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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/37998-8.txt b/37998-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a0e1f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/37998-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7398 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Morals and the Evolution of Man, by Max Simon Nordau + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Morals and the Evolution of Man + +Author: Max Simon Nordau + +Translator: Marie A. Lewenz + +Release Date: November 12, 2011 [EBook #37998] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION + OF MAN + + + + MORALS AND THE + EVOLUTION OF MAN + + BY + MAX NORDAU + + A Translation of + "BIOLOGIE DER ETHIK" + + By + MARIE A. LEWENZ, M.A. + Fellow of University College, London + + CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD + London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne + 1922 + + + + TO MY DEAR WIFE ANNA (née DONS), + + the sunshine of my life in happy days, my brave + comrade in the storms of the world-catastrophe, with + love and gratitude I dedicate this book which helped + both her and me to endure the dark years when we + were homeless wanderers. + + MADRID, _September 26th, 1916_ + + + +CONTENTS + + CHAPTER PAGE + 1. THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY 1 + 2. THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY 46 + 3. THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY 84 + 4. MORALITY AND LAW 115 + 5. INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY 144 + 6. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 185 + 7. MORALITY AND PROGRESS 215 + 8. THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY 247 + + + + +MORALS AND THE + +EVOLUTION OF MAN + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY + + +A very well-known experiment in animal psychology was once made by +Möbius. An aquarium was divided into two compartments by means of a pane +of glass; in one of these a pike was put and in the other a tench. +Hardly had the former caught sight of his prey, when he rushed to the +attack without noticing the transparent partition. He crashed with +extreme violence again the obstacle and was hurled back stunned, with a +badly battered nose. No sooner had he recovered from the blow than he +again made an onslaught upon his neighbour--with the same result. He +repeated his efforts a few times more, but succeeded only in badly +hurting his head and mouth. At last a dim idea dawned upon his dull mind +that some unknown and invisible power was protecting the tench, and that +any attempt to devour it would be in vain; consequently from that moment +he ceased from all further endeavours to molest his prey. Thereupon the +pane of glass was removed from the tank, and pike and tench swam around +together; the former took no notice whatever of his defenceless +neighbour, who had become sacred to him. In the first instance the pike +had not perceived the glass partition against which he had dashed his +head; now he did not see that it had been taken away. All he knew was +this: he must not attack this tench, otherwise he would fare badly. The +pane of glass, though no longer actually there, surrounded the tench as +with a coat of mail which effectually warded off the murderous attacks +of the pike. + +The fact so often observed, that man in many cases does that which he +passionately desires to leave undone, and refrains from doing that which +all his instincts urge him to do--this phenomenon of Morality is a +generalization upon a huge scale of the above experiment on animals with +the pane of glass in a tank. + +Jean Jacques Rousseau thought out a theoretical human being who was by +nature good. Such a human being does not exist and has never existed. +From sheer annoyance at the provoking obliquity of vision which led the +enthusiast of Geneva to develop such a theory, one is sorely tempted to +go to the opposite extreme and declare that man is by nature +fundamentally bad; but such an assertion is just as naïve as Rousseau's +contention. Good and bad are values which we can only learn to +appreciate when we have felt the effect of the phenomenon of Morality. +The concepts of good and evil are of much later origin than mankind, and +can therefore no more constitute a fundamental characteristic of man's +original nature than, for instance, the cut and colour of his clothes; +though it is open to wiseacres to maintain that man's nature to some +extent actually finds expression in the cut and colour of his +clothes--that is, in his choice of them. Anyone contemplating primitive +man, man as he emerges from the hands of Nature, stripped of all the +additions which he has acquired in the course of his historical +development, is bound to admit that man is neither good nor bad; he is a +living being acting according to the instincts implanted in his nature; +just like the pike. But in most contingencies he does not obey these +instincts, and if he reflects upon himself and his actions, he is +astounded at realizing this, and asks: "Why do I refrain from revelling +in the gratification of my desires?" + +Innumerable times every day of his life he would like to break many or +all of the Ten Commandments; but he abstains from so doing, and, what is +more, mostly without effort, without having painfully to suppress his +desire. What prevents him from yielding to his impulses? An invisible +power which lays its commands upon him: "Thou shalt not!" "Thou shalt!" +Often his aims and inclinations come into violent collision with this +order, or this prohibition, and are hurled back by the painful impact. +Man hears the threatening, imperious voice, but cannot see whence it +comes. Accustomed to reason by analogy, he concludes that it is, like +thunder, a voice of Nature. When the pike has sufficiently injured his +nose against the pane of glass, he assumes as an actual fact that an +insuperable barrier separates him from the tench, and, moreover, that it +is both useless and painful to come into contact with this. He does not +try to discover the nature of the obstacle, and gives up any further +attempt upon his mysteriously protected prey. Man, with a more highly +developed intelligence than the pike, does not accept the phenomenon of +Morality with dull resignation. Since he has become conscious of a +mysterious barrier erected between his volitions and his actions, he has +not ceased to reflect upon this barrier, to investigate it with a timid +yet irresistible desire for knowledge, and to try and discover its +nature. + +It redounds to man's credit that he has devoted so much time and energy +to investigating the character and essence of Morality. But the result +of these investigations does not redound to his credit. With the +exception of theology, there is no subject upon which so much has been +written as upon ethics. Yet whosoever plunges into this boundless sea of +literature will emerge with feelings bordering upon horror and despair. +Here a free rein is given to all man's errors, to his habit of drawing +false conclusions, to his faulty modes of thought. Incapacity to +interpret facts, association of ideas, elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp and +uncurbed by any criticism, intemperate mysticism, arrogant dogmatism, +shallow self-sufficiency--all these vie with one another in the +presentment of theories which either are patently foolish, arbitrary or +ill-founded, or else prove to be so when impartially examined. + +It is hard for the few reasonable thinkers who have taken part in this +great investigation to make their voices heard amid the uproar raised by +the solemn, unctuous, dictatorial or pedantic tomfools. And even the +former are not entirely satisfactory, because they do not distinguish +clearly enough between the form and the substance, the externals and the +essence of Morality, and because they do not discriminate with +sufficient care between questions as to its nature, origin and aim, and +its powers or sanctions--questions which must on no account be +confounded. + +What is Morality? Obviously it is necessary to attempt a clear answer to +this question before any useful purpose can be served by inquiring into +the group of problems to which it gives rise: its aim, its laws, its +origin, its method, its assumptions. The Stoics answer this question as +follows: "Morality is living according to Nature." Furthermore, it is +quite in accordance with the doctrine of the Stoics that Cicero says: +"Virtue, however, is nothing but Nature developed to the highest +possible degree of perfection" ("_ad summum perducta_"). Moral therefore +means natural; Morality and Nature are equivalent; they are one. Really +a simpler or more childlike explanation is hardly possible. The most +superficial glance at human life and at our own soul teaches us that +Morality is contrary to Nature, that it must struggle against Nature to +assert itself, that it means a victory over Nature, in so far as we +understand by Nature in this special sense the most primitive reaction +of man to simple and more complicated stimuli, the first tendency of +impulse, the immediate, instinctive urge to act. Further, the definition +of the Stoics ignores the aggregation of concepts which the synthetic +conception, Morality, involves; as if this were self-evident and +required no definition. The Stoics tacitly assume that Morality and +Good are synonymous. Cicero makes this assumption clearer by using the +word Virtue (_virtus_) instead of Morality. But in all languages this +word implies approbation and praise. It is an appreciation of worth +(_Werturteil_), to use the expression so appropriately coined by Lotze. + +But the very fact that we recognize Morality as being valuable is by no +means a matter of course and it demands an explanation. + +Certain actions could only be judged to be good if they were +distinguished from others which did not suggest the same judgment, which +were felt to be not good, to be bad or indifferent. We come to the +question, What is Good, what is Bad? The Stoics reply, "That which is +good is natural." It is easy to call facts which please us natural, and +such as displease us unnatural. In reality both series of facts are +equally natural; because everything that happens is natural; because by +definition Nature is the synthesis of all phenomena; because nothing +exists outside of Nature, and within Nature everything is a part of her +and therefore is natural and can be nothing but natural. If we +nevertheless wish to distinguish between natural and unnatural +phenomena, if we call Good, Morality, and Virtue natural, and compare +them favourably with the unnatural, this only proves that we use the +words natural and unnatural as synonyms for good and bad, and that we +have a ready-made standard by which we measure the naturalness or +unnaturalness (that is, the goodness or badness) of actions, and that +there exists within ourselves the law by which we judge them to be good +or bad. But how do we come by this law? How, of what material, and why +do we fashion this standard? Why do we approve of one thing as good and +condemn another as bad? What qualities do the former and the latter +possess, or what qualities do we ascribe to them? That is what we want +to know when we inquire as to the significance of Morality, and the +definition of the Stoics throws no light whatever upon the matter. + +According to Aristotle Morality is "the activity of Practical Reason, +which is accompanied by pleasurable emotion." It is not worth while to +dwell upon this definition. It is absolutely valueless. Practical Reason +is not a definite concept; Aristotle does not say anywhere what he +understands by "practical" when he applies this attribute to Reason; and +to call every activity of Practical Reason accompanied by pleasurable +emotion Morality is mere eccentricity. + +To take only one example: if I have a house built, and accept the +architect's plans because they please me greatly, my practical reason is +most certainly active; the gratification induced by my reasonable choice +of the plans is doubtless a pleasurable emotion; but assuredly no one +will characterize as moral this activity of my practical reason which is +accompanied by pleasurable emotion. It may be that Aristotle was +contemplating not a single action, but conduct in life as a whole. In +that case he has expressed in an unfortunate, and much too loose a +manner the thought that Morality is Reason plus pleasurable emotion. We +shall frequently meet with and have to examine this idea, which omits to +explain why pleasurable emotions attend certain activities of +"Practical Reason," whatever that may be, and fail to be aroused by +others. + +Judaism, as embodied in its law-givers and prophets, teaches that +Morality consists in living and acting in accordance with the divine +Will. Maimonides, who, however, was regarded by many of his +contemporaries as a heretic, does not consider Judaism a creed at all, +but a code of Morality. He maintains that anyone who repudiates the +tenets of the Jewish faith, even the most essential one, namely, the +belief in a single god, must not be excluded from the Jewish community +as long as he conforms to its moral laws. This thinker, usually so +accurate and nice in his reasoning, overlooks the fact that in this case +he is contradicting himself in a manner wellnigh comic. According to +him, too, Morality consists in the endeavour to live and act in +accordance with the divine Will. How is such an endeavour possible for a +man who does not believe in God and for whom consequently no divine Will +exists? Therefore either Morality must be something different from an +approximation to the standard set up by the divine Will, or else he who +denies God cannot be moral. But I will leave the author of the "Guide of +those who have gone astray" to his self-contradiction, and only retain +the Jewish definition of Morality as based upon the Will of God. + +Without any restriction Christianity has taken over this definition from +the mother-religion. In his zeal to claim that God alone is the source +of all Morality, St. Augustine allows himself to be carried away to such +an extent that he libels mankind most hatefully. Just as for Rousseau +man is by nature good, for the Bishop of Hippo he is by nature +fundamentally bad. Left to his own devices he would always wallow in the +mire of sin and vice, and would never even feel the wish to abandon his +wickedness. It is God's mercy alone which rescues him from his depravity +and sets his feet upon the path of righteousness, leading him to virtue, +salvation and eternal bliss. Thomas Aquinas is no less definite on this +point. The scriptures of Judaism and Christianity contain the eternal +law which God has ordained for mankind. He points out the paths that man +should follow. All Morality springs from Him alone. + +To this very day true believers adhere to this doctrine. Morality did +not originate on earth; the knowledge of it is a gift of grace from +heaven to mankind. It is derived from God; it is that which God has +willed; or else it does not need any special act of volition on the part +of God, but is the essence of God himself. That is the teaching of +Paley, the classical moral philosopher. Virtue consists in doing good to +mankind in obedience to the Will of God, and in order to attain eternal +salvation. Here stress is laid upon the fact that Morality is active +love for one's neighbour, and this is a concession on the part of the +conciliatory Englishman to the utilitarian ethics of his countrymen; but +for him the necessary and sufficient reason for this love of one's +neighbour is the Will of God and the desire for eternal salvation. The +German devotee, Baader, blustering like a capuchin, preaches this +twaddle: "Any Morality which is not rooted in divine law is the +intellectual impiety of our time raised to its highest power; it is the +perfection of atheism; for the idea of the absolute autonomy of man +atheistically denies the Father as law-giver; the theistic denial of the +necessity for divine aid in fulfilling the law does away with the Son or +Mediator, and finally the materialistic-pantheistic apotheosis of Matter +does away with the Holy Ghost with its sanctifying power." The Frenchman +Jouffroy, though more careful and reticent in his manner, unmistakably +expresses his conviction that "ethics, as well as the philosophy of law, +inevitably and necessarily lead to theology." + +But this necessity only exists for minds whose desire for knowledge and +truth is easily satisfied by words without a meaning that can be +visualized, by fabulous statements accepted without proof, by fictions +of the imagination, and by shallow juggling with the association of +ideas. Even those who do not approve all Auguste Comte's arguments will +agree with him when he classifies the successive steps in the mental +development of mankind as the theological, transcendental, and +scientific modes of thought. When man's understanding is in its infancy +he is content with a supernatural explanation of all phenomena which +strike him as mysterious, disquiet him or rouse his curiosity. Only I +have never been able to understand why Comte discriminates between the +theological and the transcendental modes of thought, and assigns to the +latter a higher place than the former. Both are on a footing of absolute +equality; both raise arbitrary fictions of the imagination to the +position of sources of knowledge; both substitute anthropomorphic +trivialities for the observation of phenomena and research into the +conditions under which they occur and their relationship to one another. +The only difference between them lies in the fact that transcendentalism +expresses itself in choicer language than does theology, that it +presents formulæ that are more complicated and pretentious, less +transparent and honest--formulæ which the unpractised mind does not +immediately recognize as mythological dogmas in a pseudo-scientific +disguise. + +The relationship of theological to transcendental thought is much the +same as that of superstition to religion. Both of them are one and the +same. Religion is shamefaced superstition, whereas superstition has not +yet learned to feel shame. Religion is superstition in a dress-coat, and +therefore fit for polite circles; superstition is religion in a cotton +smock and therefore cannot be admitted to society. Superstition is the +religion of the poor and unassuming, religion is the superstition of +fine folk who plume themselves on their formal and verbal scholarship. + +Ever since man has risen above the level of the beasts, ever since the +first faint glimmerings of thought began in the thick-walled, narrow and +dark skull of a hunter of the Neanderthal or Cro Magnon, he has ascribed +everything unintelligible in life and in the world around him to divine +actions and divine sources. How did the world come into existence? A god +or gods created it. How does Nature work? In accordance with the will of +a god or gods, in obedience to divine commands, as a result of divine +activities. What is life? A divine gift of grace. What is +consciousness? An irradiation of the divinity. What is infinity, what +eternity? Attributes of the god. God is the name that from the beginning +of time to the present day men have given to their ignorance. They find +it easier to bear disguised by this pseudonym; they are even proud of +it. With cunning self-deception they have endowed the word with the +dignity pertaining to a title of the most awe-inspiring majesty, and +they no longer feel ashamed of a poverty of mind which can boast of such +a magnificent name. Morality also is one of those phenomena which are +not intelligible as a matter of course. The questions how, whence, why, +and to what end Morality exists, and what it is, cannot be solved at a +glance; its life-history is not apparent to every observer, as is that +of the domestic cat. But why cudgel one's brains? Cheap explanations are +ready to hand. This way mythology, you maid-of-all-work! Morality has +been ordained by God. A moral life is one in accordance with God's +commandments. He who will not content himself with this answer is an +infidel and does not deserve to have any notice taken of him. + +Let us leave the paltry statements of theologians and note how men who +investigate questions more thoroughly have dealt with Morality. +Descartes defines Morality as the sustained endeavour to do that which +one has recognized to be right. It is difficult to discern in this +definition the father of scientific scepticism. What are the +distinguishing marks of Right? Is the decision as to what is right and +what is wrong to be left to the subjective judgment of the individual? +In that case Descartes must concede that the action of a burglar is +moral, if he has recognized that it is right for him to perpetrate his +crime between two and three o'clock in the morning, that being the most +favourable time for it, and then strives to the best of his ability to +effect an entrance into the building he has selected, at the moment +which he has recognized as the right one. Or shall all mankind, or at +least the majority, and not the individual, decide what is right? In +that case the definition would certainly approximate to the one which I +hold to be true; but for one thing it would suffer from vagueness; and, +moreover, its originator would lay himself open to the reproach of not +having shown why the individual is worthy of praise when he acts in +accordance with the convictions of the majority, though these be opposed +to his own, and in so doing allows his action to be determined by a +judgment due to a psychic mechanism other than his. + +Spinoza's "Ethics" leaves the reader in great discomfort, the result of +vacillating and contradictory explanations. Obviously Descartes' great +disciple had no clear conception of the essence of Morality and held +either consecutively, or may be even simultaneously, divers views on the +subject, amongst which those of all schools of thought are either quite +clearly expressed or at least implied. "By Good," he says, "I mean that +which we know for certain to be useful to us."[1] + + [1] I quote the wording of Berthold Auerbach's translation: + "B. de Spinoza's collected works. Translated from the Latin + by Berthold Auerbach." Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta, 1871. Second + edition, Vol. II. + +And again: "To act absolutely virtuously is merely to act, live, +preserve one's being (these three mean the same thing) in accordance +with the dictates of Reason, because one seeks one's own interest." + +According to that Morality is synonymous with egoism, and its aim is +man's individual profit or interest. Even the most pronounced +Utilitarians among ethical theorists have not ventured to go to such +lengths. True, they have contended that the aim of moral action is +happiness, but at least they define it as the happiness of the whole +community and not that of the individual, except in so far as he is a +member of the community and has his fair share of its well-being. +Spinoza foresees the objection that the pursuit of one's own happiness +cannot possibly deserve the universal esteem in which virtue is held, +and he tries to adduce reasons whereby the egoism which he characterizes +as moral may be justified and palliated: + +"Everyone exists according to the supreme law of Nature, and +consequently everyone does, according to the supreme law of Nature, that +which results from the necessities of his own nature; and therefore +every man forms his judgment as to what is good and bad according to the +supreme law of Nature, pursues his own interest according to his lights, +seeks revenge, strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he +hates." That is possibly the most audacious and at the same time the +most ill-founded statement that has ever been written on the subject of +Morality. Morality means behaviour calculated to further one's own +interest. Morality is therefore utility. But man cannot act otherwise +than morally, since he always acts as he is compelled to do by his own +nature. There is no sense in discriminating between good and bad, moral +and immoral, since one always acts in accordance with the behests of +Nature. Man automatically executes the dictates of Nature which is alone +responsible for his deeds. + +For the Stoics, too, Morality is action in accordance with the law of +Nature, but Spinoza goes further than the Stoics, in that he does away +with any universally applicable standard of moral conduct, and sets up +instead of Nature pure and simple, which is the same for all, each man's +individual nature as the authority which shall lay down rules of +behaviour for him. So Morality is something individual and subjective. +Man acts according to the requirements of his interest; his own nature +shows him what his interest requires; no other person has any right or +any qualification to form a judgment upon the worth of his conduct, to +call it good or bad, for he cannot know what course of action the man's +personal nature, peculiar to himself and to no other, may prescribe to +him. This is the doctrine of anarchy and amorality put in a nutshell, a +more wordy paraphrase of the _Fais ce que vouldras_ (please yourself), +the terse inscription that Rabelais put over the entrance to his Abbey +of Thélème, as the only law governing that abode of alluring wantonness. +Spinoza certainly does half-heartedly concede to Reason the rôle which +Aristotle positively assigns to it ("To act in an absolutely virtuous +manner is merely to act according to the guidance of Reason," etc.), but +it is impossible to see how Reason can exercise guidance and control if +"everyone does according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his nature." This can surely only mean +that everyone may yield to the unbridled desires of his natural +instincts, which is the very reverse of self-control by Reason. If +Nature is to rule despotically, there is obviously no place for a +constitutional limitation of her sole power by the effective counsel and +protests of Reason. + +But Spinoza renounces in a much more definite way his views recognizing +the right of every individual "to form his judgment as to what is good +and bad according to the supreme law of Nature," for he calmly adds: +"Society can be founded, if it reserves to itself the right possessed by +the individual to take revenge, and to pronounce a verdict on what is +good and what is bad; thereby it acquires the power to prescribe rules +of conduct for the community, to make laws, and to enforce them, not by +means of Reason, which cannot restrict passions, but by threats.... +Hence in a state of Nature, sin cannot even be imagined." + +This concession to Society most emphatically contradicts his first +definition of Morality. It does away with the right claimed for the +individual "to do according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his own nature," and by the same +"supreme law of Nature" to "judge what is good and what is bad." It +subjects conduct to the restraint, not of Nature, but of Society. It +bears witness to the admission that "Reason cannot restrict passions," +although Spinoza has just required the virtuous man to "act according to +the guidance of Reason." Spinoza admits that Morality is not the +consequence of a law inherent in the individual, but of an extraneous +law forced upon him by society; that it is not an individual but a +social phenomenon. In this he agrees with the conclusions of modern +sociological thought, but his merit is much diminished by the fact that +he skims lightly over the one great difficulty which sociological ethics +is struggling to overcome. He says, society "reserves to itself the +right ... to pronounce a verdict on what is good and what is bad, and +thereby acquires the power to prescribe rules of conduct to the +community," etc. + +It has the power right enough; police, judge, prison and gallows bear +witness to that; but has it the right? That is not clear without further +investigation. It requires to be proved. The amoralist can emphatically +deny this, basing his conclusion on Spinoza's own definition. He can +legitimately declare that he need submit to no dictates of society, that +he owes obedience only to his own nature and his own inner needs, and +the moral philosopher can only prove to him that he is wrong by +scornfully indicating the penal code and its stalwart minions. + +Spinoza, we see, has already given a whole series of mutually +destructive and contradictory definitions of Morality: it is the law of +life and conduct which society lays down for the individual, though we +do not learn from him on what principles it is based; it is the pursuit +of one's own interest as indicated by Reason; it is obedience to +necessity--that is to say, to the demands of one's own nature. All this +does not suffice him. He discovers a new aspect of Morality. +"Recognition of Good and Evil is nothing but a pleasurable or a +disagreeable emotion in so far as we are conscious of it." And again, +"Pleasure is not actually bad (as the ascetics probably contend), but +good; pain, on the contrary, is actually bad." + +In this case the ideas pleasure and pain are treated as equivalents of +good and bad, as were useful and harmful in the former case. According +to the axiom that things that are equal to the same thing must be equal +to one another, pleasurable is synonymous not only with good, but also +with beneficial, and in like manner painful with bad and harmful. Brandy +undoubtedly produces a sensation of pleasure in the drinker; is brandy, +then, good in a moral sense? Above all, is it beneficial? Many such +questions could be put to Spinoza, but this one is enough. + +Thus we discover Spinoza to be at one and the same time a Utilitarian +and a Hedonist, the champion of Impulse and again of Reason, an +anarchistic individualist and a herald of the right of society to rule +the individual. Angry and disappointed, we turn from him, for instead of +finding in him the definite standard we sought we have met with the +shifting hues of the chameleon and the uncanny changes of form of +Proteus. + +The views of the English thinkers are clearer and more convincing +although they, too, do not carry their investigations far enough. Hobbes +uses Justice and Injustice as synonyms for Morality and Immorality, and +he definitely recognizes what Spinoza only dimly guessed, namely, that +these ideas could only arise in man when living as a member of society +and not in a being dwelling alone. According to him, therefore, Morality +is a social and not an individual phenomenon; just as the moral +philosophers of the theological school look upon it as the Will of God, +so he considers it to be the Will of Society. But he was under the +obligation (non-existent for the theologian) to trace to its source this +social Will, to show how it is manifested, to explain why the individual +not only submits to it, but values this submission far more highly than +mere utility. Man learns the Will of God by revelation, and it is +forbidden to inquire into its basis. To the Will of Society Hobbes +cannot possibly ascribe the same incontestable sanctity. It should not +have escaped his notice that this Will is neither uniform nor of assured +stability, and that it often wavers and is sometimes self-contradictory. +Therefore, if he wants to call the Will of Society Justice, as the +theologians call the Will of God Morality, and if he wants to look upon +Justice and Morality as equivalents, then it is his duty to explain how +Society can make claims which conflict with the principles on which the +universal rules it has drawn up are based, and which, consequently, not +being just or moral, are unjust and immoral, but which, nevertheless, +must be acknowledged by the individual as being both just and moral, +simply because they are social claims. + +In Kant's moral philosophy we find the extremest form of mystic +dogmatism; its success would be inexplicable did one not know how prone +mankind is to be intimidated by brusque statements. Kant's dictatorial +pronouncements have become common-places. "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." That is very impressive. But what is "the maxim" on +which you act? This maxim is the moral law. Now we yearn to know what +this moral law is, whence it comes, and on what it is based. + +But our yearnings remains unsatisfied. The moral law is a secret. It is +an incomprehensible power which rules our consciousness. Ask no +questions. Be silent, submit and obey. Even the theologian discussing +moral philosophy will listen to reason. He gives us the information, +sibylline though it be, that the moral law emanates from the Will of +God, and is shown to us in the revelations of religion. Kant does not +even give such meagre information. The moral law exists. That must +suffice. "The starry heavens above thee, the moral law within thee." You +retort that that is a metaphor which you may call poetical, if you like, +but it is no explanation. You will get the following reply: this +metaphor, rightly understood, indicates that the moral law is eternal, +that it is part and parcel of uncreated Nature like the stars, that it +is a phenomenon of the same order as all the elements that go to make up +the universe. "The moral law does not flow from antecedent ideas of Good +and Evil; on the contrary, the moral law decides what is good and what +is evil." It is not derived from human experience. The less so since +"it cannot be proved by experience that it has at any place or any time +become real." In other words, no one can testify that the "Categorical +Imperative" has ever been realized, that the moral law has "at any place +or any time" ceased to be a Kantian theory productive of sacred thrills, +that it has ever emerged from the unapproachable cell wherein it dwells +in the temple of human consciousness, to take a place and play an active +part among mortals. + +The lessee of all Kant's wisdom, Hermann Cohen, with the clumsiness of +an over-zealous assistant, has expressed his master's thought in a +perfectly ludicrous form: "The moral law is to be conceived as a reality +of such kind that it must exist, that its being must be" (note the +elegance and euphony of the phrase "being must be"!) "even if no +creature existed for whom it would be valid." True, the moral law is a +maxim on which you should "act," a standard of human conduct, but it +would still exist if there were no human beings and no action. It would +come to exactly the same thing if Hermann Cohen said: the railway is to +be conceived as a reality of such kind that it must exist if there were +no human beings and consequently no travellers; even if there were no +earth on the surface of which rails and sleepers could be laid. This is +such palpable nonsense that it would be a work of supererogation to +prove its absurdity. By this grotesque exaggeration Hermann Cohen has +clearly brought to light the hollowness and weakness of Kant's Moral +philosophy which culminates in the "Categorical Imperative." In spite +of its arbitrary dogmatism, the formula of the "Categorical Imperative" +has taken a hold on the imagination of the superficially educated, and +has never ceased to be repeated with the fervour evinced by a devout man +at prayer, by several generations of those who have made it their +business to cultivate mental and moral science. + +In one of his early novels, "The Island of Dr. Moreau," H. G. Wells has +described how an audacious scientist, by performing an operation on the +brains of the most savage beasts of prey, such as panthers, wolves, +etc., transformed them into creatures with the powers of thought and +speech. He succeeds in suppressing, or at least in lulling for the time +being, their bloodthirsty instincts, but he is always afraid that these +may be roused again, and forbids the animals on which he experiments to +touch blood or fresh meat. He takes good care to give no reason for this +prohibition. He merely issues it sternly and threateningly. It is "the +Law," an unknown, inexplicable, but terrible power to which one must +submit, because opposition would expose one to unimaginable, but +terrible evils. If temptation assails the beasts they flee it, +whispering fearfully and warningly to one another: "The Law! the Law!" +Wells is a trained philosopher, and often has his tongue in his cheek. I +shrewdly suspect that when he writes of the mysterious "Law" which fills +Dr. Moreau's semi-humanized beasts of prey with superstitious terror, he +is poking fun at Kant's "Categorical Imperative." + +The great logical mistake in Kant's moral philosophy is that he +conceives Morality as a social or collective phenomenon, and yet +defines it as an individual one. According to Kant, the Categorical +Imperative exists within us. It is as immutable as the starry heavens +above us. It gives us the criterion by which to discriminate between +good and evil. Its realm is our consciousness wherein it lives and +rules; it is not introduced from outside, it springs from no power or +conditions outside our person. All the same, the only law which this +ultra subjective Categorical Imperative imposes on us is the most +centrifugal that can possibly be imagined: "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." Hence our action is designed to produce an effect on the +world around us. It is "to become a universal law" can, of course, only +mean, it is to become a universal law of human society, for Kant cannot +possibly have aspired to make the Categorical Imperative impose laws +upon the stars in their courses. Our moral law, in so far as it applies +to our actions, deals with society. When we formulate it in our minds, +we associate it from its first inception with the notion of the society +to which it is to be applied. It would have been logical to say: "Your +standard of conduct is to be what society recognizes as its universal +law." But Kant puts the cart before the horse and says on the contrary: +"The maxims on which thy action is based are by thy will to become the +universal law of society." + +Other philosophers have avoided this mistake. Hegel declares: "It is not +until man becomes a member of a moral community that the ideas of Duty +and Virtue attain a definite meaning and become direct representatives +of a universal spirit in subjectivity, which knows that it is actuated +in its aim by the universal and realizes that its dignity and its +particular aims are founded upon it." If we translate this horribly hazy +language of Hegel's into plain speech we find it means: "The ideas of +Duty and Virtue only acquire a meaning when they are applied to the acts +of commission and omission of the individual member of a community." +(When Hegel speaks of "moral community" his use of the word "moral" is +inadmissible, for he takes it for granted that the meaning of the word +"moral" has been determined and is clearly understood, whereas he ought +first to have defined its meaning.) The concepts of Duty and Virtue +denote that the individual in taking action thinks of the community, +that regard for its interests determines him, that his actions do not +attain dignity and worth until his aim becomes the interests of the +community, that these interests must coincide with those of the +individual if his actions in his own interests are to merit the +appellations of dutiful and virtuous. In short: to act morally is to act +so as to ensure the well-being of the community. The real Categorical +Imperative is a social conscience. + +Feuerbach expresses this thought clearly and distinctly when he says: +"There can be no question of Morality in the strict sense of the word +except where the subject of discussion is the relationship of man to +man, of one person to another, of me to thee." + +Recent contemporary French writers are in no way doubtful of the +meaning implied by the concept of Morality. "Morality," says Littré, +"is the whole collection of rules which determine our conduct towards +others. Moral Good is the ideal, which at any period of a civilization +forms opinions and customs with respect to this conduct; moral evil is +that which offends this ideal." This definition is very incomplete and +weak, as will be seen in the course of our remarks, but on one point it +is quite clear: it treats Morality as a social phenomenon, it +paraphrases it as the adjustment of individual action to the standard +set up by the community. The question of the origin and the aim of this +standard is left open. + +L. Lévy-Brühl formulates Littré's idea more clearly. "We call by the +name of Morality the collection of such conceptions, opinions, feelings +and customs respecting the mutual rights and duties of men in their life +as members of a community, as are recognized and generally observed at a +given time in a given civilization." + +Thus, according to some, Morality is subjection to an absolute law of +divine, or at any rate of unexplained and inexplicable origin, which +religion or a mysterious inner voice reveals to man; according to +others, it is the recognition that the claims of the community, or at +any rate of the majority of one's fellow men, are of binding force upon +the actions of the individual. These different answers to an inquiry as +to the origin of Morality both contain the tacit admission that it is a +law which peremptorily dictates to man what he shall do and what he +shall not do. But by means of what psychic mechanism does this law +enforce obedience in the consciousness of man? It is remarkable that all +moral philosophers, no matter to what age, nation or school they belong, +dimly feel or clearly recognize that in civilized man at any rate, +natural instincts and judgment are always at war; that the latter +opposes the former; that in the victory of judgment over impulse lies +the very essence of Morality; that consequently the essence of Morality +implies the control and repression of instinct by Reason--in a word, +that it is inhibition. + +We have seen that Aristotle, in definite though unconscious opposition +to the Stoics, who consider Morality synonymous with Nature, defines it +as the activity of Reason. + +Henry More was the first to express this quite clearly: "Virtue is an +intellectual force of the soul which enables it to control ... animal +instincts and sensual passions." + +And Dr. Jodl sums up the character of Christian morality in the +statement: "Moral philosophy under the influence of Christian ideas +makes Morality always appear in the guise of a prohibition; at any rate +it is apt to conceive Morality as acting in an essentially restrictive +and prohibitive manner upon the natural impulses and instincts of man." + +This is not quite correct. This Christian code of morals does not always +manifest itself as a prohibition. Its main precept is: "Love thy +neighbour as thyself." That is not a prohibition but a positive command. +Nevertheless, the point of departure of this command is an inhibition. +For the first instinctive movement of man is selfishness and, as its +consequence, indifference to one's neighbour; the first imperious +impulse is to sacrifice the latter's interests to one's own. But if +regard for one's neighbour, nay, love for him permeates our feelings, +thoughts and actions, that denotes a victory of Christian ideas over the +impulse of instinct, a suppression of that impulse--that is, an +inhibition which, not content with mere prevention, prolongs its +efficacy in the same direction until it changes the impulse of +selfishness and inconsiderateness into its very antithesis, that of +unselfishness and charity. + +It constitutes an important advance in knowledge to recognize that +Morality, and not, as Jodl makes out, only Christian Morality, is +manifested as an inhibition, as the victory achieved by Reason over +Instinct which is contemptuously described as animal, simply because its +worth is judged by a standard already supplied by current views on +Morals. It is inadmissible to judge by this standard when one attempts +an impartial investigation into the ultimate foundations and the essence +of Morality. We have no plainly obvious right--no right which does not +require a proof--simply to scorn instinct as animal; to run it down from +the start and with a respectful bow to give Reason precedence over it; +to applaud with satisfaction the suppression of rascally Instinct by +highly respectable Reason. Instinct is no more animal than any other +manifestation of life in man; and he indulges in pleasant self-deception +if he imagines that he is other than an animal, that is, a living +organism in which all processes take place according to the same laws as +in all other living beings, from the simplest one-celled creature to +the most highly developed and complicated. + +In itself Instinct has the same claim to dignity as Reason; according to +some people an even greater one, because the former is more primitive, +unpremeditated, self-assured and firmly established than the latter, and +if Reason claims to be the superior, it must substantiate that claim. + +As a matter of fact, that claim has never been universally acknowledged. + +Periods during which Reason rules at least in name and is treated with +the obsequious reverence which the model citizen has, or feigns to have, +for his sovereign, are followed by others in which Instinct revolts; +rebels dethrone Reason and set up Instinct in its place, or, as they +call it, passion and nature. The parties which in turn wield power in +these periodic revolutions may be briefly termed classical and romantic. +The classicists are the legitimist supporters of Reason; the +romanticists are revolutionaries, and their leaders are men like Cleon +or Jack Cade, Cromwell, Washington or Robespierre; that is to say, rude +demagogues or subtle dialecticians in favour of Instinct. Among the +legitimists in Reason as in politics, are to be found those who maintain +the divine right, who base the right of Reason to rule over Instinct +upon the Will of God, and others again, the constitutionalists, who base +their support on the Will of the people, on universal suffrage, who +force upon Instinct the law promulgated by society. I need not carry the +metaphor to extremes. Every reader can work it out in all its details. +I only wanted to show quite clearly that almost all moral philosophers +conceived Morality as a struggle between Reason and Instinct, as the +defeat of lawlessness by law. But their views diverge widely when they +try to explain the source of this law and its claim to obedience. + +The theologians find no difficulty in this explanation. Just as the +essence of Morality according to their ideas is the nearest possible +approximation to divine perfection, so the moral law is one enacted by +God Himself, and it is a sin punishable with hell fire to fail to +observe it or to rebel against it. Others look upon Man as his own +law-giver, and trace his moral conduct, his willingness to combat his +own instincts, to an inner voice which teaches him what is right. They +call this inner voice by different names. They call it Nature, Reason or +Conscience, and look upon it as something innate, as a normal +constituent of man's psychic nature. That is the meaning of Fichte's +apodictic statement: "That which does not meet with the approval of +one's own conscience is necessarily sin. Therefore he who acts on anyone +else's authority acts in a conscienceless manner." + +With this emphatic utterance Fichte dismisses both the devout believers, +for whom Morality is the revealed Will of God, and the Rationalists who +look upon it as the dictate of society. He considers that if man claims +to act morally, he can do so only on his own authority, i.e. on that of +his conscience. He is not aware that in so doing he frivolously abandons +all rights to pronounce an objective moral judgment on any human action. +He thereby relinquishes the power to ask any further question except: +"Did he act in accordance with his own conscience? If so, then he has +acted in a subjectively conscientious way, even if it appears to me to +be immoral or even criminal and monstrous. If he has acted contrary to +the promptings of his own conscience, then he is assuredly a sinner, +even if his action be in my eyes splendid and exemplary." Thus Fichte, +with his subjective basis of Morality, is led to a conclusion which is a +ludicrous reversal of generally accepted ideas. According to him, a man +would be acting conscientiously if, despising what all others hold good, +right and sacred, he wallows in the satisfaction of his selfish +instincts, as long as his conscience approves or even bids him do so; on +the other hand, he is a sinner if, in opposition to his inner voice, but +according to moral law, that is in obedience to extraneous authority, he +practices all the virtues. + +All these subjective moral philosophers tacitly assume with Rousseau +that man is by nature good. They take no account of the empirically +established fact that there are men whose Fichtean conscience, or whose +Kantian categorical imperative, urges them to a course of action which +according to the general opinion is bad, wicked and revolting. This +criticism applies to Beneke, according to whom Morality is "a +development of human nature which exists as such within us, and which we +need only continue or promote"; it applies equally to Reid and Dugald +Stewart, who describe it as an inclination, which has become a habit or +a principle, to act according to the dictates of conscience. But +conscience must be explained. It is by no means self-evident that each +individual conscience will have the same standard of good and evil. The +moral philosopher must not shirk the duty of showing how the conscience +acquires its concepts of moral values, with what weapons it provides +Reason to combat Instinct, which demands satisfaction without paying any +attention to the warnings of conscience. + +The great majority of moral philosophers do not endorse the view of Kant +and Fichte, that conscience is a piece of human nature, a sense inborn +in man, an inner voice that is independent of, and unmoved by, external +influences; on the contrary, they are convinced that conscience +originates outside the individual, that, in his consciousness, it is the +advocate retained by society, commissioned to plead the cause of the +community before the reason of the individual even, nay, especially, +when the interests of the community run counter to those of the +individual. + +Bacon calls the presence in our consciousness of a defender of the +interests of society our innate social affection, and treats it +unreservedly as the source of Morality. Long before his time the +Stoics had noted the existence of this social affection and called it +[Greek: oikeiôsis]; Hugo Grotius, with the intellectual perspicuity +peculiar to himself, says that "Right and Morality flow from the same +source, and this source is a strong social instinct natural to man, it +is solicitude for the community, a solicitude guided by Reason." The +English philosophers are practically unanimous in ascribing both +conscience and Morality in general to a social source. The welfare of +the community, says Richard Cumberland, is the highest moral law; +Hutcheson remarks that, in the struggle between egoism and universal +benevolence, the decisive factor in favour of the latter is the +accompanying feeling, the reflective emotion of approval. + +In modern parlance we call "universal benevolence," altruism, and the +"reflective emotion of approval" is a paraphrase of conscience which +contains an indication of its mode of action. For the idea that our +action will meet with the approval of the community and the pleasurable +emotion of satisfaction are in fact the reasons why we mostly submit to +the dictates of conscience voicing the commands of the community. Only +Hutcheson is too venturesome and goes too far, when he maintains +unreservedly that the reflective emotion of approval in the struggle +between egoism and universal benevolence is the decisive factor which +turns the scales in favour of the latter. This is by no means always the +case. When it does occur we call the action moral, but we characterize +it as immoral when, in spite of the "reflective emotion of approval" +"universal benevolence" is worsted by egoism. + +It is unnecessary to quote the opinions of other moral philosophers. +It is enough to observe that most of them describe the moral law as a +social agreement and make conscience its accredited representative. +L. Lévy-Brühl repeats a doctrine current since the days of Pythagoras +when he says: "The sense of duty and that of responsibility, horror of +crime, love of what is good and reverence for justice--all these, which +a conscience sensitive to Morality thinks it derives from itself and +from itself alone, have nevertheless a social origin"; and Feuerbach +expresses the same view in an entertainingly melodramatic fashion when +he calls the voice of conscience "An echo of the cry of revenge uttered +by the injured party." This cry of revenge would never wake an echo in +us if we did not possess a sounding board which cries of distress and +lamentation cause to vibrate. Schopenhauer, digging deeper than his +predecessor, clearly recognizes this sounding board, and describes its +characteristics when he says that the foundation of ethics is pity, +which in its passive form warns us: "_Neminem laede!