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diff --git a/37998.txt b/37998.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63033d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/37998.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7398 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Morals and the Evolution of Man, by Max Simon Nordau + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Morals and the Evolution of Man + +Author: Max Simon Nordau + +Translator: Marie A. Lewenz + +Release Date: November 12, 2011 [EBook #37998] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION + OF MAN + + + + MORALS AND THE + EVOLUTION OF MAN + + BY + MAX NORDAU + + A Translation of + "BIOLOGIE DER ETHIK" + + By + MARIE A. LEWENZ, M.A. + Fellow of University College, London + + CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD + London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne + 1922 + + + + TO MY DEAR WIFE ANNA (nee DONS), + + the sunshine of my life in happy days, my brave + comrade in the storms of the world-catastrophe, with + love and gratitude I dedicate this book which helped + both her and me to endure the dark years when we + were homeless wanderers. + + MADRID, _September 26th, 1916_ + + + +CONTENTS + + CHAPTER PAGE + 1. THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY 1 + 2. THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY 46 + 3. THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY 84 + 4. MORALITY AND LAW 115 + 5. INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY 144 + 6. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 185 + 7. MORALITY AND PROGRESS 215 + 8. THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY 247 + + + + +MORALS AND THE + +EVOLUTION OF MAN + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY + + +A very well-known experiment in animal psychology was once made by +Moebius. An aquarium was divided into two compartments by means of a pane +of glass; in one of these a pike was put and in the other a tench. +Hardly had the former caught sight of his prey, when he rushed to the +attack without noticing the transparent partition. He crashed with +extreme violence again the obstacle and was hurled back stunned, with a +badly battered nose. No sooner had he recovered from the blow than he +again made an onslaught upon his neighbour--with the same result. He +repeated his efforts a few times more, but succeeded only in badly +hurting his head and mouth. At last a dim idea dawned upon his dull mind +that some unknown and invisible power was protecting the tench, and that +any attempt to devour it would be in vain; consequently from that moment +he ceased from all further endeavours to molest his prey. Thereupon the +pane of glass was removed from the tank, and pike and tench swam around +together; the former took no notice whatever of his defenceless +neighbour, who had become sacred to him. In the first instance the pike +had not perceived the glass partition against which he had dashed his +head; now he did not see that it had been taken away. All he knew was +this: he must not attack this tench, otherwise he would fare badly. The +pane of glass, though no longer actually there, surrounded the tench as +with a coat of mail which effectually warded off the murderous attacks +of the pike. + +The fact so often observed, that man in many cases does that which he +passionately desires to leave undone, and refrains from doing that which +all his instincts urge him to do--this phenomenon of Morality is a +generalization upon a huge scale of the above experiment on animals with +the pane of glass in a tank. + +Jean Jacques Rousseau thought out a theoretical human being who was by +nature good. Such a human being does not exist and has never existed. +From sheer annoyance at the provoking obliquity of vision which led the +enthusiast of Geneva to develop such a theory, one is sorely tempted to +go to the opposite extreme and declare that man is by nature +fundamentally bad; but such an assertion is just as naive as Rousseau's +contention. Good and bad are values which we can only learn to +appreciate when we have felt the effect of the phenomenon of Morality. +The concepts of good and evil are of much later origin than mankind, and +can therefore no more constitute a fundamental characteristic of man's +original nature than, for instance, the cut and colour of his clothes; +though it is open to wiseacres to maintain that man's nature to some +extent actually finds expression in the cut and colour of his +clothes--that is, in his choice of them. Anyone contemplating primitive +man, man as he emerges from the hands of Nature, stripped of all the +additions which he has acquired in the course of his historical +development, is bound to admit that man is neither good nor bad; he is a +living being acting according to the instincts implanted in his nature; +just like the pike. But in most contingencies he does not obey these +instincts, and if he reflects upon himself and his actions, he is +astounded at realizing this, and asks: "Why do I refrain from revelling +in the gratification of my desires?" + +Innumerable times every day of his life he would like to break many or +all of the Ten Commandments; but he abstains from so doing, and, what is +more, mostly without effort, without having painfully to suppress his +desire. What prevents him from yielding to his impulses? An invisible +power which lays its commands upon him: "Thou shalt not!" "Thou shalt!" +Often his aims and inclinations come into violent collision with this +order, or this prohibition, and are hurled back by the painful impact. +Man hears the threatening, imperious voice, but cannot see whence it +comes. Accustomed to reason by analogy, he concludes that it is, like +thunder, a voice of Nature. When the pike has sufficiently injured his +nose against the pane of glass, he assumes as an actual fact that an +insuperable barrier separates him from the tench, and, moreover, that it +is both useless and painful to come into contact with this. He does not +try to discover the nature of the obstacle, and gives up any further +attempt upon his mysteriously protected prey. Man, with a more highly +developed intelligence than the pike, does not accept the phenomenon of +Morality with dull resignation. Since he has become conscious of a +mysterious barrier erected between his volitions and his actions, he has +not ceased to reflect upon this barrier, to investigate it with a timid +yet irresistible desire for knowledge, and to try and discover its +nature. + +It redounds to man's credit that he has devoted so much time and energy +to investigating the character and essence of Morality. But the result +of these investigations does not redound to his credit. With the +exception of theology, there is no subject upon which so much has been +written as upon ethics. Yet whosoever plunges into this boundless sea of +literature will emerge with feelings bordering upon horror and despair. +Here a free rein is given to all man's errors, to his habit of drawing +false conclusions, to his faulty modes of thought. Incapacity to +interpret facts, association of ideas, elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp and +uncurbed by any criticism, intemperate mysticism, arrogant dogmatism, +shallow self-sufficiency--all these vie with one another in the +presentment of theories which either are patently foolish, arbitrary or +ill-founded, or else prove to be so when impartially examined. + +It is hard for the few reasonable thinkers who have taken part in this +great investigation to make their voices heard amid the uproar raised by +the solemn, unctuous, dictatorial or pedantic tomfools. And even the +former are not entirely satisfactory, because they do not distinguish +clearly enough between the form and the substance, the externals and the +essence of Morality, and because they do not discriminate with +sufficient care between questions as to its nature, origin and aim, and +its powers or sanctions--questions which must on no account be +confounded. + +What is Morality? Obviously it is necessary to attempt a clear answer to +this question before any useful purpose can be served by inquiring into +the group of problems to which it gives rise: its aim, its laws, its +origin, its method, its assumptions. The Stoics answer this question as +follows: "Morality is living according to Nature." Furthermore, it is +quite in accordance with the doctrine of the Stoics that Cicero says: +"Virtue, however, is nothing but Nature developed to the highest +possible degree of perfection" ("_ad summum perducta_"). Moral therefore +means natural; Morality and Nature are equivalent; they are one. Really +a simpler or more childlike explanation is hardly possible. The most +superficial glance at human life and at our own soul teaches us that +Morality is contrary to Nature, that it must struggle against Nature to +assert itself, that it means a victory over Nature, in so far as we +understand by Nature in this special sense the most primitive reaction +of man to simple and more complicated stimuli, the first tendency of +impulse, the immediate, instinctive urge to act. Further, the definition +of the Stoics ignores the aggregation of concepts which the synthetic +conception, Morality, involves; as if this were self-evident and +required no definition. The Stoics tacitly assume that Morality and +Good are synonymous. Cicero makes this assumption clearer by using the +word Virtue (_virtus_) instead of Morality. But in all languages this +word implies approbation and praise. It is an appreciation of worth +(_Werturteil_), to use the expression so appropriately coined by Lotze. + +But the very fact that we recognize Morality as being valuable is by no +means a matter of course and it demands an explanation. + +Certain actions could only be judged to be good if they were +distinguished from others which did not suggest the same judgment, which +were felt to be not good, to be bad or indifferent. We come to the +question, What is Good, what is Bad? The Stoics reply, "That which is +good is natural." It is easy to call facts which please us natural, and +such as displease us unnatural. In reality both series of facts are +equally natural; because everything that happens is natural; because by +definition Nature is the synthesis of all phenomena; because nothing +exists outside of Nature, and within Nature everything is a part of her +and therefore is natural and can be nothing but natural. If we +nevertheless wish to distinguish between natural and unnatural +phenomena, if we call Good, Morality, and Virtue natural, and compare +them favourably with the unnatural, this only proves that we use the +words natural and unnatural as synonyms for good and bad, and that we +have a ready-made standard by which we measure the naturalness or +unnaturalness (that is, the goodness or badness) of actions, and that +there exists within ourselves the law by which we judge them to be good +or bad. But how do we come by this law? How, of what material, and why +do we fashion this standard? Why do we approve of one thing as good and +condemn another as bad? What qualities do the former and the latter +possess, or what qualities do we ascribe to them? That is what we want +to know when we inquire as to the significance of Morality, and the +definition of the Stoics throws no light whatever upon the matter. + +According to Aristotle Morality is "the activity of Practical Reason, +which is accompanied by pleasurable emotion." It is not worth while to +dwell upon this definition. It is absolutely valueless. Practical Reason +is not a definite concept; Aristotle does not say anywhere what he +understands by "practical" when he applies this attribute to Reason; and +to call every activity of Practical Reason accompanied by pleasurable +emotion Morality is mere eccentricity. + +To take only one example: if I have a house built, and accept the +architect's plans because they please me greatly, my practical reason is +most certainly active; the gratification induced by my reasonable choice +of the plans is doubtless a pleasurable emotion; but assuredly no one +will characterize as moral this activity of my practical reason which is +accompanied by pleasurable emotion. It may be that Aristotle was +contemplating not a single action, but conduct in life as a whole. In +that case he has expressed in an unfortunate, and much too loose a +manner the thought that Morality is Reason plus pleasurable emotion. We +shall frequently meet with and have to examine this idea, which omits to +explain why pleasurable emotions attend certain activities of +"Practical Reason," whatever that may be, and fail to be aroused by +others. + +Judaism, as embodied in its law-givers and prophets, teaches that +Morality consists in living and acting in accordance with the divine +Will. Maimonides, who, however, was regarded by many of his +contemporaries as a heretic, does not consider Judaism a creed at all, +but a code of Morality. He maintains that anyone who repudiates the +tenets of the Jewish faith, even the most essential one, namely, the +belief in a single god, must not be excluded from the Jewish community +as long as he conforms to its moral laws. This thinker, usually so +accurate and nice in his reasoning, overlooks the fact that in this case +he is contradicting himself in a manner wellnigh comic. According to +him, too, Morality consists in the endeavour to live and act in +accordance with the divine Will. How is such an endeavour possible for a +man who does not believe in God and for whom consequently no divine Will +exists? Therefore either Morality must be something different from an +approximation to the standard set up by the divine Will, or else he who +denies God cannot be moral. But I will leave the author of the "Guide of +those who have gone astray" to his self-contradiction, and only retain +the Jewish definition of Morality as based upon the Will of God. + +Without any restriction Christianity has taken over this definition from +the mother-religion. In his zeal to claim that God alone is the source +of all Morality, St. Augustine allows himself to be carried away to such +an extent that he libels mankind most hatefully. Just as for Rousseau +man is by nature good, for the Bishop of Hippo he is by nature +fundamentally bad. Left to his own devices he would always wallow in the +mire of sin and vice, and would never even feel the wish to abandon his +wickedness. It is God's mercy alone which rescues him from his depravity +and sets his feet upon the path of righteousness, leading him to virtue, +salvation and eternal bliss. Thomas Aquinas is no less definite on this +point. The scriptures of Judaism and Christianity contain the eternal +law which God has ordained for mankind. He points out the paths that man +should follow. All Morality springs from Him alone. + +To this very day true believers adhere to this doctrine. Morality did +not originate on earth; the knowledge of it is a gift of grace from +heaven to mankind. It is derived from God; it is that which God has +willed; or else it does not need any special act of volition on the part +of God, but is the essence of God himself. That is the teaching of +Paley, the classical moral philosopher. Virtue consists in doing good to +mankind in obedience to the Will of God, and in order to attain eternal +salvation. Here stress is laid upon the fact that Morality is active +love for one's neighbour, and this is a concession on the part of the +conciliatory Englishman to the utilitarian ethics of his countrymen; but +for him the necessary and sufficient reason for this love of one's +neighbour is the Will of God and the desire for eternal salvation. The +German devotee, Baader, blustering like a capuchin, preaches this +twaddle: "Any Morality which is not rooted in divine law is the +intellectual impiety of our time raised to its highest power; it is the +perfection of atheism; for the idea of the absolute autonomy of man +atheistically denies the Father as law-giver; the theistic denial of the +necessity for divine aid in fulfilling the law does away with the Son or +Mediator, and finally the materialistic-pantheistic apotheosis of Matter +does away with the Holy Ghost with its sanctifying power." The Frenchman +Jouffroy, though more careful and reticent in his manner, unmistakably +expresses his conviction that "ethics, as well as the philosophy of law, +inevitably and necessarily lead to theology." + +But this necessity only exists for minds whose desire for knowledge and +truth is easily satisfied by words without a meaning that can be +visualized, by fabulous statements accepted without proof, by fictions +of the imagination, and by shallow juggling with the association of +ideas. Even those who do not approve all Auguste Comte's arguments will +agree with him when he classifies the successive steps in the mental +development of mankind as the theological, transcendental, and +scientific modes of thought. When man's understanding is in its infancy +he is content with a supernatural explanation of all phenomena which +strike him as mysterious, disquiet him or rouse his curiosity. Only I +have never been able to understand why Comte discriminates between the +theological and the transcendental modes of thought, and assigns to the +latter a higher place than the former. Both are on a footing of absolute +equality; both raise arbitrary fictions of the imagination to the +position of sources of knowledge; both substitute anthropomorphic +trivialities for the observation of phenomena and research into the +conditions under which they occur and their relationship to one another. +The only difference between them lies in the fact that transcendentalism +expresses itself in choicer language than does theology, that it +presents formulae that are more complicated and pretentious, less +transparent and honest--formulae which the unpractised mind does not +immediately recognize as mythological dogmas in a pseudo-scientific +disguise. + +The relationship of theological to transcendental thought is much the +same as that of superstition to religion. Both of them are one and the +same. Religion is shamefaced superstition, whereas superstition has not +yet learned to feel shame. Religion is superstition in a dress-coat, and +therefore fit for polite circles; superstition is religion in a cotton +smock and therefore cannot be admitted to society. Superstition is the +religion of the poor and unassuming, religion is the superstition of +fine folk who plume themselves on their formal and verbal scholarship. + +Ever since man has risen above the level of the beasts, ever since the +first faint glimmerings of thought began in the thick-walled, narrow and +dark skull of a hunter of the Neanderthal or Cro Magnon, he has ascribed +everything unintelligible in life and in the world around him to divine +actions and divine sources. How did the world come into existence? A god +or gods created it. How does Nature work? In accordance with the will of +a god or gods, in obedience to divine commands, as a result of divine +activities. What is life? A divine gift of grace. What is +consciousness? An irradiation of the divinity. What is infinity, what +eternity? Attributes of the god. God is the name that from the beginning +of time to the present day men have given to their ignorance. They find +it easier to bear disguised by this pseudonym; they are even proud of +it. With cunning self-deception they have endowed the word with the +dignity pertaining to a title of the most awe-inspiring majesty, and +they no longer feel ashamed of a poverty of mind which can boast of such +a magnificent name. Morality also is one of those phenomena which are +not intelligible as a matter of course. The questions how, whence, why, +and to what end Morality exists, and what it is, cannot be solved at a +glance; its life-history is not apparent to every observer, as is that +of the domestic cat. But why cudgel one's brains? Cheap explanations are +ready to hand. This way mythology, you maid-of-all-work! Morality has +been ordained by God. A moral life is one in accordance with God's +commandments. He who will not content himself with this answer is an +infidel and does not deserve to have any notice taken of him. + +Let us leave the paltry statements of theologians and note how men who +investigate questions more thoroughly have dealt with Morality. +Descartes defines Morality as the sustained endeavour to do that which +one has recognized to be right. It is difficult to discern in this +definition the father of scientific scepticism. What are the +distinguishing marks of Right? Is the decision as to what is right and +what is wrong to be left to the subjective judgment of the individual? +In that case Descartes must concede that the action of a burglar is +moral, if he has recognized that it is right for him to perpetrate his +crime between two and three o'clock in the morning, that being the most +favourable time for it, and then strives to the best of his ability to +effect an entrance into the building he has selected, at the moment +which he has recognized as the right one. Or shall all mankind, or at +least the majority, and not the individual, decide what is right? In +that case the definition would certainly approximate to the one which I +hold to be true; but for one thing it would suffer from vagueness; and, +moreover, its originator would lay himself open to the reproach of not +having shown why the individual is worthy of praise when he acts in +accordance with the convictions of the majority, though these be opposed +to his own, and in so doing allows his action to be determined by a +judgment due to a psychic mechanism other than his. + +Spinoza's "Ethics" leaves the reader in great discomfort, the result of +vacillating and contradictory explanations. Obviously Descartes' great +disciple had no clear conception of the essence of Morality and held +either consecutively, or may be even simultaneously, divers views on the +subject, amongst which those of all schools of thought are either quite +clearly expressed or at least implied. "By Good," he says, "I mean that +which we know for certain to be useful to us."[1] + + [1] I quote the wording of Berthold Auerbach's translation: + "B. de Spinoza's collected works. Translated from the Latin + by Berthold Auerbach." Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta, 1871. Second + edition, Vol. II. + +And again: "To act absolutely virtuously is merely to act, live, +preserve one's being (these three mean the same thing) in accordance +with the dictates of Reason, because one seeks one's own interest." + +According to that Morality is synonymous with egoism, and its aim is +man's individual profit or interest. Even the most pronounced +Utilitarians among ethical theorists have not ventured to go to such +lengths. True, they have contended that the aim of moral action is +happiness, but at least they define it as the happiness of the whole +community and not that of the individual, except in so far as he is a +member of the community and has his fair share of its well-being. +Spinoza foresees the objection that the pursuit of one's own happiness +cannot possibly deserve the universal esteem in which virtue is held, +and he tries to adduce reasons whereby the egoism which he characterizes +as moral may be justified and palliated: + +"Everyone exists according to the supreme law of Nature, and +consequently everyone does, according to the supreme law of Nature, that +which results from the necessities of his own nature; and therefore +every man forms his judgment as to what is good and bad according to the +supreme law of Nature, pursues his own interest according to his lights, +seeks revenge, strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he +hates." That is possibly the most audacious and at the same time the +most ill-founded statement that has ever been written on the subject of +Morality. Morality means behaviour calculated to further one's own +interest. Morality is therefore utility. But man cannot act otherwise +than morally, since he always acts as he is compelled to do by his own +nature. There is no sense in discriminating between good and bad, moral +and immoral, since one always acts in accordance with the behests of +Nature. Man automatically executes the dictates of Nature which is alone +responsible for his deeds. + +For the Stoics, too, Morality is action in accordance with the law of +Nature, but Spinoza goes further than the Stoics, in that he does away +with any universally applicable standard of moral conduct, and sets up +instead of Nature pure and simple, which is the same for all, each man's +individual nature as the authority which shall lay down rules of +behaviour for him. So Morality is something individual and subjective. +Man acts according to the requirements of his interest; his own nature +shows him what his interest requires; no other person has any right or +any qualification to form a judgment upon the worth of his conduct, to +call it good or bad, for he cannot know what course of action the man's +personal nature, peculiar to himself and to no other, may prescribe to +him. This is the doctrine of anarchy and amorality put in a nutshell, a +more wordy paraphrase of the _Fais ce que vouldras_ (please yourself), +the terse inscription that Rabelais put over the entrance to his Abbey +of Theleme, as the only law governing that abode of alluring wantonness. +Spinoza certainly does half-heartedly concede to Reason the role which +Aristotle positively assigns to it ("To act in an absolutely virtuous +manner is merely to act according to the guidance of Reason," etc.), but +it is impossible to see how Reason can exercise guidance and control if +"everyone does according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his nature." This can surely only mean +that everyone may yield to the unbridled desires of his natural +instincts, which is the very reverse of self-control by Reason. If +Nature is to rule despotically, there is obviously no place for a +constitutional limitation of her sole power by the effective counsel and +protests of Reason. + +But Spinoza renounces in a much more definite way his views recognizing +the right of every individual "to form his judgment as to what is good +and bad according to the supreme law of Nature," for he calmly adds: +"Society can be founded, if it reserves to itself the right possessed by +the individual to take revenge, and to pronounce a verdict on what is +good and what is bad; thereby it acquires the power to prescribe rules +of conduct for the community, to make laws, and to enforce them, not by +means of Reason, which cannot restrict passions, but by threats.... +Hence in a state of Nature, sin cannot even be imagined." + +This concession to Society most emphatically contradicts his first +definition of Morality. It does away with the right claimed for the +individual "to do according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his own nature," and by the same +"supreme law of Nature" to "judge what is good and what is bad." It +subjects conduct to the restraint, not of Nature, but of Society. It +bears witness to the admission that "Reason cannot restrict passions," +although Spinoza has just required the virtuous man to "act according to +the guidance of Reason." Spinoza admits that Morality is not the +consequence of a law inherent in the individual, but of an extraneous +law forced upon him by society; that it is not an individual but a +social phenomenon. In this he agrees with the conclusions of modern +sociological thought, but his merit is much diminished by the fact that +he skims lightly over the one great difficulty which sociological ethics +is struggling to overcome. He says, society "reserves to itself the +right ... to pronounce a verdict on what is good and what is bad, and +thereby acquires the power to prescribe rules of conduct to the +community," etc. + +It has the power right enough; police, judge, prison and gallows bear +witness to that; but has it the right? That is not clear without further +investigation. It requires to be proved. The amoralist can emphatically +deny this, basing his conclusion on Spinoza's own definition. He can +legitimately declare that he need submit to no dictates of society, that +he owes obedience only to his own nature and his own inner needs, and +the moral philosopher can only prove to him that he is wrong by +scornfully indicating the penal code and its stalwart minions. + +Spinoza, we see, has already given a whole series of mutually +destructive and contradictory definitions of Morality: it is the law of +life and conduct which society lays down for the individual, though we +do not learn from him on what principles it is based; it is the pursuit +of one's own interest as indicated by Reason; it is obedience to +necessity--that is to say, to the demands of one's own nature. All this +does not suffice him. He discovers a new aspect of Morality. +"Recognition of Good and Evil is nothing but a pleasurable or a +disagreeable emotion in so far as we are conscious of it." And again, +"Pleasure is not actually bad (as the ascetics probably contend), but +good; pain, on the contrary, is actually bad." + +In this case the ideas pleasure and pain are treated as equivalents of +good and bad, as were useful and harmful in the former case. According +to the axiom that things that are equal to the same thing must be equal +to one another, pleasurable is synonymous not only with good, but also +with beneficial, and in like manner painful with bad and harmful. Brandy +undoubtedly produces a sensation of pleasure in the drinker; is brandy, +then, good in a moral sense? Above all, is it beneficial? Many such +questions could be put to Spinoza, but this one is enough. + +Thus we discover Spinoza to be at one and the same time a Utilitarian +and a Hedonist, the champion of Impulse and again of Reason, an +anarchistic individualist and a herald of the right of society to rule +the individual. Angry and disappointed, we turn from him, for instead of +finding in him the definite standard we sought we have met with the +shifting hues of the chameleon and the uncanny changes of form of +Proteus. + +The views of the English thinkers are clearer and more convincing +although they, too, do not carry their investigations far enough. Hobbes +uses Justice and Injustice as synonyms for Morality and Immorality, and +he definitely recognizes what Spinoza only dimly guessed, namely, that +these ideas could only arise in man when living as a member of society +and not in a being dwelling alone. According to him, therefore, Morality +is a social and not an individual phenomenon; just as the moral +philosophers of the theological school look upon it as the Will of God, +so he considers it to be the Will of Society. But he was under the +obligation (non-existent for the theologian) to trace to its source this +social Will, to show how it is manifested, to explain why the individual +not only submits to it, but values this submission far more highly than +mere utility. Man learns the Will of God by revelation, and it is +forbidden to inquire into its basis. To the Will of Society Hobbes +cannot possibly ascribe the same incontestable sanctity. It should not +have escaped his notice that this Will is neither uniform nor of assured +stability, and that it often wavers and is sometimes self-contradictory. +Therefore, if he wants to call the Will of Society Justice, as the +theologians call the Will of God Morality, and if he wants to look upon +Justice and Morality as equivalents, then it is his duty to explain how +Society can make claims which conflict with the principles on which the +universal rules it has drawn up are based, and which, consequently, not +being just or moral, are unjust and immoral, but which, nevertheless, +must be acknowledged by the individual as being both just and moral, +simply because they are social claims. + +In Kant's moral philosophy we find the extremest form of mystic +dogmatism; its success would be inexplicable did one not know how prone +mankind is to be intimidated by brusque statements. Kant's dictatorial +pronouncements have become common-places. "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." That is very impressive. But what is "the maxim" on +which you act? This maxim is the moral law. Now we yearn to know what +this moral law is, whence it comes, and on what it is based. + +But our yearnings remains unsatisfied. The moral law is a secret. It is +an incomprehensible power which rules our consciousness. Ask no +questions. Be silent, submit and obey. Even the theologian discussing +moral philosophy will listen to reason. He gives us the information, +sibylline though it be, that the moral law emanates from the Will of +God, and is shown to us in the revelations of religion. Kant does not +even give such meagre information. The moral law exists. That must +suffice. "The starry heavens above thee, the moral law within thee." You +retort that that is a metaphor which you may call poetical, if you like, +but it is no explanation. You will get the following reply: this +metaphor, rightly understood, indicates that the moral law is eternal, +that it is part and parcel of uncreated Nature like the stars, that it +is a phenomenon of the same order as all the elements that go to make up +the universe. "The moral law does not flow from antecedent ideas of Good +and Evil; on the contrary, the moral law decides what is good and what +is evil." It is not derived from human experience. The less so since +"it cannot be proved by experience that it has at any place or any time +become real." In other words, no one can testify that the "Categorical +Imperative" has ever been realized, that the moral law has "at any place +or any time" ceased to be a Kantian theory productive of sacred thrills, +that it has ever emerged from the unapproachable cell wherein it dwells +in the temple of human consciousness, to take a place and play an active +part among mortals. + +The lessee of all Kant's wisdom, Hermann Cohen, with the clumsiness of +an over-zealous assistant, has expressed his master's thought in a +perfectly ludicrous form: "The moral law is to be conceived as a reality +of such kind that it must exist, that its being must be" (note the +elegance and euphony of the phrase "being must be"!) "even if no +creature existed for whom it would be valid." True, the moral law is a +maxim on which you should "act," a standard of human conduct, but it +would still exist if there were no human beings and no action. It would +come to exactly the same thing if Hermann Cohen said: the railway is to +be conceived as a reality of such kind that it must exist if there were +no human beings and consequently no travellers; even if there were no +earth on the surface of which rails and sleepers could be laid. This is +such palpable nonsense that it would be a work of supererogation to +prove its absurdity. By this grotesque exaggeration Hermann Cohen has +clearly brought to light the hollowness and weakness of Kant's Moral +philosophy which culminates in the "Categorical Imperative." In spite +of its arbitrary dogmatism, the formula of the "Categorical Imperative" +has taken a hold on the imagination of the superficially educated, and +has never ceased to be repeated with the fervour evinced by a devout man +at prayer, by several generations of those who have made it their +business to cultivate mental and moral science. + +In one of his early novels, "The Island of Dr. Moreau," H. G. Wells has +described how an audacious scientist, by performing an operation on the +brains of the most savage beasts of prey, such as panthers, wolves, +etc., transformed them into creatures with the powers of thought and +speech. He succeeds in suppressing, or at least in lulling for the time +being, their bloodthirsty instincts, but he is always afraid that these +may be roused again, and forbids the animals on which he experiments to +touch blood or fresh meat. He takes good care to give no reason for this +prohibition. He merely issues it sternly and threateningly. It is "the +Law," an unknown, inexplicable, but terrible power to which one must +submit, because opposition would expose one to unimaginable, but +terrible evils. If temptation assails the beasts they flee it, +whispering fearfully and warningly to one another: "The Law! the Law!" +Wells is a trained philosopher, and often has his tongue in his cheek. I +shrewdly suspect that when he writes of the mysterious "Law" which fills +Dr. Moreau's semi-humanized beasts of prey with superstitious terror, he +is poking fun at Kant's "Categorical Imperative." + +The great logical mistake in Kant's moral philosophy is that he +conceives Morality as a social or collective phenomenon, and yet +defines it as an individual one. According to Kant, the Categorical +Imperative exists within us. It is as immutable as the starry heavens +above us. It gives us the criterion by which to discriminate between +good and evil. Its realm is our consciousness wherein it lives and +rules; it is not introduced from outside, it springs from no power or +conditions outside our person. All the same, the only law which this +ultra subjective Categorical Imperative imposes on us is the most +centrifugal that can possibly be imagined: "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." Hence our action is designed to produce an effect on the +world around us. It is "to become a universal law" can, of course, only +mean, it is to become a universal law of human society, for Kant cannot +possibly have aspired to make the Categorical Imperative impose laws +upon the stars in their courses. Our moral law, in so far as it applies +to our actions, deals with society. When we formulate it in our minds, +we associate it from its first inception with the notion of the society +to which it is to be applied. It would have been logical to say: "Your +standard of conduct is to be what society recognizes as its universal +law." But Kant puts the cart before the horse and says on the contrary: +"The maxims on which thy action is based are by thy will to become the +universal law of society." + +Other philosophers have avoided this mistake. Hegel declares: "It is not +until man becomes a member of a moral community that the ideas of Duty +and Virtue attain a definite meaning and become direct representatives +of a universal spirit in subjectivity, which knows that it is actuated +in its aim by the universal and realizes that its dignity and its +particular aims are founded upon it." If we translate this horribly hazy +language of Hegel's into plain speech we find it means: "The ideas of +Duty and Virtue only acquire a meaning when they are applied to the acts +of commission and omission of the individual member of a community." +(When Hegel speaks of "moral community" his use of the word "moral" is +inadmissible, for he takes it for granted that the meaning of the word +"moral" has been determined and is clearly understood, whereas he ought +first to have defined its meaning.) The concepts of Duty and Virtue +denote that the individual in taking action thinks of the community, +that regard for its interests determines him, that his actions do not +attain dignity and worth until his aim becomes the interests of the +community, that these interests must coincide with those of the +individual if his actions in his own interests are to merit the +appellations of dutiful and virtuous. In short: to act morally is to act +so as to ensure the well-being of the community. The real Categorical +Imperative is a social conscience. + +Feuerbach expresses this thought clearly and distinctly when he says: +"There can be no question of Morality in the strict sense of the word +except where the subject of discussion is the relationship of man to +man, of one person to another, of me to thee." + +Recent contemporary French writers are in no way doubtful of the +meaning implied by the concept of Morality. "Morality," says Littre, +"is the whole collection of rules which determine our conduct towards +others. Moral Good is the ideal, which at any period of a civilization +forms opinions and customs with respect to this conduct; moral evil is +that which offends this ideal." This definition is very incomplete and +weak, as will be seen in the course of our remarks, but on one point it +is quite clear: it treats Morality as a social phenomenon, it +paraphrases it as the adjustment of individual action to the standard +set up by the community. The question of the origin and the aim of this +standard is left open. + +L. Levy-Bruehl formulates Littre's idea more clearly. "We call by the +name of Morality the collection of such conceptions, opinions, feelings +and customs respecting the mutual rights and duties of men in their life +as members of a community, as are recognized and generally observed at a +given time in a given civilization." + +Thus, according to some, Morality is subjection to an absolute law of +divine, or at any rate of unexplained and inexplicable origin, which +religion or a mysterious inner voice reveals to man; according to +others, it is the recognition that the claims of the community, or at +any rate of the majority of one's fellow men, are of binding force upon +the actions of the individual. These different answers to an inquiry as +to the origin of Morality both contain the tacit admission that it is a +law which peremptorily dictates to man what he shall do and what he +shall not do. But by means of what psychic mechanism does this law +enforce obedience in the consciousness of man? It is remarkable that all +moral philosophers, no matter to what age, nation or school they belong, +dimly feel or clearly recognize that in civilized man at any rate, +natural instincts and judgment are always at war; that the latter +opposes the former; that in the victory of judgment over impulse lies +the very essence of Morality; that consequently the essence of Morality +implies the control and repression of instinct by Reason--in a word, +that it is inhibition. + +We have seen that Aristotle, in definite though unconscious opposition +to the Stoics, who consider Morality synonymous with Nature, defines it +as the activity of Reason. + +Henry More was the first to express this quite clearly: "Virtue is an +intellectual force of the soul which enables it to control ... animal +instincts and sensual passions." + +And Dr. Jodl sums up the character of Christian morality in the +statement: "Moral philosophy under the influence of Christian ideas +makes Morality always appear in the guise of a prohibition; at any rate +it is apt to conceive Morality as acting in an essentially restrictive +and prohibitive manner upon the natural impulses and instincts of man." + +This is not quite correct. This Christian code of morals does not always +manifest itself as a prohibition. Its main precept is: "Love thy +neighbour as thyself." That is not a prohibition but a positive command. +Nevertheless, the point of departure of this command is an inhibition. +For the first instinctive movement of man is selfishness and, as its +consequence, indifference to one's neighbour; the first imperious +impulse is to sacrifice the latter's interests to one's own. But if +regard for one's neighbour, nay, love for him permeates our feelings, +thoughts and actions, that denotes a victory of Christian ideas over the +impulse of instinct, a suppression of that impulse--that is, an +inhibition which, not content with mere prevention, prolongs its +efficacy in the same direction until it changes the impulse of +selfishness and inconsiderateness into its very antithesis, that of +unselfishness and charity. + +It constitutes an important advance in knowledge to recognize that +Morality, and not, as Jodl makes out, only Christian Morality, is +manifested as an inhibition, as the victory achieved by Reason over +Instinct which is contemptuously described as animal, simply because its +worth is judged by a standard already supplied by current views on +Morals. It is inadmissible to judge by this standard when one attempts +an impartial investigation into the ultimate foundations and the essence +of Morality. We have no plainly obvious right--no right which does not +require a proof--simply to scorn instinct as animal; to run it down from +the start and with a respectful bow to give Reason precedence over it; +to applaud with satisfaction the suppression of rascally Instinct by +highly respectable Reason. Instinct is no more animal than any other +manifestation of life in man; and he indulges in pleasant self-deception +if he imagines that he is other than an animal, that is, a living +organism in which all processes take place according to the same laws as +in all other living beings, from the simplest one-celled creature to +the most highly developed and complicated. + +In itself Instinct has the same claim to dignity as Reason; according to +some people an even greater one, because the former is more primitive, +unpremeditated, self-assured and firmly established than the latter, and +if Reason claims to be the superior, it must substantiate that claim. + +As a matter of fact, that claim has never been universally acknowledged. + +Periods during which Reason rules at least in name and is treated with +the obsequious reverence which the model citizen has, or feigns to have, +for his sovereign, are followed by others in which Instinct revolts; +rebels dethrone Reason and set up Instinct in its place, or, as they +call it, passion and nature. The parties which in turn wield power in +these periodic revolutions may be briefly termed classical and romantic. +The classicists are the legitimist supporters of Reason; the +romanticists are revolutionaries, and their leaders are men like Cleon +or Jack Cade, Cromwell, Washington or Robespierre; that is to say, rude +demagogues or subtle dialecticians in favour of Instinct. Among the +legitimists in Reason as in politics, are to be found those who maintain +the divine right, who base the right of Reason to rule over Instinct +upon the Will of God, and others again, the constitutionalists, who base +their support on the Will of the people, on universal suffrage, who +force upon Instinct the law promulgated by society. I need not carry the +metaphor to extremes. Every reader can work it out in all its details. +I only wanted to show quite clearly that almost all moral philosophers +conceived Morality as a struggle between Reason and Instinct, as the +defeat of lawlessness by law. But their views diverge widely when they +try to explain the source of this law and its claim to obedience. + +The theologians find no difficulty in this explanation. Just as the +essence of Morality according to their ideas is the nearest possible +approximation to divine perfection, so the moral law is one enacted by +God Himself, and it is a sin punishable with hell fire to fail to +observe it or to rebel against it. Others look upon Man as his own +law-giver, and trace his moral conduct, his willingness to combat his +own instincts, to an inner voice which teaches him what is right. They +call this inner voice by different names. They call it Nature, Reason or +Conscience, and look upon it as something innate, as a normal +constituent of man's psychic nature. That is the meaning of Fichte's +apodictic statement: "That which does not meet with the approval of +one's own conscience is necessarily sin. Therefore he who acts on anyone +else's authority acts in a conscienceless manner." + +With this emphatic utterance Fichte dismisses both the devout believers, +for whom Morality is the revealed Will of God, and the Rationalists who +look upon it as the dictate of society. He considers that if man claims +to act morally, he can do so only on his own authority, i.e. on that of +his conscience. He is not aware that in so doing he frivolously abandons +all rights to pronounce an objective moral judgment on any human action. +He thereby relinquishes the power to ask any further question except: +"Did he act in accordance with his own conscience? If so, then he has +acted in a subjectively conscientious way, even if it appears to me to +be immoral or even criminal and monstrous. If he has acted contrary to +the promptings of his own conscience, then he is assuredly a sinner, +even if his action be in my eyes splendid and exemplary." Thus Fichte, +with his subjective basis of Morality, is led to a conclusion which is a +ludicrous reversal of generally accepted ideas. According to him, a man +would be acting conscientiously if, despising what all others hold good, +right and sacred, he wallows in the satisfaction of his selfish +instincts, as long as his conscience approves or even bids him do so; on +the other hand, he is a sinner if, in opposition to his inner voice, but +according to moral law, that is in obedience to extraneous authority, he +practices all the virtues. + +All these subjective moral philosophers tacitly assume with Rousseau +that man is by nature good. They take no account of the empirically +established fact that there are men whose Fichtean conscience, or whose +Kantian categorical imperative, urges them to a course of action which +according to the general opinion is bad, wicked and revolting. This +criticism applies to Beneke, according to whom Morality is "a +development of human nature which exists as such within us, and which we +need only continue or promote"; it applies equally to Reid and Dugald +Stewart, who describe it as an inclination, which has become a habit or +a principle, to act according to the dictates of conscience. But +conscience must be explained. It is by no means self-evident that each +individual conscience will have the same standard of good and evil. The +moral philosopher must not shirk the duty of showing how the conscience +acquires its concepts of moral values, with what weapons it provides +Reason to combat Instinct, which demands satisfaction without paying any +attention to the warnings of conscience. + +The great majority of moral philosophers do not endorse the view of Kant +and Fichte, that conscience is a piece of human nature, a sense inborn +in man, an inner voice that is independent of, and unmoved by, external +influences; on the contrary, they are convinced that conscience +originates outside the individual, that, in his consciousness, it is the +advocate retained by society, commissioned to plead the cause of the +community before the reason of the individual even, nay, especially, +when the interests of the community run counter to those of the +individual. + +Bacon calls the presence in our consciousness of a defender of the +interests of society our innate social affection, and treats it +unreservedly as the source of Morality. Long before his time the +Stoics had noted the existence of this social affection and called it +[Greek: oikeiosis]; Hugo Grotius, with the intellectual perspicuity +peculiar to himself, says that "Right and Morality flow from the same +source, and this source is a strong social instinct natural to man, it +is solicitude for the community, a solicitude guided by Reason." The +English philosophers are practically unanimous in ascribing both +conscience and Morality in general to a social source. The welfare of +the community, says Richard Cumberland, is the highest moral law; +Hutcheson remarks that, in the struggle between egoism and universal +benevolence, the decisive factor in favour of the latter is the +accompanying feeling, the reflective emotion of approval. + +In modern parlance we call "universal benevolence," altruism, and the +"reflective emotion of approval" is a paraphrase of conscience which +contains an indication of its mode of action. For the idea that our +action will meet with the approval of the community and the pleasurable +emotion of satisfaction are in fact the reasons why we mostly submit to +the dictates of conscience voicing the commands of the community. Only +Hutcheson is too venturesome and goes too far, when he maintains +unreservedly that the reflective emotion of approval in the struggle +between egoism and universal benevolence is the decisive factor which +turns the scales in favour of the latter. This is by no means always the +case. When it does occur we call the action moral, but we characterize +it as immoral when, in spite of the "reflective emotion of approval" +"universal benevolence" is worsted by egoism. + +It is unnecessary to quote the opinions of other moral philosophers. +It is enough to observe that most of them describe the moral law as a +social agreement and make conscience its accredited representative. +L. Levy-Bruehl repeats a doctrine current since the days of Pythagoras +when he says: "The sense of duty and that of responsibility, horror of +crime, love of what is good and reverence for justice--all these, which +a conscience sensitive to Morality thinks it derives from itself and +from itself alone, have nevertheless a social origin"; and Feuerbach +expresses the same view in an entertainingly melodramatic fashion when +he calls the voice of conscience "An echo of the cry of revenge uttered +by the injured party." This cry of revenge would never wake an echo in +us if we did not possess a sounding board which cries of distress and +lamentation cause to vibrate. Schopenhauer, digging deeper than his +predecessor, clearly recognizes this sounding board, and describes its +characteristics when he says that the foundation of ethics is pity, +which in its passive form warns us: "_Neminem laede!_ Do harm to no +one!" And in its active form gives the order: "_Imo omnes quantum potes +juva!