and unavoidable wo, for the sin of Adam, or that all could be justly +condemned for the sin of their own nature, entailed upon them without +their agency, and therefore equally unavoidable; or he must believe that +each would have a personal trial on the ground of the covenant of works, +as Adam had. If there is another alternative, it must be some system of +probation which God has never intimated, and man, in all his inventions +has never devised. Whoever is prepared to adopt either of the two former +propositions is prepared to go all lengths in the doctrine of +predestination and reprobation charged upon Calvinism in the sermon that +gave rise to this controversy, and, of course, will find his system +subject to all the objections there urged against it. If any one chooses +to adopt the third alternative, and consider all the posterity of Adam +as standing or falling solely on the ground of the covenant of works, +such a one need not be answered in a discussion purporting to be a +"_Calvinistic_ controversy." He is a Socinian, and must be answered in +another place. All that need be done here, is to show the embarrassments +of _Calvinism proper_, the utter futility of all its changes to relieve +itself from these embarrassments, unless it plunge into Pelagianism and +Socinianism, or rest itself upon the Arminian foundation of gracious +ability. It is on this latter ground we choose to rest, because here, +and here alone, we find the doctrines of natural depravity, human +ability and responsibility, and salvation by grace, blending in +beautiful harmony. + +Having noticed some of the erroneous assumptions on which the doctrinal +objections to our theory are based, the objections themselves, I think, +may all be disposed of in a summary way. We see, on our plan, that, 1. +Adam did not render himself incapable of sinning, by the fall, but +rather rendered himself and his posterity incapable of any other moral +exercise but what was sinful; and it was on this account that a gracious +ability is necessary, in order to a second probation. 2. Sin, since the +fall, has not been the result of supernatural grace, but the natural +fruit of the fall; and supernatural grace is all that has counteracted +sin. 3. "Man needed the grace of God," _both_ "because he was wicked," +_and_ "because he was weak."--4. "The moral difference between one man +and another is--to be ascribed to God." How any one could think a +contrary opinion chargeable upon us, is to me surprising. It is more +properly Calvinism that is chargeable with this sentiment. Calvinism +says, Regeneration is a right choice. It says, also, that power to sin +implies power to be holy; and of course we become holy by the same power +as that by which we sin. And it farther says, that the power is of +nature and not of grace. Now let the reader put all these together, and +see if it does not follow most conclusively, that "the moral difference +between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God." But, on the +contrary, _we_ say the sinful nature of man is changed in regeneration +by the power of the Holy Ghost. 5. "The posterity of Adam" _did_ "need a +Saviour to atone for actual sin." For actual sin is the result, not of +gracious power, as this author supposes, but of a sinful nature +voluntarily retained and indulged. If our opponents charge us with the +sentiment, that grace is the cause of the actual sin of Adam's +posterity, because we hold that grace was the cause of their personal +existence, we grant that, in that sense, grace was a cause without which +the posterity of Adam would not have sinned. But if this makes God the +author of sin, by the same rule we could prove that God is the author of +sin, because he created moral agents--and if there is any difficulty +here, it presses on them as heavily as on us. But in any other sense, +grace is not the cause of sin. 6. "This opinion is," as we have seen, +perfectly "with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There is" _constant_ "guilt +in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "This grace is a +greater" _blessing_ "to our race than the fall of Adam" was a +"calamity;" for "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." + +Thus I have endeavoured to _explain_, _prove_, and _defend_ the doctrine +of gracious ability, a doctrine always maintained in the orthodox +Church, until the refinements of Calvinism made it necessary to call it +in question; and a doctrine on which, viewed in its different bearings, +the orthodox Arminian system must stand or fall. I have been the more +minute and extended in my remarks from this consideration; and also from +the consideration that while this doctrine has of late been most +violently assailed by all classes of Calvinists, very little has been +published in its defence. If the reader has had patience to follow the +subject through, he is now perhaps prepared to judge whether our holy +volitions are the result of a gracious ability or of natural power. + +Should I find time to pursue this subject farther, it would be in place +now to examine the doctrine of regeneration; in which examination the +nature of inherent depravity, and of that choice which is conditional to +the new birth, would be more fully noticed. "This will I do if God +permit." + + + + +NUMBER XIII. + +REGENERATION. + +An important error in any one cardinal doctrine of the Gospel will make +a glaring deformity in the entire system. Hence when one of these +doctrines is marred or perverted, a corresponding change must be made in +most or all of the others to keep up the appearance of consistency. + +These remarks apply with special emphasis to the doctrine of +regeneration. As this is a focal point, in which many other leading +doctrines centre, this doctrine must of necessity give a character to +the whole Gospel plan. This might be inferred _a priori_ from the +knowledge of the relation of _this_ to the other parts of the Christian +system, and it is practically illustrated in the history of the Church. +There are those who believe, that by the various terms used in Scripture +to express the change commonly called regeneration or the new birth, +nothing is intended but some outward ceremony, or some change of opinion +in matters of speculative belief or the like. Some say it is baptism, or +a public profession of faith; others that it is a mere speculative +renunciation of heathen idolatry, and an acknowledgment of the Christian +faith; others that it is merely a reformed life; and a few maintain that +it is the change that we shall undergo by death, or by the resurrection +of the body. These persons, and all in fact who make the new birth +something short of a radical change of heart, are obliged, for +consistency's sake, to accommodate the other doctrines to their views of +regeneration. Hence they very generally deny constitutional or derived +depravity, the inflexibility and rigorous exactions of the Divine law, +the destructive character of sin, the atonement, the supernatural agency +of the Spirit upon the human heart, justification by faith, and the +like. Thus a radical error on one point actually leads to _another +gospel_--if gospel it may be called. + +It does not come within the scope of my present design to enter into a +refutation of the foregoing errors. But from the disastrous results of +these errors we may infer the importance of guarding carefully and of +understanding clearly the Scripture doctrine of the new birth. Even +where the error is not so radical, as in the instances above alluded to, +the evil may be considerable, and in some cases fatal. + +The Arminians and Calvinists agree in this doctrine, in so far as that +they both make it a radical change of moral nature, by the supernatural +agency of the Holy Ghost. But they differ in respect to the _order_ in +which the several parts of the change take place--in respect to the +manner and degree of the agency of the Holy Spirit, and also in respect +to the part which human agency has in the accomplishment of this change. +And in some, if not all of these points, Calvinists differ as much from +each other as they do from us. + +It is my present purpose to point out some of the more prominent +Calvinistic modes of stating and explaining this doctrine, with the +difficulties attending them: after which I shall endeavour to present +and defend what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine of regeneration. + +_First Theory_.--The notion that the mind is entirely passive in this +change, that is, that nothing is done by the subject of it, which is +preparative or conditional, or in any way co-operative in its +accomplishment, has been a prevailing sentiment in the various +modifications of the old Calvinistic school. It is not indeed pretended +that the mind is inactive, either before or at the time this renovation +is effected by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it is said that the +sinner is resisting with all the power of the mind, and with all the +obstinacy of the most inveterate enmity, up to the very moment, and in +the very act of conversion. So that the sinner is regenerated, not only +_without_ his _co-operation_, but also in _spite_ of his _utmost +resistance_. Hence it is maintained, that, but for the _irresistible_ +influence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart, no sinner would be +converted. + +1. One of the leading objections to this view of conversion is, that it +is inseparably connected with the doctrine of particular and +unconditional election. The two reciprocally imply each other, and must +therefore, stand or fall together. But this doctrine of particular and +unconditional election has been sufficiently refuted, it is hoped, in +the sermon that gave rise to this controversy; if so, then the doctrine +of passivity and irresistible grace is not true. + +2. Another very serious difficulty which this theory of conversion has +to contend with is, that the Scriptures, in numerous passages, declare +that the Spirit of God may be _resisted, grieved, quenched_, and utterly +disregarded; and that the grace of God may be abused, or received in +vain. The passages to establish these propositions are so frequent that +I need not stop to point them out. But if this be so, then the grace of +God and the Spirit of grace are not irresistible. + +3. It may be yet farther objected to this doctrine of the mind's +passivity in conversion, that it is a virtual denial of all gracious +influence upon the heart before regeneration. It has been shown in +previous numbers that man was not able to comply with the conditions of +salvation without grace--and that the gracious influences of the Divine +Spirit are given to every sinner previous to regeneration. But there +would be no necessity for this, and no consistency in it, if there are +no conditions and no co-operation on the part of the sinner in the +process of the new birth. Hence the advocates of this doctrine very +consistently maintain that the first act of grace upon the heart of the +sinner is that which regenerates him. Since then this theory conflicts +with the Bible doctrine of a gracious influence anterior to conversion, +it cannot be admitted. + +4. This theory of regeneration removes all conditions on the part of the +sinner to the removal of the power and guilt of sin. It teaches that if +the sinner should do any thing acceptable to God, _as a condition_ to +his conversion, it would imply he did not need converting; that such an +idea, in fact, would be inconsistent with the doctrine of depravity, and +irreconcilable with the idea of salvation _by grace_. And this is the +ground on which the old Calvinists have so repeatedly charged us with +the denial of the doctrines of grace, and with holding that we may be +justified by our works. + +There is something very singular in these notions respecting the +necessity of _unconditional_ regeneration, in order that it may be by +grace. These same Calvinists tell us that the sinner _can_ repent, and +ought to repent, and that the Scriptures require it at his hand. What! +is the sinner able and obliged to do that which would destroy the whole +economy of grace! which would blot out the Gospel and nullify the +atonement itself? Ought he to do that which would prove him a practical +Pelagian and an operative workmonger? Is he indeed, according to +Calvinists themselves, required in Scripture to do that which would +prove Calvinism false, and a conditional regeneration true? So it would +seem. Put together these two dogmas of Calvinism. 