_ Do harm to no +one!" And in its active form gives the order: "_Imo omnes quantum potes +juva!_ Assist everyone with all your might!" + +The assumption, that sympathy with his neighbour must be present in +man's consciousness before he is capable of moral action, is one that +need not be made by subjective moral philosophers, who hold with Kant +and his school that the moral law is an inborn categorical imperative, +which proclaims its commands without reference to any extraneous object, +or to the world, or mankind. + +In the same way the theologians have no need of it, for they consider +that what is morally good is the Will of God. + +But he who holds with the moral philosophers of sociological tendencies +that Morality is regard for one's fellow men, and the recognition that +the claims of the real or supposed interest of the community are +superior to those of the comfort of the individual, must admit that +sympathy is a necessary preliminary to moral action; i.e. that the +individual must have the ability to picture the sufferings of others so +vividly that he feels their sorrows as his own, and with all his might +and all his will strives to prevent, alleviate and heal them. The lack +of this ability, psychic anæsthesia, is a symptom of disease. It renders +the person affected incapable of moral action. It is a characteristic of +the born criminal, and is the essential symptom of that state of mind +which alienists term moral insanity. Even in this condition, if reason +and the power of judgment are not affected, great offences against +current moral law can be avoided. But this results from the fear of the +painful and ruinous results which a collision with public opinion +entails, even if the offender is not actually haled into court. It is +not due to any inner necessity, nor to the prompting of one's own +feelings. + +Only the Rationalists have any cause or reason to inquire into the aims +of Morality, whether they look upon the moral law as dictated by society +or are of the opinion that it is the sum total of the rules by which +Reason, of its own initiative, successfully combats the urging of +Instinct. If the moral law is a creation of society, and is obeyed by +the individual out of sympathy with his fellow-men or consideration for +society, the logical conclusion is that society has set up the moral law +to satisfy some real or imagined need. Its aim in this case can only be +the real or supposed welfare of the community. This is the most widely +accepted view. + +"Morality and universal welfare," says Macchiavelli, "are conceptions +which coincide." In his calm assurance this apodictic writer, who +doubtlessly slept well and had an excellent digestion, is never troubled +by a doubt as to whether there is such a thing as an absolutely reliable +measure of universal welfare, and therefore whether Morality, which is +termed its equivalent, can provide us with a perfectly unimpeachable +standard. He whose ethical conscience is more tender and timid will +inevitably anxiously ask himself: Who decides what universal welfare +demands and what is conducive to it? Is it to be the masses? Is the mob, +incapable of thought, ignorant, swayed by momentary and shifting +impulses, to make moral laws for the select few who are its natural +guides? What tragedies would necessarily result from this definition! +How often a strong personality, trained to come to independent +conclusions, refuses to obey the voice of the mob! Is the sheep who +trots bleating along with the herd to be taken as the type of a moral +being? Must we necessarily condemn as immoral those who swim against the +stream, enlightened tyrants who force upon their people hateful +innovations calculated to ensure their welfare,--such men as Peter the +Great, the Emperor Joseph II, the reformer who comes into violent +conflict with the majority who are creatures of habit? "The aim of +Morality is the welfare of society; this is indeed the essence of +Morality." A sufficiently safe and most soothing formula this seems; but +really the security it gives is most deceptive, and it leaves unsolved +the most important problems relating to the phenomenon of Morality. + +A numerous group of moral philosophers seeks the aim of moral conduct +in the individual himself, not outside him. In spite of Schopenhauer's +sympathy, they doubt that consideration for the well-being of the +community would act forcibly enough upon the individual to induce him to +wage unceasing war on his impulses and struggle to overcome them. Rather +they hold that the individual must find in his inner consciousness not +only the spur to moral action, but also the reward for the same, and +they characterize this driving force as pleasurable emotions in every +sense of the words. According to them man acts morally because, and in +so far as, he anticipates pleasurable results from so doing. Epicurus +considers the aim of Morality always to be Pleasure. He makes only the +one reservation, that a reasonable man will renounce an immediate +pleasure for the sake of a greater one in the future, and that he may +delight in the anticipation of pleasurable emotions which defeat and +dull present pains. Thus the martyr may be a true Epicurean, even if by +his actions he exposes himself to most cruel torture and the most +painful death, for he is convinced that the everlasting joys of paradise +will more than indemnify him for his temporary sufferings. + +I have already shown that Aristotle considers Morality the activity of +practical Reason, which is accompanied by pleasurable emotions. He makes +these pleasurable emotions an essential part of Morality, and Spinoza +shares this view, for he says: "Knowledge of good and evil is nothing +but a pleasurable or a disagreeable emotion in so far as we are +conscious of it." + +No less roundly, one might almost say brutally, Leibnitz declares: "We +term good that which gives us pleasure; evil that which gives us pain," +while Feuerbach expresses himself rather more carefully and indefinitely +thus: "The instinct for happiness is the most potent of all instincts. +Where existence always occurs together with volition, volition and the +will to be happy are inseparable; they are, indeed, essentially one. 'I +will,' means 'I have the will not to suffer, not to be hindered and +destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be assisted and preserved; that is, +I have the will to be happy.'" This is a wordy paraphrase of Spinoza's: +"All existence is self-assertion, and Morality is only the highest and +purest form of this fundamental instinct in a reasonable being." + +Among those moral philosophers who see in pleasurable emotions the aim +of Morality, its reward and its incentive, we must distinguish two +groups: those who understand by pleasurable emotions such as appeal to +the senses--the Hedonists; and those who spiritualize the meaning of the +word and expect of Morality not an immediate bodily gratification, a +pleasure, or an insipid satisfaction of the sense, but lasting +happiness--the Eudæmonists. At the first glance the Eudæmonists seem to +have a higher and more worthy conception of the subjective reaction of +moral conduct than have the Hedonists; for the satisfaction the former +expect and promise does not apply to the lower spheres of our organic +life, but to the loftiest functions of our mind, from which alone a +feeling of happiness can emanate. + +But if we look into the matter more closely we find that to draw a sharp +distinction between the Hedonists and Eudæmonists is more than a little +arbitrary. For Pleasure and Happiness differ hardly at all in +essentials, but chiefly in degree; and this would at once be obvious if +one only took the trouble to define the two ideas, which, however, is +mostly not done. And with good reason, for it is impossible to explain +Pleasure. You can use synonyms for it; you can look wise and say: +Pleasure is that which is agreeable, or that which one desires, that in +which one delights, or a certain quality of feeling which accompanies +such organic processes as strengthen or vitalize the system; but all +that this amounts to is to say in a roundabout way, Pleasure is +Pleasure. It is a fundamental fact of our inner consciousness, just as +inexplicable as life, or as its antithesis, Pain. But if we assume that +Pleasure is something given by subjective experience, then the idea of +Happiness can be defined. Happiness is a flooding of the consciousness +with sunshine; it is enjoyment of the moment, a sense of living in the +present accentuated by pleasurable emotion. If this feeling is +organically differentiated, that is, if it springs from a certain +section of the mind or mechanism of the body and can be located there, +it is ecstasy. It is only felt as Happiness when it is, so to speak, +melted, dissolved, distributed throughout the organism, +coenesthetically diffused. + +If we agree to this definition we can take Eudæmonism into consideration +as an aim of moral action, but Hedonism we shall have to discard from +the start. If Morality is to be inhibition, a victory of Reason over +Instinct, then it cannot possibly arouse Pleasure, since the first and +most immediate source of Pleasure is the surrender to instinct, the +satisfaction of the organic appetites; but if one resists them, +suppresses them, then one experiences a privation which at best +occasions discomfort and may easily cause pain. By its very nature and +the mechanism by which it works, Morality can therefore give rise to no +pleasure, but only to discomfort. All the same, it can afford a feeling +of happiness. + +It may be objected that I am guilty of a contradiction when I assume the +possibility of Happiness without Pleasure, as I have just described +Happiness as a particular kind of Pleasure; but in reality there is no +contradiction. For Pleasure springs from a special organic apparatus, +whereas Happiness is not a condition of any particular apparatus in our +body, but a general feeling that cannot be located; if it is roused by +moral actions it originates in the self-satisfaction of Reason, in its +pride in the victory over Instinct, in the rapture occasioned by one's +own strength of will; therefore, it can well exist without any +differentiated pleasurable emotion located in any particular organic +apparatus. + +Many moral philosophers have for various reasons rejected plausible +Eudæmonism as well as Hedonism, and these reasons can all be traced back +to the recognition, or at least an inkling, of the fact that moral +action in the nature of things must exclude pleasurable emotions; at any +rate immediate ones, and such as are perceived by the senses. Perhaps +Fichte does this in the most naïve fashion, for he rejects every form of +Eudæmonism as the aim of moral action, but admits as its purpose only +bliss, that is to say, the self-satisfaction of Reason resulting from +action in accordance with its own laws. However, he struggles in vain to +deny that this "bliss" is of the nature of a pleasurable emotion, or to +interpret it as differing from Eudæmonism. He is only giving the latter +another name to make it conform in an orthodox manner with his doctrine +of the Supreme Ego. "_Baptizo te carpam!_" I baptize thee, carp! In this +way the pious man complies with the law enjoining abstinence from meat, +and with an easy conscience smacks his lips over a roast pheasant which +he has dubbed fish. + +Plato is among those who most emphatically deny that Pleasure is either +the motive force, the accompaniment, the consequence, or the aim of +Morality. But a reasonable thinker can derive no profit from his +arguments in support of this point of view, for they are rambling, +fantastic, mystical and visionary. Plato thinks it a necessary +consequence of the very nature of Good that it should be absolutely +self-sufficient. For Pleasure is a perpetual growth, a ceaseless longing +for more; it can therefore not be self-sufficient, and on this account +can not be the foundation of Morality. + +However, it is by no means obvious why Morality should not be in a +perpetual state of growth (just as Pleasure is, according to Plato), or +why it should not constantly desire an increase of its own activities. +On the contrary, this craving is just what one would most wish Morality +to have. True, it would not then attain self-satisfaction. But what is +the good of this self-satisfaction? It is a pleasurable emotion, and +according to Plato Morality is supposed to have nothing in common with +Pleasure. It is not to be contentment and serene satisfaction, but +rather tireless endeavour. However, Plato, of course, cannot admit this, +because for him Good and the deity are identical, and being perfect can +therefore advance no farther in perfection; and the striving after Good +is merely an effort of memory on man's part to call to mind more clearly +the deity whom he saw in his spiritual life before birth, and of whom he +retains a dim and confused memory in his earthly life. It is plainly +idle to waste reasonable criticism upon such visionary arguments. + +The Stoics, too, try to sever the connexion between moral conduct and +Pleasure, and to conceive the former as a simple activity of human +nature, one, moreover, from which they expect no particular +satisfaction. They overlook the fact that every activity of the impulses +and instincts of man's own nature affords him satisfaction, and that +Pleasure is nothing but this very satisfaction of natural instincts. If, +then, Morality were, as the Stoics contend, only "Life in harmony with +Nature herself," then, like every other satisfaction of natural desires, +it should be an ever-flowing source of pleasurable emotions, and this +characteristic would be inseparable from it, though the Stoics may +vainly try to deny it. + +Christianity has an easier job than Stoicism. With harsh severity, +disregarding any plea for indulgence in view of the weakness of the +flesh, it absolutely excludes the factor of pleasure from the fulfilment +of moral duties. But this severity is only apparent. The good and just +man can expect no reward for his moral conduct here on earth, but he +will find a much more ample one in the life to come. To the devout +believer who gives unlimited credit to it, the promise of the joys of +paradise has the full value of a cash disbursement. It is somewhat +childish juggling with words to deny pleasurable emotion to be the aim +of moral conduct if at the same time a most vivid foretaste of the +eternal bliss which awaits him after death be given to the virtuous man; +as if the anticipation of heavenly bliss were not a pleasurable emotion +of the highest degree! + +Kant finds it due to his point of view to spurn every weak inclination +to Eudæmonism. A Categorical Imperative cannot issue commands with an +eye to profit or comfort. That is as clear as daylight. "All Morality of +action must be founded on the necessity which arises from duty and +respect for the law, and not from love or inclination for the desired +result of the action." Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and John Stuart Mill +have recorded such irrefutable criticisms of the Kantian doctrine of the +absolute disinterestedness of moral action, that it is unnecessary to +add to their arguments. + +Only some moral philosophers, and particularly Mill, are guilty of +logical inaccuracy when they reject Eudæmonism but retain Utility as the +aim of morality. Why do the Utilitarians not realize that they are +merely Eudæmonists under another name, and that he who disregards his +own immediate interests in order to further the well-being of the +community experiences a pleasurable emotion of high order in the +satisfaction he derives from the sacrifices whereby he has contributed +to the good of the community? + +The useless exertions of a section of moral philosophers to eliminate +not only Hedonism but also Eudæmonism from moral action are a veritable +labour of Sisyphus. Hardly have these two with difficulty been expelled +by the door than they return by the window or the chimney. It is a mere +conjuring trick to remove them from this world to the next, as do the +theologians, or to substitute universal well-being for the feeling of +happiness. All the same, the desire to purge moral action of the least +admixture of hope of profit or pleasure is comprehensible. Common +experience, which is equally forced upon the profound thinker and upon +the plain man in the street least inclined to cudgel his brain, teaches +us that Morality consists, with very few exceptions, in acting against +our own immediate interest, in denying ourselves some coveted pleasure, +in renouncing some attainable profit, in undertaking some disagreeable +exertion because Reason bids us do so. From this practical experience +the man in the street gets the impression that duty is a bitter +necessity and that decency is attended by many and varied +inconveniences. The theorist, the philosopher, derives a principle from +his empirical facts; he observes that the moral man often acts against +his own immediate interests, and expresses this in the pretentious +axiom: "Morality from the very beginning excludes all thought of +profit." + +And yet the philosophers are guilty of the same superficiality as the +man in the street. They do not go far enough into the matter to perceive +that the morality of pleasure, of interest, and of duty, Hedonism, +Utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative, all lead in very slightly +different ways to the same goal--Eudæmonism. The fulfilment of duty +affords spiritual satisfaction, a pre-eminently pleasurable emotion +which increases in direct proportion to the effort which its fulfilment +demands. Interest also implies pleasure, for every interest ultimately +comes to this, that it is an attempt to secure a pleasure. This aim lies +at the bottom of all interests; it is the fundamental interest from +which all seemingly different interests are derived; it is the universal +goal to which all human effort tends, whether it be a question of making +money to satisfy ambition, of winning love and friendship, of material, +spiritual, personal or social values. Interest is self-assertion and the +intensifying of the zest for life. But these are always accompanied by +pleasurable emotions; thus interest is forthwith identified with +pleasurable emotion, even though one has to work hard, even though at +the moment it entails drudgery and discomfort. Hedonism makes no secret +of its nature and its tendency. It openly admits what the Categorical +Imperative denies and what Utilitarianism veils with vague phrases: that +the aim and object of moral action is Pleasure and nothing else. + +In our short survey of the immense field of literature dealing with +moral philosophy we have learnt that, although the most various and +divergent views are expressed as to the essence and source of Morality, +nevertheless there is but one opinion, be it clearly or vaguely stated, +be it the result of knowledge or surmise, as to the mechanism by means +of which moral concepts determine action, and as to the conscious or +unconscious aim of moral action: Moral concepts do their work by means +of inhibition, and the aim of moral action is a feeling of happiness. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY + + +It is natural for man's thoughts to be concentrated on himself until he +has learnt to rise from the deep and narrow well of his egoism to a +higher and wider view of life and, free from the taint of self-love, to +form an idea of his place in the world and his relationship to it. Not +till the development of his intellect is far advanced does any doubt +assail him as to the truth of his conviction that all his personal +affairs, the least as well as the most weighty, are of the greatest +importance to the universe, that every ache or pain he feels must wake +an echo in the heavens, that the Earth shudders in anticipation when he +is about to stumble and sprain his ankle, and that the stars in their +courses mysteriously, though intelligibly to the discerning, foretell +the hour of his birth and of his death. An Indian legend pours cruel +scorn upon this childlike megalomania: A fox had fallen into a stream +and was drowning. "The world is coming to an end!" gasped the animal in +its agony. A peasant standing on the brink replied coldly, "Oh, no, I +see only a little fox drowning." + +Many moral philosophers, those of the Kantian school without exception, +labour under the delusion of this same, egocentric view. In their eyes +the phenomenon of Morality is a cosmic one. Morality is the law of +human conduct, therefore it is the law of world processes, of the +universe. Indeed, it is the law of the universe before it becomes that +of human conduct. It would exist even if there were no men, no humanity, +no human conduct at all. The solemn innocents who weightily give +utterance to this doctrine are unaware how ridiculous they are. They do +not hesitate to subject Sirius to the yoke of the Ten Commandments. They +are convinced that the Milky Way practises virtue and shuns, or ought to +shun, vice, just as we inconsiderable human beings do. The precept, +"Thou shalt not steal," applies with binding force to gravity, and the +warning, "Thou shalt not kill," to electricity, though the latter +ruthlessly disregards it, as the results of being struck by lightning +and accidents with high voltage installations frequently prove. If they +do not threaten Nature with police and prison it is only because in +their eyes Morality is independent of all sanctions, is superior to +rewards and punishments, depends upon itself alone, constitutes its own +aim, is by its very nature a compelling force, and therefore has no need +of adventitious compulsion. + +Such profound nonsense cannot lay claim to serious treatment. It is a +counterpart to the belief that events in the history of mankind, like +war and pestilence, are foretold by heavenly signs such as fiery comets. +The stars revolve, the clockwork of the universe continues undisturbed, +as though the earth were still uninhabited, as it was when it was a +glowing fluid globe or, earlier still, a nebular mass; and this +although man's self-esteem be hurt by such a lack of consideration. If +we care to call the (so far as we know) unalterable laws, according to +which the forces of Nature act and the mechanism of the world works, the +Morality of the Universe, that may pass. Only we must in that case +clearly realize that we are speaking metaphorically, that we are making +use of a poetic simile, that we are anthropomorphically attributing +human traits to the universe. Morality is a phenomenon restricted to +mankind, or, to be strictly accurate, a phenomenon which occurs only +among living beings; for the beginnings of Morality may be traced in +creatures of a lower order than man, and it develops simultaneously with +the consciousness and the mentality of living beings. Morality is a +function of life, dependent upon it, begotten and developed by it, to +meet life's needs and serve its interests. The existence of Morality +apart from life is as unthinkable as that of hunger, ambition, or +gratitude. + +Morality is a collection of laws and prohibitions which Reason opposes +to organic instincts, by means of which the former forces the latter +into actions from which they would like to refrain, or prevents them +from carrying out that which they yearn to do. The existence of +Morality, therefore, presupposes in the first place that of an +intelligence sufficiently developed to form a clear idea of something +that is still in the future, namely, an image of the consequences +resulting from an action. + +Guided by this inner contemplation of the image of the consequences of +an action, Reason decides to carry out or prevent the action. This +gives us the lowest plane upon which Morality can occur as the cause of +action and of abstention from action. It implies, above all things, +foresight, and can therefore only exist in a consciousness which is +sufficiently developed to grasp the idea of the future and form a +picture of it. This consciousness must be capable of extracting the +elements of a conception from memory according to the laws of the +association of ideas, and be able to group them logically in a new +order. In other words, as long as the mind cannot visualize the past and +from it build up a picture of the future, Morality can find no place in +it. + +This statement requires no limitation, but it demands a short +explanation. It is quite true that Morality is foresight, but it is only +among the elect that the latter is developed to such a pitch that it is +possible to form images of the consequences of action and abstention +sufficiently clear and definite to exercise a restraining or encouraging +influence. + +The average man can act morally without first working out a clear +picture of the future. It is enough that he has been trained to the +habit of respecting current precepts, and of accepting the views +obtaining in his circle as to what is good or bad, what is admissible or +inadmissible. This morality, of course, is merely a matter of drill or +training; it is unthinking automatism; it is inferior, and not to be +compared with the living, creative morality of higher natures, which, as +a sovereign law-giver, comes to an independent decision in every case +and, like the guardian angel of childlike faith, guides man on his path +through life, indicates the right course at the cross-roads, and warns +him of pitfalls and stumbling-blocks. But for everyday use mechanical +morality may suffice. In the uneventful existence of the average man, +which passes in a stereotyped way, this mechanical morality is an +acceptable guide and counsellor, but it remains an outside influence +foreign to his inner consciousness; he is glad to deceive and outwit it, +as a slave does his master's bailiff if he can do so without running the +risk of a thrashing; but if his destiny unexpectedly rises above its +accustomed dead level, then this dogmatic morality, which he has never +really assimilated, leaves him in the lurch, and mournfully, in piteous +tones, he utters the well-known cry, "It is easy to do one's duty; it is +difficult to know where one's duty lies." + +Reason, then, which is capable of foreseeing the results of actions, +teaches a man what he must do and from what he must abstain, where he +may follow his instinct and where he must resist it, according as it +considers the presumptive results of yielding to impulse good or bad. +But whence does Reason obtain the standard it applies to the actions of +men and their results? How does it acquire the fundamental concepts Good +and Bad, and what is their significance? Generally speaking, the answer +will be as follows: Moral values are appraised by a standard supplied by +a general consensus of opinion; Reason acknowledges as good that which +meets with the approval of the community, that which the latter desires +and therefore praises; the community, for its part, echoes the +pronouncements of influential personages, i.e. of the most respected, +most powerful, and most aristocratic; Reason condemns as bad that which +the community disapproves, and which it therefore censures and rejects. +This definition does not solve the problem of good and bad, it only +shifts it. + +Later we shall have to show upon what grounds the community +discriminates between acceptable and reprehensible facts, calling the +former good and the latter bad. For the present it is enough to observe +that Reason derives the laws, which it constantly impresses on man, from +the opinion of the community. + +It can happen that Reason rejects the opinion of the community and forms +a conclusion opposed to it. This revolt of individual morality against +conventional morality is the great tragedy of man. It can only occur in +the soul of a hero, for mediocre and insipid people always bow to the +opinion of the majority. There is clearly imminent danger of making a +mistake. Not seldom, however, the individual is right in his opposition +to the community, and then the latter is fired by his example to examine +its traditional dogmas and to correct or reject them. This is not the +only, but it is the most common means by which Morality is developed and +changed. Its progress demands martyrs. Strong personalities must be +sacrificed to force a revision of moral values. Socrates has to swallow +the draft of hemlock so that unfettered thought may acquire the right to +doubt the legend of the gods. Jesus has to incur the dangerous anger of +the Pharisees so that the adulteress may be treated with indulgence and +human sympathy instead of being punished according to rigorous law. But +the opposition of a self-willed, subjective Morality to the accepted +moral law is always exceptional; the general rule is submission to the +moral law. This is indeed a necessary preliminary to revolt against the +moral law of the community, for it is only by means of a vigorous social +education that man develops such a nicely balanced and keen sense of +Good and Bad, that he cannot prevail upon himself to carry out generally +approved actions which his own intelligence does not recognize as moral. +He whose moral sense has not been intensified by strict discipline will +never be assailed by doubt, as long as he follows in the footsteps of +the multitude. + +Hence, as a rule, Reason exercises its control of the actions of man in +conformity with the laws prescribed by the community. Before Morality +develops into the practice of Good and the rejection of Bad it takes the +form of consideration for the world at large, since it is the latter +which has created the concepts of Good and Bad as well as the standard +by which they are judged, and in order to avoid conflict with the +community, and to maintain uninterrupted agreement with it, the +individual exerts himself to persist in doing good and to refrain from +doing evil. + +The establishment of these facts gives deep offence to the mystics among +moral philosophers. "What a debasement and belittling of Morality! What! +It is supposed to be nothing more than a sort of obsequiousness towards +the multitude? Its laws are observed for the sake of pleasing others? It +is a comedy played to win applause and a call before the curtain? That +is a libel and a calumny. The truly moral man looks neither to the right +nor to the left. He does not condescend to ask, 'What will the world say +to this?' There is but one judge in whose eyes he wishes to be +justified: his conscience." + +Quite right. But what is conscience found to be if we penetrate the fog +of mystic words with which it has come to be surrounded? Conscience is +the permanent representative of the community in the consciousness of +the individual, just as public opinion may be termed the conscience of +every member of society made manifest. Metaphorically, it wields the +powers pertaining to society; it praises and blames, it condemns and +exalts, it punishes and rewards, as society could do; and it actually +pronounces judgment in the name of society, even though it does not +preface such judgment with this formula which is tacitly implied and +must always be mentally added. Conscience is the invisible link which +unites the individual with a social group, just as speech, custom, +tradition, and political institutions are the visible links. But the +social origin and representative nature of conscience set limits to its +power. Conscience is a respected authority with wide powers only in the +consciousness of those individuals who have a highly developed social +sense. I purposely do not say those in whom the instinct to follow the +crowd preponderates, because this mode of expression might imply blame +and condemnation which I do not intend to convey. + +For social instinct comes natural to an individual born, educated and +working in a community, who shares its feelings, views and interests, +nay, even its prejudices and mistakes; and if he lacks it, it is a sign +of a morbid deviation from the normal. Only the decadent man is +uncannily lonely in spirit, alien, indifferent or definitely hostile to +his human surroundings; he is, according to the violence and +polarization of his instincts, the passionate anarchist or the born +criminal; the public opinion of his circle is unintelligible to him and +makes no impression on him; it has no significance for him; he attaches +no importance to its approbation, and its anger leaves him cold; he +would take no notice of it, were it not that he knows its power to +destroy him, and fears its police, its prisons, and its scaffolds. Such +a man, organically predisposed to crime, most urgently needs a +conscience. It would arrest him on the downward path to which his evil +instincts lead. It would warn him to resist the wicked impulses of his +selfishness. But he, of all people, has no conscience. He can have none. +He is anti-social, he is at war with society, diplomatic relations +between him and it have been broken off, and it has no representative in +his consciousness. A lively and active feeling of joint responsibility +with the community is a necessary predisposition on the part of the +individual before conscience can have any power. Where the former is +lacking the latter is mute and paralysed. + +The essence of Morality, as we have found, is the subjection of +instinct and direct organic impulses to the discipline of Reason. The +latter exercises a censorship in pursuance of a law which it derives not +from within, but from without, from the ordinances of the community +which instructs Reason as to what it should permit, what it should +forbid, and what it should demand. Conscience ensures respect for its +commands, and may be called the executive power or police of Reason, +acting as the authorized representative of Morality. It is the garrison +which the community maintains in the individual's consciousness, which +it arms and supplies with authority and instructions; the power of +conscience lies in the strength of the community at its back, and is +without influence only upon those who refuse admission to the troops of +the community and yield to none but actual physical force. All this +proves irrefutably that Morality is a phenomenon arising from the social +life of man, and its power is a function of society. + +If under the conditions in which humanity lives nowadays one could +imagine a man totally detached from his species, leading a solitary +life, Morality would be absolutely meaningless to him. The idea is one +he could never conceive. It would have no significance. Good and bad +would always retain their original meaning as labels for sensual +qualities, for pleasant or unpleasant sensations of taste, smell, etc.; +they would never be spiritualized or apply to the quality of actions. He +would be unable to attach any meaning to the words duty and right. The +terms virtue, vice, conscience, repentance would convey nothing to him. +Morality can only originate when the individual lives united with +fellow beings in a social community. It is a consequence of this union. +It is the one condition on which alone this union can be permanent. + +The solitary individual must, however, not be confused with the lonely +one. Robinson Crusoe, shipwrecked on a desert island and forced to stay +there without companionship, is not primitive man. He is a son of +civilization who has fallen upon evil days. In his enforced solitariness +he maintains the habits of thought of his original surroundings. He +preserves the concepts of Morality even though he has no occasion to +obey its dictates. He can, if not actually yet potentially, be a paragon +of virtue or a sink of iniquity; he can have a very delicate or a very +dull conscience. He continues to be a man of social instincts cut off +from society, and goes on thinking and feeling in a social manner. By +primitive man I mean man as he was before society originated. For, +contrary to the sociological school which denies the individual and +boldly refuses to allow him any existence, declaring society to be older +and earlier than the individual, I think I have conclusively shown +("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" [The Meaning of History]) that man is not +by nature a gregarious animal, that he lived alone, being self-sufficing +as long as the climatic conditions, under which he first made his +appearance on earth, enabled him to exist by his own unaided efforts and +capabilities, and that he banded himself together with others in gangs, +troops and hordes--the earliest forms of subsequent society--when, after +the first ice age following his appearance, the struggle for existence +grew ever harder, ever more laborious, transcending the powers of the +individual so that he could only overcome Nature, now grown hostile to +him, by uniting with others of his kind. + +This primitive man of the golden geological period before the Ice Age +knew no Morality, and as far as human intelligence can tell he would +never have known of it had there been a continuance of the paradisaic +conditions obtaining at the time of his birth, and had the climate not +deteriorated. The occurrence of murderous frosts, the necessity of +seeking protection from them in natural caves or artificially +constructed shelters, and of kindling and maintaining fires, the +diminution or disappearance of vegetable food, and the need to replace +it by the booty of the chase or fishing--all these forced him to unite +his efforts with those of other men who shared his wretched lot on +earth. But in order to maintain this community with others he had to +learn a new science, one he had hitherto not known because he had had no +need of it: consideration for his fellows. He might no longer think of +himself alone, consider his own inclinations in all eventualities, give +way to all his moods or yield to every whim; he had unceasingly to bear +his neighbour in mind and take care not to annoy him, not to make an +enemy of him, not to become hateful to him. Forbearance towards his +neighbour was the necessary condition of their life in common, just as +their life in common was the necessary condition of self-preservation. +The penalty for selfish indulgence was stern persecution, punishment, +perhaps death; in any case, expulsion from the community. Man, +therefore, stood before the choice of self-control or destruction, and +this dilemma taught him Morality. + +Such, we must imagine, were the beginnings of Morality. It was not +prearranged or purposely sought; it grew naturally from the +companionship of men and developed simultaneously with society. If the +struggle for existence made life in communities a necessity, the first +coercive law of the community was to enjoin upon its members a mode of +conduct which alone rendered the existence of the community possible, +and the fundamental rule of this conduct was mutual consideration. +Without this two egoisms cannot exist side by side and develop. They +either destroy or shun one another. This phenomenon may also be observed +among the higher animals. Elephants, living in herds, expel quarrelsome +individuals and force them to wander alone far from the rest. The +natives of Ceylon and India fear these "bachelor elephants" as being +specially savage and malicious. They think that they grow like this +because of their loneliness. That is probably a false conclusion. It is +much more likely that these animals have been driven from their herd +because they were savage and malicious, because their characters were +opposed to discipline. Here we come upon the first faint foreshadowing +of the phenomenon of Morality in an animal community. + +Now that we have introduced the idea of the growth and development of +Morality, it becomes obvious that it must have begun with mere +indications, and that from rude, dim, undeveloped beginnings it +gradually grows more perfect, more refined, more nicely differentiated. +At first man avoids only the most brutal injuries to his neighbour, such +as hurting him, doing him bodily harm, threatening to kill him, openly +robbing him. In proportion as he becomes more spiritually sensitive, as +he learns to feel the insult and humiliation of injuries other than +those inflicted with a fist or club, he is led to refrain from giving +his fellow-men similar offence, which though it deals no gaping wounds, +yet hurts his spiritual sensibilities. A series of values is developed, +growing ever longer, ever more complicated, with more and more +gradations, until, going far beyond the simple, artless commandments, +"Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not covet thy +neighbour's wife nor his goods," it reaches the pitch of agonized +self-reproach, because of the slightest and most secret impulses to +dislike, injustice, covetousness, dissimulation, etc. + +Morality must be regarded as a support and a weapon in the struggle for +existence in so far as, given present climatic conditions on earth and +the civilization arising therefrom, man can only exist in societies, and +society cannot exist without Morality. The chain of thought runs as +follows: without morality no society, without society no individual +existence; consequently, Morality is the essential condition for the +existence of the individual as well as for that of the community. +However, we must always bear in mind the reservation, "given the +present climatic conditions on earth." Had the earth continued to be the +paradise it must have been at the birth of our species (since otherwise +the latter could simply not have originated), the necessity would never +have arisen for the individual to band himself together with others of +his kind, no society would ever have developed, and there would have +been no Morality. Serious as the subject is, one cannot but smile at the +thought of the comic figure the learned, professorial Neo-Kantians would +cut with their dogma of the absolute and cosmic nature of Morality, if +they propounded it among men whose wants Nature's bounty was able to +satisfy as easily as the frog is satisfied in his puddle or the crow on +his tree top. They would find no trace of absolute Morality among +mankind, and would be reduced to seeking it among the stars. + +The very nature of Morality, in that it is an aid to man in the struggle +for existence, makes it easy to understand the origin and nature of the +concepts Good and Bad. There are propensities and actions which +facilitate life in a community which, indeed, alone make it possible: +love of one's neighbour, helpfulness, liberality, consideration for the +feelings of others, and amiability. There are others which make such a +life difficult or absolutely impossible: uncompromising selfishness, +violence, cruelty, rapacity, instinctive hostility to one's neighbour. +Men recognized that the former were beneficial to them, the latter +harmful. The former aroused their liking, the latter their disapproval, +dislike and animosity. The quality of feeling which accompanied the +perceptions of actions of the former kind was akin to that with which +they responded to beneficial, profitable, useful and welcome sense +impressions. The quality of feeling, which actions of the second +category gave rise to, was akin to that due to harmful and repellent +sense impressions. Following the law of analogy, they placed on an equal +footing actions which were felt to be pleasing and pleasant sensations +of taste and smell; similarly with disagreeable actions and unpleasant +sense impressions; and finally they called the former good and the +latter bad, using terms originally applicable only to the realm of the +senses. + +Not everything that is pleasant to the senses is beneficial. There are +poisons which are pleasing to taste, but none the less noxious for that, +such as (to give only one example) alcoholic drinks and impressions of a +certain order, like voluptuousness, which man greedily pursues, even +though they ruin his health. But these are exceptions. As a rule, not +only man, but all living creatures, derive pleasant sensations from +beneficial things; and it is probable that that category of sensations, +which we are conscious of as being pleasant, is nothing but the state of +coenesthesis, when the organism functions particularly energetically +under the influence of the absorption of food or of a special stimulus +of the senses, when it feels its life processes carried on particularly +vigorously, freely and harmoniously; just as we feel that state of +coenesthesis to be unpleasant, which occurs when the organism +functions badly, slackly, and in a manner calculated to endanger the +continuance of life. With the reservation that has been indicated we +can say in general that Good is equivalent to beneficial and pleasant, +Bad to harmful and unpleasant. This is true of the transferred and +spiritualized as well as of the immediate and material meaning of these +expressions of value. The significance of the words Good and Bad, the +point of departure, development and change of conception they indicate, +suffice to justify the Utilitarians and the Hedonists or Eudæmonists +among the moral philosophers, and to confute the contentions of their +critics, who deny all connexion between Morality and a practical +purpose, profit or pleasure, and declare these to be unworthy +humiliations of its majesty. + +They wriggle, with the agility of a contortionist on the music-hall +stage, to get over the obvious and palpable aim of moral conduct. They +display all the cunning of dishonest sophistry in their arguments to +prove that the element of subjective satisfaction which moral action +yields is non-existent, and that, therefore, the Hedonists and +Eudæmonists are wrong. They stir up an opaque cloud of words, phrases +and formulæ to hide the fact, which nevertheless emerges clearly, that +he who acts morally expects to derive pleasurable emotions from his +action, or at least tries thereby to avoid probable painful emotions, +and that moral conduct, just as it is designed to give the individual +subjective satisfaction which is a kind of pleasure, is also meant to be +a benefit, or at any rate a supposed benefit, to the community. + +Morality must never try for a reward and never