_ Assist everyone with all your might!" + +The assumption, that sympathy with his neighbour must be present in +man's consciousness before he is capable of moral action, is one that +need not be made by subjective moral philosophers, who hold with Kant +and his school that the moral law is an inborn categorical imperative, +which proclaims its commands without reference to any extraneous object, +or to the world, or mankind. + +In the same way the theologians have no need of it, for they consider +that what is morally good is the Will of God. + +But he who holds with the moral philosophers of sociological tendencies +that Morality is regard for one's fellow men, and the recognition that +the claims of the real or supposed interest of the community are +superior to those of the comfort of the individual, must admit that +sympathy is a necessary preliminary to moral action; i.e. that the +individual must have the ability to picture the sufferings of others so +vividly that he feels their sorrows as his own, and with all his might +and all his will strives to prevent, alleviate and heal them. The lack +of this ability, psychic anaesthesia, is a symptom of disease. It renders +the person affected incapable of moral action. It is a characteristic of +the born criminal, and is the essential symptom of that state of mind +which alienists term moral insanity. Even in this condition, if reason +and the power of judgment are not affected, great offences against +current moral law can be avoided. But this results from the fear of the +painful and ruinous results which a collision with public opinion +entails, even if the offender is not actually haled into court. It is +not due to any inner necessity, nor to the prompting of one's own +feelings. + +Only the Rationalists have any cause or reason to inquire into the aims +of Morality, whether they look upon the moral law as dictated by society +or are of the opinion that it is the sum total of the rules by which +Reason, of its own initiative, successfully combats the urging of +Instinct. If the moral law is a creation of society, and is obeyed by +the individual out of sympathy with his fellow-men or consideration for +society, the logical conclusion is that society has set up the moral law +to satisfy some real or imagined need. Its aim in this case can only be +the real or supposed welfare of the community. This is the most widely +accepted view. + +"Morality and universal welfare," says Macchiavelli, "are conceptions +which coincide." In his calm assurance this apodictic writer, who +doubtlessly slept well and had an excellent digestion, is never troubled +by a doubt as to whether there is such a thing as an absolutely reliable +measure of universal welfare, and therefore whether Morality, which is +termed its equivalent, can provide us with a perfectly unimpeachable +standard. He whose ethical conscience is more tender and timid will +inevitably anxiously ask himself: Who decides what universal welfare +demands and what is conducive to it? Is it to be the masses? Is the mob, +incapable of thought, ignorant, swayed by momentary and shifting +impulses, to make moral laws for the select few who are its natural +guides? What tragedies would necessarily result from this definition! +How often a strong personality, trained to come to independent +conclusions, refuses to obey the voice of the mob! Is the sheep who +trots bleating along with the herd to be taken as the type of a moral +being? Must we necessarily condemn as immoral those who swim against the +stream, enlightened tyrants who force upon their people hateful +innovations calculated to ensure their welfare,--such men as Peter the +Great, the Emperor Joseph II, the reformer who comes into violent +conflict with the majority who are creatures of habit? "The aim of +Morality is the welfare of society; this is indeed the essence of +Morality." A sufficiently safe and most soothing formula this seems; but +really the security it gives is most deceptive, and it leaves unsolved +the most important problems relating to the phenomenon of Morality. + +A numerous group of moral philosophers seeks the aim of moral conduct +in the individual himself, not outside him. In spite of Schopenhauer's +sympathy, they doubt that consideration for the well-being of the +community would act forcibly enough upon the individual to induce him to +wage unceasing war on his impulses and struggle to overcome them. Rather +they hold that the individual must find in his inner consciousness not +only the spur to moral action, but also the reward for the same, and +they characterize this driving force as pleasurable emotions in every +sense of the words. According to them man acts morally because, and in +so far as, he anticipates pleasurable results from so doing. Epicurus +considers the aim of Morality always to be Pleasure. He makes only the +one reservation, that a reasonable man will renounce an immediate +pleasure for the sake of a greater one in the future, and that he may +delight in the anticipation of pleasurable emotions which defeat and +dull present pains. Thus the martyr may be a true Epicurean, even if by +his actions he exposes himself to most cruel torture and the most +painful death, for he is convinced that the everlasting joys of paradise +will more than indemnify him for his temporary sufferings. + +I have already shown that Aristotle considers Morality the activity of +practical Reason, which is accompanied by pleasurable emotions. He makes +these pleasurable emotions an essential part of Morality, and Spinoza +shares this view, for he says: "Knowledge of good and evil is nothing +but a pleasurable or a disagreeable emotion in so far as we are +conscious of it." + +No less roundly, one might almost say brutally, Leibnitz declares: "We +term good that which gives us pleasure; evil that which gives us pain," +while Feuerbach expresses himself rather more carefully and indefinitely +thus: "The instinct for happiness is the most potent of all instincts. +Where existence always occurs together with volition, volition and the +will to be happy are inseparable; they are, indeed, essentially one. 'I +will,' means 'I have the will not to suffer, not to be hindered and +destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be assisted and preserved; that is, +I have the will to be happy.'" This is a wordy paraphrase of Spinoza's: +"All existence is self-assertion, and Morality is only the highest and +purest form of this fundamental instinct in a reasonable being." + +Among those moral philosophers who see in pleasurable emotions the aim +of Morality, its reward and its incentive, we must distinguish two +groups: those who understand by pleasurable emotions such as appeal to +the senses--the Hedonists; and those who spiritualize the meaning of the +word and expect of Morality not an immediate bodily gratification, a +pleasure, or an insipid satisfaction of the sense, but lasting +happiness--the Eudaemonists. At the first glance the Eudaemonists seem to +have a higher and more worthy conception of the subjective reaction of +moral conduct than have the Hedonists; for the satisfaction the former +expect and promise does not apply to the lower spheres of our organic +life, but to the loftiest functions of our mind, from which alone a +feeling of happiness can emanate. + +But if we look into the matter more closely we find that to draw a sharp +distinction between the Hedonists and Eudaemonists is more than a little +arbitrary. For Pleasure and Happiness differ hardly at all in +essentials, but chiefly in degree; and this would at once be obvious if +one only took the trouble to define the two ideas, which, however, is +mostly not done. And with good reason, for it is impossible to explain +Pleasure. You can use synonyms for it; you can look wise and say: +Pleasure is that which is agreeable, or that which one desires, that in +which one delights, or a certain quality of feeling which accompanies +such organic processes as strengthen or vitalize the system; but all +that this amounts to is to say in a roundabout way, Pleasure is +Pleasure. It is a fundamental fact of our inner consciousness, just as +inexplicable as life, or as its antithesis, Pain. But if we assume that +Pleasure is something given by subjective experience, then the idea of +Happiness can be defined. Happiness is a flooding of the consciousness +with sunshine; it is enjoyment of the moment, a sense of living in the +present accentuated by pleasurable emotion. If this feeling is +organically differentiated, that is, if it springs from a certain +section of the mind or mechanism of the body and can be located there, +it is ecstasy. It is only felt as Happiness when it is, so to speak, +melted, dissolved, distributed throughout the organism, +coenesthetically diffused. + +If we agree to this definition we can take Eudaemonism into consideration +as an aim of moral action, but Hedonism we shall have to discard from +the start. If Morality is to be inhibition, a victory of Reason over +Instinct, then it cannot possibly arouse Pleasure, since the first and +most immediate source of Pleasure is the surrender to instinct, the +satisfaction of the organic appetites; but if one resists them, +suppresses them, then one experiences a privation which at best +occasions discomfort and may easily cause pain. By its very nature and +the mechanism by which it works, Morality can therefore give rise to no +pleasure, but only to discomfort. All the same, it can afford a feeling +of happiness. + +It may be objected that I am guilty of a contradiction when I assume the +possibility of Happiness without Pleasure, as I have just described +Happiness as a particular kind of Pleasure; but in reality there is no +contradiction. For Pleasure springs from a special organic apparatus, +whereas Happiness is not a condition of any particular apparatus in our +body, but a general feeling that cannot be located; if it is roused by +moral actions it originates in the self-satisfaction of Reason, in its +pride in the victory over Instinct, in the rapture occasioned by one's +own strength of will; therefore, it can well exist without any +differentiated pleasurable emotion located in any particular organic +apparatus. + +Many moral philosophers have for various reasons rejected plausible +Eudaemonism as well as Hedonism, and these reasons can all be traced back +to the recognition, or at least an inkling, of the fact that moral +action in the nature of things must exclude pleasurable emotions; at any +rate immediate ones, and such as are perceived by the senses. Perhaps +Fichte does this in the most naive fashion, for he rejects every form of +Eudaemonism as the aim of moral action, but admits as its purpose only +bliss, that is to say, the self-satisfaction of Reason resulting from +action in accordance with its own laws. However, he struggles in vain to +deny that this "bliss" is of the nature of a pleasurable emotion, or to +interpret it as differing from Eudaemonism. He is only giving the latter +another name to make it conform in an orthodox manner with his doctrine +of the Supreme Ego. "_Baptizo te carpam!_" I baptize thee, carp! In this +way the pious man complies with the law enjoining abstinence from meat, +and with an easy conscience smacks his lips over a roast pheasant which +he has dubbed fish. + +Plato is among those who most emphatically deny that Pleasure is either +the motive force, the accompaniment, the consequence, or the aim of +Morality. But a reasonable thinker can derive no profit from his +arguments in support of this point of view, for they are rambling, +fantastic, mystical and visionary. Plato thinks it a necessary +consequence of the very nature of Good that it should be absolutely +self-sufficient. For Pleasure is a perpetual growth, a ceaseless longing +for more; it can therefore not be self-sufficient, and on this account +can not be the foundation of Morality. + +However, it is by no means obvious why Morality should not be in a +perpetual state of growth (just as Pleasure is, according to Plato), or +why it should not constantly desire an increase of its own activities. +On the contrary, this craving is just what one would most wish Morality +to have. True, it would not then attain self-satisfaction. But what is +the good of this self-satisfaction? It is a pleasurable emotion, and +according to Plato Morality is supposed to have nothing in common with +Pleasure. It is not to be contentment and serene satisfaction, but +rather tireless endeavour. However, Plato, of course, cannot admit this, +because for him Good and the deity are identical, and being perfect can +therefore advance no farther in perfection; and the striving after Good +is merely an effort of memory on man's part to call to mind more clearly +the deity whom he saw in his spiritual life before birth, and of whom he +retains a dim and confused memory in his earthly life. It is plainly +idle to waste reasonable criticism upon such visionary arguments. + +The Stoics, too, try to sever the connexion between moral conduct and +Pleasure, and to conceive the former as a simple activity of human +nature, one, moreover, from which they expect no particular +satisfaction. They overlook the fact that every activity of the impulses +and instincts of man's own nature affords him satisfaction, and that +Pleasure is nothing but this very satisfaction of natural instincts. If, +then, Morality were, as the Stoics contend, only "Life in harmony with +Nature herself," then, like every other satisfaction of natural desires, +it should be an ever-flowing source of pleasurable emotions, and this +characteristic would be inseparable from it, though the Stoics may +vainly try to deny it. + +Christianity has an easier job than Stoicism. With harsh severity, +disregarding any plea for indulgence in view of the weakness of the +flesh, it absolutely excludes the factor of pleasure from the fulfilment +of moral duties. But this severity is only apparent. The good and just +man can expect no reward for his moral conduct here on earth, but he +will find a much more ample one in the life to come. To the devout +believer who gives unlimited credit to it, the promise of the joys of +paradise has the full value of a cash disbursement. It is somewhat +childish juggling with words to deny pleasurable emotion to be the aim +of moral conduct if at the same time a most vivid foretaste of the +eternal bliss which awaits him after death be given to the virtuous man; +as if the anticipation of heavenly bliss were not a pleasurable emotion +of the highest degree! + +Kant finds it due to his point of view to spurn every weak inclination +to Eudaemonism. A Categorical Imperative cannot issue commands with an +eye to profit or comfort. That is as clear as daylight. "All Morality of +action must be founded on the necessity which arises from duty and +respect for the law, and not from love or inclination for the desired +result of the action." Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and John Stuart Mill +have recorded such irrefutable criticisms of the Kantian doctrine of the +absolute disinterestedness of moral action, that it is unnecessary to +add to their arguments. + +Only some moral philosophers, and particularly Mill, are guilty of +logical inaccuracy when they reject Eudaemonism but retain Utility as the +aim of morality. Why do the Utilitarians not realize that they are +merely Eudaemonists under another name, and that he who disregards his +own immediate interests in order to further the well-being of the +community experiences a pleasurable emotion of high order in the +satisfaction he derives from the sacrifices whereby he has contributed +to the good of the community? + +The useless exertions of a section of moral philosophers to eliminate +not only Hedonism but also Eudaemonism from moral action are a veritable +labour of Sisyphus. Hardly have these two with difficulty been expelled +by the door than they return by the window or the chimney. It is a mere +conjuring trick to remove them from this world to the next, as do the +theologians, or to substitute universal well-being for the feeling of +happiness. All the same, the desire to purge moral action of the least +admixture of hope of profit or pleasure is comprehensible. Common +experience, which is equally forced upon the profound thinker and upon +the plain man in the street least inclined to cudgel his brain, teaches +us that Morality consists, with very few exceptions, in acting against +our own immediate interest, in denying ourselves some coveted pleasure, +in renouncing some attainable profit, in undertaking some disagreeable +exertion because Reason bids us do so. From this practical experience +the man in the street gets the impression that duty is a bitter +necessity and that decency is attended by many and varied +inconveniences. The theorist, the philosopher, derives a principle from +his empirical facts; he observes that the moral man often acts against +his own immediate interests, and expresses this in the pretentious +axiom: "Morality from the very beginning excludes all thought of +profit." + +And yet the philosophers are guilty of the same superficiality as the +man in the street. They do not go far enough into the matter to perceive +that the morality of pleasure, of interest, and of duty, Hedonism, +Utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative, all lead in very slightly +different ways to the same goal--Eudaemonism. The fulfilment of duty +affords spiritual satisfaction, a pre-eminently pleasurable emotion +which increases in direct proportion to the effort which its fulfilment +demands. Interest also implies pleasure, for every interest ultimately +comes to this, that it is an attempt to secure a pleasure. This aim lies +at the bottom of all interests; it is the fundamental interest from +which all seemingly different interests are derived; it is the universal +goal to which all human effort tends, whether it be a question of making +money to satisfy ambition, of winning love and friendship, of material, +spiritual, personal or social values. Interest is self-assertion and the +intensifying of the zest for life. But these are always accompanied by +pleasurable emotions; thus interest is forthwith identified with +pleasurable emotion, even though one has to work hard, even though at +the moment it entails drudgery and discomfort. Hedonism makes no secret +of its nature and its tendency. It openly admits what the Categorical +Imperative denies and what Utilitarianism veils with vague phrases: that +the aim and object of moral action is Pleasure and nothing else. + +In our short survey of the immense field of literature dealing with +moral philosophy we have learnt that, although the most various and +divergent views are expressed as to the essence and source of Morality, +nevertheless there is but one opinion, be it clearly or vaguely stated, +be it the result of knowledge or surmise, as to the mechanism by means +of which moral concepts determine action, and as to the conscious or +unconscious aim of moral action: Moral concepts do their work by means +of inhibition, and the aim of moral action is a feeling of happiness. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY + + +It is natural for man's thoughts to be concentrated on himself until he +has learnt to rise from the deep and narrow well of his egoism to a +higher and wider view of life and, free from the taint of self-love, to +form an idea of his place in the world and his relationship to it. Not +till the development of his intellect is far advanced does any doubt +assail him as to the truth of his conviction that all his personal +affairs, the least as well as the most weighty, are of the greatest +importance to the universe, that every ache or pain he feels must wake +an echo in the heavens, that the Earth shudders in anticipation when he +is about to stumble and sprain his ankle, and that the stars in their +courses mysteriously, though intelligibly to the discerning, foretell +the hour of his birth and of his death. An Indian legend pours cruel +scorn upon this childlike megalomania: A fox had fallen into a stream +and was drowning. "The world is coming to an end!" gasped the animal in +its agony. A peasant standing on the brink replied coldly, "Oh, no, I +see only a little fox drowning." + +Many moral philosophers, those of the Kantian school without exception, +labour under the delusion of this same, egocentric view. In their eyes +the phenomenon of Morality is a cosmic one. Morality is the law of +human conduct, therefore it is the law of world processes, of the +universe. Indeed, it is the law of the universe before it becomes that +of human conduct. It would exist even if there were no men, no humanity, +no human conduct at all. The solemn innocents who weightily give +utterance to this doctrine are unaware how ridiculous they are. They do +not hesitate to subject Sirius to the yoke of the Ten Commandments. They +are convinced that the Milky Way practises virtue and shuns, or ought to +shun, vice, just as we inconsiderable human beings do. The precept, +"Thou shalt not steal," applies with binding force to gravity, and the +warning, "Thou shalt not kill," to electricity, though the latter +ruthlessly disregards it, as the results of being struck by lightning +and accidents with high voltage installations frequently prove. If they +do not threaten Nature with police and prison it is only because in +their eyes Morality is independent of all sanctions, is superior to +rewards and punishments, depends upon itself alone, constitutes its own +aim, is by its very nature a compelling force, and therefore has no need +of adventitious compulsion. + +Such profound nonsense cannot lay claim to serious treatment. It is a +counterpart to the belief that events in the history of mankind, like +war and pestilence, are foretold by heavenly signs such as fiery comets. +The stars revolve, the clockwork of the universe continues undisturbed, +as though the earth were still uninhabited, as it was when it was a +glowing fluid globe or, earlier still, a nebular mass; and this +although man's self-esteem be hurt by such a lack of consideration. If +we care to call the (so far as we know) unalterable laws, according to +which the forces of Nature act and the mechanism of the world works, the +Morality of the Universe, that may pass. Only we must in that case +clearly realize that we are speaking metaphorically, that we are making +use of a poetic simile, that we are anthropomorphically attributing +human traits to the universe. Morality is a phenomenon restricted to +mankind, or, to be strictly accurate, a phenomenon which occurs only +among living beings; for the beginnings of Morality may be traced in +creatures of a lower order than man, and it develops simultaneously with +the consciousness and the mentality of living beings. Morality is a +function of life, dependent upon it, begotten and developed by it, to +meet life's needs and serve its interests. The existence of Morality +apart from life is as unthinkable as that of hunger, ambition, or +gratitude. + +Morality is a collection of laws and prohibitions which Reason opposes +to organic instincts, by means of which the former forces the latter +into actions from which they would like to refrain, or prevents them +from carrying out that which they yearn to do. The existence of +Morality, therefore, presupposes in the first place that of an +intelligence sufficiently developed to form a clear idea of something +that is still in the future, namely, an image of the consequences +resulting from an action. + +Guided by this inner contemplation of the image of the consequences of +an action, Reason decides to carry out or prevent the action. This +gives us the lowest plane upon which Morality can occur as the cause of +action and of abstention from action. It implies, above all things, +foresight, and can therefore only exist in a consciousness which is +sufficiently developed to grasp the idea of the future and form a +picture of it. This consciousness must be capable of extracting the +elements of a conception from memory according to the laws of the +association of ideas, and be able to group them logically in a new +order. In other words, as long as the mind cannot visualize the past and +from it build up a picture of the future, Morality can find no place in +it. + +This statement requires no limitation, but it demands a short +explanation. It is quite true that Morality is foresight, but it is only +among the elect that the latter is developed to such a pitch that it is +possible to form images of the consequences of action and abstention +sufficiently clear and definite to exercise a restraining or encouraging +influence. + +The average man can act morally without first working out a clear +picture of the future. It is enough that he has been trained to the +habit of respecting current precepts, and of accepting the views +obtaining in his circle as to what is good or bad, what is admissible or +inadmissible. This morality, of course, is merely a matter of drill or +training; it is unthinking automatism; it is inferior, and not to be +compared with the living, creative morality of higher natures, which, as +a sovereign law-giver, comes to an independent decision in every case +and, like the guardian angel of childlike faith, guides man on his path +through life, indicates the right course at the cross-roads, and warns +him of pitfalls and stumbling-blocks. But for everyday use mechanical +morality may suffice. In the uneventful existence of the average man, +which passes in a stereotyped way, this mechanical morality is an +acceptable guide and counsellor, but it remains an outside influence +foreign to his inner consciousness; he is glad to deceive and outwit it, +as a slave does his master's bailiff if he can do so without running the +risk of a thrashing; but if his destiny unexpectedly rises above its +accustomed dead level, then this dogmatic morality, which he has never +really assimilated, leaves him in the lurch, and mournfully, in piteous +tones, he utters the well-known cry, "It is easy to do one's duty; it is +difficult to know where one's duty lies." + +Reason, then, which is capable of foreseeing the results of actions, +teaches a man what he must do and from what he must abstain, where he +may follow his instinct and where he must resist it, according as it +considers the presumptive results of yielding to impulse good or bad. +But whence does Reason obtain the standard it applies to the actions of +men and their results? How does it acquire the fundamental concepts Good +and Bad, and what is their significance? Generally speaking, the answer +will be as follows: Moral values are appraised by a standard supplied by +a general consensus of opinion; Reason acknowledges as good that which +meets with the approval of the community, that which the latter desires +and therefore praises; the community, for its part, echoes the +pronouncements of influential personages, i.e. of the most respected, +most powerful, and most aristocratic; Reason condemns as bad that which +the community disapproves, and which it therefore censures and rejects. +This definition does not solve the problem of good and bad, it only +shifts it. + +Later we shall have to show upon what grounds the community +discriminates between acceptable and reprehensible facts, calling the +former good and the latter bad. For the present it is enough to observe +that Reason derives the laws, which it constantly impresses on man, from +the opinion of the community. + +It can happen that Reason rejects the opinion of the community and forms +a conclusion opposed to it. This revolt of individual morality against +conventional morality is the great tragedy of man. It can only occur in +the soul of a hero, for mediocre and insipid people always bow to the +opinion of the majority. There is clearly imminent danger of making a +mistake. Not seldom, however, the individual is right in his opposition +to the community, and then the latter is fired by his example to examine +its traditional dogmas and to correct or reject them. This is not the +only, but it is the most common means by which Morality is developed and +changed. Its progress demands martyrs. Strong personalities must be +sacrificed to force a revision of moral values. Socrates has to swallow +the draft of hemlock so that unfettered thought may acquire the right to +doubt the legend of the gods. Jesus has to incur the dangerous anger of +the Pharisees so that the adulteress may be treated with indulgence and +human sympathy instead of being punished according to rigorous law. But +the opposition of a self-willed, subjective Morality to the accepted +moral law is always exceptional; the general rule is submission to the +moral law. This is indeed a necessary preliminary to revolt against the +moral law of the community, for it is only by means of a vigorous social +education that man develops such a nicely balanced and keen sense of +Good and Bad, that he cannot prevail upon himself to carry out generally +approved actions which his own intelligence does not recognize as moral. +He whose moral sense has not been intensified by strict discipline will +never be assailed by doubt, as long as he follows in the footsteps of +the multitude. + +Hence, as a rule, Reason exercises its control of the actions of man in +conformity with the laws prescribed by the community. Before Morality +develops into the practice of Good and the rejection of Bad it takes the +form of consideration for the world at large, since it is the latter +which has created the concepts of Good and Bad as well as the standard +by which they are judged, and in order to avoid conflict with the +community, and to maintain uninterrupted agreement with it, the +individual exerts himself to persist in doing good and to refrain from +doing evil. + +The establishment of these facts gives deep offence to the mystics among +moral philosophers. "What a debasement and belittling of Morality! What! +It is supposed to be nothing more than a sort of obsequiousness towards +the multitude? Its laws are observed for the sake of pleasing others? It +is a comedy played to win applause and a call before the curtain? That +is a libel and a calumny. The truly moral man looks neither to the right +nor to the left. He does not condescend to ask, 'What will the world say +to this?' There is but one judge in whose eyes he wishes to be +justified: his conscience." + +Quite right. But what is conscience found to be if we penetrate the fog +of mystic words with which it has come to be surrounded? Conscience is +the permanent representative of the community in the consciousness of +the individual, just as public opinion may be termed the conscience of +every member of society made manifest. Metaphorically, it wields the +powers pertaining to society; it praises and blames, it condemns and +exalts, it punishes and rewards, as society could do; and it actually +pronounces judgment in the name of society, even though it does not +preface such judgment with this formula which is tacitly implied and +must always be mentally added. Conscience is the invisible link which +unites the individual with a social group, just as speech, custom, +tradition, and political institutions are the visible links. But the +social origin and representative nature of conscience set limits to its +power. Conscience is a respected authority with wide powers only in the +consciousness of those individuals who have a highly developed social +sense. I purposely do not say those in whom the instinct to follow the +crowd preponderates, because this mode of expression might imply blame +and condemnation which I do not intend to convey. + +For social instinct comes natural to an individual born, educated and +working in a community, who shares its feelings, views and interests, +nay, even its prejudices and mistakes; and if he lacks it, it is a sign +of a morbid deviation from the normal. Only the decadent man is +uncannily lonely in spirit, alien, indifferent or definitely hostile to +his human surroundings; he is, according to the violence and +polarization of his instincts, the passionate anarchist or the born +criminal; the public opinion of his circle is unintelligible to him and +makes no impression on him; it has no significance for him; he attaches +no importance to its approbation, and its anger leaves him cold; he +would take no notice of it, were it not that he knows its power to +destroy him, and fears its police, its prisons, and its scaffolds. Such +a man, organically predisposed to crime, most urgently needs a +conscience. It would arrest him on the downward path to which his evil +instincts lead. It would warn him to resist the wicked impulses of his +selfishness. But he, of all people, has no conscience. He can have none. +He is anti-social, he is at war with society, diplomatic relations +between him and it have been broken off, and it has no representative in +his consciousness. A lively and active feeling of joint responsibility +with the community is a necessary predisposition on the part of the +individual before conscience can have any power. Where the former is +lacking the latter is mute and paralysed. + +The essence of Morality, as we have found, is the subjection of +instinct and direct organic impulses to the discipline of Reason. The +latter exercises a censorship in pursuance of a law which it derives not +from within, but from without, from the ordinances of the community +which instructs Reason as to what it should permit, what it should +forbid, and what it should demand. Conscience ensures respect for its +commands, and may be called the executive power or police of Reason, +acting as the authorized representative of Morality. It is the garrison +which the community maintains in the individual's consciousness, which +it arms and supplies with authority and instructions; the power of +conscience lies in the strength of the community at its back, and is +without influence only upon those who refuse admission to the troops of +the community and yield to none but actual physical force. All this +proves irrefutably that Morality is a phenomenon arising from the social +life of man, and its power is a function of society. + +If under the conditions in which humanity lives nowadays one could +imagine a man totally detached from his species, leading a solitary +life, Morality would be absolutely meaningless to him. The idea is one +he could never conceive. It would have no significance. Good and bad +would always retain their original meaning as labels for sensual +qualities, for pleasant or unpleasant sensations of taste, smell, etc.; +they would never be spiritualized or apply to the quality of actions. He +would be unable to attach any meaning to the words duty and right. The +terms virtue, vice, conscience, repentance would convey nothing to him. +Morality can only originate when the individual lives united with +fellow beings in a social community. It is a consequence of this union. +It is the one condition on which alone this union can be permanent. + +The solitary individual must, however, not be confused with the lonely +one. Robinson Crusoe, shipwrecked on a desert island and forced to stay +there without companionship, is not primitive man. He is a son of +civilization who has fallen upon evil days. In his enforced solitariness +he maintains the habits of thought of his original surroundings. He +preserves the concepts of Morality even though he has no occasion to +obey its dictates. He can, if not actually yet potentially, be a paragon +of virtue or a sink of iniquity; he can have a very delicate or a very +dull conscience. He continues to be a man of social instincts cut off +from society, and goes on thinking and feeling in a social manner. By +primitive man I mean man as he was before society originated. For, +contrary to the sociological school which denies the individual and +boldly refuses to allow him any existence, declaring society to be older +and earlier than the individual, I think I have conclusively shown +("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" [The Meaning of History]) that man is not +by nature a gregarious animal, that he lived alone, being self-sufficing +as long as the climatic conditions, under which he first made his +appearance on earth, enabled him to exist by his own unaided efforts and +capabilities, and that he banded himself together with others in gangs, +troops and hordes--the earliest forms of subsequent society--when, after +the first ice age following his appearance, the struggle for existence +grew ever harder, ever more laborious, transcending the powers of the +individual so that he could only overcome Nature, now grown hostile to +him, by uniting with others of his kind. + +This primitive man of the golden geological period before the Ice Age +knew no Morality, and as far as human intelligence can tell he would +never have known of it had there been a continuance of the paradisaic +conditions obtaining at the time of his birth, and had the climate not +deteriorated. The occurrence of murderous frosts, the necessity of +seeking protection from them in natural caves or artificially +constructed shelters, and of kindling and maintaining fires, the +diminution or disappearance of vegetable food, and the need to replace +it by the booty of the chase or fishing--all these forced him to unite +his efforts with those of other men who shared his wretched lot on +earth. But in order to maintain this community with others he had to +learn a new science, one he had hitherto not known because he had had no +need of it: consideration for his fellows. He might no longer think of +himself alone, consider his own inclinations in all eventualities, give +way to all his moods or yield to every whim; he had unceasingly to bear +his neighbour in mind and take care not to annoy him, not to make an +enemy of him, not to become hateful to him. Forbearance towards his +neighbour was the necessary condition of their life in common, just as +their life in common was the necessary condition of self-preservation. +The penalty for selfish indulgence was stern persecution, punishment, +perhaps death; in any case, expulsion from the community. Man, +therefore, stood before the choice of self-control or destruction, and +this dilemma taught him Morality. + +Such, we must imagine, were the beginnings of Morality. It was not +prearranged or purposely sought; it grew naturally from the +companionship of men and developed simultaneously with society. If the +struggle for existence made life in communities a necessity, the first +coercive law of the community was to enjoin upon its members a mode of +conduct which alone rendered the existence of the community possible, +and the fundamental rule of this conduct was mutual consideration. +Without this two egoisms cannot exist side by side and develop. They +either destroy or shun one another. This phenomenon may also be observed +among the higher animals. Elephants, living in herds, expel quarrelsome +individuals and force them to wander alone far from the rest. The +natives of Ceylon and India fear these "bachelor elephants" as being +specially savage and malicious. They think that they grow like this +because of their loneliness. That is probably a false conclusion. It is +much more likely that these animals have been driven from their herd +because they were savage and malicious, because their characters were +opposed to discipline. Here we come upon the first faint foreshadowing +of the phenomenon of Morality in an animal community. + +Now that we have introduced the idea of the growth and development of +Morality, it becomes obvious that it must have begun with mere +indications, and that from rude, dim, undeveloped beginnings it +gradually grows more perfect, more refined, more nicely differentiated. +At first man avoids only the most brutal injuries to his neighbour, such +as hurting him, doing him bodily harm, threatening to kill him, openly +robbing him. In proportion as he becomes more spiritually sensitive, as +he learns to feel the insult and humiliation of injuries other than +those inflicted with a fist or club, he is led to refrain from giving +his fellow-men similar offence, which though it deals no gaping wounds, +yet hurts his spiritual sensibilities. A series of values is developed, +growing ever longer, ever more complicated, with more and more +gradations, until, going far beyond the simple, artless commandments, +"Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not covet thy +neighbour's wife nor his goods," it reaches the pitch of agonized +self-reproach, because of the slightest and most secret impulses to +dislike, injustice, covetousness, dissimulation, etc. + +Morality must be regarded as a support and a weapon in the struggle for +existence in so far as, given present climatic conditions on earth and +the civilization arising therefrom, man can only exist in societies, and +society cannot exist without Morality. The chain of thought runs as +follows: without morality no society, without society no individual +existence; consequently, Morality is the essential condition for the +existence of the individual as well as for that of the community. +However, we must always bear in mind the reservation, "given the +present climatic conditions on earth." Had the earth continued to be the +paradise it must have been at the birth of our species (since otherwise +the latter could simply not have originated), the necessity would never +have arisen for the individual to band himself together with others of +his kind, no society would ever have developed, and there would have +been no Morality. Serious as the subject is, one cannot but smile at the +thought of the comic figure the learned, professorial Neo-Kantians would +cut with their dogma of the absolute and cosmic nature of Morality, if +they propounded it among men whose wants Nature's bounty was able to +satisfy as easily as the frog is satisfied in his puddle or the crow on +his tree top. They would find no trace of absolute Morality among +mankind, and would be reduced to seeking it among the stars. + +The very nature of Morality, in that it is an aid to man in the struggle +for existence, makes it easy to understand the origin and nature of the +concepts Good and Bad. There are propensities and actions which +facilitate life in a community which, indeed, alone make it possible: +love of one's neighbour, helpfulness, liberality, consideration for the +feelings of others, and amiability. There are others which make such a +life difficult or absolutely impossible: uncompromising selfishness, +violence, cruelty, rapacity, instinctive hostility to one's neighbour. +Men recognized that the former were beneficial to them, the latter +harmful. The former aroused their liking, the latter their disapproval, +dislike and animosity. The quality of feeling which accompanied the +perceptions of actions of the former kind was akin to that with which +they responded to beneficial, profitable, useful and welcome sense +impressions. The quality of feeling, which actions of the second +category gave rise to, was akin to that due to harmful and repellent +sense impressions. Following the law of analogy, they placed on an equal +footing actions which were felt to be pleasing and pleasant sensations +of taste and smell; similarly with disagreeable actions and unpleasant +sense impressions; and finally they called the former good and the +latter bad, using terms originally applicable only to the realm of the +senses. + +Not everything that is pleasant to the senses is beneficial. There are +poisons which are pleasing to taste, but none the less noxious for that, +such as (to give only one example) alcoholic drinks and impressions of a +certain order, like voluptuousness, which man greedily pursues, even +though they ruin his health. But these are exceptions. As a rule, not +only man, but all living creatures, derive pleasant sensations from +beneficial things; and it is probable that that category of sensations, +which we are conscious of as being pleasant, is nothing but the state of +coenesthesis, when the organism functions particularly energetically +under the influence of the absorption of food or of a special stimulus +of the senses, when it feels its life processes carried on particularly +vigorously, freely and harmoniously; just as we feel that state of +coenesthesis to be unpleasant, which occurs when the organism +functions badly, slackly, and in a manner calculated to endanger the +continuance of life. With the reservation that has been indicated we +can say in general that Good is equivalent to beneficial and pleasant, +Bad to harmful and unpleasant. This is true of the transferred and +spiritualized as well as of the immediate and material meaning of these +expressions of value. The significance of the words Good and Bad, the +point of departure, development and change of conception they indicate, +suffice to justify the Utilitarians and the Hedonists or Eudaemonists +among the moral philosophers, and to confute the contentions of their +critics, who deny all connexion between Morality and a practical +purpose, profit or pleasure, and declare these to be unworthy +humiliations of its majesty. + +They wriggle, with the agility of a contortionist on the music-hall +stage, to get over the obvious and palpable aim of moral conduct. They +display all the cunning of dishonest sophistry in their arguments to +prove that the element of subjective satisfaction which moral action +yields is non-existent, and that, therefore, the Hedonists and +Eudaemonists are wrong. They stir up an opaque cloud of words, phrases +and formulae to hide the fact, which nevertheless emerges clearly, that +he who acts morally expects to derive pleasurable emotions from his +action, or at least tries thereby to avoid probable painful emotions, +and that moral conduct, just as it is designed to give the individual +subjective satisfaction which is a kind of pleasure, is also meant to be +a benefit, or at any rate a supposed benefit, to the community. + +Morality must never try for a reward and never expect one. It must be +absolutely disinterested. It has no business to pursue any aim outside +itself. Thus say the mystics of moral philosophy, juggling with words; +and they think they are doing especial honour to Morality and raising it +to a particularly proud eminence. But Morality has no need of this +artificial and false grandeur to maintain its lofty place among the +phenomena of life, and it is derogatory neither to its authority nor to +its influence to be recognized as a beneficial force conducive to +happiness. + +The opponents of Utilitarianism and Eudaemonism in Ethics, if they speak +in good faith, may be excused on the grounds that their analysis of the +phenomenon of Morality is shallow. For them Morality is something +absolute, which exists by itself as an eternal and unalterable law of +the Universe, but which is revealed in the individual and therefore must +be conceived individually as a quality which has become human, as a +human value. If anyone persists in looking upon Morality as an +absolutely individual matter, without any connexion with anything +outside the individual, if anyone obstinately shuts his eyes to the fact +that Morality has not been developed by the individual out of his own +immediate needs and in consideration of himself alone, but that it is, +on the contrary, a creation of society and has no sense or significance +except as a social phenomenon, then indeed he can with some show of +justification deny Utilitarianism and Hedonism. For truly, looked at +from the point of view of the individual, moral conduct appears neither +pleasant nor immediately beneficial. On the contrary, it is, as a rule, +directly opposed to his own apparent interest, and it is achieved with +difficulty by sacrifice and renunciation, which are never pleasant and +often very painful. + +Once in a drawing-room, during a game of definitions, I heard a +light-hearted young lady define Duty in the following terms: "Duty is +that which we do unwillingly." A stern professor contradicted her at +once with the solemnity he thought due to his position, and assured her +reprovingly: "It is my duty to give lectures, and I do this duty gladly. +If you were right, madam, expressions such as 'zealous in one's duty' +and 'willing performance of duty' would have no meaning and could never +have been coined." That seems convincing, but yet it is wrong. +Expressions such as "zealous in one's duty" and "willing performance of +duty" were not coined until society had developed its system of Morality +and had educated its members to strive for its approval by conducting +themselves in accordance with this system, to look on its approval as a +flattering distinction and to fear its disapproval as a disgrace. Such +phrases are Pharisaical, calculated to exercise a suggestive influence +profitable to society. They are the sugar to sweeten the pill; but the +young lady was honest and the professor conventional; the pill is +bitter. Thinkers recognized and admitted this thousands of years ago. +Antiphon, the sophist, says: "The law, the outcome of an agreement, +coerces nature, the result of growth, and goes against the interest of +the individual." The same idea is expressed by the tragic poet in the +lines: "The gods have placed sweat before virtue." This was said in the +very same words by Lao Tse, the disciple of Meng Tse, the pupil of +Confucius and the reformer of his doctrine. + +The law, not only the law of the state which Antiphon has principally in +view, but also the moral law, "goes against the interest of the +individual"; not in reality, but apparently, at the first superficial +glance. Moral conduct is the reverse of natural conduct; it takes place +in opposition to instinct by deflecting the original impulse; it is a +subjugation of inclination, a victory over the real nature of the man. +Virtue has to exert its utmost strength in bitter struggles, fought out +within the individual, before it can reveal itself actively in deeds. +That is a natural consequence of the manner in which Morality +originated. + +The point is that it was not created directly for the individual, but +for the community, and for the former only in so far as he is a part of +the community, and from its stability and well-being derives a benefit +which he may, or may not, be conscious of; which he may, or may not, be +able to appreciate; which he accepts as something natural and +self-understood without further thought; for which he does not consider +any return service to be due; but which is nevertheless of real +magnitude, profiting the individual, facilitating his existence, or even +alone making it possible; and for which, as for every other gift, he +must make sacrifices. For within society there can be no gifts. It +possesses nothing but what it has acquired from its members, and the +latter must pay full value for everything it provides, unasked or +otherwise. + +As the Moral law originated to meet the needs of the community, and was +gradually formulated in definite precepts, it is comprehensible that the +community never paused to inquire what subjective effect its law would +have on the feelings of the individual. If you impose a law upon someone +you hardly ever consider how great will be the emotions of pleasure or +displeasure which its enforcement will entail. The order is, "Obey, +whether you like it or not; that which deeper insight and more +far-seeing wisdom prescribe is for your good." Thus the individual is +forced to work laboriously for his own good, which in his purblindness +he does not even recognize. It would be comprehensible if the +individual, who does not see farther than his own nose and does not look +beyond the present moment, formed the opinion that Morality is not +perceptibly beneficial to him and gives him no pleasure, and that, +therefore, the Utilitarians and the Hedonists talk nonsense. But the +moral philosopher, who observes the individual in relationship to the +community and surveys human actions, the way they are connected, and the +way they interact upon one another, has no right to pursue the same line +of thought as the individual, and deny that Morality aims at utility and +pleasure, even though the individual, when he acts morally, does not +perceive any personal advantage, nor feel any pleasure except the +self-satisfaction which he has been trained to feel, since in the eyes +of others he is so good and honest. That Morality aims at utility, and +is at the same time a source of pleasure and happiness, may seem dark +and doubtful while we consider the individual, but it becomes clear as +day and indisputable when we regard the community. + +Among creatures of a lower order than man, indeed among all animals that +live together in flocks or herds, we find the first beginnings of that +mode of conduct which in man we call moral, and which is not intended to +be of direct benefit to the individual, or to add to his momentary +pleasure, but which subordinates or sacrifices these personal +satisfactions to the good of the community. + +Chamois, when they are grazing, set one of their number on guard upon a +rocky eminence with a distant view, and this individual is responsible +for the safety of the herd. While the others feed in peace and comfort, +this guardian chamois forgoes the food which is doubtless just as +attractive to it as to the others, and tirelessly keeps a sharp look out +over its whole field of vision, warning its companions at the first +approach of danger by uttering a shrill cry. + +When the great herds of buffaloes still inhabited the North American +prairies, they had at the head and on the flanks of the herd the +strongest bulls, while the centre was occupied by the cows with their +calves and the young animals. Before civilization came to trouble them, +the grizzly bear was the only enemy that threatened them, and with him +they were able to deal; one of them would meet the attacking bear in +single combat, but did not always emerge from it unhurt. Often enough at +the end of the fight both the bull and the bear would be terribly +injured or even dead; yet by sacrificing his life the bull saved the +rest of the herd. + +The thrilling adventure of the Abyssinian baboon is well known; first +told by Alfred Brehm in his "_Tierleben_" (animal life), it was +afterwards quoted by Darwin and many other writers. On a hunting +expedition Brehm surprised a party of monkeys in a clearing. They fled +at once and had found shelter in the wood before the dogs could reach +them. Only one young one had got separated from the rest and was left +behind alone. It had scrambled up on to a solitary rock standing in the +plain, round which the dogs were barking furiously, and in its terror +the creature uttered piercing cries for help. A little male monkey, +hearing it, detached himself from the group, turned back from the safety +of the forest, made quietly for the rock and fetched away the trembling +young baboon from among the pack, silent now and shrinking in amazement; +and then stroking and caressing the little creature he carried it safely +in his arms to its family in the wood, unmolested by the stupefied dogs +and spared by the hunter, lost in admiration of this self-sacrificing +courage. + +In these three instances we see how the joint responsibility among +gregarious animals develops in them an ever increasing sense of duty, +which teaches the chamois to forgo its food during the hours it is on +guard, rouses in the buffalo a savage lust for battle, and makes the +baboon perform a premeditated deed of epic heroism. When men act as +these animals did, we ascribe this to Morality. This is nothing but +joint responsibility in action, the joint responsibility which the +species is forced by the conditions of life to adopt, if it is to +survive. + +Among the moral philosophers the mystics are prevented, by the haze +which obscures all their thought, from seeing that Morality originates +from this joint responsibility. Or rather, if they do see it, they think +this origin too low. They demand a more exalted genealogy for the +phenomenon of Morality. According to them the Moral law comes straight +from God. The concepts Good and Evil are revealed. Commands and +prohibitions are imposed upon the soul by that omnipotence which +spiritualizes the universe and of which the soul is an immortal part. + +If these phrases were anything but moonshine and tinkling cymbals they +certainly would make any other explanation of this astonishing fact +superfluous; the fact, namely, that man does what is repugnant to him, +and refrains from doing what would give him pleasure, that he is content +with himself when he has voluntarily curbed his impulses and made +sacrifices, and that he feels the pricks of conscience if he chances to +experience the pleasure of appeasement because he has satisfied his +desires. "Man obeys divine commands." That suffices and obviates the +necessity of seeking for explanations of this phenomenon, which shall +satisfy Reason. + +It is a mere mirage, the reflection of an earthly state of affairs in +the heavens, to assume that the universe is governed by an authority +devoid of responsibility, which imposes on its subjects, that is to say +men, laws and instructions, discipline and order. + +It is a form of anthropomorphism, the most widespread and stubborn of +errors in thought among those men who try to understand the +unintelligible, and are content with the most unfounded explanation +which their naive imagination freely invents for them. This same +anthropomorphism, not even at a loss to solve the problem of the origin +and essence of the universe, replies unhesitatingly that God by an act +of volition created it out of