1. _The sinner is +able, and ought to repent._ 2. _The idea that the sinner does any thing +toward his regeneration destroys the doctrine of depravity and of +salvation by grace._ I say put these two together, and you have almost +all the contradictions of Calvinism converged to a focus--and what is +most fatal to the system, you have the authority of Calvinism itself to +prove that every intelligent probationer on the earth not only has the +ability, but is authoritatively required to give practical demonstration +that the system is false!! What is this but to say, "You _can_, and you +_cannot;_"--if you _do_ not, you will be justly condemned--if you _do_, +you will ruin the Gospel system, and yourself with it? Where such +glaring paradoxes appear, there must be something materially wrong in, +at least, some parts of the system. + +5. But the inconsistency of this theory is not its only, and certainly +not its most injurious characteristic. In the same proportion as men are +made to believe that there are no conditions on their part to their +regeneration, they will be likely to fall into one of the two extremes +of carelessness or despair, either of which, persisted in, would be +ruinous. I cannot doubt but that, in this way, tens of thousands have +been ruined. We should infer that such would be the result of the +doctrine, from only understanding its character; and I am fully +satisfied that, in my own personal acquaintance, I have met with +hundreds who have been lulled in the cradle of Antinomianism on the one +hand, or paralyzed with despair on the other, by this same doctrine of +passive, unconditional conversion. Calvinists, it is true, tell us this +is the abuse of the doctrine; but it appears to me to be the legitimate +fruit. What else could we expect? A man might as well attempt to +dethrone the Mediator, as to do any thing toward his own conversion. +Teach this, and carelessness ensues, Antinomian feelings will follow--or +if you arouse the mind by the curse of the law, and by the fearful doom +that awaits the unregenerate, what can he do? Nothing! Hell rises from +beneath to meet him, but he can do _nothing_. He looks until he is +excited to phrensy, from which he very probably passes over to raving +madness, or settles down into a state of gloomy despair. + +6. Another very decisive objection to this doctrine is, the frequent, +and I may say uniform language of Scripture. The Scriptures require us +to _seek--ask--knock--come to Christ--look unto God--repent--believe +--open the door_ of the heart--_receive Christ_, &c. No one can fail to +notice how these instructions are sprinkled over the whole volume of +revelation. And what is specially in point here, all these are spoken of +and urged upon us as conditions of blessings that shall follow--even the +blessings of salvation, of regeneration--and as conditions, too, without +which we cannot expect these blessings. Take one passage of many--"As +many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, +even to them that believe on his name." If any one doubts whether +"becoming the sons of God," as expressed in this text, means +regeneration, the next verse will settle it--"Which were born not of +blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of +God," John i, 12, 13. The latter verse I may have occasion to remark +upon hereafter; it is quoted here to show that the new birth is +undoubtedly the subject here spoken of. And we are here expressly +taught, in language that will bear no other interpretation, that +_receiving_ Christ and _believing_ on his name are the conditions of +regeneration. If there were no other passage in the Bible to direct our +minds on this subject, this plain unequivocal text ought to be decisive. +But the truth is, this is the uniform language of Scripture. And are +there any passages against these, any that say we cannot come, cannot +believe, seek, &c? or any that say, this work of personal regeneration +is performed independent of conditions? I know of none which will not +fairly admit of a different construction. We are often met with this +passage--"It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of +God that showeth mercy." See Rom. ix, 16. But whoever interpreteth this +of personal and individual regeneration can hardly have examined the +passage carefully and candidly. But we are told again, it is God that +renews the heart; and if it is his work, it is not the work of the +sinner. I grant this; this is the very sentiment I mean to maintain; but +then there may be conditions--_there are conditions_--or else we should +not hear the psalmist _praying_ for this, in language that has been +preserved for the edification of all subsequent generations, "Create in +me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." This is a +practical comment on Christ's conditional salvation, "Ask and ye shall +receive." + +Since then this doctrine of passive and unconditional regeneration +implies unconditional election--since it is in opposition to those +scriptures which teach that the Spirit and grace of God may be resisted +and received in vain--since it is a virtual denial of all gracious +influences upon the heart before regeneration--since it leads the +abettors of the theory into gross contradictions, by their endeavours to +reconcile the can and the _cannot_ of their system--since its practical +tendency is to make sinners careless, or drive them to despair--and +finally, since it contradicts that numerous class of scriptures, some of +which are very unequivocal, that predicate the blessings of regeneration +and justification upon certain preparatory and conditional acts of the +sinner--_therefore_ we conclude that this theory cannot be true. + +_Second Theory_.--To avoid these difficulties, to make the sinner feel +his responsibility, and to bring him into action, a new theory of +regeneration is proposed. This constitutes a leading characteristic of +the New Divinity. It is the theory of _self-conversion_. Its advocates +maintain that there is no more mystery or supernatural agency in the +process of the change, called the new birth, than there is in any other +leading purpose or decision of the mind. It is true, they do not wholly +exclude the Holy Spirit from this work, but his agency is mediate and +indirect. He acts in some undefinable way, through the truth as an +instrument. The truth acts upon the mind, in the way of _moral suasion_, +and the sinner, in the view and by the influence of truth, resolves to +give himself up to God and to his service--and _this is regeneration_. +The preparation is of God--but the actual change is man's own work. The +God of providence reveals the truth and arranges the means for its +promulgation, the Spirit of grace applies it to the understanding, the +sinner looks at it, reflects upon it, and at length is persuaded to set +about the work, and regenerates himself! + +That we may be the better prepared to meet this hypothesis, it should be +noticed that it is inseparable from the notion that all sin consists in +voluntary exercise, or in other words, in a series of sinful volitions. +Regeneration is a change from sin to holiness--and hence a regenerate +state is the opposite of a sinful state. If then a regenerate state is +nothing more than a series of holy volitions, an unregenerate state, +which is its opposite, is nothing more than a series of unholy +volitions. Thus it appears that this doctrine of regeneration by the act +of the will must stand or fall with the notion that all sin consists in +voluntary exercise. Any argument, therefore, brought against this latter +theory will bear with equal weight against this new idea of +regeneration. Bearing this in mind, we are prepared to object to this +doctrine, + +1. That it is inconsistent with the doctrine of constitutional +depravity. This is granted by the supporters of the theory, and hence +constitutional depravity is no part of their system. All the arguments +therefore that have been adduced in favour of derived, inherent +depravity, or that can be urged in favour of this doctrine, will stand +directly opposed to this view of regeneration. The arguments in favour +of our views of depravity need not be repeated; and the reader is +referred to a previous number in which this point has been discussed. + +2. Another objection to this theory of regeneration is, that it makes +_entire_ sanctification take place at the time of regeneration. +Conversion, holiness, are nothing more than a decision of the will; and +since the will can never be _more than decided_, of course the decision +at regeneration is the _perfection of holiness_. On this ground, +therefore, though Christians are exhorted to "cleanse themselves from +all filthiness of flesh and spirit, _perfecting holiness_ in the fear of +the Lord;" though the saints are commanded to "grow in grace," to +"confess their sins," that they may be "cleansed from _all +unrighteousness_," though some of the Corinthian Christians were "carnal +and walked as men," and for that reason were, after years of experience, +only _babes_ in Christ--still, if we embrace this sentiment, we must +call the convert, at his first spiritual breath, as holy as he ever _can +be_ in any of the subsequent stages of his experience! Surely the +apostles taught not this! And yet so strongly are men impelled forward +by their systems, this doctrine of perfect holiness at conversion is the +very sentiment that many of the advocates of the New Divinity are now +propagating--a clear proof that it necessarily follows from their theory +of conversion. This of itself, it strikes me, ought to destroy the +doctrine. + +3. Another bearing of this hypothesis, and one which I think must prove +fatal to it, is, that the Scriptures represent this change to be chiefly +in the affections, whereas this doctrine makes it exclusively in the +will. That the Scriptures place the change in the affections chiefly, I +suppose will not be denied. If it should be, without stopping here to +quote specific passages, or use many arguments, one consideration alone +will be sufficient to set the question at rest.--True evangelical +holiness consists in love to God and man; and sin is loving the creature +rather than the Creator. The apostle brings into view both the +regenerate and the unregenerate state in this passage--"Set your +affection on things above, and not on things on the earth." Numerous are +the passages which teach that love to God is the essence of the +Christian character. The affections, therefore, are the seat of this +change. But we are told by this new theory the change is in the will. It +is only to resolve to serve God, and we are converted.--Either this +theory, therefore, or the Bible account of this matter must be wrong. + +To avoid this difficulty, it may be said, that a change of the will +implies a change of the affections. But this is changing the +position--which is, that a decision of the will is regeneration. If +however this new position be insisted upon, it can be reconciled with +the phraseology used only by making a change of the affections a mere +_subordinate_ part of regeneration, whereas the Scriptures make the +change consist essentially in this. But there is still a more serious +difficulty in this idea, that the change of the will implies a change in +the affections. It necessarily implies that the affections are at all +times under the control of the will. But this is as unphilosophical as +it is unscriptural. It is even directly contrary to the observation and +knowledge of men who have paid only common and casual attention to +mental phenomena. The will is oftener enthralled by the affections, than +the affections by the will. Even in common and worldly matters let a man +try by an effort of the will to beget love where it does not exist, or +to transfer the affections from one object to another, and how will he +succeed? Will love and hatred go or come at his bidding? You might as +well attempt, by an act of the will, to make sweet bitter, or bitter +sweet to the physical taste. How much less can a man, by an act of the +will, make all things new, and transfer the heart from the grossness of +creature love to the purity of supreme love to God. The Apostle Paul has +taught us his failure in this matter. When he "would do good, evil was +present with him." "For," says he, "the good that I would do, I do not; +but the evil which I would not, that I do." And this is the fact in most +cases of genuine awakening. Resolutions are formed, but the current of +the unsanctified affections sweeps them away. Over the untowardness of +the unregenerate heart the will has, in fact, but a feeble influence; +and this is the reason why the man, struggling with the corruptions of +his heart, is driven to despair, and exclaims, "O! wretched man that I +am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" + +We shall see hereafter how the action of the will is indispensable in +regeneration; but not in this _direct_ way to change and control the +affections, by the power of its own decisions. When I find my will +capable of doing this, I must have an essentially different intellectual +character from the one I now have. + +Since the Scriptures make the new birth a change of affections, and this +theory makes it a change of volitions; and especially since the +affections cannot be transferred from _earth_ to _heaven_ by a _mere act +of the will_, therefore the doctrine which teaches and implies these +views must be false. + +4. This idea of the character of sin and of the new birth makes man +sinless, at particular times, even _without_ regeneration. I do not mean +by this that he is not obnoxious to punishment for past unholy +volitions. But if sin consists only in voluntary exercise, whenever the +mind does not act; or whenever its action is not under the control of +the will, there is nothing of sin personally appertaining to the +man.