expect one. It must be +absolutely disinterested. It has no business to pursue any aim outside +itself. Thus say the mystics of moral philosophy, juggling with words; +and they think they are doing especial honour to Morality and raising it +to a particularly proud eminence. But Morality has no need of this +artificial and false grandeur to maintain its lofty place among the +phenomena of life, and it is derogatory neither to its authority nor to +its influence to be recognized as a beneficial force conducive to +happiness. + +The opponents of Utilitarianism and Eudæmonism in Ethics, if they speak +in good faith, may be excused on the grounds that their analysis of the +phenomenon of Morality is shallow. For them Morality is something +absolute, which exists by itself as an eternal and unalterable law of +the Universe, but which is revealed in the individual and therefore must +be conceived individually as a quality which has become human, as a +human value. If anyone persists in looking upon Morality as an +absolutely individual matter, without any connexion with anything +outside the individual, if anyone obstinately shuts his eyes to the fact +that Morality has not been developed by the individual out of his own +immediate needs and in consideration of himself alone, but that it is, +on the contrary, a creation of society and has no sense or significance +except as a social phenomenon, then indeed he can with some show of +justification deny Utilitarianism and Hedonism. For truly, looked at +from the point of view of the individual, moral conduct appears neither +pleasant nor immediately beneficial. On the contrary, it is, as a rule, +directly opposed to his own apparent interest, and it is achieved with +difficulty by sacrifice and renunciation, which are never pleasant and +often very painful. + +Once in a drawing-room, during a game of definitions, I heard a +light-hearted young lady define Duty in the following terms: "Duty is +that which we do unwillingly." A stern professor contradicted her at +once with the solemnity he thought due to his position, and assured her +reprovingly: "It is my duty to give lectures, and I do this duty gladly. +If you were right, madam, expressions such as 'zealous in one's duty' +and 'willing performance of duty' would have no meaning and could never +have been coined." That seems convincing, but yet it is wrong. +Expressions such as "zealous in one's duty" and "willing performance of +duty" were not coined until society had developed its system of Morality +and had educated its members to strive for its approval by conducting +themselves in accordance with this system, to look on its approval as a +flattering distinction and to fear its disapproval as a disgrace. Such +phrases are Pharisaical, calculated to exercise a suggestive influence +profitable to society. They are the sugar to sweeten the pill; but the +young lady was honest and the professor conventional; the pill is +bitter. Thinkers recognized and admitted this thousands of years ago. +Antiphon, the sophist, says: "The law, the outcome of an agreement, +coerces nature, the result of growth, and goes against the interest of +the individual." The same idea is expressed by the tragic poet in the +lines: "The gods have placed sweat before virtue." This was said in the +very same words by Lao Tse, the disciple of Meng Tse, the pupil of +Confucius and the reformer of his doctrine. + +The law, not only the law of the state which Antiphon has principally in +view, but also the moral law, "goes against the interest of the +individual"; not in reality, but apparently, at the first superficial +glance. Moral conduct is the reverse of natural conduct; it takes place +in opposition to instinct by deflecting the original impulse; it is a +subjugation of inclination, a victory over the real nature of the man. +Virtue has to exert its utmost strength in bitter struggles, fought out +within the individual, before it can reveal itself actively in deeds. +That is a natural consequence of the manner in which Morality +originated. + +The point is that it was not created directly for the individual, but +for the community, and for the former only in so far as he is a part of +the community, and from its stability and well-being derives a benefit +which he may, or may not, be conscious of; which he may, or may not, be +able to appreciate; which he accepts as something natural and +self-understood without further thought; for which he does not consider +any return service to be due; but which is nevertheless of real +magnitude, profiting the individual, facilitating his existence, or even +alone making it possible; and for which, as for every other gift, he +must make sacrifices. For within society there can be no gifts. It +possesses nothing but what it has acquired from its members, and the +latter must pay full value for everything it provides, unasked or +otherwise. + +As the Moral law originated to meet the needs of the community, and was +gradually formulated in definite precepts, it is comprehensible that the +community never paused to inquire what subjective effect its law would +have on the feelings of the individual. If you impose a law upon someone +you hardly ever consider how great will be the emotions of pleasure or +displeasure which its enforcement will entail. The order is, "Obey, +whether you like it or not; that which deeper insight and more +far-seeing wisdom prescribe is for your good." Thus the individual is +forced to work laboriously for his own good, which in his purblindness +he does not even recognize. It would be comprehensible if the +individual, who does not see farther than his own nose and does not look +beyond the present moment, formed the opinion that Morality is not +perceptibly beneficial to him and gives him no pleasure, and that, +therefore, the Utilitarians and the Hedonists talk nonsense. But the +moral philosopher, who observes the individual in relationship to the +community and surveys human actions, the way they are connected, and the +way they interact upon one another, has no right to pursue the same line +of thought as the individual, and deny that Morality aims at utility and +pleasure, even though the individual, when he acts morally, does not +perceive any personal advantage, nor feel any pleasure except the +self-satisfaction which he has been trained to feel, since in the eyes +of others he is so good and honest. That Morality aims at utility, and +is at the same time a source of pleasure and happiness, may seem dark +and doubtful while we consider the individual, but it becomes clear as +day and indisputable when we regard the community. + +Among creatures of a lower order than man, indeed among all animals that +live together in flocks or herds, we find the first beginnings of that +mode of conduct which in man we call moral, and which is not intended to +be of direct benefit to the individual, or to add to his momentary +pleasure, but which subordinates or sacrifices these personal +satisfactions to the good of the community. + +Chamois, when they are grazing, set one of their number on guard upon a +rocky eminence with a distant view, and this individual is responsible +for the safety of the herd. While the others feed in peace and comfort, +this guardian chamois forgoes the food which is doubtless just as +attractive to it as to the others, and tirelessly keeps a sharp look out +over its whole field of vision, warning its companions at the first +approach of danger by uttering a shrill cry. + +When the great herds of buffaloes still inhabited the North American +prairies, they had at the head and on the flanks of the herd the +strongest bulls, while the centre was occupied by the cows with their +calves and the young animals. Before civilization came to trouble them, +the grizzly bear was the only enemy that threatened them, and with him +they were able to deal; one of them would meet the attacking bear in +single combat, but did not always emerge from it unhurt. Often enough at +the end of the fight both the bull and the bear would be terribly +injured or even dead; yet by sacrificing his life the bull saved the +rest of the herd. + +The thrilling adventure of the Abyssinian baboon is well known; first +told by Alfred Brehm in his "_Tierleben_" (animal life), it was +afterwards quoted by Darwin and many other writers. On a hunting +expedition Brehm surprised a party of monkeys in a clearing. They fled +at once and had found shelter in the wood before the dogs could reach +them. Only one young one had got separated from the rest and was left +behind alone. It had scrambled up on to a solitary rock standing in the +plain, round which the dogs were barking furiously, and in its terror +the creature uttered piercing cries for help. A little male monkey, +hearing it, detached himself from the group, turned back from the safety +of the forest, made quietly for the rock and fetched away the trembling +young baboon from among the pack, silent now and shrinking in amazement; +and then stroking and caressing the little creature he carried it safely +in his arms to its family in the wood, unmolested by the stupefied dogs +and spared by the hunter, lost in admiration of this self-sacrificing +courage. + +In these three instances we see how the joint responsibility among +gregarious animals develops in them an ever increasing sense of duty, +which teaches the chamois to forgo its food during the hours it is on +guard, rouses in the buffalo a savage lust for battle, and makes the +baboon perform a premeditated deed of epic heroism. When men act as +these animals did, we ascribe this to Morality. This is nothing but +joint responsibility in action, the joint responsibility which the +species is forced by the conditions of life to adopt, if it is to +survive. + +Among the moral philosophers the mystics are prevented, by the haze +which obscures all their thought, from seeing that Morality originates +from this joint responsibility. Or rather, if they do see it, they think +this origin too low. They demand a more exalted genealogy for the +phenomenon of Morality. According to them the Moral law comes straight +from God. The concepts Good and Evil are revealed. Commands and +prohibitions are imposed upon the soul by that omnipotence which +spiritualizes the universe and of which the soul is an immortal part. + +If these phrases were anything but moonshine and tinkling cymbals they +certainly would make any other explanation of this astonishing fact +superfluous; the fact, namely, that man does what is repugnant to him, +and refrains from doing what would give him pleasure, that he is content +with himself when he has voluntarily curbed his impulses and made +sacrifices, and that he feels the pricks of conscience if he chances to +experience the pleasure of appeasement because he has satisfied his +desires. "Man obeys divine commands." That suffices and obviates the +necessity of seeking for explanations of this phenomenon, which shall +satisfy Reason. + +It is a mere mirage, the reflection of an earthly state of affairs in +the heavens, to assume that the universe is governed by an authority +devoid of responsibility, which imposes on its subjects, that is to say +men, laws and instructions, discipline and order. + +It is a form of anthropomorphism, the most widespread and stubborn of +errors in thought among those men who try to understand the +unintelligible, and are content with the most unfounded explanation +which their naïve imagination freely invents for them. This same +anthropomorphism, not even at a loss to solve the problem of the origin +and essence of the universe, replies unhesitatingly that God by an act +of volition created it out of nothing to prove to Himself His own +omnipotence and omniscience; in like manner it has no scruple in +ascribing the phenomenon of Morality to a creative act of God's, and +makes Ethics, which properly speaking form the chief part of psychology, +anthropology and sociology, a subdivision of theology, that is, of +anthropomorphic mythology. + +Critical Reason, which realizes that deceptive fictions are not true +thought, but dreams--not the result of ripe intellectual effort, but of +the childish play of the imagination, seeks the roots of Morality not in +the air or in the ether, but in the solid earth; not in some +indemonstrable, transcendental sphere, but in an obvious need of human +nature. The biological necessities of the species, which can only +survive by dint of living in communities, sufficiently explain the +origin of the feeling of joint responsibility, of consideration for +one's neighbour, of the concepts Good and Evil and of conscience; and we +have no use for the dogmas of revealed Morality derived from some +fabulous, supernatural source, or for the Kantian categorical +imperative. + +Morality, understood as a form of joint responsibility, determines the +inner and outer relations of the individual to the community; that is to +say, to as much of it as he comes in immediate contact with, to wit, his +neighbour. Morality provides him with the notions of Duty and Right, of +the consideration he owes his neighbour and of that which he may demand +from his neighbour. It is customary to look upon Rights and Duties as +opposites. This is mere indolence of thought. Right and Duty are +supplementary, forming together one concept. They are in reality one and +the same thing regarded from different points of view. My Duty is the +subjective form of my neighbour's Right; my Right the subjective form of +other people's Duty. That which is Duty, when I have to do it out of +consideration for others, becomes my Right, when others have to do it +out of consideration for me. + +Respect for the personality of others, which is the feeling from which +the concept of Right and Duty emanates, seems to be a late and noble +product of Morality and a particularly praiseworthy victory of prescient +intelligence over selfishness. This factor of our consciousness which +determines our will and which gradually becomes an instinct, is really +only a special application of the law of least resistance which governs +all organic life. We have no selfless, ideal respect for the personality +of another; but, made wise by experience and observation, we assume that +that other has the power to resist and to retaliate if a wrong is done +to him or he is injured; hence we avoid, to the best of our ability, +actions to which he is likely to object, so as not to come into conflict +with him, because to overcome his opposition would require effort and +expose us to danger. Respect for the personality of another and for his +rights may be expressed by a mechanical formula which runs as follows: +this respect varies directly as the real or supposed might of the other +person, and inversely as our own real or supposed might. + +The society of which he is a member, and which makes his existence +possible, prescribes to the individual the laws governing his moral +conduct. That which a community at any given time approves and demands, +rejects or forbids, constitutes the precept whereby its members regulate +their conduct, and offers ample security for their conscience. + +The concepts Good and Bad originate simultaneously with society; they +are the form in which its actual conditions of existence are conveyed to +the consciousness of its members. The only immutable thing about them is +the fact of their continued existence. Without the coercive discipline +of a rule conducive to the common weal and governing the mutual +relations between its members, no society could be imagined to exist, +unless its members were all similar in nature, reacted in an identical +fashion to all impressions and possessed the same feelings and +sensations, the same inclinations and the same impulses of volition. In +that case no difference could ever arise between one individual and +another, or between an individual and the community, which would have to +be smoothed over by the moral law emanating from the community and +controlling the individual, or be suppressed by the community's order. +Every individual could be left to the guidance of his own instincts, for +he would know himself always to be in agreement with the community; no +consideration for others need hamper or modify his actions; he could +behave just as if he were alone in the world. But as individuals differ +from one another, feel, think and want different things, collisions in +which they hurt, cripple or even kill one another are the inevitable +consequence of their opposing movements; and the interference of the +moral law is absolutely necessary to polarize these movements and guide +them into parallel courses, so that they do not run counter to one +another. + +But Good and Bad derive not only their existence but their measure and +their significance from the views of the community. They are therefore +not absolute but variable; they are not an immutable standard amid the +ever-changing conditions of humanity, a rule by which the value of the +actions and aims of mortals are indisputably determined, but are subject +to the laws of evolution in society and therefore in a constant state of +flux. At different times and in different places they present the most +varied aspects. What is virtue here and now may have been vice formerly +and at another spot, and _vice versa_. In the royal family of ancient +Egypt marriage between brothers and sisters was the prescribed custom. +We call this incest and it fills us with horror. To the sons of Egypt it +seemed meritorious and constituted a claim to special veneration. The +Babylonians and Canaanites burnt their first-born in Moloch's fiery +furnace, and this sacrifice was accounted a highly praiseworthy act of +piety and of the fear of God. The Spartans taught their sons, their +future warriors, the art of stealing without being caught; and he who +did this most cleverly achieved the most flattering recognition. The +Cherusci butchered the Roman prisoners taken from the legions of Varus +as a sacrifice to their tribal gods, and a noble-minded and brave man +like Arminius considered this absolutely honourable and knightly. The +Aztecs, who had undeniably attained an advanced degree of civilization, +at high festivals used with obsidian knives to cut open the breasts of +human sacrifices on the altars of their gods, and tear the heart out of +their living bodies. That was an action finding favour in the sight of +the gods, and the people watched it with awe and those mystic emotions +which religious rites are intended to arouse. + +Moral law in Europe, during the Middle Ages and almost up to modern +times, permitted, and even ordained, the punishment by horrible torture +and death of those whose religious convictions differed from the +teaching of the established church; and with its consent supposed +witches were sent to the stake. In feudal times the most terrible and +revolting of crimes was felony--that is, a breach of faith on the part +of the vassal against his overlord--and no torture was too cruel as a +punishment. Nobles, who had so delicate a sense of honour that for a wry +look or the accidental touch of an elbow they would draw their swords, +enunciated the principle: "the king's blood does not defile," and vied +with each other in forcing their daughters upon the king as concubines. +Until Wilberforce roused the English conscience at the end of the +eighteenth century, and Schölcher did the same in France in the middle +of the nineteenth, slavery was considered a state of affairs which a +moral community could tolerate. The North American descendants of those +Puritans whom no persecution and no martyrdom could prevent from leading +a life consonant with the dictates of their conscience, did not scruple +to exercise proprietary rights over human beings who, in the case of +octoroons and even of quadroons, did not even differ from them in +colour, supposing that difference of colour could be considered an +excuse. The code, which began with the "Declaration of Rights," +contained heavy penalties for those who helped a slave to escape. Men, +whose uprightness no one could doubt, did not hesitate to set +bloodhounds on the track of an escaped nigger, and four years of a +bloody civil war were needed before refractory slave-owners were forced +to acknowledge the immorality of forced labour. + +These examples have been taken from the customs of civilized nations. +Amongst races that have not attained the high degree of development to +which the white man has risen, we meet with much more revolting +deviations from the moral law obtaining among white men. Tribes are +known in which the commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother," is +interpreted so, that the children kill and eat their parents as soon as +the latter have attained a considerable age. The North American Indians, +who had a well developed sense of honour, were capable of chivalrous +feelings and kept their word with absolute loyalty, used to torture +helpless prisoners and scalp their defeated enemies, even the women. +Among the Dyaks, who are under Dutch rule and are familiar with the laws +and customs of Christian Europe, a marriageable youth must first cut off +a human being's head before he is allowed to wed. He need not overcome +his victim in honourable combat; he may creep upon him surreptitiously, +and even fall upon him in his sleep and murder him in cowardly fashion +without danger to himself. + +All these are instances which we unhesitatingly condemn. To our idea +they are crimes and misdeeds which among us would make their +perpetrators liable either to contempt and expulsion from decent society +or to the extremest penalties of the law; yet at their time and in their +place they were considered meritorious and virtuous, and were approved +by public opinion and the conscience of their authors. But we can go +farther and subject our own moral law to a similar independent +consideration. We shall find that to us also deeds appear permissible, +virtuous and even splendid, which do not differ essentially from the +thefts of the Spartans or the head-hunting of the Dyaks. A company +promoter who sells on the Stock Exchange shares that he must know to be +worthless, can with Spartan cunning rob thousands of trustful victims of +the fruits of their labour and economy, and reduce them to beggary; and +not only does he go unpunished, but if by his knavery he becomes a +millionaire and uses his wealth cleverly, he can attain the highest +political and social honours and distinctions. We may admit that +financial roguery of this sort can now no longer be classed among +strictly moral actions, that public opinion is on the verge of placing +it in the category of vice and crime, and that legislators are beginning +to make attempts to inflict severe and humiliating penalties on its +perpetrators. + +But another series of deeds is still generally considered so undoubtedly +virtuous and laudable, that it evokes the highest homage from the best +intellects of the age, poets, musicians, scientists, teachers, sculptors +and painters, and the leaders of the people--the deeds of war. The most +horrible butchery of men, the theft of property and liberty, +ill-treatment, destruction are not only permissible but obligatory and +laudable, if they occur in war, and if their authors can point to the +fact that they are acting in the service of their country at the order +of a legitimate authority. Neither the soldiers nor their leaders are +bound to inquire whether the authority, whether their mother country is +waging war for a purpose that moral law can approve. "Right or wrong, my +country." In the eyes of her sons the country is always in the right, +even if it be objectively in the wrong, and by its orders every soldier +murders, robs, burns and ravages, plays the executioner to harmless, +unarmed, innocent strangers, compels prisoners to forced labour, steals +letters that fall into his hands and prevents families who are cruelly +separated from communicating with one another; and his conscience does +not reproach him in the least, nor is he conscious of being a criminal +deserving of all the penalties of the law. Every single one of these +actions, if perpetrated by an individual on his own account and for his +own purposes, would result in the death penalty, and it would be richly +deserved, too. But in war, carried out collectively at the bidding of a +government, they become deeds of heroism, filling the doer with pride, +moving the community to tears of enthusiasm, and they are held up to +youth as shining examples to be imitated. It is more than likely that +future times will judge the esteem in which these deeds are held not +otherwise than we do the value placed by other forms of society on human +sacrifices, the slaughter of parents and head-hunting. + +It is hard to determine the exact part which conscience plays in the +changes undergone by the concepts Good and Evil. As conscience is the +voice of the community in the consciousness of the individual, it +approves on principle what seems right and praiseworthy to the +community. Just as little as conscience prevented a Babylonian mother +from sacrificing her child to Moloch, does it in these days stop the +average citizen from doing a soldier's work of killing and destroying in +time of war. If an individual knows himself to be in complete agreement +with the general opinion, then he lives at peace with his conscience. No +impulse to change the customs, to set up a new Morality, to condemn +long-established usages, is to be expected from such an one. + +The mechanism whereby changes are wrought in views on Good and Evil is +quite different. Everywhere and at all times there are exceptional +persons whose abilities render them specially fit to feel and think +independently. To their idea the community has no determining but only +an advisory voice. They reserve to themselves the right of decision in +every case. In their consciousness there persists a clear recognition of +the fact that the essence of Morality lies in consideration for others, +and when the current acceptation of the moral law among the majority +allows them, nay, commands them to disregard this consideration, they +experience a feeling of discomfort which dull, unthinking imitation of +the general example does not soothe. They meditate upon the deviation +from the fundamental rule of considering one's neighbour, they test its +justification, and they condemn it, if its difference with the general +moral law cannot be adjusted. If the essence of Morality is +consideration for one's neighbour, its purpose is the well-being of the +community; its essence must be adapted to this purpose, that is to say, +consideration for one's neighbour must be subordinated to the general +welfare. The thief, the robber and the murderer have no claim upon +consideration, and even a man with the most delicate sense of Morality +will agree that coercion of the criminal is desirable. Tolstoy's +warning: "Do not oppose the evildoer," is not Morality, but an +exaggerated parody of it, which renders it nugatory. Thus the most moral +person will not raise any objection to a war waged in defence of hearth +and home when their safety is threatened by a ruthless attack. + +But, if a mode of action which, though it be generally practised and +approved, injures the individual and causes him to suffer, cannot be +justified on the grounds of an obvious benefit to the community, then a +small, sometimes an almost infinitesimal minority of independent +thinkers will rise against the custom; they are not afraid of coming +into violent conflict with generally accepted views; they defend the +fundamental principle of Morality, namely, consideration for the +individual, against the exception, namely, oppression of the individual +for the ostensible good of the community; they brand as immoral what is +generally accounted moral; they announce that the current acceptation of +the goodness or badness of a certain order of actions must cease. + +The intervention of such reformers always gives offence, and arouses +anger which at times rises to murderous fury. But this wrathful +indignation is just what makes a break in the automatic fashion in which +the majority of average men act according to traditional custom; the +attention of more and more minds is arrested, critically they examine +the accepted moral law, they are penetrated first by the suspicion and +finally by the clear conviction that it is contrary to the essence of +Morality, and they swell the ranks of the innovators who inveigh against +the tradition. The struggle lasts long and is carried on pitilessly. The +preachers of the new Morality seem corrupt and criminal to the +supporters of the old. They are persecuted and slandered and not seldom +have to suffer martyrdom, but they always emerge victorious if their +doctrine is in agreement with the logic of the fundamental principles of +Moral law. That is the history of the abolition of human sacrifices, of +the vendetta, of slavery, of legal torture, of religious coercion. + +Whoever looks about him with open eyes will note that civilized men are +at the moment adopting new ideas with regard to the operation of state +omnipotence, to war, to the right of the economically strong to exploit +others, to the rights of women, to sexual morality, to the penal system. +The advocates of a new Morality must still put up with the most +humiliating abuse. He who wishes to defend the individual from coercion +by the state is an anarchist and deserves to be hanged or broken on the +wheel. He who maintains that war is immoral belongs to the rabble of +vagabonds who own no nationality, for whom no contempt is too deep and +no punishment too severe. He who refuses a duel is a dishonoured coward, +and thereby cuts himself off from decent society. He who recognizes +woman's right to motherhood is a dastardly purveyor of opportunities for +prostitution. He who attacks the present relation between Capital and +Labour as a hypocritical continuation of slavery is an ignorant agitator +or an enemy of society. He who would like to see the idea of punishment +excluded from the law, as being retrograde and unscientific, and who +wishes only the point of view of the defence of society to be recognized +as valid, talks sentimental nonsense, disarms justice and places the +community at large at the mercy of criminals. + +But the issue of the struggle is not in doubt. The present systems, +which present exceptions to the moral law of consideration for one's +neighbour, must go. Although they are considered moral to-day, are, in +fact, Morality itself, to-morrow they will be felt to be immoral and be +abhorred by all men of moral feelings. Thus the concepts Good and Bad +gradually change their meaning; views on what is moral and what immoral +are constantly in a state of flux; and the only permanent thing is +recognition of the fact that man's actions must be withdrawn from the +control of subjective choice and whim, and must be subject to a law set +up by the community; the justification of this law lies in its being +necessary to the existence of society. Every revision of Moral values +originates in some vexation, and ends by refining and deepening moral +sentiment. In this chapter only the scheme of development of moral views +and of their changes has been indicated. The question of moral progress +will be dealt with fully later on. + +To sum up the arguments of this section, Morality is not transcendental +but immanent; it is a social phenomenon and restricted to the sphere of +living beings. Its beginnings may be traced in animal societies, it is +developed among mankind. The preliminary condition necessary for this +development is the ability to visualize future happenings, since moral +conduct is determined by estimating its effects and results, that is, by +conceiving something in the future. Morality has a positive, concrete +aim. It makes the existence of society possible, and this, given the +circumstances obtaining on our planet, is the necessary condition for +the preservation of each individual, and it originated from the instinct +of self-preservation in the species. Its essence lies in consideration +for one's neighbour, because without this the communal life of +individuals, that is, a society, would be impossible. + +If individuals had been able to live alone, Morality could never have +come into existence. The concepts Good and Bad characterize those +actions which society feels to be beneficial or harmful to itself. As +moral conduct implies consideration for one's neighbour, it is often, if +not always, in conflict with selfishness, that is, with the immediate +and instinctive impulses, and is, in the first place, accompanied by +disagreeable sensations. The pleasurable emotion of satisfaction arises +later through habit and reflection; it accompanies the thought of the +merit and praiseworthiness of the victory over self. Conscience is the +voice of the community in the individual's consciousness. The idea of +Duty is the subjective conception of the Rights of our neighbour; the +idea of Rights is the subjective conception of our neighbour's Duty to +us. Morality is not absolute, but relative, and is subject to continual +changes. To maintain that Morality is cosmic, eternal, immutable, that +it aims neither at profit nor pleasure, but constitutes its own aim, is +pure anthropomorphic superstition. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY + + +Morality is a restraint which the community imposes on each of its +members. It demands from the individual the sacrifice of his transitory +and momentary comfort in favour of his general welfare which is +dependent on that of the community. It prohibits the pleasure of +gratifying his desires in order that by this unpleasant renunciation his +lasting well-being may be ensured. Subjectively experienced and viewed, +therefore, Morality always implies the limitation of free will, the +curbing of desire, opposition to inclinations and appetites, and the +diminution or suppression of free, or let us rather say of unbridled, +action. Before Morality can profit the community, it disturbs and +incommodes the individual, it rouses in him disagreeable sensations +which may reach such a pitch as to be intense pain. It is only after +deep reflection, of which not everyone is capable, that the individual +realizes that Morality is an essential condition of the life of society, +and that the preservation of society is an essential condition of his +own life; before he investigates, before he even meditates on Morality, +the individual feels it directly to be unpleasant, laborious, +stern--nay, hostile. + +The control which Morality exercises over the actions, and indeed in +many cases over the most secret thoughts of the individual, appears at +the first glance to be somewhat paradoxical. It is by no means obvious +why the individual should always take sides against himself and, +adopting a defensive and disapproving attitude, hold his instinctive +tendencies in check. Moral conduct would be intelligible if the +community were always ready with means of coercion and could constrain +the individual by brute force to place its interest before his own +pleasure. But the individual does not wait for police intervention on +the part of the community. He frowns upon himself with the awful +severity of the law. He threatens himself with a cudgel. He divides +himself into two beings, one of which wants to follow its instincts, +while the other curbs them vigorously; one is a rearing, often a +refractory, horse, the other a rider with bridle, whip and spur. + +This reduplication of the ego, one-half of which establishes control +over the other, one-half of which tries to remain true to itself, while +the other divests itself of its identity and denies itself--this is the +inner process, the outward manifestation of which is moral conduct. This +demands investigation and explanation. We must show how the organism +could develop from within itself the power to paralyse, or completely +repress, its own elemental activities, and how Morality was able to +become an integral part in the general scheme of life processes. + +The mechanism whereby the mind, appraising, foreseeing and judging, +checks the first movement of impulse, is inhibition or repression. +Without inhibition moral conduct would not be possible. The mind would +have no method of indicating the path and prescribing rules to the +organism's instinct. It would have no means of making its insight +prevail over the desires of the senses. It would have no weapon with +which to force its being to actions opposed to its organic inclinations. +Without inhibition the individual would never give precedence to the +demands of the community and lay himself open to disagreeable emotions +in order to please the community. Inhibition was the necessary organic +preliminary to the phenomenon of Morality. It had to be pre-existent in +the individual, so that Morality could make itself at home in his +intellectual life, so that it could acquire creative, ruling and +practical power among the elect, and become an unconscious and easy +habit among the average. Morality took possession of a pre-existent +organic aptitude and made it serve its own purposes. But organic +aptitudes are not alike in all individuals. In some cases they are more +or less perfect; in others they may be lacking altogether. Indeed only +individuals with highly developed powers of inhibition are capable of +that heroic Morality which liberates them from the weakness of the flesh +and makes them independent of the demands of the body; those in whom +this power of inhibition is scantily developed evade the influence of +Morality entirely, and it has no authority over them. + +That which is called character is at bottom the name we give to the +power of inhibition. Where it is weak we speak of lack of character, +whereas by strength of character we mean that the power of inhibition is +great. The will makes use of inhibition. With its help the will guides +the living machine in a certain direction and urges it to perform given +tasks. At the first glance it may not seem obvious that positive actions +can come of repression, which is something negative. But if we analyse +psychologically the actions demanded and promoted by the will, and trace +them back to their organic origins, we shall find that, as a rule, the +first elements consist in the prevention of impulsive movements, and +that the impetus to positive effort is given by the will, which converts +these movements into contrary ones. A few instances may make this +psychic process clearer. Winkelried, at Sempach, cleaves a path through +the cuirassiers while they bury their lances in his breast; he becomes +capable of this great deed of self-sacrifice in that, by a mighty effort +of will power, he suppresses the strongest of all instincts, that of +self-preservation, and forces all his energies, which are naturally +directed towards flight from danger, to challenge danger and yield +completely to it. The lover who overcomes his passion and renounces its +object, because his idol is the bride of his best friend, begins with +the determined inhibition of the impulse which urges him towards the +woman, and attains renunciation by the suppression of his desire; this +renunciation finds expression in positive actions, in the rupture of +relations which bring him happiness, the avoidance of meetings which +would prevent the wound in his heart from healing, and so on. The brave +rescuer who plunges into the waves to save a drowning man, or enters a +burning house to save a fellow creature threatened by the flames, must +first overcome his natural shrinking fear of the water and the fire; and +not till after the suppression of strong impulses to avoid the uncanny +adventure, does he succeed in making his muscles obey the impulse to +save life. + +Inhibition, therefore, is the organic foundation on which Morality +builds, not only that Morality which consists in abstention from certain +actions, but that which is manifested in active virtue. But inhibition +is a faculty which the organism has developed for its own ends, the +better and more easily to preserve its own life, and to render its power +of achievement greater. Morality makes use of this faculty, which it +finds ready to hand, for the ends of the community, and very often +against the immediate interests of the individual for whose advantage it +is nevertheless intended. Now the individual would not put up with this +inexpedient use, one is tempted to say this clever misuse, of one of its +organic capacities, if this yielding up of the mechanism of inhibition +to Morality were not beneficial to life and therefore came within the +sphere of the biological purpose of inhibition. By being grafted on a +pre-existent organic faculty Morality becomes such itself; it forms a +link in the chain of biological processes within the individual +organism; it ceases to be purely a product of society forced upon the +individual to his molestation and in spite of his annoyance; it acquires +the character of a differentiation of inhibition in order to help the +individual, or even to make it at all possible for him to adapt himself +to life in a society. + +That under the present conditions obtaining on our planet the human +individual can only live in society demands no proof. And as he can only +live in society if he submits to its rules of good and bad, Morality, +which urges him to this submission, aids and even preserves his life. We +shall now show that inhibition, of which Morality is a differentiation +making it easier for the individual to adapt himself to the conditions +of social life, is of the greatest value to the individual from the +biological point of view. + +The lowest forms of life it is possible for us to observe show nothing +which can be interpreted as inhibition. All external influences to which +they are not indifferent invariably produce the same effects. They +respond to every stimulus with a reflex action which reveals nothing +that we should be justified in describing as an activity of the will. +The reaction follows with strictly automatic regularity upon the +stimulus, and nothing intervenes between the two which would permit the +conclusion that in the simple organism there is any faculty that could +delay, modify or change the reaction to the external stimulus. + +Just as iron filings always respond to the attraction of a magnet in the +same way, just as certain combinations of mercury at the impact of a +blow flare up with an explosion, just as ice when warmed melts and +becomes water, and water when cooled to a definite point freezes into +ice, so do the simplest living things seek out certain rays in the +spectrum, certain temperatures, certain chemical conditions and avoid +others. Not only unicellular organisms do this, but also comparatively +highly developed animals, such as the daphniæ, for if light is sent +through a prism into a vessel containing water, these little creatures +collect at the violet end of the spectrum; such as the wood-lice, which +hate the light and creep into dark crevices; such as gnats, which are +attracted by the sun and dance in their hundreds in its rays. Moreover, +we meet with a similar phenomenon in man. We, too, in winter and spring +seek the sun and in summer the shade; in the cold season the warm stove +attracts us; bad smells put us to flight, sweet scents of flowers allure +us. The simplest automatic reflex actions are at the root of these +attractions and repulsions, exactly the same as with the daphniæ, +wood-lice and gnats. Only we are able to control and suppress these +reflex actions which the lower animals apparently cannot. + +Anthropomorphic modes of thought easily mislead us into thinking that +the processes we observe in lower animals are due to an exercise of will +power. We draw near to the fire in winter because it is pleasant, but we +can quit it if duty calls us into the cold streets. One is apt to +imagine that the simple organisms also experience pleasant and +unpleasant feelings, that they try and avoid the latter, that the +daphnia seeks the violet rays because it likes them, that the wood-louse +flees the light because it dislikes it; in fact, that these creatures +possess a consciousness which becomes aware of and distinguishes between +pleasing and displeasing impressions, and that they possess a will which +responds to these impressions with suitable reactions. Very +distinguished scientists have been unable to resist the temptation to +assume in the lower animals, even in unicellular organisms, the +existence of processes with which we are familiar in the human +consciousness. William Roux introduces us to a "psychology of protista," +and W. Kleinsorge goes so far as to maintain the existence of "cellular +ethics," and to devote himself to research into its laws. The work of +both these biologists is as fascinating as the most beautiful +fairy-tale, but it is probably the creation of a lively and fertile +imagination, just as the fairy story is. + +More prosaic and less imaginative scientists do not see evidences of +psychology in the signs of life in the protista, or ethics in the +movements of a cell, but merely the effects of universal chemical and +physical laws which also control lifeless inorganic matter. To these +laws they trace the tropisms of simple organisms which tempt the +imagination, prone as it is to anthropomorphism, into errors; such +tropisms, that is to say, as their tendency to seek moderate warmth, +certain rays of light and weak alkaline solutions, or to avoid acids, +heat and ultra-violet rays. The little organisms probably do not obey +these impulses for reasons of pleasure or pain any more than the iron +filings obey the attraction of a magnet for such reasons. They do not +fly to it because it gives them pleasure; the little metal leaves of an +electroscope do not move apart because contact with each other +displeases them. All forms of tropism, chemicotropic, thermotropic, +phototropic manifestations, active and passive tropisms clearly show +that minute organisms involuntarily and unresistingly respond to the +influence of natural forces, just as if they were inanimate particles. + +Microscopic investigations reveal many phenomena which one is tempted to +consider signs of life, but which cannot be such, as they occur in +connexion with inanimate matter. The Brownian movements are rhythmical +molecular changes of position, not due to any mechanical impulse +emanating from the surroundings, nor to a current in the fluid in which +the object of investigation is immersed, but arising from the object +itself, mostly very finely divided, tiny balls of mercury. A very small +drop of chloroform introduced into a fluid of different density behaves +exactly like a unicellular organism. It sends out pseudopods, wriggles +and draws them in again. The pseudopods seem to feel and examine +particles of matter with which they come in contact, and then either to +withdraw quickly from them or to surround and incorporate them in the +drop. This is deceptively similar to the behaviour of a living cell +absorbing food, though there can be no question of this in the case of +the drop of chloroform. In the latter it is merely a question of the +effects of surface tension, that is, of the normal behaviour of matter +in accordance with the laws governing the forces of nature, the +investigation of which lies in the domain of chemistry and physics. + +Impartial thought comes to a conclusion about these phenomena different +from that derived from anthropomorphic delusions. It does not try to +smuggle dim, dark life into the collections of mercury molecules +apparently obeying some inner impulse, or into the seeking or feeling +about of a pseudopod of chloroform. On the contrary, it understands life +as the play of natural forces under the conditions supplied by a living +organism, as the automatic working of a machine-like apparatus to which +natural forces supply the motive power. Similar manifestations in +inanimate matter and in elementary organisms seem to justify the +conclusion that the distinction between living and non-living matter is +arbitrary, that there are only forces, or perhaps one single force, that +is to say, one movement, in the universe, whose activity is manifested +in the most manifold forms, of which life is one. Modern Monism has come +to this conclusion, but it is not alone in so doing. Long before Monism +there was a philosophy which conceived all cosmic energies to form a +unity; and really it is only an obstinate quarrel about words, for the +Hylozoists regard the universe as something living and ascribe life to +all matter and all atoms of which matter is made up, while the +Materialists regard life as a play of forces in matter. Fundamentally +the Hylozoists and Materialists hold the same views, only that the +former call force life and the latter call life force; just as the only +point of difference between them and the Pantheists is that these have +given the majestic title of God to the universal life they assume--as +Spinoza has it, "_Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt_." + +The question, what is life? is the greatest that the human understanding +can ask of itself. For thousands of years man has cudgelled his brain +over this, and is as far from finding an answer to-day as he was on the +first day. The definition most often repeated runs thus: Life is the +ability possessed by certain bodies to react to stimuli, to absorb +nourishment and to reproduce themselves. That is a statement of observed +facts, but it is no explanation. It informs us that we are familiar with +bodies which behave in a way distinguishing them from other bodies; but +why they conduct themselves differently from others, what the particular +thing is which is present in certain combinations of