nothing to prove to Himself His own +omnipotence and omniscience; in like manner it has no scruple in +ascribing the phenomenon of Morality to a creative act of God's, and +makes Ethics, which properly speaking form the chief part of psychology, +anthropology and sociology, a subdivision of theology, that is, of +anthropomorphic mythology. + +Critical Reason, which realizes that deceptive fictions are not true +thought, but dreams--not the result of ripe intellectual effort, but of +the childish play of the imagination, seeks the roots of Morality not in +the air or in the ether, but in the solid earth; not in some +indemonstrable, transcendental sphere, but in an obvious need of human +nature. The biological necessities of the species, which can only +survive by dint of living in communities, sufficiently explain the +origin of the feeling of joint responsibility, of consideration for +one's neighbour, of the concepts Good and Evil and of conscience; and we +have no use for the dogmas of revealed Morality derived from some +fabulous, supernatural source, or for the Kantian categorical +imperative. + +Morality, understood as a form of joint responsibility, determines the +inner and outer relations of the individual to the community; that is to +say, to as much of it as he comes in immediate contact with, to wit, his +neighbour. Morality provides him with the notions of Duty and Right, of +the consideration he owes his neighbour and of that which he may demand +from his neighbour. It is customary to look upon Rights and Duties as +opposites. This is mere indolence of thought. Right and Duty are +supplementary, forming together one concept. They are in reality one and +the same thing regarded from different points of view. My Duty is the +subjective form of my neighbour's Right; my Right the subjective form of +other people's Duty. That which is Duty, when I have to do it out of +consideration for others, becomes my Right, when others have to do it +out of consideration for me. + +Respect for the personality of others, which is the feeling from which +the concept of Right and Duty emanates, seems to be a late and noble +product of Morality and a particularly praiseworthy victory of prescient +intelligence over selfishness. This factor of our consciousness which +determines our will and which gradually becomes an instinct, is really +only a special application of the law of least resistance which governs +all organic life. We have no selfless, ideal respect for the personality +of another; but, made wise by experience and observation, we assume that +that other has the power to resist and to retaliate if a wrong is done +to him or he is injured; hence we avoid, to the best of our ability, +actions to which he is likely to object, so as not to come into conflict +with him, because to overcome his opposition would require effort and +expose us to danger. Respect for the personality of another and for his +rights may be expressed by a mechanical formula which runs as follows: +this respect varies directly as the real or supposed might of the other +person, and inversely as our own real or supposed might. + +The society of which he is a member, and which makes his existence +possible, prescribes to the individual the laws governing his moral +conduct. That which a community at any given time approves and demands, +rejects or forbids, constitutes the precept whereby its members regulate +their conduct, and offers ample security for their conscience. + +The concepts Good and Bad originate simultaneously with society; they +are the form in which its actual conditions of existence are conveyed to +the consciousness of its members. The only immutable thing about them is +the fact of their continued existence. Without the coercive discipline +of a rule conducive to the common weal and governing the mutual +relations between its members, no society could be imagined to exist, +unless its members were all similar in nature, reacted in an identical +fashion to all impressions and possessed the same feelings and +sensations, the same inclinations and the same impulses of volition. In +that case no difference could ever arise between one individual and +another, or between an individual and the community, which would have to +be smoothed over by the moral law emanating from the community and +controlling the individual, or be suppressed by the community's order. +Every individual could be left to the guidance of his own instincts, for +he would know himself always to be in agreement with the community; no +consideration for others need hamper or modify his actions; he could +behave just as if he were alone in the world. But as individuals differ +from one another, feel, think and want different things, collisions in +which they hurt, cripple or even kill one another are the inevitable +consequence of their opposing movements; and the interference of the +moral law is absolutely necessary to polarize these movements and guide +them into parallel courses, so that they do not run counter to one +another. + +But Good and Bad derive not only their existence but their measure and +their significance from the views of the community. They are therefore +not absolute but variable; they are not an immutable standard amid the +ever-changing conditions of humanity, a rule by which the value of the +actions and aims of mortals are indisputably determined, but are subject +to the laws of evolution in society and therefore in a constant state of +flux. At different times and in different places they present the most +varied aspects. What is virtue here and now may have been vice formerly +and at another spot, and _vice versa_. In the royal family of ancient +Egypt marriage between brothers and sisters was the prescribed custom. +We call this incest and it fills us with horror. To the sons of Egypt it +seemed meritorious and constituted a claim to special veneration. The +Babylonians and Canaanites burnt their first-born in Moloch's fiery +furnace, and this sacrifice was accounted a highly praiseworthy act of +piety and of the fear of God. The Spartans taught their sons, their +future warriors, the art of stealing without being caught; and he who +did this most cleverly achieved the most flattering recognition. The +Cherusci butchered the Roman prisoners taken from the legions of Varus +as a sacrifice to their tribal gods, and a noble-minded and brave man +like Arminius considered this absolutely honourable and knightly. The +Aztecs, who had undeniably attained an advanced degree of civilization, +at high festivals used with obsidian knives to cut open the breasts of +human sacrifices on the altars of their gods, and tear the heart out of +their living bodies. That was an action finding favour in the sight of +the gods, and the people watched it with awe and those mystic emotions +which religious rites are intended to arouse. + +Moral law in Europe, during the Middle Ages and almost up to modern +times, permitted, and even ordained, the punishment by horrible torture +and death of those whose religious convictions differed from the +teaching of the established church; and with its consent supposed +witches were sent to the stake. In feudal times the most terrible and +revolting of crimes was felony--that is, a breach of faith on the part +of the vassal against his overlord--and no torture was too cruel as a +punishment. Nobles, who had so delicate a sense of honour that for a wry +look or the accidental touch of an elbow they would draw their swords, +enunciated the principle: "the king's blood does not defile," and vied +with each other in forcing their daughters upon the king as concubines. +Until Wilberforce roused the English conscience at the end of the +eighteenth century, and Schoelcher did the same in France in the middle +of the nineteenth, slavery was considered a state of affairs which a +moral community could tolerate. The North American descendants of those +Puritans whom no persecution and no martyrdom could prevent from leading +a life consonant with the dictates of their conscience, did not scruple +to exercise proprietary rights over human beings who, in the case of +octoroons and even of quadroons, did not even differ from them in +colour, supposing that difference of colour could be considered an +excuse. The code, which began with the "Declaration of Rights," +contained heavy penalties for those who helped a slave to escape. Men, +whose uprightness no one could doubt, did not hesitate to set +bloodhounds on the track of an escaped nigger, and four years of a +bloody civil war were needed before refractory slave-owners were forced +to acknowledge the immorality of forced labour. + +These examples have been taken from the customs of civilized nations. +Amongst races that have not attained the high degree of development to +which the white man has risen, we meet with much more revolting +deviations from the moral law obtaining among white men. Tribes are +known in which the commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother," is +interpreted so, that the children kill and eat their parents as soon as +the latter have attained a considerable age. The North American Indians, +who had a well developed sense of honour, were capable of chivalrous +feelings and kept their word with absolute loyalty, used to torture +helpless prisoners and scalp their defeated enemies, even the women. +Among the Dyaks, who are under Dutch rule and are familiar with the laws +and customs of Christian Europe, a marriageable youth must first cut off +a human being's head before he is allowed to wed. He need not overcome +his victim in honourable combat; he may creep upon him surreptitiously, +and even fall upon him in his sleep and murder him in cowardly fashion +without danger to himself. + +All these are instances which we unhesitatingly condemn. To our idea +they are crimes and misdeeds which among us would make their +perpetrators liable either to contempt and expulsion from decent society +or to the extremest penalties of the law; yet at their time and in their +place they were considered meritorious and virtuous, and were approved +by public opinion and the conscience of their authors. But we can go +farther and subject our own moral law to a similar independent +consideration. We shall find that to us also deeds appear permissible, +virtuous and even splendid, which do not differ essentially from the +thefts of the Spartans or the head-hunting of the Dyaks. A company +promoter who sells on the Stock Exchange shares that he must know to be +worthless, can with Spartan cunning rob thousands of trustful victims of +the fruits of their labour and economy, and reduce them to beggary; and +not only does he go unpunished, but if by his knavery he becomes a +millionaire and uses his wealth cleverly, he can attain the highest +political and social honours and distinctions. We may admit that +financial roguery of this sort can now no longer be classed among +strictly moral actions, that public opinion is on the verge of placing +it in the category of vice and crime, and that legislators are beginning +to make attempts to inflict severe and humiliating penalties on its +perpetrators. + +But another series of deeds is still generally considered so undoubtedly +virtuous and laudable, that it evokes the highest homage from the best +intellects of the age, poets, musicians, scientists, teachers, sculptors +and painters, and the leaders of the people--the deeds of war. The most +horrible butchery of men, the theft of property and liberty, +ill-treatment, destruction are not only permissible but obligatory and +laudable, if they occur in war, and if their authors can point to the +fact that they are acting in the service of their country at the order +of a legitimate authority. Neither the soldiers nor their leaders are +bound to inquire whether the authority, whether their mother country is +waging war for a purpose that moral law can approve. "Right or wrong, my +country." In the eyes of her sons the country is always in the right, +even if it be objectively in the wrong, and by its orders every soldier +murders, robs, burns and ravages, plays the executioner to harmless, +unarmed, innocent strangers, compels prisoners to forced labour, steals +letters that fall into his hands and prevents families who are cruelly +separated from communicating with one another; and his conscience does +not reproach him in the least, nor is he conscious of being a criminal +deserving of all the penalties of the law. Every single one of these +actions, if perpetrated by an individual on his own account and for his +own purposes, would result in the death penalty, and it would be richly +deserved, too. But in war, carried out collectively at the bidding of a +government, they become deeds of heroism, filling the doer with pride, +moving the community to tears of enthusiasm, and they are held up to +youth as shining examples to be imitated. It is more than likely that +future times will judge the esteem in which these deeds are held not +otherwise than we do the value placed by other forms of society on human +sacrifices, the slaughter of parents and head-hunting. + +It is hard to determine the exact part which conscience plays in the +changes undergone by the concepts Good and Evil. As conscience is the +voice of the community in the consciousness of the individual, it +approves on principle what seems right and praiseworthy to the +community. Just as little as conscience prevented a Babylonian mother +from sacrificing her child to Moloch, does it in these days stop the +average citizen from doing a soldier's work of killing and destroying in +time of war. If an individual knows himself to be in complete agreement +with the general opinion, then he lives at peace with his conscience. No +impulse to change the customs, to set up a new Morality, to condemn +long-established usages, is to be expected from such an one. + +The mechanism whereby changes are wrought in views on Good and Evil is +quite different. Everywhere and at all times there are exceptional +persons whose abilities render them specially fit to feel and think +independently. To their idea the community has no determining but only +an advisory voice. They reserve to themselves the right of decision in +every case. In their consciousness there persists a clear recognition of +the fact that the essence of Morality lies in consideration for others, +and when the current acceptation of the moral law among the majority +allows them, nay, commands them to disregard this consideration, they +experience a feeling of discomfort which dull, unthinking imitation of +the general example does not soothe. They meditate upon the deviation +from the fundamental rule of considering one's neighbour, they test its +justification, and they condemn it, if its difference with the general +moral law cannot be adjusted. If the essence of Morality is +consideration for one's neighbour, its purpose is the well-being of the +community; its essence must be adapted to this purpose, that is to say, +consideration for one's neighbour must be subordinated to the general +welfare. The thief, the robber and the murderer have no claim upon +consideration, and even a man with the most delicate sense of Morality +will agree that coercion of the criminal is desirable. Tolstoy's +warning: "Do not oppose the evildoer," is not Morality, but an +exaggerated parody of it, which renders it nugatory. Thus the most moral +person will not raise any objection to a war waged in defence of hearth +and home when their safety is threatened by a ruthless attack. + +But, if a mode of action which, though it be generally practised and +approved, injures the individual and causes him to suffer, cannot be +justified on the grounds of an obvious benefit to the community, then a +small, sometimes an almost infinitesimal minority of independent +thinkers will rise against the custom; they are not afraid of coming +into violent conflict with generally accepted views; they defend the +fundamental principle of Morality, namely, consideration for the +individual, against the exception, namely, oppression of the individual +for the ostensible good of the community; they brand as immoral what is +generally accounted moral; they announce that the current acceptation of +the goodness or badness of a certain order of actions must cease. + +The intervention of such reformers always gives offence, and arouses +anger which at times rises to murderous fury. But this wrathful +indignation is just what makes a break in the automatic fashion in which +the majority of average men act according to traditional custom; the +attention of more and more minds is arrested, critically they examine +the accepted moral law, they are penetrated first by the suspicion and +finally by the clear conviction that it is contrary to the essence of +Morality, and they swell the ranks of the innovators who inveigh against +the tradition. The struggle lasts long and is carried on pitilessly. The +preachers of the new Morality seem corrupt and criminal to the +supporters of the old. They are persecuted and slandered and not seldom +have to suffer martyrdom, but they always emerge victorious if their +doctrine is in agreement with the logic of the fundamental principles of +Moral law. That is the history of the abolition of human sacrifices, of +the vendetta, of slavery, of legal torture, of religious coercion. + +Whoever looks about him with open eyes will note that civilized men are +at the moment adopting new ideas with regard to the operation of state +omnipotence, to war, to the right of the economically strong to exploit +others, to the rights of women, to sexual morality, to the penal system. +The advocates of a new Morality must still put up with the most +humiliating abuse. He who wishes to defend the individual from coercion +by the state is an anarchist and deserves to be hanged or broken on the +wheel. He who maintains that war is immoral belongs to the rabble of +vagabonds who own no nationality, for whom no contempt is too deep and +no punishment too severe. He who refuses a duel is a dishonoured coward, +and thereby cuts himself off from decent society. He who recognizes +woman's right to motherhood is a dastardly purveyor of opportunities for +prostitution. He who attacks the present relation between Capital and +Labour as a hypocritical continuation of slavery is an ignorant agitator +or an enemy of society. He who would like to see the idea of punishment +excluded from the law, as being retrograde and unscientific, and who +wishes only the point of view of the defence of society to be recognized +as valid, talks sentimental nonsense, disarms justice and places the +community at large at the mercy of criminals. + +But the issue of the struggle is not in doubt. The present systems, +which present exceptions to the moral law of consideration for one's +neighbour, must go. Although they are considered moral to-day, are, in +fact, Morality itself, to-morrow they will be felt to be immoral and be +abhorred by all men of moral feelings. Thus the concepts Good and Bad +gradually change their meaning; views on what is moral and what immoral +are constantly in a state of flux; and the only permanent thing is +recognition of the fact that man's actions must be withdrawn from the +control of subjective choice and whim, and must be subject to a law set +up by the community; the justification of this law lies in its being +necessary to the existence of society. Every revision of Moral values +originates in some vexation, and ends by refining and deepening moral +sentiment. In this chapter only the scheme of development of moral views +and of their changes has been indicated. The question of moral progress +will be dealt with fully later on. + +To sum up the arguments of this section, Morality is not transcendental +but immanent; it is a social phenomenon and restricted to the sphere of +living beings. Its beginnings may be traced in animal societies, it is +developed among mankind. The preliminary condition necessary for this +development is the ability to visualize future happenings, since moral +conduct is determined by estimating its effects and results, that is, by +conceiving something in the future. Morality has a positive, concrete +aim. It makes the existence of society possible, and this, given the +circumstances obtaining on our planet, is the necessary condition for +the preservation of each individual, and it originated from the instinct +of self-preservation in the species. Its essence lies in consideration +for one's neighbour, because without this the communal life of +individuals, that is, a society, would be impossible. + +If individuals had been able to live alone, Morality could never have +come into existence. The concepts Good and Bad characterize those +actions which society feels to be beneficial or harmful to itself. As +moral conduct implies consideration for one's neighbour, it is often, if +not always, in conflict with selfishness, that is, with the immediate +and instinctive impulses, and is, in the first place, accompanied by +disagreeable sensations. The pleasurable emotion of satisfaction arises +later through habit and reflection; it accompanies the thought of the +merit and praiseworthiness of the victory over self. Conscience is the +voice of the community in the individual's consciousness. The idea of +Duty is the subjective conception of the Rights of our neighbour; the +idea of Rights is the subjective conception of our neighbour's Duty to +us. Morality is not absolute, but relative, and is subject to continual +changes. To maintain that Morality is cosmic, eternal, immutable, that +it aims neither at profit nor pleasure, but constitutes its own aim, is +pure anthropomorphic superstition. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY + + +Morality is a restraint which the community imposes on each of its +members. It demands from the individual the sacrifice of his transitory +and momentary comfort in favour of his general welfare which is +dependent on that of the community. It prohibits the pleasure of +gratifying his desires in order that by this unpleasant renunciation his +lasting well-being may be ensured. Subjectively experienced and viewed, +therefore, Morality always implies the limitation of free will, the +curbing of desire, opposition to inclinations and appetites, and the +diminution or suppression of free, or let us rather say of unbridled, +action. Before Morality can profit the community, it disturbs and +incommodes the individual, it rouses in him disagreeable sensations +which may reach such a pitch as to be intense pain. It is only after +deep reflection, of which not everyone is capable, that the individual +realizes that Morality is an essential condition of the life of society, +and that the preservation of society is an essential condition of his +own life; before he investigates, before he even meditates on Morality, +the individual feels it directly to be unpleasant, laborious, +stern--nay, hostile. + +The control which Morality exercises over the actions, and indeed in +many cases over the most secret thoughts of the individual, appears at +the first glance to be somewhat paradoxical. It is by no means obvious +why the individual should always take sides against himself and, +adopting a defensive and disapproving attitude, hold his instinctive +tendencies in check. Moral conduct would be intelligible if the +community were always ready with means of coercion and could constrain +the individual by brute force to place its interest before his own +pleasure. But the individual does not wait for police intervention on +the part of the community. He frowns upon himself with the awful +severity of the law. He threatens himself with a cudgel. He divides +himself into two beings, one of which wants to follow its instincts, +while the other curbs them vigorously; one is a rearing, often a +refractory, horse, the other a rider with bridle, whip and spur. + +This reduplication of the ego, one-half of which establishes control +over the other, one-half of which tries to remain true to itself, while +the other divests itself of its identity and denies itself--this is the +inner process, the outward manifestation of which is moral conduct. This +demands investigation and explanation. We must show how the organism +could develop from within itself the power to paralyse, or completely +repress, its own elemental activities, and how Morality was able to +become an integral part in the general scheme of life processes. + +The mechanism whereby the mind, appraising, foreseeing and judging, +checks the first movement of impulse, is inhibition or repression. +Without inhibition moral conduct would not be possible. The mind would +have no method of indicating the path and prescribing rules to the +organism's instinct. It would have no means of making its insight +prevail over the desires of the senses. It would have no weapon with +which to force its being to actions opposed to its organic inclinations. +Without inhibition the individual would never give precedence to the +demands of the community and lay himself open to disagreeable emotions +in order to please the community. Inhibition was the necessary organic +preliminary to the phenomenon of Morality. It had to be pre-existent in +the individual, so that Morality could make itself at home in his +intellectual life, so that it could acquire creative, ruling and +practical power among the elect, and become an unconscious and easy +habit among the average. Morality took possession of a pre-existent +organic aptitude and made it serve its own purposes. But organic +aptitudes are not alike in all individuals. In some cases they are more +or less perfect; in others they may be lacking altogether. Indeed only +individuals with highly developed powers of inhibition are capable of +that heroic Morality which liberates them from the weakness of the flesh +and makes them independent of the demands of the body; those in whom +this power of inhibition is scantily developed evade the influence of +Morality entirely, and it has no authority over them. + +That which is called character is at bottom the name we give to the +power of inhibition. Where it is weak we speak of lack of character, +whereas by strength of character we mean that the power of inhibition is +great. The will makes use of inhibition. With its help the will guides +the living machine in a certain direction and urges it to perform given +tasks. At the first glance it may not seem obvious that positive actions +can come of repression, which is something negative. But if we analyse +psychologically the actions demanded and promoted by the will, and trace +them back to their organic origins, we shall find that, as a rule, the +first elements consist in the prevention of impulsive movements, and +that the impetus to positive effort is given by the will, which converts +these movements into contrary ones. A few instances may make this +psychic process clearer. Winkelried, at Sempach, cleaves a path through +the cuirassiers while they bury their lances in his breast; he becomes +capable of this great deed of self-sacrifice in that, by a mighty effort +of will power, he suppresses the strongest of all instincts, that of +self-preservation, and forces all his energies, which are naturally +directed towards flight from danger, to challenge danger and yield +completely to it. The lover who overcomes his passion and renounces its +object, because his idol is the bride of his best friend, begins with +the determined inhibition of the impulse which urges him towards the +woman, and attains renunciation by the suppression of his desire; this +renunciation finds expression in positive actions, in the rupture of +relations which bring him happiness, the avoidance of meetings which +would prevent the wound in his heart from healing, and so on. The brave +rescuer who plunges into the waves to save a drowning man, or enters a +burning house to save a fellow creature threatened by the flames, must +first overcome his natural shrinking fear of the water and the fire; and +not till after the suppression of strong impulses to avoid the uncanny +adventure, does he succeed in making his muscles obey the impulse to +save life. + +Inhibition, therefore, is the organic foundation on which Morality +builds, not only that Morality which consists in abstention from certain +actions, but that which is manifested in active virtue. But inhibition +is a faculty which the organism has developed for its own ends, the +better and more easily to preserve its own life, and to render its power +of achievement greater. Morality makes use of this faculty, which it +finds ready to hand, for the ends of the community, and very often +against the immediate interests of the individual for whose advantage it +is nevertheless intended. Now the individual would not put up with this +inexpedient use, one is tempted to say this clever misuse, of one of its +organic capacities, if this yielding up of the mechanism of inhibition +to Morality were not beneficial to life and therefore came within the +sphere of the biological purpose of inhibition. By being grafted on a +pre-existent organic faculty Morality becomes such itself; it forms a +link in the chain of biological processes within the individual +organism; it ceases to be purely a product of society forced upon the +individual to his molestation and in spite of his annoyance; it acquires +the character of a differentiation of inhibition in order to help the +individual, or even to make it at all possible for him to adapt himself +to life in a society. + +That under the present conditions obtaining on our planet the human +individual can only live in society demands no proof. And as he can only +live in society if he submits to its rules of good and bad, Morality, +which urges him to this submission, aids and even preserves his life. We +shall now show that inhibition, of which Morality is a differentiation +making it easier for the individual to adapt himself to the conditions +of social life, is of the greatest value to the individual from the +biological point of view. + +The lowest forms of life it is possible for us to observe show nothing +which can be interpreted as inhibition. All external influences to which +they are not indifferent invariably produce the same effects. They +respond to every stimulus with a reflex action which reveals nothing +that we should be justified in describing as an activity of the will. +The reaction follows with strictly automatic regularity upon the +stimulus, and nothing intervenes between the two which would permit the +conclusion that in the simple organism there is any faculty that could +delay, modify or change the reaction to the external stimulus. + +Just as iron filings always respond to the attraction of a magnet in the +same way, just as certain combinations of mercury at the impact of a +blow flare up with an explosion, just as ice when warmed melts and +becomes water, and water when cooled to a definite point freezes into +ice, so do the simplest living things seek out certain rays in the +spectrum, certain temperatures, certain chemical conditions and avoid +others. Not only unicellular organisms do this, but also comparatively +highly developed animals, such as the daphniae, for if light is sent +through a prism into a vessel containing water, these little creatures +collect at the violet end of the spectrum; such as the wood-lice, which +hate the light and creep into dark crevices; such as gnats, which are +attracted by the sun and dance in their hundreds in its rays. Moreover, +we meet with a similar phenomenon in man. We, too, in winter and spring +seek the sun and in summer the shade; in the cold season the warm stove +attracts us; bad smells put us to flight, sweet scents of flowers allure +us. The simplest automatic reflex actions are at the root of these +attractions and repulsions, exactly the same as with the daphniae, +wood-lice and gnats. Only we are able to control and suppress these +reflex actions which the lower animals apparently cannot. + +Anthropomorphic modes of thought easily mislead us into thinking that +the processes we observe in lower animals are due to an exercise of will +power. We draw near to the fire in winter because it is pleasant, but we +can quit it if duty calls us into the cold streets. One is apt to +imagine that the simple organisms also experience pleasant and +unpleasant feelings, that they try and avoid the latter, that the +daphnia seeks the violet rays because it likes them, that the wood-louse +flees the light because it dislikes it; in fact, that these creatures +possess a consciousness which becomes aware of and distinguishes between +pleasing and displeasing impressions, and that they possess a will which +responds to these impressions with suitable reactions. Very +distinguished scientists have been unable to resist the temptation to +assume in the lower animals, even in unicellular organisms, the +existence of processes with which we are familiar in the human +consciousness. William Roux introduces us to a "psychology of protista," +and W. Kleinsorge goes so far as to maintain the existence of "cellular +ethics," and to devote himself to research into its laws. The work of +both these biologists is as fascinating as the most beautiful +fairy-tale, but it is probably the creation of a lively and fertile +imagination, just as the fairy story is. + +More prosaic and less imaginative scientists do not see evidences of +psychology in the signs of life in the protista, or ethics in the +movements of a cell, but merely the effects of universal chemical and +physical laws which also control lifeless inorganic matter. To these +laws they trace the tropisms of simple organisms which tempt the +imagination, prone as it is to anthropomorphism, into errors; such +tropisms, that is to say, as their tendency to seek moderate warmth, +certain rays of light and weak alkaline solutions, or to avoid acids, +heat and ultra-violet rays. The little organisms probably do not obey +these impulses for reasons of pleasure or pain any more than the iron +filings obey the attraction of a magnet for such reasons. They do not +fly to it because it gives them pleasure; the little metal leaves of an +electroscope do not move apart because contact with each other +displeases them. All forms of tropism, chemicotropic, thermotropic, +phototropic manifestations, active and passive tropisms clearly show +that minute organisms involuntarily and unresistingly respond to the +influence of natural forces, just as if they were inanimate particles. + +Microscopic investigations reveal many phenomena which one is tempted to +consider signs of life, but which cannot be such, as they occur in +connexion with inanimate matter. The Brownian movements are rhythmical +molecular changes of position, not due to any mechanical impulse +emanating from the surroundings, nor to a current in the fluid in which +the object of investigation is immersed, but arising from the object +itself, mostly very finely divided, tiny balls of mercury. A very small +drop of chloroform introduced into a fluid of different density behaves +exactly like a unicellular organism. It sends out pseudopods, wriggles +and draws them in again. The pseudopods seem to feel and examine +particles of matter with which they come in contact, and then either to +withdraw quickly from them or to surround and incorporate them in the +drop. This is deceptively similar to the behaviour of a living cell +absorbing food, though there can be no question of this in the case of +the drop of chloroform. In the latter it is merely a question of the +effects of surface tension, that is, of the normal behaviour of matter +in accordance with the laws governing the forces of nature, the +investigation of which lies in the domain of chemistry and physics. + +Impartial thought comes to a conclusion about these phenomena different +from that derived from anthropomorphic delusions. It does not try to +smuggle dim, dark life into the collections of mercury molecules +apparently obeying some inner impulse, or into the seeking or feeling +about of a pseudopod of chloroform. On the contrary, it understands life +as the play of natural forces under the conditions supplied by a living +organism, as the automatic working of a machine-like apparatus to which +natural forces supply the motive power. Similar manifestations in +inanimate matter and in elementary organisms seem to justify the +conclusion that the distinction between living and non-living matter is +arbitrary, that there are only forces, or perhaps one single force, that +is to say, one movement, in the universe, whose activity is manifested +in the most manifold forms, of which life is one. Modern Monism has come +to this conclusion, but it is not alone in so doing. Long before Monism +there was a philosophy which conceived all cosmic energies to form a +unity; and really it is only an obstinate quarrel about words, for the +Hylozoists regard the universe as something living and ascribe life to +all matter and all atoms of which matter is made up, while the +Materialists regard life as a play of forces in matter. Fundamentally +the Hylozoists and Materialists hold the same views, only that the +former call force life and the latter call life force; just as the only +point of difference between them and the Pantheists is that these have +given the majestic title of God to the universal life they assume--as +Spinoza has it, "_Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt_." + +The question, what is life? is the greatest that the human understanding +can ask of itself. For thousands of years man has cudgelled his brain +over this, and is as far from finding an answer to-day as he was on the +first day. The definition most often repeated runs thus: Life is the +ability possessed by certain bodies to react to stimuli, to absorb +nourishment and to reproduce themselves. That is a statement of observed +facts, but it is no explanation. It informs us that we are familiar with +bodies which behave in a way distinguishing them from other bodies; but +why they conduct themselves differently from others, what the particular +thing is which is present in certain combinations of matter and absent +in others--that is an impenetrable secret. + +Science has tried by the most varied methods to solve the problem. It +seemed a triumph of research that Woehler produced urea, that chemists +later on manufactured carbohydrates, that Fischer is on the high road to +the production of synthetic albumen. What is gained by these +discoveries? We bring about the same combinations as the living cell +does. That is, no doubt, an interesting achievement, but its value as an +addition to our knowledge on this point is infinitesimal. For we +accomplish the production of sugar, urea and amine in a manner very +different to that of the living cell, and he who copies the things +turned out in a workshop has contributed nothing to our knowledge of the +workman who plies his trade in the workshop. The dividing line between +life and lifelessness was supposed to have been obliterated when +elementary manifestations of life were proved to exist in inanimate +matter; the Brownian movements in the smallest particles; the growth of +crystals immersed in a solution of the same chemical composition as +themselves; crystallization itself which represents a kind of very +simple organization of matter, and at any rate proves the sway of a +regulating and directive force; the tendency of certain elements to +combine, which has been called their affinity. But this name is only a +poetical metaphor which no one will take literally. The growth of +crystals in their mother liquor is merely mechanical precipitation on +their surface, an external addition of layers of the same material; but +not growth by the incorporation of such matter, that is, through the +absorption of nourishment. + +These and similar results of observation do not suffice absolutely to +justify the assumption, seductive though it be, that life is a +fundamental attribute of matter, that it is present everywhere though +graduated in intensity, that therefore apparently inanimate matter +differs not qualitatively, but only quantitatively from living beings, +that life stretches in an unbroken line from the block of metal or rock, +in which it is completely obscured, to man, the most highly developed +organism we know of; and that at a certain point in its range it reveals +itself in a form which permits no distinction between organic and +inorganic matter. + +The origin of life is as completely unknown to us as its essence. For +thousands of years the assumption was lightheartedly made that under +certain, somewhat vague circumstances, life originated of its own +accord. Pasteur showed that a _generatio spontanea_ cannot be proved to +exist, that every living thing comes from another living thing, a parent +organism, and that the old philosophers were right in propounding +"_omne vivum ex ovo_" as a law, although they only guessed it and had +not proved it experimentally. A very few critics, who are hard to +convince, still dare to assert in a small voice that Pasteur's work and +all the facts established by microbiology do not prove conclusively that +life does not nevertheless originate from inorganic matter under +conditions which we cannot nowadays reproduce in our laboratories. No +answer can be made to this objection. An experiment is only conclusive +for the conditions in which it is made, and not for others. All that we +can positively assert is that on earth the genesis of life without a +demonstrable parent organism has never been observed. To go farther, and +to assert that a _generatio spontanea_ is absolutely impossible under +any conditions, on earth or elsewhere, is arbitrary, just as it is to +assert the contrary. + +Those who are supporters of the theory that life can be developed from +non-living matter for a long time thought they had conclusively proved +their case; they argued as follows: At the present time life exists on +our planet; according to the Kant-Laplace hypothesis our planet was +formed from a cosmic nebula and passed through a state of fluid +incandescence; in this state life is impossible; therefore life must +have originated spontaneously one day after the Earth had cooled down; +consequently either the Kant-Laplace hypothesis is wrong or the +assertion that life can only be generated by life is erroneous; the two +assumptions are incompatible. This conclusion no longer presents any +insuperable difficulties. It has been observed that spores which have +been kept for months at the temperature of frozen hydrogen, that is, +very nearly at absolute zero, have retained their germinative power and +have developed when they were brought back to a favourable temperature. +Therefore they would not be killed by the cold of interstellar space on +their way from one heavenly body to another, and could become the seeds +of life on another hitherto inanimate star. That large numbers of tiny +particles of matter exist in interstellar space and are precipitated on +the heavenly bodies is proved by the cosmic dust that arctic explorers +have collected from the surface of snow and ice. Therefore the Earth may +well have been in an incandescent state, and may yet have received from +interstellar space the germs of life which developed and multiplied when +the Earth's crust had cooled sufficiently to provide the conditions +favourable to their existence; and these germs may have been the +ancestors of all the life that exists on earth to-day after a period of +evolution lasting hundreds of millions of years. + +This would account for the origin of life upon the Earth, but not of +life in general. The germs, which travel as carriers of life from an +older heavenly body to a younger one, must have sprung from parents, and +however far back we trace their genealogical tree we are always finally +faced by this dilemma: either life did, after all, originate at one time +from something lifeless, and what has happened once must be able to +happen again, now and always; or life never originated at all, but has +always existed; it is eternal like matter, in forms whose variety we +cannot even dimly grasp, its threads, having neither beginning nor end, +wind through eternity. Of these two assumptions the latter is +incomparably more in harmony with our present-day views on the universe. +We believe the matter of which the universe is built up to be +everlasting. It costs no great effort to believe life to be eternal too. +True, the idea of eternity is inconceivable to us; it is a dim +conception which has given rise to a word, a tone picture which portrays +something indefinite, but within the bounds of the inconceivable there +is room for both semi-obscurities, the everlastingness of matter and the +everlastingness of life. + +But the most enigmatical point in the riddle of life is not life itself, +which is a form of being, and is neither more nor less comprehensible +than the existence of an inanimate object, of a stone, of water, of the +air; it is consciousness. Descartes proves his own existence to himself +by the fact that he thinks. Life must be accompanied by consciousness in +order to convince the living being that it exists. The formula: "_cogito +ergo sum_" has been admired for hundreds of years. It certainly is +specious. But how many questions it leaves unanswered! Has it the right +to deny life to an entity that does not conceive itself? Must it not be +completed by the proof that life without thought, that is, without +consciousness, does not exist, that consciousness is the necessary +complement of life? And, above all, ought not Descartes to have given us +an explanation of what thought and consciousness are? + +I will attempt to answer the questions left unanswered by Descartes. But +I must premise one thing. Every definition of consciousness implies a +postulate: life. Though at a pinch we can picture life without +consciousness, consciousness without life is absolutely inconceivable. I +do not undertake to explain what life is, any more than I attempted it +above. We must take it as something given. Consciousness, then, is the +subjective realization of something objective, the inward realization of +something outside. If in a living being a picture of its surroundings is +developed, then it absorbs something which is not a necessary part of +itself. Of course, this inner image must not be understood to imply an +absorption of matter. It is a process in the matter of which the living +being is built up. But, all the same, the image of the outer world in +the inner being does signify a penetration of the latter by the former. +This image, which follows the changes of the outer world and repeats +them in the inner being, is consciousness. It may be shadowy and +blurred, or clear and distinct; it may in rapid succession be formed and +pass away, and it can be preserved as a memory; it may reflect a greater +or a lesser portion of the outer world; consciousness is accordingly +duller or sharper; its contents are scant or plentiful, it retains the +images of a shorter or longer series of conditions in the surrounding +world. Between nutrition, which is recognized as an essential phenomenon +of life, and consciousness a surprising parallelism subsists. Both +consist in an absorption of the outer world by the organism; nutrition +is the assimilation of matter, consciousness that of stimuli. In the +process of nutrition the organism digests small quantities of the +outside world; in consciousness it digests the world as a whole. + +This parallelism is no mere play of the intellect. If it is followed out +it leads to significant ideas if not to actual knowledge. What +penetrates from the outer world into the inner being of the organism is +vibration, movement, force. Is the matter which is absorbed as +nourishment ultimately anything different? Here we come up against the +ultimate problems of physics, the various hypotheses regarding the +nature of force and matter, the theories that in addition to matter +there is an ether, or that the ether is a different, more subtle, form +of matter, or that neither matter nor ether exist, but atoms out of +which everything is built up, which themselves consist of electrons +which are centres of force, motions without material consistency. All +these theories, of which the last cannot be grasped by the human +understanding, we can leave severely alone. This is not the place to +investigate them. But the attitude of the living organism towards the +outer world from which it absorbs nourishment and impressions, +converting them into power to drive the life machine and transmuting +them into consciousness, lends peculiar support to the supposition that +force and matter are not only inseparable but identical, that in them we +must seek a principle, or perhaps regard them themselves as a principle, +which must be of the same nature as consciousness, for otherwise it +could not be transmuted into the latter. + +The senses are the means by which the outer world penetrates as an image +into the inner being. Before the senses are differentiated the living +organism possesses a general sensitiveness; that is to say, that under +the influence of the outer world its cell protoplasm undergoes a process +of regrouping, resulting in chemical and dynamic changes. The chemical +results of stimulus are anabolism and katabolism, a building up and +breaking down of the cell content; the dynamic results are movements +which in the lowest forms of life are purely mechanical, but in the +higher forms adapt the organism to the external influence in so far as +they place it either so as to be affected by the latter as long and as +powerfully as possible, or else so as to evade it. The living organism +can experience no stimulus and respond to it without absorbing and +transmuting it, converting it into a chemical process or a movement. +This inner process is a subjective realization of something objective, a +penetration by the outer world, therefore an elementary consciousness. +In proportion as the general sensitiveness becomes differentiated into +specific ones, as the image of the outer world filters through the +different coloured glass panes of the various senses into the inner +being of the organism, this image becomes multicoloured and varied. + +It lies in the nature of this mechanism that the subjective image is not +identical with the objective original, but is modified and even +distorted by the panes through which it penetrates to the inner being of +the organism. What the subject perceives is never anything but a symbol +of the object, never the object itself; but this symbol suffices to +enable the consciousness to form an idea of the object, just as letters +enable the reader to take in words and thoughts. We must conceive the +development of consciousness to go hand in hand with that of the senses. +The more windows the organism can open to the outer world the more +easily and the more clearly does its image penetrate. The number of +objects which the subject can take in is the measure of the perfection +of its consciousness. The protista, lacking specific sense organs and +possessing only the general sensitiveness of protoplasm, can form only +to a very limited extent and with very little variety an inner +realization of the stimuli of the outer world. Its consciousness is +necessarily very restricted and exceedingly dim. Consciousness is +enlarged and grows clearer as the organism develops and its general +sensitiveness is differentiated into specific senses, until we reach the +level of man whose consciousness embraces far more of the outer world +than does that of any other living creature; because, lacking new +senses, he has succeeded in amplifying and enlarging those he possesses, +and has by artificial means made himself capable of perceiving stimuli +to which he is not directly susceptible and which therefore would have +remained unknown to him; to a certain extent he has translated them into +a form which his senses can perceive. + +I do not overlook any of the difficulties which my attempt to explain +consciousness leaves untouched. On all sides the most urgent and +disquieting questions arise. Above all, the fundamental question, the +most enigmatic of all: how is an external stimulus, that is a movement, +a vibration, converted into a sensation, a perception? Further: must we +in the consciousness distinguish between the frame and its contents, +the conceptual mechanism and the concept? Or do the two coincide? Is +there no consciousness without a conceptual content? And is it the +movement entering into the organism, the inner realization of the outer +world which, transmuting itself in an incomprehensible manner into a +concept, creates consciousness, becomes consciousness? Is the +consciousness of the man standing upon the highest plane of +intellectuality the greatest consciousness possible? Does there exist +anywhere in the universe a more abundant, perhaps an infinitely more +abundant consciousness than that of human beings on the Earth, and will +the latter ever rise to this height? It is obvious that a development is +in progress. There was a time when the most comprehensive, the clearest +consciousness on earth was that of the trilobite or the cephalopod. +Evolution has gone as far as man. Does it stop at that or will it +continue? + +According to Herbert Spencer evolution is progress from the simple to +the complicated. Let us accept this definition. Have we the right to set +up a scale of values and place the complicated above the simple? Is the +latter not the more perfect because it has more power of resistance, +greater durability, and can hold its own triumphantly against all +destructive influences? Is not evolution, then, a retrogression from the +perfect, because simple, to the more complicated, and therefore more +fragile, more easily upset and less capable of resistance to harm? Is it +not sheer egocentrism if we appraise the value of living beings +according to their greater or less resemblance to ourselves, and judge +them to be less or more worthy in proportion to their disparity with us? +Are the fish which, living in the sea wherein we cannot exist, can +inhabit the greater part of the globe, are wild duck which fly, swim and +walk, not more perfect than we, who have had to conquer the air and the +water by artificial means? Is not the mouse's hearing sharper than ours? +The eagle's sight keener? The dog's scent incomparably more delicate? +Has not the carrier pigeon an infinitely better sense of locality than +we have? Are not many beasts physically stronger, more nimble and agile +than man? His only claim to superiority rests on the greater perfection +of his consciousness. Why do not all living creatures participate +equally in the evolution to which this superiority is due? Why does it +not take place in every organism and lead the unicellular living being +in an unbroken ascent to the level of Goethe or Napoleon, or to a still +more lofty one, if such an one exist anywhere in the universe? + +If one could believe in a Ruling Power and the plan of the universe as +its work, would it not be terribly cruel and revoltingly unjust that +this power, instead of treating all living beings alike, should make a +kind of selection of grace and lead some up to a higher level while it +condemned others to lasting lowliness, and that it should ordain that on +the road from the unicellular organism to man, countless connecting +links should be left hopelessly behind and not be permitted to continue +their ascent? Or must we admit the humiliating conclusion that a greater +amount of consciousness does not necessarily imply higher rank and +greater dignity, and that a protista, with its almost unimaginably pale +and narrow consciousness, can have just as great a feeling of well-being +as man with his immeasurably superior intellectual life; that therefore +the protista suffers no wrong if it never gets beyond its present stage +of evolution; and finally that the amount of the outer world which man +can absorb in his consciousness is as far removed from the entirety of +the universe as the contents of the protista's consciousness are from +that of the human mind? No answer can be found to these questions. +Whatever purports to be an answer, be it introduced as theology or as +philosophy, is visionary or nonsensical. We must resign ourselves to +moving in a very small circle moderately illuminated by Reason, while +all around, if we seek to penetrate beyond it, we perceive gruesome +darkness. + +Evolution, that is a progress from the comparatively simple to the more +complicated, is a striking fact--I say comparatively simple advisedly, +for even in the unicellular organism the processes are far removed from +the absolutely simple. We do not know from what part of the organism the +impulse to evolution comes. Here we meet with the same mystery which +shrouds growth, its duration, its measure and its bounds. As the +conception is lacking, a word has been found, viz., entelechy, which +Driesch introduced into biology, the co-operation of all parts of the +organism for the purpose not only of preserving it but also of making it +more efficient in the matter of self-preservation and more perfect. A +critical investigation of entelechy would involve the broaching of the +whole question of life. It does not come within the scope of this work. +I shall therefore content myself with a very few remarks. Entelechy +works as if it were reasonable and acted with a set purpose. If you +think it out exhaustively it forces you to the assumption that life is +an intellectual principle, even in the protoplasm of the cell, long +before there is any perceptible trace of consciousness; that this +intellectual principle makes use of matter, builds it up, organizes it, +moulds it into material and tools for construction, and sets up a +mechanism in which and by which it develops itself. As far as we can see +the purpose of life is life itself. Entelechy directs all the work of +the organism in such a way that it becomes more and more capable of +self-preservation, that its efficiency becomes greater, that it can +absorb more of the outer world and can react more vigorously upon the +outer world. In other words, life strives continuously to make its +embodiments more permanent, securer, richer and more manifold. + +However, if we do not know how the impulse to evolution originates, we +can at least form an idea of the mechanism of evolution. Fundamentally +life consists in the absorption of cosmic movements or vibrations, and +their transformation into another form of movement. The living cell is a +machine which makes use of cosmic energy for physio-chemical work. +Metabolism, warmth, electric manifestations, movement, and as their +concomitant a graduated consciousness, are the result of this work which +is carried out by cosmic energy in the cell power machine. + +To start with, this machine works in the very simplest fashion. It uses +up its motive power as fast as it acquires it. Energy flows in and +immediately flows out again in another form. The organism is like a pipe +or a vessel without a bottom, so that its contents cannot be stored. The +lower organisms which obey tropisms are such bottomless vessels. They +are continually and inevitably subjected to the same attractions and +repulsions and have no means to withstand them. But at a certain stage +of evolution--how? why? Driesch replies: Entelechy!