--When the action of the will is suspended by an all-absorbing +emotion of wonder or surprise--in sound sleep when the mental states, if +there are any, are not under the control of the will--in cases of +suspended animation, by drowning, fainting, or otherwise--in short, +whenever the mind is necessarily wholly engrossed, as is often the case, +by some scientific investigation, or matter of worldly business, not of +a moral character, then, and in every such case, whatever may be the +guilt for past transgressions, there is no personal unholiness. And by +the same reasoning we may show that the regenerate pass a great portion +of their time without any personal holiness! + +5. According to the theory we are opposing, regeneration, strictly +speaking, means nothing. The work of grace, by which a sinner is made +meet for heaven, embraces two essential points, _pardon_ and _renewal_. +The former is not a positive change of character, but a relative change, +from a state of condemnation to a state of acquittal. But as +regeneration, if it have any appropriate meaning, cannot mean a mere +change of relation, any construction or system that forces such a +meaning upon it does, in fact, do it away. Hence, being _born again, +being renewed, being created anew, being sanctified, being translated +from darkness to light, being raised from the dead_, and numerous other +scripture expressions, are figurative forms of speech, so foreign from +the idea they are used to express, that they are worse than +unmeaning--they lead to error. But if these expressions mean any thing +more than pardon, what is that meaning? This doctrine makes the +principal change take place in the _neighbourhood_ of the will; not in +the will itself, meaning by that, the mental power by which we put forth +volitions. This _faculty_ of the mind is sound, and needs no change--all +the other mental susceptibilities are sound, the essence of the mind and +the susceptibilities of the mind are perfectly free from any moral +perversion. It is the mental _action_ that is bad.--What is there then +in the man that is to be changed? Do you say his volitions? But these he +changes every hour. Do you say, he must leave off wrong volitions, and +have right ones? This too he often does. "But he must do it with right +motives," you say, "this acting from _right motives_ is the regenerate +state." Indeed! Suppose then that he has resolved to serve God, from +right motives, what if he should afterward resolve, from false shame or +fear, to neglect a duty, is he now unregenerate? This is changing from +regenerate to unregenerate, from _entire_ holiness to _entire_ +unholiness with a breath. Truly such a regeneration is _nothing_. But +you say, after he has once submitted, he now has a "governing purpose" +to serve God, and this constitutes him regenerate; aye, a _governing_ +purpose that _does not govern_ him. Let it be understood, you cannot +divide a volition; it has an entire character in itself; and if it be +unholy, no preceding holy volition can sanctify it. Hence every change +of volition from wrong to right, and from right to wrong, is a change of +state, so that regeneracy and unregeneracy play in and out of the human +bosom in the alternation of every criminal thought or every pious +aspiration. Is this the Bible doctrine of the new birth? And yet this is +all you can make of it, if you resolve it into the mere action of the +will. + +6. This doctrine of self-conversion, by an act of the will, is directly +contrary to Scripture. It would be tedious to me and my readers to quote +all those passages that attribute this work directly to the Holy Spirit, +and that speak of it as a work which _God himself_ accomplishes for, and +in us. There is one passage which is much in point, however, and is +sufficient of itself to settle this question. "But as many as received +him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that +believe on his name. Who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the +flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," John i, 12, 13. This is a +two-edged sword--it cuts off, as we have remarked before, passive and +unconditional regeneration on the one hand; and also, as we may now see, +self conversion by an act of the will, on the other. I know not how +words can be put together, in so small a compass, better to answer the +true objects of destroying these two opposite theories of regeneration, +and asserting the true theory. Here is, first--the _receiving of +Christ,_ the _believing on his name_--this is the condition. Second, +Christ gives the "power," viz. strength and privilege, to become the +sons of God. This is the regeneration. Third--This becoming "the sons of +God," or being "born," is not in a _physical way_, by flesh and blood, +nor yet by _human will_, but of or by God. Can any thing be clearer or +more decisive? + +Indeed the very terms, _regeneration, born, birth_, &c, imply of +themselves another and an efficient agent; and then to connect these +with the Divine agency, as the Scriptures have done some half dozen +times in the phrase, "born of God," and several other times in the +phrase, "of the Spirit:" to have this called being "begotten again," and +the like, is enough, one would think, if words have any meaning, to show +that man does not change his own heart. The same may be said of the +terms _resurrection, translation, creation, renewal_, and various other +terms the Scriptures use to express this change. Jesus Christ claimed +that he had "power to lay down his life, and _to take it again;_" but +this is the only instance of self-resurrection power that we read of; +and even this was by his Divine nature; for he was "quickened by the +Spirit," and raised "by the power of God." But these theorists teach +that man has power to lay down his life, and then, after he is "dead in +trespasses and sins," he has power to take his life again. Truly this is +giving man a power that approaches very near to one of the Divine +attributes. To Christ alone does it belong "to quicken whom he will." To +change the heart of the sinner is one of the Divine prerogatives, and he +that attempts to convert himself; and trusts to this, will find in the +end that he is _carnal_ still. For "whatsoever is born of the flesh is +flesh, but whatsoever is born of the Spirit is spirit." + +Let me not here be misunderstood. I shall endeavour to show, in its +proper place, the conditional agency of man in this work. I have only +time to add, in this number, that I consider those scriptures which +press duties upon the sinner as applying to this conditional agency. And +even those strong expressions which sometimes occur in the Bible, +requiring the sinner to "make himself a new heart"--"to cleanse his +hands and purify his heart," &c, will find an easy solution and a +pertinent application in this view of the subject. For if there are +certain pending conditions, without which the work will not be +accomplished, then there would be a propriety, while pressing this duty, +to use expressions showing that this work was conditionally, though not +_efficiently_, resting upon the agency of the sinner. + +In my next I shall endeavour to show that there is no intermediate +_Calvinistic_ ground between the two theories examined in this number. +If that attempt prove successful, and if in this it has been found that +the two theories examined are encumbered with too many embarrassments to +be admitted, then we shall be the better prepared to listen to the +teachings of the Scriptures on this important and leading doctrine of +the Christian faith. + + + + +NUMBER XIV. + +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. + +An inconsistency in any received theory is constantly driving its +supporters to some modification of their system. This is a redeeming +principle in the human mind, and greatly encourages the hope that truth +will finally triumph. + +It has already been noticed that the doctrine of entire passivity, in +regeneration, is so pressed with difficulties that it has sought relief +in the opposite notion of self-conversion. But this latter hypothesis +is, in turn, encumbered, if possible, with still greater embarrassments. +The presumption therefore is, that the truth lies between them; and it +will doubtless be found, by a fair and thorough investigation, that this +is the fact. But here the question arises, Can _Calvinists_ consistently +occupy any such middle ground? In other words, retaining the other +peculiarities of Calvinism, can our Calvinistic brethren assume any +position between these two extremes which will avoid the difficulties of +both? A brief examination, it is hoped, will decide this question. + +_Third Theory_.--Dr. Tyler is a highly respectable clergyman of the +Calvinistic faith, and is now at the head of the theological school in +East Windsor, Conn., which was got up with the avowed purpose of +counteracting the New-Haven theology. We should not therefore suspect +him of leaning too much toward the New Divinity. He tells us that the +only depravity is to be unwilling to serve God--that there is "no other +obstacle in the way of the sinner's salvation except what lies in his +own will"--that "to be born again is simply to be made willing to do +what God requires." What is this but the New Divinity? The will is here +made, most explicitly, the sole seat of depravity; and regeneration is +an act of the will. But every act of the will is the sinner's _own act_, +and therefore the agent, by that act of the will which constitutes +regeneration, converts himself.--Perhaps Dr. Tyler will say, the sinner +in this case does not convert himself, because he is "_made willing_." +God makes him willing "in the day of his power." It is remarkable what a +favourite phrase this is with the Calvinists. It is borrowed from the +third verse of the hundred and tenth Psalm, "Thy people shall be willing +in the day of thy power." Now although the word "made" is not in the +text; although there is not the _slightest_ evidence that the text +speaks of regeneration at all, but on the contrary, it is most evidently +intended to describe the character and conduct of God's people, viz. the +regenerate; and although every scholar, at least, among the Calvinists, +knows this as well as he knows his right hand from the left, yet we hear +it repeated by the learned and the ignorant, at all times and +places--"God's people are made willing in the day of his power." It is +not only a gross perversion of a Scripture phrase, but its repetition, +in this perverted sense, renders it wearisome and sickening. But, +waiving this, it becomes us to ask whether there is any more rational or +Scriptural ground for the idea itself than there is for this use of the +text. What is meant by making the soul willing? I confess I cannot +understand it. Is it meant that God _forces_ the soul to be willing? +This is a contradiction in terms. To say that God acts directly on the +will, and thus changes its determination by superior force, is to +destroy its freedom--is to produce a volition without motive or +reason--which would, at any rate, be an anomalous action of the will. +And what is still more fatal to the theory, it implies _no act_ of the +sinner whatever, but an irresistible act of the Divine power, which +therefore necessarily throws the theory back upon the doctrine of +passive conversion. There is no avoiding this conclusion, I think, on +the ground that God changes the action of the will, by an exertion of +power upon the will itself. If, to avoid this, it should be said that +the will is not changed by a direct act of power, but influenced to a +holy determination indirectly, through the medium of motives, presented +by the Holy Spirit--then and in that case we should be thrown forward on +to the self-conversion system. The sinner's voluntary act, by which he +regenerated himself, would be as truly and entirely _his own_ as any +other act of the will; therefore he would be self-regenerated. This +also would be regeneration, not by the Holy Spirit, but _by the truth;_ +which is another feature of the New Divinity. This also would make all +depravity consist in the will, or rather in its _acts;_ which has been +shown in the preceding number to be unscriptural as well as +unphilosophical. This objection is valid, whether the depravity is +supposed to be in the _power_ of willing, or in the _acts_ of the will. +But since, in Dr. Tyler's view, to will in one direction is depravity, +and to will in another direction is regeneration, and since all that +motives _can_ do is, not to change the will itself, but only prompt it +to new voluntary states, it follows conclusively that Dr. T. makes all +holiness and all unholiness consist in volitions; and therefore the +_moral-exercise_ system is true; which is another feature of the New +Divinity. Truly I may repeat, we do not need another theological +seminary in Connecticut to teach this doctrine. + +Finally, according to this theory of Dr. T., he and all those who reason +like him, are chargeable, I think, with a palpable paralogism--they +reason in a circle. They say, in the express language of Dr. Tyler, "All +men may be saved if they will"--"No man is hindered from coming to +Christ who is willing to come"--that is, since to will and to be willing +is to be regenerated, this language gravely teaches us, "All men may be +saved, if they _are regenerated_"--"No man is hindered from coming to +Christ (to be regenerated) who _is regenerated!