matter and absent +in others--that is an impenetrable secret. + +Science has tried by the most varied methods to solve the problem. It +seemed a triumph of research that Woehler produced urea, that chemists +later on manufactured carbohydrates, that Fischer is on the high road to +the production of synthetic albumen. What is gained by these +discoveries? We bring about the same combinations as the living cell +does. That is, no doubt, an interesting achievement, but its value as an +addition to our knowledge on this point is infinitesimal. For we +accomplish the production of sugar, urea and amine in a manner very +different to that of the living cell, and he who copies the things +turned out in a workshop has contributed nothing to our knowledge of the +workman who plies his trade in the workshop. The dividing line between +life and lifelessness was supposed to have been obliterated when +elementary manifestations of life were proved to exist in inanimate +matter; the Brownian movements in the smallest particles; the growth of +crystals immersed in a solution of the same chemical composition as +themselves; crystallization itself which represents a kind of very +simple organization of matter, and at any rate proves the sway of a +regulating and directive force; the tendency of certain elements to +combine, which has been called their affinity. But this name is only a +poetical metaphor which no one will take literally. The growth of +crystals in their mother liquor is merely mechanical precipitation on +their surface, an external addition of layers of the same material; but +not growth by the incorporation of such matter, that is, through the +absorption of nourishment. + +These and similar results of observation do not suffice absolutely to +justify the assumption, seductive though it be, that life is a +fundamental attribute of matter, that it is present everywhere though +graduated in intensity, that therefore apparently inanimate matter +differs not qualitatively, but only quantitatively from living beings, +that life stretches in an unbroken line from the block of metal or rock, +in which it is completely obscured, to man, the most highly developed +organism we know of; and that at a certain point in its range it reveals +itself in a form which permits no distinction between organic and +inorganic matter. + +The origin of life is as completely unknown to us as its essence. For +thousands of years the assumption was lightheartedly made that under +certain, somewhat vague circumstances, life originated of its own +accord. Pasteur showed that a _generatio spontanea_ cannot be proved to +exist, that every living thing comes from another living thing, a parent +organism, and that the old philosophers were right in propounding +"_omne vivum ex ovo_" as a law, although they only guessed it and had +not proved it experimentally. A very few critics, who are hard to +convince, still dare to assert in a small voice that Pasteur's work and +all the facts established by microbiology do not prove conclusively that +life does not nevertheless originate from inorganic matter under +conditions which we cannot nowadays reproduce in our laboratories. No +answer can be made to this objection. An experiment is only conclusive +for the conditions in which it is made, and not for others. All that we +can positively assert is that on earth the genesis of life without a +demonstrable parent organism has never been observed. To go farther, and +to assert that a _generatio spontanea_ is absolutely impossible under +any conditions, on earth or elsewhere, is arbitrary, just as it is to +assert the contrary. + +Those who are supporters of the theory that life can be developed from +non-living matter for a long time thought they had conclusively proved +their case; they argued as follows: At the present time life exists on +our planet; according to the Kant-Laplace hypothesis our planet was +formed from a cosmic nebula and passed through a state of fluid +incandescence; in this state life is impossible; therefore life must +have originated spontaneously one day after the Earth had cooled down; +consequently either the Kant-Laplace hypothesis is wrong or the +assertion that life can only be generated by life is erroneous; the two +assumptions are incompatible. This conclusion no longer presents any +insuperable difficulties. It has been observed that spores which have +been kept for months at the temperature of frozen hydrogen, that is, +very nearly at absolute zero, have retained their germinative power and +have developed when they were brought back to a favourable temperature. +Therefore they would not be killed by the cold of interstellar space on +their way from one heavenly body to another, and could become the seeds +of life on another hitherto inanimate star. That large numbers of tiny +particles of matter exist in interstellar space and are precipitated on +the heavenly bodies is proved by the cosmic dust that arctic explorers +have collected from the surface of snow and ice. Therefore the Earth may +well have been in an incandescent state, and may yet have received from +interstellar space the germs of life which developed and multiplied when +the Earth's crust had cooled sufficiently to provide the conditions +favourable to their existence; and these germs may have been the +ancestors of all the life that exists on earth to-day after a period of +evolution lasting hundreds of millions of years. + +This would account for the origin of life upon the Earth, but not of +life in general. The germs, which travel as carriers of life from an +older heavenly body to a younger one, must have sprung from parents, and +however far back we trace their genealogical tree we are always finally +faced by this dilemma: either life did, after all, originate at one time +from something lifeless, and what has happened once must be able to +happen again, now and always; or life never originated at all, but has +always existed; it is eternal like matter, in forms whose variety we +cannot even dimly grasp, its threads, having neither beginning nor end, +wind through eternity. Of these two assumptions the latter is +incomparably more in harmony with our present-day views on the universe. +We believe the matter of which the universe is built up to be +everlasting. It costs no great effort to believe life to be eternal too. +True, the idea of eternity is inconceivable to us; it is a dim +conception which has given rise to a word, a tone picture which portrays +something indefinite, but within the bounds of the inconceivable there +is room for both semi-obscurities, the everlastingness of matter and the +everlastingness of life. + +But the most enigmatical point in the riddle of life is not life itself, +which is a form of being, and is neither more nor less comprehensible +than the existence of an inanimate object, of a stone, of water, of the +air; it is consciousness. Descartes proves his own existence to himself +by the fact that he thinks. Life must be accompanied by consciousness in +order to convince the living being that it exists. The formula: "_cogito +ergo sum_" has been admired for hundreds of years. It certainly is +specious. But how many questions it leaves unanswered! Has it the right +to deny life to an entity that does not conceive itself? Must it not be +completed by the proof that life without thought, that is, without +consciousness, does not exist, that consciousness is the necessary +complement of life? And, above all, ought not Descartes to have given us +an explanation of what thought and consciousness are? + +I will attempt to answer the questions left unanswered by Descartes. But +I must premise one thing. Every definition of consciousness implies a +postulate: life. Though at a pinch we can picture life without +consciousness, consciousness without life is absolutely inconceivable. I +do not undertake to explain what life is, any more than I attempted it +above. We must take it as something given. Consciousness, then, is the +subjective realization of something objective, the inward realization of +something outside. If in a living being a picture of its surroundings is +developed, then it absorbs something which is not a necessary part of +itself. Of course, this inner image must not be understood to imply an +absorption of matter. It is a process in the matter of which the living +being is built up. But, all the same, the image of the outer world in +the inner being does signify a penetration of the latter by the former. +This image, which follows the changes of the outer world and repeats +them in the inner being, is consciousness. It may be shadowy and +blurred, or clear and distinct; it may in rapid succession be formed and +pass away, and it can be preserved as a memory; it may reflect a greater +or a lesser portion of the outer world; consciousness is accordingly +duller or sharper; its contents are scant or plentiful, it retains the +images of a shorter or longer series of conditions in the surrounding +world. Between nutrition, which is recognized as an essential phenomenon +of life, and consciousness a surprising parallelism subsists. Both +consist in an absorption of the outer world by the organism; nutrition +is the assimilation of matter, consciousness that of stimuli. In the +process of nutrition the organism digests small quantities of the +outside world; in consciousness it digests the world as a whole. + +This parallelism is no mere play of the intellect. If it is followed out +it leads to significant ideas if not to actual knowledge. What +penetrates from the outer world into the inner being of the organism is +vibration, movement, force. Is the matter which is absorbed as +nourishment ultimately anything different? Here we come up against the +ultimate problems of physics, the various hypotheses regarding the +nature of force and matter, the theories that in addition to matter +there is an ether, or that the ether is a different, more subtle, form +of matter, or that neither matter nor ether exist, but atoms out of +which everything is built up, which themselves consist of electrons +which are centres of force, motions without material consistency. All +these theories, of which the last cannot be grasped by the human +understanding, we can leave severely alone. This is not the place to +investigate them. But the attitude of the living organism towards the +outer world from which it absorbs nourishment and impressions, +converting them into power to drive the life machine and transmuting +them into consciousness, lends peculiar support to the supposition that +force and matter are not only inseparable but identical, that in them we +must seek a principle, or perhaps regard them themselves as a principle, +which must be of the same nature as consciousness, for otherwise it +could not be transmuted into the latter. + +The senses are the means by which the outer world penetrates as an image +into the inner being. Before the senses are differentiated the living +organism possesses a general sensitiveness; that is to say, that under +the influence of the outer world its cell protoplasm undergoes a process +of regrouping, resulting in chemical and dynamic changes. The chemical +results of stimulus are anabolism and katabolism, a building up and +breaking down of the cell content; the dynamic results are movements +which in the lowest forms of life are purely mechanical, but in the +higher forms adapt the organism to the external influence in so far as +they place it either so as to be affected by the latter as long and as +powerfully as possible, or else so as to evade it. The living organism +can experience no stimulus and respond to it without absorbing and +transmuting it, converting it into a chemical process or a movement. +This inner process is a subjective realization of something objective, a +penetration by the outer world, therefore an elementary consciousness. +In proportion as the general sensitiveness becomes differentiated into +specific ones, as the image of the outer world filters through the +different coloured glass panes of the various senses into the inner +being of the organism, this image becomes multicoloured and varied. + +It lies in the nature of this mechanism that the subjective image is not +identical with the objective original, but is modified and even +distorted by the panes through which it penetrates to the inner being of +the organism. What the subject perceives is never anything but a symbol +of the object, never the object itself; but this symbol suffices to +enable the consciousness to form an idea of the object, just as letters +enable the reader to take in words and thoughts. We must conceive the +development of consciousness to go hand in hand with that of the senses. +The more windows the organism can open to the outer world the more +easily and the more clearly does its image penetrate. The number of +objects which the subject can take in is the measure of the perfection +of its consciousness. The protista, lacking specific sense organs and +possessing only the general sensitiveness of protoplasm, can form only +to a very limited extent and with very little variety an inner +realization of the stimuli of the outer world. Its consciousness is +necessarily very restricted and exceedingly dim. Consciousness is +enlarged and grows clearer as the organism develops and its general +sensitiveness is differentiated into specific senses, until we reach the +level of man whose consciousness embraces far more of the outer world +than does that of any other living creature; because, lacking new +senses, he has succeeded in amplifying and enlarging those he possesses, +and has by artificial means made himself capable of perceiving stimuli +to which he is not directly susceptible and which therefore would have +remained unknown to him; to a certain extent he has translated them into +a form which his senses can perceive. + +I do not overlook any of the difficulties which my attempt to explain +consciousness leaves untouched. On all sides the most urgent and +disquieting questions arise. Above all, the fundamental question, the +most enigmatic of all: how is an external stimulus, that is a movement, +a vibration, converted into a sensation, a perception? Further: must we +in the consciousness distinguish between the frame and its contents, +the conceptual mechanism and the concept? Or do the two coincide? Is +there no consciousness without a conceptual content? And is it the +movement entering into the organism, the inner realization of the outer +world which, transmuting itself in an incomprehensible manner into a +concept, creates consciousness, becomes consciousness? Is the +consciousness of the man standing upon the highest plane of +intellectuality the greatest consciousness possible? Does there exist +anywhere in the universe a more abundant, perhaps an infinitely more +abundant consciousness than that of human beings on the Earth, and will +the latter ever rise to this height? It is obvious that a development is +in progress. There was a time when the most comprehensive, the clearest +consciousness on earth was that of the trilobite or the cephalopod. +Evolution has gone as far as man. Does it stop at that or will it +continue? + +According to Herbert Spencer evolution is progress from the simple to +the complicated. Let us accept this definition. Have we the right to set +up a scale of values and place the complicated above the simple? Is the +latter not the more perfect because it has more power of resistance, +greater durability, and can hold its own triumphantly against all +destructive influences? Is not evolution, then, a retrogression from the +perfect, because simple, to the more complicated, and therefore more +fragile, more easily upset and less capable of resistance to harm? Is it +not sheer egocentrism if we appraise the value of living beings +according to their greater or less resemblance to ourselves, and judge +them to be less or more worthy in proportion to their disparity with us? +Are the fish which, living in the sea wherein we cannot exist, can +inhabit the greater part of the globe, are wild duck which fly, swim and +walk, not more perfect than we, who have had to conquer the air and the +water by artificial means? Is not the mouse's hearing sharper than ours? +The eagle's sight keener? The dog's scent incomparably more delicate? +Has not the carrier pigeon an infinitely better sense of locality than +we have? Are not many beasts physically stronger, more nimble and agile +than man? His only claim to superiority rests on the greater perfection +of his consciousness. Why do not all living creatures participate +equally in the evolution to which this superiority is due? Why does it +not take place in every organism and lead the unicellular living being +in an unbroken ascent to the level of Goethe or Napoleon, or to a still +more lofty one, if such an one exist anywhere in the universe? + +If one could believe in a Ruling Power and the plan of the universe as +its work, would it not be terribly cruel and revoltingly unjust that +this power, instead of treating all living beings alike, should make a +kind of selection of grace and lead some up to a higher level while it +condemned others to lasting lowliness, and that it should ordain that on +the road from the unicellular organism to man, countless connecting +links should be left hopelessly behind and not be permitted to continue +their ascent? Or must we admit the humiliating conclusion that a greater +amount of consciousness does not necessarily imply higher rank and +greater dignity, and that a protista, with its almost unimaginably pale +and narrow consciousness, can have just as great a feeling of well-being +as man with his immeasurably superior intellectual life; that therefore +the protista suffers no wrong if it never gets beyond its present stage +of evolution; and finally that the amount of the outer world which man +can absorb in his consciousness is as far removed from the entirety of +the universe as the contents of the protista's consciousness are from +that of the human mind? No answer can be found to these questions. +Whatever purports to be an answer, be it introduced as theology or as +philosophy, is visionary or nonsensical. We must resign ourselves to +moving in a very small circle moderately illuminated by Reason, while +all around, if we seek to penetrate beyond it, we perceive gruesome +darkness. + +Evolution, that is a progress from the comparatively simple to the more +complicated, is a striking fact--I say comparatively simple advisedly, +for even in the unicellular organism the processes are far removed from +the absolutely simple. We do not know from what part of the organism the +impulse to evolution comes. Here we meet with the same mystery which +shrouds growth, its duration, its measure and its bounds. As the +conception is lacking, a word has been found, viz., entelechy, which +Driesch introduced into biology, the co-operation of all parts of the +organism for the purpose not only of preserving it but also of making it +more efficient in the matter of self-preservation and more perfect. A +critical investigation of entelechy would involve the broaching of the +whole question of life. It does not come within the scope of this work. +I shall therefore content myself with a very few remarks. Entelechy +works as if it were reasonable and acted with a set purpose. If you +think it out exhaustively it forces you to the assumption that life is +an intellectual principle, even in the protoplasm of the cell, long +before there is any perceptible trace of consciousness; that this +intellectual principle makes use of matter, builds it up, organizes it, +moulds it into material and tools for construction, and sets up a +mechanism in which and by which it develops itself. As far as we can see +the purpose of life is life itself. Entelechy directs all the work of +the organism in such a way that it becomes more and more capable of +self-preservation, that its efficiency becomes greater, that it can +absorb more of the outer world and can react more vigorously upon the +outer world. In other words, life strives continuously to make its +embodiments more permanent, securer, richer and more manifold. + +However, if we do not know how the impulse to evolution originates, we +can at least form an idea of the mechanism of evolution. Fundamentally +life consists in the absorption of cosmic movements or vibrations, and +their transformation into another form of movement. The living cell is a +machine which makes use of cosmic energy for physio-chemical work. +Metabolism, warmth, electric manifestations, movement, and as their +concomitant a graduated consciousness, are the result of this work which +is carried out by cosmic energy in the cell power machine. + +To start with, this machine works in the very simplest fashion. It uses +up its motive power as fast as it acquires it. Energy flows in and +immediately flows out again in another form. The organism is like a pipe +or a vessel without a bottom, so that its contents cannot be stored. The +lower organisms which obey tropisms are such bottomless vessels. They +are continually and inevitably subjected to the same attractions and +repulsions and have no means to withstand them. But at a certain stage +of evolution--how? why? Driesch replies: Entelechy!--a new part is +developed in the machine, something like the cam on a cogwheel which +forces it to come to rest. Or, to keep to the earlier simile, the +bottomless vessel acquires a bottom with a tap that can be opened and +closed. With this arrangement the organism is able to store the energy +it has received and then to make use of it according to its needs, to do +much more or much less work with it, to achieve much greater or much +smaller effects, than it would be capable of doing with the amount of +energy it receives from outside in a given unit of time. It is obvious +how much more efficient the organism becomes if it can store up energy +and can adapt to its needs the amount used up. This new part of the +machine is Inhibition. + +It appears early, and takes part in the general development of the +organism; it is indeed the strongest factor in this development. Before +Inhibition intervenes the organism has only one response to stimulus: +reflex action. This is of the character of an electric discharge. It may +be stronger or weaker, but is uniform in kind. It varies quantitatively +but not qualitatively. In the lower organisms it is a contraction of the +cell protoplasm, a movement. In the higher organisms, in which the life +processes are carried out on the principle of the division of labour and +which have developed various organs for this purpose, each organ +performs the action of its specific function; the muscle contracts, the +nerve sends out a nervous impulse, the gland forms a secretion, and so +on. All reflex actions have this in common, that they serve no other +purpose than that of relaxing tension in the organism. They do not imply +any co-ordinated effort to promote the comfort and the welfare of the +living being. They cannot fulfil any complicated task. They exhaust the +organism which, after a series of reflex actions, becomes insensitive to +stimuli and must rest for a time before it can react again. + +Beginning from that stage of evolution where inhibition intervenes, +reflex action loses the character of an automatic response to impulse +and becomes disciplined. Inhibition tries to suppress reflex action. Its +success is more or less complete according to the sensitiveness and life +energy of the tissue receiving the stimulus and the degree to which the +mechanism of inhibition is developed. The organism retains its tension, +remains charged with energy, and is able to carry out work for definite +purposes. In place of anarchistic reflex action which occurs regardless +of the needs of the organism, we find economy of energy, co-ordination +of effort, movement directed to a profitable end. It is only inhibition +which can raise the organism from its state of passivity, its helpless +dependence upon tropism, to a being in which a will is beginning to +dawn and which by its will becomes self-determinative. Inhibition is a +function of the will; it is the will's tool. Even Plato dimly perceived +this, and he expresses it in the metaphorical language peculiar to +himself, when, in the "Republic," he compares a human being to a +creature made up of three animals: a hundred-headed sea-serpent which +must at one and the same time be fed and tamed, a blind lion, and a man +who tames the serpent by means of the lion. These three animals are +desire ([Greek: epithumia]), courage ([Greek: thumos]), and mind +([Greek: nous]). We say in biological language, reflex action, +inhibition, and will or volitional reason. + +All the concepts that are referred to here: purpose, co-ordination, +inhibition and will, are every one of them dependent upon one +fundamental concept, consciousness. Without it they are unthinkable. +Schopenhauer's unconscious will is a word without meaning. I have +postulated consciousness as the inseparable concomitant of life. It is +probably the essence of life. In its lowest stage it is too dim, its +contents too meagre and blurred, properly to distinguish the organism in +which it dwells from the world around. In a higher state of development, +when it gradually grows clearer and begins to be filled with more +sharply defined ideas, it learns to keep its organism and the +surrounding world apart, and tries to make the attitude of the former to +the latter one of self-defence, self-preservation and self-development. +From this stage of development onward, concepts begin to connect and +group themselves in such a way that consciousness contains not only an +image of the immediate present, but also memories of the past and a +forecast of the future. The ability to prolong the present into the +future, to understand the actual as a cause of the effects that follow +and to foresee these effects, that is the starting point of logic and +reason. It is the necessary antecedent of the will, which would have no +meaning if it were not the effort to realize a conception of actions and +their consequences, previously worked out by consciousness. Will is a +function of consciousness which, in pursuance of the well-known +biological law, creates an instrument for its purposes, and this +instrument is inhibition. The higher an organism stands on the ladder of +evolution the more energetically and surely does inhibition work, the +nicer and the more masterly does its intervention in the original reflex +actions grow. + +Thanks to the piling up of reserves of energy, which is a result of +inhibition, the organism can carry out its work of differentiation, can +develop organs and organic systems, and obtain the power to perform more +complicated functions; these render it ever more independent of the +outer world and enable it to affect the outer world to an increasing +extent. Inhibition plays an important part in differentiation. Its +apparatus becomes organized. The nerve centres from which the inhibition +proceeds form a ladder of which each rung is subordinate to the next. +The peripheral nerves are controlled by the nerve centres in the spinal +cord, these again by the centres in the medulla oblongata, and then in +succession by the cerebellum and the cerebrum, and finally by the +corticle. On the principle of least resistance, on which all life is +based, the highest centres of inhibition unburden themselves by granting +the lower ones a certain measure of independence. The reaction to the +most ordinary and frequent stimuli is controlled and organized in its +character and strength by the apparatus of inhibition, so that it ensues +automatically, and no active inhibition, that is, no conscious effort of +the will, is required. The simplest of these automatic reflex movements +take place below the level of consciousness. + +Those organized complexes of movement, however, which we call instincts, +are carefully watched by the consciousness and subjected to severe check +if they appear to run counter to the supposed interest of the organism. +The hereditary complexes of movement constituting instinct are highly +organized and oppose inhibition, only yielding to it when it is stronger +than they are. This can be observed in animals which are capable of +taming and training. All the artificial actions and omissions that man +teaches them are triumphs of inhibition over automatism. Among human +beings it is only the elect who can vigorously suppress their instincts +by inhibition directed by Reason. The being that has attained the summit +of organic evolution on earth is man, in whom only the lower, vegetative +life processes are liable to the influence of tropism and primary reflex +actions, while all the higher and highest functions are the work of +Reason, which arms the will with inhibition and suppresses all impulses +and actions that hinder its purposes. It is characteristic of these +functions that they are first worked out as concepts by the +consciousness before they are realized as movements. + +It was essential for Morality to find this whole organic structure ready +to its hand before it could become a factor in human life. This +structure had been developed and perfected by the organism for its own +purposes, for the defence and enrichment of its life, to ward off +painful and obtain pleasurable feelings. Morality took possession of it +and used it for its own ends, which do not at the first glance coincide +with the aims which the individual immediately perceives and imagines, +and may indeed be diametrically opposed to these, preventing pleasurable +emotions, causing him pain and even endangering his life. + +But Morality, which is a creation of society, was only able to dominate +the individual and gain control of the organic apparatus of his vital +economy, because its purpose is directed towards the same goal as the +tendencies of the individual organism, prolonging them beyond the +individual's scope, aiming at his preservation, and thus coinciding with +his instinct for self-preservation. + +Morality limits the individual's vainglory and subordinates him to the +community; it is the condition on which the community allows the +individual to participate in the mightier and more varied means of +protection and the enrichment of existence which it has to offer. But +apart from this somewhat remote advantage of Morality, there is another +immediate one for the individual: it consists in the continual exercise +and consequent strengthening of inhibition; therefore, as we have learnt +to see in inhibition the main factor in the development and +differentiation of all living creatures, it offers a means of raising +the individual to biological perfection. The faculty of inhibition, +being in a continual state of strong tension, makes automatic reflexes +subject to the will, makes blind impulses obedient to the somewhat less +blind reason, and helps man along the path of evolution from the status +of a creature of instinct to that of a thinking personality of strong +character, capable of judgment and foresight, a personality which does +not seek to attain the pleasurable emotions necessary to every living +creature by pandering to his senses and satisfying the appetites of the +flesh, but achieves them by gratification of a higher order, by the +triumph of the intellect over vegetative life, by strengthening the will +in relation to the stimuli of the outer world and the organs, by taking +pleasure in the fact that the will is content with its sway. These are +harsh but subtle pleasures which, when they continue to preponderate in +the consciousness, bring about that state of subjective happiness which +is in the highest degree beneficial to life. + +Morality is an arrangement which has arisen from the needs of society; +that is to say, it is not innate, but is an artificial institution of +the race. However, it grafts itself upon the natural organs and +attributes of man, and thus, from being a sociological phenomenon, it +becomes a biological one. The idea that Morality is something absolute, +a cosmic force, and that it would still exist and be valid if there were +no human beings, and even if the earth had no existence, I have refuted +with scorn. We must hold fast to the fact that Morality is a law of +human conduct, that it is in force only among mankind, and that apart +from mankind it is unthinkable. As, however, it becomes a differentiated +function of the apparatus of inhibition, it participates in the general +processes of life and leads us to that point where, indeed, we face the +unnerving outlook upon the absolute and the question of eternity. + +My arguments have led me to many phenomena that can be established and +interpreted as facts of experience, but the explanation of which lies +beyond the power of the human mind. We have examined the riddle of life, +and we have distinguished therein a number of inexplicable things: the +lack of a beginning, sensitiveness to stimuli, consciousness, the +transformation of vibrations into sensations and concepts, the will, and +inhibition. We are forced to the conclusion that the only discernible +aim of life's activities is the preservation of life, or, more shortly, +that life is its own aim and object. Morality, too, either openly or by +implication, sets itself the one clearly demonstrable task of ensuring +to the individual the preservation and security of his existence in a +higher sphere than that of individual vegetative life processes. Thereby +it fits into the scheme of existence, its mysteries and aims, and +becomes an integral part of the cycle of life which emerges from +eternity and returns to it. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MORALITY AND LAW + + +The coercion which the community exercises upon its members, by means of +which it forces them to adapt their actions and abstention from action +to the standard it has set up, has two forms: Custom and Law. Are the +two really different? What is their relation, one to the other? These +are questions worth investigating. + +Ever since the earliest times, grave men have meditated on the relation +between Custom and Law. They were forced by evidence and practical +experience to note a difference between the two institutions, but at the +same time they had the definite impression that they trace their origin +to the same source. Socrates distinguishes between the written laws of +his country and the unwritten ones which express the will of the gods. +The former constitute positive Law which the citizen must observe and to +which he must submit; the latter, however, are higher, for they emanate +from the gods themselves. The immutability of the unwritten laws is a +proof that they are superior to the written ones. Written laws vary from +state to state. They are the work of individual law-givers who were +sometimes wise men and sometimes unreasonable tyrants. But all contain +certain precepts which are everywhere alike, which everywhere impose +the same rules upon man. It is almost as if one and the same law-giver +had co-operated in the making of all the laws that obtain in the +different towns and countries, and are so unlike one another in many +points. This common law-giver, whose will is manifest in all laws, +however far removed they be from one another, is the Deity. That is +essentially Socrates' train of thought as given by Xenophon in his +_Memorabilia_. The Attic sage speaks the language of his time, which, by +the way, is still that of many present-day people. The Deity, whose will +permeates all written laws and to whom they may be traced, is the +principle of Morality. Hugo Grotius, in a manner more appropriate to +modern thought, expresses it thus: "Law and Morality spring from the +same source, namely, the strong social instinct natural to man. They +bear witness to reasonable solicitude for the welfare of the community." +This placing on an equality of Law and Custom, of _jus_ and _mos_, is +very remarkable in such a strictly professional thinker, such a positive +jurist as Grotius. Kant discriminates between the doctrine of Virtue and +the doctrine of Law; he keeps them apart, but he emphasizes their +connexion, and the two together make up his doctrine of Ethics. + +As a matter of fact, no fundamental difference between Law and Custom +exists; only Law is enforced differently to Custom. It would be going +too far to say: Law has sanctions and Custom has none. The latter has +sanctions too, but they are of a different kind to those of the Law. He +who transgresses Custom will suffer the contempt of his fellow men, and +this may become so penetratingly severe that the most hardened and +shameless rascal must feel it. In an old, loose form of society where +individualism is highly developed, and each one goes his own way, paying +little regard to the others, there an unscrupulous, conscienceless rogue +may sin against Socrates' unwritten law without being penalized. In a +young, closely-knit community, however, in which the feeling of intimate +connexion between the members is lively and vivid, he would be +proscribed, as soon as he was found out, and it would be impossible for +him to remain, say, for example, in a small town of the United States. +Public opinion would make it so hot for him that he would be glad to +escape with a whole skin. But this punishment is exceptional for +transgressions of Custom, whereas it is the rule for those of the Law. + +The sanction of the Law is stricter than that of Custom, just as the Law +itself is stricter than is Custom. The Law concerns itself with concrete +cases in which consideration for one's fellow men must be practised, +duties to him fulfilled, and his claims respected. These cases are +defined by Law as clearly as possible, whereas Custom confines itself to +generalities and determines the whole attitude of the individual to his +neighbour. Custom embraces the outer and inner life of man and +supervises his opinions, which are the parents of his deeds, and also +his deeds themselves; Law is only concerned with actions, and refrains +from penetrating to the intimacy of thoughts, unless the latter alter +the essential character of the action, as premeditation in an act of +revenge and temporary or permanent irresponsibility alter the judgment +of offences and crimes. Law is a miserly extract of custom, a meagre +selection from its variety, a concentration and embodiment of its +surging vagueness. It may be compared with crystals, which in their +geometrically accurate forms are crystallized clearly and definitely out +of a liquid, the mother liquor; or with the heavenly bodies which +agglomerate out of surging primal nebulæ. Custom is the primitive thing, +Law is derived from it. It appeals to its descent from Custom, and +founds, at any rate tacitly, its claim to respect on these grounds. A +law which ran counter to Custom, which was confessedly in opposition to +Custom, could never be maintained or prevail, though it bristled with +the menace of the most dreadful punishments. + +The relationship of mother to child between Custom and Law may be +obscure to the majority; it is clear to the analytical mind. Recognition +of the essential unity of both phenomena explains an assumption which +was widespread among the best intellects from the Middle Ages until well +into the eighteenth century, but which has now been abandoned as +erroneous by more positive, though indeed narrower, legal minds. This +assumption is that there is a natural Law antecedent to historical Law, +which exists and acts beside and above the latter, and which forms the +basis and the measure of every positive law, of every concrete legal +judgment. It is comprehensible that the nineteenth century swept away +the idea of natural Law and freely made fun of it. To a sternly +disciplined legal mind it must indeed seem grotesque if a judge, in +order to arrive at a verdict in some concrete dispute, cites the rights +to which man is born instead of a certain text of the law, or even, +following Schiller's advice, reaches up to the stars and brings down +thence the eternal Law. Even this procedure is not so farcical as it +seems to stupid article-mongers and hair-splitting paragraphists, for +the procedure of equity of the English judges, who are not prone to +clowning, is at bottom nothing but this reaching up to the stars and +this judging by the rights to which man is born. The feud between +natural Law and historical Law was really a quarrel about a word. Jean +Jacques Rousseau, his contemporaries and disciples, simply made a +mistake in their choice of an expression. They were guilty of an +inaccuracy when they spoke of natural Law. They should have said: "the +innate claim of man that his person should be respected," or, "natural +consideration for one's fellow man," or, most shortly and simply, +"Morality." To the latter legal lights would have raised none of the +objections with which they victoriously opposed natural Law. + +The beginnings of Morality coincide with the beginnings of society, as +the latter could not have existed for a single day without the former. +Since men, forced by the struggle for existence, emerged from their +original, natural solitude and united in a community, they have had to +watch over their impulses, suppress their desires, do things they +disliked, and in all their actions and abstentions from action consider +their neighbours' feelings, as they demanded that their feelings, too, +should be considered. That was Morality which limited the vainglory and +arbitrary conduct of unfettered man. It included all rules that +determine the attitude of man to man. There was no distinction between +Custom and Law. Men were ruled by custom which was traditional in their +community and observed by all; and their Custom had the force of Law. + +Formulated laws, and more especially written laws, appear comparatively +late. True, Asia has old examples of such; the Manava Dharma Shastra, +the book of laws of the Indian Manu, the Chinese Chings, the law of +Hammu Rabi, and that other law, akin to this, though not derived from +it, but probably drawn from a similar older source, the law of the +Pentateuch. The laws of Draco, Solon and Lycurgus and the Roman Twelve +table law are appreciably younger; much later still the _leges +barbarorum_ were written down, some of them, like the prescriptive Law +of the Germans set down in the "_Sachsenspiegel_," not till the end of +the Middle Ages. It is peculiar to most of the old Asiatic laws that +they contain both rules of conduct and legal regulations, and that they +do not differentiate between these two kinds of precepts. + +Let us take one example: the Ten Commandments. Beside such positive +orders as "Thou shalt not steal"; "Thou shalt not kill"; "Honour thy +father and thy mother"; we find such as give rules for the character and +course of spiritual happenings, regarding which others cannot observe +whether they are obeyed or not, like the commandments respecting man's +relationship to God, or admonishing man not to covet his neighbour's +wife or goods. Those are subjective impulses, spiritual moods which are +revealed only to the eye of conscience as long as they do not betray +themselves in action, and which by their very nature cannot be the +subject of Law which deals only with outward manifestations of thought +and will, and is concerned only with things done. + +In constitutional Law, too, no less than in criminal and civil Law, the +eighteenth century tends to preface certain laws with universal moral +principles, and to establish by formal law that the former are derived +from the latter. The Declaration of Independence of the United States in +July, 1774, says: We consider the following truths self-evident: that +all men are born equal; that the Creator has bestowed upon them +inalienable rights, amongst which are the right to life, to freedom, to +the pursuit of happiness, etc. So before these rights are guaranteed by +the Law, they are announced to belong by birth and nature to man, to be +independent of any particular and express bestowal by the law-giver, and +beyond all dispute or even argument. Of the thirteen States which formed +the original Union, ten accompanied their constitution by a Bill of +Rights which repeated the essential contents of the Declaration of +Independence of July, 1774; seven of them placed them as an introduction +before their fundamental law, and three of them incorporated them in the +latter. Two others, New York and Georgia, distributed them among various +articles of their constitution. Rhode Island alone refrained from a +general declaration. The States which joined the Union later, with few +exceptions followed the example of their predecessors and built up their +constitution on the foundation of an explicit statement of the natural +rights of man. The French Revolution followed the course which the +United States had indicated, and began its constitution of 1791 with the +"Declaration of the rights of men and citizens," which is not a law in +the technical sense of the word, but is superior to all positive Law, +constitutes the latter's standard and touchstone, and straightway makes +all laws invalid which are not animated by its spirit or which +contradict it. + +In the beginning, therefore, there was Morality, and the first laws, +which formulated its precepts either in oral tradition or in writing, +recommended without distinction what was good and desirable, and what +was necessary and expedient. The differentiation of the Morality, which +the commonwealth felt to be its code of right and wrong, into Custom and +Law took place in late times. It was most definite in Rome, where for +the first time a clear distinction was made between men's relation to +their gods and their relation to one another; the former was left to the +individual's conscience, the latter subjected to the power of the State; +the elements of feeling and of dim perception were banished from the Law +which confined its attention to deeds which it regulated in a +high-handed manner. Law chose from out the all-embracing sphere of +Morality one narrow area, that of mankind's immediate, material +interests, and took this as its sole theme. The object of all Morality +is to enable men to live together in a community peacefully and +prosperously; within the bounds of this more general purpose, the task +of the Law is to suppress by force the grosser hindrances to this +harmony among individuals, and by material means of coercion +emphatically oblige everyone to respect the interests of his neighbour. +What every responsible man of sound mind demands first and foremost is a +proper respect for the possessions that are his by birth and +acquisition, that is for his life, for his bodily welfare, for all the +goods he owns that minister to his needs, his comfort and his pleasure. +He who lays violent hands on these possessions, or threatens to endanger +them, is recognized to be an enemy; man arms himself against such an +one, fights against him, tries, if he have a strong character, to +destroy him, or flees from him if he is too weak to triumph over him; +man only yields to such an one if he simply cannot help himself, but he +does so with hatred and revenge in his heart, and in a state of mind +which, if it becomes fairly widespread, sets every man's hand against +his fellow-men and leads to the ruin and even to the dissolution of the +community. Hence the task of Law is effectively to protect the +individual from the infringement of his rights by others. It places the +organized forces of the community at the service of the individual whose +interests are threatened, for the criminal law penalizes more or less +severely attempts against life and health, unlawful seizure of property +whether by force or cunning, malicious molestation and offence; the laws +of commerce keep watch over the faithful fulfilment of contracts dealing +with the fair exchange of goods or the execution of work, and in case of +need enforce it. + +A select few, everywhere only a small minority, has a different scale of +values to that of the masses. For them "life is not the supreme thing." +There are things they value more highly. The masses have no +understanding for these people's needs and fine feelings. Their +self-respect and their dignity are dear to them as wealth, their honour +more sacred than life itself. Unhesitatingly they sacrifice their +property to freedom, and more unbearable than anxiety for their material +interests is life in surroundings in which brutality, vulgar sentiments, +harsh egotism, malice, hypocrisy and treachery preponderate. The Law +does not consider this minority. It is the creation and the servant of +the great majority. It clings to earth and is incapable of lofty +flights. It is of no service to the elect in the preservation of their +noblest spiritual possessions or the defence of their ideals against +clumsy maltreatment. It declares itself to be incompetent to deal with +any but material affairs. + +Therein lies at one and the same time the strength and the weakness of +the Law. Its strength lies in the fact that it definitely limits its +sphere of action and strives to achieve positive results by positive +means, results intelligible even to a mean understanding. Its weakness +lies in the fact that it ignores man's highest and noblest interests. +And these interests are there, they too deserve consideration and +protection, they have a right to demand that the guarantee of the +community should embrace them as well. The well-being of the community, +which is the object of Morality and of Law too, demands that such +conditions should be created and maintained, as should enable the elect +also to enjoy life or at least find existence bearable. But Law does +not suffice for that. No law enjoins upon the careless throng of +pachyderms to spare the tenderest