--a new part is +developed in the machine, something like the cam on a cogwheel which +forces it to come to rest. Or, to keep to the earlier simile, the +bottomless vessel acquires a bottom with a tap that can be opened and +closed. With this arrangement the organism is able to store the energy +it has received and then to make use of it according to its needs, to do +much more or much less work with it, to achieve much greater or much +smaller effects, than it would be capable of doing with the amount of +energy it receives from outside in a given unit of time. It is obvious +how much more efficient the organism becomes if it can store up energy +and can adapt to its needs the amount used up. This new part of the +machine is Inhibition. + +It appears early, and takes part in the general development of the +organism; it is indeed the strongest factor in this development. Before +Inhibition intervenes the organism has only one response to stimulus: +reflex action. This is of the character of an electric discharge. It may +be stronger or weaker, but is uniform in kind. It varies quantitatively +but not qualitatively. In the lower organisms it is a contraction of the +cell protoplasm, a movement. In the higher organisms, in which the life +processes are carried out on the principle of the division of labour and +which have developed various organs for this purpose, each organ +performs the action of its specific function; the muscle contracts, the +nerve sends out a nervous impulse, the gland forms a secretion, and so +on. All reflex actions have this in common, that they serve no other +purpose than that of relaxing tension in the organism. They do not imply +any co-ordinated effort to promote the comfort and the welfare of the +living being. They cannot fulfil any complicated task. They exhaust the +organism which, after a series of reflex actions, becomes insensitive to +stimuli and must rest for a time before it can react again. + +Beginning from that stage of evolution where inhibition intervenes, +reflex action loses the character of an automatic response to impulse +and becomes disciplined. Inhibition tries to suppress reflex action. Its +success is more or less complete according to the sensitiveness and life +energy of the tissue receiving the stimulus and the degree to which the +mechanism of inhibition is developed. The organism retains its tension, +remains charged with energy, and is able to carry out work for definite +purposes. In place of anarchistic reflex action which occurs regardless +of the needs of the organism, we find economy of energy, co-ordination +of effort, movement directed to a profitable end. It is only inhibition +which can raise the organism from its state of passivity, its helpless +dependence upon tropism, to a being in which a will is beginning to +dawn and which by its will becomes self-determinative. Inhibition is a +function of the will; it is the will's tool. Even Plato dimly perceived +this, and he expresses it in the metaphorical language peculiar to +himself, when, in the "Republic," he compares a human being to a +creature made up of three animals: a hundred-headed sea-serpent which +must at one and the same time be fed and tamed, a blind lion, and a man +who tames the serpent by means of the lion. These three animals are +desire ([Greek: epithumia]), courage ([Greek: thumos]), and mind +([Greek: nous]). We say in biological language, reflex action, +inhibition, and will or volitional reason. + +All the concepts that are referred to here: purpose, co-ordination, +inhibition and will, are every one of them dependent upon one +fundamental concept, consciousness. Without it they are unthinkable. +Schopenhauer's unconscious will is a word without meaning. I have +postulated consciousness as the inseparable concomitant of life. It is +probably the essence of life. In its lowest stage it is too dim, its +contents too meagre and blurred, properly to distinguish the organism in +which it dwells from the world around. In a higher state of development, +when it gradually grows clearer and begins to be filled with more +sharply defined ideas, it learns to keep its organism and the +surrounding world apart, and tries to make the attitude of the former to +the latter one of self-defence, self-preservation and self-development. +From this stage of development onward, concepts begin to connect and +group themselves in such a way that consciousness contains not only an +image of the immediate present, but also memories of the past and a +forecast of the future. The ability to prolong the present into the +future, to understand the actual as a cause of the effects that follow +and to foresee these effects, that is the starting point of logic and +reason. It is the necessary antecedent of the will, which would have no +meaning if it were not the effort to realize a conception of actions and +their consequences, previously worked out by consciousness. Will is a +function of consciousness which, in pursuance of the well-known +biological law, creates an instrument for its purposes, and this +instrument is inhibition. The higher an organism stands on the ladder of +evolution the more energetically and surely does inhibition work, the +nicer and the more masterly does its intervention in the original reflex +actions grow. + +Thanks to the piling up of reserves of energy, which is a result of +inhibition, the organism can carry out its work of differentiation, can +develop organs and organic systems, and obtain the power to perform more +complicated functions; these render it ever more independent of the +outer world and enable it to affect the outer world to an increasing +extent. Inhibition plays an important part in differentiation. Its +apparatus becomes organized. The nerve centres from which the inhibition +proceeds form a ladder of which each rung is subordinate to the next. +The peripheral nerves are controlled by the nerve centres in the spinal +cord, these again by the centres in the medulla oblongata, and then in +succession by the cerebellum and the cerebrum, and finally by the +corticle. On the principle of least resistance, on which all life is +based, the highest centres of inhibition unburden themselves by granting +the lower ones a certain measure of independence. The reaction to the +most ordinary and frequent stimuli is controlled and organized in its +character and strength by the apparatus of inhibition, so that it ensues +automatically, and no active inhibition, that is, no conscious effort of +the will, is required. The simplest of these automatic reflex movements +take place below the level of consciousness. + +Those organized complexes of movement, however, which we call instincts, +are carefully watched by the consciousness and subjected to severe check +if they appear to run counter to the supposed interest of the organism. +The hereditary complexes of movement constituting instinct are highly +organized and oppose inhibition, only yielding to it when it is stronger +than they are. This can be observed in animals which are capable of +taming and training. All the artificial actions and omissions that man +teaches them are triumphs of inhibition over automatism. Among human +beings it is only the elect who can vigorously suppress their instincts +by inhibition directed by Reason. The being that has attained the summit +of organic evolution on earth is man, in whom only the lower, vegetative +life processes are liable to the influence of tropism and primary reflex +actions, while all the higher and highest functions are the work of +Reason, which arms the will with inhibition and suppresses all impulses +and actions that hinder its purposes. It is characteristic of these +functions that they are first worked out as concepts by the +consciousness before they are realized as movements. + +It was essential for Morality to find this whole organic structure ready +to its hand before it could become a factor in human life. This +structure had been developed and perfected by the organism for its own +purposes, for the defence and enrichment of its life, to ward off +painful and obtain pleasurable feelings. Morality took possession of it +and used it for its own ends, which do not at the first glance coincide +with the aims which the individual immediately perceives and imagines, +and may indeed be diametrically opposed to these, preventing pleasurable +emotions, causing him pain and even endangering his life. + +But Morality, which is a creation of society, was only able to dominate +the individual and gain control of the organic apparatus of his vital +economy, because its purpose is directed towards the same goal as the +tendencies of the individual organism, prolonging them beyond the +individual's scope, aiming at his preservation, and thus coinciding with +his instinct for self-preservation. + +Morality limits the individual's vainglory and subordinates him to the +community; it is the condition on which the community allows the +individual to participate in the mightier and more varied means of +protection and the enrichment of existence which it has to offer. But +apart from this somewhat remote advantage of Morality, there is another +immediate one for the individual: it consists in the continual exercise +and consequent strengthening of inhibition; therefore, as we have learnt +to see in inhibition the main factor in the development and +differentiation of all living creatures, it offers a means of raising +the individual to biological perfection. The faculty of inhibition, +being in a continual state of strong tension, makes automatic reflexes +subject to the will, makes blind impulses obedient to the somewhat less +blind reason, and helps man along the path of evolution from the status +of a creature of instinct to that of a thinking personality of strong +character, capable of judgment and foresight, a personality which does +not seek to attain the pleasurable emotions necessary to every living +creature by pandering to his senses and satisfying the appetites of the +flesh, but achieves them by gratification of a higher order, by the +triumph of the intellect over vegetative life, by strengthening the will +in relation to the stimuli of the outer world and the organs, by taking +pleasure in the fact that the will is content with its sway. These are +harsh but subtle pleasures which, when they continue to preponderate in +the consciousness, bring about that state of subjective happiness which +is in the highest degree beneficial to life. + +Morality is an arrangement which has arisen from the needs of society; +that is to say, it is not innate, but is an artificial institution of +the race. However, it grafts itself upon the natural organs and +attributes of man, and thus, from being a sociological phenomenon, it +becomes a biological one. The idea that Morality is something absolute, +a cosmic force, and that it would still exist and be valid if there were +no human beings, and even if the earth had no existence, I have refuted +with scorn. We must hold fast to the fact that Morality is a law of +human conduct, that it is in force only among mankind, and that apart +from mankind it is unthinkable. As, however, it becomes a differentiated +function of the apparatus of inhibition, it participates in the general +processes of life and leads us to that point where, indeed, we face the +unnerving outlook upon the absolute and the question of eternity. + +My arguments have led me to many phenomena that can be established and +interpreted as facts of experience, but the explanation of which lies +beyond the power of the human mind. We have examined the riddle of life, +and we have distinguished therein a number of inexplicable things: the +lack of a beginning, sensitiveness to stimuli, consciousness, the +transformation of vibrations into sensations and concepts, the will, and +inhibition. We are forced to the conclusion that the only discernible +aim of life's activities is the preservation of life, or, more shortly, +that life is its own aim and object. Morality, too, either openly or by +implication, sets itself the one clearly demonstrable task of ensuring +to the individual the preservation and security of his existence in a +higher sphere than that of individual vegetative life processes. Thereby +it fits into the scheme of existence, its mysteries and aims, and +becomes an integral part of the cycle of life which emerges from +eternity and returns to it. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MORALITY AND LAW + + +The coercion which the community exercises upon its members, by means of +which it forces them to adapt their actions and abstention from action +to the standard it has set up, has two forms: Custom and Law. Are the +two really different? What is their relation, one to the other? These +are questions worth investigating. + +Ever since the earliest times, grave men have meditated on the relation +between Custom and Law. They were forced by evidence and practical +experience to note a difference between the two institutions, but at the +same time they had the definite impression that they trace their origin +to the same source. Socrates distinguishes between the written laws of +his country and the unwritten ones which express the will of the gods. +The former constitute positive Law which the citizen must observe and to +which he must submit; the latter, however, are higher, for they emanate +from the gods themselves. The immutability of the unwritten laws is a +proof that they are superior to the written ones. Written laws vary from +state to state. They are the work of individual law-givers who were +sometimes wise men and sometimes unreasonable tyrants. But all contain +certain precepts which are everywhere alike, which everywhere impose +the same rules upon man. It is almost as if one and the same law-giver +had co-operated in the making of all the laws that obtain in the +different towns and countries, and are so unlike one another in many +points. This common law-giver, whose will is manifest in all laws, +however far removed they be from one another, is the Deity. That is +essentially Socrates' train of thought as given by Xenophon in his +_Memorabilia_. The Attic sage speaks the language of his time, which, by +the way, is still that of many present-day people. The Deity, whose will +permeates all written laws and to whom they may be traced, is the +principle of Morality. Hugo Grotius, in a manner more appropriate to +modern thought, expresses it thus: "Law and Morality spring from the +same source, namely, the strong social instinct natural to man. They +bear witness to reasonable solicitude for the welfare of the community." +This placing on an equality of Law and Custom, of _jus_ and _mos_, is +very remarkable in such a strictly professional thinker, such a positive +jurist as Grotius. Kant discriminates between the doctrine of Virtue and +the doctrine of Law; he keeps them apart, but he emphasizes their +connexion, and the two together make up his doctrine of Ethics. + +As a matter of fact, no fundamental difference between Law and Custom +exists; only Law is enforced differently to Custom. It would be going +too far to say: Law has sanctions and Custom has none. The latter has +sanctions too, but they are of a different kind to those of the Law. He +who transgresses Custom will suffer the contempt of his fellow men, and +this may become so penetratingly severe that the most hardened and +shameless rascal must feel it. In an old, loose form of society where +individualism is highly developed, and each one goes his own way, paying +little regard to the others, there an unscrupulous, conscienceless rogue +may sin against Socrates' unwritten law without being penalized. In a +young, closely-knit community, however, in which the feeling of intimate +connexion between the members is lively and vivid, he would be +proscribed, as soon as he was found out, and it would be impossible for +him to remain, say, for example, in a small town of the United States. +Public opinion would make it so hot for him that he would be glad to +escape with a whole skin. But this punishment is exceptional for +transgressions of Custom, whereas it is the rule for those of the Law. + +The sanction of the Law is stricter than that of Custom, just as the Law +itself is stricter than is Custom. The Law concerns itself with concrete +cases in which consideration for one's fellow men must be practised, +duties to him fulfilled, and his claims respected. These cases are +defined by Law as clearly as possible, whereas Custom confines itself to +generalities and determines the whole attitude of the individual to his +neighbour. Custom embraces the outer and inner life of man and +supervises his opinions, which are the parents of his deeds, and also +his deeds themselves; Law is only concerned with actions, and refrains +from penetrating to the intimacy of thoughts, unless the latter alter +the essential character of the action, as premeditation in an act of +revenge and temporary or permanent irresponsibility alter the judgment +of offences and crimes. Law is a miserly extract of custom, a meagre +selection from its variety, a concentration and embodiment of its +surging vagueness. It may be compared with crystals, which in their +geometrically accurate forms are crystallized clearly and definitely out +of a liquid, the mother liquor; or with the heavenly bodies which +agglomerate out of surging primal nebulae. Custom is the primitive thing, +Law is derived from it. It appeals to its descent from Custom, and +founds, at any rate tacitly, its claim to respect on these grounds. A +law which ran counter to Custom, which was confessedly in opposition to +Custom, could never be maintained or prevail, though it bristled with +the menace of the most dreadful punishments. + +The relationship of mother to child between Custom and Law may be +obscure to the majority; it is clear to the analytical mind. Recognition +of the essential unity of both phenomena explains an assumption which +was widespread among the best intellects from the Middle Ages until well +into the eighteenth century, but which has now been abandoned as +erroneous by more positive, though indeed narrower, legal minds. This +assumption is that there is a natural Law antecedent to historical Law, +which exists and acts beside and above the latter, and which forms the +basis and the measure of every positive law, of every concrete legal +judgment. It is comprehensible that the nineteenth century swept away +the idea of natural Law and freely made fun of it. To a sternly +disciplined legal mind it must indeed seem grotesque if a judge, in +order to arrive at a verdict in some concrete dispute, cites the rights +to which man is born instead of a certain text of the law, or even, +following Schiller's advice, reaches up to the stars and brings down +thence the eternal Law. Even this procedure is not so farcical as it +seems to stupid article-mongers and hair-splitting paragraphists, for +the procedure of equity of the English judges, who are not prone to +clowning, is at bottom nothing but this reaching up to the stars and +this judging by the rights to which man is born. The feud between +natural Law and historical Law was really a quarrel about a word. Jean +Jacques Rousseau, his contemporaries and disciples, simply made a +mistake in their choice of an expression. They were guilty of an +inaccuracy when they spoke of natural Law. They should have said: "the +innate claim of man that his person should be respected," or, "natural +consideration for one's fellow man," or, most shortly and simply, +"Morality." To the latter legal lights would have raised none of the +objections with which they victoriously opposed natural Law. + +The beginnings of Morality coincide with the beginnings of society, as +the latter could not have existed for a single day without the former. +Since men, forced by the struggle for existence, emerged from their +original, natural solitude and united in a community, they have had to +watch over their impulses, suppress their desires, do things they +disliked, and in all their actions and abstentions from action consider +their neighbours' feelings, as they demanded that their feelings, too, +should be considered. That was Morality which limited the vainglory and +arbitrary conduct of unfettered man. It included all rules that +determine the attitude of man to man. There was no distinction between +Custom and Law. Men were ruled by custom which was traditional in their +community and observed by all; and their Custom had the force of Law. + +Formulated laws, and more especially written laws, appear comparatively +late. True, Asia has old examples of such; the Manava Dharma Shastra, +the book of laws of the Indian Manu, the Chinese Chings, the law of +Hammu Rabi, and that other law, akin to this, though not derived from +it, but probably drawn from a similar older source, the law of the +Pentateuch. The laws of Draco, Solon and Lycurgus and the Roman Twelve +table law are appreciably younger; much later still the _leges +barbarorum_ were written down, some of them, like the prescriptive Law +of the Germans set down in the "_Sachsenspiegel_," not till the end of +the Middle Ages. It is peculiar to most of the old Asiatic laws that +they contain both rules of conduct and legal regulations, and that they +do not differentiate between these two kinds of precepts. + +Let us take one example: the Ten Commandments. Beside such positive +orders as "Thou shalt not steal"; "Thou shalt not kill"; "Honour thy +father and thy mother"; we find such as give rules for the character and +course of spiritual happenings, regarding which others cannot observe +whether they are obeyed or not, like the commandments respecting man's +relationship to God, or admonishing man not to covet his neighbour's +wife or goods. Those are subjective impulses, spiritual moods which are +revealed only to the eye of conscience as long as they do not betray +themselves in action, and which by their very nature cannot be the +subject of Law which deals only with outward manifestations of thought +and will, and is concerned only with things done. + +In constitutional Law, too, no less than in criminal and civil Law, the +eighteenth century tends to preface certain laws with universal moral +principles, and to establish by formal law that the former are derived +from the latter. The Declaration of Independence of the United States in +July, 1774, says: We consider the following truths self-evident: that +all men are born equal; that the Creator has bestowed upon them +inalienable rights, amongst which are the right to life, to freedom, to +the pursuit of happiness, etc. So before these rights are guaranteed by +the Law, they are announced to belong by birth and nature to man, to be +independent of any particular and express bestowal by the law-giver, and +beyond all dispute or even argument. Of the thirteen States which formed +the original Union, ten accompanied their constitution by a Bill of +Rights which repeated the essential contents of the Declaration of +Independence of July, 1774; seven of them placed them as an introduction +before their fundamental law, and three of them incorporated them in the +latter. Two others, New York and Georgia, distributed them among various +articles of their constitution. Rhode Island alone refrained from a +general declaration. The States which joined the Union later, with few +exceptions followed the example of their predecessors and built up their +constitution on the foundation of an explicit statement of the natural +rights of man. The French Revolution followed the course which the +United States had indicated, and began its constitution of 1791 with the +"Declaration of the rights of men and citizens," which is not a law in +the technical sense of the word, but is superior to all positive Law, +constitutes the latter's standard and touchstone, and straightway makes +all laws invalid which are not animated by its spirit or which +contradict it. + +In the beginning, therefore, there was Morality, and the first laws, +which formulated its precepts either in oral tradition or in writing, +recommended without distinction what was good and desirable, and what +was necessary and expedient. The differentiation of the Morality, which +the commonwealth felt to be its code of right and wrong, into Custom and +Law took place in late times. It was most definite in Rome, where for +the first time a clear distinction was made between men's relation to +their gods and their relation to one another; the former was left to the +individual's conscience, the latter subjected to the power of the State; +the elements of feeling and of dim perception were banished from the Law +which confined its attention to deeds which it regulated in a +high-handed manner. Law chose from out the all-embracing sphere of +Morality one narrow area, that of mankind's immediate, material +interests, and took this as its sole theme. The object of all Morality +is to enable men to live together in a community peacefully and +prosperously; within the bounds of this more general purpose, the task +of the Law is to suppress by force the grosser hindrances to this +harmony among individuals, and by material means of coercion +emphatically oblige everyone to respect the interests of his neighbour. +What every responsible man of sound mind demands first and foremost is a +proper respect for the possessions that are his by birth and +acquisition, that is for his life, for his bodily welfare, for all the +goods he owns that minister to his needs, his comfort and his pleasure. +He who lays violent hands on these possessions, or threatens to endanger +them, is recognized to be an enemy; man arms himself against such an +one, fights against him, tries, if he have a strong character, to +destroy him, or flees from him if he is too weak to triumph over him; +man only yields to such an one if he simply cannot help himself, but he +does so with hatred and revenge in his heart, and in a state of mind +which, if it becomes fairly widespread, sets every man's hand against +his fellow-men and leads to the ruin and even to the dissolution of the +community. Hence the task of Law is effectively to protect the +individual from the infringement of his rights by others. It places the +organized forces of the community at the service of the individual whose +interests are threatened, for the criminal law penalizes more or less +severely attempts against life and health, unlawful seizure of property +whether by force or cunning, malicious molestation and offence; the laws +of commerce keep watch over the faithful fulfilment of contracts dealing +with the fair exchange of goods or the execution of work, and in case of +need enforce it. + +A select few, everywhere only a small minority, has a different scale of +values to that of the masses. For them "life is not the supreme thing." +There are things they value more highly. The masses have no +understanding for these people's needs and fine feelings. Their +self-respect and their dignity are dear to them as wealth, their honour +more sacred than life itself. Unhesitatingly they sacrifice their +property to freedom, and more unbearable than anxiety for their material +interests is life in surroundings in which brutality, vulgar sentiments, +harsh egotism, malice, hypocrisy and treachery preponderate. The Law +does not consider this minority. It is the creation and the servant of +the great majority. It clings to earth and is incapable of lofty +flights. It is of no service to the elect in the preservation of their +noblest spiritual possessions or the defence of their ideals against +clumsy maltreatment. It declares itself to be incompetent to deal with +any but material affairs. + +Therein lies at one and the same time the strength and the weakness of +the Law. Its strength lies in the fact that it definitely limits its +sphere of action and strives to achieve positive results by positive +means, results intelligible even to a mean understanding. Its weakness +lies in the fact that it ignores man's highest and noblest interests. +And these interests are there, they too deserve consideration and +protection, they have a right to demand that the guarantee of the +community should embrace them as well. The well-being of the community, +which is the object of Morality and of Law too, demands that such +conditions should be created and maintained, as should enable the elect +also to enjoy life or at least find existence bearable. But Law does +not suffice for that. No law enjoins upon the careless throng of +pachyderms to spare the tenderest and noblest sensibilities of lofty +natures; no judge punishes thoughtless or purposely malicious injury to +them. To remedy this evil we must rise from the lowly plain of Law, the +natural dwelling-place of the masses, to the heights of Morality, the +habitual abode of superior minds. At the theological stage of +civilization refuge is sought with the gods in whose hands the +protection of essential, spiritual possessions is placed. They are +expected to punish the wicked whose evil deeds are beyond the reach of +any penal code, they are expected to soothe and comfort when life is +hard or even unendurable. That is the compromise that the elect made +with life in the hard times of European barbarism. They escaped from the +world and thus avoided contact with the repugnant masses. They shut +themselves up in cloistered cells away from mankind and held mystic +intercourse with God. Among the people, cruel authorities with +difficulty maintained discipline and scanty law and order by means of +flogging and the pillory, torture, the gallows and the wheel. The +minority of the elect disciplined themselves, suppressed their lower +impulses by self-imposed mortification, and with the help of prayer and +belief in God's promised millennium managed to keep their heads above +water despite the crushing spectacle of the life of those times. + +Long before the Christian era, the Greeks of noble disposition felt the +need of living in an atmosphere of higher intellectuality and morality +than that of the market-place, and they hid themselves behind the +cloud-curtain of the Eleusinian Mysteries, where they kept to +themselves, escaped the rule of the rude Law, and followed the nobler +precepts of Morality. Whenever the measure of Morality contained in +positive law did not suffice for the minority with higher aspirations, +this minority adopted the same expedient, a form of esotericism; small +circles were formed outside the community in which there was added to +the current legal code a superstructure of stricter rules, more finely +shaded duties, more courteous consideration. Present-day life also +offers examples of this tendency which is met with in all ages. There +are select circles and professions in which the standard of +irreproachableness is far higher than among the mass of the people. +There a man is not held blameless, simply because he has never +transgressed a positive law, never come into conflict with the powers of +justice. He must be as unspotted in the eye of moral justice as he is in +that of the Law. A club or association that is self-respecting will not +admit to membership a candidate reputed to lie, to have an evil tongue, +to break his word, to be a toady and a snob, though none of these +offences are punishable by law. It has happened that a corps of German +officers has forced one of their number to send in his papers because he +has seduced and deserted a respectable girl, an adventure flattering to +the vanity of puppies who, as like as not, boast of it, and with which a +judge can only deal if the injured girl appeals to him--and even then he +cannot punish the offender, but merely sentence him to pay damages. + +Almost the whole world is agreed on the point that the Law does not +sufficiently protect honour. Positive Law evidently does not consider it +of such value as material possessions, for the defence of which it knows +itself to be qualified. But there are numbers of people whose honour is +dearer to them than their fortune, even than their life, and trembling +with indignation they see that a thief who steals their purse with a few +shillings is haled off to prison, while a slanderer who sullies their +honour either goes unpunished, or at most gets off with a fine, which +merely adds official insult to the injury. In this case the Law has +lagged so far behind Morality that individuals try of their own accord +to bridge the gulf without counting on the intervention of the +community. For aspersions of their honour the masses take revenge with +fists and cudgels, often with bloody results; and among the elect they +resort to duels with lethal weapons, a preposterous proceeding due to +desperation, and a bitter indictment of the prevailing laws. It is a +deed of self-help, like the formation of a vigilance committee among the +anarchical throng of a lawless rabble. Hardly to be justified on +reasonable grounds, it is intelligible from the point of view of +historical tradition, and as a survival of dim and primitive ideas. In +early days a properly regulated duel was an ordeal showing the judgment +of heaven. It was the general conviction that God would give victory to +the right and crush the wrong. When human Law failed, the injured party +appealed to the source of all Law and placed his cause in the hands of +the Almighty. From this point of view the duel is no unsuitable means +of preventing plots to evade the law. Even if the injured party is +inexperienced in the use of the weapon, even if his opponent is skilled +and vastly his superior, he need not worry, for God fights on his side. +Therefore he is more sure of success than if he entrusted his cause to +fallible human judges. But from the moment that the duel ceases to be +regarded as a means of arriving at the verdict of God, nothing can be +urged in its defence, and that it nevertheless persists is a fact that +can only be accounted for by the inadequacy of the current laws. + +It really is astonishing that the Law does not yet appraise honour at +its true value. Educated people almost unanimously regret and condemn +the backwardness of the Law in this respect, all the more so because the +tremendous development of the respectable, as well as of the +disreputable, Press facilitates and aggravates libel to a hitherto +undreamed-of extent, and no defence can overtake the slander which is +quickly spread broadcast. Doubtless public opinion will urge that +measures be taken to bring the Law into line with the views now held on +all sides on the significance of honour, its defencelessness and its +need for protection. That this has not yet been done is due to the +slowness with which the Law adapts itself to the demands of a Morality +which grows ever more profound and more refined. Law, which originally +devoted itself only to the crudest material interests, very slowly +extends the range of its protection, but it does so continually, with an +ever-widening embrace, including more and more delicate, more and more +noble, possessions, taking into consideration ever higher and ever finer +needs. What early legislator would have thought of man's needing +protection not only against murder, grievous bodily harm and +maltreatment, but also against the dangers due to ignorance and +carelessness in light-heartedly spreading infectious diseases, and +contaminating water and the air? Who would have dreamed in former times +that positive Law would consider the sensitiveness of nerves, desire for +beauty, dislike of ugliness and forbid disturbing street noises, protect +the countryside from wicked disfigurement, and prevent the construction +of buildings which would spoil the artistic architectural plan of a +city? + +These little traits, these concessions to personal demands, which to a +coarse mind do not seem obviously justified, go to prove that positive +Law continues to grow beyond the bounds of its unavoidably crude +materialism, and strives to rise into the regions of the unwritten law +of the Peripatetics, where ideal possessions are of more importance than +those which have traditionally come within the scope of criminal and +civil Law. Law and Custom have a natural tendency to approach more and +more nearly to one another, to become merged in one another where the +line that divides them is but faintly indicated. The closer the union +between them, the more perfect is the Morality of a society. Absolute +perfection would be reached if Law, which has been derived by +differentiation from Morality, should, after a protracted period of +development, return to its source and be completely merged again in +Morality. But that is a dream which can never be realized as long as +man is constituted as he is at the present time. Enthusiasts have +dreamed of it, and in their imagination have seen an anarchical and +lawless society in which no positive Law, no sanctions of force were +needed, and in which the understanding and conscience of individuals +would suffice to ensure the rule of good faith and goodness, and the +curbing of selfishness. As far as man can tell we shall never attain +this Utopia. We shall never be able to do without positive Law, not only +on account of undeveloped and perverse natures, in which animalism has +the upper hand of humanity, and which must be kept under strict +discipline, but because a sure guide is needed in cases of doubt and +irresolution which confuse even the good, nay, the best, men when +passion and violent desire, with their heavy thunderclouds, darken the +outlook of Reason, and judgment wavers amid the hurly-burly of a +spiritual tempest. All that we may hope for and should desire is that +Law should be filled with the spirit of Morality and embrace as many +moral ideas as possible. + +It lies in the nature of the thing that Morality was never clearly and +definitely formulated, for as soon as this was done it assumed the +character of Law. It remained general and slightly vague, it spoke to +men in such indefinite terms as "good," "virtue," "duty," "love of one's +neighbour," "unselfishness," "patience"--terms into which everyone can +read the meaning which suits his thoughts and feelings. Mankind has +never lacked moral teachers. The Indian Shastras and the Chings, +Confucius and Meng Tse, the prophets of Israel and Ben Sirach, Plato +and the wise men of the Stoics, the Zend Avesta, Jesus and Paul, the +platonic ethics of Nicomachus, those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, +thousands of years ago preached the principles which exhaust the whole +field of Morality, and beyond the essentials of which none of the later +moralists have gone; neither the "Imitation of Christ" nor Ibn Bachia, +Spinoza, the Scotch school and Kant, up to Wundt and Guyau. + +But what about the effect of the doctrines which they advocated gently +or passionately, adducing proofs or uttering threats? To lend weight to +them they either appealed to God, threatening mankind with His wrath and +vengeance, or to Reason, which, according to them, could advise man only +for his good. Perhaps they could intimidate those who had blind faith +and convince the reasonable. But there are many of little faith, and +more still who are unreasonable, and on these the persuasion, warnings +and conclusions of the Moralists had no effect. For these it was +imperative to clothe the minimum of Morality, the minimum without which +no society can exist, in the definite form of laws, and so create the +Law to which the weapons of the community lend compelling force. Thus +the whole material of Ethics is divided into Morality and Law. The +Theologians and Scholiasts who trace all binding rules of human conduct +back to revelations of the Divine Will recognized on principle only one +single law: but the aspect of practical life made even them distinguish +between the "_lex indicativa_" and the "_lex praeceptiva_," between an +indication or counsel and precept or command. The "_lex indicativa_" is +Morality, the "_lex praeceptiva_" is the Law. + +Codes are the normal expression of the Law. Not all Law is formulated in +this way, for there is a recognized Law of custom, but all laws, +codified or not, become a part of the prevailing Law. Naturally, and as +is only reasonable, all Law is pre-existent in the consciousness of the +majority, and the law-giver's role is limited to setting down in +paragraphs universally acknowledged principles dictated by public +opinion. However, there are an appreciable number of historical +instances in which this procedure is reversed; the law-giver, without +inquiring whether his ideas were in accord with the general conscience, +arbitrarily clothed his dictates to the community in paragraphs which it +had to accept as Law. It is clear that this procedure is extremely +risky. Even if the law-giver possesses superior wisdom, even if he is +far in advance of his people and his age, even if his intentions are of +the best, there is grave danger that the moral feeling of the people +will revolt against the laws thus forced on them. Outwardly they yield +to the pressure of public authority, but they obey the Law with a keen +inner sense of opposition; a chasm yawns between conscience and the +practice of the Law, ideas of Morality and Law become confused, the +moral foundation of all laws totters, and the public gets into the habit +of regarding the Law as something alien and hostile, which cannot be +disregarded with impunity, but which it is not only not culpable, but +even meritorious to evade. + +An enormous amount has been written on the subject of what a law is, and +all this literature expresses in endless words very few and, almost +without exception, very mediocre thoughts. I should consider it an +unpardonable waste of time to devote any considerable space to this +rubbish, either in order merely to quote opinions or to investigate and +confute them. Perhaps the best thing said of the laws is Hobbes's +description: Civil Law (the law of the country) is nothing but a +guarantee of natural Law. It is true that this definition implies a +supposition: the existence of natural Law which, however, is not binding +in itself but requires the sanctions of the law of the country. +Moreover, it is only correct if we add the limitation that it does not +guarantee all natural Law, but only a part of it. Hobbes is also forced +by his definition of the law of a country to explain what he means by +natural Law, and he does not evade this duty. "Natural Law," he says, +"is the decree of true Reason (_ratiocinatio recta_) with regard to what +we must do and what avoid for our self-preservation.... Transgression of +natural Laws is due to false Reason (_ratiocinatio falsa_)." + +In spite of its vagueness this explanation of Hobbes's shows that what +he really means by natural Law is Morality, and in this respect his +views on the relation of natural Law to civil Law, that is, of Morality +to Law, practically coincide with mine. Nevertheless, he ignobly denies +the moral decency of his doctrine of Law when later on he coldly and +dryly remarks: All that the state commands is just, all that it forbids +is unjust. Saying this he stupidly and obsequiously makes the civil +code the source of Law, whereas by his own definition Law (he says +"Natural Law") is the source of the civil code. It is more pardonable +for Pusendorf, a formal jurist, to say: "Law is the decree (_decretum_) +with which a superior binds his subject (_sibi subjectum_)." That +interpretation of Law is possible if it is considered from outside; it +is a means of coercion in the hands of the mighty to subjugate the +dependant; this point of view ignores the essential; but Pusendorf has +no concern with this, for he makes no claim to be a philosopher, he +keeps within the bounds of juridical practice. + +The Bishop of Seville, Saint Isidor, the most respected theologian of +the time between the last patristic writers and St. Thomas Aquinas, +gives the following definition of Law: "Law is an institution +(_constitutio_) made by the people, by which the nobles (_majores +natu_), together with the common folk, have given a sanction to some +ordinance." This says little about the essence of Law, but it leads to +the question of the origin of laws. On this subject, too, whole +libraries full of books have been written since the time of Plato and +Aristotle; luckily, for the most part, they now only serve as food for +moths and worms. + +From this tangle of hair-splitting and sophistry, from this muddle of +syllogisms, dogmatism and deep-sounding phrases which mean nothing at +all, one thought emerges pretty clearly, to wit, that only the highest +authority in the State has the right to make laws. On this point there +is perfect unanimity; and that is natural, for it is so obvious that it +has no need to be circumstantially investigated and proved in the fifty +thousand books that have been written on the subject. It is perfectly +clear that one cannot possibly force all the members of a state to obey +certain commands and prohibitions which the Law contains, unless one is +stronger than each one of them, and therefore the Law must necessarily +emanate from the highest power in the state. It is beside the point to +obscure this simplest and most transparent fact by questions as to the +right of the law-giver. He needs no theoretical right since he has the +might. To use Kant's expression, positive Law is not a creation of the +mind ([Greek: noumenon]), it is a phenomenon; its existence is a matter +of empiricism, not of reason; it is a matter of fact and is under no +obligation to justify itself intellectually to the intellect. No +law-giver has ever troubled to tack on a preamble or an addition to the +law he promulgates proving that he has the right to enact it. + +But in the literature dealing with this matter opinions differ widely as +to who embodies or possesses the highest power in the state. According +to some it is the king, because he wields the sword and therefore can +enforce unconditional obedience; according to others it is the Church, +because the Law, to be binding, must be moral, and Morality is +established by God since the Church is the representative of God on +earth. Others again regard the people as a whole as the highest power, +because without their assent no law can prevail, and because even the +king only has the power of which the people divests itself to transfer +it to him. History has advanced beyond this quarrel. + +To-day no one dares to dispute the fact that the nation alone is +qualified to enact laws for itself through the agency of its chosen +representatives, and that no law can be binding for the people without +their explicit or tacit consent. In Switzerland, where they have +instituted the referendum, the people by their vote can repudiate a law, +made by their representatives in their name, before it comes into force; +and in the other constitutional states they have recourse to the +following expedient: whenever a law is promulgated which seems +inacceptable to them, at the next Parliamentary election they vote for +men who are pledged to do away with it. The people have the power to +make laws, therefore they also have the right to do so, and they do not +hesitate to revolt if this right is tampered with. In recent times no +nation outside Russia has submitted to having laws forced on it, in +framing which it has not co-operated, and which it has not expressly +accepted. The United States tore themselves away from the Mother Country +with the cry: "No taxation without representation!" and more than a +hundred years before that the English people had irrefutably proved to +the Stuart king, Charles I, that he had no right to make and unmake +laws, by condemning him in a court of law with legal formalities and +then having his head cut off by a masked executioner. + +The legal code is the concrete form of the Law, and the Law is the +crystallization of the most material part of Morality. And as Morality +binds every member of the community, as man is only tolerated in the +community on condition that he respects Morality, it is a matter of +logic that he should also respect the Law; that is to say, that he must +not only submit to it because he fears punishment if he fails to do so, +but that he must feel obedience to the Law to be part of his Morality, +that he must act lawfully at the dictate of his own conscience, and not +because of the threat of the power of the state. This might be +enunciated as a principle without reservation and without limitation, if +in practice the laws always were, as in theory they should be, moral. +But this is not necessarily the case. The law is a form, and every form +can be abused by filling it with unlawful contents. If an unscrupulous +adulterator of wine fills a champagne bottle of the usual shape, +complete with metalled and wired cork and a label recommending it, with +some disgusting mixture and puts it on the market, he is severely +punished for adulteration of food and infringement of the law protecting +trade marks. But if the government publish in the _Gazette_ foolish, +risky, and perhaps absolutely immoral orders in the form of a law, duly +arranged in chapters, articles and paragraphs, as the people are +accustomed to seeing their moral laws expressed, who impugns them for +it? + +The examples of this in history are only too numerous. To this category +belong all laws seeking to maintain the validity of state authority at +the expense of the natural rights of thinking and feeling men, e.g. all +religious persecutions, the maltreatment of socialists, excise laws and +duties which hamper freedom of work and movement, or are tantamount to +robbing a particular man or all citizens. As a rule, laws of this kind +can be imposed upon the people only in a despotically ruled state, since +the people in this case has no share in legislation; but constitutional +government is no guarantee against it, for parliamentary majorities can +be forced to enact tyrannical laws, by fanning the flame of national or +party fanaticism, by encouraging prejudices, or by intimidation; this is +proved by Bismarck's May laws and Socialist laws, and also by the laws +passed by the National Assembly at Versailles against the rebels of the +Commune and against Paris. Obedience to such laws cannot reasonably be +demanded. Only a Hobbes will dispute this, for whom "everything that the +state commands is just, everything that it prohibits is unjust," or the +Digest according to which "_quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem_" +(what pleases the ruler has the force of law). Legal enactments, though +they be immoral, are yet formal Law; as a matter of fact, however, they +are wrong, and even if their originator has the power by brute force to +secure obedience to them, no man who tries to evade them and to get them +abolished will be accused of immorality. + +A trivial objection strikes one at once. Only a despotic megalomaniac +will forbid his subjects to make representations in the proper quarters, +and in the proper way, for the purpose of getting a bad law abrogated; +but as long as it is in force it must be obeyed. For if every citizen +were allowed to make a selection of the laws according to his choice, +acquiescing in some and rejecting others, this would lead straight to +anarchy. The reply to this is that anarchy, although a terrible evil, is +notwithstanding a lesser one than an immoral law, that is, a law which +sins against Morality. For the maintenance of law and order which the +State guarantees is only preferable to anarchy because it enables +individuals to live together in peace, and guarantees liberty of +movement and respect for persons, life and property. But if the State +acts wrongly, and interferes in the feelings and convictions of +individuals, if it uses brute force to compel them to actions and +abstentions against which all the good in them rebels, then its law and +order is law and disorder, and it is the State itself which brings about +a condition of anarchy by making force the ruling factor in the life of +the individual. For the latter it is all one whether he has to yield to +the force of the State or that of his neighbour. Nay, more, his position +is worse in a condition of anarchy caused by the State, than in that +which existed before the State was formed, because it is easier to meet +force with force, when this emanates from an individual who is one's +equal, than when it is exercised by the superior organization of the +State. The State which enacts immoral laws denies its own principle and +causes its own dissolution. + +The intellectual constructions of the eighteenth century, of which the +most famous is J. J. Rousseau's "Social Contract," are not taken +literally by anyone nowadays. Nobody seriously believes that one day +individuals living in a state of nature banded themselves together and +made a contract, by virtue of which they renounced certain liberties +and rights and transferred them to a superior authority which was to +rule them so as to promote the general welfare, peace and happiness. But +if the procedure was not quite so simple as this, at least it is certain +that the State undertakes the task which Rousseau expressly prescribes +as its aim. If, however, through its fault, the fault of its +legislation, the welfare of the community suffers, and peace and +happiness are not promoted but hindered, disturbed and destroyed, then +every citizen has the moral right to revolt against the State and +paralyse its pernicious might; not because it has broken a formal +contract with its citizens, but because it has become inimical to the +peaceful life of mankind, the purpose of every social community. If +anyone is troubled at the thought that there is no reliable standard +whereby to test the morality of a law and no place indicated where such +a measure can be applied, he may take comfort by remembering that all +Morality is surrendered to the feelings and judgment of the majority and +has no other sanction than this. History teaches us that the majority +does not acquit itself too badly of its duty. Public opinion suffices to +maintain Morality at a certain level in a community. And if public +opinion is capable of ensuring respect for the unwritten law of Morality +without the sanctions of State Law, it may surely be recognized as a fit +judge of the morality of a law. That is the theory of the right of +citizens to defend themselves by all means, even by force, against +immoral laws. Practically, it is of no importance, because nowadays, at +least in all progressive and liberally governed States, the people have +constitutional means at their disposal to prevent or quickly to rid +themselves of laws that are obnoxious. + +Morality includes the Law, whereas Law is only a part of Morality. Owing +to its coercive nature, the Law is obliged to be concrete and material +and to ignore all the imponderable, barely perceptible, spiritual and +dream-like things which hover round Morality, surround it with an +atmosphere and transport it beyond definite boundaries into the realm of +the unconscious and visionary. The total exclusion of the element of +feeling which Morality includes, constitutes the most profound +difference between it and the Law. Law protects order but knows no love. +The separation of Law from Morality is due to the pressure of +selfishness which thinks it has made the greatest possible concession +when it rises to the height of saying with Ulpian: "_Neminem laedere. +Suum cuique reddere. Honeste vivere._" Injure no one; that is, refrain +from the ruthless use of force; render to each his own; that is, do not +retain in rascally fashion what belongs to another; live honourably; +that is, give no offence to your neighbour by disorderly conduct and +depravity. + +Well and good. At a pinch one can live like that. But the words pity, +kindness, love of one's neighbour do not occur in Ulpian's pithy +statements, and the Law knows nothing of them. + +The Law guards each man's well-earned possessions, but it bids no one +make sacrifices. Morality can demand these. It can insist that the +individual should freely, and urged by his own inner impulse, impose +sacrifices upon himself, reduce his possessions in favour of another, +disturb his personal comfort at any moment, perhaps even risk his life; +that is to say, that of his own free will he should do just those things +from which the Law carefully shields him. Where the Law says: injure no +one! Morality says often enough: injure yourself to do good to your +neighbour. Where the Law says: to each man his own! Morality not seldom +says: to each man your own if he needs it more than you do. Morality +counts on the existence of a quality of which the Law has no need: +Sympathy. To be moral we must feel in our own being at the time, or +retrospectively, the subjective experiences of our neighbour, with the +same quality of emotion that he feels; his pain must be our pain, as his +pleasure must be our pleasure. For the man who cannot do this--who +realizes in his mind the circumstances of his neighbour only as an +image, and without the concomitant note of feeling--it is impossible to +rise to the height of Morality. It is not his fault, for the gift of +sympathy is an organic disposition, which you either do or do not +possess, which you can develop or suppress, but which you cannot create +if it is lacking. Nevertheless, the lack of sympathy is a pitiable +infirmity, for it prevents a man from scaling the heights of Morality. + +To respect the Law is to practise a wise selfishness. To act morally is +to divest oneself of selfishness and attain the privilege of +unselfishness. To behave in strict accordance with the Law earns the +merited praise of civic blamelessness. But to act morally is a virtue +which is of incomparably higher quality than that of mere +blamelessness. The law-abiding man, the honest man, is praised as having +been "_Integer vitae sceleris purus_." That is an acceptable epitaph. +But the man of active Morality, willingly suffering for others, provides +an example which reconciles millions to the hardships of life. The +former is a worthy man, but the latter is a saint. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY + + +Men, who would be deeply offended if their Morality were called into +question, quite coolly investigate the problem as to whether the State +in its actions and omissions is bound by the same moral laws as the +individual, and the majority of them come to the conclusion that in its +relation to other States, the State must not be guided, that is to say, +hampered, by moral considerations. They go further than this and not +only liberate the State in its dealings with other countries from the +trammels of Morality, but claim for the government the privilege of +standing beyond and above the moral law in the conduct of public +affairs, because to their mind both foreign and home politics move on a +different plane to that of ethics. If anyone objects to this shameless +contention, its advocates contemptuously dismiss him with the disdainful +remark: "That is the drivel of a layman, and no man of science would +waste his time on it." And if you were to reply: "Your views are those +of gaolbirds who try after the event to hatch a theory justifying their +misdeeds," they would probably shrug their shoulders and murmur +scornfully: "The man is obviously mad." + +Professorial wisdom has formulated pedantically what practical +politicians, the heads of states and leading ministers have thought, +said and done. Napoleon remarked at St. Helena to Count de Las Cases, +who respectfully notes the fact in his "_Memorial de Sainte Helene_": +"The actions of a ruler who labours for the community, must be +distinguished from those of a private individual who is free to indulge +his feelings; policy permits, nay, commands, the one to do what in the +case of the other would often be inexcusable." Perhaps it was under the +influence of this remark, with which he, no doubt, was familiar, that +Professor Nisard one day in a lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris +propounded the theory that there was a dual Morality, one public or +political, the other private, and that these two did not follow the same +rules. That was shortly after the Coup d'Etat of Napoleon III, and it +was easy to descry, in the words of the celebrated professor of literary +history, obsequiousness towards the new Emperor and the effort of a +courtier to excuse the violence which the Emperor had just done to the +constitution he had sworn to uphold. Nisard was one of the ornaments of +the university, a teacher of youth, who was as popular as he was +respected. But the sound ethical feeling of his hearers revolted against +the depravity of the principles he had just enunciated, and the violent +expression of their indignation drove him in shame and disgrace from his +chair and out of the lecture hall. + +Macchiavelli is the most famous advocate of the Immorality of the State +and the right of politics to be unethical, and his name is identified +with this infamous theory. An enormous amount has been written about +the Florentine statesman, his book of the "Prince" and the doctrines he +advances in it; among these works those in which his theories are +endorsed preponderate to a horrifying extent over those which oppose and +refute them. Mohl and Paul Janet have furnished us with the best +abstracts of these very numerous writings, and I refer the reader to +them. Here I can only dwell on the main points of the investigation. + +Macchiavelli writes: "A man who wishes to be perfectly good is without +doubt in danger among those who are not good. It is therefore advisable +that a prince should learn not always to be good, so as to be able to +put these rules of life into practice, or not, as circumstances may +demand." "A prince cannot maintain loyalty to a treaty if it become +dangerous to his interests." In short, the prince not only may, but +must, do what is in his own interests. He need not stop to think whether +his actions are honest. The only measure of their worth and +appropriateness is the profit they promise. Their success always +justifies them, only their failure proves them to be bad. + +The most revolting thing in the arguments of the "Prince" is the +equanimity with which the author adduces them. Never does he let slip a +word of excitement, never does an indication of feeling appear. He +treats his subject not as an investigation of principles to which one +adopts a mental attitude and which one should approve or disapprove, but +as a description of existing facts which arouse one's emotions as little +as, for instance, the enumeration of the qualities and characteristics +of a mineral. It has been said in his defence that his book is a +concrete study, the presentation of the character of Caesar Borgia, of +his psychology and of his principles of government; and that +Macchiavelli wished to give an objective account of the philosophy of +the events he had observed, but did not wish to judge them subjectively; +and this, if for no other reason, because an expression of his own +opinion would have been too dangerous for him. It is further urged that +his personal views are revealed in the treatise on Livy. + +This defence, however, is far from convincing. In the "Prince" +Macchiavelli maintains the same unconcerned and cool note that prevails +in his account of the treacherous assassinations perpetrated in +Senigaglia by his hero Caesar Borgia. The only personal feeling, which +peeps out occasionally in both works, is a certain perverse, aesthetic +satisfaction, experienced by the artist with the eye of a connoisseur +who lingers over a work of nature, perfect in its way, and delights in +the harmony of actions which, with absolute logic, almost with +mathematical precision, result from the definite premise supplied by a +certain character. Des Esseintes, the ideal aesthete invented by Joris +Karl Huysmans, may appraise the worth of a monster solely by its beauty, +without a thought for its morality. But by such appraisement he cuts +himself off from the community of men, though he, in his arrogance, +being morally insane, may abuse them as philistines. + +Since it first appeared, Macchiavellism has found disciples and admirers +in every age; and these, in liberating politics from all fetters of +Morality, go further than its originator. The German jurist of the +century of the Reformation, Schoppe (1576-1649), declares sententiously +that politics differ from Morality and have their own principles, just +as Morality has: he considers that the chief difference between them is +that the latter takes as its subject of study that which should be; the +former, that which is. For this one phrase this pedant, who has +otherwise rightly deserved oblivion, has some claim to be remembered. +For here he consigns Morality to the realm of pure thought, of +theoretical and meditative idealism, while for politics he claims the +sphere of practical reality and shows the first dim dawning of that +practical policy (_Realpolitik_) which, two hundred and fifty years +later, was to be as the light of the sun to statesmen. + +The Frenchman, Gabriel Naude, almost a contemporary of Schoppe's, +constituted himself the champion of Coups d'Etat, if they promised +political advantages; further, he justifies and praises the Night of +Saint Bartholomew, a very energetic measure taken in his lifetime to put +an end to the religious strife which was weakening France and causing +the government much embarrassment; his only regret is that the happy +idea of slaughtering all the Huguenots was not carried out more +completely; in other words, that the massacre of the obnoxious +Protestants was not continued until they had been completely wiped out. + +Even in Descartes, who confessed to a somewhat shady opportunism in +questions of state and, for instance, concedes reasonable and moral +justification to Absolutism, we find the depressing statement: "Against +the enemy one is, so to speak ('_quasi_'), permitted to do anything," a +conscious and determined denial of the Christian commandment "Love thine +enemies," which perhaps demands too much of the average man and can only +be expected from saints, but which, anyway, contains an exhortation for +all the world at least to be just to one's enemies and act according to +the dictates of Morality. + +D'Holbach does not beat about the bush, but declares roundly: "In +politics the only crime is not to succeed." Even Macchiavelli did not +express it as baldly as that. To quote the Duke of La Rochefoucauld, he +at least pays virtue the compliment of hypocrisy, for he gives this +advice: "Do (the evil which is profitable) and excuse it afterwards." +This is a paraphrase of the old advice given by a pettifogging lawyer +for the benefit of the criminal: "If you have done it, deny it," and of +the well-known phrase of Frederick the Great which runs something like +this: "If I have a desire for a foreign country, I begin by seizing it, +then I send for lawyers who prove that I had a right to it." This, then, +was the opinion of that king who wrote an "Anti-Macchiavelli," of whom, +however, Paul Janet neatly remarks: "Nothing is more typical of +Macchiavellism than as heir presumptive to the throne to refute +Macchiavelli's principles, and then as ruling monarch to apply them with +the more determination." + +For the sake of the incorruptible Morality which Kant defends in his +little work "_Vom ewigen Frieden_" ("Of Eternal Peace"), he may be +forgiven for his weakly worldly wisdom in following up the "Critique of +Pure Reason" with the "Critique of Practical Reason." In "_Vom ewigen +Frieden_" he bravely demands harmony between Politics and Morality. More +sweepingly than the English proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," he +demonstrates that honesty is better than policy. It is an old tradition +of all governments, and especially of diplomacy, to affect secrecy, +since their inavowable intrigues shun the light of day and the eye of +outsiders. To-day the democracy in all constitutional states demands +that foreign policy should be given full publicity. Kant expressed his +opinion shortly and sharply a hundred and fifty years ago: "All +political actions which cannot be made public are unjust." In the +eighteenth century, in which he lived and which began with the war of +the Spanish Succession, went on to the wars of Frederick the Great, and +ended with the war of the Coalition against the French Revolution, he +does not dare to make a definite claim that force should be expelled +from inter-state relations and Law put in its place, but he does say, if +somewhat timidly, that one may "dream of" an ideal in which the quarrels +of nations are adjusted, like those of private persons, by laws which +have been framed and approved by all. Kant is a comforting exception +amid the many teachers of constitutional law who are almost unanimously +Macchiavellian in their attitude, and who regard his point of view with +contemptuous and condescending leniency because he was an unworldly +philosopher, a theorist in politics. + +The English and Scottish moral philosophers, from Locke to J. S. Mill +and Herbert Spencer, are all untainted by Macchiavellism and recognize +only one Morality for the state as for the individual, for political as +for private action. But it must be admitted that their doctrines have +not yet been generally assimilated by the consciousness of their own +people. Now, as ever, it is a fundamental principle of English law that +"the king can do no wrong." That means that the king, the embodiment and +epitome of the state, as the source of Law is Law itself, and is +superior to all the laws of the country, which is a still more drastic +paraphrase of the doctrine of the Digest: "_quod principi placuit legis +habet vigorem_"; every whim of the potentate has the force of law, and +the English have coined the horrible phrase, "My country, right or +wrong," a dictum which allows ruthless deceivers of the people and +destroyers of their country to hide their most appalling misdeeds +beneath the mask of patriotism and to disguise deeds worthy of a +criminal in the habiliments of virtue. + +Real patriotism demands that a true citizen and an honourable man should +with might and main, even at the price of his life, oppose any injustice +about to be committed by his government and his misguided compatriots; +and, further, that he should strive to maintain his country in the path +of Right and Morality even if, as sometimes happens, in a dispute +between his nation and a foreign one the latter has Right and Morality +on its side. On the plea of inevitable partiality a judge may refuse to +try a case in which a near relative of his is involved. That is a +permissible concession to that human imperfection which causes reason +to fall silent when feeling raises its voice; and justice does not +suffer, for there are other judges who can take the seat that has been +voluntarily vacated. No citizen has the right to evade the duty of +judging his country, because, if he fails, there is no other judge who +can be put in his place and fulfil his duty. Every citizen is personally +responsible for the just and moral behaviour of his community, +responsible to his own conscience, to his nation, to the world, to the +present and to the future; and if he is powerless to prevent depravity +and misdeeds, he must at least solemnly and loudly condemn them, as this +is his only means of avoiding joint responsibility for the infamy. If he +fails to do this, the public crime becomes his personal crime as well. +The elder Brutus, so much and so justly admired by the Romans, is an +example to all, for without mercy he handed his own flesh and blood over +to the executioner, when according to the law his life was forfeit. The +state has no greater claim to indulgence and mercy than had Brutus's +son, if knowingly and intentionally it indulges in vice. For if you +allow the dictum, "Right or wrong, my country," to be valid, then you +must also apply it to the state of filibusterers that once existed in +the Antilles, and must demand of its citizens that their patriotism +should approve and defend theft, piracy, rape and assassination, for the +systematic perpetration of which their state was founded. + +In contrast with this wretched "My country, right or wrong," the +inflexible dictum of the ancients stands out: "_Fiat justitia, pereat +mundus!_" (Let justice be done though the world perish!). And what does +most honour to the French Revolution is the phrase so often mocked by +political profiteers: "Sooner shall the colonies perish than a +principle!" That was the standpoint of the prophets of Israel, who truly +did not love their people less than do the wretched scoundrels who shout +"hurray!" and yell songs, when their country deals Morality and Right a +brutal blow, because the leaders think that this will profit the +country, or themselves. + +Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as heads of the state, acted in +accordance with Macchiavelli's views. At their time this was expressed +by saying that they were guided by the necessities of the state. In the +second half of the nineteenth century Macchiavellism received the name +of practical policy (_Realpolitik_). The despisers of Morality, who call +the misdeeds of the state _Realpolitik_, apparently do not know that +this one word implies a very comprehensive admission. To their idea +_Realpolitik_ is a policy which reckons only with realities, not with +desires, yearnings or hope, or as Schoppe brutally expresses it: with +that which is, not with that which ought to be. It is active in the +domain of facts, not in that of principles. + +But, according to the advocates of _Realpolitik_, facts and realities +mean nothing but the sole rule of interest, selfishness, ruthlessness, +force, cunning and contempt for all foreign rights; whereas fairness, +justice, the curbing and suppression of one's own desires, consideration +for one's neighbour, love of mankind--all these are phrases, or let us +rather say ideals, which are to be found, not in the world, but in the +brains of a small minority of enthusiasts without influence. He who +confesses to such views, to whom the worst impulses alone are real, +while he relegates Morality to the sphere of the unreal, of visions far +from reality, is a pessimist as long as his convictions remain theory; +but if he puts them into practice, or urges the leaders of the state to +do so, then he is an evildoer who breaks the moral law as soon as it +appears unaccompanied by the police, the prison and the gallows. In +private life a man with such views is a criminal who obeys his evil +instincts whenever he may hope to evade the law of the state. The +bandit, who is clever enough to manage so that police and court of +justice cannot touch him, is a practical politician, for the riches he +acquires by theft, robbery and murder are realities; the criminal code +is but a scrap of paper, something visionary, as long as its minions do +not seize him by the collar. + +The immorality of politics, the way in which the foundations of Morality +are ignored by the state, is the natural consequence of the power of +rulers; for in them all the original instincts of the human beast still +untamed by moral law are exaggerated by the intense realization of their +loftiness, the glory and the illustriousness of their position, and they +are not forced by wholesome fear of the means of coercion wielded by the +moral administration to control themselves, to exercise and develop +their organic powers of inhibition. The elevation of this fact of the +Immorality of the state to a theory that the state is not bound by moral +law, is derived from the conception which philosophers of all ages, +from ancient times to the present day, have formed of the character and +the purpose of the state. Plato, in the Republic, maintains the +omnipotence of the state, which nothing and no one can limit; and +Aristotle, not rising to such heights of error as his master, says more +soberly: "It is a grave mistake to believe that every citizen is his own +master." The Italian philosopher Filangieri considers the guiding +principle and motive power of the state to be "love of power," which a +fool three centuries later called the "will to power," whereupon other +fools declared this to be a brand-new discovery. + +Hegel goes farthest of all in his idolatry of the state; according to +him the state is not alone moral, but Morality itself, just as God is +according to the theologians. As it would be arrogant blasphemy to +characterize anything that God ordains as immoral, as it would be +nonsensical to wish to impose upon God a moral law from outside, not +emanating from Him, to which He would have to submit even against His +will, so it is reprehensible to judge the actions of the state by the +standard of individual Morality; and it is equally absurd to admit any +moral coercion imposed on the state from outside, any guiding principle +other than the law of its necessities and the logic which indicates the +means needed to attain the necessary end. + +According to Treitschke the state is the highest form of human +existence; nothing higher than the state exists. He has never asked +himself the question whether, after all, humanity itself is not superior +to the state which is the form, a form, of its existence and therefore +not its essence. + +From his conviction that the state is the highest thing existing, +Treitschke concludes that certain moral duties, e.g. that of +self-sacrifice, cannot possibly exist for the state. "The individual is +to sacrifice himself for the sake of a higher community of which he is a +member; but the state is itself the highest thing in the outer community +of mankind, therefore it can never be confronted with the duty of +self-destruction." + +How obvious that seems! How grossly mistaken it is all the same! First +of all the state is not the highest thing; there is something higher, +and that is humanity; if then we recognize a moral duty of +self-sacrifice for humanity, theoretically this duty may arise just as +much for the state as for the individual. + +Secondly, the idea that owing to Morality the state might one day +actually be in such a position as to be forced to sacrifice itself is +the most shocking nonsense. How could that possibly be? If the state +always acts with strict Morality towards its citizens and foreign +states, it is simply impossible that it should have to sacrifice its +existence in the fulfilment of some task; for tasks only arise when, and +as long as, the state exists. Once it is disintegrated there can be no +task, either theoretically or practically, for it to accomplish, +therefore it cannot have to sacrifice itself for such a task. But if the +Immorality of another state, or of a minority of its citizens, should +endanger it, threaten it with an unjust attack from within or without, +then there is no rule of Morality that can forbid it to defend itself +to the last, and its self-sacrifice could then only be a result of its +complete annihilation in a justifiable war of necessity. On the other +hand, even the most unscrupulous practical politicians do not possess +any absolute guarantee against defeat, though they declare a war of +aggression to be permissible, whether waged on account of an itching for +power, for purposes of conquest, for the winning of prestige, +predominance or economic advantages. + +Thirdly and lastly, the duty of self-sacrifice for the state can only be +envisaged and seriously discussed, if the state be conceived as a person +to whom the duty of Morality applies in every way; but this conception +is mystic anthropomorphism, not sober, sensible recognition of realities +such as the practical politicians love to boast of. + +For, as a matter of fact, the state is not a person but a concept, an +institution created by man in the interests of one individual, of a few, +of many or of all; an organization of habits and interests, a relation +in which individuals live together. The mysticism of the weak-minded has +transformed it into a person with human features, with the qualities, +desires, duties, and aims of an individual; these men are intellectually +incapable of penetrating to the fundamental facts underlying the +concept, and cling entirely to word-pictures which are mere verbalism. +Scholasticism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was chiefly occupied +in a quarrel about Nominalism and Realism. It was allowed to drop and +was not fought out to a decision. Perhaps because it is impossible to +convince these superficial babblers who take a name or a word for an +object actually existent in time and space, that they are in error. The +fight between Abelard and Roscelet and that between the two of them and +Duns Scotus ought to be taken up again. Above all, one ought to knock it +into the heads of those who make a fetish of the state that it is a mere +word, the famous "_flatus vocis_" of the Nominalists, which they +worship, to which they build altars and make human sacrifices. + +This humiliating form of idolatry is practised by the school of +sociologists known as organicistic, as well as by the practical +politicians. This school maintains that the individual has no +independent existence at all, that he continues to exist only in the +community, by the community, as a totally subordinate, dependent and +incomplete fraction of the community; that the only real thing in the +species is society, the state; that this must be regarded as a living +organism, in which the individual human being is merely a cell which in +solitude, outside the community and detached from it, is as little +capable of life and has as little significance as a cell separated from +a highly differentiated creature, such as a man or some other mammal. In +my book "_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" (The Meaning of History), I threw as +much light as I possibly could on this superstition, and I pointed out +in detail its lack of sense as well as its dangers. I can, therefore, +content myself here with a resume and a few indications. + +There is nothing mysterious or supernatural about the historic or even +the prehistoric origin of the state; part we can learn from reliable +documentary evidence, part we can gather with certainty from obvious +facts. From the primitive human family, which more probably consisted of +a pair than of a man and several women, there arose the formless horde, +a crowd of individuals of all ages, connected by blood; this developed +into a tribe in which age, strength, courage and intelligence were +appreciated in a certain order, and thereby were produced the beginnings +of discipline, co-operation and regularized mutual relations; that is to +say, of organization. This embryo of later formations, this sketchy +beginning of an economic and political community, evolved more definite +and differentiated forms when the wandering huntsmen and shepherds, +seeking prolific hunting grounds and pasture lands, and later on arable +land too, came upon other groups of men and fought with them for the +possession of the desired domain. In the conflict strong and brave men +came to the front, and the victor became the natural, and for the most +part willingly recognized, leader and master of his companions, while +any who opposed him were reduced by force to submit to his authority. +The state crystallized around this war-hero, and by all its members its +aim was clearly and obviously recognized to be defence and the increase +of property outside the state; that is, the warding off of attacks by +foreign robbers and acquisitive invasions of neighbouring domains--wars +of defence and conquest, but always war; and within the state the +maintenance of a certain measure of safety for individuals. This safety, +however, had to be purchased dearly by the limitation, often enough the +complete surrender, of the right of self-determination, of independence +of will and freedom; so dearly, in fact, that the price was far higher +than the value of the advantages acquired. + +The leader in warfare became the ruler and bequeathed his privileges to +his descendants. The state was he himself, the land his property, the +people his family in the old sense of the word--that is, his kindred, +his servants, his slaves. His comrades in arms who had most +distinguished themselves became an aristocracy of the sword, the +supporters and tools of his power, though often enough they became his +rebellious rivals and overthrew him. Defeated enemies were robbed of all +their possessions and slaughtered; later on they were degraded to serfs, +a position little better than that of beasts of burden. A regular +parasitism developed, by means of which the ruler and his companions in +arms exploited the subjugated and productive masses for their own +profit. + +The acute form of this parasitism was warfare in its chronic form, its +prolongation in times of peace, the extortion of contributions and +duties, the imposition of taxes and forced labour from the people. The +ruler was clever enough to provide himself with a moral right to his +exercise of brute force, by inventing a divine origin for his person and +power, and making worship of his person an essential tenet of the +national religion. The systematic suppression of the masses without +rights became the universal practice of the ruler and of the instruments +of his power, and this gradually spread to the higher classes who could +still play the master to the lower strata, but were of no more account +than the vulgar herd in the eyes of the ruler, having to bow their +proud heads beneath the same yoke. A very few races followed a different +course of development from the primitive horde to an organized state. +They remained free members of the community with equal rights, they +allowed no hereditary ruler from among themselves to become their +superior, and governed themselves as republicans, who nevertheless also +waged war without exception, either forced thereto by the attacks of +greedy neighbours or lured into doing so by the example of the +monarchies within their purview or by lust for booty. In warfare they +won slaves and subjects, and changed into oligarchies, most often into +despotic states, and before they ultimately declined to the parasitism +of a single man and his aids fell victims to a collective parasitism +which gave the conquered and subjugated population up to the spoliation +of the victors. + +Up till modern times the state preserved the character of a private +domain belonging to the ruler and his house. Wars were waged in the +interests of dynasties, and as late as the eighteenth century the +succession in Spain and in certain provinces of Austria was the origin +and purpose of various campaigns. The French Revolution first wrought a +change in this. Since this great event it has been impossible to plunge +any European state into war in order to support the claims to property, +more or less legally justified, made by its ruling house. The people +have taken the place of princes, and now the principle of nationalities +furnishes the reason or excuse for bloody conflicts between states; and +this has become a factor in modern politics and history merely because +dynasties had built up their realms regardless of the origin and +language of the inhabitants of the districts which they had conquered, +stolen, bought, or acquired by exchange, by marriage or by inheritance, +and were indifferent to the national unity of their subjects as long as +they could gain possession of the country and the people. + +From the time of its first vague beginnings up till the rise of modern +democracy, the state has been nothing but a means of parasitism in the +hands of the ruling person or group, and an instrument for the +preparation for, and the waging of, war. All the state's tasks, which +apparently lie outside the sphere of war, if they are carefully +examined, will be found, after all, to aim at efficiency in war, and it +has gradually selected these tasks from the simple consideration that +their execution increases the guarantees of success in warfare and in +government. + +The deification of the ruler in Asiatic and Egyptian lands, the +unconditional identification of the realm with his person, the uniform +enslavement of the whole people, its naive exploitation for the sole +benefit of the sovereign and his assistants are no longer possible in +Europe at the present day. The development of the nations to a higher +plane of civilization and a clearer consciousness of their own worth +forced the state to alter its constitution to a certain extent and to +devote itself, at least theoretically, more to the interests of its +citizens than the service of its prince. The intellectual constructions +of the eighteenth century correspond to no historical reality. The +Social Contract, the inception of which J. J. Rousseau described so +graphically, was never made. Hutcheson, who had expressed the idea long +before the enthusiast of Geneva, conceived it only as the epitome of the +principles which the state should embody; according to Hume, the +relations of the citizens to each other and to the state are a tacit +contract which need not be explicitly formulated, because it originates +in human nature; and Fichte even assures us that Rousseau himself did +not mean his Social Contract to be taken literally. According to him it +was only an idea. But societies must act in pursuance of this idea, and +they were founded, if not actually, yet legally upon an unwritten +contract. Anyway, the ideas of Hutcheson, Hume and Rousseau have +nowadays been assimilated by the general consciousness. The masses +believe in the natural, inborn rights of man, some of which he certainly +has surrendered in favour of the community; they demand and expect of +the state that it should serve their just interests, and they are no +longer ready to be made use of by the ruler and a powerful, often very +small, minority, for purposes which are foreign to them, which they do +not know, and for which they do not care. + +Those who juggle with words, who talk dark and mysterious nonsense about +the concept of the state, or dogmatize fanatically on the subject, +contemptuously call this conception of the nature of the state and the +relation of its citizens to it shallow rationalism, and from the heights +of their supposed knowledge they look down disdainfully upon arguments +which they libellously call the laymen's babble. They are only in part +bumptious fools who pretend that uncritical, parrotlike repetition of +traditional formulae is erudition and confused thought is profundity, and +who declare the clear-headed men who mock their silly mysticism, their +superstitious dread of word phantoms, to be simply incapable of +understanding their depth. Partly they are very sly toadies, very +cunning sycophants of power, or ruthless egoists, unscrupulous +freebooters, who pretend to be enthusiastic and devout apostles of the +divinity of the state and demand the most humble submission, adoration +and unconditional devotion in order that, as priests in its temple, they +may grind their own axes at its altars. + +Such are those folk who maintain the double thesis that the state is +everything, the individual nothing, the former the sole reality, the +latter without any separate existence, and that the state, as mankind's +highest form of existence, need recognize nothing as superior to itself, +neither right nor law, and may therefore take as sole guide for its +actions its own interests and not Morality. + +You cannot maintain a single one of these contentions unless you and all +men are deprived of reasoning power; they crumble away instantly in the +light of Reason. It is not true that the state alone is real and that it +is superior to the individual, not only because of the forces at its +disposal, the complex of which it represents, but also as an entity, as +a thought, a principle. The individual alone in the species, that is, +living, feeling, thinking and acting man, is real. The individual +created the state out of himself. He can also destroy it. The practical +politicians above all people should be of this opinion; as he can do +it, he may do it; as he has the power to do it, he has the right to do +it. The individualist will not make this a question of law, but will +simply assert that, though the individual is the father of the state, +yet he has no reasonable grounds for destroying it, so long as it makes +no murderous attacks on its creator. The individual did not create the +state consciously, intentionally and formally by means of a social +contract, but naturally and organically, under pressure of +circumstances. It is clearly to his interests to maintain it, to furnish +the necessary means for its existence and efficiency, but always on the +one condition that the state should really protect and promote the +interests of the individual, lighten his burdens in the struggle for +existence, and make that prosperity, comfort and happiness possible +which he cannot secure unaided in his struggle with the hostile forces +of Nature and with rival fellow-men. + +But if the state oppresses the individual with burdens and duties which +he feels no inner necessity to fulfil, if it confiscates him, body and +soul, instead of respecting his freedom and his right to +self-determination, then the assumption falls to the ground; the state +is no longer an institution which benefits the individual; it is +inimical to the individual, hinders him in his struggle for existence, +destroys his happiness; and he obeys his primitive instinct for +self-preservation if he turns against it, masters it as he would a +monster, draws its teeth and claws, and forces it back to the place it +was meant to occupy, that of a docile and industrious servant of the +individual, not of one individual who aspires to rule the others, but of +all individuals who are of the people that make up the state. + +I consider it unnecessary and a little ridiculous to quote authorities +in support of the statement that twice two are four; what is reasonable +and clear is convincing without further recommendation; nevertheless, it +is a fact that may be worthy of mention that some of the best intellects +of all nations have sided with the individual against the state. On the +one side we have Plato, whose ideal is Sparta and who would like to see +the despotism of this model state and its communal meals completed by +the addition of community of property, of wives, and of children; we +have Hegel, who has gone farther than any one in his idolatry of the +state; we have Auguste Comte, who, in his zeal for his newly founded +science of Sociology, conceives society as an organism biologically +superior to the individual, and thereby has become the father of the +Organicists. But against these we can put the Englishman, Jeremy +Bentham, the embodiment of sound common sense, whom the muddle-headed +fools that pose as deep thinkers have good reason to hate and fear, and +whom they try to depreciate as vulgar and shallow; further, his +compatriot, Herbert Spencer, who is his kindred spirit; the Frenchman, +Frederic Bastiat, whose writings sparkle with flashes of wit; the +German, Wilhelm Humboldt, who bravely and successfully combated the +state tyranny defended by Fichte. All these are convinced individualists +who adduce irrefutable reasons for their views. We may also include +Kant among them, as he gave utterance to this decisive sentence: "Man is +his own aim and end, and must never be a mere means"; consequently it is +never permissible to sacrifice the sovereignty of one's own person to +that of the state, or make use of it for the realization of political +aims by disregarding, and doing violence to, one's right of +self-determination. Harald Hoefding contends that progress should be +measured by the extent to which, in Kant's sense of the words, man is +recognized to be his own aim and end; but that is not only a measure of +progress, it is the measure of all civilization. + +For civilization, to my idea, means a state worthy of man, implying his +mental, moral and material independence of all motive forces other than +those of his own nature; its aim is the most complete attainment +possible of this independence; its measure the extent to which the +individual determines his own fate and is able to ward off from it +undesired outside influences. At the first awakening of his +consciousness primitive man was aware of being exposed to unknown forces +which controlled him at will and against which his will was powerless. +From the very beginning, at first dimly and then more and more clearly, +man has felt this to be unworthy and intolerable. The best of the +species have always laboured with all their strength to liberate +themselves, and the great ambition of man throughout his development has +always been not submissively to accept whatever fate was accorded him, +but to work out his destiny according to his needs and his own ideas. + +The anguish caused by wretched dependence upon external forces is the +origin of religion as of superstition, which both spring from the same +root. With the anthropomorphism peculiar to the earliest stages of +thought, man personified the mysterious powers which ruled his fate. He +created gods for himself, and then, as far as his knowledge permitted, +he sought some relation between himself and them, and tried to get at +them by every means available. He imagined them like unto himself, that +is, vain, capricious, greedy, easily frightened by dark threats, and +then, very reasonably on this hypothesis, he importuned them with +prayers, sacrifices, hymns of praise and vows, as well as magic formulae +and incantations, always with the inflexible intention of making them +serve his purposes, not of serving theirs. The contrite Jewish prayer: +"Thy will be done, Lord, Thy will, not mine," is a new trait in the +religious thought of man. The heathen always strives to have his will +done in opposition to that of the gods, and to divert them from their +decisions if he dislikes them. + +In a state of advanced development theological thought gave way before +the scientific. Man learnt to conceive Nature's rule, not +transcendentally, but intrinsically. He recognized that the forces +around him, which so often crossed his purpose, are not to be influenced +by prayer and sacrifice, but that it is expedient and possible to +discover their character and the conditions of their activity. By dint +of long-sustained efforts he has succeeded in effectively standing up to +hostile Nature and in warding off her undesired interference in his +destiny. If the tribulations, which formerly suddenly brought his +schemes to nought and often destroyed him, are not entirely overcome, it +is merely because his practice does not conform closely enough to the +directions evolved by his theoretical knowledge, because he is too +careless or too clumsy to make proper use of the weapons against the +elements with which science has armed him. + +But this same man, who has learnt to be a match for Nature, his creator, +is powerless against his creature, the state. He can neither evade it +nor escape from it. The state disposes of him without his consent, +against his most obvious interests, in spite of his powerless +opposition; it hurls him hither and thither, annihilates him, crushes +him by its will and is unmoved by the will of the individual. + +True, man has sought to maintain his right of self-determination against +the forces of politics, as against all others that broke his will and +intervened in his life without his consent. For thousands of years all +state development has tried to protect the modest individual, lost in +the crowd and featureless, but nevertheless a person, that is, a world +to himself, against the arbitrariness of rulers or leading statesmen. +That is the one unchanging tendency which leads from Harmodius and +Aristogeiton, the slayers of a tyrant, the rebellion of the elder +Brutus, the murder of Caesar, by way of the Revolt of the Netherlands and +the execution of Charles I of England, to the great Revolution, the +risings of 1848 and the struggle for constitutional government in all +states of the Old World and the New. The formula has long been +discovered whereby the individual can maintain the dignity of his +sovereign personality and his own responsibility for the shaping of his +destiny. It is civil freedom, constitutionalism, sovereignty of the +people. There are arrangements, carefully thought out, nicely weighed, +cleverly worked out to the smallest detail, by which the individual is +fitted into his place in the community without being deprived of the +management of his own affairs, by which the sacrifices needful for the +fulfilment of collective tasks are exacted without his being reduced to +a condition of slavery, by which the independence of the individual is +safeguarded and yet a state of chaos and anarchy is avoided. + +But this formula fares as do the doctrines of science: hitherto it has +remained a theory everywhere. The franchise, representation of the +people, responsibility of ministers, constitutional limitation of the +ruler's power, are infallibly effective weapons or instruments, but no +people has yet learnt how to handle them rightly. That is why pessimists +speak of the bankruptcy of civilization, that is why the aim of +civilization, the liberation of the person and the enforcement of its +sovereignty, has nowhere been attained, that is why, to quote Napoleon I +in his interview with Goethe at Erfurt, "In our times the power of fate +is politics." And yet all these institutions of a modern constitutional +state, from the ballot-paper and the voting of taxes in Parliament to +the enforced resignation of the ministry on a vote of censure and the +oath of the ruler to observe the constitution, recognize the rights of +the individual as opposed to the state, and at least theoretically give +the lie to the bold declaration that the state is everything and the +individual nothing. + +It is no less untrue to say that the state is superior to Morality and +is not bound by it. In order to prove this we need only be brave enough +not to be intimidated by the mysterious mien and gestures and the dark, +pompous phrases of the mystics who worship the state, and to penetrate +to the real, conceptual idea of the word. + +The hocus pocus that the worshippers of the state perform around their +idol puts one in mind of Kempelen, who created a sensation with his +automaton in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This figure, got +up as a Turkish woman, gave rise to astonishment and, among not a few, +to superstitious fear. It played chess, and so well, too, that it almost +always succeeded in winning, even against its most skilled opponents. +People cudgelled their brains to solve the riddle, all sorts of +explanations were suggested, one more impossible than the other, but +still the mystery remained dark, until the owner, having made enough +money and sick of the part of an itinerant swindler, revealed the trick. +In the hollow figure there sat a clever chess player who worked its +hands and with them carried out the moves on the board. + +This anecdote can be applied literally to the state. Simpletons, drunk +with phrases, and cunning cheats contend that the state is a +supernatural creation in which the "spirit of the universe," the "spirit +of history" takes shape, and through which it realizes its aims; these +aims, utterly transcending the understanding of the individual, are +unintelligible to man. Such overwhelming phrases strike the simple, +credulous hearer dumb and send cold shudders of awe up his spine. But +let us look at the inside of this magic machine whose works are driven +by the "spirit of the world" and with whose help this spirit fulfils its +impenetrable designs. What do we find? Men, quite ordinary mortals, who +sit in the machine and work its levers; men whose intellectual powers +are only in rare cases superior to those of their enslaved subjects +bereft of will; men who are, as a rule, of average intelligence and not +seldom even below the average. + +These men are the rulers, ministers who cling to office, high officials, +party leaders and professional politicians who would like to become +ministers, generals who seek to make themselves conspicuous, publicists +who hope to derive personal profit by dint of bowing and scraping before +the men in power, by flattering the stupidest and most despicable +prejudices of the masses, or even by implanting such prejudices with +persuasive talk and purposely leading them astray. These men are formed +on the same model as all individuals of the species and are therefore +full of human weaknesses, a prey to all human desires, moved by all +human impulses. They are selfish, vain, the sport of likes and dislikes, +of self-deception as to the value of their ideas, opinions and +judgments, disputatious, arrogant, greedy of possessions, power and +pleasure, spurred by the instinct to magnify and swell their personality +and impose it upon others. And these men are to be liberated from the +discipline of the moral law? They are to be superior to the moral law? + +For whom, then, was the moral law created and developed if not for these +men--whose actions, although they spring from the same motives and +aspire to the same satisfaction of self as those of all other men, can +be fraught with consequences incomparably more evil, because they make +use of the state machine for their purposes. Through the force and +momentum given by the machinery of the state these actions are +boundlessly augmented, their range being indefinitely increased and +their results multiplied a thousandfold. The simplest logic shows that +these men within the state machine, rendered so specially dangerous by +their terrible armament and weapons, far from being liberated from the +coercion of moral law, ought to be subjected to it with extraordinary +severity, a severity which should be greater than that which suffices +for the average man, in proportion as their power to do harm is greater +than that of the man in the street. + +Now all this time, rather carelessly, or at any rate weakly, I am making +a concession to the pious devotees of the religion of the state, by +speaking of the state machine,--a dubious expression, coined to deceive +by rousing superstitious ideas. The phrase is a picture, a rhetorical +figure that one must be careful not to take literally. There is no state +machine. There is only a relation of men to one another and to +traditional habits, organized rules of command, obedience and equable +conduct--habits into which the community of men has fallen in accordance +with the law of least resistance, in order to promote their own +interests, at least theoretically, without being forced to exert +themselves continually to form new judgments, decisions and +arrangements which the ever-shifting, ever-changing conditions of life +render necessary. + +Here again, behind the word, we find men, always only men. Just as those +who command, from whose will all state action emanates, are men, so also +the instruments by which they carry out their decisions are only +metaphorically speaking, levers and wheels, parts of a machine of steel +and iron; in reality they are officials, soldiers and policemen, they +are judges and bailiffs; in short, they are men. And these men, who in +all private relations with their fellow men are sternly