_" And indeed this view +of regeneration not only makes learned divines talk nonsense, but the +Scriptures also. The invitation, "Whosoever will, let him come," &c, +must mean, "Whosoever _is regenerate_, let him come," and so of other +passages. Thus this theory of Dr. Tyler, and of the many who hold with +him, is so closely hemmed in on both sides, that it must throw itself +for support, either upon the doctrine of passivity, or self-conversion; +at the same time that in other respects it involves itself in +inconsistent and anti-scriptural dogmas. + +But that we may leave no position unexamined, let us take another view +of the subject. Suppose, instead of saying regeneration is simply a +change of the will, it should be argued that a change of the will +implies a change of the affections, and this therefore is included in +regeneration. Then I would ask, whether this change of the affections is +in the order of cause and effect, or in the order of time, _prior_ or +_subsequent_ to the act of the will. If this change is prior to any +action of the will in the case, then the sinner has no voluntary +co-operation in the work; and this brings us up once more upon the +doctrine of passive regeneration. The heart is changed before the +subject of the change acts. If the action of the will precedes the +change of the heart, then this change will be effected in one of two +ways. Either this anterior volition does itself change the heart; or it +is a mere preparatory condition, on _occasion of which_ God changes the +heart. In the former case the man himself would change his own heart, +and this is self-conversion; and in the latter alternative we have a +conditional regeneration wrought by the Holy Ghost, and this is the very +doctrine for which _we contend_, in opposition to Calvinism. If it +should be said, this change of the will and this change of the heart +take place independent of each other, that would not help the matter, +since in this view the change of _heart_ would be passive and +unconditional. Thus whichever way this system turns, its difficulties +press upon it still, and it finds no relief. Indeed there can, as I +conceive, be no intermediate Calvinistic theory of regeneration, and +there _can be_ but two other alternatives--either God must renew the +heart, independent of all co-operation on the part of the subject of +this change--and this is the old doctrine of unconditional Divine +efficiency--or the first acceptable act of the will must be +regeneration; and this is the new doctrine of _self-conversion_. Let the +reader, let any one reflect closely on this subject, and I cannot doubt +but he will say with me, _There is no third alternative_. The nature of +the case will admit of none. The former theory may not contradict many +of those scriptures that speak of _Divine efficiency_ in the work of +grace upon the heart, but it is utterly incompatible with those that +urge the sinner to duty.--The latter theory corresponds well with the +urgent injunctions to duty, so abundant in the Scriptures, but is wholly +irreconcilable with those that speak of Divine efficiency. The true +theory must answer to both; and must also correspond with all the other +parts of the Christian system. Is there such a theory? Every honest +inquirer after truth will embrace it doubtless, if it can be +presented--for truth, wherever, and whenever, and by whomsoever +discovered, is infinitely to be preferred to error, however long and +fondly it may have been cherished. Such a theory I will now try to +present--and although I may fail in making it very explicit, and in +bringing forward all its defences, yet if the general outlines can be +seen and be defended, it will, I trust, commend itself to the favourable +notice of the reader. + +_Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration_.--I approach this subject by laying +down the two following fundamental principles:-- + +1. The work of regeneration is performed by the direct and efficient +operations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. + +2. The Holy Spirit exerts this regenerating power only on conditions, to +be first complied with by the subject of the change. + +The first principle I deem it unnecessary to defend farther than it has +been defended in the foregoing remarks. It is not objected to by any +orthodox Christians that I know of, only so far as the new views of +self-conversion, and of conversion by moral suasion, may be thought an +exception. And this we have reason to hope will be an exception of +limited extent and short duration. The sentiment conflicts so directly +with such a numerous class of scriptures, and with the most approved +principles of mental philosophy; and has, at the same time, such a +direct tendency to annihilate all the essential features of +regeneration, it cannot long find encouragement in a spiritual Church. +It may however make many converts for a time, for men are fond of taking +the work of salvation into their own hands; but if it should, between +such converts and the true Church there will ultimately be a separation +as wide as that which now separates orthodoxy and Socinianism. + +The other fundamental principle seems to follow, almost of necessity, +from the scriptures that so abundantly point out the sinner's duty and +agency, in connection with his conversion. The principle, however, is +strenuously opposed by all classes of Calvinists. The opposite of this +is in fact the essential characteristic of Calvinism, if any _one_ +notion can be so called; for however much the Calvinistic system may be +modified, in other respects, this is clung to as the elementary germ +which constitutes the identity of the system. Even the New Divinity, +which makes so much of human agency, does not allow it a _conditional +action_--it allows of no intermediate volition between the mental states +of worldly love and Divine love, as the occasion on which the transfer +is made, or the conditional hinge on which the important revolution is +accomplished. On the contrary, it considers the volition itself as the +transfer--the volition constitutes the _entire change_. Thus warily does +Calvinism, in all its changes, avoid conditional regeneration. Hence if +I were called upon to give a general definition of Calvinism, that +should include all the species that claim the name, I would say, +_Calvinists are those who believe in unconditional regeneration_. For +the moment this point is given up by any one, all parties agree that he +is not a Calvinist. + +But why is conditional regeneration so offensive? Is it because the +Scriptures directly oppose it? This is hardly pretended. It is supposed, +however, by the Calvinists, that to acknowledge this doctrine would +require the renunciation of certain other doctrines which are taught in +the Scriptures. This lays the foundation for the objections that have +been made against this doctrine. It is objected that _a depraved sinner +cannot perform an acceptable condition until he is regenerated_--that +_God cannot consistently accept of any act short of that which +constitutes regeneration_--that _the idea of a conditional regeneration +implies salvation by works, in part at least, and not wholly by grace_. + +I have mentioned these objections in this connection, not so much to +attempt, at this moment, a direct refutation of them, as to advert to +what I conceive to be the ground of the difficulty in the minds of those +making the objections. It appears to me that the difference between us +results principally from a difference of our views in respect to the +constitution and the constitutional action of the mind itself. The +philosophical part of our theology will be modified very much by our +views of the philosophy of mind. Let it be granted then:-- + +1. That the mind is possessed of a moral susceptibility, generally +called _conscience_, which lays the foundation of the notions of right +and wrong, and by which we feel the emotions of approval or disapproval +for our past conduct, and the feelings of obligation with respect to the +present and the future; and that even in an unregenerate state this +susceptibility often operates in accordance with its original design, +and therefore agreeably with the Divine will. + +2. That the understanding or intellect, which is a general division of +the mind, containing in itself several distinct susceptibilities or +powers, may, in an unregenerate state of the mind, be so enlightened and +informed on the subjects of Divine truth as to perceive the right and +the wrong; and as to perceive also, to some extent at least, the way of +salvation pointed out in the Gospel. + +3. That the affections and propensities (sometimes called the heart) are +the principal seat of depravity--and these are often arrayed in direct +hostility to the convictions of the judgment and the feelings of moral +obligation. + +4. That the will, or that mental power by which we put forth volitions, +and make decisions, while it is more or less, directly or indirectly, +influenced by the judgment, the conscience, and the affections, is in +fact designed to give direction and unity to the whole mental action; +and it always accomplishes this, where there is a proper harmony in the +mental powers. But by sin this harmony has been disturbed, and the +unholy affections have gained an undue ascendancy, so that, in the +unregenerate, in all questions of preference between God and the world, +in spite of the judgment, of conscience, and of the will, the world is +loved and God is hated. + +5. That in those cases where we cannot control our affections by a +direct volition, we may, nevertheless, under the promptings of +conscience, and in the light of the judgment, resolve against sin--but +these resolutions, however firmly and repeatedly made, will be carried +away and overruled by the strength of the carnal mind. This shows us our +own weakness, drives us to self-despair, until, under the enlightening +influences of grace, and the drawings of the Spirit, the soul is led to +prayer and to an abdication of itself into the hands of Divine mercy, +through Christ; and _then_, and on _these conditions_, the Holy Spirit +changes the character and current of the unholy affections--and _this is +regeneration_. + +In laying down the preceding postulates I have endeavoured to express +myself with as much brevity, and with as little metaphysical +technicality as possible; for the reason that they are designed to be +understood by all. Bating the deficiencies that may on this account be +noticed by the philosophical reader, I think it may be assumed that +these, so far as the powers and operations of the mind are concerned, +embrace the basis and general outlines of what we call _conditional +regeneration_. I am not aware that they are in opposition to an one +principle of Scripture theology, or mental philosophy. And if this +process is found consonant with reason and Scripture, in its general +features, it will be easy to show that its relative bearings are such as +most happily harmonize all the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel system. + +We plant ourselves then upon these general positions, and as ability +will permit, or truth may seem to justify, shall endeavour to defend +them against such objections as may be anticipated, or are known to have +been made against any of the principles here assumed. + +1. It may be objected perhaps that this is making too broad a +distinction between the different mental powers, giving to each such a +distinctive action and operation as to infringe upon the doctrine of