and noblest sensibilities of lofty +natures; no judge punishes thoughtless or purposely malicious injury to +them. To remedy this evil we must rise from the lowly plain of Law, the +natural dwelling-place of the masses, to the heights of Morality, the +habitual abode of superior minds. At the theological stage of +civilization refuge is sought with the gods in whose hands the +protection of essential, spiritual possessions is placed. They are +expected to punish the wicked whose evil deeds are beyond the reach of +any penal code, they are expected to soothe and comfort when life is +hard or even unendurable. That is the compromise that the elect made +with life in the hard times of European barbarism. They escaped from the +world and thus avoided contact with the repugnant masses. They shut +themselves up in cloistered cells away from mankind and held mystic +intercourse with God. Among the people, cruel authorities with +difficulty maintained discipline and scanty law and order by means of +flogging and the pillory, torture, the gallows and the wheel. The +minority of the elect disciplined themselves, suppressed their lower +impulses by self-imposed mortification, and with the help of prayer and +belief in God's promised millennium managed to keep their heads above +water despite the crushing spectacle of the life of those times. + +Long before the Christian era, the Greeks of noble disposition felt the +need of living in an atmosphere of higher intellectuality and morality +than that of the market-place, and they hid themselves behind the +cloud-curtain of the Eleusinian Mysteries, where they kept to +themselves, escaped the rule of the rude Law, and followed the nobler +precepts of Morality. Whenever the measure of Morality contained in +positive law did not suffice for the minority with higher aspirations, +this minority adopted the same expedient, a form of esotericism; small +circles were formed outside the community in which there was added to +the current legal code a superstructure of stricter rules, more finely +shaded duties, more courteous consideration. Present-day life also +offers examples of this tendency which is met with in all ages. There +are select circles and professions in which the standard of +irreproachableness is far higher than among the mass of the people. +There a man is not held blameless, simply because he has never +transgressed a positive law, never come into conflict with the powers of +justice. He must be as unspotted in the eye of moral justice as he is in +that of the Law. A club or association that is self-respecting will not +admit to membership a candidate reputed to lie, to have an evil tongue, +to break his word, to be a toady and a snob, though none of these +offences are punishable by law. It has happened that a corps of German +officers has forced one of their number to send in his papers because he +has seduced and deserted a respectable girl, an adventure flattering to +the vanity of puppies who, as like as not, boast of it, and with which a +judge can only deal if the injured girl appeals to him--and even then he +cannot punish the offender, but merely sentence him to pay damages. + +Almost the whole world is agreed on the point that the Law does not +sufficiently protect honour. Positive Law evidently does not consider it +of such value as material possessions, for the defence of which it knows +itself to be qualified. But there are numbers of people whose honour is +dearer to them than their fortune, even than their life, and trembling +with indignation they see that a thief who steals their purse with a few +shillings is haled off to prison, while a slanderer who sullies their +honour either goes unpunished, or at most gets off with a fine, which +merely adds official insult to the injury. In this case the Law has +lagged so far behind Morality that individuals try of their own accord +to bridge the gulf without counting on the intervention of the +community. For aspersions of their honour the masses take revenge with +fists and cudgels, often with bloody results; and among the elect they +resort to duels with lethal weapons, a preposterous proceeding due to +desperation, and a bitter indictment of the prevailing laws. It is a +deed of self-help, like the formation of a vigilance committee among the +anarchical throng of a lawless rabble. Hardly to be justified on +reasonable grounds, it is intelligible from the point of view of +historical tradition, and as a survival of dim and primitive ideas. In +early days a properly regulated duel was an ordeal showing the judgment +of heaven. It was the general conviction that God would give victory to +the right and crush the wrong. When human Law failed, the injured party +appealed to the source of all Law and placed his cause in the hands of +the Almighty. From this point of view the duel is no unsuitable means +of preventing plots to evade the law. Even if the injured party is +inexperienced in the use of the weapon, even if his opponent is skilled +and vastly his superior, he need not worry, for God fights on his side. +Therefore he is more sure of success than if he entrusted his cause to +fallible human judges. But from the moment that the duel ceases to be +regarded as a means of arriving at the verdict of God, nothing can be +urged in its defence, and that it nevertheless persists is a fact that +can only be accounted for by the inadequacy of the current laws. + +It really is astonishing that the Law does not yet appraise honour at +its true value. Educated people almost unanimously regret and condemn +the backwardness of the Law in this respect, all the more so because the +tremendous development of the respectable, as well as of the +disreputable, Press facilitates and aggravates libel to a hitherto +undreamed-of extent, and no defence can overtake the slander which is +quickly spread broadcast. Doubtless public opinion will urge that +measures be taken to bring the Law into line with the views now held on +all sides on the significance of honour, its defencelessness and its +need for protection. That this has not yet been done is due to the +slowness with which the Law adapts itself to the demands of a Morality +which grows ever more profound and more refined. Law, which originally +devoted itself only to the crudest material interests, very slowly +extends the range of its protection, but it does so continually, with an +ever-widening embrace, including more and more delicate, more and more +noble, possessions, taking into consideration ever higher and ever finer +needs. What early legislator would have thought of man's needing +protection not only against murder, grievous bodily harm and +maltreatment, but also against the dangers due to ignorance and +carelessness in light-heartedly spreading infectious diseases, and +contaminating water and the air? Who would have dreamed in former times +that positive Law would consider the sensitiveness of nerves, desire for +beauty, dislike of ugliness and forbid disturbing street noises, protect +the countryside from wicked disfigurement, and prevent the construction +of buildings which would spoil the artistic architectural plan of a +city? + +These little traits, these concessions to personal demands, which to a +coarse mind do not seem obviously justified, go to prove that positive +Law continues to grow beyond the bounds of its unavoidably crude +materialism, and strives to rise into the regions of the unwritten law +of the Peripatetics, where ideal possessions are of more importance than +those which have traditionally come within the scope of criminal and +civil Law. Law and Custom have a natural tendency to approach more and +more nearly to one another, to become merged in one another where the +line that divides them is but faintly indicated. The closer the union +between them, the more perfect is the Morality of a society. Absolute +perfection would be reached if Law, which has been derived by +differentiation from Morality, should, after a protracted period of +development, return to its source and be completely merged again in +Morality. But that is a dream which can never be realized as long as +man is constituted as he is at the present time. Enthusiasts have +dreamed of it, and in their imagination have seen an anarchical and +lawless society in which no positive Law, no sanctions of force were +needed, and in which the understanding and conscience of individuals +would suffice to ensure the rule of good faith and goodness, and the +curbing of selfishness. As far as man can tell we shall never attain +this Utopia. We shall never be able to do without positive Law, not only +on account of undeveloped and perverse natures, in which animalism has +the upper hand of humanity, and which must be kept under strict +discipline, but because a sure guide is needed in cases of doubt and +irresolution which confuse even the good, nay, the best, men when +passion and violent desire, with their heavy thunderclouds, darken the +outlook of Reason, and judgment wavers amid the hurly-burly of a +spiritual tempest. All that we may hope for and should desire is that +Law should be filled with the spirit of Morality and embrace as many +moral ideas as possible. + +It lies in the nature of the thing that Morality was never clearly and +definitely formulated, for as soon as this was done it assumed the +character of Law. It remained general and slightly vague, it spoke to +men in such indefinite terms as "good," "virtue," "duty," "love of one's +neighbour," "unselfishness," "patience"--terms into which everyone can +read the meaning which suits his thoughts and feelings. Mankind has +never lacked moral teachers. The Indian Shastras and the Chings, +Confucius and Meng Tse, the prophets of Israel and Ben Sirach, Plato +and the wise men of the Stoics, the Zend Avesta, Jesus and Paul, the +platonic ethics of Nicomachus, those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, +thousands of years ago preached the principles which exhaust the whole +field of Morality, and beyond the essentials of which none of the later +moralists have gone; neither the "Imitation of Christ" nor Ibn Bachia, +Spinoza, the Scotch school and Kant, up to Wundt and Guyau. + +But what about the effect of the doctrines which they advocated gently +or passionately, adducing proofs or uttering threats? To lend weight to +them they either appealed to God, threatening mankind with His wrath and +vengeance, or to Reason, which, according to them, could advise man only +for his good. Perhaps they could intimidate those who had blind faith +and convince the reasonable. But there are many of little faith, and +more still who are unreasonable, and on these the persuasion, warnings +and conclusions of the Moralists had no effect. For these it was +imperative to clothe the minimum of Morality, the minimum without which +no society can exist, in the definite form of laws, and so create the +Law to which the weapons of the community lend compelling force. Thus +the whole material of Ethics is divided into Morality and Law. The +Theologians and Scholiasts who trace all binding rules of human conduct +back to revelations of the Divine Will recognized on principle only one +single law: but the aspect of practical life made even them distinguish +between the "_lex indicativa_" and the "_lex præceptiva_," between an +indication or counsel and precept or command. The "_lex indicativa_" is +Morality, the "_lex præceptiva_" is the Law. + +Codes are the normal expression of the Law. Not all Law is formulated in +this way, for there is a recognized Law of custom, but all laws, +codified or not, become a part of the prevailing Law. Naturally, and as +is only reasonable, all Law is pre-existent in the consciousness of the +majority, and the law-giver's rôle is limited to setting down in +paragraphs universally acknowledged principles dictated by public +opinion. However, there are an appreciable number of historical +instances in which this procedure is reversed; the law-giver, without +inquiring whether his ideas were in accord with the general conscience, +arbitrarily clothed his dictates to the community in paragraphs which it +had to accept as Law. It is clear that this procedure is extremely +risky. Even if the law-giver possesses superior wisdom, even if he is +far in advance of his people and his age, even if his intentions are of +the best, there is grave danger that the moral feeling of the people +will revolt against the laws thus forced on them. Outwardly they yield +to the pressure of public authority, but they obey the Law with a keen +inner sense of opposition; a chasm yawns between conscience and the +practice of the Law, ideas of Morality and Law become confused, the +moral foundation of all laws totters, and the public gets into the habit +of regarding the Law as something alien and hostile, which cannot be +disregarded with impunity, but which it is not only not culpable, but +even meritorious to evade. + +An enormous amount has been written on the subject of what a law is, and +all this literature expresses in endless words very few and, almost +without exception, very mediocre thoughts. I should consider it an +unpardonable waste of time to devote any considerable space to this +rubbish, either in order merely to quote opinions or to investigate and +confute them. Perhaps the best thing said of the laws is Hobbes's +description: Civil Law (the law of the country) is nothing but a +guarantee of natural Law. It is true that this definition implies a +supposition: the existence of natural Law which, however, is not binding +in itself but requires the sanctions of the law of the country. +Moreover, it is only correct if we add the limitation that it does not +guarantee all natural Law, but only a part of it. Hobbes is also forced +by his definition of the law of a country to explain what he means by +natural Law, and he does not evade this duty. "Natural Law," he says, +"is the decree of true Reason (_ratiocinatio recta_) with regard to what +we must do and what avoid for our self-preservation.... Transgression of +natural Laws is due to false Reason (_ratiocinatio falsa_)." + +In spite of its vagueness this explanation of Hobbes's shows that what +he really means by natural Law is Morality, and in this respect his +views on the relation of natural Law to civil Law, that is, of Morality +to Law, practically coincide with mine. Nevertheless, he ignobly denies +the moral decency of his doctrine of Law when later on he coldly and +dryly remarks: All that the state commands is just, all that it forbids +is unjust. Saying this he stupidly and obsequiously makes the civil +code the source of Law, whereas by his own definition Law (he says +"Natural Law") is the source of the civil code. It is more pardonable +for Pusendorf, a formal jurist, to say: "Law is the decree (_decretum_) +with which a superior binds his subject (_sibi subjectum_)." That +interpretation of Law is possible if it is considered from outside; it +is a means of coercion in the hands of the mighty to subjugate the +dependant; this point of view ignores the essential; but Pusendorf has +no concern with this, for he makes no claim to be a philosopher, he +keeps within the bounds of juridical practice. + +The Bishop of Seville, Saint Isidor, the most respected theologian of +the time between the last patristic writers and St. Thomas Aquinas, +gives the following definition of Law: "Law is an institution +(_constitutio_) made by the people, by which the nobles (_majores +natu_), together with the common folk, have given a sanction to some +ordinance." This says little about the essence of Law, but it leads to +the question of the origin of laws. On this subject, too, whole +libraries full of books have been written since the time of Plato and +Aristotle; luckily, for the most part, they now only serve as food for +moths and worms. + +From this tangle of hair-splitting and sophistry, from this muddle of +syllogisms, dogmatism and deep-sounding phrases which mean nothing at +all, one thought emerges pretty clearly, to wit, that only the highest +authority in the State has the right to make laws. On this point there +is perfect unanimity; and that is natural, for it is so obvious that it +has no need to be circumstantially investigated and proved in the fifty +thousand books that have been written on the subject. It is perfectly +clear that one cannot possibly force all the members of a state to obey +certain commands and prohibitions which the Law contains, unless one is +stronger than each one of them, and therefore the Law must necessarily +emanate from the highest power in the state. It is beside the point to +obscure this simplest and most transparent fact by questions as to the +right of the law-giver. He needs no theoretical right since he has the +might. To use Kant's expression, positive Law is not a creation of the +mind ([Greek: noumenon]), it is a phenomenon; its existence is a matter +of empiricism, not of reason; it is a matter of fact and is under no +obligation to justify itself intellectually to the intellect. No +law-giver has ever troubled to tack on a preamble or an addition to the +law he promulgates proving that he has the right to enact it. + +But in the literature dealing with this matter opinions differ widely as +to who embodies or possesses the highest power in the state. According +to some it is the king, because he wields the sword and therefore can +enforce unconditional obedience; according to others it is the Church, +because the Law, to be binding, must be moral, and Morality is +established by God since the Church is the representative of God on +earth. Others again regard the people as a whole as the highest power, +because without their assent no law can prevail, and because even the +king only has the power of which the people divests itself to transfer +it to him. History has advanced beyond this quarrel. + +To-day no one dares to dispute the fact that the nation alone is +qualified to enact laws for itself through the agency of its chosen +representatives, and that no law can be binding for the people without +their explicit or tacit consent. In Switzerland, where they have +instituted the referendum, the people by their vote can repudiate a law, +made by their representatives in their name, before it comes into force; +and in the other constitutional states they have recourse to the +following expedient: whenever a law is promulgated which seems +inacceptable to them, at the next Parliamentary election they vote for +men who are pledged to do away with it. The people have the power to +make laws, therefore they also have the right to do so, and they do not +hesitate to revolt if this right is tampered with. In recent times no +nation outside Russia has submitted to having laws forced on it, in +framing which it has not co-operated, and which it has not expressly +accepted. The United States tore themselves away from the Mother Country +with the cry: "No taxation without representation!" and more than a +hundred years before that the English people had irrefutably proved to +the Stuart king, Charles I, that he had no right to make and unmake +laws, by condemning him in a court of law with legal formalities and +then having his head cut off by a masked executioner. + +The legal code is the concrete form of the Law, and the Law is the +crystallization of the most material part of Morality. And as Morality +binds every member of the community, as man is only tolerated in the +community on condition that he respects Morality, it is a matter of +logic that he should also respect the Law; that is to say, that he must +not only submit to it because he fears punishment if he fails to do so, +but that he must feel obedience to the Law to be part of his Morality, +that he must act lawfully at the dictate of his own conscience, and not +because of the threat of the power of the state. This might be +enunciated as a principle without reservation and without limitation, if +in practice the laws always were, as in theory they should be, moral. +But this is not necessarily the case. The law is a form, and every form +can be abused by filling it with unlawful contents. If an unscrupulous +adulterator of wine fills a champagne bottle of the usual shape, +complete with metalled and wired cork and a label recommending it, with +some disgusting mixture and puts it on the market, he is severely +punished for adulteration of food and infringement of the law protecting +trade marks. But if the government publish in the _Gazette_ foolish, +risky, and perhaps absolutely immoral orders in the form of a law, duly +arranged in chapters, articles and paragraphs, as the people are +accustomed to seeing their moral laws expressed, who impugns them for +it? + +The examples of this in history are only too numerous. To this category +belong all laws seeking to maintain the validity of state authority at +the expense of the natural rights of thinking and feeling men, e.g. all +religious persecutions, the maltreatment of socialists, excise laws and +duties which hamper freedom of work and movement, or are tantamount to +robbing a particular man or all citizens. As a rule, laws of this kind +can be imposed upon the people only in a despotically ruled state, since +the people in this case has no share in legislation; but constitutional +government is no guarantee against it, for parliamentary majorities can +be forced to enact tyrannical laws, by fanning the flame of national or +party fanaticism, by encouraging prejudices, or by intimidation; this is +proved by Bismarck's May laws and Socialist laws, and also by the laws +passed by the National Assembly at Versailles against the rebels of the +Commune and against Paris. Obedience to such laws cannot reasonably be +demanded. Only a Hobbes will dispute this, for whom "everything that the +state commands is just, everything that it prohibits is unjust," or the +Digest according to which "_quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem_" +(what pleases the ruler has the force of law). Legal enactments, though +they be immoral, are yet formal Law; as a matter of fact, however, they +are wrong, and even if their originator has the power by brute force to +secure obedience to them, no man who tries to evade them and to get them +abolished will be accused of immorality. + +A trivial objection strikes one at once. Only a despotic megalomaniac +will forbid his subjects to make representations in the proper quarters, +and in the proper way, for the purpose of getting a bad law abrogated; +but as long as it is in force it must be obeyed. For if every citizen +were allowed to make a selection of the laws according to his choice, +acquiescing in some and rejecting others, this would lead straight to +anarchy. The reply to this is that anarchy, although a terrible evil, is +notwithstanding a lesser one than an immoral law, that is, a law which +sins against Morality. For the maintenance of law and order which the +State guarantees is only preferable to anarchy because it enables +individuals to live together in peace, and guarantees liberty of +movement and respect for persons, life and property. But if the State +acts wrongly, and interferes in the feelings and convictions of +individuals, if it uses brute force to compel them to actions and +abstentions against which all the good in them rebels, then its law and +order is law and disorder, and it is the State itself which brings about +a condition of anarchy by making force the ruling factor in the life of +the individual. For the latter it is all one whether he has to yield to +the force of the State or that of his neighbour. Nay, more, his position +is worse in a condition of anarchy caused by the State, than in that +which existed before the State was formed, because it is easier to meet +force with force, when this emanates from an individual who is one's +equal, than when it is exercised by the superior organization of the +State. The State which enacts immoral laws denies its own principle and +causes its own dissolution. + +The intellectual constructions of the eighteenth century, of which the +most famous is J. J. Rousseau's "Social Contract," are not taken +literally by anyone nowadays. Nobody seriously believes that one day +individuals living in a state of nature banded themselves together and +made a contract, by virtue of which they renounced certain liberties +and rights and transferred them to a superior authority which was to +rule them so as to promote the general welfare, peace and happiness. But +if the procedure was not quite so simple as this, at least it is certain +that the State undertakes the task which Rousseau expressly prescribes +as its aim. If, however, through its fault, the fault of its +legislation, the welfare of the community suffers, and peace and +happiness are not promoted but hindered, disturbed and destroyed, then +every citizen has the moral right to revolt against the State and +paralyse its pernicious might; not because it has broken a formal +contract with its citizens, but because it has become inimical to the +peaceful life of mankind, the purpose of every social community. If +anyone is troubled at the thought that there is no reliable standard +whereby to test the morality of a law and no place indicated where such +a measure can be applied, he may take comfort by remembering that all +Morality is surrendered to the feelings and judgment of the majority and +has no other sanction than this. History teaches us that the majority +does not acquit itself too badly of its duty. Public opinion suffices to +maintain Morality at a certain level in a community. And if public +opinion is capable of ensuring respect for the unwritten law of Morality +without the sanctions of State Law, it may surely be recognized as a fit +judge of the morality of a law. That is the theory of the right of +citizens to defend themselves by all means, even by force, against +immoral laws. Practically, it is of no importance, because nowadays, at +least in all progressive and liberally governed States, the people have +constitutional means at their disposal to prevent or quickly to rid +themselves of laws that are obnoxious. + +Morality includes the Law, whereas Law is only a part of Morality. Owing +to its coercive nature, the Law is obliged to be concrete and material +and to ignore all the imponderable, barely perceptible, spiritual and +dream-like things which hover round Morality, surround it with an +atmosphere and transport it beyond definite boundaries into the realm of +the unconscious and visionary. The total exclusion of the element of +feeling which Morality includes, constitutes the most profound +difference between it and the Law. Law protects order but knows no love. +The separation of Law from Morality is due to the pressure of +selfishness which thinks it has made the greatest possible concession +when it rises to the height of saying with Ulpian: "_Neminem laedere. +Suum cuique reddere. Honeste vivere._" Injure no one; that is, refrain +from the ruthless use of force; render to each his own; that is, do not +retain in rascally fashion what belongs to another; live honourably; +that is, give no offence to your neighbour by disorderly conduct and +depravity. + +Well and good. At a pinch one can live like that. But the words pity, +kindness, love of one's neighbour do not occur in Ulpian's pithy +statements, and the Law knows nothing of them. + +The Law guards each man's well-earned possessions, but it bids no one +make sacrifices. Morality can demand these. It can insist that the +individual should freely, and urged by his own inner impulse, impose +sacrifices upon himself, reduce his possessions in favour of another, +disturb his personal comfort at any moment, perhaps even risk his life; +that is to say, that of his own free will he should do just those things +from which the Law carefully shields him. Where the Law says: injure no +one! Morality says often enough: injure yourself to do good to your +neighbour. Where the Law says: to each man his own! Morality not seldom +says: to each man your own if he needs it more than you do. Morality +counts on the existence of a quality of which the Law has no need: +Sympathy. To be moral we must feel in our own being at the time, or +retrospectively, the subjective experiences of our neighbour, with the +same quality of emotion that he feels; his pain must be our pain, as his +pleasure must be our pleasure. For the man who cannot do this--who +realizes in his mind the circumstances of his neighbour only as an +image, and without the concomitant note of feeling--it is impossible to +rise to the height of Morality. It is not his fault, for the gift of +sympathy is an organic disposition, which you either do or do not +possess, which you can develop or suppress, but which you cannot create +if it is lacking. Nevertheless, the lack of sympathy is a pitiable +infirmity, for it prevents a man from scaling the heights of Morality. + +To respect the Law is to practise a wise selfishness. To act morally is +to divest oneself of selfishness and attain the privilege of +unselfishness. To behave in strict accordance with the Law earns the +merited praise of civic blamelessness. But to act morally is a virtue +which is of incomparably higher quality than that of mere +blamelessness. The law-abiding man, the honest man, is praised as having +been "_Integer vitae sceleris purus_." That is an acceptable epitaph. +But the man of active Morality, willingly suffering for others, provides +an example which reconciles millions to the hardships of life. The +former is a worthy man, but the latter is a saint. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY + + +Men, who would be deeply offended if their Morality were called into +question, quite coolly investigate the problem as to whether the State +in its actions and omissions is bound by the same moral laws as the +individual, and the majority of them come to the conclusion that in its +relation to other States, the State must not be guided, that is to say, +hampered, by moral considerations. They go further than this and not +only liberate the State in its dealings with other countries from the +trammels of Morality, but claim for the government the privilege of +standing beyond and above the moral law in the conduct of public +affairs, because to their mind both foreign and home politics move on a +different plane to that of ethics. If anyone objects to this shameless +contention, its advocates contemptuously dismiss him with the disdainful +remark: "That is the drivel of a layman, and no man of science would +waste his time on it." And if you were to reply: "Your views are those +of gaolbirds who try after the event to hatch a theory justifying their +misdeeds," they would probably shrug their shoulders and murmur +scornfully: "The man is obviously mad." + +Professorial wisdom has formulated pedantically what practical +politicians, the heads of states and leading ministers have thought, +said and done. Napoleon remarked at St. Helena to Count de Las Cases, +who respectfully notes the fact in his "_Mémorial de Sainte Hélène_": +"The actions of a ruler who labours for the community, must be +distinguished from those of a private individual who is free to indulge +his feelings; policy permits, nay, commands, the one to do what in the +case of the other would often be inexcusable." Perhaps it was under the +influence of this remark, with which he, no doubt, was familiar, that +Professor Nisard one day in a lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris +propounded the theory that there was a dual Morality, one public or +political, the other private, and that these two did not follow the same +rules. That was shortly after the Coup d'Etat of Napoleon III, and it +was easy to descry, in the words of the celebrated professor of literary +history, obsequiousness towards the new Emperor and the effort of a +courtier to excuse the violence which the Emperor had just done to the +constitution he had sworn to uphold. Nisard was one of the ornaments of +the university, a teacher of youth, who was as popular as he was +respected. But the sound ethical feeling of his hearers revolted against +the depravity of the principles he had just enunciated, and the violent +expression of their indignation drove him in shame and disgrace from his +chair and out of the lecture hall. + +Macchiavelli is the most famous advocate of the Immorality of the State +and the right of politics to be unethical, and his name is identified +with this infamous theory. An enormous amount has been written about +the Florentine statesman, his book of the "Prince" and the doctrines he +advances in it; among these works those in which his theories are +endorsed preponderate to a horrifying extent over those which oppose and +refute them. Mohl and Paul Janet have furnished us with the best +abstracts of these very numerous writings, and I refer the reader to +them. Here I can only dwell on the main points of the investigation. + +Macchiavelli writes: "A man who wishes to be perfectly good is without +doubt in danger among those who are not good. It is therefore advisable +that a prince should learn not always to be good, so as to be able to +put these rules of life into practice, or not, as circumstances may +demand." "A prince cannot maintain loyalty to a treaty if it become +dangerous to his interests." In short, the prince not only may, but +must, do what is in his own interests. He need not stop to think whether +his actions are honest. The only measure of their worth and +appropriateness is the profit they promise. Their success always +justifies them, only their failure proves them to be bad. + +The most revolting thing in the arguments of the "Prince" is the +equanimity with which the author adduces them. Never does he let slip a +word of excitement, never does an indication of feeling appear. He +treats his subject not as an investigation of principles to which one +adopts a mental attitude and which one should approve or disapprove, but +as a description of existing facts which arouse one's emotions as little +as, for instance, the enumeration of the qualities and characteristics +of a mineral. It has been said in his defence that his book is a +concrete study, the presentation of the character of Cæsar Borgia, of +his psychology and of his principles of government; and that +Macchiavelli wished to give an objective account of the philosophy of +the events he had observed, but did not wish to judge them subjectively; +and this, if for no other reason, because an expression of his own +opinion would have been too dangerous for him. It is further urged that +his personal views are revealed in the treatise on Livy. + +This defence, however, is far from convincing. In the "Prince" +Macchiavelli maintains the same unconcerned and cool note that prevails +in his account of the treacherous assassinations perpetrated in +Senigaglia by his hero Cæsar Borgia. The only personal feeling, which +peeps out occasionally in both works, is a certain perverse, æsthetic +satisfaction, experienced by the artist with the eye of a connoisseur +who lingers over a work of nature, perfect in its way, and delights in +the harmony of actions which, with absolute logic, almost with +mathematical precision, result from the definite premise supplied by a +certain character. Des Esseintes, the ideal æsthete invented by Joris +Karl Huysmans, may appraise the worth of a monster solely by its beauty, +without a thought for its morality. But by such appraisement he cuts +himself off from the community of men, though he, in his arrogance, +being morally insane, may abuse them as philistines. + +Since it first appeared, Macchiavellism has found disciples and admirers +in every age; and these, in liberating politics from all fetters of +Morality, go further than its originator. The German jurist of the +century of the Reformation, Schoppe (1576-1649), declares sententiously +that politics differ from Morality and have their own principles, just +as Morality has: he considers that the chief difference between them is +that the latter takes as its subject of study that which should be; the +former, that which is. For this one phrase this pedant, who has +otherwise rightly deserved oblivion, has some claim to be remembered. +For here he consigns Morality to the realm of pure thought, of +theoretical and meditative idealism, while for politics he claims the +sphere of practical reality and shows the first dim dawning of that +practical policy (_Realpolitik_) which, two hundred and fifty years +later, was to be as the light of the sun to statesmen. + +The Frenchman, Gabriel Naudé, almost a contemporary of Schoppe's, +constituted himself the champion of Coups d'Etat, if they promised +political advantages; further, he justifies and praises the Night of +Saint Bartholomew, a very energetic measure taken in his lifetime to put +an end to the religious strife which was weakening France and causing +the government much embarrassment; his only regret is that the happy +idea of slaughtering all the Huguenots was not carried out more +completely; in other words, that the massacre of the obnoxious +Protestants was not continued until they had been completely wiped out. + +Even in Descartes, who confessed to a somewhat shady opportunism in +questions of state and, for instance, concedes reasonable and moral +justification to Absolutism, we find the depressing statement: "Against +the enemy one is, so to speak ('_quasi_'), permitted to do anything," a +conscious and determined denial of the Christian commandment "Love thine +enemies," which perhaps demands too much of the average man and can only +be expected from saints, but which, anyway, contains an exhortation for +all the world at least to be just to one's enemies and act according to +the dictates of Morality. + +D'Holbach does not beat about the bush, but declares roundly: "In +politics the only crime is not to succeed." Even Macchiavelli did not +express it as baldly as that. To quote the Duke of La Rochefoucauld, he +at least pays virtue the compliment of hypocrisy, for he gives this +advice: "Do (the evil which is profitable) and excuse it afterwards." +This is a paraphrase of the old advice given by a pettifogging lawyer +for the benefit of the criminal: "If you have done it, deny it," and of +the well-known phrase of Frederick the Great which runs something like +this: "If I have a desire for a foreign country, I begin by seizing it, +then I send for lawyers who prove that I had a right to it." This, then, +was the opinion of that king who wrote an "Anti-Macchiavelli," of whom, +however, Paul Janet neatly remarks: "Nothing is more typical of +Macchiavellism than as heir presumptive to the throne to refute +Macchiavelli's principles, and then as ruling monarch to apply them with +the more determination." + +For the sake of the incorruptible Morality which Kant defends in his +little work "_Vom ewigen Frieden_" ("Of Eternal Peace"), he may be +forgiven for his weakly worldly wisdom in following up the "Critique of +Pure Reason" with the "Critique of Practical Reason." In "_Vom ewigen +Frieden_" he bravely demands harmony between Politics and Morality. More +sweepingly than the English proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," he +demonstrates that honesty is better than policy. It is an old tradition +of all governments, and especially of diplomacy, to affect secrecy, +since their inavowable intrigues shun the light of day and the eye of +outsiders. To-day the democracy in all constitutional states demands +that foreign policy should be given full publicity. Kant expressed his +opinion shortly and sharply a hundred and fifty years ago: "All +political actions which cannot be made public are unjust." In the +eighteenth century, in which he lived and which began with the war of +the Spanish Succession, went on to the wars of Frederick the Great, and +ended with the war of the Coalition against the French Revolution, he +does not dare to make a definite claim that force should be expelled +from inter-state relations and Law put in its place, but he does say, if +somewhat timidly, that one may "dream of" an ideal in which the quarrels +of nations are adjusted, like those of private persons, by laws which +have been framed and approved by all. Kant is a comforting exception +amid the many teachers of constitutional law who are almost unanimously +Macchiavellian in their attitude, and who regard his point of view with +contemptuous and condescending leniency because he was an unworldly +philosopher, a theorist in politics. + +The English and Scottish moral philosophers, from Locke to J. S. Mill +and Herbert Spencer, are all untainted by Macchiavellism and recognize +only one Morality for the state as for the individual, for political as +for private action. But it must be admitted that their doctrines have +not yet been generally assimilated by the consciousness of their own +people. Now, as ever, it is a fundamental principle of English law that +"the king can do no wrong." That means that the king, the embodiment and +epitome of the state, as the source of Law is Law itself, and is +superior to all the laws of the country, which is a still more drastic +paraphrase of the doctrine of the Digest: "_quod principi placuit legis +habet vigorem_"; every whim of the potentate has the force of law, and +the English have coined the horrible phrase, "My country, right or +wrong," a dictum which allows ruthless deceivers of the people and +destroyers of their country to hide their most appalling misdeeds +beneath the mask of patriotism and to disguise deeds worthy of a +criminal in the habiliments of virtue. + +Real patriotism demands that a true citizen and an honourable man should +with might and main, even at the price of his life, oppose any injustice +about to be committed by his government and his misguided compatriots; +and, further, that he should strive to maintain his country in the path +of Right and Morality even if, as sometimes happens, in a dispute +between his nation and a foreign one the latter has Right and Morality +on its side. On the plea of inevitable partiality a judge may refuse to +try a case in which a near relative of his is involved. That is a +permissible concession to that human imperfection which causes reason +to fall silent when feeling raises its voice; and justice does not +suffer, for there are other judges who can take the seat that has been +voluntarily vacated. No citizen has the right to evade the duty of +judging his country, because, if he fails, there is no other judge who +can be put in his place and fulfil his duty. Every citizen is personally +responsible for the just and moral behaviour of his community, +responsible to his own conscience, to his nation, to the world, to the +present and to the future; and if he is powerless to prevent depravity +and misdeeds, he must at least solemnly and loudly condemn them, as this +is his only means of avoiding joint responsibility for the infamy. If he +fails to do this, the public crime becomes his personal crime as well. +The elder Brutus, so much and so justly admired by the Romans, is an +example to all, for without mercy he handed his own flesh and blood over +to the executioner, when according to the law his life was forfeit. The +state has no greater claim to indulgence and mercy than had Brutus's +son, if knowingly and intentionally it indulges in vice. For if you +allow the dictum, "Right or wrong, my country," to be valid, then you +must also apply it to the state of filibusterers that once existed in +the Antilles, and must demand of its citizens that their patriotism +should approve and defend theft, piracy, rape and assassination, for the +systematic perpetration of which their state was founded. + +In contrast with this wretched "My country, right or wrong," the +inflexible dictum of the ancients stands out: "_Fiat justitia, pereat +mundus!