required to +submit to the dictates of Morality and the demands of the Law, are the +same on whom other men, the leaders of the state, impose the duty of +breaking all these precepts and laws; as ambassadors they must deny and +dishonour the signatures to treaties; as leaders or paid servants of the +press bureau they must systematically spread lies; as attorneys of the +state they must persecute and maltreat those who tell the truth; as +policemen they must tear the fathers of families from wife and children +and hunt them into the barracks; as soldiers they must invade a foreign +land, murder unknown and innocent men, rob them of their property, burn +down their houses, lay waste their lands, in a word, do everything that +is punishable with prison and gallows; they must perpetrate all crimes +which the aim and end of Morality and Law are to prevent and condemn. If +one defends such action, where can one find the courage and the +justification to require these men at one time to honour the Ten +Commandments and at another to disregard them, to be criminals in the +name of the state in the morning and to be moral private persons and +law-abiding citizens in the afternoon? After all, they only have one +nature, one mind, one character and one set of perceptive faculties. + +To realize the monstrosity of this doctrine of twofold Morality, public +and private, and of the non-compulsoriness of moral law for the state, +it suffices to refer again to the fundamental concepts of Morality. +Individuals have banded themselves together in a community in order to +be able to live more easily, or to live at all, under the present +conditions obtaining on our planet. Lest society should be disintegrated +by the quarrels of its members, and the latter should find themselves +exposed single-handed to a hopeless struggle for existence, a limitation +of their unfettered whims and desires, the curbing of their selfishness, +control of their impulses and the exercise of consideration for their +neighbours have been imposed upon them. + +This coercion is Morality, and society can enforce it by vigorous +measures; but for the most part this is unnecessary, for society has +inculcated in its members the faculty of urging upon themselves in every +situation the dictates of the community and of insisting on obedience to +them. This faculty is conscience. The means by which conscience, +inspired and assisted by reason, determines the will to keep in check or +to suppress organic impulses and inclinations, desires and appetites, is +inhibition; moreover, the development and strengthening of inhibition +does not alone promote the aims of the community, but is of the highest +biological importance to the individual himself, apart from his +relations to society, as it renders him stronger and more efficient, +differentiates him more subtly, and raises him to a higher level of +development. + +Now the state is a special development of society; it owes its existence +to the same necessities as the latter, its task is to minimize the +struggle for existence for the individual, to protect him from avoidable +dangers and to ensure the safety of his life, the fruits of his labour +and that measure of freedom which is compatible with life in a +community. But if the state puts an end to the coercion instituted by +the community and therefore by the state itself; if it does away with +Morality for itself, that is, for a number of individuals, be they few +or many, that act in its name; if it allows selfishness, appetites and +ruthlessness to have the same free play as with creatures of a lower +order than man, or as with men before they formed themselves into +communities; if in the pursuit of its plans beyond the bounds of +Morality it intensifies the struggle for existence in a tragic manner, +exposes men to the most terrible dangers, brutally destroys their +liberty, gravely threatens their life and property or even devotes them +to ruin--why, then it destroys the assumptions on which the state itself +is based, denies its own aim, deprives itself of any right to existence, +and the individuals have thenceforward but one interest, namely, to +drive away this bogey of the state and with all possible means to force +the men, who make use of it and the superstitions clinging to it, to +respect the moral law which the community has created to overwhelm +anti-social, immoral individuals, to render them harmless and if +necessary to destroy them. + +One point there is on which the Machiavellian or practical politicians +are particularly fond of talking nonsense, and that is the state's +loyalty to treaties. Is the state bound by a treaty? Must it honour its +signature? Must it perform what it has undertaken to do? The detestable, +unanimous answer is "No. A treaty cannot hinder the state from doing +what its interest demands." Prince Bismarck is often cited on this +point, as he once said: "The only sound foundation for the state is +state egoism." And another time: "A treaty is only valid _rebus sic +stantibus_, if the situation is the same as when it was concluded; if +the circumstances change, it becomes invalid by the very fact." Such +views are revolting, however great a name be appended to them. Contract, +or treaty, is the basis of the law. Whoever breaks it is dishonoured, +and doubly dishonoured is he who from the beginning enters upon it with +the idea at the back of his mind of deriving every possible advantage +from it and of breaking it when the time comes to fulfil obligations. + +The phrase, "sound egoism," whether it refer to a private person or to +the state, must make every decent man blush for shame. Egoism may be +sound, but it is always the contrary of moral. It is just as convenient +for the individual as for the state to think only of his own advantage +and unhesitatingly to sacrifice his neighbour's rights to it; but +Morality arose and was constituted a rule of human relations in order +to break the back of this selfishness and to teach man consideration for +his neighbour. It is no valid excuse to say that state egoism is no sin, +but a virtue and a merit, that it is different in character from the +egoism of the individual. That is not true. It is not different in +character. It is of exactly the same character as in private life. The +responsible leader of the state who is guilty of a breach of treaty +makes believe to himself and others that he does not do it for his own +sake, but in the interests of the state. But who is the state? I have +already given the answer to this. The state consists of men, the +interests served by a breach of treaty are those of men, not, as a rule, +of all, not even of many members of the state, but of a few, of a class, +a group, perhaps of only one family whose power, wealth and reputation +it is intended to increase. So-called state egoism is in actual fact the +private egoism of many individuals, who break the law, or tolerate and +condone a breach of the law, for the sake of pocketing ill-gotten gains; +and no one is so stupid as to let himself be bamboozled into believing +that the shameful crime of breaking a treaty for the purpose of "sound" +egoistic grabbing becomes moral when it is perpetrated not by one +individual but by thousands or millions of individuals. + +The _reservatio mentalis_, too, of "_rebus sic stantibus_" is an +unwarrantable and wicked reservation. Nothing prevents a decent man when +making a contract from adding a clause reserving the right to terminate +it if the essential conditions should change. If the other party to the +contract does not agree to this, well, then the contract cannot be +concluded. But to sign it with the mental reservation that one will +disavow one's signature if the obligations undertaken become irksome, +that is swindling. There is one consideration so simple that it is +inconceivable that those who break contracts do not realize it. In some +concrete case the leader of the state judges it to be profitable to the +state to disregard good faith. What guarantee has he that his judgment +is right? He is a man, and no man is infallible. But all mankind have +made good faith the foundation of their life in communities, and if a +single man has the temerity to draw a conclusion violating the immutable +convictions and doctrines of all mankind, he must be mad not to see that +most probably he is wrong and that all mankind in every age and every +clime is right. I have left out of consideration the fact that any +possible advantage arising from the breach of faith would not excuse him +morally, and setting aside the ethical aspect of the case, I dwell only +on the logical argument. + +There is one case and one only in which a contract is not binding, +either on the state or on the private individual, and that is when the +signatory was forced to enter upon it with a knife at his throat. +Obligations which a victor imposes on his defeated and disarmed opponent +are by their very nature invalid. The old cry of Brennus: "_Vae +victis!_" is might and cannot constitute a right. Civil law calls this +kind of thing compulsion and decrees that it invalidates any contract. +Only a pedantic mind, stupid and depraved, immersed in hair-splitting +trickery and incapable of a straight thought, could complacently +maintain in the face of all common sense that might and compulsion, far +from doing away with right, are the source of all right. The silly +formula coined for this is: "Might is right." Might may be a fact, but +it is not right. The source of right is not might but Morality, which +might disavows and destroys. The necessary condition of any obligation +which is to be valid is freedom. Kant proved this, but his proof was +unnecessary, for it is self-evident. A forced treaty is no treaty, for +it is the victor's fist which has guided the hand of the vanquished, and +it is he who wrote the latter's signature under the document. The will, +the consciousness of the seeming signatory were absent at the time. + +But the worst and most immoral action of the state, beside which a +breach of treaty for selfish reasons pales to insignificance, is the war +of aggression for purposes of profit, that is, for the conquest of +territory, extortion of money, increase of power, or fame. War is the +quintessence of all crimes against life and property, against the body +and mind of a person, the prevention of which is the aim and object of +all Morality and all laws derived from it. Any means are permissible +whereby this wickedness may be prevented; the war of defence, waged by +the party attacked, is not only justified but sacred, as are the +functions of the institutions that society has developed to hunt down +and punish those who do not respect Morality and Law. And just as it is +the duty of every society to maintain courts of justice, police and +prisons, so it is the duty of every state to be well armed, well versed +in the use of weapons and strong, so long as it must count on the fact +that there are practical politicians who do not recognize Morality as +binding the state, and nations that are ready on the first hint of their +leaders to perpetrate every crime that conscience, the Ten Commandments +and penal law forbid. + +It is idle, in my opinion, to discuss the question whether war will ever +disappear from the world. It serves no purpose to contradict those who +declare it to be eternal. It is possible that it will continue to exist +as long as there is vice, sin and crime; and I do not believe that these +will ever be completely exterminated. Among mankind there will probably +never be a lack of sick and depraved people whose selfishness is +monstrously exaggerated, whose instincts urge them with stormy violence, +whose powers of inhibition are scantily developed or altogether wanting, +who suffer from anaesthesia of the feelings and are therefore incapable +of any sympathy with their fellow men and who are mentally too weak to +foresee the results of their actions. Individuals of this kind are born +criminals whose existence society will probably never be able to prevent +and against whom it is obliged to protect itself. Now war arises from +the same psychic conditions as the antisocial actions of these born +criminals, and therefore the pessimists may be right in maintaining that +it can never be abolished. But it is one thing to assert the existence +of a deplorable fact and quite another to glorify it. To say that war is +a part of the universe constituted by God is blasphemy, even though the +saying emanates from Moltke. To extol war ecstatically and to sing hymns +of praise to it, to declare that it evokes the highest virtues of man is +a panegyric of crime, a thing anticipated and punishable in the penal +code. + +I am not here attempting to solve the problem of what practical measures +can be taken whereby right may be set in the place of might in +inter-state relations, and instead of ruthless selfishness, Morality, +that is, self-control, consideration and respect for the just claims of +one's fellow men and love of one's neighbour. That is as far beyond the +scope of this work as is the investigation of the methods of education, +criminal justice, police organization or prison conditions intended to +deal with the tide of crime and to stem it as far as possible. I am +concerned with moral philosophy, and from that point of view I show that +all Morality is rooted in the desire of men to live together peaceably +in a society, to have greater security of life and property, greater +possibilities of happiness, and that the same needs must impose the +rules of Morality upon states in their relations to one another. +According to Hobbes the primitive condition of mankind is that of a war +of every man against all other men, and only the creation of society +makes an end of it. But if the state unleashes the dogs of aggressive +warfare it hurls mankind back into its primitive condition and destroys +the work it was created to do. The Stoic Seneca says: "_Homo sacra res +homini_," "Man is sacred to man." The practical politicians who praise +war repeat with Hobbes: "_Homo homini lupus_," "Man is a wolf to man." +The moral man demands a return from Hobbes to Seneca. If it has been +possible in the state to tame the wolfish instincts of the individual +and to make him bow down before Custom and Law, it must be equally +possible to do so in the relations of states to one another. He who +denies this in principle disavows Morality altogether, not only for the +state but also for the individual; he who admits it in principle but in +practice scornfully disregards it is a bandit, and it is desirable to +treat him like any other robber and murderer who, to satisfy his wolfish +appetites, tramples on Morality and Right and acts like a wild beast. + +To this, however, the Moralist will object sadly, and the practical +politician with scornful superiority, that the state has created +institutions for suppressing the bandit, but that there are none such to +control bandit states, and that self-defence alone, the only means of +self-protection for man in Hobbes's primitive condition, can gain a +footing between them. Clearly only the party attacked is in a state of +self-defence, but the bandit who has a sufficient sense of humour to +play the pettifogging lawyer can always maintain that attack is also +self-defence, the preventive form of self-defence. The answer to this +is: if society has managed to provide judges and police in order to +secure peace, then mankind will for the same purpose learn how to +provide courts of justice and a police force to deal with the bandits of +practical politics who endanger peace among nations. But that is a +practical question, not a theoretical one, not a principle of moral +philosophy. The latter shows irrefutably that there is only one +Morality, not a private one and a public one which is its negation, not +one kind for the individual and another for politics, for the state. + +He who defends the thesis of a twofold Morality merely shows that he +does not possess simple Morality. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY + + +Theological thought is faced with a problem in ethics which presents the +greatest difficulties. It is the problem of Free Will. + +Is man who perceives, judges, has volition and acts, a free being +inwardly? Can he, guided only by his own reasonable thoughts and +conclusions, determined entirely by his own inner impulses and +uninfluenced by outer circumstances, choose one or the other of two +conflicting possibilities? When he has to make a decision, is he always +like Hercules at the cross-roads who has to make up his mind alone as to +which path he shall take, whether he is to follow quiet, modest virtue, +or alluring, voluptuous vice? Does he do evil because he willed to do so +and not otherwise, although it was in his power to avoid it? Does he +decide for the good, because after due investigation and consideration +he recognized it as preferable, though he might have rejected it? Or is +man always subject to coercion from which at no time and no place he can +escape? Are all his actions determined by the law of Nature which +regulates every one of his movements just as mechanically as the course +of the stars or the fall of a body to our earth when its support is +removed? Is he an automaton, set going by cosmic forces, who possesses +the doubtful privilege consciously to be able to follow the turning of +his wheels, the action of his levers, rods and indicators and to listen +to their humming and knocking without being allowed to interfere in +their movements or to change the least thing in their functions or work? +Is he fettered by the chain of causes which have existed eternally and +continue to act immutably to all eternity? + +Theological thought is condemned to find an answer to the question of +freedom or determinism, as it is the necessary condition for the +essential concepts of the theological doctrine of Morality, that is, the +concept of responsibility and those consequent upon this, namely, sin, +reward and punishment. For the true believer God is the source of +Morality. He Himself is Morality. What He ordains is good in itself and +cannot be otherwise, for there is no room for evil in His nature, since +if He could be conceived to do evil, it would by the very fact of His +doing it become good. A man, to be moral, must approximate to the nature +of God as nearly as it is granted to mortals to do. The moral law is +revealed by God's mercy to give man a light which shows him the right +path and lights him on his way. Thanks to Him the poor mortal is +relieved of the incertitude due to his limited mental powers and is +endowed with the priceless possession of a certain precept which he need +only obey in order to be sure of salvation. + +However, granted the correctness of this assumption, it is not +comprehensible how evil came into the world. It contradicts all +attributes with which faith has endowed the deity. It cannot appear +without God's knowledge, for He is omniscient and nothing is hidden +from Him. It cannot occur against His will, for He is omnipotent and +nothing resists His bidding. But least of all can it rage with His +knowledge and consent, for He is infinitely good and therefore does not +permit his creatures to fall victims to evil. But experience teaches us +that evil has a permanent place in human life, and this forces one to +the conclusion that either God is hard and cruel, and therefore not +infinitely good and not Morality itself, or that He has no knowledge of +evil and therefore is not omniscient, but, on the contrary, blind as +well as stupid, or that He sees the evil but cannot prevent it, and +therefore is not omnipotent and must recognize the existence of higher +powers than Himself against whom He is impotent. + +These terrifying conclusions have not escaped the notice of the devout, +and they have always made the most desperate efforts to evade them. Some +have chosen the easiest way out of the difficulty; they close their eyes +before the yawning abyss, fold their hands devoutly and invent pious +phrases about the inscrutable ways of Providence and its infinite +wisdom, which the weak intelligence of mortals cannot grasp. Others take +infinite pains; in the sweat of their brow they with difficulty evolve +tortuous and hypocritical explanations, which in reality explain +nothing, but in a mind which lends itself willingly to them give rise to +the illusion that the contradiction has been solved. Perhaps the most +astounding piece of work accomplished by this miserable juggling, or +this delusion of self by means of an exuberant flow of words, is +presented in the four volumes of the "Theodicee," by which Leibnitz +made himself a laughing-stock. Mazdeism has invented an alluring but at +the same time risky expedient. It lightly assumes that two principles +obtain in the universe, a good one and a bad one, the creator and the +destroyer, the merciful God and the cruel demon, Ormuzd and Ahriman. In +this way everything is easy to understand. Good is the work of radiant +Ormuzd, evil the deed of dark Ahriman. The two fight together with very +nearly equal forces, but this doctrine reveals the comforting prospect +of a distant future in which Ormuzd shall finally triumph over Ahriman, +and fills the trembling believer with elation at the thought that after +aeons of the tragic struggle between good and evil, at the end of the +world the curtain will fall on the victory of good. By this victory +Mazdeism, which claims to be monotheistic, rescues its single god, +although the introduction of a second principle of very nearly equal +power, which holds the one god in check for an immeasurable period of +time, brings this system perilously close to polytheism. + +To the purer monotheism of Christianity there is indeed something +repugnant in the assumption of a second, opposite principle of almost +equal power, but yet it has admitted the existence of the devil, who is +undoubtedly reminiscent of Ahriman. Only he lacks the independence of +the Mazdean demon. He is not on a footing of equality with God, but is +subject to Him as is every creature. He is not strong enough to oppose +God and can only do evil because God allows it. But why does He allow +it? Why does He tolerate the devil? Why can the latter proceed with his +evil work with God's consent? To this theology gives a crafty answer +which Goethe has clothed in the glorious beauty of inimitable poetry. +God has assigned to the devil the task of tempting man with all the arts +of seduction in order to give him the opportunity of testing and +developing his moral strength in resistance, of purging himself, of +attaining purity and salvation by his own efforts. In short, he exists +in order to give man a sort of Swedish gymnastics in virtue. The +struggle is not quite fair, for the devil is held by a halter and is +pulled up if he gets too big an advantage, and man is always assisted by +redeeming mercy, a hand being stretched out to him from the clouds which +sets him on his feet as often as he stumbles. But theology is not bound +by rules of sport. That is how the picture of the universe is presented +in "_Faust_." But he who painted it is the same Goethe who on another +occasion angrily complains: "You allow man to become guilty--and then +leave him to his suffering." Does the divinity allow man to fall a +victim to evil without turning it aside from him? Does he only try him +in order mercifully to rescue him at the moment when he is about to +succumb? Goethe does not answer this question without ambiguity. That is +not his business either. He may contradict himself. He is a poet who is +allowed to express contradictory views. He is not a theologian whose +duty it is, by means of a definite dogma, to support those who totter in +doubt. + +All these attempts to reconcile the attributes of the deity with the +fact that there is evil in the world which continually leads man into +danger, emanate from the explicit or tacit assumption that man possesses +Free Will. For if his will is not free and he does evil, then he does it +because he must and because he cannot do otherwise. But this must can +only come from the deity who is almighty; it is the deity who condemns +man, who forces him to do evil. Man therefore does evil as God's tool +without volition; therefore, as a matter of fact, it is God Himself who +does evil. But if God is capable of doing evil He is not Morality +itself, or every distinction between good and evil is destroyed, and we +must recognize what seems evil to us to be just as moral as what seems +good, because the one is as much the work of God as the other. But if +this is admitted, and it is logically impossible not to admit it, then +the whole foundation of transcendental, that is, of theological, ethics +breaks down. The latter is therefore forced, on pain of suicide, to +maintain that man has Free Will. + +But with this assertion theological ethics by no means disarms all the +objections which threaten its life. Renouvier's book on Free Will is +probably the most thorough and exhaustive work on this subject which has +been treated by thousands of thinkers and not a few babblers since the +time of the ancient Greeks, and he describes it as follows: "Will is +free and spontaneous if Reason cannot foretell its untrammelled action +at any time other than that at which it actually takes place." Renouvier +makes no limitation and no reservation. He does not say, "if human +reason cannot foretell its action," and this omission of the +particularizing adjective is not carelessness or a mistake on his part, +it is duly considered; for the prudent dialectician knows very well that +he would ruin his theory of Free Will if he only maintained that human +reason alone should be able to foretell its action. There are many +happenings which human reason cannot foretell, and which nevertheless +obey immutable laws and take place according to absolutely fixed rules +without the exercise of any inner freedom or authority on the part of +the individual. If human reason cannot foretell these happenings, it is +not because no external force of the universe determines them and they +are entirely spontaneous, but simply because the laws controlling them +are unknown. Therefore the impossibility of foretelling them is no proof +of their freedom, it is only a proof of the ignorance of the human mind. +There was a time when no human intellect could foretell the occurrence +of a solar or lunar eclipse. Was that because the heavenly bodies act +freely and are eclipsed only at their own spontaneous desire, when and +how they please? No, because man had not discovered and comprehended +their movements. To this very day we are unable to foretell the weather +on a particular day next year, or the result of the next harvest, or an +earthquake. Does this prove the freedom, the absolute independence of +these occurrences? No; it only proves the inadequacy of our knowledge. +Renouvier therefore would achieve nothing for his theory of Free Will, +if only human understanding were to be unable to foretell the actions of +the Will. That is why he does not say "human reason," but simply +"Reason." The essence of Free Will is that its actions altogether shall +be incapable of being foreseen; it is not in its nature to act in +accordance with some predetermination which must necessarily reckon with +outer circumstances and given forces; and the impossibility of +foretelling its actions exists not only for human Reason but for every +Reason--for Reason in general. + +For every Reason and therefore for the divine Reason as well. And now +theological ethics must find a way out of this dilemma: either God does +not foresee the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of +his omniscience, that is, of one of His essential attributes; or God +foresees the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of the +Freedom of the Will, the essence of which, according to Renouvier, lies +in the fact that it cannot be foreseen. For this impossibility of being +foreseen is indeed the quality by which Free Will stands or falls. Let +us realize the significance of this concept. Nothing can be foreseen +which will not with certainty occur. But whatever at some future time +will become a reality, must even now be virtually a reality for an +omniscient Reason not bound by the human categories of time and space, +since for this Reason neither proximity nor distance exists, but +everything is on one plane, and there is no future or past, but +everything is present. So if the divine Reason foresees now how the free +Will of man will act in the future, that is equivalent to saying that +this free Will is forced to act in the particular way which God foresees +and not otherwise. Therefore the Will is not free but, on the contrary, +strictly bound. It is obliged to make the event foreseen by God a fact, +as God can only foresee what must certainly come to pass, and a foreseen +event that does not happen would mean a mistake, a false assumption, of +which one cannot believe God capable without denying Him. This apparent +free Will is coercion at sight. As its action is foreseen by God, the +Will is subject to the law of fate, but a period of delay is granted. +Every movement of the supposedly free Will becomes a part of the order +of the universe which has been unalterably laid down from eternity, and +which the human Will cannot upset without burying God in the ruins. Man +may imagine that his Will is free. But that is self-deception, and he +can only indulge in it because what God sees clearly is hidden from him, +namely, the goal towards which, though he does not realize it, he is +inevitably led along strictly defined paths by the iron hand of fate. + +It would be unjust towards theology to say that it has never seen the +incompatibility of Free Will with divine omniscience. This has not +escaped its notice, but it has attempted by the use of familiar formulae +to get out of the difficulty. In his book _De libero Arbitrio_ Saint +Augustine stoutly maintains that the human Will is free, but he tries to +rescue the attributes of the deity by reserving to it the right or the +power to intervene by its mercy in the actions of the Will, if in its +freedom it comes to a decision which endangers the salvation of the +soul. Saint Thomas Aquinas takes good care not to differ in opinion from +the Bishop of Hippo. The reformers, Calvin, Luther and Bishop Jansen, +too, were better logicians than the patristic writers, and +unhesitatingly denied the freedom of the Will, but they did not notice +that they made God responsible for all the misdeeds of man, lacking +freedom and acting with God's foreknowledge and at His behest. The +Council of Trent scorned all these contradictions and unintelligible +points, and declared with infallible authority that man's Will is free +and that at the same time God is omniscient. The Catholic Church at the +time was in some countries still in a position to meet Reason, if it +raised objections, with an unanswerable argument: the stake. + +That is the peculiarity of theological as distinguished from scientific +thought, the purest form of which is mathematics. The former never +follows a train of thought to its strictly logical conclusion, but only +follows a certain distance, to a point where it loses itself in an +impenetrable black fog, or in a cloud of glory which dazzles the +beholder. Mathematical thought, on the contrary, develops the train of +thought to the bitter end, to its ultimate conclusions. These are +necessarily absurd if the premises are erroneous, and their absurdity is +so clear that it convincingly proves the mistake in the point of +departure. Such a scrupulous confutation of self is to be expected as +little from mystic visions as from arrogant dogmatism. The former obey +the laws of dreams, in which the association of ideas, unfettered by +logic, holds sway and strings together the most incompatible ideas to +form an apparently connected series; the latter demands the privilege of +being independent of the judgment of Reason, and of being tried by +Faith, a judge who always decides in its favour. + +Those who believe in Free Will adduce a proof of it which they derive by +the method of introspection. Man, they say, will never be convinced that +he is not free, that his actions are not determined by his own will +alone, for he has the incontrovertible consciousness of the contrary. He +is quite clear on the point that he does a thing because it is his will +to do so, that he had the choice of doing it or not, that he does what +he wants, that he comes to his decision owing to considerations, +inclinations, moods or intentions which are perfectly known to him, if +to him only. At the Sorbonne in Paris they still remember the +professor--when the anecdote was told me Victor Cousin was named as the +hero, but I cannot guarantee that it was he and no other--who used to +say in his lecture on Free Will: "Man's will is free. There is no need +to prove this by giving reasons. We feel it immediately as a truth. I +will show you. I will raise my right arm. I raise it"--here he raised +his right arm with a commanding gesture, kept it for a short time in +this position, and added triumphantly: "You see that my will is free." +His hearers broke into enthusiastic applause at this triumphant +demonstration. To-day they would receive it with loud laughter. + +We have learnt to seek the roots of most, perhaps of all, human actions +in the subconsciousness. There they are worked out under influences +which cannot be perceived by introspection and in which inborn and +acquired inclinations, experiences, organic conditions at the time, +instincts, attractions and repulsions play a decisive part. They rise +ready made into consciousness, and the latter, not having seen them +being formed, persuades itself that it has produced them spontaneously, +and imagines reasons why it willed to do actions that were determined +outside its sphere. The professor who authoritatively states, "I wish to +raise my right arm and therefore I do it," certainly says this in all +good faith, but equally certainly he is ignorant. He is not aware of the +play of forces which end in his gesture. He raises his right arm, which +he believes he chooses with complete freedom, because he is in the habit +of using his right arm by preference; if he had been left-handed he +would have announced his wish to raise his left arm, and would have been +equally convinced that he had decided, with complete freedom, for his +left arm. If he suffered from chronic muscular rheumatism in one of his +arms, so that it would trouble him or hurt him to move it, he would +unconsciously choose the other, sound arm, and maintain just as +positively that he had done so with complete freedom. I have mentioned +as instances two particularly crude and therefore very obvious reasons +which may determine the action of this simple-minded professor without +his being aware of it. But each one of our more complicated, and even of +our simplest, movements is the outcome of numberless subtle causes which +are partly due to the organized experiences and habits of our individual +life, partly a necessary consequence of our inherited qualities, our +bodily and intellectual constitution, and their origin goes back to the +far distant past of our species, to the beginnings of life, we may even +say to eternity. Our consciousness can tell nothing of these causes. +They elude our observation and investigation and remain ever unknown to +us. Renouvier is quite right when he says no understanding--and I say +without his ambiguity no human understanding of the present time--can +foretell the actions of another, nor indeed his own, but not because +they come to pass independently of inevitable causes, but simply because +these causes cannot be descried by our ignorance. + +It is vain labour to try and derive the solution of the question of +Free Will, or even a contribution towards it, from introspection. +It is a method unsuitable for this purpose. The Greek sage well knew +what a great and difficult task he set man when he admonished him: +"[Greek: gnothi seauton]." That is easy to say but difficult if not +impossible to do. Spinoza very happily characterized the self-deception +in which the individual is plunged with regard to the part played in +determining his actions by his conscious Will aided by Reason; he says +that if a stone, flung by some hand, had consciousness, it would imagine +it was flying of its own free will; and in another place he points out +without any illustrative metaphor, that a drunk man and a child, who +certainly do not act on their own initiative, also believe in the +freedom of their will. It has been possible to prove experimentally how +ignorant of the real motives of his actions the individual may be. It is +suggested to a person who has been hypnotized that on awakening he is to +carry out a certain action, something particularly absurd, unjustified +and aimless being intentionally chosen. The subject of the experiment +on awaking faithfully carries out the suggestion, and as he has no +memory of what happened while he was in the hypnotic state, he is +convinced that he is yielding to a sudden idea, a whim, but that in any +case his action is determined by his own will. But since he must realize +the absurdity of what he is doing, he seeks for some sufficient motive +to explain it, and always finds one to his own satisfaction. + +All the efforts of anguished sophists to prove their thesis of the +Freedom of the Will from data supplied by introspection have failed +miserably. But they were forced to undertake them, for theology cannot +give up the contention that man acts with free Will. It is an important +part of the religious conception of the universe and of the relation in +which, according to this, man stands to God. + +To put it shortly, religion sees in man's life on earth a preparation +for eternity. It gives him the opportunity of coming nearer to God by +his own efforts and thus making himself worthy of the salvation which +secures him a place in the sight of God to the end of time. Thus the +life of the flesh is made a method of selection by which the sheep are +sundered from the goats. God provides man with free Will for this +special purpose, so that he may make use of it to choose good of his own +accord and to avoid evil. This undoubtedly wearisome task is made much +easier for him, because God in His goodness has given him laws, +doctrines of Morality and examples which point out the way of salvation. +If man makes proper use of his gifts, if in pursuance of divine +admonition, he treads of his own free will the path of virtue, he +acquires merit which gives him a legitimate claim to the reward of +finding favour in God's eyes and to be admitted to the company of the +just and pure. But if man purposely turns to evil, of which he is warned +by revelation and which he has been given the power to avoid, then he is +a sinner and deserves the punishment of damnation, which, however, he +may yet escape if God in His mercy forgives him his sin. Therefore man +holds in his hand the fate of his immortal soul. It depends on him +whether this fate be salvation or damnation. He is responsible for +directing it to the former or the latter. Of course, God has the power +to force him to virtue and to stop him from vice. But it is not His plan +to condemn man to be the slave of virtue. He wants man to choose virtue +of his own accord, He wants noble souls about Him who by freedom have +attained Morality. + +This religious view of the universe, which deals in assertions and +disdains on principle to prove even one of them to Reason by facts that +can be tested, contrasts with the scientific view of the universe which +asserts nothing but what can be objectively ascertained to be true, +which distinguishes sharply between the account of what has been +observed and can be tested by everyone and hypotheses for which it +demands no belief, but only the recognition of their possibility or +probability, and which it discards as soon as an ascertained fact +definitely disproves them. No compromise is possible between these two +views of the universe. Nothing can bridge the chasm between them. It +would be superficial to say that the theme of the scientific view is +realities and that of the religious one imagination. Imagination is also +a reality, only of a different order to that which is called so in +common parlance. It is a subjective reality; it exists only in the mind +that conceives it. Reality itself is for the thinking mind only a state +of consciousness, but it is an image of conditions which have an +objective existence, though in another form, outside the consciousness. +The supporters of religion maintain that there is an objective reality +corresponding to their concepts, but this cannot be ascertained by any +of the senses which the living organism has developed in order to +establish a relation between the world, of which it is a part, and +itself. It is perfectly useless for supporters of the one view of the +universe to try and convince those of the other. Each of them moves on a +different plane and is unapproachable to the other. All that can be done +is to define both the one and the other as clearly as possible and prove +their incompatibility. + +For the scientific view of the Universe the problem of Free Will does +not exist and cannot exist. All facts that science has observed force it +to the assumption of causation, which does not only mean that every +phenomenon is produced by a cause, is the effect of a cause and could +never have occurred but for this cause, but also means that the effect +represents the exact equivalent of the energy which was its cause. Thus +the hypothesis of the indestructibility of the total energy in the +universe is an essential part of the concept of causation, the +fundamental hypothesis without which the phenomenon of the universe and +the things which occur in it are simply unintelligible to Reason; and +everything in and outside ourselves, everything that we perceive, +becomes chaos, chance, lawless whim or miracle in the theological sense +of the word. + +It is inconceivable that an effect should be anything other than the +reappearance in a different form of the exact quantity of energy that +caused it; for if the energy of the effect exceeded that of its cause, +then part of the effect would have been produced without cause; and if +the energy of the effect fell short of that of the cause, then part of +the energy of the cause would have been expended without producing an +effect. That, however, would be the negation of causation, it would be +an admission that part of the effect (i.e. an effect) could be produced +without sufficient cause, i.e. out of nothing, and that a part of the +cause (i.e. energy) could disappear (into nothing) without producing an +equivalent effect, which is obviously absurd. + +The human Will manifests itself by an action or the prevention of an +action according to the impulse felt by our organism. Both these are an +exercise of force, the amount of which can be measured. Indeed, +inhibition, too, is a dynamical effort which represents the exact +equivalent of the force with which the impulse which it has checked +acted on the motory centres. The Will, therefore, expends energy which +does work that can be measured. But the Will must derive this energy +from some source. It therefore also only converts energy derived from +the energy of the universe, the total amount of which can neither be +augmented nor diminished; the Will consequently is a part of the dynamic +energy of the universe, and must necessarily be subject to its +mechanical law; that is, to the law of causation. It is therefore not +free, but dependent, as is every phenomenon in the universe. Whoever +maintains its freedom maintains that it is independent, that it is not +subject to the law of causation, that it has no cause of which the +elements, if they could be fully known to us, would be measurable, that +it expends energy which it derives from nowhere, that it produces energy +out of nothing. Whoever maintains this contradicts all experience from +which the knowledge of Nature and her laws has been built up; it is +obviously hopeless to expect a reasonable discussion with such a person. + +Now the supporters of free Will may reply that they do not deny that the +Will derives its energy from the organism and therefore from the +universal source of cosmic energy, and that it makes use of it according +to the laws of mechanics; but they assert that the direction in which +energy is expended by the Will is freely determined by it; further, that +the direction does not affect the amount of energy used, and +consequently the Will can act absolutely in accordance with the +mechanical laws of the universe and yet can, independently of outside +causes, determine the manner in which the energy shall be expended; that +is to say, the Will can be free. But this objection is pure sophistry, +for the determination of the direction, in so far as it is not mere +imagination and therefore ineffective and sterile, but really controls +the action, is an expenditure of energy. The controlling power uses up +energy and obeys a cause, so we have arrived at the same dilemma +again--either the controlling Will is subject to the law of causation, +then it is not free; or it is free and is determined by no outside +cause, then we must ascribe to it motion without driving power and +energy derived from nothing--which is absurd. + +No. There is no such thing as Free Will. The concept of freedom itself +is an illusion of thought which cannot survey sufficiently extensive +connexions. Nothing in the universe is free; all things mutually +determine each other. All are cause and effect, and they fit into one +another like cog wheels. Everything is linked up and dovetailed. The +philosopher's phrase, "Everything is in flux," is the description of the +outward appearance of things. Against it we must set the reality which +is: "Everything is eternally at rest." For a circumscribed system of +motion without beginning or end may mean motion for every individual +point which describes the course, but is, as a whole, virtually at rest. +Everything that exists, or ever will exist, has its necessary and +sufficient cause in that which has always been; the sequence of +phenomena has been unalterably determined since all eternity for all +eternity; what we call chance is an occurrence for which our ignorance +cannot perceive the necessary causes and conditions; past and future +would be in the same plane, therefore would be present for an +omniscience, which knew and understood the machine of the universe down +to its smallest wheel and pin. + +One of the logical consequences of this is that, without any miracle or +the assumption of any supernatural influences, it would be possible to +foretell the most distant events in all their smallest details. An +intelligence sufficiently wide and penetrating would, following the +strict law of causation, be able to produce all lines of the present +with absolute certainty immeasurably far into the future. As everything +that ever will be necessarily must be, it virtually exists at present +and has always existed; therefore it is only a question of clarity of +vision, which however, is denied to man, to see it at any time and to +any extent. + +The illusion of flux is explicable. Life, which like all world processes +is a cyclical motion, is passed in an endless alternation between the +shining forth and extinction of consciousness, the bearers of which are +an everlasting series of organisms following one another. Every organism +lasts a limited time, during which it is carried along an inconceivably +small fraction of the tremendous cycle. It sees all the points of this +short stretch but once, and does not learn that they are eternally the +same. It gathers the false impression that they fly past it, whereas +they are at rest and it passes them, until it ceases to be a suitable +bearer of consciousness and disappears, making room for a successor. +This rigid immutability of the whole Universe is certainly intolerably +gruesome to the imagination, but then, every time we look beyond the +narrow confines of life and human circumstances, to peep into the +infinity and eternity which surrounds us, do not terrifying vistas open +up before us? + +Not only the religious minded, but many free thinkers, too, have Free +Will at heart, though the latter are otherwise guiltless of any +mysticism. They claim it in the name of man's dignity, which would be +deeply humiliated if we had to confess ourselves the slaves of outside +influences, automata moved by universal causation without our having any +say in the matter. We are not entitled to such trumpery pride. Let us +seek our dignity in our striving for knowledge, in the subjection of our +own instincts to the control of our Reason, but not in an imaginary +independence of the laws of Nature, whose commands we should oppose in +vain. + +With Free Will responsibility also disappears. That is obvious. But that +means a collapse only for theological Morality. Scientific ethics can +manage very well without responsibility. Nay, more; there is no room in +it for this concept. In the system of theological Morality +responsibility has a transcendental significance. To sum up once more +shortly what has been dealt with in detail above: according to this +system Morality is a divine command, obedience to, or disregard of which +results in salvation or damnation; in order that reward and punishment +may be just, one as well as the other must be merited; that implies the +assumption that virtue is practised or vice chosen intentionally and +with forethought; but this mode of action must be freely willed if man +is to be responsible for it before his divine Judge. + +Scientific ethics knows nothing of this supernatural dream. In its view +Morality is an immanent phenomenon which occurs only within humanity--or +to define it more accurately, within humanity organized as a society. +It arose from a definite necessity; from the undeniable need of men to +unite, so as to be able, in company with one another, shoulder to +shoulder, to succeed more easily, or indeed to succeed at all, in the +struggle for existence which is too hard for the solitary individual. It +has a clearly recognizable aim: to teach man to curb his selfish +instincts and to practise consideration for his neighbour, by which +means alone peaceable life in common and productive co-operation are +possible. The instinct of self-preservation supplies society with the +laws of Morality which it imperiously imposes on all its members, and +unconditional obedience to which it demands. Society does not dream of +saying to the individual: "You are free; you must yourself decide +whether you will follow the path of virtue or that of vice." On the +contrary, it says to him: "Whether you wish it or not, you must do that +which my doctrine of Morality indicates as good and eschew that which it +declares to be evil. You have no choice. I tolerate you in my midst only +if you submit to the laws of Morality. If you transgress them I shall +draw your teeth and claws or destroy you altogether." By discipline +lasting many thousands of years society has developed in the individual, +though not in all, an organ that watches that his conduct is moral, and +this is the conscience. But this is only supplementary to, and +representative of, society, which in the main exercises police +supervision itself, and sees that in general the moral law is obeyed. It +judges all the actions of the individual that come to its knowledge. +Conscience only is the competent authority where occurrences are +concerned which take place simply in the consciousness of the +individual, and which he alone is aware of. Conscience is only too often +a lenient judge who acquits the individual too easily and nearly always +admits extenuating circumstances. Society does not let him off so +lightly; his punishment is certain if he cannot prevent his sin from +becoming known. + +Responsibility therefore also exists in Morality as understood by +sociologists. As far as his intentions are concerned the individual must +come to terms with his conscience, which, as a rule, he does not find +difficult. For his deeds he must account to society, and it does not ask +what took place in his consciousness, but only how his spiritual +impulses were manifested. For his deeds, then, he is summoned before +society's court of justice and must answer for them without having +recourse to the excuse that he acted as he was forced to do by his +disposition and the pressure of circumstances, and that he had no choice +and could not act otherwise. Though Morality has always been necessary +for the life of the community, and though the latter has, under the +pressure of the law of self-preservation, always had to make its members +strictly subservient to Morality, it has ever had a dim idea that the +responsibility of the individual for his actions is only of practical, +not of fundamental or ideal significance. It has never pushed +investigation as to how far the individual acted freely or not to any +great lengths, never attempted to trace it to the foundations of his +consciousness, to the inception of the impulses of his Will. Where the +lack of freedom was obvious, for instance, where every layman could see +there was insanity, the Moral law has been disregarded ever since +ancient times, and society has contented itself with protecting itself +from the intolerable actions of the lunatic by rendering him harmless. +Since positive Law, made concrete in the laws with penal sanctions, was +evolved from the universal Moral law, it has admitted the plea of +irresponsibility and refrained from exercising its coercive powers where +such irresponsibility has been established. In addition to madness, +demonstrable coercion and self-defence relieve the individual from +responsibility for the crime and render him immune from punishment. + +In the course of evolution society has conceded still further +limitations of individual responsibility. It willingly admits new +knowledge gained by scientific psychology and concedes limited +responsibility, not only in case of madness, but in such cases, too, +where experts can convincingly prove to the judges, the guardians of its +Law, that the individual was in an abnormal condition and affected by +morbid influences at the time of the crime. Farther society cannot go, +if it does not want to put an end to Moral law and do away altogether +with positive law. Concern for its continued existence forbids this. It +must leave it to the philosophers to continue the investigation. They +must show that the Will is never free, always fettered, not only in the +extreme cases of madness or when under the influence of suggestion. They +must make it clear that there is only a difference of degree and not of +kind between the determining influences under which the individual is +constrained to act, and that the causation which binds him proceeds by +imperceptible degrees from the delirium of the maniac and the obsession +of the abnormal man to the passion, lust and desire of the man with +strongly developed instincts, and to the slight stimulus of habits, the +colourless judgment and shallow considerations of the ordinary man with +a deformed character and no definite features. Society can draw no +practical conclusion from the theoretical recognition of the lasting +limitation and lack of freedom of the Will, because moral law by its +very nature implies coercion, and therefore excludes freedom. Whether +the individual submits to the Moral law of