the +mind's unity and simplicity. It is believed, however, the more this +point is reflected upon by an attentive observance of our own minds, or +the minds of others, the more satisfied shall we be that the principles +here assumed are correct. That there are these distinct properties of +mind no one doubts. It is in accordance with universal language, to +speak of the intellect, of the conscience, of the will, and of the +affections, as distinct properties of the mind. The properties of mind +are as clearly marked by our consciousness, as the properties of matter +by our senses. And although, in consequence of the invisibility of mind, +there is doubtless a more perfect unity in each individual mental +property, than in each distinct quality of matter, still each of the +mental qualities has its appropriate and distinctive character. +Calvinists themselves acknowledge this. They allow we have a moral sense +which tests good or evil, even in an unregenerate state; they allow the +intellect may perceive and approve of truth, even when the heart rejects +it; they allow that to perceive and to judge, to feel moral obligation +and to will, are distinct operations of the mind; and that our +perceptions and our conscience may be right, when our affections are +wrong. So far then we are agreed, and so far they make distinctions in +the mind, as wide as any that have been claimed in the principles above +laid down. Theologians, I grant, have, in many instances, confounded in +their reasonings the will and the affections. And this has also +sometimes been done by writers on the philosophy of the mind. But it is +most evident, I think, they have done this without good reason. Mr. +Locke says, "I find the will often confounded with several of the +affections, especially desire, and one put for the other." This he +thinks is an error, of which "any one who turns his thoughts inward upon +what passes in his own mind" will be convinced. Rev. Professor Upham, of +Bowdoin College, Maine, himself a Calvinist, as is generally supposed, +in a late excellent treatise on the will, asserts, and clearly proves, I +think, that "_the state of the mind, which we term volition, is entirely +distinct from that which we term desire_." Nay, he proves that desires +and volitions are often in direct opposition. Hence as love implies +desire, our volitions may often conflict with our love. And this is +precisely the state the awakened sinner is in when he "would do good, +but evil is present with him." + +2. It may be said, and has sometimes been said, that this view of the +subject involves a contradiction; that it is the same as to say, the man +wills against his preference, or in other words, he wills what he does +not choose. I cannot answer this objection better than by an argument in +Professor Upham's work, already alluded to, in which he says, of a +similar objection on this very subject, "It will be found on examination +to resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and naturally vanishes as soon +as that fallacy is detected." "It is undoubtedly true that the common +usage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice and choosing +indiscriminately to either the desire or volition; but it does not +follow, and is not true, that we apply them to these different parts of +our nature in precisely the same sense." "When the word choice implies +desire at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects brought +before the mind at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or +predominant desire." "At other times we use the terms choice and +choosing in application to the will--when it is applied to that power, +it expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the +exception, as in the other case, that more than one object of volition +was present, in view of the mind, before the putting forth of the +voluntary act. It is in fact the circumstance that two or more objects +are present, which suggests the use of the word choice or choosing, in +either case." "But the acts are entirely different in their nature, +although under certain circumstances the same name is applied to them." +Hence he adds, "The contradiction is not a real, but merely a verbal +one. If we ever choose against choosing, it will be found merely that +choice which is volition, placed against that choice which is desire." +And this is nothing more than to say that volitions and desires may +conflict with each other, which we know to be the fact in numerous +instances. + +If in reply to the foregoing, and in farther defence of the objection, +it should be urged, that there could be not only no motive for the +volition in this case, but that it would in fact be put forth against +all motive, since the feelings of the heart would be of a directly +opposite character, I reply, that it is not true that there would be no +motive for the action of the will, in opposition to the sinful +affections. It is seen already that the judgment in the awakened sinner +is against continuing in sin, and the rebukes of the conscience for the +past, and its admonitions for the future, are powerful motives in +opposition to the unholy affections. The feelings of compunction and of +moral obligation gain great accessions of strength, moreover, from the +terrors of the Divine law, which alarm the fears, and from the promises +of the Gospel, which encourage the hopes of the awakened sinner. And it +is especially and emphatically true that under the existing influence of +these fears and hopes, the voice of conscience is most effectual in +prompting the sinner to "flee from the wrath to come," and "lay hold on +the hope set before him." Can it be said then that there is no motive +for a volition, or a mental effort that shall conflict with the +unsanctified affections? + +3. Again it is said, for every inch of this ground is disputed, that the +action of the mind under such motives is purely selfish, and cannot +therefore perform conditions acceptable to God. To this it may be +replied, that to be influenced by motives of self preservation and +personal salvation is not criminal; nay, it is commendable. In proof of +this but one argument is necessary. God moves upon our fears and hopes, +for the _express purpose_ of inducing us to forsake sin, and serve him; +and he applies these motives to man in his unregenerate state. This is +so obvious a fact, it is presumed none will deny it. But is it wrong for +us to be prompted to action by those considerations which God himself +urges upon us? If he attempts to excite our fears and hopes to prompt us +to a course of self preservation, can it be wrong for us to be +influenced by this means, and in this direction? I should hardly know +how to hold an argument with a man that should assert this--and yet +this sentiment is implied in the objection now under examination. +Beside, these acts conditional to regeneration are not wholly, perhaps +not chiefly, from motives of personal interest. Our moral feelings have +a great part in this work. And it is principally by arousing an accusing +conscience that fear and hope aid in the performance of the conditions +of regeneration. But whatever proportion there may be of the ingredients +of personal fear and hope in the feelings that enter into this +conditional action of the mind, it is certain that the fear of the +consequences of sin, and the hope to escape them, are not themselves +criminal, much less then are they capable of rendering a complex state +of the mind, of which they are but a part, unacceptable to God. Indeed +this objection to a mental act, merely because it is prompted by self +love, has always been to me a matter of wonder. Selfishness is a term +which we generally use in a bad sense, and we mean by it that form of +self love that leads us to seek our own gratification at the expense and +the injury of others, or in opposition to the will of God. But that self +love which leads us to seek our own highest interests, and especially +our eternal interests, without injury to others, and in accordance with +the Divine will, is never thought criminal, I believe, except where one +has a particular system to support by such a notion. But that system is +itself of a doubtful character which requires such an argument to +sustain it. + +4. Another objection which has been made to one of the principles above +laid down is, that "it is the province of the will to control the +affections, and not the affections the will; and that the will always +possesses the power to do this, even in an unregenerate state." If so, +then man has power, at any time, by an act of the will, to love God. Let +him try--let that unholy sinner try. Can he succeed? You say perhaps, +for so the Calvinists have said, "He can if he will;" that is, he can +will to love God if he does will to love God! This is no great discovery +surely, and it is certainly no proper answer to the question. I ask it +again, Can he, by a direct act of the will, love God? Do you say, by +varying the form of the answer, "He can if he chooses?" If you mean by +choice the act of the will, this is the same answer over again, the +folly of which is so apparent. But if you mean by choice the desires of +his heart, then your answer amounts to this: If the desires of the heart +are in favour of loving God, he can, by an act of the will, love him. +But if the desires of the heart are in favour of loving God, the love is +already begotten, and there is no need of the act of the will to produce +it. In that case your proposition would be, the sinner can love God by +an act of the will, _if he loves him!_ the absurdity of which is too +evident to require comment. It is thus that the coils of error run into +each other in endless circles. + +But, perhaps, to help the argument, if possible, it may be urged that +the will can decide in favour of a closer examination, and by voluntary +attention may get such strong perceptions of truth as will give it the +voluntary power over the heart. To this I would reply, in the first +place, this is giving up the argument, it is acknowledging that certain +preparatory acts of the will are necessary before the mind can love +God--but _this is conditional regeneration_. And it may be farther +maintained, in opposition to this sentiment that the mere perception of +truth, even when united with conscience, and personal fear and hope, is +not sufficient to give the will power over the unrenewed affections. In +proof of this, Scripture might be adduced; but reserving the Scripture +argument for the present, we may quote good Calvinistic authority in +proof that the will may be enthralled by the affections. Professor Upham +says, "Whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always +a greater or less degree of enthralment." And then he proceeds to show +how the mind may be enslaved by the _propensities_, _appetites_, +_affections,_ and _passions_. He illustrates; for example, the progress +of this enthralment in the case of an appetite for strong drink; which, +"like a strong man armed, violently seizes the will, binds it hand and +foot, and hurls it into the dust." Again he says, "There are not +unfrequently cases where the propensities and passions have become so +intense, after years of repetition, as to control, or in other words, +enthral the voluntary power almost entirely." (Treatise on the Will.) +Dr. Griffin, also an able Calvinistic writer, says, in decided terms, +"The judgment of the intellect and the decisions of the will are both +controlled by the heart." + +The idea of the enthralment of the will, however, may be objected to on +another ground, viz. that if admitted it would destroy accountability, +since none are accountable for what they cannot avoid. But I have not +said they cannot avoid it; neither have I said we are not voluntary +either in keeping or discarding the unholy heart. I assert directly the +contrary. Every probationer decides whether he will be holy or happy. +But his decisions to be holy are effectual only when he seeks that from +God which he cannot do for himself. Then, and then only, will God give +him the victory over the old man, with the deceitful lusts of the heart. +_But this is conditional regeneration_. + +Having said thus much in defence of the philosophy of the principles +laid down, the way is prepared to show that they accord with Scripture, +and to defend them with the doctrine which we build upon them from the +supposed Scripture objections which have been urged against them. But +this will furnish matter for another number. + + + + +NUMBER XV. + +REGENERATION, CONTINUED. + +In proposing and vindicating, in the preceding number, those views of +the philosophy of mind which are supposed to throw light upon the +process of regeneration, it was not intended to be intimated that a +knowledge of this theory is necessary in order to experience the new +birth. In the practical purposes of life men do not ordinarily stop to +analyze their mental states before they _judge_, _feel_, and _act_. They +have the _practical_ use of their mental faculties, and that suffices. +In this way the most ignorant and the most unphilosophical may be saved. +Why, then, it may be asked, is it necessary to enter into this analysis +at all? To this it may be replied, that whenever we can trace the +adaptation of the provisions of grace and the reason of the Divine +requirements to the known facts and laws of the human mind, it will +strengthen our confidence in the economy of grace, increase our +admiration of the wisdom and goodness of God, and sharpen our weapons of +defence against the cavils and assaults of an opposing skepticism. But +especially is this philosophical examination necessary whenever a +superficial or an erroneous philosophy would force upon us an erroneous +theology. The metaphysical mist with which some theories have veiled the +doctrine of regeneration, and the delusive and distorted views that have +resulted from this obscuration, may be removed and corrected by the +radiance of a pure philosophy. But as human philosophy is, at best, more +likely to err on these subjects than revelation, the former should +always be corrected or confirmed by the latter. How is it in the case +under examination? How do the assumed opinions correspond with +revelation? + +Let us glance again at our positions. The principal points assumed +are--that there is often a conflict between the feelings of moral +obligation on the one hand, enlightened as they are by reason and by +grace, sanctioned as they are by fear and hope, and the unholy +affections on the other; that under the promptings of the moral feelings +the will frequently puts forth its strength to resist and subdue the +unholy affections, but in every such case the effort fails when unaided +by the sanctifying grace of God--and that victory is finally gained by a +conditional act of the will, through which, or on occasion of which, God +subdues the passions and changes the heart. These views have been +vindicated, as being in accordance with the philosophy of mind. The +question now is, Are they sustained by Scripture? I answer, _Yes, most +clearly_. + +If the Apostle Paul had attempted, by a set argument, to illustrate and +affirm these views, he could not have done it better or more explicitly +than he has done in the latter part of the 7th, and the first part of +the 8th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. "I see," says the +apostle, "another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, +and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my +members." _The law of sin in his members_ was undoubtedly the carnal +mind, the unholy affections. These _warred_ against the _law of his +mind_, his enlightened judgment, his feelings of moral obligation; and +in this warfare the former were victorious, and carried captive the +will; so that "the good that he would, he did not, and the evil that he +would not, that he did." "To will was present with him," but "how to +perform, he knew not." See the entire passage, for it beautifully +illustrates our whole theory. Here is the conflict, the struggle between +conscience and sin; here is pointed out the seat of sin, viz. the +"flesh" or carnal mind, which is but another name for the unsanctified +affections and appetites; here is the will struggling to turn the +contest on the side of duty, but struggling in vain; every effort +results in defeat--_it is taken captive, and overcome_.--Despair finally +settles down upon the mind, as far as personal strength is concerned, +and the anxious soul looks abroad for help, and cries out, "Who shall +deliver me from the body of this death!" Then it is that deliverance +comes! Jesus Christ, the Saviour of sinners, sets him free! + +Professor Stuart, of Andover, himself a Calvinist, has shown most +conclusively, what Arminians have long contended for, that this portion +of revelation refers specifically to the work of regeneration. But +whether this be granted by every Calvinist or not, no man can deny but +that the grand philosophical principles heretofore contended for, are +here fully illustrated--the same _division_ of the mind--the same +_conflict_--the same _thraldom_ of the _will_, and the same +_deliverance_, through _faith_ in Jesus Christ our Lord. + +The same principles, in part at least, are recognized in Gal. v, 17, +"For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the +flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye _cannot_ +do the things that ye _would_." In short, all those passages where the +difficulty of subduing the carnal mind, of keeping the body under, of +crucifying the old man, all those passages that speak of a _warfare_, an +_internal conflict_, and the like, recognize the principles here +contended for. These principles, so frequently adverted to in the +Scriptures, are proved to be in exact conformity with experience. Who +that has passed through this change, but remembers this conflict, this +war in the members? Who but recollects how his best resolutions were +broken as often as made; and how, after various and vigorous efforts, +his heart seemed to himself to grow worse and worse? He found secret +treason lurking in his bosom even when he was trying to repent of his +past disloyalty. + + "The more he strove against its power, + He felt the guilt and sin the more." + +Every additional effort sunk him apparently but the lower in "the +horrible pit and miry clay," until "the Lord heard his _cry_," until +"the Lord brought him up, and set his feet upon a rock, and established +his goings, and put a new song in his mouth." + +That the Scriptures speak of a conditional action of the mind, +preparatory to the work of regeneration, appears from express passages, +as well as from the general tenor of that numerous class of scriptures +which enjoin duty upon the sinner, and predicate justification and +salvation upon those duties. John i, 12, has already been quoted and +commented upon, in which the new birth is suspended upon _receiving_ +Christ, or _believing_ on his name. The many cases of healing the body, +by Christ, are evident illustrations of the healing of the soul. In +fact, we have good reasons for supposing that, in most of these cases at +least, the soul and body were healed at the same time; and this was +always on the condition of _asking_ and _believing_. John iii, 14, 13, +"As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son +of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, +but have everlasting life." Here our Saviour shows the analogy between +the cure of the Israelites by looking at the brazen serpent, and of +sinners by looking to Christ. But how were the Israelites healed? By the +conditional act of _looking_ at the brazen serpent. So looking at Christ +is the condition of healing the soul. Take away this condition and the +whole analogy is destroyed. Let this condition be understood, and the +text will accord with others, equally expressive of conditions. "Look +unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." "Seek first the +kingdom of God and his righteousness." "Seek the Lord while he may be +found." God hath determined that all nations "should seek the Lord, if +haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from +every one of us." Will any one pretend to say that this looking and +seeking implies regeneration? This is mere assumption; where is the +proof? who would ever infer this idea from the Scriptures themselves? +What! is the sinner regenerated before the malady of his soul, the +poisonous bite of sin, is healed? Has he found the Lord before he has +sought him? And must he seek after he has found him? The _kingdom of +God_ is religion in the soul--it is "righteousness, peace, and joy in +the Holy Ghost;" and when we are regenerated, we have it in possession, +and have therefore no need to seek it. But we are commanded to _seek_ +the kingdom of God; this, therefore, must be a work preparatory to, and +conditional of regeneration. "Come unto me all ye that labour and are +heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Take my yoke upon you," &c. To +be _restless_, and not to have on the yoke of Christ, is to be +unregenerate; but such are to _come_ and _take_ the yoke, and then, and +on that condition, they will find rest to their souls. "The Spirit and +the bride say, Come, &c, and whosoever will, let him come and take of +the water of life freely." To take of the water of life is to be +regenerate; but to this end we must _come_, and must first _will_ in +order to _come_. "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear +my voice and open the door, I will come in and sup with him, and he with +me." Before Christ is _in_ the soul, there is no regeneration; but +before he will _come_ in, he knocks, and the sinner must first _hear_, +and then _open the door_, and on this condition Christ comes in and +imparts his grace. + +But it is useless to proceed farther in quoting particular texts. They +might be extended indefinitely, with a force and pertinency that cannot +be evaded: all going to establish the fact that the work of grace on the +heart is conditional. + +Will any one pretend to deny, that the unregenerate sinner is called +upon to _seek_, _ask_, _repent_, _believe_, &c? And what do such +scriptures mean? The acts of the mind here enjoined must _constitute_ +regeneration, or they must follow regeneration as an effect of that +work, or they must precede it as a necessary and required condition. To +say that these acts are the very definition of regeneration itself--are +only synonymous terms to express this renewal of the heart, is to make +regeneration consist in _exercises_ merely--is in fact to make it the +sinner's appropriate and exclusive work; unless it can be shown that +this commanding the sinner to ask, &c, is nothing more nor less than a +promise that God will ask, seek, repent, and believe for him! But this +will hardly be pretended; and the idea that these acts do themselves +_constitute_ the new birth, has already been seen to be defective and +indefensible. + +To suppose that these acts follow regeneration, as an effect or fruit of +the change itself, is to deny them that position and relation in which +they are actually placed by the word of God. It makes one seek, after he +has found; ask, after he has received; repent and believe, after he is +possessed of that salvation, to obtain which these duties are enjoined. +The phraseology to suit this theory, should evidently be of an entirely +different character. When the sinner asks what he shall do to be saved, +the answer should be--"_Nothing_ until God renews the heart; and then +as a fruit of this you will of course _seek_, _ask_, _believe_," &c. If, +indeed, the sinner is to do nothing until God renews him, why is it +necessary that he should first be awakened? Why is the command addressed +to him at all? Why does not the Holy Spirit immediately renew the heart, +while the transgressor is stupid in his wickedness, instead of calling +after him to _awake_, _flee_, and _escape_ for his life? Do you say you +can give no other reason than that it pleases God to take this course +with the sinner, and to call up his attention to the subject before he +renews him? I answer, then it pleases God that there should be certain +preparatory acts of the mind in order to regeneration: and this is in +fact admitting the principle for which we contend, and this more +especially if it be acknowledged, as it evidently must be, that these +preparatory mental states or acts are, to any extent, voluntary. Thus, +not only is the absurdity of making these acts the _result_ of +regeneration most apparent; but in tracing out the consistent meaning +and practical bearing of those scriptures that are addressed to the +unconverted, we find them establishing the third alternative, that these +acts of the mind are _preparatory_ to regeneration, and are the +prescribed conditions on which God will accomplish the work. Thus the +Scripture argument is found to confirm the philosophical view of the +subject, and both are strengthened by Christian experience. The doctrine +of conditional regeneration, therefore, is confirmed by a threefold +argument, no part of which, it is believed, can be easily overthrown. +Against it, however, there are several strong objections urged, which +have already been mentioned, and which we are now prepared to hear and +examine. + +1. It has been objected, that to admit human agency and co-operation in +this change, is to deny salvation by _grace_. But how does this appear? +Suppose the very conditions are by a gracious appointment--suppose the +operations of a gracious system are in this way better adapted to a +moral government--suppose this conditional action of the mind to be +itself the result of a gracious influence, enlightening the +understanding, and quickening and arousing the moral sense--finally, +suppose these conditions not to be _efficient_, much less _meritorious_ +causes, by which the mind either changes itself, or renders itself more +morally deserving of the Divine favour--I say suppose all this, and then +show if you can, how such conditions can detract at all from the grace +of this salvation. + +2. It has been objected, that "since man never is what he ought to be +until he is renewed and made holy, therefore any act short of that which +either constitutes or implies regeneration cannot be acceptable to +God--God cannot consistently approve of any step that falls short of +man's duty. It is his duty to be holy, and therefore any thing short of +this is sin, and consequently cannot be accepted as a condition." We +should be careful to discriminate between things closely related, and +yet actually distinct from each other. It is one thing to be pleased +with the character of the mind as a whole, in view of its relations to +the Divine law and its necessary qualifications for heaven, and another +thing to be pleased with a particular mental state, or conditional +volition, in reference to its adaptation to a proposed end, or a +specific object. For instance: the Calvinists think that an awakened and +an anxiously inquiring sinner is in a more suitable state of mind to +receive the blessing of regeneration, than one perfectly stupid and +thoughtless. If they do not, why do they try to bring sinners to +thoughtfulness? Why do they try to awaken them to a sense of their +danger, and make them tremble under the view of the Divine displeasure? +Or why do they call their attention to Gospel provisions and a crucified +Saviour? Is not this a preparatory process? And have they the Divine +warrant for such a course? Is this the method which the Divine Being +takes to save his rebellious subjects? Then, doubtless, this method is +well pleasing to him: and in reference to this specific end he has in +view, he is pleased with each successive step in the process. He is +pleased when the shiner pays attention to the word; he is pleased when +he is awakened, and when he begins to tremble and inquire, "What shall I +do to be saved?" This is just as he would have it, and just as he +designed; although the entire character of the sinner is not acceptable +to him until he is made holy. The very principle, then, objected to by +the Calvinists is recognized by their own theory and practice. Now if we +say God is pleased to accept of the sinner's prayer, and faith, and +sorrow for sin, as a condition of what he will do for him, what +propriety is there in replying, God cannot accept of any thing short of +a holy heart? We know he cannot approve of a heart until it is holy; but +he can approve of certain feelings and volitions as suited, according to +the Divine appointment, to be the condition on which he will make the +heart holy. Do you ask on what ground he accepts of this? I answer, on +the ground of the merits of Christ; the ground on which the whole +process rests. God does not accept of the prayer, repentance, and faith +of the _regenerate_, because they are regenerate, and by reason of their +holiness; but their acceptance is wholly and continually through Christ. +Through the same medium and merits the prayer of the inquiring sinner is +heard and answered. + +If your servant had left you unjustly, and deserted the service he was +obligated to perform, and you should finally tell him, if he would +return and resume his duties you would forgive the past, and accept of +him for the future, would it be inconsistent to say, you were pleased +when he began to listen to the proposal, and pleased when he took the +first and every succeeding step, as being suitable and necessary to the +end proposed, although, in view of _his_ duty and _your_ claim, you +would not be pleased with him, as your acceptable servant, until he was +actually and faithfully employed in your service? + +Let it not be inferred from the above that I advocate a gradual +conversion. I do not. I believe when God renews the heart he does it at +once; but the preparatory steps are nevertheless indispensable to the +accomplishment of this work. And God is well pleased with the first step +of attention on the part of the sinner, and with every succeeding step +of prayer, anxious inquiry, feeling of moral obligation, purpose to +forsake sin, looking after and attempting to believe in Christ, not +because these are _all_ that he requires, but because they are the +necessary preparatives for what is to follow. + +3. The foregoing remarks will prepare the way to meet a similar +objection to the last, and one to some extent the same in substance. It +is this: "Are these conditional acts of the mind holy or unholy +exercises? If holy, then the work of regeneration is accomplished +already, and therefore these cannot be the _conditions_ of that change. +If unholy, then they can be no other than offensive to a holy God, and +therefore cannot be conditions well pleasing to him." In addition to +what has been already said, having a bearing upon this question, it may +be stated that the terms holy and unholy may be equivocal, as used in +this connection; and thus the supposed dilemma would be more in words +than in fact, more in appearance than in reality. This dilemma is urged +in the argument under the idea that there can be but the two kinds of +exercises, holy and unholy. And this may be true enough, only let us +understand what is meant. If by holy exercises are meant those in which +the entire feeling is on the side of God, I readily answer, _No_, the +mind before regeneration has no such exercises. If by holiness is meant, +that the judgment and conscience are on the side of truth, I answer, +_Yes_, this is the state of the mind when it is truly awakened by the +Holy Spirit and by Divine truth. It is entirely immaterial to me, +therefore, whether the objector call the exercise holy or unholy, +provided he draw no special inferences from the use of a general term +that the positions here assumed do not authorize. Sure I am that the +objector cannot say there is nothing in the exercises of the +unregenerate, awakened sinner, such as God would have for the end +proposed, until he is prepared to say that a fear of the consequences of +sin, an enlightened judgment, the remorse of conscience for the past, +the feelings of obligation for the future, and the hope of victory over +sin through Christ, all combining to induce the sinner to flee for +refuge, and lay hold upon the hope set before him, are all wrong, and +not as God would have them? But when a man is prepared to say this, it +is difficult to see how he could be reasoned with farther, for he would +seem to have given up reason and Scripture. And yet who does not know +that these are the exercises of the soul awakened to a sense of sin and +its consequences, even while as yet his unholy affections hang upon him +like a _body of death_:--Yea, who does not know that it is this body of +death, from which he cannot escape, and this abhorrence of sin and its +consequences, that rein him up, and incline him to a surrender of his +soul into the hands of Christ, from whom, as a consequence, he receives +_power_ to become a son of God. "But what is the motive?" it is asked, +"is not this unholy?" And pray what does this inquiry mean? If by motive +is meant the moving cause _out_ of the mind; _that_ cannot be unholy, +for it is the Holy Spirit, and the holy word of God, that are thus +urging the sinner to Christ. If by motive is meant the judgments and +feelings of the mind, that prompt to these voluntary efforts to avoid +sin and its consequences, these are the enlightened understanding and +the feelings of obligation, already alluded to, which, I repeat, the +objector is welcome to call holy or unholy as he pleases; all I claim +is, they are what God approves of, and are the necessary conditions of +his subsequent work of renewing the heart. + +But perhaps it may be asked here, Is not the sinner, in the performance +of these conditions, _partly_ converted? I answer, This again depends +entirely upon what you mean by conversion. If by conversion you +understand the whole of the preparatory work of awakening and seeking, +as well as the _change_ of the _heart_--then of course you would say he +is _partly_ converted. If you mean by conversion only a change of views +and a consequent change of purpose, by which the sinner determines to +seek, that he may find the pearl of great price--the blessing of a new +heart and of forgiveness, then you would say he is _wholly_ converted. +But if you mean, by conversion, the change of heart itself, the washing +of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, then not only is +not the work done, but it is not begun. The way of the Lord is prepared +and the renewal will follow. + +Thus the objections that have been thought so formidable against the +doctrine of conditional regeneration are found, on a closer inspection, +to be more in appearance than in reality. They receive their influence, +as objections, rather from their indefiniteness and the ambiguity of +terms, than from any intrinsic force. + +There is, however, one form more in which an objection may be urged in a +general way against the ideas of the new birth here advanced. And as I +wish fearlessly and candidly to state and meet, if possible, every +difficulty, it will be necessary to touch upon this. It may be urged +that "the only exercises that can be claimed as conditions of +regeneration on Bible grounds are _repentance_ and _faith;_ for +'repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ' are laid at +the foundation of all Gospel requirements. Whenever the awakened sinner +came to the apostles to know what he should do to be saved, they always +met him with, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be +saved.' Whenever the apostles went out to preach the Gospel, they +preached 'every where that men should repent.'" "But," continues the +objector, "if repentance and faith are the only duties or exercises +which can be claimed as conditions, it is evident there are no such +conditions; for repentance and faith, so far from being conditions of +regeneration, are either the new birth itself, or are Christian graces, +implying the new birth." + +The premises, in the above objection, will not be denied. Repentance and +faith are supposed to be the Gospel conditions of regeneration. But it +is denied that these are necessarily regeneration itself, or that they +imply regeneration in any other sense, than as antecedents to it. There +are, it is acknowledged, a repentance and a faith that are Christian +graces, and imply the new birth. This is the faith that "is the +substance of things hoped for." It is that principle of spiritual life +which the Christian has in his soul when he can say, "The life that I +now live I live by faith in the Son of God." This is that repentance, +also, which keeps the soul continually at the foot of the cross, and +leads it constantly to feel, + + "Every moment, Lord, I need + The merit of thy death." + +But because repentance and faith are the necessary characteristics of +the Christian, and because they are the more perfect as the Christian +character ripens, it does not therefore follow that there are no +repentance and faith conditional to the new birth. The very fact that +repentance and faith were urged by Christ and his apostles, as the +initiatory step to salvation, proves the opposite of this. They do not +say, Repent and believe the Gospel, and this is salvation, but, "Repent +and believe, and ye shall (on this condition) be saved." And surely it +is unnecessary to prove here that salvation in the New Testament +generally means a meetness for heaven or holiness. Our blessed Saviour +was called Jesus, because he _saved_ his people _from their sins_. + +Beside, it may well be argued, that faith and repentance are acts of the +mind, and cannot therefore be considered as the new birth itself, unless +the mind converts itself, especially since they are _enjoined duties_, +and must therefore be _voluntary_ acts. It is no where said that God +repents and believes for us; but it is expressly and repeatedly taught, +that God _renews_ us.--Repentance and faith, then, are our work, but +regeneration is his. I know it is said in one place, Acts v, 31, that +Christ was exalted "to _give repentance_ to Israel." But the _act_ +itself of repentance cannot be said to be _given_. This would be an +absurdity. How can any one give me a mental _act?