his own accord, or because he +is forced thereto by the community's powers of coercion, is of no +account to society. It deals only with the visible results. + +But it is not merely a matter of flat utilitarianism, it is not even +unjust, if society, without inquiring whether the Will is free or not, +makes the individual responsible for his actions and only makes an +exception from this universal rule in extreme cases. Even though his +will is subject to the law of causation, and the individual always acts +as he must, he nevertheless has a means of keeping within the moral law +despite inner impulses and outer pressure, and that is by his judgment +and its instrument, inhibition. Like every organic function which is not +purely vegetative and therefore beyond the influence of the Will, +judgment and inhibition can be strengthened and perfected by methodical +exercise, while total neglect of them will weaken and finally atrophy +them. The community may demand that each of its members shall devote +attention to the development of the natural functions which permit him +to discriminate and to suppress any inclination to evil which may +appear. It facilitates this duty towards itself and himself for the +individual--for it is a question of the increase of his organic +efficiency and of his personal worth--by the institutions it founds for +the education of youth, by schools which not only impart knowledge, but +also form the character, by instruction after the school age, by the +honours with which it distinguishes especially excellent persons, +thereby holding them up to example. The community prescribes that +everyone should acquire a certain minimum of knowledge, and for this +purpose forces each individual by law to go to school for a certain +number of years. It may and ought to force him also to render himself +more capable of obeying the moral law by methodical exercise of his +will. Every citizen is responsible to the state for being able to read +and write. In this sense the individual is also responsible for +sufficiently strengthening his faculty of inhibition to be able to +control his selfish, anti-social and immoral desires. + +The particular purpose for which he is to employ his faculty of +inhibition depends on the current moral law of the age, which is +determined not by the individual, but by the community. The individual +does quite enough and is free of blame if he strives with all his might +to approximate his actions to the ideal which the community demands at a +given time for the life of its members in common and for their mutual +relations. To alter and perfect this ideal is the business of a few +select men with wider judgment, stronger will and warmer sympathies than +the average. In these exceptional cases it is not the community which +imposes its ideal on the individual, but, on the contrary, the +individual who works out a new ideal for the community, and, so to +speak, thanks to his personal qualities, establishes a new record in the +gymnastic of the Will which beats all earlier ones. + +Finally, it is true, the individual is dependent on his natural +disposition. To say that he can be, and is to be, raised above himself +is a very impressive, but really nonsensical, phrase. He can get out of +himself only what is in him by nature, and however hard he may try to +reach out beyond the boundaries drawn by his organic disposition, he +finds it impossible to overstep them. But, as a rule, they are far wider +than the individual has any idea of until he attempts to reach them, and +he will find many surprises if he labours untiringly to develop to their +fullest extent all the possibilities latent in him. Even a born weakling +can, by dint of methodical practice, harden his flaccid muscles +sufficiently to become a gymnast of average skill, though he is hardly +likely to become a first-class athlete. + +In just the same way a weak-willed or simple person can by earnest +endeavours rise to a consistent morality; if, nevertheless, there appear +in him, continually or occasionally, organic impulses which carry him +away, it is not his fault but his misfortune. In that case he is +subjectively not responsible for his immorality. But the community can, +all the same, not liberate him from responsibility, because the law of +self-preservation forces it to insist on observance of the moral law, +and it has no means of accurately measuring how strong the pressure of +instincts and the power of inhibition is in any individual, and to what +extent he has fulfilled the duty of exercising and strengthening the +latter. The phrase "To understand everything is to forgive everything" +shows insight, but is only true in the sense that one must not blame an +individual for his natural imperfection. It comprehends recognition of +the Will's lack of freedom, and the inadmissibility, from the +philosophical point of view, of the concept of responsibility, but it +does not affect the right and the duty of the community to demand moral +conduct regardless of this lack of freedom. It is not permitted to +forgive because it understands. Moreover, there would be no sense in +forgiveness by the community, for the concept of forgiveness implies +feeling and kindly forgetfulness of an injury inflicted of malice +prepense; but insult and offence play no part in the punishment by +society of transgressions of the moral law, and indulgence due to +sensibility would endanger its existence. + +The certainty possessed by the individual that his evil deeds, if they +become known, will have evil consequences for him is one of the +determining factors which is indispensable in helping him to make a +decision. It is an inadmissible affectation to condemn the fear of +punishment as a motive for moral action, because it ought to be the +result of the conviction that it is absolutely right. It is a powerful +aid to self-discipline, as also are the thought and the foretaste of +the satisfaction upon which self-respect may count if general respect +and praise are to be the reward of exemplary conduct. + +The great weakness of the Kantian doctrine of Morality lies in the fact +that it retains Free Will, even though it gives it another name. It is +called autonomy of Will and is contrasted with heteronomy. This doctrine +demands, and considers it possible, that the Will should be its own +lawgiver and should not allow others to lay down laws for it; but it +fails to examine how the Will comes to make laws for itself, of what +hypothesis these laws are the necessary conclusions, by what means the +Will secures respect for its law, and whether this seemingly +self-imposed law is not really the inner realization of a ready-made law +of extraneous origin. The dogma of the autonomy of the Will is a +consequence of the preliminary error of excluding utility from Morality +and of declaring its imperative to be categorical, that is, not +dependent on the aim, but independent and regardless of any aim. The +whole tomfoolery of the categorical imperative and of the autonomy of +the Will is transcendental mysticism, and is all the more surprising as +it is the result of an investigation which claims to be the work of pure +Reason. It is the shadow of the ghostly bogies of religious conceptions +in the daylight of "pure Reason." + +From the point of view of the community we may speak of merit and sin, +but not from the subjective point of view. For the community the moral +conduct of the individual is useful, immoral conduct is disadvantageous, +therefore it praises the one and condemns and punishes the other. That +is opportunism, but not moral philosophy. Considered subjectively, moral +conduct is just as little meritorious as beauty, great stature, muscular +strength, keen intelligence, health, a good memory, prompt reactions of +consciousness and all other advantages that the individual has received +without his personal intervention as a gift of nature. And immoral +conduct is just as little blameworthy as ugliness, stupidity, sickness +and other misfortunes which the individual is burdened with by heredity +or which a hard fate has imposed on him. Happy is the favoured man! +Pitiable the unfortunate one! Both are the work of forces which are +absolutely beyond the control of their wills. In the same way the good +man acts morally because he possesses insight and restraining +will-power, and the bad man acts immorally because these perfections +have been denied him, and neither the one nor the other can do anything +in the matter. + +That does not relieve man of the duty of labouring assiduously at his +moral development, but it does relieve him of responsibility for the +result of his efforts. On one point the sociological, the biological and +the theological moralists agree: they all bow down humbly before Grace. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +MORALITY AND PROGRESS + + +I have fully investigated in another book ("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_") +the problem of progress in all its details. I therefore refer the reader +to that for all particulars, and will here give only a summary of the +main points. + +Progress implies motion from one point to another. This simple concept +is supplemented by others, some clear and some dim, which group +themselves round it: the conception that the point towards which motion +is directed signifies something better and more desirable than the one +from which the motion takes place, and the assumption that the motion is +due to an impulse, either inherent in the moving object or complex of +objects and an essential part of it, or else impressed upon it by +outside forces; further, that the impulse connotes a conscious image of +the goal arrived at, recognition of its higher worth and the desire for +greater perfection. + +All these ideas, which are concomitants of the concept of progress, are +childish anthropomorphism when applied to the universe. To define +progress as motion from a worse point to a better one implies the +existence of a scale whereby value may be measured. Now values are +clearly determined and graded as far as human beings or any similar +creatures are concerned. Worse or better means to man less or more +pleasant, useful, pleasing; progress, therefore, is a development to a +condition which man considers more suitable and useful for him and feels +to be more harmonious and pleasanter. The universe, from this +standpoint, would make progress to prepare itself for the appearance of +man, to become more intelligible, habitable and comfortable for man, to +please and delight him. Whether it obeys its own natural disposition or +a higher intelligence, a god, in carrying out this work, in either case +it would realize progress to serve mankind. But if this ceases to exist, +there is no point in characterizing a development as progress in the +sense of amelioration, beautification and perfection. One would then +have no right to describe, for instance, the solar system with its +planets as indicating progress from the original condition of nebula, +because the latter in itself, apart from man and the conditions of his +existence, is not better or worse, not more beautiful or uglier, not +more perfect or more defective than the former; the original nebula and +the solar system are equally the result of the play of the same cosmic +forces, and the dynamic formula of the one is the same as that of the +other. But Reason rejects as nonsensical any view which declares man to +be the aim of the universe, which puts all the work of the universe at +his service, and conceives it as a huge machine functioning for his +advantage. + +For reasons of formal logic, too, the idea of progress in the universe +is unthinkable. The understanding cannot conceive of the universe as +other than eternal. Now in eternity all progress, that is, all motion +from a point of departure, must have reached its goal eternities ago, +however slow the motion, however distant the goal. Eternity and progress +are two concepts which logically exclude one another. + +In the universe there can be no progress in the sense of ascent, of +motion from a worse to a better thing; the only thing in the universe, +in Nature, which is comprehensible to the understanding and which +experience, derived from sense perceptions, can establish, is evolution, +an eternal, equable motion always on the same level; and human standards +of value are not applicable to its regular, successive stages. One state +is merged without a break in another, the simple becomes more manifold +until a maximum of complexity is reached; thereupon what is intricate +gradually falls to pieces, and the complicated is dissolved and returns +to the simple; then, when this point is attained, the same course begins +again, and so on for all eternity. Thus evolution in the universe is an +endless succession of cyclic movements from the simple to the intricate +and back to the simple; with a constant alternation from one point of +each single circle to the other; with the most extreme, crushing +uniformity in the totality of all cycles; with absolutely equal dignity +of all the phases of the endless course as they develop one from the +other; with a synchronism, inconceivable to man, of all forms of +evolution in numberless circles revolving side by side within the +infinite whole of the universe. + +But the concept of progress, which cannot be derived from the processes +in the universe and has no sense when applied to them, becomes a +reasonable one as soon as its validity is limited to the evolution of +humanity. Here we no longer deal with conceptions of eternity and +infinity. It is a question of temporal and spacial phenomena. The +existence of man had a beginning. No doubt it will have an end. It +appeared on earth latest at the commencement of the Quaternary +geological period, but more probably towards the end of the Tertiary +period. It must necessarily disappear when the earth, owing to cold and +evaporation, becomes incapable of supporting life, a state of affairs +which, according to our present knowledge of natural laws, must +inevitably come to pass. A few million years are allotted to it in which +to fulfil its destiny, certainly a short span of time compared with the +eternity of the universe, but compared with the duration of individual +and national life, with personal destinies and historical occurrences, +an immeasurably vast prospect. Within the limits of its genesis, its +being and its disappearance, it is in a constant state of evolution. It +is impossible to deny this. Comparisons between the skulls found among +remains of the paleolithic age and those of our times, between the state +of the undeveloped tribes of central Africa and Australia and that of +the peoples of Europe and America, between the beginnings of human +speech and the present-day languages, between the thought, knowledge and +abilities of former generations and ours--all these prove this +incontrovertibly. + +The purpose of this evolution is unmistakable. It is directed towards an +ever closer, ever subtler adaptation to the unalterable conditions +which are imposed on men by Nature, and which they must make the best of +if they are not to perish. And it is synonymous with progress; that is +to say, not only with change, simple motion from one point to another, +but with amelioration and improvement. + +Here we may apply standards of value. The aim and object of evolution, +which we know and desire, supply us with them. Here we may judge and +appraise anthropomorphically. Not only may we do so, but we must, for it +is a question of matters which concern mankind alone. All evolution of +mankind, corporal and intellectual, the enlargement of the brain case so +as to accommodate a larger brain; the development of the muscles of the +larynx, palate and hand, and the accurate co-ordination of their +movements, which things make clearer and more emphatic speech possible +and render the hands defter; the acquisition, interpretation and storing +up of experiences leading to discoveries and inventions, all are +directed to the same end: to provide men with more reliable weapons in +the struggle for existence; to defend them from the dangers surrounding +them, the destructive forces of Nature; to render their life more +secure, longer and richer; to save them from fatigue and suffering; to +give them pleasurable emotions and possibilities of happiness. And as we +have a clear idea of the object of our evolution, as we desire this +object and continually seek to find new means whereby to reach it, we +are absolutely justified in calling every movement that brings us nearer +to the aim we have in view, and aspire to reach, a progressive step, +and in calling every stage of evolution which realizes a biggish part of +the object desired an amelioration, an improvement, an ascent. + +The total amount of progress which has secured to mankind its +development we sum up in the concept of civilization. The latter, +however, is still far removed from ideal perfection. What we know is +infinitesimally small compared with the tremendous bulk of the unknown, +perhaps the unknowable, which greets our view on all sides. Our +technical achievements often leave us in the lurch and indicate no way +out of many difficulties. In the human being who knows and can do +something, too much still remains of the stupid, helpless, untamed, +primitive beast. + +Nevertheless, what has been achieved is of value, and it is childish to +depreciate it. Paradoxical minds, like J. J. Rousseau and his +parrot-like imitators, may deny the use of all civilization and declare +that the so-called state of nature, the ignorance and helplessness of +undeveloped man amid all too mighty Nature, is preferable. That is an +intellectual joke which is not very amusing. We have not vanquished +death, but we have prolonged life, as the mortality statistics prove. We +cannot cure all diseases; crowded dwellings in great cities, the nature +and intensity of our occupations--civilization, in short--bring diseases +from which we should probably not suffer if we were savages; but the +cave-dwellers, too, were subject to illnesses, and our antisepsis and +hygiene effectually prevent many and grave bodily ills. Division of +labour makes the individual dependent on the whole economic organism; +it makes it easier for the favoured few to exploit the many and to be +parasites at their expense, but nevertheless the individual can more +easily satisfy his needs than if, being completely free and independent, +he alone had to provide all the objects he requires. The speed and +facility with which the exchange of goods is effected, thanks to ever +new and ever more excellent means of communication, often give rise to +artificial wants; cheap travel occasions useless restlessness, but the +emancipation of the individual from the place of his birth, the +conversion of the whole globe into one single economic domain, of which +every part with its own particular superabundance of men and products +supplies the lack of the same in other parts, has at least this +invaluable advantage, that it makes man more independent of local +hazards and makes the earth more habitable for him. Many things provided +by civilization are obtainable only by the rich, and the spectacle of +the luxury of these favoured mortals makes the lot of the poor harder to +bear, but the possibility of working one's way up into the ranks of the +fortunate is a mighty spur to strong characters, and gives rise to +efforts which are profitable to many. All the great technical +achievements of civilization can certainly not bring happiness either to +the individual or to the community, because happiness is a spiritual +state which does not depend on bodily satisfactions and, though it may +be troubled by material conditions, can never be created by them; but +the moments of happiness which the individual experiences derive an +extraordinary intensity from the instruments of civilization which +surround and serve us. + +Certainly civilization has its bad points, and it requires no great +cleverness to discover them, to point them out and to exaggerate them. +Certainly many of its most boasted, supposed benefits are not really a +blessing, but either merely imaginary or else unimportant--little, +superfluous things which may be pleasant, but lacking which we can live +without great deprivation, and for which we undoubtedly pay far too +dearly. But, on the whole, it is a mighty achievement of man's +struggling intellect, an invaluable improvement of the lot of man, and +if anyone denies this he forfeits any claim to serious refutation. +Rousseau's state of nature may be a very pleasant change for a summer +holiday, but every man of sound common sense would decline it as a +permanent abode. + +We may therefore freely concede the fact of progress in civilization in +so far as the latter implies greater safety, facility, order and +equability of life, deeper and more widely diffused knowledge and more +perfect adaptation of man to the natural conditions in which he finds +himself. For it is no reservation to note in the course of evolution +both individual deviations from the path which leads to the goal of +civilization, the amelioration of the constitution of mankind, and +occasional relapses into bygone barbarisms. To make use of Gumplowicz's +expression, it is not an acrochronic and acrotopic illusion (that is, a +form of self-deception which consists in thinking the time when one +lives and the place where one lives the best of all times and the most +wonderful of all places) if we place the present far above all past +ages and declare our civilization to be incomparably richer and more +perfect than anything that has preceded it. The _laudator acti_, the +cross-grained Nestor who praises the past at the expense of the present, +the enthusiast for "the good old times," is a figure that has always +been familiar. But it proves nothing. This tender love of the past is +not the outcome of objective comparison and consideration, but an +impulse of subjective psychology. It is simply the emotion and longing +which fill an old man's heart when he looks back on his youth. He +remembers the pleasurable emotions which once accompanied all his +impressions and which are now unknown to his worn-out organism, and he +thinks the world was better because he found more joy in it. The aged +man is convinced that in his youth the sky was bluer, the rose more +odorous, the women more beautiful than now, but an impartial observer +would pityingly shake his head at this. + +But can the progress, which cannot reasonably be denied in civilization, +also be traced in Morality? Philosophers who are by no means negligible +have roundly replied in the negative. Buckle declares uncompromisingly +that the only progress possible to man is intellectual, and by this he +means that mankind grows in knowledge, foresight and clarity of thought, +but not at the same time in Morality, which, according to him, differs +from the intellect and understanding and is not included in them. +Buckle's unfavourable judgment has been turned into a formula which has +often been repeated. Scientifically, technically, we progress; morally +we stand still or slip back; the two orders of development move neither +in the same direction nor with the same speed. That is a view that is +widely held. Fr. Bouillier comes to the same conclusion as Buckle, +though from different considerations. He asserts that "a savage who +obeys his conscience, however ignorant this may be, can be as virtuous +as a Socrates or an Aristides; one can even go so far as to defend the +view that social progress instead of strengthening individual morality +weakens it, for society, in proportion as it is better ordered, saves +the individual the trouble of a great many virtuous actions." + +However, there are other moralists who take the opposite view. +Shaftesbury cannot imagine a moral system in which there is no place for +the idea of constant progress, of continuous improvement. The great +Frenchmen of the eighteenth century are convinced of the moral rise of +humanity. "The mass of mankind," says Turgot, "advances constantly +towards an ever-growing perfection," and elsewhere: "Men taught by +experience grow in ever greater measure and in a better sense humane." +Condorcet defends no less emphatically the view that the faculty of +growing more perfect is inherent in man. This is a case of pessimism and +optimism which have their roots less in reasonable thought than in +temperament. A worn-out, weary individual, or generation, looks back and +spends the time in futile yearning and melancholy visions of the past; +but a sturdy generation, full of life, and conscious of it, looks +forward, and planning, inventing, and determined to realize its creative +ideas, it conjures up the image of the future. Pessimism regrets and +groans; optimism hopes and promises. The former, like Ovid, thinks the +Golden Age is in the past, the latter, like the fathers of the great +Revolution, looks for it in the future. In neither case do they reach +conclusions as a result of observation and logical thought, rather they +invent reasons afterwards for their conclusions, as they do +interpretations of their observations. But he who regards life neither +with bitterness nor with pride, and tries to understand it objectively, +will come to the opinion that Morality too has its fair share in the +progress of civilization. + +Theological thought interprets moral perfection differently from +scientific thought. According to the former it is independent of +intellectual development and purely a matter of faith. God is the ideal +of Morality, belief in Him the necessary condition for a moral life. +Through its fall mankind withdrew from God and was left a prey to +Immorality; original sin perpetually burdened it; by redemption and +grace it has been purified from this inborn stain, led back to God and +once more rendered capable of Morality. For mankind only one kind of +progress in Morality was possible, and this took place, not gradually +and step by step, but with one sudden swift advance, by which it +immediately attained the highest degree of moral perfection possible, +and that was when the true faith was revealed to it. Before the +revelation mankind did not know real Morality, only its dim shadow, only +a vague yearning for it; by the revelation at one blow it was in full +possession of Morality, and now it is the business of every individual, +whether he will draw near to the divine example by pious efforts or +ruthlessly withdraw from it. Since the glad tidings of faith were +announced to humanity there can be no question of moral progress for +mankind as a whole; it has become a personal matter which everyone has +to deal with himself. Criticism of this dogmatism is superfluous. It is +quite enough to place it before the reader. + +It is quite comprehensible, too, that those whose views permit them to +talk with Bouillier of a savage who obeys his conscience should deny +moral progress. They assume that a savage has a conscience, that +conscience is an element of human nature, that it is a quality or a +capacity like sensation or memory, that it is born with man like his +limbs and organs. In that case it might well be asserted that subjective +Morality has made no progress in historic and perhaps even in +prehistoric times, and that actually a "savage who obeys his conscience +can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or an Aristides." + +It would hardly be possible to give a concrete proof of the contrary; if +for no other reason because for a long time there have been no savages +in the strict sense of the word anywhere on earth. By savages we mean +human beings in their primitive, zoological condition who have developed +solely according to the biological forms of the species and under the +influence of surrounding Nature and have taken over nothing of an +intellectual character from the group to which they belong. All savages +of whom we know form societies which for the most part are not even +loosely, but firmly, knit together, with laws that may seem nonsensical +and barbaric to us, but are none the less binding with clearly defined +duties which they impose on every member, with sanctions whose cruelty +supersedes that of any punishment permitted by civilization. A man who +is a member of a society, no matter how primitive it may be, may +certainly have a conscience, but the point is that he is not a savage, +but the contrary of a savage, namely: a social being who has received an +education from his society, who is bound to conform to its habits, +customs and views, and who in all his actions must consider its opinion. +But these conditions, as I have shown, produce a conscience, the +representative of society in the consciousness of the individual. +Conscience is no innate feature of man uninfluenced by society, it is +not a product of Nature, it is the result of education; he who possesses +a conscience is no savage, but a person formed by discipline and +subservient to it; conscience is the fruit of civilization, of a certain +civilization; in itself it represents progress compared with the +primitive state of man. Consequently it is an objectionable +contradiction to talk of conscience and at the same time deny moral +progress. + +It is peculiarly arbitrary, too, to think that a savage, if he had a +conscience, could obey it to the same extent, that is, be just as +virtuous, as a Socrates or an Aristides. This would contradict all the +observations and experience from which I have derived the doctrine that +conscience works by means of inhibition, and that Morality and Virtue +from the biological point of view are inhibition. For inhibition is +developed by practice and use. Except in cases of morbid disturbance it +develops simultaneously with the understanding which manipulates it and +demands efficiency from it. There can be no two opinions about the fact +that the understanding and the faculty of inhibition in living beings +have developed progressively. There is no need to adduce any proof that +the frog is intellectually superior to the zoospore, and man to the +frog, and that as we ascend the scale of organisms we find their +reactions to stimuli are increasingly subject to individual +modification, and that there is a gradual transition from the original, +purely mechanical tropism to differentiated reflex action, which, +however, is still beyond the control of the will, and finally to +resistances which suppress every externally visible reply on the part of +the organism to the impression it has received. + +In the course of this development the faculty of inhibition grows +stronger and more efficient and obeys the behests of the understanding +more and more swiftly, surely and reliably; it can reach a pitch of +invincibility against which all the revolts of instinct, all the storms +of passion, are powerless. + +In the savage, or rather in man at a low stage of civilization, the +power of inhibition is far from having reached such perfect development. +It is not very robust, works defectively and often fails. Little +civilized man, if he has a conscience, cannot even with the best +intentions always obey it punctually. His instinct is stronger than his +insight. He is not master of his impulses; rather it is they that master +him. All who have described tribes of low civilization have observed +that their reactions resemble reflex movements and that they lack +self-control. Moral conduct, that is, control of their selfishness and +consideration for their fellow men, is difficult for them if it demands +effort, sacrifice and painful renunciation. However, we need not trouble +to go to the negroes of the Congo or the inhabitants of the Solomon +Islands to observe the inefficiency of the power of inhibition. We need +only look around us. We shall find enough instances among ourselves. The +uneducated, the badly educated and abnormal people on whom teaching and +example make no impression cannot follow the precepts of Morality, +although they know them. To express it as the Roman poet does, they know +the better and approve it, but they have a longing for the worse. So it +is wrong to say that a savage can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or +an Aristides. He could not, even if he would. He would lack the organic +means: a sufficiently trained intelligence to point out his moral duty, +a sufficiently developed faculty of inhibition to follow the admonition +of his intelligence. Bouillier's objection to moral progress will not +hold water. The Romantics who have invented the fairy tale of the noble +savage and who declare in Seume's words: "See, we savages are better men +after all," are out of touch with reality. Like civilization, and +simultaneously with civilization, Morality progresses towards +improvement, towards perfection. + +The Kantian moralist, like the theologian, is forbidden by the logic of +his system to admit the possibility of moral progress. If the moral law +is categorical, that is, unlimited by any special purpose, if it exists +within us, eternal and immutable as the stars above us, we should be +hard put to it to say how this unalterable block, placed in our souls we +know not how or by whom, could receive an impetus to progressive +development, or in what way this development could be carried out. That +which is categorical is absolute, and the concept of progress in the +absolute, as in the infinite and the eternal, has no sense. But whoever +regards Morality from the biological and sociological point of view is +forced to assert its progress, just as the dogmatic mystic, who believes +in the categorical imperative, is forced to deny it. + +Let us recapitulate the fundamental concepts. Regarded biologically +Morality is Inhibition, the development of which is of the greatest +importance to the individual, as it enables him not to waste the living +force of his cell plasm and of his organs in sterile reflex movements, +but to store it up and hold it ready for useful purposes. The stronger +his power of inhibition the better he is armed for the struggle for +existence, and the better he is armed the more efficient he is. Denial +of the progressive development of Inhibition implies a denial that +modern man can maintain himself with more ease and security against +Nature and hostile or injurious natural phenomena, and that he is more +successful in competition with other men than his predecessors on earth. +But this latter denial is obviously nonsense. The only individuals who +do not take part in progressive development are the degenerates. They +are organically inferior, their faculty of inhibition is defective or +altogether lacking, they are slaves of impulses which their will and +intelligence have no means of controlling, they are the outcome of +morbidly arrested or retrograde development, they are the victims and +refuse of a civilization too intensive, too exhausting and wearing for +some men, and they are destined to fall out of the ranks of a race +moving majestically forward and to lie helplessly by the roadside. + +From the sociological point of view Morality is the bond which unites +the individuals in a community, the foundation upon which alone society +can be built up and maintained. For it implies a victory over self, +consideration for one's neighbour, recognition of his rights, concession +of his claims, even when valued possessions must unwillingly be given up +and painful renunciation of attainable satisfaction is required. This is +neighbourly kindness and the charity of the Bible, Hutcheson's and +Hume's benevolence, Adam Smith's sympathy and Herbert Spencer's +altruism; it is the necessary condition on which alone individuals can +live peaceably together and helpfully assist each other to make life +easier. If most or all individuals lack it, we have Hobbes's war of all +against all; then man is as a wolf to other men, and each one is +condemned to the state of a beast roaming in loneliness. If a few, a +minority, lack it, then the majority will not tolerate them in its +midst, but will expel them from the community as a dangerous nuisance +and deprive them of the privilege of mutual aid and of the advantage of +joint responsibility. + +The species of man, like every other species of organism and like every +individual, wants to live. It can only achieve this by adapting itself +to existing natural conditions. The more suitable and perfect the +adaptation the more easily and securely it lives. Under the present +conditions of the universe and the earth a solitary human individual +could not manage to exist, let alone develop into an intelligent being. +The form his adaptation to circumstances has taken is that of union in +an organized community. For the existence of society and the adjustment +of the individual in it is the indispensable condition for the life of +the species as well as of the individual. Society can only continue to +exist if individuals learn to consider one another and practise +benevolence towards each other. Society therefore created Morality and +inculcated it in all its members, because it was its first need, the +essential condition which rendered its existence possible, just as the +species created society, because it could only continue to live as an +organized society. + +Thus Morality with the strictest logical necessity has its place in the +totality of efforts which human beings had to make, and still have to +make, in order to preserve life, to make it sufficiently profound and to +enrich it with satisfactions, that is, with pleasurable emotions of +every kind, so that they may continue to have the will and the eager +desire to maintain their existence by effort and struggle; in short, in +order to make life seem worth living, even at the cost of constant toil +and moil. Without society it is impossible for the individual to exist; +without Morality it is impossible for society to exist; the instinct of +self-preservation furnishes society with habits and rules governing the +mutual relations of its members and with institutions for economizing +force; all these together we call civilization. The development and +improvement of civilization is obvious; it is proved by the fact that it +draws nearer and nearer to its goal, namely, the establishment of +satisfactory relations between individuals and groups, and the +attainment of a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of individual +effort. But it would be incomprehensible if Morality, the essential +condition for the existence of society which creates civilization, +should have no part in the indisputable, because easily demonstrable, +progress of the latter. + +Morality occupies such a large place in civilization that the mistaken +view has arisen among many moral philosophers that it is the aim of +civilization and has no aim other than itself. Closer investigation +shows this to be an error, a reversal of the true relation. Morality is +no aim, certainly no aim to itself, it is a means to an end, the most +important, most indispensable means to the one end, to bring about +civilization, to maintain and refine it, and adapt it more and more to +its task. But the task of civilization, as I have shown, is to preserve, +facilitate and enrich the life of the individual and the species. +Morality therefore is the most important form in which the instinct of +self-preservation in the species is manifested, and to deny progress to +it implies the assumption that the species does not possess the impulse +to preserve and beautify its existence, that its instinct of +self-preservation flags, that it does not recognize its aim and is +ignorant of the path leading to its goal. This assumption, however, is +contradicted by all, and supported by none, of the phenomena observable +in the life of the species--the absolute increase of the population of +the earth, the prolongation of individual life and of the age of +efficiency, the combating of every kind of harmful thing. + +The steadfast self-control of civilized man compared with the +unreliability of the savage, who appears capricious and unaccountable +because he freely obeys every impulse, proves the progressive +development of the faculty of inhibition in the individual organism. The +order and definite organization of modern society, the rule of law, +men's equality before the law, the guarantee of freedom and respect for +the person, all these compared with the state of nations in earlier +times (actually anarchy under a mantle of tyranny and the unlimited +power of a few mighty ones over the helpless masses) prove the +progressive development of civilization in the social organism. But +logically the progressive development of Morality itself must correspond +to the progressive development of its instrument, inhibition, and of its +product, civilization. + +The conclusion to which we are forced by theoretical considerations is +fully endorsed by observation of actual life. It is sufficient to +indicate broad facts to one who denies moral progress. Slavery, which +Aristotle thought a law of Nature, which Christianity tolerated, which +modern states, such as England, France, the United States and Brazil, +defended and protected by law, was everywhere abolished some years ago. +The objection is raised that modern hired labour is merely slavery of +the proletariat under another name, that the exploitation of workmen by +employers is a hypocritical continuation of serfdom. But that is +sophistry. The hired labourer is not bound to his contract. He can break +it. "Yes, at the price of starvation." That used to be the case, but +nowadays organized working men are no longer at the mercy of powerful +capital, and therein lies progress. They are in a position to make +conditions and not seldom to force their acceptance. They have the right +to strike, to move from place to place, to form unions. The community +has recognized the duty of mitigating, at least to some extent, the +evils to which faulty economic organization exposes the workman. It has +instituted accident and health insurance, old age pensions, and, in some +places, assistance for those who are out of work through no fault of +their own. All this is still very defective, but these are hopeful +beginnings, all the same, and, above all, it shows the awakening of a +social conscience that earlier ages did not know. + +Justice is administered more and more humanely, that is, morally. It is +a century since legal torture was abolished. Society is ashamed to get +at the truth easily by torturing a suspect who after all may be +innocent. The condemned man is no longer branded or mutilated; he +suffers no corporal ill-treatment of which the results can never be +obliterated. Capital punishment is still a blot on the honour of +civilization. But for more than a century now, since the time of +Beccaria, it has been violently opposed and has already been abolished +in some states; the others will no doubt have to follow suit within a +short time. Consider that in England at the beginning of the nineteenth +century a thief was hanged if he had stolen a thing of no more value +than the rope that was to hang him, and even children of fourteen years +were condemned to this fate. To-day the judge pronounces sentence of +death, even where it is still legal, with grave misgivings and +searchings of conscience, and the execution, formerly a public +spectacle, is carried out more or less secretly, because the conviction +is gradually ripening in society that by the cold-blooded killing of a +man it is perpetrating a crime which it must keep as secret as possible. +The sentence is now almost everywhere deferred, and thus the conviction +becomes a very emphatic warning which points out the path of repentance, +of conversion and improvement to the guilty man, and leaves him the +possibility of becoming a decent human being again. Special courts for +children mitigate the stern penal code and modify it according to the +needs of unripe, youthful characters. Imprisonment for debt is a +half-forgotten thing of the past and regarded more or less as a joke. +What these changes have in common is that they one and all indicate a +deepening of the community's feeling of duty and responsibility towards +the individual, greater respect for persons on the part of the law, an +increase of the will to resist the first impulse of anger, revenge and +mercilessness. These tendencies, however, are the very essence of +Morality. + +I forbear to adduce as a proof of progress that the Inquisition no +longer rules and nowhere burns its victims. For actually there is no +greater toleration of those who hold other opinions than there was +formerly. Religious toleration is explained by the fact that the +people's consciousness no longer attaches such enormous importance to +religion as in past centuries. But political, aesthetic and philosophical +antagonisms arouse as much bloodthirsty rage to-day as did formerly +heresy in religion, and opponents would unhesitatingly apply torture and +the stake to one another if the great mass of the people would develop +sufficiently enthusiastic zeal for their views to allow their raging +fanaticism to have recourse to violence, as it once permitted +domineering religious orthodoxy to do. + +Other aspects of civilization, not so essential, are hardly less +encouraging than the developments on which I have hitherto dwelt. +Drunkenness, formerly an almost universal vice, is on the decrease. +Among the educated classes it is only met with exceptionally, and is +recognized as a morbid aberration; among the lower classes it +continually grows less. The statistics of the savings banks show an +ever-growing determination to save. The masses who used to rejoice in +dirt now manifest an increasingly vigorous desire for a cleanliness that +demands soap and baths. This indicates control of impulse, of the +inclination for alcoholic drinks and the tendency to squander, and an +increase of self-respect which recognizes dirt to be humiliating. These +are activities of the moral feelings, their material activities. + +If, in spite of these material proofs of the progress of Morality in all +social functions and in many individual habits, serious-minded men still +maintain that it stands still or even that it shows retrogression +compared with former times, this view, which is undoubtedly a mistaken +one, is due to wrong interpretation of facts. + +Bouillier's remark that "social progress instead of increasing +individual Morality weakens it, because society, in proportion as it is +better organized, saves the individual the trouble of a number of +virtuous actions" has a perfectly correct point of departure. Many tasks +of neighbourly kindness and humane joint responsibility which used to be +left to the inclination, the free choice and the noble zeal of +individuals, and could be carried out or neglected by them, are now +methodically fulfilled by the community. Saint Martin no longer needs to +divide his cloak to give half to a poor shivering man. The public +charity commission gives him winter clothes if he cannot afford to buy +any. No knights are needed to protect innocence, weakness and humility +from oppressors. The oppressed appeal successfully to the police, the +court of justice, or, by writing to the papers, to public opinion. There +is no need for Knights Templar or Knights of St. John to care for +strangers and tend the sick. Inns and public hospitals are at their +disposal. To-day there would be neither occasion nor reason for the +miracle of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, who against the orders of her hard +husband took to the starving bread which was turned into roses. The poor +are regularly fed in municipal and communal kitchens. Individual deeds +of mercy are less necessary now than formerly, when, if they occurred, +they were the outcome of exceptionally noble and devout sympathy and +heroic self-sacrifice. + +One is therefore inclined to believe that men are less capable of such +deeds than they were in the past. But that is doing them a grave +injustice. Dr. Barnardo, who opened a home for the little waifs and +strays of the East End of London, is not inferior to St. Vincent de Paul +who adopted and brought up forsaken children. John Brown who suffered a +martyr's death by hanging because he attempted with arms to liberate the +negro slaves of the Southern States, Henry Dumont who devoted the +efforts of a lifetime to founding the Red Cross to help those wounded in +war, Emile Zola who sacrificed his fortune, his reputation as an author, +his personal safety, and suffered persecution, calumny, exile, a +shameful condemnation in court, and violent threats to his life in order +to get justice for Captain Dreyfus who had been wrongfully accused--all +these can well compare with the saints in the Golden Legend. Virtue +exists potentially in as many cases as formerly, probably in more; and +it is actively practised whenever and wherever it is appealed to. + +Another result of the long evolution of civilization and Morality is the +development of an ethical instinct in all except abnormal, degenerate +individuals, which causes men to act morally in nearly all situations +without conscious reflection, choice or effort. The individual who is +ethically well grounded, in whom moral conduct has become an organized +reflex action, does what is right without any conscious effort, and +therefore does not in so doing evoke any idea of merit either in +himself or in witnesses. But to do right habitually, carelessly and +almost without thought, as one breathes and eats, easily makes one +unjust in one's judgments. The battle between Reason and blind instinct, +between the Will and refractory Impulse, the victory of the lofty +principle, of spirituality over what is irrational and materialistic, +which give us the illusion that free humanity is superior to the +fatality of cosmic forces, have something so elevated and beautiful +about them that we are disappointed if they are absent, and practical +Morality without this dramatic setting does not appear to be real +Morality. + +Nevertheless we must not give way to this aesthetic point of view. We +must always remember that Morality has a biological and sociological aim +and must soberly admit that it is all the better if this aim is realized +without in every single case depending on uncertain individual +decisions. It would be an ideal state of affairs if in a society there +were such clear knowledge of all its vital necessities, and this had +been so inculcated in all its members, that their harmonious life +together and their co-operation for the common weal would never more be +troubled by the revolt of ruthless individual selfishness against the +love of one's neighbour and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the +community. The ideal of Morality would be attained, but the concept of +Merit would be transferred from the individual to the community. +Superficial observation might object to finding in individuals no +victorious struggle against resistance, hence no virtue, and might +bemoan the stagnation, nay, the retrogression, of Morality. But whoever +views matters as a whole would have to admit that it would imply the +greatest progress in virtue if the latter from being an individual merit +had become an attribute of the community. I am far from maintaining that +we have reached this ideal state; but evolution tends unmistakably in +this direction; and this is one of the reasons why Morality may appear +to make no progress. + +The very rise of the community to a higher stage of Morality may be a +fresh cause of error concerning the progress of Morality. The work of +the strongest and most clear-headed thinkers for many thousand years, +who have bequeathed as a legacy to the community their lifelong labours +for the amelioration of the lot of mankind, has developed in us an ideal +of active and passive Morality which is always present, even to the mind +of the weak or bad man who cannot or will not live up to it. By this +ideal, which is that of the community and which we bear within us, we +involuntarily judge real life as we observe it, without applying the +necessary corrections. We necessarily note a discrepancy between theory +and practice, which appears to us to be not mere inadequacy but a +contradiction of principles, not a quantitative, but a qualitative +difference, and thus he who is not forewarned easily becomes doubtful, +pessimistic, and bitterly contemptuous of mankind. + +This is the theme with which light literature unweariedly deals. Novels +and the drama constantly show us types: "Pillars of society" and other +worthy men, who pretend to be honourable, who are full of good +principles, preach unctuously and condemn others with pious indignation, +but who themselves in all situations behave with the most horrible +selfishness and are sinks of iniquity. The creators of these rogues +professing virtue, of these secret sinners, think they are mightily +superior; they think they know mankind, that they are deceived by no one +and can see deep down into men's souls; they call their method realism, +and they look down with the greatest contempt upon poets who depict +good, unselfish, noble, in short, moral characters, and call them +optimists, flirts, distillers of rosewater, who are either too silly or +too dishonest to see the truth or to confess it. If realism happens to +be the fashion, the public believes these men who depict what is ugly +and disgusting, admires them, is impressed by them, and scorns the +idealists who have a better opinion of mankind. + +However, realism is onesided and exaggerated, and therefore just as far +from the truth as enthusiastic idealism. It picks out certain +characteristics of human nature, generalizes from them and neglects the +others, thereby libelling mankind. The same people who in their flat, +insipid daily life unhesitatingly indulge their poor little vanities, +their naive selfishness, their childish jealousy, their secret +sensuality and their moral cowardice because it is of no consequence, +because it alters nothing in the general constitution of society, +because the community takes good care that moral principles shall be +maintained, these same people can, on great occasions, which, however, +seldom occur, reveal virtues which they themselves never suspected and +which we gaze at in blank astonishment with reverent awe. The +hypocritical Philistines of realistic literature, rotten at the core, +when the _Titanic_ sank, during the plague in Manchuria, at the +earthquake of Messina, in the mine disaster at Courrieres, and on Arctic +and Antarctic expeditions, proved to be heroes who came very near to the +theatrical ideal of Morality, if they did not quite reach it. If one +takes the valet's point of view and observes man in his dressing-gown +and slippers when he does not feel called upon to pull himself together, +one may very well form a poor opinion of him. But if one considers the +actions of the community and dwells on the loftiest deeds of +individuals, one will no longer believe that the Morality of the present +time is inferior to that of any other age. + +There is one phenomenon, though, which seems to prove that those who +deny moral progress are in the right, and that is war. This is indeed +the triumph of the beast in mankind, a bestial trampling under foot of +civilization, its principles, methods and aims, and it might be adduced +as a crushing proof of the stagnation or retrogression of Morality that +to this very day its horrors can devastate the earth, as they did +hundreds and thousands of years ago, only to an incomparably greater +extent, more cruelly and more thoroughly. But this, too, would be a +false conclusion. It is certain that the men who take it upon themselves +freely, purposely and intentionally to make war are monsters; their +action is a crime that cannot be expiated. Unhesitatingly they have +recourse to massacre, robbery, fire and all other horrors in order to +satisfy their devilish self-seeking which desires the fulfilment of +their ambition, that is, of their self-love and vanity, which covets +riches, increase of power, a ruling position and its privileges. These +they pursue either for themselves or for a family or caste, and they +pretend that they wish to defend their country from its enemies, to +acquire new boundaries for it affording better protection than the old, +to promote the development of the nation by getting fresh territory, to +spread its civilization and secure a glorious future for it. + +Nations, however, which allow their rulers to plunge them into a war of +aggression may be foolish and clumsy, but they need not be immoral. They +are made drunk with phrases which appeal to their noblest feelings, +which their government and its intellectual bailiffs pour out to them in +overflowing measure; they believe the shameless lies which are told them +boastfully; and this is undoubtedly a lamentable, mental weakness which +drew from Dante the bitter cry: "Often one hears the people in their +intoxication cry: 'Long live our death! Down with our life!'" But having +simply accepted these preliminary ideas the people act with such +Morality as one cannot forbear to admire. In a grand flight they rise +superior to all thought of self, raise their feeling of joint +responsibility to the pitch of heroism and martyrdom, and gladly +sacrifice to their duty to their neighbour and to the community their +possessions, their comfort, their health and their lives. That is very +great virtue whose subjective merit is no whit diminished by the fact +that it is manifested in a cause that is objectively unjust. And this +virtue on the part of nations which have been misled was never so +widespread or so real as now. The attitude of mercenaries who served the +highest bidder, the lack of ideals among the soldiers who followed +foreign conquerors at whose command they tyrannized over nations who did +not concern them at all, the cynicism of the leaders who unhesitatingly +went over to the enemy and fought against their own country and people, +these are things that are not to be found nowadays and are almost +unthinkable. No Napoleon of to-day could lead the men of Wuertemberg and +Bavaria to Spain and Russia, nor could an Elector of Hesse sell recruits +to England for the conquest of North America; no Louis XIV could induce +a Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to fight his battles against German +adversaries, no Constable of Bourbon ally himself with Spain against his +native France. Leonidas, once admired and praised as an exception, is +to-day the rule. "The guards who die but do not yield" are to be found +on every battlefield nowadays. + +In modern warfare a higher, more perfect Morality of the masses obtains +than was the case in the past. That war itself is the most immoral thing +does not detract from the moral worth of those who are led and misled. +The masses lack insight and judgment, their understanding is not +sufficiently developed to realize the bestiality of the rulers who put +them to such evil use; but the way they suppress their own feelings, the +way their will controls their impulses, their social discipline, in +short, their Morality, is admirable. Moreover, the conscience of mankind +revolts more and more against the wickedness of war, and the best men of +the time are striving to bring the mutual relations of nations, like +those of individuals, within the jurisdiction of Law and Morality. +Morality will doubtless at no distant date do away with war, as it has +abolished human sacrifice, slavery, blood feuds, head hunting and +cannibalism. + +No phenomenon of individual worthlessness observed within a narrow +sphere can detract from the fact that the community constantly improves. +A pessimistic view of the development of Morality has no justification. +Progress of civilization implies progress of Morality, its most +important instrument in the work of adapting the race to the immutable +conditions of its existence. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY + + +The concept of Morality includes an idea of compulsion, of coercion. A +voice says to man: "You must!" or "You may not!" It commands him to do, +or to refrain from doing, something. If he obeys, all is well; but if he +takes no notice of it, pays no heed to it, the question arises: "What +now? Will the voice rest content with crying in the wilderness? Will it +not mind speaking to deaf ears? Will the refractory individual not +suffer for disregarding it, or has it means to enforce obedience, and +what are these means?" + +The answer to this question depends on what view one holds as to the +nature of this monitory, warning, commanding voice. Whoever believes in +Kant's categorical imperative must admit that this word of command is +denuded of all power of coercion and must absolutely rely on the good +will of the individual in whose soul it makes itself heard. According to +Kant the moral law aims at no extraneous result, no utility. It is its +own aim and object. But its own aim is fulfilled as soon as the +categorical imperative has spoken, whether the individual acts in +accordance with it or not. It has therefore in principle no sanction. + +True, Kant contradicts himself, for after having sternly excluded from +his doctrine all utility as the end of Morality, all trace of feeling +from moral action, he smuggles blissful happiness in by a back door; the +result of submission to the moral law and its dutiful fulfilment, he +declares, will be bliss. Bliss, however you interpret it, is a +pleasurable emotion. Whether you act morally with the declared intention +of attaining the pleasurable emotion of bliss, or whether this +pleasurable emotion comes of its own accord as an undesired reward when +you have acted morally merely from a feeling of duty, without a thought +for such a result, without a wish to attain it, it makes no difference +to the fact that moral action actually meets with a reward. Kant does +not openly promise this, but with a wink he whispers in your ear that +there is a prospect of it. + +Nor does it alter the further fact that Kant, having contemptuously +expelled Eudaemonism from his system, reinstates it with full honours. +Once it has been conceded that moral conduct makes man blissful, in +other words gives him a reward, the categorical imperative also has a +sanction, albeit a very insufficient one. He who fulfils the moral law +attains bliss; that is a spur whether you admit it or not. But he who +does not fulfil it loses this advantage, otherwise, however, nothing +happens to him. The sanction, therefore, is onesided. A reward is +offered for the fulfilment of the moral law, but there is no punishment +for its non-fulfilment. For it is no penalty if bliss is withheld from +him who has no conception of it and no desire for it. No matter, then, +if the moral law be eternal and immutable as the stars above us, if it +be categorical, if it be fulfilled, not owing to a conception of its +effect, not from liking for this effect, but from an inner necessity, it +ceases to be a living force for mankind or to have any practical +significance; for the single thread which unites it with human +feelings--the whispered, vague promise of bliss--is too thin. Feeling +which has no knowledge of this misty bliss, and therefore no yearning +for it, is uninfluenced by the categorical moral law. Reason is not +necessarily convinced that it is right and valid. The moral law abides +like the stars with which it is arbitrarily compared, itself a star in +airless space, pursuing its course regardless of humanity, having no +relation to it or connexion with it; regard for or disregard of the +moral law makes no perceptible difference, and it ceases to have any but +a kind of astronomical interest for mankind, a purely theoretical +interest for purposes of scientific observation and calculation, and is +in no way applicable to the feelings, thoughts and actions of men. + +Theological Morality adopts a widely different point of view. Its logic +compels it to provide the most effective sanctions. God is the lawgiver +of Morality. He prescribes with dictatorial omniscience what is good, +what is bad, what should be practised and what avoided. Obedience earns +a glorious reward, revolt entails the most terrible punishment. Reward +and punishment are eternal, or may in certain circumstances be so, and +this, by the way, is cruelty which ill accords with the universal +goodness ascribed to God. For human understanding will never be +persuaded, will never be able to grasp, that a sinner, however grave +and numerous his sins committed during the brief period of the fleeting +life of man, can ever deserve an eternity of the most fearful +punishment. The lack of proportion between the deed and the penalty is +so monstrous that it is felt to be the gravest injustice, against which +both Reason and feeling revolt. Imagination can conceive hell fire that +lasts a certain time and has an aim, like life with its praiseworthy and +wicked deeds, but it boggles at the idea of a hell from which there is +no escape and the agonies of which are endless. + +The Old Testament conceives the sanctions of the moral law enunciated by +God in a thoroughly realistic manner. Fulfil the commandment "that thy +days may be long in the land." If you disobey, the curse of the Lord +will be on you and you will be pursued by His anger unto the fourth +generation. Christianity considered it dubious to make this life the +scene of reward and punishment. It is imprudent to let divine justice +rule here below, so to say, in public, before an audience and +representatives of the Press who attentively follow the proceedings, +watch all its details, and can judge whether the verdict is put into +execution. Prudence demands that the trial should take place in the next +world, where it is protected from annoying curiosity. Mocking onlookers +cannot then observe that it is only in the dramas of noble-minded poets +that in the last act vice is inevitably punished and virtue rewarded, +while in real life only too often merit starves, suffers humiliation and +poverty and altogether leads a miserable existence, while sin flourishes +in an objectionable manner and to the very end revels in all the good +things of this earth. However, the religious moralists painted such a +vivid and arresting picture of what awaits the sinners in the next +world, that if men had not been obdurate in their disbelief they must +have shudderingly realized it, as if it actually happened in this world. +Words from the pulpit admonishing men to obey God's law under penalty of +most terrible punishment were greatly emphasized by the paintings and +sculpture over the altars and the church doors, where all the tortures +of hell were depicted by great artists who put all their imagination and +all their genius into the work. + +As innumerable people have testified, these representations were taken +so literally, not only by the simple-minded masses but also by the more +highly educated, that they were haunted by them, waking and sleeping, +and imagined that in their own flesh they felt the torture of flames, of +boiling pitch, of the prick of the pitchfork as the devil turned them on +the grid, of the teeth with which the spirits of hell tore their flesh +from their bones. The fear of hell poisoned many a life up till quite +recently, especially in Scotland, and kept people in a constant state of +agitation and anguish which occasionally rose to mad despair. It is +remarkable that only punishment was so impressively held up to man's +view, but not reward. Pictures of paradise are much less rich and varied +than those of hell, and its joys are peculiarly modest. The inventive +powers of painters, sculptors, and poets did not rise above a +beautifully illuminated hall where the blessed are ranged around God's +throne and with folded hands sing hymns of praise to Him, while angels +play an accompaniment on trumpets and fiddles. A prayer meeting, a choir +and a concert of music, that is all that Christian eschatology holds out +as an eternal reward to virtue. It redounds to its credit that it +assumes a sufficiently modest taste among the good to make them long for +these joys and find infinite happiness in them. + +Islam does not count on such moderation. The joys of paradise that it +promises are so crudely sensual that they may well arouse lust in coarse +natures, and can counterbalance the fear of hell fire. The ideas of the +reward of merit in the hereafter held by the northern nations, Germans +and Scandinavians, are just as low and coarse. For the Mohamedans +paradise is a harem; for the worshippers of Odin it is a pot-house where +there are free drinks and a jolly brawl to end up with. Heroes who fall +in battle--they knew no virtues but a warlike spirit and contempt of +death--enter Valhalla, where they partake of the everlasting orgies of +the gods, drink unlimited quantities of mead and beer, and fight for +them to their heart's content without taking any harm. The North +American Indians hope, after leading a model life, to be gathered to the +Great Spirit, and in the happy hunting grounds of heaven evermore to +kill abundant game. Only Buddhism comforts the virtuous man with finer +and more spiritual hopes. From out his world of weariness and pessimism +it opens up the prospect of Nirvana to him, that is, of the end of all +feeling, which after all can only be painful, and of all thought, which +after all is only melancholy and despair, and of the volatilization of +the personality, the only real release; while it condemns the sinner to +the worst punishment, continued existence in ever new incarnations. + +These are indeed extraordinarily vigorous sanctions, which, though they +fail to have any effect on the unbeliever, make a very deep impression +on the believer, and are well fitted to determine his actions. But they +imply a debasement of the motives for leading a moral life, which are no +longer the outcome of insight and a convinced desire for good, but the +result of fear and avidity, a speculation for profit, a prudent flight +from danger. The practice of morality becomes a safe investment for the +father of a family who hopes to find his savings augmented by interest +in the hereafter, and the avoidance of vice becomes a schoolboy's fear +of punishment. Nevertheless, the view is widely held by superficial, +practical men that these imaginary and deceptive sanctions of Morality +cannot be dispensed with, that only the fear of hell can keep the masses +from giving themselves up to every form of vice and crime, that only the +promise of paradise is capable of inducing them to act unselfishly and +make sacrifices, and that all bonds of discipline would be loosened if +they ceased to believe in a last judgment and an hereafter with its +rewards and punishments. + +This whole system of sanctions in a future life is a transcendental +projection (according with primitive, childlike thought) of immanent +practices and forms in the positive administration of justice which are +transferred to a class of actions that successfully evade it. +Traditional and customary Law, as well as written Law, puts its whole +emphasis on sanctions; it partakes itself of the nature of a sanction. +Without sanctions it has no meaning. It is not kindly counsel, nor +fatherly admonition, nor wise advice, it is a stern command, it is +coercion, and this arouses only scorn if it is not armed with the means +to make itself a reality to which the unwilling must also submit, +because they cannot help themselves. There is no law, there can be no +law, which is not supplemented by arrangements that make it binding for +everyone. + +In the British House of Commons it has been customary for many hundred +years to designate members as the representatives of their particular +constituency. Only if a member commits a grave offence against the rules +of the House does he run the risk of the Speaker's calling him by name, +but this case has not arisen within the memory of man. A disrespectful +Irish member of Parliament, urged by perverse curiosity, asked the +Speaker one day: "What would happen if you called me by my name?" The +Speaker thought for a short time and then answered with impressive +gravity: "I have no idea, but it must be something terrible." Such a +mysterious threat of an unknown catastrophe may suffice for a picked +assembly whose members would no doubt maintain order and observe all the +rules of parliamentary decency, even if they were not held in check by +the fear of some dark danger. It would not be sufficient by a long way +to guarantee the rule of Law in a society which includes individuals of +the most varied disposition, mind development, education and strength of +impulse. + +Positive Law, as I have shown, presents a very simplified excerpt of +Morality for the use of coarser natures. It is a summary of the minimum +of self-denial, consideration for one's fellow men, and the feeling of +joint responsibility, the observance of which the community must +pitilessly demand from all its members if it is to continue to exist and +not fall back within a very short time into the state of Hobbes's war of +all against all. The necessity of self-preservation makes it a duty for +the community to provide for the case that one of its members refuses to +accept the minimum of discipline and to recognize the claims of another +personality. The community prevents this revolt, which would frustrate +its aim and endanger its existence, by employing physical force to break +all resistance to the Law which it must, for the common weal, impose on +all its members. That is an extraneous compulsion that certainly has +something brutal and unworthy of man about it and may well arouse +discomfort in more highly developed minds. It would undoubtedly be more +dignified and better if there were no need for the handcuffs of the +police, for prison cells and executioners, if man's own insight and the +admonition of his conscience were enough to constrain everyone to +respect the Law, that is, to practise a minimum of Morality. + +But the community cannot wait until this stage of moral development has +been generally attained. It refuses to entrust its existence to the +spiritual purity of all its members. On principle it disregards +processes in the consciousness of the individual--I have cited in an +earlier chapter the few exceptions to this rule: investigation as to +premeditation, accountability, freedom from undue influence--and keeps +to actions which alone it judges. It declares itself incompetent to +pronounce sentence upon a "storm inside a skull," to quote Victor Hugo. +Its sphere is that of obvious facts. Not until subjective impulses and +decisions are manifested in outward form does it intervene with methods +of the same order, with outward coercion. The sanctions of its law are +material, are punishments and fines. It hits the wrongdoer over the head +and on his hands and forcibly empties his pockets. To look into his soul +and set matters to rights there is a task undertaken much later by +law-givers. It was only after they had remembered that the source of law +is Morality and that its ultimate aim is not the bare attainment of a +state of mutual respect for one another's rights, but the education of +the community to a universal condition of self-discipline, consideration +and neighbourly love, that the law-givers made a point not only of +requiting the bad man's misdeeds, but also of trying to elevate him +morally. + +At different times, at different stages of civilization, and according +to the current views of the universe, society has interpreted in +different ways the punishment it inflicts and which it carries out by +forcible means, so as to ensure respect for its laws. Its original +character is that of revenge for an offence. The wrongdoer has offended +the community, it attacks him furiously and breaks every bone in his +body just as an angry individual would do in his first access of +indignation. That is Draco's penal code. That is the law of literal +requital. The special characteristic of this sanction is its violence +and lack of moderation. It does not trouble to find the right proportion +between punishment and crime. It does not carefully and fairly weigh the +force of its blows. The club falls with a frightful crash, but its +dynamical effect is not calculated beforehand in kilogrammetres. "The +stab of a knife is not measured," as an Italian proverb says. Thus +conceived, punishment has something primitive about it, something +intolerably barbarous. The community does the very things it was +created, by Morality and Law, to prevent; it exercises the right of the +stronger against the challenger; it promotes war, not that of all +against all, but of all against one, and its punishment is an act of +war. + +In a strongly religious society which lives in the idea of immediate +community with the deity, every transgression of the law is felt to be a +sin against the gods, and the punishment becomes an expiation offered to +them so as to avert their dangerous anger from the commonwealth. In the +administration of justice dim religious ideas are mingled, punishment is +tinged with a veneer of civilization, the culprit is, so to speak, +offered as a sacrifice to the gods. This supernatural view was prolonged +by the Inquisition, at least for a certain class of offences, until +almost modern times. + +When society awakens to the consciousness that its bond of union is +Morality, and that its most important task is to educate its members in +Morality, it introduces the concept of betterment into its penal system. +It wants not only to punish the wrongdoer sharply but also to transform +him inwardly and purify him. He is to feel that the punishment is not +only a requital but a mental benefit. In the Austrian army, until +corporal punishment was abolished, it was a rule that the soldier, after +being flogged, should approach the officer on duty and say, as he +saluted, "I thank you for the kind punishment." That is the attitude +that society, when it gives a moralizing tendency to its penal laws, +wishes the person who has been punished to attain. In this there is much +pleasing self-deception not unmixed with a good deal of hypocrisy. Penal +law offers the wrongdoer but little scope for improvement. + +All misdemeanours and crimes flow from three sources: ignorance, passion +and innate, anti-social self-seeking. Ignorance is the main, almost the +exclusive cause of wrongdoing among young criminals who have been badly +brought up or neglected, who have never had anything but bad examples +before them, and who cannot distinguish between good and evil. Society +may hope to improve these by right treatment; it must not punish, it +must educate them. Men who commit crimes from passion are those who +possess a consciousness of Morality and a conscience, who know quite +well what is right and what wrong, but have not sufficient strength of +character, that is, not an adequately developed power of inhibition, to +resist an opportunity, a temptation, a turmoil of their instincts. To +want to improve them is senseless, for they are not bad; they are weak, +or at any rate not strong enough. What they need is a strengthening of +their character, of their faculty of inhibition, and to achieve this is +beyond the power of society. All it can do is to humiliate the guilty +party by publicly exposing his lapse and by condemning him, and then +grant a delay of the execution of the sentence. In so doing it says to +him: "You have acted basely and ought to be ashamed of yourself, now go +and do not do it again." If the warning is unavailing and he relapses, +then the earlier sentence, as well as the new one, is executed. Fear of +this is added to his motives for acting honestly, and may possibly +strengthen his resistance to the onslaught of his evil instincts. But +his good conduct will always be at stake in the struggle between his +power of inhibition and his instincts, and the stronger of the two will +always carry the day. And finally, upon the man whose organic +disposition makes him anti-social, upon Lombroso's born criminal, +society can have no educative effect whatever. It is a hopeless case. +Society can render him harmless, it cannot alter him. Consideration for +his neighbour will never find a place in his consciousness. He will +never learn to resist his impulses and desires. His spiritual +insensibility makes him indifferent to the sufferings of others. +Incapable of continuous and equable effort, he will always want to prey +on society by begging, deceiving, stealing and robbing. He has no +conscience and does not hear the voice of society in his mind. He knows +nothing of good and evil, which are both empty phrases for him, words +without any meaning, and he is convinced that he acts rightly every time +he seeks to satisfy his appetites. In his case it is love's labour lost +to try and give a moral meaning to the sanctions of the law. Punishment +is not directed against the soul of the born criminal, only against his +body. It overwhelms him, fetters him and makes him either for the time +being, or permanently, harmless; but his organic tendency continues to +sway him, and whenever he recovers his liberty he is the same as before +he was punished. + +The Mystics give to punishment the character of fatherly and chastening +discipline by which the sinner expiates his crime and is purged of the +sin; thus it purifies him and leads him back to the state of innocence; +a kind of anticipatory hell fire which enables him to enter paradise. In +"Gorgias" Plato says explicitly: "He who is punished is liberated from +the evil of his soul." And the Apostle Paul teaches us: "Punishment is +ordained for the betterment of man." Criminal anthropology recognizes +that it is useless to expect this moralizing and redeeming effect from +punishment. Lombroso altogether rejects punishment as a means of +discipline and expiation, and before him Bentham and J. S. Mill, and +simultaneously with him and after him Fouillee, Guyau and Maudsley +adopted the same view. According to them the sanction of criminal law, +which extends and completes it and ensures its efficacy, can have no +other aim than the law itself, and this aim is to defend society against +its active enemies, if possible by converting them, if necessary by +forcible subjugation. + +In a book which is full of interest, but whose value is considerably +diminished by a strong admixture of mysticism, "Esquisse d'une morale +sans obligation ni sanction," M. Guyau goes much farther than the +criminal anthropologists and sociological opponents of punishment, and +expresses the somewhat paradoxical view that "the real sanction seems to +imply complete freedom from punishment for the crime committed, as +punishment for any action that has been accomplished is useless." It is +quite correct that no punishment under the sun can undo what has been +done. But it is not feasible for that reason to dispense with all +punishment for misdeeds and to call this systematic freedom from +punishment a sanction. Guyau overlooks the fact that the punishment is +directed not to the crime but the perpetrator. It certainly alters +nothing in a past transgression of the law, and that is not its object, +but it may possibly have the effect of preventing fresh misdeeds on the +part of the same wrongdoer or of others, and that would justify it. + +If society must renounce the idea of improving the misdemeanant, +especially the man whose organic tendencies make him a criminal and who +is the most dangerous and commits the most numerous and worst crimes, it +nevertheless assumes that it makes an impression on morally doubtful +characters by punishing misdemeanours and crimes, that it warns them and +prevents them from erring. That is the theory of intimidation, which +also has many opponents. It will hardly be denied that psychologically +it is well founded. The conception of the evil consequences for himself +that his action may entail strengthens the impulsive man's power of +inhibition when he is about to do wrong, and perhaps enables him to +overcome his immoral instinct. Only it is difficult to measure the force +which the thought of punishment adds to the effort of inhibition. This +force does not come into question at all with the man who sins +occasionally from passion. The flood of his impulses sweeps away all +barriers which reason may oppose, and their power of resistance is not +materially increased by the fear of consequences, because the mental +horizon is completely darkened at the time of the storm and no prevision +is possible. The criminal from organic causes exercises no inhibition. +He knows that society condemns his actions, but he is convinced of his +personal right to carry them out, and fears no punishment, because he +hopes to escape it, and tries his utmost by means of planning, prudence +and self-control to outwit society. The theory of intimidation is not +applicable to these two classes of criminals, and they constitute a +large proportion of the army of wrongdoers against which society has to +defend itself by force. + +But there remains the great number of mediocre natures whose sympathy +with their fellow men, the emotional foundation of the subjective +impulse to Morality, is only slightly developed, who have a superficial +veneer of Morality, who act honourably out of prudence, but who would +feel no repugnance towards perpetrating profitable misdeeds, if they +were certain that they would incur no risk. These insipid characters +whose emotional temperature oscillates round about freezing point and +who are incapable of great excitement, of passion, would see no reason +to resist any temptation, to disregard any favourable opportunity, if +the penal code, the judge and the policeman did not warn them to be +careful. For this kind of man the penal sanction is really a useful and +perhaps an indispensable means of prevention, and it has been thought +out and developed by the community with a view to such people. + +Not content with theoretical considerations, people have also appealed +to practical experience to test the theory of intimidation. In some +countries capital punishment was either legally abolished or tacitly +suppressed, the judges either refraining from pronouncing the sentence +on the prisoner or the head of the state, when appealed to, commuting it +by an act of pardon to loss of liberty. Statistics seemed to show that +serious crimes meriting the death penalty increased, and capital +punishment was reintroduced or the practice of systematic pardons was +abandoned, with the alleged result that the worst crimes grew less +numerous. I express myself doubtfully, because I do not think that the +statistics were sufficiently conclusive. They embraced too small a +number of cases and too short a period of time. It cannot be +conclusively proved that the abolition of the death penalty resulted in +an increase of capital crimes; but it is certain that crimes were never +more frequent or more horrible than in the times when criminal justice +was most cruel and made use of the most terrible sanctions. Up to the +dawn of modern times legal torture was administered, at every street +corner there were gallows, the poor wretch under sentence of death was +pinched with red-hot pincers, the executioner tore the flesh from his +bones, poured boiling pitch over him, cut out his tongue, hacked off his +hands, broke him on the wheel or burnt him alive; executions were a sort +of public entertainment or popular holiday, and efforts were made to +attract as many spectators as possible; every inhabitant of one of the +larger towns was familiar from childhood with the horrid spectacle of +mutilated human bodies writhing in torture, and there rang in his ears +the echo of the screams of pain and of the shrill death rattle of the +victims. But these impressions were so far from intimidating the gaping +crowd that many hurried from the place of execution to commit the most +execrable crimes, the punishment of which they had just witnessed; +consequently punishments have gradually been made less cruel, and the +public is excluded from executions, which clearly indicates a decisive +rejection of the theory of intimidation. + +The truth is that the severity of the punishment has no effect upon the +frequency or the savagery of crimes. The criminality of a community +depends on the value and emphasis of the moral education which it +bestows upon the rising generation. It can prevent its members, at any +rate the average, normal type, from developing into criminals. But the +fear of punishment has no deterrent effect upon those whose criminal +impulses have not been subjugated by social discipline. The severity of +the punishment does not contribute anything to the defence of society. +It only proves that the lawgiver and the criminal judges are on the +lowest level of civilization which corresponds to a widespread and +barbarous criminality, and that their modes of thought and feeling are +horribly like those of the criminals whom they sentence to torture, the +gallows, and the wheel. + +Positive law aims at defending society, and tries to attain its end by +punishing transgressions. It provides no reward for conscientious +obedience. The law has no honours to bestow on blamelessness and virtue. +Society felt the want of this and made attempts to encourage honourable +conduct by conferring distinctions, just as it tries to intimidate vice +by punishing crime. These attempts were not particularly happy. The +bestowal of titles and orders is no recognition of virtue, but a means +adopted by governments to ensure devotion to power. An arrangement was +made in some places to honour model citizens in public and crown them +with laurels, but it soon came to grief owing to indifference and +mockery. A private individual wanted to fill this gap in social +institutions. The Count of Montyon, a son of the eighteenth century, +whose philosophy he had imbibed, instituted the prizes for virtue which +are distributed annually by the French Academy. They are bestowed on +modest integrity in humble circumstances which has manifested a sense of +duty, neighbourly love and self-sacrifice. This friend of man has had +few imitators, and that is understandable. Sound common sense realizes +that rewards like the Montyon prizes for virtue do not with the +infallibility of a natural law fall to the lot of merit, but are nearly +always adjudicated to the prizewinner by chance, by recommendation, and +by all sorts of influences that have nothing to do with virtue; and it +seems unjust that among equal claims some should be satisfied while +others, the great majority, are not. It would be vain to contend that +one virtue which goes empty-handed is not unfairly treated when another +gets a benefit on which it has not counted, and that in a moral +character, such as alone would be eligible for a prize for virtue, there +is no room for envy. That would be the moral of the Gospel concerning +the labourers who came at the eleventh hour, which has met with +opposition from others besides the contemporaries of Jesus. + +On the whole, the community has never felt called upon to solve the +moral problem of the reward of virtue. It has always contented itself +with the punishment of vice and has given its law threatening, but not +encouraging, sanctions. This attitude shows that it has always had a +clear conception of its moral task. In its positive law it never +included anything but that minimum of Morality that was absolutely +necessary to its existence, and without which it would dissolve into its +original elements, its order would be replaced by chaos, by the war of +all against all. It must insist on the observance of this minimum; it +must use forcible means to achieve this. But it does not feel justified +in demanding more than this minimum, because more is not claimed by its +instinct of self-preservation. A surplus of virtue over and above the +amount necessary for the life of society is desirable; but it does not +lie within the scope of the natural functions of the community, +determined by its organic necessities, to achieve this by compulsion +and the provision of legal rewards as an encouragement. It is the +business of the individual to work at his own moral improvement, and the +community cannot interfere directly in the matter. It is enough that it +encourage this work indirectly by bestowing care on the culture and +education of the individual, by making it the duty of its public schools +to inculcate good principles, and by creating a public opinion which +surrounds all the activities of higher morality with admiration, respect +and gratitude. The moral education of the individual is not an object +with which laws are concerned; it is the result of the constant, vital +influence of the community, and can have no sanction other than the +increase of well-being of every single person within the social union, +which is a natural consequence of raising the moral level of the +community. + +The penal sanctions of positive law have a gross materialism about them +corresponding to the definite concreteness of the actions with which +positive law deals. The broad field of Morality, however, which is +outside the narrow sphere of the laws, has no room for sanctions of a +material nature. The penalties prescribed by law are directed to actions +which, if they became general, would in a very short space of time +result in the dissolution of society. The community essays by forcible +measures to prevent this kind of action, and these measures more or less +fulfil their aim, whether you interpret their use on the theory of +discipline, of expiation and purification by repentance, of improvement +and moral re-birth, or of intimidation. All these theories were invented +later on, after the community had been convinced by experience that +punishment, if it does not entirely prevent crime, at least limits it +sufficiently to make the continued existence of society possible, and +more or less to guarantee to its members the safety of their life, their +property and their personal dignity. + +Against transgressions of the moral law, the results of which are not +immediately obvious, such as ruthless selfishness, blunted sympathy and +lack of active neighbourly kindness, the community does not proceed with +forcible measures; firstly, because it cannot establish their existence +convincingly and hence cannot try them in a court of justice, and +secondly, because it does not recognize them as constituting an +immediate danger to its existence. Now, as the sanctions set up by +society are not applicable to these transgressions, an individual whose +mind does not penetrate very far into matters is disquieted, for +accustomed as he is to the spectacle of the steady justice of the state, +he seeks the counterpart in the forms of this justice in the world of +Morality, and does not discover it at the first glance. He asks +anxiously where are the police, the public prosecutor, the examining +magistrate, the criminal court, the prison for sins against Morality, +and invents them, since he cannot find them. He transfers to the +hereafter the sanctions of Morality, which are not visible on earth. He +cannot make up his mind to renounce them, because the fact that sins +against the moral law go unpunished would seem to him to indicate +intolerable anarchy, comparable with the state of a community where +everyone could murder, rob and mutilate to his heart's content without +incurring the risk of the least personal unpleasantness. + +In the sphere of the moral law punishment certainly does not follow hot +foot upon crime, but it nevertheless does not fail to appear, and +becomes visible when the eye is capable of embracing long periods of +time and of tracing intricate connexions. The sanctions of the moral law +differ from those of criminal law, but they are not wanting. They are of +a subjective and of an objective character. The subjective punishment +for a sin against the laws of Morality is remorse. It is inflicted by +the inner judge who rules in the consciousness of the individual, by +conscience, and penetrates to the very deepest depths of a person's mind +which no outward punishment imposed by the community ever reaches. It is +not only religious and political martyrs who endure torture and death +with proud serenity, conscious that they are morally immeasurably +superior to their executioners; even common criminals remain perfectly +unmoved by their punishment and regret only that they are weaker than +their captors. Prisons are full of convicts who look upon their +condition as that of prisoners of war. They have been worsted in their +battle with law. That seems to them a misfortune but not a disgrace. +They are neither humble nor contrite, but revengeful. They are +determined and ready to take up the duel with society as soon as an +opportunity offers and they may hope to do so with some prospect of +success. + +But remorse is an unresisting submission to the verdict of conscience +and the consciousness of one's own unworthiness. It is the recognition +of the justice of the sentence which brands one, and the constant, +anguished realization that one's personality has been deservedly +humiliated, dishonoured and deprived of its rights. As a spiritual +process, remorse causes the sinner continually to relive the misdeed he +committed, while at the same time he is fully conscious of its atrocity. +The ego becomes dual, one part active, the other watching and judging. +The one again and again perpetrates its misdeed, the other looks on +horrified and suffers agonies. It is one long torture and disgrace of +self. Remorse condemns the sinner perpetually to repeat in his mind the +deed which fills him with horror of himself. This state of mind is the +nearest approach to eternal damnation in hell. There is only one means +of temporary escape: to extinguish memory by narcotics. That is why +remorse not seldom leads to drunkenness. Shakespeare, with a poet's +infallible insight into the soul, has grasped and depicted the nature of +remorse, the uninterrupted, torturing presence of the misdeed in man's +consciousness. Lady Macbeth sees her hands ever stained with the blood +of the innocent royal victim whom she herself did not even murder, and +she complains that "all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this +little hand." Leontes, in the "Winter's Tale," on hearing of Hermione's +alleged death, of which he believes himself guilty, mourns: + + "Once a day I'll visit + The chapel where they lie; and tears shed there + Shall be my recreation: so long as nature + Will bear up with this exercise, so long + I daily vow to use it." + +Remorse is the most effective of the subjective sanctions of Morality; +it is almost too effective, for owing to its duration and severity the +punishment easily grows disproportionate to the crime. But it has one +great disadvantage, it affects only better natures who have an active +conscience and spiritual delicacy, while it spares the wicked who have +no conscience, who perpetrate their misdeeds contentedly, without a +qualm, and regret them only when they are discovered and lead to +unpleasantness. + +Nevertheless, the actions of these hardened sinners do not go quite +unpunished. Moral law always takes vengeance for transgressions, but not +directly on the evildoer. In addition to the subjective, it also has an +objective sanction; when it is violated retribution falls on the +community. The masses have a dim idea that every evil deed meets with +requital and express it in the proverb that "Though the mills of God +grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small." They have noticed that +the curse of an evil deed never fails to come, and is consummated with +crushing force, only that it does not happen at once. It seems +objectionably unjust that the culprit should not feel the effect of his +crime, whilst others do who were not born when it was perpetrated. But +the concept of retributory justice is as little applicable to the +far-reaching relations in the life of humanity as to the actions of the +laws of Nature, for instance gravity or electricity. Morality is, as I +have shown, an adaptation of the species to the natural conditions in +which it is forced to live. Morality, therefore, has an aim, which is to +make social life in common possible for the individual, this life alone +enabling him to maintain his existence amid the conditions obtaining on +this earth. The discipline which Morality imposes on the individual +leaves him a certain amount of free play. If he escapes from this +discipline to a certain small extent which does not threaten the +existence of society, this revolt has no ill effect upon the life of the +species, the latter has no grounds for punishing him, and the only, yet +sufficient, sanction of the loose Morality of an undisciplined +individual lies in the fact that he is more or less inferior to the most +perfect type of the species, and visibly bears the stamp of his +worthlessness in his character, his bearing and his mode of thought. But +if in his disregard of Morality the individual goes so far as to +frustrate its aim and endanger the existence of society, then the latter +must either find ways and means of rendering the culprit harmless or +else it overlooks his misdeed and thereby becomes an accessory and +justly suffers the evils consequent upon a deterioration of Morals which +is universally tolerated. + +The means by which a society must defend the Morality necessary to its +existence can only be spiritual, for it is not a question of breaches of +the positive law which result in the intervention of justice and of +material penalties, but of a disregard of the commands of Morality, +which are not drawn up in paragraphs. Public opinion suffices to rouse +the individual who despises the Moral law to an uncomfortable sense of +his unworthiness; if he finds himself treated with contempt and sees +disapproval and dislike in everyone's face, either he will be spurred +to an effort to overcome his immoral instincts or his self-respect will +suffer from the universal contempt with which he meets; and this +suffering is his punishment, therefore it is the sanction of a breach of +the Moral law. + +If public opinion does not keep careful and severe watch, such as may be +termed the function of a higher moral police, then inevitably the moral +tone of the whole society will sink to a lower level, and this will +result in making life harder and more difficult, and in certain +circumstances may lead to dissolution. This is not a theoretical +assumption, but an observed fact, a lesson taught by history. It tells +us of epochs in which the licentiousness of individuals, favoured by a +society too dull, weak and indifferent to stand up against bad examples, +succeeded in corrupting all classes. Such a period is exemplified by the +fall of Rome. Common natures indulged and wallowed in every vice, the +better ones felt such disgust for a life without nobility and virtue +that they discarded it, and the community lost all excuse of joint +responsibility and became so loosely knit together that it was incapable +of common effort or sacrifice, and collapsed miserably at the first +onslaught of a foreign aggressor tempted by its depravity. + +The disintegration of a society, the sanction of its sins against +Morality, is a slow process. It does not often take place +catastrophically, with theatrical effect, so that even a dull observer +can grasp the connexion between cause and effect. But whoever +investigates closely will realize that all evils from which society +suffers, which make life more bitter and harder for its members, are +ultimately due to defective Morality. What are class struggles with +their consequent hostilities between groups of the same nation, their +coercion and damage, but manifestations of self-seeking, lack of +consideration and injustice, that is, of Immorality? Would they be +possible if members of all classes, capitalists and workers, +agriculturists and townsmen, rulers and subjects were inspired by +neighbourly kindness, understanding and appreciation of the needs, +pretensions and feelings of their opponents, and by a spirit of +self-sacrifice? Would the decay of character, the arbitrariness and +arrogance of the mighty, the cowardly slavishness of the masses, with +the resultant rottenness of public affairs, be conceivable if +individuals were conscious of their dignity and their duty to themselves +and the community, and if they had the strength and the determination to +overcome their fear of men? Could wars of aggression bring ruin upon +mankind if leading personalities did not give way to the desire for +outward honours, to the hunger for power, to avarice, to the itch of +vanity, that is to the lowest forms of selfishness, and if the masses +out of stupidity or fear of a mental effort, and out of dread for their +personal responsibility did not allow themselves to be misused for base +purposes? + +Thus we find insufficient Morality in individuals, or the complete lack +of it, to be at the root of all evils with which the community is +afflicted, and we are justified in conceiving war, party quarrels, +collisions between groups representing different interests, revolutions, +in fact, all tragedies of life in societies with the suffering and +destruction they entail, as the penal sanction of sins against Morality. +Morality, which was created to facilitate life for the individual or to +make it at all possible for him, is no longer able to fulfil its aim, +and the society finds itself by its own fault back in the condition of +misery and fear, owing to which its instinct of self-preservation +originally forced it to make the effort of setting up the Moral law. +Even the most merciless zealot cannot wish for a more efficacious and +painful punishment of Immorality. + +But Morality does not possess the sanction of punishment alone, it has +also the more amiable one of reward. We have seen that by strengthening +the faculty of inhibition it raises the individual to a higher level of +organic development, that by the inculcation of consideration and +neighbourly kindness it affords the community the possibility of working +together peacefully and profitably. But it does more than that. It gives +life an incomparably higher value than when it is dull and uniform, by +enriching and beautifying it with heroism and with ideals. + +Ideals and heroism are direct creations of Morality and inconceivable +without it. The ideal is a conception of perfection; the thought of +attaining it is accompanied by the most pleasurable emotions, and the +individual regards it as his life's task to strive for it. The struggle +for the ideal implies effort at all times, renunciation of the ease of a +thoughtless and care-free existence, an endless series of difficult +victories over appetites clamouring for immediate satisfaction, that is, +constant work in the service of Morality. He who has an ideal is never +troubled by the problem of the meaning of life. His life has an aim and +significance. He knows whither he goes, why he lives, for what he works. +He knows nothing of the doubts of the aimless wanderer, of the +discouraging consciousness of one's own uselessness, and his assurance, +his conviction that his efforts are useful and worthy come very near to +happiness. Heroism is the noblest victory of a thinking and volitional +personality over selfishness; it is altruism which rises to +self-sacrifice, the proud subjugation by Reason of the most primitive +and powerful of all instincts, that of self-preservation. It is the +highest achievement of which Morality is capable. It is never developed +for the profit of an individual, but always for that of a community, for +a thought, for an ideal. His heroic conduct raises the hero out of the +rut of his existence, liberates him from the trammels of his +individuality and enlarges this to represent a community, its longings, +its resolutions, its determination. At the moment of his heroic action +the hero lives innumerable lives, the lives of all for whom he risks his +own, and if death reaches him, it can destroy only his single person, +but cannot put an end to the dynamic activity of the community which is +included in the hero, while he is magnificently elevated far above +himself. The faculty of forming an ideal of existence and activity, and +of rising to the heights of heroism, is the royal reward of Morality +which the perfect subjection of animal instincts to the rule of human +Reason has achieved. Its punishment for those retrograde individuals who +never learn to control their instinctive reflex actions is that they are +denied the sight of the glory of the ideal, that heroism is unknown and +incomprehensible to them, that they lead their lives fettered and +imprisoned, unconscious of any task, without prospect or exaltation, as +if they dwelt in a cellar or in a dark dungeon. These are the sanctions +of Morality. It has no others, nor does it need them. + +In one passage of the book cited above Guyau makes the doubting remark: +"Who can tell us whether Morality is not ... at one and the same time a +beautiful and useful art? Perhaps it bewitches us and deceives us." Let +us assume that it is an illusion. That would not detract from its value +for mankind. Is not all our knowledge of the world, is not our whole +view of Nature an illusion? We are made conscious of the universe by its +qualities, and these qualities are conferred on it by our senses. But +all knowledge that we derive from our senses is an illusion. For the +senses do not convey reality to us, but the modifications which the +influence of reality produces in our sense organs. The universe has +neither sound nor colour nor scent. But we perceive it as sounding, +coloured and scented. These qualities we attribute to reality are +illusions of our senses, but these illusions make up all the beauty of +the world which without them would be dumb, blind and without charm for +us. + +Life for us is an unspeakably oppressive riddle. Has it an aim, and, if +so, what? We do not know. All thought only leads to the conclusion: life +is its own aim and end, we live for life's sake. And this conclusion is +no solution of the problem. Then Morality appears, and not only makes +life easier and possible, but even shows us an aim, if not for +universal, at least for individual life. That aim is the humanization of +the animal, the spiritualization of man, the exaltation and enrichment +of the individual by means of sympathy, neighbourly kindness, a sense of +joint responsibility, and the subjection of Instinct to Reason which, as +far as we know, is the noblest product of Nature. It is possible that +Morality, which hides the eerie unintelligibility of life from us, is an +illusion. Blessed be the illusion which makes life worth living. + + + Printed in England by Cassell & Company, Limited, London, E.C.4. + F17.122 + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Morals and the Evolution of Man, by +Max Simon Nordau + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + +***** This file should be named 37998.txt or 37998.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/9/9/37998/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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