_ Hence Dr. Doddridge, +although a Calvinist, very candidly and very justly remarks, on this +passage, that "to _give repentance_ signifies to _give place_, or _room_ +for repentance," to sustain which interpretation he quotes Josephus and +others who use the phrase in this sense. If then repentance and faith +are enjoined upon us, as _our duties_, and if they are every where +spoken of as prerequisites in the work of salvation, and as preparatory +steps and conditions to the process of holiness, how can it be otherwise +than that these are antecedent, in the order of nature, to regeneration? + +It may farther be argued, in support of this view of faith and +repentance, that no sin can be forgiven until repented of--repentance +therefore must precede remission of sins. This I suppose Calvinists +allow, but they say that, in the order of nature, the heart is renewed +before sin is forgiven--and that repentance, therefore, which is either +the new birth itself, or the immediate fruit of it, is a condition of +justification, but not of regeneration. If this be correct, then the +soul is made holy before it is forgiven. But St. Paul informs us, Romans +iv, 5, that God through faith "justifieth the _ungodly_." If then there +be any antecedence in the order of the two parts of the work of grace, +we must suppose that justification has the precedence, and that +regeneration follows, and hence repentance and faith precede +regeneration. Indeed I cannot see why repentance is not as necessary to +remove the sin of the heart as to forgive the sin of the life. If God +will not forgive sin without repentance, will he renew the heart without +it? Has he any where promised this? If not, but if, on the contrary, he +every where seems to have suspended the working out of our salvation _in +us_, upon our repentance, then may we safely conclude--nay, then we must +necessarily believe that we repent in order to be renewed. The same may +be said of faith. Faith in fact seems to be the exclusive channel +through which every gracious effect is produced upon the mind. The +sinner cannot be awakened without faith, for it precedes every judgment +in favour of truth, and every motion of moral feeling, and of course +every favourable concurrence of the will. The sinner never could throw +himself upon the Divine mercy, never would embrace Christ as his +Saviour, until he believed. Hence the Scriptures lay such great stress +upon faith, and make it the grand, and indeed the only _immediate_ +condition of the work of grace upon the heart. Repentance is a condition +only remotely, _in order_ to justifying faith; agreeable to the teaching +of Christ, "And ye, when ye had heard, afterward _repented_ not that ye +_might believe_ on him." But faith is necessary _immediately_, as that +mental state directly antecedent to the giving up of the soul into the +hands of Divine mercy. And shall we still be told that faith is not the +condition of regeneration? The order of the work seems to be--1. A +degree of faith in order to repentance. 2. Repentance, in order to such +an increase of faith as will lead the soul to throw itself upon +Christ.--3. The giving up of the soul to Christ as the only ground of +hope. 4. The change of heart by the efficient operation of the Holy +Spirit.--Now on whichever of these four stages of the process, except +the first, the objector lays his finger and says, _That_ is not a +condition of regeneration, for it is regeneration itself, it will be +seen that _that_ very part is conditional. If, for instance, he fix on +the second stage, and contend that that is regeneration, which I call +repentance _in order_ to regenerating faith; even _that_ would be +_conditional_ regeneration, for it is preceded by faith--and so of all +that follow. And surely no one will pretend that what I call the first +stage, the faith which precedes awakening and remorse of conscience, and +the exciting alternations of fear and hope in the anxious and inquiring +sinner, is regeneration. And if this first degree of faith is not the +change, then it is utterly inconsistent to talk of unconditional +regeneration, for this faith stands at the head of all that follows--it +is a mental act necessarily preparatory to the whole work. And as we +shall presently see, it is an act that depends upon the agency of the +will. Hence we are brought again to our conclusion, that the change +called the new birth is effected by the Holy Spirit, on the ground of +certain conditional acts of him who is the subject of the change. + +"But the very _nature_ of repentance and of faith, the very _definition_ +of the two mental states expressed by these terms," it is said, "proves +that a person, to possess them, must be regenerate; or at any rate, that +these states cannot be conditions of regeneration, to be performed by +the sinner." Let us attend for a moment to this objection in detail. + +What is repentance? "It is," say some Calvinistic writers, "a _change of +mind_. The original means this, and so it should have been rendered; and +if it had been so rendered, it would have set this controversy at rest." +But what if we should grant (what I do not believe) that the original +word means this, and this only, still it would not follow that the +change of mind called the new birth is meant by this term. A change of +judgment is a change of mind--a change of purpose is a change of +mind--any change of the general current of feeling, such as that from +carelessness and stupidity in to a state of anxiety and earnest inquiry, +what shall I do to be saved? is a change of mind.--And such a change of +mind indispensably precedes regeneration. No person ever, from being a +careless, hardened sinner, becomes an anxious and earnest inquirer after +salvation, without an important change in his judgment, moral feeling, +and volitions. Hence this definition does not at all help the objector, +unless he can prove that the Scriptures always mean by this term that +change which they elsewhere call the new birth. Indeed, since we have +already shown that repentance is our work, and the renewing of the heart +exclusively God's work, it follows incontrovertibly, that the change of +mind called repentance is not the new birth. + +If repentance meant that change of mind called the new birth, then the +regenerate would be _often born again_, and that, too, without +backsliding; for those who are growing the fastest in grace repent the +most constantly and the most deeply. + +Again: it is objected, that "faith is not a voluntary state of mind, and +therefore cannot be considered a condition, performed by the sinner, in +order to regeneration." To believe is doubtless, in many instances, +perfectly involuntary. There are numerous cases in which a man is +obliged to believe, both against his will and against his desires. There +are other cases, again, in which the will is not only much concerned in +believing, but in which its action is indispensable in order to believe. +And the faith of the Gospel is pre-eminently an instance of this kind. +"Faith," saith the word, "cometh by hearing." But hearing implies +attention; and every deliberate act of attention implies an act of the +will. A man can no more leap, by one transition, from a state of entire +carelessness into the faith that justifies the soul, than he can make a +world. But he can take the steps that lead to this result. To believe to +the saving of the soul requires _consideration_, _self examination_, a +_knowledge_ of the object of faith, or the truth to be believed, +_earnest looking_, and _prayerful seeking_. But is there no act of the +will in all these? It is said that "the Spirit takes of the things of +Jesus Christ, and shows them unto us." And it is doubtless true, that +the soul cannot get such a view of Christ as encourages him to throw +himself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Saviour, until the Spirit +makes, to the mind's eye, this special exhibition of the "things of +Christ." But when does he do this? Does he come to the sinner when he is +careless and inattentive, and show him the _things of Christ?_ No! it is +only to the inquiring and self-despairing sinner, who is earnestly +groaning out the sentiment in the bitterness of his heart, "Who shall +deliver me from the body of this death?" And is there no voluntary +action in all this? + +But it will perhaps be wearisome to the reader to pursue these +objections farther. I should not have gone so fully into this part of +the subject, but for the fact, that this sentiment of unconditional +regeneration is considered the strong hold of Calvinism. This point +moreover appears to have been but slightly handled by most of the +anti-Calvinistic writers; and therefore I have felt it the more +necessary to attempt an answer to all the most important arguments that +are adduced in opposition to our view of this doctrine. I am far from +thinking I have done the subject justice, and may have cause perhaps +hereafter to acknowledge that some of my minor positions are untenable, +and that some of my expressions need modifying or explaining, although I +have used what care and circumspection my time and circumstances would +permit in reference not only to the doctrine itself, but also in +reference to the forms of expression. And as it respects the leading +doctrines here inculcated, I repose upon them with entire confidence. +However the theory clashes with that of many great and good men, it is +believed to be the only theory that will consistently explain the +practice and preaching of these very men. It is, in my view, the only +theory that will satisfactorily and consistently explain those great and +leading principles by which evangelical Christians expect to convert the +world to Christ. And, if this be true, the sooner the Christian Church +is established on this foundation, the better. We have already seen that +a mixture of error in the essential doctrines leads to various mutations +from extreme to extreme of dangerous heresy. How long before the Church +shall be _rooted and grounded in the truth!_ May He who said, LET LIGHT +BE; AND LIGHT WAS, hasten that glorious day! + +THE END. + + + + +Footnotes + +[1] Many objections have been made, by the reviewers, to my manner of +stating the doctrine of predestination. It is objected, that the great +body of Calvinists believe, no more than the Arminians, that God +"efficiently controls and actuates the human will." On a careful, and I +hope, candid revision of the subject, however, I cannot satisfy myself +that the objection is valid. I am quite sure God must control the will, +or he cannot, as Calvinists teach, secure the proposed end, by the +prescribed means. It is readily granted that Calvinists deny _such a +control_ as destroys the freedom of the will. But it is the object of +the sermon and of the following controversy to show that Calvinistic +predestination is, on any ground of consistency, utterly irreconcilable +with mental freedom. How far this has been done, of course, each will +judge for himself. + +[2] It seems, to the author of the sermon, but little better than +trifling, to object, as some have, to this argument on foreknowledge, +that "God must predetermine his works before he could certainly know +what would take place; and hence, in the order of cause and effect, he +must decree in order to know." It is readily conceded, that, in the +order of nature, the Divine Being could not foreknow that a world would +certainly exist, until he had determined to create it. But was there no +prescience back of this? Did he determine to create a universe, +independent of a view of all the bearings in the case? If so, he created +at random and in ignorance. If not, then a view of all the results +preceded his determination to create; and thus we are led irresistibly +to the doctrine of the sermon, that "God foreknows in order to +predestinate." + +[3] The review of the sermon, in the Christian Spectator, is understood +to be from the pen of Doctor Fitch, professor of divinity in Yale +College. + +[4] See Christian Spectator, Vol. iv, No. 3. + +[5] A part of this sermon has lately been published, in a tract form, +and circulated with the _avowed_ purpose of counteracting the influence +of the sermon "on predestination." + +[6] A man was afflicted with the hydrophobia. When his paroxysms were +coming on he was aware of it, and gave warning to his friends to be on +their guard, that he might not injure them. Suppose, however, he knew of +a sure remedy, but voluntarily neglected to avail himself of it. Would +he not in that case be guilty, not only of all the evils that might +result to others from his malady; but also of self murder? And yet this +man's madness was entirely beyond the direct control of his will. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Calvinistic Controversy, by Wilbur Fisk + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY *** + +***** This file should be named 38232.txt or 38232.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/3/38232/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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