_" (Let justice be done though the world perish!). And what does +most honour to the French Revolution is the phrase so often mocked by +political profiteers: "Sooner shall the colonies perish than a +principle!" That was the standpoint of the prophets of Israel, who truly +did not love their people less than do the wretched scoundrels who shout +"hurray!" and yell songs, when their country deals Morality and Right a +brutal blow, because the leaders think that this will profit the +country, or themselves. + +Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as heads of the state, acted in +accordance with Macchiavelli's views. At their time this was expressed +by saying that they were guided by the necessities of the state. In the +second half of the nineteenth century Macchiavellism received the name +of practical policy (_Realpolitik_). The despisers of Morality, who call +the misdeeds of the state _Realpolitik_, apparently do not know that +this one word implies a very comprehensive admission. To their idea +_Realpolitik_ is a policy which reckons only with realities, not with +desires, yearnings or hope, or as Schoppe brutally expresses it: with +that which is, not with that which ought to be. It is active in the +domain of facts, not in that of principles. + +But, according to the advocates of _Realpolitik_, facts and realities +mean nothing but the sole rule of interest, selfishness, ruthlessness, +force, cunning and contempt for all foreign rights; whereas fairness, +justice, the curbing and suppression of one's own desires, consideration +for one's neighbour, love of mankind--all these are phrases, or let us +rather say ideals, which are to be found, not in the world, but in the +brains of a small minority of enthusiasts without influence. He who +confesses to such views, to whom the worst impulses alone are real, +while he relegates Morality to the sphere of the unreal, of visions far +from reality, is a pessimist as long as his convictions remain theory; +but if he puts them into practice, or urges the leaders of the state to +do so, then he is an evildoer who breaks the moral law as soon as it +appears unaccompanied by the police, the prison and the gallows. In +private life a man with such views is a criminal who obeys his evil +instincts whenever he may hope to evade the law of the state. The +bandit, who is clever enough to manage so that police and court of +justice cannot touch him, is a practical politician, for the riches he +acquires by theft, robbery and murder are realities; the criminal code +is but a scrap of paper, something visionary, as long as its minions do +not seize him by the collar. + +The immorality of politics, the way in which the foundations of Morality +are ignored by the state, is the natural consequence of the power of +rulers; for in them all the original instincts of the human beast still +untamed by moral law are exaggerated by the intense realization of their +loftiness, the glory and the illustriousness of their position, and they +are not forced by wholesome fear of the means of coercion wielded by the +moral administration to control themselves, to exercise and develop +their organic powers of inhibition. The elevation of this fact of the +Immorality of the state to a theory that the state is not bound by moral +law, is derived from the conception which philosophers of all ages, +from ancient times to the present day, have formed of the character and +the purpose of the state. Plato, in the Republic, maintains the +omnipotence of the state, which nothing and no one can limit; and +Aristotle, not rising to such heights of error as his master, says more +soberly: "It is a grave mistake to believe that every citizen is his own +master." The Italian philosopher Filangieri considers the guiding +principle and motive power of the state to be "love of power," which a +fool three centuries later called the "will to power," whereupon other +fools declared this to be a brand-new discovery. + +Hegel goes farthest of all in his idolatry of the state; according to +him the state is not alone moral, but Morality itself, just as God is +according to the theologians. As it would be arrogant blasphemy to +characterize anything that God ordains as immoral, as it would be +nonsensical to wish to impose upon God a moral law from outside, not +emanating from Him, to which He would have to submit even against His +will, so it is reprehensible to judge the actions of the state by the +standard of individual Morality; and it is equally absurd to admit any +moral coercion imposed on the state from outside, any guiding principle +other than the law of its necessities and the logic which indicates the +means needed to attain the necessary end. + +According to Treitschke the state is the highest form of human +existence; nothing higher than the state exists. He has never asked +himself the question whether, after all, humanity itself is not superior +to the state which is the form, a form, of its existence and therefore +not its essence. + +From his conviction that the state is the highest thing existing, +Treitschke concludes that certain moral duties, e.g. that of +self-sacrifice, cannot possibly exist for the state. "The individual is +to sacrifice himself for the sake of a higher community of which he is a +member; but the state is itself the highest thing in the outer community +of mankind, therefore it can never be confronted with the duty of +self-destruction." + +How obvious that seems! How grossly mistaken it is all the same! First +of all the state is not the highest thing; there is something higher, +and that is humanity; if then we recognize a moral duty of +self-sacrifice for humanity, theoretically this duty may arise just as +much for the state as for the individual. + +Secondly, the idea that owing to Morality the state might one day +actually be in such a position as to be forced to sacrifice itself is +the most shocking nonsense. How could that possibly be? If the state +always acts with strict Morality towards its citizens and foreign +states, it is simply impossible that it should have to sacrifice its +existence in the fulfilment of some task; for tasks only arise when, and +as long as, the state exists. Once it is disintegrated there can be no +task, either theoretically or practically, for it to accomplish, +therefore it cannot have to sacrifice itself for such a task. But if the +Immorality of another state, or of a minority of its citizens, should +endanger it, threaten it with an unjust attack from within or without, +then there is no rule of Morality that can forbid it to defend itself +to the last, and its self-sacrifice could then only be a result of its +complete annihilation in a justifiable war of necessity. On the other +hand, even the most unscrupulous practical politicians do not possess +any absolute guarantee against defeat, though they declare a war of +aggression to be permissible, whether waged on account of an itching for +power, for purposes of conquest, for the winning of prestige, +predominance or economic advantages. + +Thirdly and lastly, the duty of self-sacrifice for the state can only be +envisaged and seriously discussed, if the state be conceived as a person +to whom the duty of Morality applies in every way; but this conception +is mystic anthropomorphism, not sober, sensible recognition of realities +such as the practical politicians love to boast of. + +For, as a matter of fact, the state is not a person but a concept, an +institution created by man in the interests of one individual, of a few, +of many or of all; an organization of habits and interests, a relation +in which individuals live together. The mysticism of the weak-minded has +transformed it into a person with human features, with the qualities, +desires, duties, and aims of an individual; these men are intellectually +incapable of penetrating to the fundamental facts underlying the +concept, and cling entirely to word-pictures which are mere verbalism. +Scholasticism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was chiefly occupied +in a quarrel about Nominalism and Realism. It was allowed to drop and +was not fought out to a decision. Perhaps because it is impossible to +convince these superficial babblers who take a name or a word for an +object actually existent in time and space, that they are in error. The +fight between Abelard and Roscelet and that between the two of them and +Duns Scotus ought to be taken up again. Above all, one ought to knock it +into the heads of those who make a fetish of the state that it is a mere +word, the famous "_flatus vocis_" of the Nominalists, which they +worship, to which they build altars and make human sacrifices. + +This humiliating form of idolatry is practised by the school of +sociologists known as organicistic, as well as by the practical +politicians. This school maintains that the individual has no +independent existence at all, that he continues to exist only in the +community, by the community, as a totally subordinate, dependent and +incomplete fraction of the community; that the only real thing in the +species is society, the state; that this must be regarded as a living +organism, in which the individual human being is merely a cell which in +solitude, outside the community and detached from it, is as little +capable of life and has as little significance as a cell separated from +a highly differentiated creature, such as a man or some other mammal. In +my book "_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" (The Meaning of History), I threw as +much light as I possibly could on this superstition, and I pointed out +in detail its lack of sense as well as its dangers. I can, therefore, +content myself here with a résumé and a few indications. + +There is nothing mysterious or supernatural about the historic or even +the prehistoric origin of the state; part we can learn from reliable +documentary evidence, part we can gather with certainty from obvious +facts. From the primitive human family, which more probably consisted of +a pair than of a man and several women, there arose the formless horde, +a crowd of individuals of all ages, connected by blood; this developed +into a tribe in which age, strength, courage and intelligence were +appreciated in a certain order, and thereby were produced the beginnings +of discipline, co-operation and regularized mutual relations; that is to +say, of organization. This embryo of later formations, this sketchy +beginning of an economic and political community, evolved more definite +and differentiated forms when the wandering huntsmen and shepherds, +seeking prolific hunting grounds and pasture lands, and later on arable +land too, came upon other groups of men and fought with them for the +possession of the desired domain. In the conflict strong and brave men +came to the front, and the victor became the natural, and for the most +part willingly recognized, leader and master of his companions, while +any who opposed him were reduced by force to submit to his authority. +The state crystallized around this war-hero, and by all its members its +aim was clearly and obviously recognized to be defence and the increase +of property outside the state; that is, the warding off of attacks by +foreign robbers and acquisitive invasions of neighbouring domains--wars +of defence and conquest, but always war; and within the state the +maintenance of a certain measure of safety for individuals. This safety, +however, had to be purchased dearly by the limitation, often enough the +complete surrender, of the right of self-determination, of independence +of will and freedom; so dearly, in fact, that the price was far higher +than the value of the advantages acquired. + +The leader in warfare became the ruler and bequeathed his privileges to +his descendants. The state was he himself, the land his property, the +people his family in the old sense of the word--that is, his kindred, +his servants, his slaves. His comrades in arms who had most +distinguished themselves became an aristocracy of the sword, the +supporters and tools of his power, though often enough they became his +rebellious rivals and overthrew him. Defeated enemies were robbed of all +their possessions and slaughtered; later on they were degraded to serfs, +a position little better than that of beasts of burden. A regular +parasitism developed, by means of which the ruler and his companions in +arms exploited the subjugated and productive masses for their own +profit. + +The acute form of this parasitism was warfare in its chronic form, its +prolongation in times of peace, the extortion of contributions and +duties, the imposition of taxes and forced labour from the people. The +ruler was clever enough to provide himself with a moral right to his +exercise of brute force, by inventing a divine origin for his person and +power, and making worship of his person an essential tenet of the +national religion. The systematic suppression of the masses without +rights became the universal practice of the ruler and of the instruments +of his power, and this gradually spread to the higher classes who could +still play the master to the lower strata, but were of no more account +than the vulgar herd in the eyes of the ruler, having to bow their +proud heads beneath the same yoke. A very few races followed a different +course of development from the primitive horde to an organized state. +They remained free members of the community with equal rights, they +allowed no hereditary ruler from among themselves to become their +superior, and governed themselves as republicans, who nevertheless also +waged war without exception, either forced thereto by the attacks of +greedy neighbours or lured into doing so by the example of the +monarchies within their purview or by lust for booty. In warfare they +won slaves and subjects, and changed into oligarchies, most often into +despotic states, and before they ultimately declined to the parasitism +of a single man and his aids fell victims to a collective parasitism +which gave the conquered and subjugated population up to the spoliation +of the victors. + +Up till modern times the state preserved the character of a private +domain belonging to the ruler and his house. Wars were waged in the +interests of dynasties, and as late as the eighteenth century the +succession in Spain and in certain provinces of Austria was the origin +and purpose of various campaigns. The French Revolution first wrought a +change in this. Since this great event it has been impossible to plunge +any European state into war in order to support the claims to property, +more or less legally justified, made by its ruling house. The people +have taken the place of princes, and now the principle of nationalities +furnishes the reason or excuse for bloody conflicts between states; and +this has become a factor in modern politics and history merely because +dynasties had built up their realms regardless of the origin and +language of the inhabitants of the districts which they had conquered, +stolen, bought, or acquired by exchange, by marriage or by inheritance, +and were indifferent to the national unity of their subjects as long as +they could gain possession of the country and the people. + +From the time of its first vague beginnings up till the rise of modern +democracy, the state has been nothing but a means of parasitism in the +hands of the ruling person or group, and an instrument for the +preparation for, and the waging of, war. All the state's tasks, which +apparently lie outside the sphere of war, if they are carefully +examined, will be found, after all, to aim at efficiency in war, and it +has gradually selected these tasks from the simple consideration that +their execution increases the guarantees of success in warfare and in +government. + +The deification of the ruler in Asiatic and Egyptian lands, the +unconditional identification of the realm with his person, the uniform +enslavement of the whole people, its naïve exploitation for the sole +benefit of the sovereign and his assistants are no longer possible in +Europe at the present day. The development of the nations to a higher +plane of civilization and a clearer consciousness of their own worth +forced the state to alter its constitution to a certain extent and to +devote itself, at least theoretically, more to the interests of its +citizens than the service of its prince. The intellectual constructions +of the eighteenth century correspond to no historical reality. The +Social Contract, the inception of which J. J. Rousseau described so +graphically, was never made. Hutcheson, who had expressed the idea long +before the enthusiast of Geneva, conceived it only as the epitome of the +principles which the state should embody; according to Hume, the +relations of the citizens to each other and to the state are a tacit +contract which need not be explicitly formulated, because it originates +in human nature; and Fichte even assures us that Rousseau himself did +not mean his Social Contract to be taken literally. According to him it +was only an idea. But societies must act in pursuance of this idea, and +they were founded, if not actually, yet legally upon an unwritten +contract. Anyway, the ideas of Hutcheson, Hume and Rousseau have +nowadays been assimilated by the general consciousness. The masses +believe in the natural, inborn rights of man, some of which he certainly +has surrendered in favour of the community; they demand and expect of +the state that it should serve their just interests, and they are no +longer ready to be made use of by the ruler and a powerful, often very +small, minority, for purposes which are foreign to them, which they do +not know, and for which they do not care. + +Those who juggle with words, who talk dark and mysterious nonsense about +the concept of the state, or dogmatize fanatically on the subject, +contemptuously call this conception of the nature of the state and the +relation of its citizens to it shallow rationalism, and from the heights +of their supposed knowledge they look down disdainfully upon arguments +which they libellously call the laymen's babble. They are only in part +bumptious fools who pretend that uncritical, parrotlike repetition of +traditional formulæ is erudition and confused thought is profundity, and +who declare the clear-headed men who mock their silly mysticism, their +superstitious dread of word phantoms, to be simply incapable of +understanding their depth. Partly they are very sly toadies, very +cunning sycophants of power, or ruthless egoists, unscrupulous +freebooters, who pretend to be enthusiastic and devout apostles of the +divinity of the state and demand the most humble submission, adoration +and unconditional devotion in order that, as priests in its temple, they +may grind their own axes at its altars. + +Such are those folk who maintain the double thesis that the state is +everything, the individual nothing, the former the sole reality, the +latter without any separate existence, and that the state, as mankind's +highest form of existence, need recognize nothing as superior to itself, +neither right nor law, and may therefore take as sole guide for its +actions its own interests and not Morality. + +You cannot maintain a single one of these contentions unless you and all +men are deprived of reasoning power; they crumble away instantly in the +light of Reason. It is not true that the state alone is real and that it +is superior to the individual, not only because of the forces at its +disposal, the complex of which it represents, but also as an entity, as +a thought, a principle. The individual alone in the species, that is, +living, feeling, thinking and acting man, is real. The individual +created the state out of himself. He can also destroy it. The practical +politicians above all people should be of this opinion; as he can do +it, he may do it; as he has the power to do it, he has the right to do +it. The individualist will not make this a question of law, but will +simply assert that, though the individual is the father of the state, +yet he has no reasonable grounds for destroying it, so long as it makes +no murderous attacks on its creator. The individual did not create the +state consciously, intentionally and formally by means of a social +contract, but naturally and organically, under pressure of +circumstances. It is clearly to his interests to maintain it, to furnish +the necessary means for its existence and efficiency, but always on the +one condition that the state should really protect and promote the +interests of the individual, lighten his burdens in the struggle for +existence, and make that prosperity, comfort and happiness possible +which he cannot secure unaided in his struggle with the hostile forces +of Nature and with rival fellow-men. + +But if the state oppresses the individual with burdens and duties which +he feels no inner necessity to fulfil, if it confiscates him, body and +soul, instead of respecting his freedom and his right to +self-determination, then the assumption falls to the ground; the state +is no longer an institution which benefits the individual; it is +inimical to the individual, hinders him in his struggle for existence, +destroys his happiness; and he obeys his primitive instinct for +self-preservation if he turns against it, masters it as he would a +monster, draws its teeth and claws, and forces it back to the place it +was meant to occupy, that of a docile and industrious servant of the +individual, not of one individual who aspires to rule the others, but of +all individuals who are of the people that make up the state. + +I consider it unnecessary and a little ridiculous to quote authorities +in support of the statement that twice two are four; what is reasonable +and clear is convincing without further recommendation; nevertheless, it +is a fact that may be worthy of mention that some of the best intellects +of all nations have sided with the individual against the state. On the +one side we have Plato, whose ideal is Sparta and who would like to see +the despotism of this model state and its communal meals completed by +the addition of community of property, of wives, and of children; we +have Hegel, who has gone farther than any one in his idolatry of the +state; we have Auguste Comte, who, in his zeal for his newly founded +science of Sociology, conceives society as an organism biologically +superior to the individual, and thereby has become the father of the +Organicists. But against these we can put the Englishman, Jeremy +Bentham, the embodiment of sound common sense, whom the muddle-headed +fools that pose as deep thinkers have good reason to hate and fear, and +whom they try to depreciate as vulgar and shallow; further, his +compatriot, Herbert Spencer, who is his kindred spirit; the Frenchman, +Frédéric Bastiat, whose writings sparkle with flashes of wit; the +German, Wilhelm Humboldt, who bravely and successfully combated the +state tyranny defended by Fichte. All these are convinced individualists +who adduce irrefutable reasons for their views. We may also include +Kant among them, as he gave utterance to this decisive sentence: "Man is +his own aim and end, and must never be a mere means"; consequently it is +never permissible to sacrifice the sovereignty of one's own person to +that of the state, or make use of it for the realization of political +aims by disregarding, and doing violence to, one's right of +self-determination. Harald Höfding contends that progress should be +measured by the extent to which, in Kant's sense of the words, man is +recognized to be his own aim and end; but that is not only a measure of +progress, it is the measure of all civilization. + +For civilization, to my idea, means a state worthy of man, implying his +mental, moral and material independence of all motive forces other than +those of his own nature; its aim is the most complete attainment +possible of this independence; its measure the extent to which the +individual determines his own fate and is able to ward off from it +undesired outside influences. At the first awakening of his +consciousness primitive man was aware of being exposed to unknown forces +which controlled him at will and against which his will was powerless. +From the very beginning, at first dimly and then more and more clearly, +man has felt this to be unworthy and intolerable. The best of the +species have always laboured with all their strength to liberate +themselves, and the great ambition of man throughout his development has +always been not submissively to accept whatever fate was accorded him, +but to work out his destiny according to his needs and his own ideas. + +The anguish caused by wretched dependence upon external forces is the +origin of religion as of superstition, which both spring from the same +root. With the anthropomorphism peculiar to the earliest stages of +thought, man personified the mysterious powers which ruled his fate. He +created gods for himself, and then, as far as his knowledge permitted, +he sought some relation between himself and them, and tried to get at +them by every means available. He imagined them like unto himself, that +is, vain, capricious, greedy, easily frightened by dark threats, and +then, very reasonably on this hypothesis, he importuned them with +prayers, sacrifices, hymns of praise and vows, as well as magic formulæ +and incantations, always with the inflexible intention of making them +serve his purposes, not of serving theirs. The contrite Jewish prayer: +"Thy will be done, Lord, Thy will, not mine," is a new trait in the +religious thought of man. The heathen always strives to have his will +done in opposition to that of the gods, and to divert them from their +decisions if he dislikes them. + +In a state of advanced development theological thought gave way before +the scientific. Man learnt to conceive Nature's rule, not +transcendentally, but intrinsically. He recognized that the forces +around him, which so often crossed his purpose, are not to be influenced +by prayer and sacrifice, but that it is expedient and possible to +discover their character and the conditions of their activity. By dint +of long-sustained efforts he has succeeded in effectively standing up to +hostile Nature and in warding off her undesired interference in his +destiny. If the tribulations, which formerly suddenly brought his +schemes to nought and often destroyed him, are not entirely overcome, it +is merely because his practice does not conform closely enough to the +directions evolved by his theoretical knowledge, because he is too +careless or too clumsy to make proper use of the weapons against the +elements with which science has armed him. + +But this same man, who has learnt to be a match for Nature, his creator, +is powerless against his creature, the state. He can neither evade it +nor escape from it. The state disposes of him without his consent, +against his most obvious interests, in spite of his powerless +opposition; it hurls him hither and thither, annihilates him, crushes +him by its will and is unmoved by the will of the individual. + +True, man has sought to maintain his right of self-determination against +the forces of politics, as against all others that broke his will and +intervened in his life without his consent. For thousands of years all +state development has tried to protect the modest individual, lost in +the crowd and featureless, but nevertheless a person, that is, a world +to himself, against the arbitrariness of rulers or leading statesmen. +That is the one unchanging tendency which leads from Harmodius and +Aristogeiton, the slayers of a tyrant, the rebellion of the elder +Brutus, the murder of Cæsar, by way of the Revolt of the Netherlands and +the execution of Charles I of England, to the great Revolution, the +risings of 1848 and the struggle for constitutional government in all +states of the Old World and the New. The formula has long been +discovered whereby the individual can maintain the dignity of his +sovereign personality and his own responsibility for the shaping of his +destiny. It is civil freedom, constitutionalism, sovereignty of the +people. There are arrangements, carefully thought out, nicely weighed, +cleverly worked out to the smallest detail, by which the individual is +fitted into his place in the community without being deprived of the +management of his own affairs, by which the sacrifices needful for the +fulfilment of collective tasks are exacted without his being reduced to +a condition of slavery, by which the independence of the individual is +safeguarded and yet a state of chaos and anarchy is avoided. + +But this formula fares as do the doctrines of science: hitherto it has +remained a theory everywhere. The franchise, representation of the +people, responsibility of ministers, constitutional limitation of the +ruler's power, are infallibly effective weapons or instruments, but no +people has yet learnt how to handle them rightly. That is why pessimists +speak of the bankruptcy of civilization, that is why the aim of +civilization, the liberation of the person and the enforcement of its +sovereignty, has nowhere been attained, that is why, to quote Napoleon I +in his interview with Goethe at Erfurt, "In our times the power of fate +is politics." And yet all these institutions of a modern constitutional +state, from the ballot-paper and the voting of taxes in Parliament to +the enforced resignation of the ministry on a vote of censure and the +oath of the ruler to observe the constitution, recognize the rights of +the individual as opposed to the state, and at least theoretically give +the lie to the bold declaration that the state is everything and the +individual nothing. + +It is no less untrue to say that the state is superior to Morality and +is not bound by it. In order to prove this we need only be brave enough +not to be intimidated by the mysterious mien and gestures and the dark, +pompous phrases of the mystics who worship the state, and to penetrate +to the real, conceptual idea of the word. + +The hocus pocus that the worshippers of the state perform around their +idol puts one in mind of Kempelen, who created a sensation with his +automaton in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This figure, got +up as a Turkish woman, gave rise to astonishment and, among not a few, +to superstitious fear. It played chess, and so well, too, that it almost +always succeeded in winning, even against its most skilled opponents. +People cudgelled their brains to solve the riddle, all sorts of +explanations were suggested, one more impossible than the other, but +still the mystery remained dark, until the owner, having made enough +money and sick of the part of an itinerant swindler, revealed the trick. +In the hollow figure there sat a clever chess player who worked its +hands and with them carried out the moves on the board. + +This anecdote can be applied literally to the state. Simpletons, drunk +with phrases, and cunning cheats contend that the state is a +supernatural creation in which the "spirit of the universe," the "spirit +of history" takes shape, and through which it realizes its aims; these +aims, utterly transcending the understanding of the individual, are +unintelligible to man. Such overwhelming phrases strike the simple, +credulous hearer dumb and send cold shudders of awe up his spine. But +let us look at the inside of this magic machine whose works are driven +by the "spirit of the world" and with whose help this spirit fulfils its +impenetrable designs. What do we find? Men, quite ordinary mortals, who +sit in the machine and work its levers; men whose intellectual powers +are only in rare cases superior to those of their enslaved subjects +bereft of will; men who are, as a rule, of average intelligence and not +seldom even below the average. + +These men are the rulers, ministers who cling to office, high officials, +party leaders and professional politicians who would like to become +ministers, generals who seek to make themselves conspicuous, publicists +who hope to derive personal profit by dint of bowing and scraping before +the men in power, by flattering the stupidest and most despicable +prejudices of the masses, or even by implanting such prejudices with +persuasive talk and purposely leading them astray. These men are formed +on the same model as all individuals of the species and are therefore +full of human weaknesses, a prey to all human desires, moved by all +human impulses. They are selfish, vain, the sport of likes and dislikes, +of self-deception as to the value of their ideas, opinions and +judgments, disputatious, arrogant, greedy of possessions, power and +pleasure, spurred by the instinct to magnify and swell their personality +and impose it upon others. And these men are to be liberated from the +discipline of the moral law? They are to be superior to the moral law? + +For whom, then, was the moral law created and developed if not for these +men--whose actions, although they spring from the same motives and +aspire to the same satisfaction of self as those of all other men, can +be fraught with consequences incomparably more evil, because they make +use of the state machine for their purposes. Through the force and +momentum given by the machinery of the state these actions are +boundlessly augmented, their range being indefinitely increased and +their results multiplied a thousandfold. The simplest logic shows that +these men within the state machine, rendered so specially dangerous by +their terrible armament and weapons, far from being liberated from the +coercion of moral law, ought to be subjected to it with extraordinary +severity, a severity which should be greater than that which suffices +for the average man, in proportion as their power to do harm is greater +than that of the man in the street. + +Now all this time, rather carelessly, or at any rate weakly, I am making +a concession to the pious devotees of the religion of the state, by +speaking of the state machine,--a dubious expression, coined to deceive +by rousing superstitious ideas. The phrase is a picture, a rhetorical +figure that one must be careful not to take literally. There is no state +machine. There is only a relation of men to one another and to +traditional habits, organized rules of command, obedience and equable +conduct--habits into which the community of men has fallen in accordance +with the law of least resistance, in order to promote their own +interests, at least theoretically, without being forced to exert +themselves continually to form new judgments, decisions and +arrangements which the ever-shifting, ever-changing conditions of life +render necessary. + +Here again, behind the word, we find men, always only men. Just as those +who command, from whose will all state action emanates, are men, so also +the instruments by which they carry out their decisions are only +metaphorically speaking, levers and wheels, parts of a machine of steel +and iron; in reality they are officials, soldiers and policemen, they +are judges and bailiffs; in short, they are men. And these men, who in +all private relations with their fellow men are sternly required to +submit to the dictates of Morality and the demands of the Law, are the +same on whom other men, the leaders of the state, impose the duty of +breaking all these precepts and laws; as ambassadors they must deny and +dishonour the signatures to treaties; as leaders or paid servants of the +press bureau they must systematically spread lies; as attorneys of the +state they must persecute and maltreat those who tell the truth; as +policemen they must tear the fathers of families from wife and children +and hunt them into the barracks; as soldiers they must invade a foreign +land, murder unknown and innocent men, rob them of their property, burn +down their houses, lay waste their lands, in a word, do everything that +is punishable with prison and gallows; they must perpetrate all crimes +which the aim and end of Morality and Law are to prevent and condemn. If +one defends such action, where can one find the courage and the +justification to require these men at one time to honour the Ten +Commandments and at another to disregard them, to be criminals in the +name of the state in the morning and to be moral private persons and +law-abiding citizens in the afternoon? After all, they only have one +nature, one mind, one character and one set of perceptive faculties. + +To realize the monstrosity of this doctrine of twofold Morality, public +and private, and of the non-compulsoriness of moral law for the state, +it suffices to refer again to the fundamental concepts of Morality. +Individuals have banded themselves together in a community in order to +be able to live more easily, or to live at all, under the present +conditions obtaining on our planet. Lest society should be disintegrated +by the quarrels of its members, and the latter should find themselves +exposed single-handed to a hopeless struggle for existence, a limitation +of their unfettered whims and desires, the curbing of their selfishness, +control of their impulses and the exercise of consideration for their +neighbours have been imposed upon them. + +This coercion is Morality, and society can enforce it by vigorous +measures; but for the most part this is unnecessary, for society has +inculcated in its members the faculty of urging upon themselves in every +situation the dictates of the community and of insisting on obedience to +them. This faculty is conscience. The means by which conscience, +inspired and assisted by reason, determines the will to keep in check or +to suppress organic impulses and inclinations, desires and appetites, is +inhibition; moreover, the development and strengthening of inhibition +does not alone promote the aims of the community, but is of the highest +biological importance to the individual himself, apart from his +relations to society, as it renders him stronger and more efficient, +differentiates him more subtly, and raises him to a higher level of +development. + +Now the state is a special development of society; it owes its existence +to the same necessities as the latter, its task is to minimize the +struggle for existence for the individual, to protect him from avoidable +dangers and to ensure the safety of his life, the fruits of his labour +and that measure of freedom which is compatible with life in a +community. But if the state puts an end to the coercion instituted by +the community and therefore by the state itself; if it does away with +Morality for itself, that is, for a number of individuals, be they few +or many, that act in its name; if it allows selfishness, appetites and +ruthlessness to have the same free play as with creatures of a lower +order than man, or as with men before they formed themselves into +communities; if in the pursuit of its plans beyond the bounds of +Morality it intensifies the struggle for existence in a tragic manner, +exposes men to the most terrible dangers, brutally destroys their +liberty, gravely threatens their life and property or even devotes them +to ruin--why, then it destroys the assumptions on which the state itself +is based, denies its own aim, deprives itself of any right to existence, +and the individuals have thenceforward but one interest, namely, to +drive away this bogey of the state and with all possible means to force +the men, who make use of it and the superstitions clinging to it, to +respect the moral law which the community has created to overwhelm +anti-social, immoral individuals, to render them harmless and if +necessary to destroy them. + +One point there is on which the Machiavellian or practical politicians +are particularly fond of talking nonsense, and that is the state's +loyalty to treaties. Is the state bound by a treaty? Must it honour its +signature? Must it perform what it has undertaken to do? The detestable, +unanimous answer is "No. A treaty cannot hinder the state from doing +what its interest demands." Prince Bismarck is often cited on this +point, as he once said: "The only sound foundation for the state is +state egoism." And another time: "A treaty is only valid _rebus sic +stantibus_, if the situation is the same as when it was concluded; if +the circumstances change, it becomes invalid by the very fact." Such +views are revolting, however great a name be appended to them. Contract, +or treaty, is the basis of the law. Whoever breaks it is dishonoured, +and doubly dishonoured is he who from the beginning enters upon it with +the idea at the back of his mind of deriving every possible advantage +from it and of breaking it when the time comes to fulfil obligations. + +The phrase, "sound egoism," whether it refer to a private person or to +the state, must make every decent man blush for shame. Egoism may be +sound, but it is always the contrary of moral. It is just as convenient +for the individual as for the state to think only of his own advantage +and unhesitatingly to sacrifice his neighbour's rights to it; but +Morality arose and was constituted a rule of human relations in order +to break the back of this selfishness and to teach man consideration for +his neighbour. It is no valid excuse to say that state egoism is no sin, +but a virtue and a merit, that it is different in character from the +egoism of the individual. That is not true. It is not different in +character. It is of exactly the same character as in private life. The +responsible leader of the state who is guilty of a breach of treaty +makes believe to himself and others that he does not do it for his own +sake, but in the interests of the state. But who is the state? I have +already given the answer to this. The state consists of men, the +interests served by a breach of treaty are those of men, not, as a rule, +of all, not even of many members of the state, but of a few, of a class, +a group, perhaps of only one family whose power, wealth and reputation +it is intended to increase. So-called state egoism is in actual fact the +private egoism of many individuals, who break the law, or tolerate and +condone a breach of the law, for the sake of pocketing ill-gotten gains; +and no one is so stupid as to let himself be bamboozled into believing +that the shameful crime of breaking a treaty for the purpose of "sound" +egoistic grabbing becomes moral when it is perpetrated not by one +individual but by thousands or millions of individuals. + +The _reservatio mentalis_, too, of "_rebus sic stantibus_" is an +unwarrantable and wicked reservation. Nothing prevents a decent man when +making a contract from adding a clause reserving the right to terminate +it if the essential conditions should change. If the other party to the +contract does not agree to this, well, then the contract cannot be +concluded. But to sign it with the mental reservation that one will +disavow one's signature if the obligations undertaken become irksome, +that is swindling. There is one consideration so simple that it is +inconceivable that those who break contracts do not realize it. In some +concrete case the leader of the state judges it to be profitable to the +state to disregard good faith. What guarantee has he that his judgment +is right? He is a man, and no man is infallible. But all mankind have +made good faith the foundation of their life in communities, and if a +single man has the temerity to draw a conclusion violating the immutable +convictions and doctrines of all mankind, he must be mad not to see that +most probably he is wrong and that all mankind in every age and every +clime is right. I have left out of consideration the fact that any +possible advantage arising from the breach of faith would not excuse him +morally, and setting aside the ethical aspect of the case, I dwell only +on the logical argument. + +There is one case and one only in which a contract is not binding, +either on the state or on the private individual, and that is when the +signatory was forced to enter upon it with a knife at his throat. +Obligations which a victor imposes on his defeated and disarmed opponent +are by their very nature invalid. The old cry of Brennus: "_Vae +victis!_" is might and cannot constitute a right. Civil law calls this +kind of thing compulsion and decrees that it invalidates any contract. +Only a pedantic mind, stupid and depraved, immersed in hair-splitting +trickery and incapable of a straight thought, could complacently +maintain in the face of all common sense that might and compulsion, far +from doing away with right, are the source of all right. The silly +formula coined for this is: "Might is right." Might may be a fact, but +it is not right. The source of right is not might but Morality, which +might disavows and destroys. The necessary condition of any obligation +which is to be valid is freedom. Kant proved this, but his proof was +unnecessary, for it is self-evident. A forced treaty is no treaty, for +it is the victor's fist which has guided the hand of the vanquished, and +it is he who wrote the latter's signature under the document. The will, +the consciousness of the seeming signatory were absent at the time. + +But the worst and most immoral action of the state, beside which a +breach of treaty for selfish reasons pales to insignificance, is the war +of aggression for purposes of profit, that is, for the conquest of +territory, extortion of money, increase of power, or fame. War is the +quintessence of all crimes against life and property, against the body +and mind of a person, the prevention of which is the aim and object of +all Morality and all laws derived from it. Any means are permissible +whereby this wickedness may be prevented; the war of defence, waged by +the party attacked, is not only justified but sacred, as are the +functions of the institutions that society has developed to hunt down +and punish those who do not respect Morality and Law. And just as it is +the duty of every society to maintain courts of justice, police and +prisons, so it is the duty of every state to be well armed, well versed +in the use of weapons and strong, so long as it must count on the fact +that there are practical politicians who do not recognize Morality as +binding the state, and nations that are ready on the first hint of their +leaders to perpetrate every crime that conscience, the Ten Commandments +and penal law forbid. + +It is idle, in my opinion, to discuss the question whether war will ever +disappear from the world. It serves no purpose to contradict those who +declare it to be eternal. It is possible that it will continue to exist +as long as there is vice, sin and crime; and I do not believe that these +will ever be completely exterminated. Among mankind there will probably +never be a lack of sick and depraved people whose selfishness is +monstrously exaggerated, whose instincts urge them with stormy violence, +whose powers of inhibition are scantily developed or altogether wanting, +who suffer from anæsthesia of the feelings and are therefore incapable +of any sympathy with their fellow men and who are mentally too weak to +foresee the results of their actions. Individuals of this kind are born +criminals whose existence society will probably never be able to prevent +and against whom it is obliged to protect itself. Now war arises from +the same psychic conditions as the antisocial actions of these born +criminals, and therefore the pessimists may be right in maintaining that +it can never be abolished. But it is one thing to assert the existence +of a deplorable fact and quite another to glorify it. To say that war is +a part of the universe constituted by God is blasphemy, even though the +saying emanates from Moltke. To extol war ecstatically and to sing hymns +of praise to it, to declare that it evokes the highest virtues of man is +a panegyric of crime, a thing anticipated and punishable in the penal +code. + +I am not here attempting to solve the problem of what practical measures +can be taken whereby right may be set in the place of might in +inter-state relations, and instead of ruthless selfishness, Morality, +that is, self-control, consideration and respect for the just claims of +one's fellow men and love of one's neighbour. That is as far beyond the +scope of this work as is the investigation of the methods of education, +criminal justice, police organization or prison conditions intended to +deal with the tide of crime and to stem it as far as possible. I am +concerned with moral philosophy, and from that point of view I show that +all Morality is rooted in the desire of men to live together peaceably +in a society, to have greater security of life and property, greater +possibilities of happiness, and that the same needs must impose the +rules of Morality upon states in their relations to one another. +According to Hobbes the primitive condition of mankind is that of a war +of every man against all other men, and only the creation of society +makes an end of it. But if the state unleashes the dogs of aggressive +warfare it hurls mankind back into its primitive condition and destroys +the work it was created to do. The Stoic Seneca says: "_Homo sacra res +homini_," "Man is sacred to man." The practical politicians who praise +war repeat with Hobbes: "_Homo homini lupus_," "Man is a wolf to man." +The moral man demands a return from Hobbes to Seneca. If it has been +possible in the state to tame the wolfish instincts of the individual +and to make him bow down before Custom and Law, it must be equally +possible to do so in the relations of states to one another. He who +denies this in principle disavows Morality altogether, not only for the +state but also for the individual; he who admits it in principle but in +practice scornfully disregards it is a bandit, and it is desirable to +treat him like any other robber and murderer who, to satisfy his wolfish +appetites, tramples on Morality and Right and acts like a wild beast. + +To this, however, the Moralist will object sadly, and the practical +politician with scornful superiority, that the state has created +institutions for suppressing the bandit, but that there are none such to +control bandit states, and that self-defence alone, the only means of +self-protection for man in Hobbes's primitive condition, can gain a +footing between them. Clearly only the party attacked is in a state of +self-defence, but the bandit who has a sufficient sense of humour to +play the pettifogging lawyer can always maintain that attack is also +self-defence, the preventive form of self-defence. The answer to this +is: if society has managed to provide judges and police in order to +secure peace, then mankind will for the same purpose learn how to +provide courts of justice and a police force to deal with the bandits of +practical politics who endanger peace among nations. But that is a +practical question, not a theoretical one, not a principle of moral +philosophy. The latter shows irrefutably that there is only one +Morality, not a private one and a public one which is its negation, not +one kind for the individual and another for politics, for the state. + +He who defends the thesis of a twofold Morality merely shows that he +does not possess simple Morality. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY + + +Theological thought is faced with a problem in ethics which presents the +greatest difficulties. It is the problem of Free Will. + +Is man who perceives, judges, has volition and acts, a free being +inwardly? Can he, guided only by his own reasonable thoughts and +conclusions, determined entirely by his own inner impulses and +uninfluenced by outer circumstances, choose one or the other of two +conflicting possibilities? When he has to make a decision, is he always +like Hercules at the cross-roads who has to make up his mind alone as to +which path he shall take, whether he is to follow quiet, modest virtue, +or alluring, voluptuous vice? Does he do evil because he willed to do so +and not otherwise, although it was in his power to avoid it? Does he +decide for the good, because after due investigation and consideration +he recognized it as preferable, though he might have rejected it? Or is +man always subject to coercion from which at no time and no place he can +escape? Are all his actions determined by the law of Nature which +regulates every one of his movements just as mechanically as the course +of the stars or the fall of a body to our earth when its support is +removed? Is he an automaton, set going by cosmic forces, who possesses +the doubtful privilege consciously to be able to follow the turning of +his wheels, the action of his levers, rods and indicators and to listen +to their humming and knocking without being allowed to interfere in +their movements or to change the least thing in their functions or work? +Is he fettered by the chain of causes which have existed eternally and +continue to act immutably to all eternity? + +Theological thought is condemned to find an answer to the question of +freedom or determinism, as it is the necessary condition for the +essential concepts of the theological doctrine of Morality, that is, the +concept of responsibility and those consequent upon this, namely, sin, +reward and punishment. For the true believer God is the source of +Morality. He Himself is Morality. What He ordains is good in itself and +cannot be otherwise, for there is no room for evil in His nature, since +if He could be conceived to do evil, it would by the very fact of His +doing it become good. A man, to be moral, must approximate to the nature +of God as nearly as it is granted to mortals to do. The moral law is +revealed by God's mercy to give man a light which shows him the right +path and lights him on his way. Thanks to Him the poor mortal is +relieved of the incertitude due to his limited mental powers and is +endowed with the priceless possession of a certain precept which he need +only obey in order to be sure of salvation. + +However, granted the correctness of this assumption, it is not +comprehensible how evil came into the world. It contradicts all +attributes with which faith has endowed the deity. It cannot appear +without God's knowledge, for He is omniscient and nothing is hidden +from Him. It cannot occur against His will, for He is omnipotent and +nothing resists His bidding. But least of all can it rage with His +knowledge and consent, for He is infinitely good and therefore does not +permit his creatures to fall victims to evil. But experience teaches us +that evil has a permanent place in human life, and this forces one to +the conclusion that either God is hard and cruel, and therefore not +infinitely good and not Morality itself, or that He has no knowledge of +evil and therefore is not omniscient, but, on the contrary, blind as +well as stupid, or that He sees the evil but cannot prevent it, and +therefore is not omnipotent and must recognize the existence of higher +powers than Himself against whom He is impotent. + +These terrifying conclusions have not escaped the notice of the devout, +and they have always made the most desperate efforts to evade them. Some +have chosen the easiest way out of the difficulty; they close their eyes +before the yawning abyss, fold their hands devoutly and invent pious +phrases about the inscrutable ways of Providence and its infinite +wisdom, which the weak intelligence of mortals cannot grasp. Others take +infinite pains; in the sweat of their brow they with difficulty evolve +tortuous and hypocritical explanations, which in reality explain +nothing, but in a mind which lends itself willingly to them give rise to +the illusion that the contradiction has been solved. Perhaps the most +astounding piece of work accomplished by this miserable juggling, or +this delusion of self by means of an exuberant flow of words, is +presented in the four volumes of the "Théodicée," by which Leibnitz +made himself a laughing-stock. Mazdeism has invented an alluring but at +the same time risky expedient. It lightly assumes that two principles +obtain in the universe, a good one and a bad one, the creator and the +destroyer, the merciful God and the cruel demon, Ormuzd and Ahriman. In +this way everything is easy to understand. Good is the work of radiant +Ormuzd, evil the deed of dark Ahriman. The two fight together with very +nearly equal forces, but this doctrine reveals the comforting prospect +of a distant future in which Ormuzd shall finally triumph over Ahriman, +and fills the trembling believer with elation at the thought that after +æons of the tragic struggle between good and evil, at the end of the +world the curtain will fall on the victory of good. By this victory +Mazdeism, which claims to be monotheistic, rescues its single god, +although the introduction of a second principle of very nearly equal +power, which holds the one god in check for an immeasurable period of +time, brings this system perilously close to polytheism. + +To the purer monotheism of Christianity there is indeed something +repugnant in the assumption of a second, opposite principle of almost +equal power, but yet it has admitted the existence of the devil, who is +undoubtedly reminiscent of Ahriman. Only he lacks the independence of +the Mazdean demon. He is not on a footing of equality with God, but is +subject to Him as is every creature. He is not strong enough to oppose +God and can only do evil because God allows it. But why does He allow +it? Why does He tolerate the devil? Why can the latter proceed with his +evil work with God's consent? To this theology gives a crafty answer +which Goethe has clothed in the glorious beauty of inimitable poetry. +God has assigned to the devil the task of tempting man with all the arts +of seduction in order to give him the opportunity of testing and +developing his moral strength in resistance, of purging himself, of +attaining purity and salvation by his own efforts. In short, he exists +in order to give man a sort of Swedish gymnastics in virtue. The +struggle is not quite fair, for the devil is held by a halter and is +pulled up if he gets too big an advantage, and man is always assisted by +redeeming mercy, a hand being stretched out to him from the clouds which +sets him on his feet as often as he stumbles. But theology is not bound +by rules of sport. That is how the picture of the universe is presented +in "_Faust_." But he who painted it is the same Goethe who on another +occasion angrily complains: "You allow man to become guilty--and then +leave him to his suffering." Does the divinity allow man to fall a +victim to evil without turning it aside from him? Does he only try him +in order mercifully to rescue him at the moment when he is about to +succumb? Goethe does not answer this question without ambiguity. That is +not his business either. He may contradict himself. He is a poet who is +allowed to express contradictory views. He is not a theologian whose +duty it is, by means of a definite dogma, to support those who totter in +doubt. + +All these attempts to reconcile the attributes of the deity with the +fact that there is evil in the world which continually leads man into +danger, emanate from the explicit or tacit assumption that man possesses +Free Will. For if his will is not free and he does evil, then he does it +because he must and because he cannot do otherwise. But this must can +only come from the deity who is almighty; it is the deity who condemns +man, who forces him to do evil. Man therefore does evil as God's tool +without volition; therefore, as a matter of fact, it is God Himself who +does evil. But if God is capable of doing evil He is not Morality +itself, or every distinction between good and evil is destroyed, and we +must recognize what seems evil to us to be just as moral as what seems +good, because the one is as much the work of God as the other. But if +this is admitted, and it is logically impossible not to admit it, then +the whole foundation of transcendental, that is, of theological, ethics +breaks down. The latter is therefore forced, on pain of suicide, to +maintain that man has Free Will. + +But with this assertion theological ethics by no means disarms all the +objections which threaten its life. Renouvier's book on Free Will is +probably the most thorough and exhaustive work on this subject which has +been treated by thousands of thinkers and not a few babblers since the +time of the ancient Greeks, and he describes it as follows: "Will is +free and spontaneous if Reason cannot foretell its untrammelled action +at any time other than that at which it actually takes place." Renouvier +makes no limitation and no reservation. He does not say, "if human +reason cannot foretell its action," and this omission of the +particularizing adjective is not carelessness or a mistake on his part, +it is duly considered; for the prudent dialectician knows very well that +he would ruin his theory of Free Will if he only maintained that human +reason alone should be able to foretell its action. There are many +happenings which human reason cannot foretell, and which nevertheless +obey immutable laws and take place according to absolutely fixed rules +without the exercise of any inner freedom or authority on the part of +the individual. If human reason cannot foretell these happenings, it is +not because no external force of the universe determines them and they +are entirely spontaneous, but simply because the laws controlling them +are unknown. Therefore the impossibility of foretelling them is no proof +of their freedom, it is only a proof of the ignorance of the human mind. +There was a time when no human intellect could foretell the occurrence +of a solar or lunar eclipse. Was that because the heavenly bodies act +freely and are eclipsed only at their own spontaneous desire, when and +how they please? No, because man had not discovered and comprehended +their movements. To this very day we are unable to foretell the weather +on a particular day next year, or the result of the next harvest, or an +earthquake. Does this prove the freedom, the absolute independence of +these occurrences? No; it only proves the inadequacy of our knowledge. +Renouvier therefore would achieve nothing for his theory of Free Will, +if only human understanding were to be unable to foretell the actions of +the Will. That is why he does not say "human reason," but simply +"Reason." The essence of Free Will is that its actions altogether shall +be incapable of being foreseen; it is not in its nature to act in +accordance with some predetermination which must necessarily reckon with +outer circumstances and given forces; and the impossibility of +foretelling its actions exists not only for human Reason but for every +Reason--for Reason in general. + +For every Reason and therefore for the divine Reason as well. And now +theological ethics must find a way out of this dilemma: either God does +not foresee the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of +his omniscience, that is, of one of His essential attributes; or God +foresees the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of the +Freedom of the Will, the essence of which, according to Renouvier, lies +in the fact that it cannot be foreseen. For this impossibility of being +foreseen is indeed the quality by which Free Will stands or falls. Let +us realize the significance of this concept. Nothing can be foreseen +which will not with certainty occur. But whatever at some future time +will become a reality, must even now be virtually a reality for an +omniscient Reason not bound by the human categories of time and space, +since for this Reason neither proximity nor distance exists, but +everything is on one plane, and there is no future or past, but +everything is present. So if the divine Reason foresees now how the free +Will of man will act in the future, that is equivalent to saying that +this free Will is forced to act in the particular way which God foresees +and not otherwise. Therefore the Will is not free but, on the contrary, +strictly bound. It is obliged to make the event foreseen by God a fact, +as God can only foresee what must certainly come to pass, and a foreseen +event that does not happen would mean a mistake, a false assumption, of +which one cannot believe God capable without denying Him. This apparent +free Will is coercion at sight. As its action is foreseen by God, the +Will is subject to the law of fate, but a period of delay is granted. +Every movement of the supposedly free Will becomes a part of the order +of the universe which has been unalterably laid down from eternity, and +which the human Will cannot upset without burying God in the ruins. Man +may imagine that his Will is free. But that is self-deception, and he +can only indulge in it because what God sees clearly is hidden from him, +namely, the goal towards which, though he does not realize it, he is +inevitably led along strictly defined paths by the iron hand of fate. + +It would be unjust towards theology to say that it has never seen the +incompatibility of Free Will with divine omniscience. This has not +escaped its notice, but it has attempted by the use of familiar formulæ +to get out of the difficulty. In his book _De libero Arbitrio_ Saint +Augustine stoutly maintains that the human Will is free, but he tries to +rescue the attributes of the deity by reserving to it the right or the +power to intervene by its mercy in the actions of the Will, if in its +freedom it comes to a decision which endangers the salvation of the +soul. Saint Thomas Aquinas takes good care not to differ in opinion from +the Bishop of Hippo. The reformers, Calvin, Luther and Bishop Jansen, +too, were better logicians than the patristic writers, and +unhesitatingly denied the freedom of the Will, but they did not notice +that they made God responsible for all the misdeeds of man, lacking +freedom and acting with God's foreknowledge and at His behest. The +Council of Trent scorned all these contradictions and unintelligible +points, and declared with infallible authority that man's Will is free +and that at the same time God is omniscient. The Catholic Church at the +time was in some countries still in a position to meet Reason, if it +raised objections, with an unanswerable argument: the stake. + +That is the peculiarity of theological as distinguished from scientific +thought, the purest form of which is mathematics. The former never +follows a train of thought to its strictly logical conclusion, but only +follows a certain distance, to a point where it loses itself in an +impenetrable black fog, or in a cloud of glory which dazzles the +beholder. Mathematical thought, on the contrary, develops the train of +thought to the bitter end, to its ultimate conclusions. These are +necessarily absurd if the premises are erroneous, and their absurdity is +so clear that it convincingly proves the mistake in the point of +departure. Such a scrupulous confutation of self is to be expected as +little from mystic visions as from arrogant dogmatism. The former obey +the laws of dreams, in which the association of ideas, unfettered by +logic, holds sway and strings together the most incompatible ideas to +form an apparently connected series; the latter demands the privilege of +being independent of the judgment of Reason, and of being tried by +Faith, a judge who always decides in its favour. + +Those who believe in Free Will adduce a proof of it which they derive by +the method of introspection. Man, they say, will never be convinced that +he is not free, that his actions are not determined by his own will +alone, for he has the incontrovertible consciousness of the contrary. He +is quite clear on the point that he does a thing because it is his will +to do so, that he had the choice of doing it or not, that he does what +he wants, that he comes to his decision owing to considerations, +inclinations, moods or intentions which are perfectly known to him, if +to him only. At the Sorbonne in Paris they still remember the +professor--when the anecdote was told me Victor Cousin was named as the +hero, but I cannot guarantee that it was he and no other--who used to +say in his lecture on Free Will: "Man's will is free. There is no need +to prove this by giving reasons. We feel it immediately as a truth. I +will show you. I will raise my right arm. I raise it"--here he raised +his right arm with a commanding gesture, kept it for a short time in +this position, and added triumphantly: "You see that my will is free." +His hearers broke into enthusiastic applause at this triumphant +demonstration. To-day they would receive it with loud laughter. + +We have learnt to seek the roots of most, perhaps of all, human actions +in the subconsciousness. There they are worked out under influences +which cannot be perceived by introspection and in which inborn and +acquired inclinations, experiences, organic conditions at the time, +instincts, attractions and repulsions play a decisive part. They rise +ready made into consciousness, and the latter, not having seen them +being formed, persuades itself that it has produced them spontaneously, +and imagines reasons why it willed to do actions that were determined +outside its sphere. The professor who authoritatively states, "I wish to +raise my right arm and therefore I do it," certainly says this in all +good faith, but equally certainly he is ignorant. He is not aware of the +play of forces which end in his gesture. He raises his right arm, which +he believes he chooses with complete freedom, because he is in the habit +of using his right arm by preference; if he had been left-handed he +would have announced his wish to raise his left arm, and would have been +equally convinced that he had decided, with complete freedom, for his +left arm. If he suffered from chronic muscular rheumatism in one of his +arms, so that it would trouble him or hurt him to move it, he would +unconsciously choose the other, sound arm, and maintain just as +positively that he had done so with complete freedom. I have mentioned +as instances two particularly crude and therefore very obvious reasons +which may determine the action of this simple-minded professor without +his being aware of it. But each one of our more complicated, and even of +our simplest, movements is the outcome of numberless subtle causes which +are partly due to the organized experiences and habits of our individual +life, partly a necessary consequence of our inherited qualities, our +bodily and intellectual constitution, and their origin goes back to the +far distant past of our species, to the beginnings of life, we may even +say to eternity. Our consciousness can tell nothing of these causes. +They elude our observation and investigation and remain ever unknown to +us. Renouvier is quite right when he says no understanding--and I say +without his ambiguity no human understanding of the present time--can +foretell the actions of another, nor indeed his own, but not because +they come to pass independently of inevitable causes, but simply because +these causes cannot be descried by our ignorance. + +It is vain labour to try and derive the solution of the question of +Free Will, or even a contribution towards it, from introspection. +It is a method unsuitable for this purpose. The Greek sage well knew +what a great and difficult task he set man when he admonished him: +"[Greek: gnôthi seauton]." That is easy to say but difficult if not +impossible to do. Spinoza very happily characterized the self-deception +in which the individual is plunged with regard to the part played in +determining his actions by his conscious Will aided by Reason; he says +that if a stone, flung by some hand, had consciousness, it would imagine +it was flying of its own free will; and in another place he points out +without any illustrative metaphor, that a drunk man and a child, who +certainly do not act on their own initiative, also believe in the +freedom of their will. It has been possible to prove experimentally how +ignorant of the real motives of his actions the individual may be. It is +suggested to a person who has been hypnotized that on awakening he is to +carry out a certain action, something particularly absurd, unjustified +and aimless being intentionally chosen. The subject of the experiment +on awaking faithfully carries out the suggestion, and as he has no +memory of what happened while he was in the hypnotic state, he is +convinced that he is yielding to a sudden idea, a whim, but that in any +case his action is determined by his own will. But since he must realize +the absurdity of what he is doing, he seeks for some sufficient motive +to explain it, and always finds one to his own satisfaction. + +All the efforts of anguished sophists to prove their thesis of the +Freedom of the Will from data supplied by introspection have failed +miserably. But they were forced to undertake them, for theology cannot +give up the contention that man acts with free Will. It is an important +part of the religious conception of the universe and of the relation in +which, according to this, man stands to God. + +To put it shortly, religion sees in man's life on earth a preparation +for eternity. It gives him the opportunity of coming nearer to God by +his own efforts and thus making himself worthy of the salvation which +secures him a place in the sight of God to the end of time. Thus the +life of the flesh is made a method of selection by which the sheep are +sundered from the goats. God provides man with free Will for this +special purpose, so that he may make use of it to choose good of his own +accord and to avoid evil. This undoubtedly wearisome task is made much +easier for him, because God in His goodness has given him laws, +doctrines of Morality and examples which point out the way of salvation. +If man makes proper use of his gifts, if in pursuance of divine +admonition, he treads of his own free will the path of virtue, he +acquires merit which gives him a legitimate claim to the reward of +finding favour in God's eyes and to be admitted to the company of the +just and pure. But if man purposely turns to evil, of which he is warned +by revelation and which he has been given the power to avoid, then he is +a sinner and deserves the punishment of damnation, which, however, he +may yet escape if God in His mercy forgives him his sin. Therefore man +holds in his hand the fate of his immortal soul. It depends on him +whether this fate be salvation or damnation. He is responsible for +directing it to the former or the latter. Of course, God has the power +to force him to virtue and to stop him from vice. But it is not His plan +to condemn man to be the slave of virtue. He wants man to choose virtue +of his own accord, He wants noble souls about Him who by freedom have +attained Morality. + +This religious view of the universe, which deals in assertions and +disdains on principle to prove even one of them to Reason by facts that +can be tested, contrasts with the scientific view of the universe which +asserts nothing but what can be objectively ascertained to be true, +which distinguishes sharply between the account of what has been +observed and can be tested by everyone and hypotheses for which it +demands no belief, but only the recognition of their possibility or +probability, and which it discards as soon as an ascertained fact +definitely disproves them. No compromise is possible between these two +views of the universe. Nothing can bridge the chasm between them. It +would be superficial to say that the theme of the scientific view is +realities and that of the religious one imagination. Imagination is also +a reality, only of a different order to that which is called so in +common parlance. It is a subjective reality; it exists only in the mind +that conceives it. Reality itself is for the thinking mind only a state +of consciousness, but it is an image of conditions which have an +objective existence, though in another form, outside the consciousness. +The supporters of religion maintain that there is an objective reality +corresponding to their concepts, but this cannot be ascertained by any +of the senses which the living organism has developed in order to +establish a relation between the world, of which it is a part, and +itself. It is perfectly useless for supporters of the one view of the +universe to try and convince those of the other. Each of them moves on a +different plane and is unapproachable to the other. All that can be done +is to define both the one and the other as clearly as possible and prove +their incompatibility. + +For the scientific view of the Universe the problem of Free Will does +not exist and cannot exist. All facts that science has observed force it +to the assumption of causation, which does not only mean that every +phenomenon is produced by a cause, is the effect of a cause and could +never have occurred but for this cause, but also means that the effect +represents the exact equivalent of the energy which was its cause. Thus +the hypothesis of the indestructibility of the total energy in the +universe is an essential part of the concept of causation, the +fundamental hypothesis without which the phenomenon of the universe and +the things which occur in it are simply unintelligible to Reason; and +everything in and outside ourselves, everything that we perceive, +becomes chaos, chance, lawless whim or miracle in the theological sense +of the word. + +It is inconceivable that an effect should be anything other than the +reappearance in a different form of the exact quantity of energy that +caused it; for if the energy of the effect exceeded that of its cause, +then part of the effect would have been produced without cause; and if +the energy of the effect fell short of that of the cause, then part of +the energy of the cause would have been expended without producing an +effect. That, however, would be the negation of causation, it would be +an admission that part of the effect (i.e. an effect) could be produced +without sufficient cause, i.e. out of nothing, and that a part of the +cause (i.e. energy) could disappear (into nothing) without producing an +equivalent effect, which is obviously absurd. + +The human Will manifests itself by an action or the prevention of an +action according to the impulse felt by our organism. Both these are an +exercise of force, the amount of which can be measured. Indeed, +inhibition, too, is a dynamical effort which represents the exact +equivalent of the force with which the impulse which it has checked +acted on the motory centres. The Will, therefore, expends energy which +does work that can be measured. But the Will must derive this energy +from some source. It therefore also only converts energy derived from +the energy of the universe, the total amount of which can neither be +augmented nor diminished; the Will consequently is a part of the dynamic +energy of the universe, and must necessarily be subject to its +mechanical law; that is, to the law of causation. It is therefore not +free, but dependent, as is every phenomenon in the universe. Whoever +maintains its freedom maintains that it is independent, that it is not +subject to the law of causation, that it has no cause of which the +elements, if they could be fully known to us, would be measurable, that +it expends energy which it derives from nowhere, that it produces energy +out of nothing. Whoever maintains this contradicts all experience from +which the knowledge of Nature and her laws has been built up; it is +obviously hopeless to expect a reasonable discussion with such a person. + +Now the supporters of free Will may reply that they do not deny that the +Will derives its energy from the organism and therefore from the +universal source of cosmic energy, and that it makes use of it according +to the laws of mechanics; but they assert that the direction in which +energy is expended by the Will is freely determined by it; further, that +the direction does not affect the amount of energy used, and +consequently the Will can act absolutely in accordance with the +mechanical laws of the universe and yet can, independently of outside +causes, determine the manner in which the energy shall be expended; that +is to say, the Will can be free. But this objection is pure sophistry, +for the determination of the direction, in so far as it is not mere +imagination and therefore ineffective and sterile, but really controls +the action, is an expenditure of energy. The controlling power uses up +energy and obeys a cause, so we have arrived at the same dilemma +again--either the controlling Will is subject to the law of causation, +then it is not free; or it is free and is determined by no outside +cause, then we must ascribe to it motion without driving power and +energy derived from nothing--which is absurd. + +No. There is no such thing as Free Will. The concept of freedom itself +is an illusion of thought which cannot survey sufficiently extensive +connexions. Nothing in the universe is free; all things mutually +determine each other. All are cause and effect, and they fit into one +another like cog wheels. Everything is linked up and dovetailed. The +philosopher's phrase, "Everything is in flux," is the description of the +outward appearance of things. Against it we must set the reality which +is: "Everything is eternally at rest." For a circumscribed system of +motion without beginning or end may mean motion for every individual +point which describes the course, but is, as a whole, virtually at rest. +Everything that exists, or ever will exist, has its necessary and +sufficient cause in that which has always been; the sequence of +phenomena has been unalterably determined since all eternity for all +eternity; what we call chance is an occurrence for which our ignorance +cannot perceive the necessary causes and conditions; past and future +would be in the same plane, therefore would be present for an +omniscience, which knew and understood the machine of the universe down +to its smallest wheel and pin. + +One of the logical consequences of this is that, without any miracle or +the assumption of any supernatural influences, it would be possible to +foretell the most distant events in all their smallest details. An +intelligence sufficiently wide and penetrating would, following the +strict law of causation, be able to produce all lines of the present +with absolute certainty immeasurably far into the future. As everything +that ever will be necessarily must be, it virtually exists at present +and has always existed; therefore it is only a question of clarity of +vision, which however, is denied to man, to see it at any time and to +any extent. + +The illusion of flux is explicable. Life, which like all world processes +is a cyclical motion, is passed in an endless alternation between the +shining forth and extinction of consciousness, the bearers of which are +an everlasting series of organisms following one another. Every organism +lasts a limited time, during which it is carried along an inconceivably +small fraction of the tremendous cycle. It sees all the points of this +short stretch but once, and does not learn that they are eternally the +same. It gathers the false impression that they fly past it, whereas +they are at rest and it passes them, until it ceases to be a suitable +bearer of consciousness and disappears, making room for a successor. +This rigid immutability of the whole Universe is certainly intolerably +gruesome to the imagination, but then, every time we look beyond the +narrow confines of life and human circumstances, to peep into the +infinity and eternity which surrounds us, do not terrifying vistas open +up before us? + +Not only the religious minded, but many free thinkers, too, have Free +Will at heart, though the latter are otherwise guiltless of any +mysticism. They claim it in the name of man's dignity, which would be +deeply humiliated if we had to confess ourselves the slaves of outside +influences, automata moved by universal causation without our having any +say in the matter. We are not entitled to such trumpery pride. Let us +seek our dignity in our striving for knowledge, in the subjection of our +own instincts to the control of our Reason, but not in an imaginary +independence of the laws of Nature, whose commands we should oppose in +vain. + +With Free Will responsibility also disappears. That is obvious. But that +means a collapse only for theological Morality. Scientific ethics can +manage very well without responsibility. Nay, more; there is no room in +it for this concept. In the system of theological Morality +responsibility has a transcendental significance. To sum up once more +shortly what has been dealt with in detail above: according to this +system Morality is a divine command, obedience to, or disregard of which +results in salvation or damnation; in order that reward and punishment +may be just, one as well as the other must be merited; that implies the +assumption that virtue is practised or vice chosen intentionally and +with forethought; but this mode of action must be freely willed if man +is to be responsible for it before his divine Judge. + +Scientific ethics knows nothing of this supernatural dream. In its view +Morality is an immanent phenomenon which occurs only within humanity--or +to define it more accurately, within humanity organized as a society. +It arose from a definite necessity; from the undeniable need of men to +unite, so as to be able, in company with one another, shoulder to +shoulder, to succeed more easily, or indeed to succeed at all, in the +struggle for existence which is too hard for the solitary individual. It +has a clearly recognizable aim: to teach man to curb his selfish +instincts and to practise consideration for his neighbour, by which +means alone peaceable life in common and productive co-operation are +possible. The instinct of self-preservation supplies society with the +laws of Morality which it imperiously imposes on all its members, and +unconditional obedience to which it demands. Society does not dream of +saying to the individual: "You are free; you must yourself decide +whether you will follow the path of virtue or that of vice." On the +contrary, it says to him: "Whether you wish it or not, you must do that +which my doctrine of Morality indicates as good and eschew that which it +declares to be evil. You have no choice. I tolerate you in my midst only +if you submit to the laws of Morality. If you transgress them I shall +draw your teeth and claws or destroy you altogether." By discipline +lasting many thousands of years society has developed in the individual, +though not in all, an organ that watches that his conduct is moral, and +this is the conscience. But this is only supplementary to, and +representative of, society, which in the main exercises police +supervision itself, and sees that in general the moral law is obeyed. It +judges all the actions of the individual that come to its knowledge. +Conscience only is the competent authority where occurrences are +concerned which take place simply in the consciousness of the +individual, and which he alone is aware of. Conscience is only too often +a lenient judge who acquits the individual too easily and nearly always +admits extenuating circumstances. Society does not let him off so +lightly; his punishment is certain if he cannot prevent his sin from +becoming known. + +Responsibility therefore also exists in Morality as understood by +sociologists. As far as his intentions are concerned the individual must +come to terms with his conscience, which, as a rule, he does not find +difficult. For his deeds he must account to society, and it does not ask +what took place in his consciousness, but only how his spiritual +impulses were manifested. For his deeds, then, he is summoned before +society's court of justice and must answer for them without having +recourse to the excuse that he acted as he was forced to do by his +disposition and the pressure of circumstances, and that he had no choice +and could not act otherwise. Though Morality has always been necessary +for the life of the community, and though the latter has, under the +pressure of the law of self-preservation, always had to make its members +strictly subservient to Morality, it has ever had a dim idea that the +responsibility of the individual for his actions is only of practical, +not of fundamental or ideal significance. It has never pushed +investigation as to how far the individual acted freely or not to any +great lengths, never attempted to trace it to the foundations of his +consciousness, to the inception of the impulses of his Will. Where the +lack of freedom was obvious, for instance, where every layman could see +there was insanity, the Moral law has been disregarded ever since +ancient times, and society has contented itself with protecting itself +from the intolerable actions of the lunatic by rendering him harmless. +Since positive Law, made concrete in the laws with penal sanctions, was +evolved from the universal Moral law, it has admitted the plea of +irresponsibility and refrained from exercising its coercive powers where +such irresponsibility has been established. In addition to madness, +demonstrable coercion and self-defence relieve the individual from +responsibility for the crime and render him immune from punishment. + +In the course of evolution society has conceded still further +limitations of individual responsibility. It willingly admits new +knowledge gained by scientific psychology and concedes limited +responsibility, not only in case of madness, but in such cases, too, +where experts can convincingly prove to the judges, the guardians of its +Law, that the individual was in an abnormal condition and affected by +morbid influences at the time of the crime. Farther society cannot go, +if it does not want to put an end to Moral law and do away altogether +with positive law. Concern for its continued existence forbids this. It +must leave it to the philosophers to continue the investigation. They +must show that the Will is never free, always fettered, not only in the +extreme cases of madness or when under the influence of suggestion. They +must make it clear that there is only a difference of degree and not of +kind between the determining influences under which the individual is +constrained to act, and that the causation which binds him proceeds by +imperceptible degrees from the delirium of the maniac and the obsession +of the abnormal man to the passion, lust and desire of the man with +strongly developed instincts, and to the slight stimulus of habits, the +colourless judgment and shallow considerations of the ordinary man with +a deformed character and no definite features. Society can draw no +practical conclusion from the theoretical recognition of the lasting +limitation and lack of freedom of the Will, because moral law by its +very nature implies coercion, and therefore excludes freedom. Whether +the individual submits to the Moral law of his own accord, or because he +is forced thereto by the community's powers of coercion, is of no +account to society. It deals only with the visible results. + +But it is not merely a matter of flat utilitarianism, it is not even +unjust, if society, without inquiring whether the Will is free or not, +makes the individual responsible for his actions and only makes an +exception from this universal rule in extreme cases. Even though his +will is subject to the law of causation, and the individual always acts +as he must, he nevertheless has a means of keeping within the moral law +despite inner impulses and outer pressure, and that is by his judgment +and its instrument, inhibition. Like every organic function which is not +purely vegetative and therefore beyond the influence of the Will, +judgment and inhibition can be strengthened and perfected by methodical +exercise, while total neglect of them will weaken and finally atrophy +them. The community may demand that each of its members shall devote +attention to the development of the natural functions which permit him +to discriminate and to suppress any inclination to evil which may +appear. It facilitates this duty towards itself and himself for the +individual--for it is a question of the increase of his organic +efficiency and of his personal worth--by the institutions it founds for +the education of youth, by schools which not only impart knowledge, but +also form the character, by instruction after the school age, by the +honours with which it distinguishes especially excellent persons, +thereby holding them up to example. The community prescribes that +everyone should acquire a certain minimum of knowledge, and for this +purpose forces each individual by law to go to school for a certain +number of years. It may and ought to force him also to render himself +more capable of obeying the moral law by methodical exercise of his +will. Every citizen is responsible to the state for being able to read +and write. In this sense the individual is also responsible for +sufficiently strengthening his faculty of inhibition to be able to +control his selfish, anti-social and immoral desires. + +The particular purpose for which he is to employ his faculty of +inhibition depends on the current moral law of the age, which is +determined not by the individual, but by the community. The individual +does quite enough and is free of blame if he strives with all his might +to approximate his actions to the ideal which the community demands at a +given time for the life of its members in common and for their mutual +relations. To alter and perfect this ideal is the business of a few +select men with wider judgment, stronger will and warmer sympathies than +the average. In these exceptional cases it is not the community which +imposes its ideal on the individual, but, on the contrary, the +individual who works out a new ideal for the community, and, so to +speak, thanks to his personal qualities, establishes a new record in the +gymnastic of the Will which beats all earlier ones. + +Finally, it is true, the individual is dependent on his natural +disposition. To say that he can be, and is to be, raised above himself +is a very impressive, but really nonsensical, phrase. He can get out of +himself only what is in him by nature, and however hard he may try to +reach out beyond the boundaries drawn by his organic disposition, he +finds it impossible to overstep them. But, as a rule, they are far wider +than the individual has any idea of until he attempts to reach them, and +he will find many surprises if he labours untiringly to develop to their +fullest extent all the possibilities latent in him. Even a born weakling +can, by dint of methodical practice, harden his flaccid muscles +sufficiently to become a gymnast of average skill, though he is hardly +likely to become a first-class athlete. + +In just the same way a weak-willed or simple person can by earnest +endeavours rise to a consistent morality; if, nevertheless, there appear +in him, continually or occasionally, organic impulses which carry him +away, it is not his fault but his misfortune. In that case he is +subjectively not responsible for his immorality. But the community can, +all the same, not liberate him from responsibility, because the law of +self-preservation forces it to insist on observance of the moral law, +and it has no means of accurately measuring how strong the pressure of +instincts and the power of inhibition is in any individual, and to what +extent he has fulfilled the duty of exercising and strengthening the +latter. The phrase "To understand everything is to forgive everything" +shows insight, but is only true in the sense that one must not blame an +individual for his natural imperfection. It comprehends recognition of +the Will's lack of freedom, and the inadmissibility, from the +philosophical point of view, of the concept of responsibility, but it +does not affect the right and the duty of the community to demand moral +conduct regardless of this lack of freedom. It is not permitted to +forgive because it understands. Moreover, there would be no sense in +forgiveness by the community, for the concept of forgiveness implies +feeling and kindly forgetfulness of an injury inflicted of malice +prepense; but insult and offence play no part in the punishment by +society of transgressions of the moral law, and indulgence due to +sensibility would endanger its existence. + +The certainty possessed by the individual that his evil deeds, if they +become known, will have evil consequences for him is one of the +determining factors which is indispensable in helping him to make a +decision. It is an inadmissible affectation to condemn the fear of +punishment as a motive for moral action, because it ought to be the +result of the conviction that it is absolutely right. It is a powerful +aid to self-discipline, as also are the thought and the foretaste of +the satisfaction upon which self-respect may count if general respect +and praise are to be the reward of exemplary conduct. + +The great weakness of the Kantian doctrine of Morality lies in the fact +that it retains Free Will, even though it gives it another name. It is +called autonomy of Will and is contrasted with heteronomy. This doctrine +demands, and considers it possible, that the Will should be its own +lawgiver and should not allow others to lay down laws for it; but it +fails to examine how the Will comes to make laws for itself, of what +hypothesis these laws are the necessary conclusions, by what means the +Will secures respect for its law, and whether this seemingly +self-imposed law is not really the inner realization of a ready-made law +of extraneous origin. The dogma of the autonomy of the Will is a +consequence of the preliminary error of excluding utility from Morality +and of declaring its imperative to be categorical, that is, not +dependent on the aim, but independent and regardless of any aim. The +whole tomfoolery of the categorical imperative and of the autonomy of +the Will is transcendental mysticism, and is all the more surprising as +it is the result of an investigation which claims to be the work of pure +Reason. It is the shadow of the ghostly bogies of religious conceptions +in the daylight of "pure Reason." + +From the point of view of the community we may speak of merit and sin, +but not from the subjective point of view. For the community the moral +conduct of the individual is useful, immoral conduct is disadvantageous, +therefore it praises the one and condemns and punishes the other. That +is opportunism, but not moral philosophy. Considered subjectively, moral +conduct is just as little meritorious as beauty, great stature, muscular +strength, keen intelligence, health, a good memory, prompt reactions of +consciousness and all other advantages that the individual has received +without his personal intervention as a gift of nature. And immoral +conduct is just as little blameworthy as ugliness, stupidity, sickness +and other misfortunes which the individual is burdened with by heredity +or which a hard fate has imposed on him. Happy is the favoured man! +Pitiable the unfortunate one! Both are the work of forces which are +absolutely beyond the control of their wills. In the same way the good +man acts morally because he possesses insight and restraining +will-power, and the bad man acts immorally because these perfections +have been denied him, and neither the one nor the other can do anything +in the matter. + +That does not relieve man of the duty of labouring assiduously at his +moral development, but it does relieve him of responsibility for the +result of his efforts. On one point the sociological, the biological and +the theological moralists agree: they all bow down humbly before Grace. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +MORALITY AND PROGRESS + + +I have fully investigated in another book ("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_") +the problem of progress in all its details. I therefore refer the reader +to that for all particulars, and will here give only a summary of the +main points. + +Progress implies motion from one point to another. This simple concept +is supplemented by others, some clear and some dim, which group +themselves round it: the conception that the point towards which motion +is directed signifies something better and more desirable than the one +from which the motion takes place, and the assumption that the motion is +due to an impulse, either inherent in the moving object or complex of +objects and an essential part of it, or else impressed upon it by +outside forces; further, that the impulse connotes a conscious image of +the goal arrived at, recognition of its higher worth and the desire for +greater perfection. + +All these ideas, which are concomitants of the concept of progress, are +childish anthropomorphism when applied to the universe. To define +progress as motion from a worse point to a better one implies the +existence of a scale whereby value may be measured. Now values are +clearly determined and graded as far as human beings or any similar +creatures are concerned. Worse or better means to man less or more +pleasant, useful, pleasing; progress, therefore, is a development to a +condition which man considers more suitable and useful for him and feels +to be more harmonious and pleasanter. The universe, from this +standpoint, would make progress to prepare itself for the appearance of +man, to become more intelligible, habitable and comfortable for man, to +please and delight him. Whether it obeys its own natural disposition or +a higher intelligence, a god, in carrying out this work, in either case +it would realize progress to serve mankind. But if this ceases to exist, +there is no point in characterizing a development as progress in the +sense of amelioration, beautification and perfection. One would then +have no right to describe, for instance, the solar system with its +planets as indicating progress from the original condition of nebula, +because the latter in itself, apart from man and the conditions of his +existence, is not better or worse, not more beautiful or uglier, not +more perfect or more defective than the former; the original nebula and +the solar system are equally the result of the play of the same cosmic +forces, and the dynamic formula of the one is the same as that of the +other. But Reason rejects as nonsensical any view which declares man to +be the aim of the universe, which puts all the work of the universe at +his service, and conceives it as a huge machine functioning for his +advantage. + +For reasons of formal logic, too, the idea of progress in the universe +is unthinkable. The understanding cannot conceive of the universe as +other than eternal. Now in eternity all progress, that is, all motion +from a point of departure, must have reached its goal eternities ago, +however slow the motion, however distant the goal. Eternity and progress +are two concepts which logically exclude one another. + +In the universe there can be no progress in the sense of ascent, of +motion from a worse to a better thing; the only thing in the universe, +in Nature, which is comprehensible to the understanding and which +experience, derived from sense perceptions, can establish, is evolution, +an eternal, equable motion always on the same level; and human standards +of value are not applicable to its regular, successive stages. One state +is merged without a break in another, the simple becomes more manifold +until a maximum of complexity is reached; thereupon what is intricate +gradually falls to pieces, and the complicated is dissolved and returns +to the simple; then, when this point is attained, the same course begins +again, and so on for all eternity. Thus evolution in the universe is an +endless succession of cyclic movements from the simple to the intricate +and back to the simple; with a constant alternation from one point of +each single circle to the other; with the most extreme, crushing +uniformity in the totality of all cycles; with absolutely equal dignity +of all the phases of the endless course as they develop one from the +other; with a synchronism, inconceivable to man, of all forms of +evolution in numberless circles revolving side by side within the +infinite whole of the universe. + +But the concept of progress, which cannot be derived from the processes +in the universe and has no sense when applied to them, becomes a +reasonable one as soon as its validity is limited to the evolution of +humanity. Here we no longer deal with conceptions of eternity and +infinity. It is a question of temporal and spacial phenomena. The +existence of man had a beginning. No doubt it will have an end. It +appeared on earth latest at the commencement of the Quaternary +geological period, but more probably towards the end of the Tertiary +period. It must necessarily disappear when the earth, owing to cold and +evaporation, becomes incapable of supporting life, a state of affairs +which, according to our present knowledge of natural laws, must +inevitably come to pass. A few million years are allotted to it in which +to fulfil its destiny, certainly a short span of time compared with the +eternity of the universe, but compared with the duration of individual +and national life, with personal destinies and historical occurrences, +an immeasurably vast prospect. Within the limits of its genesis, its +being and its disappearance, it is in a constant state of evolution. It +is impossible to deny this. Comparisons between the skulls found among +remains of the paleolithic age and those of our times, between the state +of the undeveloped tribes of central Africa and Australia and that of +the peoples of Europe and America, between the beginnings of human +speech and the present-day languages, between the thought, knowledge and +abilities of former generations and ours--all these prove this +incontrovertibly. + +The purpose of this evolution is unmistakable. It is directed towards an +ever closer, ever subtler adaptation to the unalterable conditions +which are imposed on men by Nature, and which they must make the best of +if they are not to perish. And it is synonymous with progress; that is +to say, not only with change, simple motion from one point to another, +but with amelioration and improvement. + +Here we may apply standards of value. The aim and object of evolution, +which we know and desire, supply us with them. Here we may judge and +appraise anthropomorphically. Not only may we do so, but we must, for it +is a question of matters which concern mankind alone. All evolution of +mankind, corporal and intellectual, the enlargement of the brain case so +as to accommodate a larger brain; the development of the muscles of the +larynx, palate and hand, and the accurate co-ordination of their +movements, which things make clearer and more emphatic speech possible +and render the hands defter; the acquisition, interpretation and storing +up of experiences leading to discoveries and inventions, all are +directed to the same end: to provide men with more reliable weapons in +the struggle for existence; to defend them from the dangers surrounding +them, the destructive forces of Nature; to render their life more +secure, longer and richer; to save them from fatigue and suffering; to +give them pleasurable emotions and possibilities of happiness. And as we +have a clear idea of the object of our evolution, as we desire this +object and continually seek to find new means whereby to reach it, we +are absolutely justified in calling every movement that brings us nearer +to the aim we have in view, and aspire to reach, a progressive step, +and in calling every stage of evolution which realizes a biggish part of +the object desired an amelioration, an improvement, an ascent. + +The total amount of progress which has secured to mankind its +development we sum up in the concept of civilization. The latter, +however, is still far removed from ideal perfection. What we know is +infinitesimally small compared with the tremendous bulk of the unknown, +perhaps the unknowable, which greets our view on all sides. Our +technical achievements often leave us in the lurch and indicate no way +out of many difficulties. In the human being who knows and can do +something, too much still remains of the stupid, helpless, untamed, +primitive beast. + +Nevertheless, what has been achieved is of value, and it is childish to +depreciate it. Paradoxical minds, like J. J. Rousseau and his +parrot-like imitators, may deny the use of all civilization and declare +that the so-called state of nature, the ignorance and helplessness of +undeveloped man amid all too mighty Nature, is preferable. That is an +intellectual joke which is not very amusing. We have not vanquished +death, but we have prolonged life, as the mortality statistics prove. We +cannot cure all diseases; crowded dwellings in great cities, the nature +and intensity of our occupations--civilization, in short--bring diseases +from which we should probably not suffer if we were savages; but the +cave-dwellers, too, were subject to illnesses, and our antisepsis and +hygiene effectually prevent many and grave bodily ills. Division of +labour makes the individual dependent on the whole economic organism; +it makes it easier for the favoured few to exploit the many and to be +parasites at their expense, but nevertheless the individual can more +easily satisfy his needs than if, being completely free and independent, +he alone had to provide all the objects he requires. The speed and +facility with which the exchange of goods is effected, thanks to ever +new and ever more excellent means of communication, often give rise to +artificial wants; cheap travel occasions useless restlessness, but the +emancipation of the individual from the place of his birth, the +conversion of the whole globe into one single economic domain, of which +every part with its own particular superabundance of men and products +supplies the lack of the same in other parts, has at least this +invaluable advantage, that it makes man more independent of local +hazards and makes the earth more habitable for him. Many things provided +by civilization are obtainable only by the rich, and the spectacle of +the luxury of these favoured mortals makes the lot of the poor harder to +bear, but the possibility of working one's way up into the ranks of the +fortunate is a mighty spur to strong characters, and gives rise to +efforts which are profitable to many. All the great technical +achievements of civilization can certainly not bring happiness either to +the individual or to the community, because happiness is a spiritual +state which does not depend on bodily satisfactions and, though it may +be troubled by material conditions, can never be created by them; but +the moments of happiness which the individual experiences derive an +extraordinary intensity from the instruments of civilization which +surround and serve us. + +Certainly civilization has its bad points, and it requires no great +cleverness to discover them, to point them out and to exaggerate them. +Certainly many of its most boasted, supposed benefits are not really a +blessing, but either merely imaginary or else unimportant--little, +superfluous things which may be pleasant, but lacking which we can live +without great deprivation, and for which we undoubtedly pay far too +dearly. But, on the whole, it is a mighty achievement of man's +struggling intellect, an invaluable improvement of the lot of man, and +if anyone denies this he forfeits any claim to serious refutation. +Rousseau's state of nature may be a very pleasant change for a summer +holiday, but every man of sound common sense would decline it as a +permanent abode. + +We may therefore freely concede the fact of progress in civilization in +so far as the latter implies greater safety, facility, order and +equability of life, deeper and more widely diffused knowledge and more +perfect adaptation of man to the natural conditions in which he finds +himself. For it is no reservation to note in the course of evolution +both individual deviations from the path which leads to the goal of +civilization, the amelioration of the constitution of mankind, and +occasional relapses into bygone barbarisms. To make use of Gumplowicz's +expression, it is not an acrochronic and acrotopic illusion (that is, a +form of self-deception which consists in thinking the time when one +lives and the place where one lives the best of all times and the most +wonderful of all places) if we place the present far above all past +ages and declare our civilization to be incomparably richer and more +perfect than anything that has preceded it. The _laudator acti_, the +cross-grained Nestor who praises the past at the expense of the present, +the enthusiast for "the good old times," is a figure that has always +been familiar. But it proves nothing. This tender love of the past is +not the outcome of objective comparison and consideration, but an +impulse of subjective psychology. It is simply the emotion and longing +which fill an old man's heart when he looks back on his youth. He +remembers the pleasurable emotions which once accompanied all his +impressions and which are now unknown to his worn-out organism, and he +thinks the world was better because he found more joy in it. The aged +man is convinced that in his youth the sky was bluer, the rose more +odorous, the women more beautiful than now, but an impartial observer +would pityingly shake his head at this. + +But can the progress, which cannot reasonably be denied in civilization, +also be traced in Morality? Philosophers who are by no means negligible +have roundly replied in the negative. Buckle declares uncompromisingly +that the only progress possible to man is intellectual, and by this he +means that mankind grows in knowledge, foresight and clarity of thought, +but not at the same time in Morality, which, according to him, differs +from the intellect and understanding and is not included in them. +Buckle's unfavourable judgment has been turned into a formula which has +often been repeated. Scientifically, technically, we progress; morally +we stand still or slip back; the two orders of development move neither +in the same direction nor with the same speed. That is a view that is +widely held. Fr. Bouillier comes to the same conclusion as Buckle, +though from different considerations. He asserts that "a savage who +obeys his conscience, however ignorant this may be, can be as virtuous +as a Socrates or an Aristides; one can even go so far as to defend the +view that social progress instead of strengthening individual morality +weakens it, for society, in proportion as it is better ordered, saves +the individual the trouble of a great many virtuous actions." + +However, there are other moralists who take the opposite view. +Shaftesbury cannot imagine a moral system in which there is no place for +the idea of constant progress, of continuous improvement. The great +Frenchmen of the eighteenth century are convinced of the moral rise of +humanity. "The mass of mankind," says Turgot, "advances constantly +towards an ever-growing perfection," and elsewhere: "Men taught by +experience grow in ever greater measure and in a better sense humane." +Condorcet defends no less emphatically the view that the faculty of +growing more perfect is inherent in man. This is a case of pessimism and +optimism which have their roots less in reasonable thought than in +temperament. A worn-out, weary individual, or generation, looks back and +spends the time in futile yearning and melancholy visions of the past; +but a sturdy generation, full of life, and conscious of it, looks +forward, and planning, inventing, and determined to realize its creative +ideas, it conjures up the image of the future. Pessimism regrets and +groans; optimism hopes and promises. The former, like Ovid, thinks the +Golden Age is in the past, the latter, like the fathers of the great +Revolution, looks for it in the future. In neither case do they reach +conclusions as a result of observation and logical thought, rather they +invent reasons afterwards for their conclusions, as they do +interpretations of their observations. But he who regards life neither +with bitterness nor with pride, and tries to understand it objectively, +will come to the opinion that Morality too has its fair share in the +progress of civilization. + +Theological thought interprets moral perfection differently from +scientific thought. According to the former it is independent of +intellectual development and purely a matter of faith. God is the ideal +of Morality, belief in Him the necessary condition for a moral life. +Through its fall mankind withdrew from God and was left a prey to +Immorality; original sin perpetually burdened it; by redemption and +grace it has been purified from this inborn stain, led back to God and +once more rendered capable of Morality. For mankind only one kind of +progress in Morality was possible, and this took place, not gradually +and step by step, but with one sudden swift advance, by which it +immediately attained the highest degree of moral perfection possible, +and that was when the true faith was revealed to it. Before the +revelation mankind did not know real Morality, only its dim shadow, only +a vague yearning for it; by the revelation at one blow it was in full +possession of Morality, and now it is the business of every individual, +whether he will draw near to the divine example by pious efforts or +ruthlessly withdraw from it. Since the glad tidings of faith were +announced to humanity there can be no question of moral progress for +mankind as a whole; it has become a personal matter which everyone has +to deal with himself. Criticism of this dogmatism is superfluous. It is +quite enough to place it before the reader. + +It is quite comprehensible, too, that those whose views permit them to +talk with Bouillier of a savage who obeys his conscience should deny +moral progress. They assume that a savage has a conscience, that +conscience is an element of human nature, that it is a quality or a +capacity like sensation or memory, that it is born with man like his +limbs and organs. In that case it might well be asserted that subjective +Morality has made no progress in historic and perhaps even in +prehistoric times, and that actually a "savage who obeys his conscience +can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or an Aristides." + +It would hardly be possible to give a concrete proof of the contrary; if +for no other reason because for a long time there have been no savages +in the strict sense of the word anywhere on earth. By savages we mean +human beings in their primitive, zoological condition who have developed +solely according to the biological forms of the species and under the +influence of surrounding Nature and have taken over nothing of an +intellectual character from the group to which they belong. All savages +of whom we know form societies which for the most part are not even +loosely, but firmly, knit together, with laws that may seem nonsensical +and barbaric to us, but are none the less binding with clearly defined +duties which they impose on every member, with sanctions whose cruelty +supersedes that of any punishment permitted by civilization. A man who +is a member of a society, no matter how primitive it may be, may +certainly have a conscience, but the point is that he is not a savage, +but the contrary of a savage, namely: a social being who has received an +education from his society, who is bound to conform to its habits, +customs and views, and who in all his actions must consider its opinion. +But these conditions, as I have shown, produce a conscience, the +representative of society in the consciousness of the individual. +Conscience is no innate feature of man uninfluenced by society, it is +not a product of Nature, it is the result of education; he who possesses +a conscience is no savage, but a person formed by discipline and +subservient to it; conscience is the fruit of civilization, of a certain +civilization; in itself it represents progress compared with the +primitive state of man. Consequently it is an objectionable +contradiction to talk of conscience and at the same time deny moral +progress. + +It is peculiarly arbitrary, too, to think that a savage, if he had a +conscience, could obey it to the same extent, that is, be just as +virtuous, as a Socrates or an Aristides. This would contradict all the +observations and experience from which I have derived the doctrine that +conscience works by means of inhibition, and that Morality and Virtue +from the biological point of view are inhibition. For inhibition is +developed by practice and use. Except in cases of morbid disturbance it +develops simultaneously with the understanding which manipulates it and +demands efficiency from it. There can be no two opinions about the fact +that the understanding and the faculty of inhibition in living beings +have developed progressively. There is no need to adduce any proof that +the frog is intellectually superior to the zoospore, and man to the +frog, and that as we ascend the scale of organisms we find their +reactions to stimuli are increasingly subject to individual +modification, and that there is a gradual transition from the original, +purely mechanical tropism to differentiated reflex action, which, +however, is still beyond the control of the will, and finally to +resistances which suppress every externally visible reply on the part of +the organism to the impression it has received. + +In the course of this development the faculty of inhibition grows +stronger and more efficient and obeys the behests of the understanding +more and more swiftly, surely and reliably; it can reach a pitch of +invincibility against which all the revolts of instinct, all the storms +of passion, are powerless. + +In the savage, or rather in man at a low stage of civilization, the +power of inhibition is far from having reached such perfect development. +It is not very robust, works defectively and often fails. Little +civilized man, if he has a conscience, cannot even with the best +intentions always obey it punctually. His instinct is stronger than his +insight. He is not master of his impulses; rather it is they that master +him. All who have described tribes of low civilization have observed +that their reactions resemble reflex movements and that they lack +self-control. Moral conduct, that is, control of their selfishness and +consideration for their fellow men, is difficult for them if it demands +effort, sacrifice and painful renunciation. However, we need not trouble +to go to the negroes of the Congo or the inhabitants of the Solomon +Islands to observe the inefficiency of the power of inhibition. We need +only look around us. We shall find enough instances among ourselves. The +uneducated, the badly educated and abnormal people on whom teaching and +example make no impression cannot follow the precepts of Morality, +although they know them. To express it as the Roman poet does, they know +the better and approve it, but they have a longing for the worse. So it +is wrong to say that a savage can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or +an Aristides. He could not, even if he would. He would lack the organic +means: a sufficiently trained intelligence to point out his moral duty, +a sufficiently developed faculty of inhibition to follow the admonition +of his intelligence. Bouillier's objection to moral progress will not +hold water. The Romantics who have invented the fairy tale of the noble +savage and who declare in Seume's words: "See, we savages are better men +after all," are out of touch with reality. Like civilization, and +simultaneously with civilization, Morality progresses towards +improvement, towards perfection. + +The Kantian moralist, like the theologian, is forbidden by the logic of +his system to admit the possibility of moral progress. If the moral law +is categorical, that is, unlimited by any special purpose, if it exists +within us, eternal and immutable as the stars above us, we should be +hard put to it to say how this unalterable block, placed in our souls we +know not how or by whom, could receive an impetus to progressive +development, or in what way this development could be carried out. That +which is categorical is absolute, and the concept of progress in the +absolute, as in the infinite and the eternal, has no sense. But whoever +regards Morality from the biological and sociological point of view is +forced to assert its progress, just as the dogmatic mystic, who believes +in the categorical imperative, is forced to deny it. + +Let us recapitulate the fundamental concepts. Regarded biologically +Morality is Inhibition, the development of which is of the greatest +importance to the individual, as it enables him not to waste the living +force of his cell plasm and of his organs in sterile reflex movements, +but to store it up and hold it ready for useful purposes. The stronger +his power of inhibition the better he is armed for the struggle for +existence, and the better he is armed the more efficient he is. Denial +of the progressive development of Inhibition implies a denial that +modern man can maintain himself with more ease and security against +Nature and hostile or injurious natural phenomena, and that he is more +successful in competition with other men than his predecessors on earth. +But this latter denial is obviously nonsense. The only individuals who +do not take part in progressive development are the degenerates. They +are organically inferior, their faculty of inhibition is defective or +altogether lacking, they are slaves of impulses which their will and +intelligence have no means of controlling, they are the outcome of +morbidly arrested or retrograde development, they are the victims and +refuse of a civilization too intensive, too exhausting and wearing for +some men, and they are destined to fall out of the ranks of a race +moving majestically forward and to lie helplessly by the roadside. + +From the sociological point of view Morality is the bond which unites +the individuals in a community, the foundation upon which alone society +can be built up and maintained. For it implies a victory over self, +consideration for one's neighbour, recognition of his rights, concession +of his claims, even when valued possessions must unwillingly be given up +and painful renunciation of attainable satisfaction is required. This is +neighbourly kindness and the charity of the Bible, Hutcheson's and +Hume's benevolence, Adam Smith's sympathy and Herbert Spencer's +altruism; it is the necessary condition on which alone individuals can +live peaceably together and helpfully assist each other to make life +easier. If most or all individuals lack it, we have Hobbes's war of all +against all; then man is as a wolf to other men, and each one is +condemned to the state of a beast roaming in loneliness. If a few, a +minority, lack it, then the majority will not tolerate them in its +midst, but will expel them from the community as a dangerous nuisance +and deprive them of the privilege of mutual aid and of the advantage of +joint responsibility. + +The species of man, like every other species of organism and like every +individual, wants to live. It can only achieve this by adapting itself +to existing natural conditions. The more suitable and perfect the +adaptation the more easily and securely it lives. Under the present +conditions of the universe and the earth a solitary human individual +could not manage to exist, let alone develop into an intelligent being. +The form his adaptation to circumstances has taken is that of union in +an organized community. For the existence of society and the adjustment +of the individual in it is the indispensable condition for the life of +the species as well as of the individual. Society can only continue to +exist if individuals learn to consider one another and practise +benevolence towards each other. Society therefore created Morality and +inculcated it in all its members, because it was its first need, the +essential condition which rendered its existence possible, just as the +species created society, because it could only continue to live as an +organized society. + +Thus Morality with the strictest logical necessity has its place in the +totality of efforts which human beings had to make, and still have to +make, in order to preserve life, to make it sufficiently profound and to +enrich it with satisfactions, that is, with pleasurable emotions of +every kind, so that they may continue to have the will and the eager +desire to maintain their existence by effort and struggle; in short, in +order to make life seem worth living, even at the cost of constant toil +and moil. Without society it is impossible for the individual to exist; +without Morality it is impossible for society to exist; the instinct of +self-preservation furnishes society with habits and rules governing the +mutual relations of its members and with institutions for economizing +force; all these together we call civilization. The development and +improvement of civilization is obvious; it is proved by the fact that it +draws nearer and nearer to its goal, namely, the establishment of +satisfactory relations between individuals and groups, and the +attainment of a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of individual +effort. But it would be incomprehensible if Morality, the essential +condition for the existence of society which creates civilization, +should have no part in the indisputable, because easily demonstrable, +progress of the latter. + +Morality occupies such a large place in civilization that the mistaken +view has arisen among many moral philosophers that it is the aim of +civilization and has no aim other than itself. Closer investigation +shows this to be an error, a reversal of the true relation. Morality is +no aim, certainly no aim to itself, it is a means to an end, the most +important, most indispensable means to the one end, to bring about +civilization, to maintain and refine it, and adapt it more and more to +its task. But the task of civilization, as I have shown, is to preserve, +facilitate and enrich the life of the individual and the species. +Morality therefore is the most important form in which the instinct of +self-preservation in the species is manifested, and to deny progress to +it implies the assumption that the species does not possess the impulse +to preserve and beautify its existence, that its instinct of +self-preservation flags, that it does not recognize its aim and is +ignorant of the path leading to its goal. This assumption, however, is +contradicted by all, and supported by none, of the phenomena observable +in the life of the species--the absolute increase of the population of +the earth, the prolongation of individual life and of the age of +efficiency, the combating of every kind of harmful thing. + +The steadfast self-control of civilized man compared with the +unreliability of the savage, who appears capricious and unaccountable +because he freely obeys every impulse, proves the progressive +development of the faculty of inhibition in the individual organism. The +order and definite organization of modern society, the rule of law, +men's equality before the law, the guarantee of freedom and respect for +the person, all these compared with the state of nations in earlier +times (actually anarchy under a mantle of tyranny and the unlimited +power of a few mighty ones over the helpless masses) prove the +progressive development of civilization in the social organism. But +logically the progressive development of Morality itself must correspond +to the progressive development of its instrument, inhibition, and of its +product, civilization. + +The conclusion to which we are forced by theoretical considerations is +fully endorsed by observation of actual life. It is sufficient to +indicate broad facts to one who denies moral progress. Slavery, which +Aristotle thought a law of Nature, which Christianity tolerated, which +modern states, such as England, France, the United States and Brazil, +defended and protected by law, was everywhere abolished some years ago. +The objection is raised that modern hired labour is merely slavery of +the proletariat under another name, that the exploitation of workmen by +employers is a hypocritical continuation of serfdom. But that is +sophistry. The hired labourer is not bound to his contract. He can break +it. "Yes, at the price of starvation." That used to be the case, but +nowadays organized working men are no longer at the mercy of powerful +capital, and therein lies progress. They are in a position to make +conditions and not seldom to force their acceptance. They have the right +to strike, to move from place to place, to form unions. The community +has recognized the duty of mitigating, at least to some extent, the +evils to which faulty economic organization exposes the workman. It has +instituted accident and health insurance, old age pensions, and, in some +places, assistance for those who are out of work through no fault of +their own. All this is still very defective, but these are hopeful +beginnings, all the same, and, above all, it shows the awakening of a +social conscience that earlier ages did not know. + +Justice is administered more and more humanely, that is, morally. It is +a century since legal torture was abolished. Society is ashamed to get +at the truth easily by torturing a suspect who after all may be +innocent. The condemned man is no longer branded or mutilated; he +suffers no corporal ill-treatment of which the results can never be +obliterated. Capital punishment is still a blot on the honour of +civilization. But for more than a century now, since the time of +Beccaria, it has been violently opposed and has already been abolished +in some states; the others will no doubt have to follow suit within a +short time. Consider that in England at the beginning of the nineteenth +century a thief was hanged if he had stolen a thing of no more value +than the rope that was to hang him, and even children of fourteen years +were condemned to this fate. To-day the judge pronounces sentence of +death, even where it is still legal, with grave misgivings and +searchings of conscience, and the execution, formerly a public +spectacle, is carried out more or less secretly, because the conviction +is gradually ripening in society that by the cold-blooded killing of a +man it is perpetrating a crime which it must keep as secret as possible. +The sentence is now almost everywhere deferred, and thus the conviction +becomes a very emphatic warning which points out the path of repentance, +of conversion and improvement to the guilty man, and leaves him the +possibility of becoming a decent human being again. Special courts for +children mitigate the stern penal code and modify it according to the +needs of unripe, youthful characters. Imprisonment for debt is a +half-forgotten thing of the past and regarded more or less as a joke. +What these changes have in common is that they one and all indicate a +deepening of the community's feeling of duty and responsibility towards +the individual, greater respect for persons on the part of the law, an +increase of the will to resist the first impulse of anger, revenge and +mercilessness. These tendencies, however, are the very essence of +Morality. + +I forbear to adduce as a proof of progress that the Inquisition no +longer rules and nowhere burns its victims. For actually there is no +greater toleration of those who hold other opinions than there was +formerly. Religious toleration is explained by the fact that the +people's consciousness no longer attaches such enormous importance to +religion as in past centuries. But political, æsthetic and philosophical +antagonisms arouse as much bloodthirsty rage to-day as did formerly +heresy in religion, and opponents would unhesitatingly apply torture and +the stake to one another if the great mass of the people would develop +sufficiently enthusiastic zeal for their views to allow their raging +fanaticism to have recourse to violence, as it once permitted +domineering religious orthodoxy to do. + +Other aspects of civilization, not so essential, are hardly less +encouraging than the developments on which I have hitherto dwelt. +Drunkenness, formerly an almost universal vice, is on the decrease. +Among the educated classes it is only met with exceptionally, and is +recognized as a morbid aberration; among the lower classes it +continually grows less. The statistics of the savings banks show an +ever-growing determination to save. The masses who used to rejoice in +dirt now manifest an increasingly vigorous desire for a cleanliness that +demands soap and baths. This indicates control of impulse, of the +inclination for alcoholic drinks and the tendency to squander, and an +increase of self-respect which recognizes dirt to be humiliating. These +are activities of the moral feelings, their material activities. + +If, in spite of these material proofs of the progress of Morality in all +social functions and in many individual habits, serious-minded men still +maintain that it stands still or even that it shows retrogression +compared with former times, this view, which is undoubtedly a mistaken +one, is due to wrong interpretation of facts. + +Bouillier's remark that "social progress instead of increasing +individual Morality weakens it, because society, in proportion as it is +better organized, saves the individual the trouble of a number of +virtuous actions" has a perfectly correct point of departure. Many tasks +of neighbourly kindness and humane joint responsibility which used to be +left to the inclination, the free choice and the noble zeal of +individuals, and could be carried out or neglected by them, are now +methodically fulfilled by the community. Saint Martin no longer needs to +divide his cloak to give half to a poor shivering man. The public +charity commission gives him winter clothes if he cannot afford to buy +any. No knights are needed to protect innocence, weakness and humility +from oppressors. The oppressed appeal successfully to the police, the +court of justice, or, by writing to the papers, to public opinion. There +is no need for Knights Templar or Knights of St. John to care for +strangers and tend the sick. Inns and public hospitals are at their +disposal. To-day there would be neither occasion nor reason for the +miracle of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, who against the orders of her hard +husband took to the starving bread which was turned into roses. The poor +are regularly fed in municipal and communal kitchens. Individual deeds +of mercy are less necessary now than formerly, when, if they occurred, +they were the outcome of exceptionally noble and devout sympathy and +heroic self-sacrifice. + +One is therefore inclined to believe that men are less capable of such +deeds than they were in the past. But that is doing them a grave +injustice. Dr. Barnardo, who opened a home for the little waifs and +strays of the East End of London, is not inferior to St. Vincent de Paul +who adopted and brought up forsaken children. John Brown who suffered a +martyr's death by hanging because he attempted with arms to liberate the +negro slaves of the Southern States, Henry Dumont who devoted the +efforts of a lifetime to founding the Red Cross to help those wounded in +war, Emile Zola who sacrificed his fortune, his reputation as an author, +his personal safety, and suffered persecution, calumny, exile, a +shameful condemnation in court, and violent threats to his life in order +to get justice for Captain Dreyfus who had been wrongfully accused--all +these can well compare with the saints in the Golden Legend. Virtue +exists potentially in as many cases as formerly, probably in more; and +it is actively practised whenever and wherever it is appealed to. + +Another result of the long evolution of civilization and Morality is the +development of an ethical instinct in all except abnormal, degenerate +individuals, which causes men to act morally in nearly all situations +without conscious reflection, choice or effort. The individual who is +ethically well grounded, in whom moral conduct has become an organized +reflex action, does what is right without any conscious effort, and +therefore does not in so doing evoke any idea of merit either in +himself or in witnesses. But to do right habitually, carelessly and +almost without thought, as one breathes and eats, easily makes one +unjust in one's judgments. The battle between Reason and blind instinct, +between the Will and refractory Impulse, the victory of the lofty +principle, of spirituality over what is irrational and materialistic, +which give us the illusion that free humanity is superior to the +fatality of cosmic forces, have something so elevated and beautiful +about them that we are disappointed if they are absent, and practical +Morality without this dramatic setting does not appear to be real +Morality. + +Nevertheless we must not give way to this æsthetic point of view. We +must always remember that Morality has a biological and sociological aim +and must soberly admit that it is all the better if this aim is realized +without in every single case depending on uncertain individual +decisions. It would be an ideal state of affairs if in a society there +were such clear knowledge of all its vital necessities, and this had +been so inculcated in all its members, that their harmonious life +together and their co-operation for the common weal would never more be +troubled by the revolt of ruthless individual selfishness against the +love of one's neighbour and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the +community. The ideal of Morality would be attained, but the concept of +Merit would be transferred from the individual to the community. +Superficial observation might object to finding in individuals no +victorious struggle against resistance, hence no virtue, and might +bemoan the stagnation, nay, the retrogression, of Morality. But whoever +views matters as a whole would have to admit that it would imply the +greatest progress in virtue if the latter from being an individual merit +had become an attribute of the community. I am far from maintaining that +we have reached this ideal state; but evolution tends unmistakably in +this direction; and this is one of the reasons why Morality may appear +to make no progress. + +The very rise of the community to a higher stage of Morality may be a +fresh cause of error concerning the progress of Morality. The work of +the strongest and most clear-headed thinkers for many thousand years, +who have bequeathed as a legacy to the community their lifelong labours +for the amelioration of the lot of mankind, has developed in us an ideal +of active and passive Morality which is always present, even to the mind +of the weak or bad man who cannot or will not live up to it. By this +ideal, which is that of the community and which we bear within us, we +involuntarily judge real life as we observe it, without applying the +necessary corrections. We necessarily note a discrepancy between theory +and practice, which appears to us to be not mere inadequacy but a +contradiction of principles, not a quantitative, but a qualitative +difference, and thus he who is not forewarned easily becomes doubtful, +pessimistic, and bitterly contemptuous of mankind. + +This is the theme with which light literature unweariedly deals. Novels +and the drama constantly show us types: "Pillars of society" and other +worthy men, who pretend to be honourable, who are full of good +principles, preach unctuously and condemn others with pious indignation, +but who themselves in all situations behave with the most horrible +selfishness and are sinks of iniquity. The creators of these rogues +professing virtue, of these secret sinners, think they are mightily +superior; they think they know mankind, that they are deceived by no one +and can see deep down into men's souls; they call their method realism, +and they look down with the greatest contempt upon poets who depict +good, unselfish, noble, in short, moral characters, and call them +optimists, flirts, distillers of rosewater, who are either too silly or +too dishonest to see the truth or to confess it. If realism happens to +be the fashion, the public believes these men who depict what is ugly +and disgusting, admires them, is impressed by them, and scorns the +idealists who have a better opinion of mankind. + +However, realism is onesided and exaggerated, and therefore just as far +from the truth as enthusiastic idealism. It picks out certain +characteristics of human nature, generalizes from them and neglects the +others, thereby libelling mankind. The same people who in their flat, +insipid daily life unhesitatingly indulge their poor little vanities, +their naïve selfishness, their childish jealousy, their secret +sensuality and their moral cowardice because it is of no consequence, +because it alters nothing in the general constitution of society, +because the community takes good care that moral principles shall be +maintained, these same people can, on great occasions, which, however, +seldom occur, reveal virtues which they themselves never suspected and +which we gaze at in blank astonishment with reverent awe. The +hypocritical Philistines of realistic literature, rotten at the core, +when the _Titanic_ sank, during the plague in Manchuria, at the +earthquake of Messina, in the mine disaster at Courrières, and on Arctic +and Antarctic expeditions, proved to be heroes who came very near to the +theatrical ideal of Morality, if they did not quite reach it. If one +takes the valet's point of view and observes man in his dressing-gown +and slippers when he does not feel called upon to pull himself together, +one may very well form a poor opinion of him. But if one considers the +actions of the community and dwells on the loftiest deeds of +individuals, one will no longer believe that the Morality of the present +time is inferior to that of any other age. + +There is one phenomenon, though, which seems to prove that those who +deny moral progress are in the right, and that is war. This is indeed +the triumph of the beast in mankind, a bestial trampling under foot of +civilization, its principles, methods and aims, and it might be adduced +as a crushing proof of the stagnation or retrogression of Morality that +to this very day its horrors can devastate the earth, as they did +hundreds and thousands of years ago, only to an incomparably greater +extent, more cruelly and more thoroughly. But this, too, would be a +false conclusion. It is certain that the men who take it upon themselves +freely, purposely and intentionally to make war are monsters; their +action is a crime that cannot be expiated. Unhesitatingly they have +recourse to massacre, robbery, fire and all other horrors in order to +satisfy their devilish self-seeking which desires the fulfilment of +their ambition, that is, of their self-love and vanity, which covets +riches, increase of power, a ruling position and its privileges. These +they pursue either for themselves or for a family or caste, and they +pretend that they wish to defend their country from its enemies, to +acquire new boundaries for it affording better protection than the old, +to promote the development of the nation by getting fresh territory, to +spread its civilization and secure a glorious future for it. + +Nations, however, which allow their rulers to plunge them into a war of +aggression may be foolish and clumsy, but they need not be immoral. They +are made drunk with phrases which appeal to their noblest feelings, +which their government and its intellectual bailiffs pour out to them in +overflowing measure; they believe the shameless lies which are told them +boastfully; and this is undoubtedly a lamentable, mental weakness which +drew from Dante the bitter cry: "Often one hears the people in their +intoxication cry: 'Long live our death! Down with our life!'" But having +simply accepted these preliminary ideas the people act with such +Morality as one cannot forbear to admire. In a grand flight they rise +superior to all thought of self, raise their feeling of joint +responsibility to the pitch of heroism and martyrdom, and gladly +sacrifice to their duty to their neighbour and to the community their +possessions, their comfort, their health and their lives. That is very +great virtue whose subjective merit is no whit diminished by the fact +that it is manifested in a cause that is objectively unjust. And this +virtue on the part of nations which have been misled was never so +widespread or so real as now. The attitude of mercenaries who served the +highest bidder, the lack of ideals among the soldiers who followed +foreign conquerors at whose command they tyrannized over nations who did +not concern them at all, the cynicism of the leaders who unhesitatingly +went over to the enemy and fought against their own country and people, +these are things that are not to be found nowadays and are almost +unthinkable. No Napoleon of to-day could lead the men of Würtemberg and +Bavaria to Spain and Russia, nor could an Elector of Hesse sell recruits +to England for the conquest of North America; no Louis XIV could induce +a Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to fight his battles against German +adversaries, no Constable of Bourbon ally himself with Spain against his +native France. Leonidas, once admired and praised as an exception, is +to-day the rule. "The guards who die but do not yield" are to be found +on every battlefield nowadays. + +In modern warfare a higher, more perfect Morality of the masses obtains +than was the case in the past. That war itself is the most immoral thing +does not detract from the moral worth of those who are led and misled. +The masses lack insight and judgment, their understanding is not +sufficiently developed to realize the bestiality of the rulers who put +them to such evil use; but the way they suppress their own feelings, the +way their will controls their impulses, their social discipline, in +short, their Morality, is admirable. Moreover, the conscience of mankind +revolts more and more against the wickedness of war, and the best men of +the time are striving to bring the mutual relations of nations, like +those of individuals, within the jurisdiction of Law and Morality. +Morality will doubtless at no distant date do away with war, as it has +abolished human sacrifice, slavery, blood feuds, head hunting and +cannibalism. + +No phenomenon of individual worthlessness observed within a narrow +sphere can detract from the fact that the community constantly improves. +A pessimistic view of the development of Morality has no justification. +Progress of civilization implies progress of Morality, its most +important instrument in the work of adapting the race to the immutable +conditions of its existence. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY + + +The concept of Morality includes an idea of compulsion, of coercion. A +voice says to man: "You must!" or "You may not!" It commands him to do, +or to refrain from doing, something. If he obeys, all is well; but if he +takes no notice of it, pays no heed to it, the question arises: "What +now? Will the voice rest content with crying in the wilderness? Will it +not mind speaking to deaf ears? Will the refractory individual not +suffer for disregarding it, or has it means to enforce obedience, and +what are these means?" + +The answer to this question depends on what view one holds as to the +nature of this monitory, warning, commanding voice. Whoever believes in +Kant's categorical imperative must admit that this word of command is +denuded of all power of coercion and must absolutely rely on the good +will of the individual in whose soul it makes itself heard. According to +Kant the moral law aims at no extraneous result, no utility. It is its +own aim and object. But its own aim is fulfilled as soon as the +categorical imperative has spoken, whether the individual acts in +accordance with it or not. It has therefore in principle no sanction. + +True, Kant contradicts himself, for after having sternly excluded from +his doctrine all utility as the end of Morality, all trace of feeling +from moral action, he smuggles blissful happiness in by a back door; the +result of submission to the moral law and its dutiful fulfilment, he +declares, will be bliss. Bliss, however you interpret it, is a +pleasurable emotion. Whether you act morally with the declared intention +of attaining the pleasurable emotion of bliss, or whether this +pleasurable emotion comes of its own accord as an undesired reward when +you have acted morally merely from a feeling of duty, without a thought +for such a result, without a wish to attain it, it makes no difference +to the fact that moral action actually meets with a reward. Kant does +not openly promise this, but with a wink he whispers in your ear that +there is a prospect of it. + +Nor does it alter the further fact that Kant, having contemptuously +expelled Eudæmonism from his system, reinstates it with full honours. +Once it has been conceded that moral conduct makes man blissful, in +other words gives him a reward, the categorical imperative also has a +sanction, albeit a very insufficient one. He who fulfils the moral law +attains bliss; that is a spur whether you admit it or not. But he who +does not fulfil it loses this advantage, otherwise, however, nothing +happens to him. The sanction, therefore, is onesided. A reward is +offered for the fulfilment of the moral law, but there is no punishment +for its non-fulfilment. For it is no penalty if bliss is withheld from +him who has no conception of it and no desire for it. No matter, then, +if the moral law be eternal and immutable as the stars above us, if it +be categorical, if it be fulfilled, not owing to a conception of its +effect, not from liking for this effect, but from an inner necessity, it +ceases to be a living force for mankind or to have any practical +significance; for the single thread which unites it with human +feelings--the whispered, vague promise of bliss--is too thin. Feeling +which has no knowledge of this misty bliss, and therefore no yearning +for it, is uninfluenced by the categorical moral law. Reason is not +necessarily convinced that it is right and valid. The moral law abides +like the stars with which it is arbitrarily compared, itself a star in +airless space, pursuing its course regardless of humanity, having no +relation to it or connexion with it; regard for or disregard of the +moral law makes no perceptible difference, and it ceases to have any but +a kind of astronomical interest for mankind, a purely theoretical +interest for purposes of scientific observation and calculation, and is +in no way applicable to the feelings, thoughts and actions of men. + +Theological Morality adopts a widely different point of view. Its logic +compels it to provide the most effective sanctions. God is the lawgiver +of Morality. He prescribes with dictatorial omniscience what is good, +what is bad, what should be practised and what avoided. Obedience earns +a glorious reward, revolt entails the most terrible punishment. Reward +and punishment are eternal, or may in certain circumstances be so, and +this, by the way, is cruelty which ill accords with the universal +goodness ascribed to God. For human understanding will never be +persuaded, will never be able to grasp, that a sinner, however grave +and numerous his sins committed during the brief period of the fleeting +life of man, can ever deserve an eternity of the most fearful +punishment. The lack of proportion between the deed and the penalty is +so monstrous that it is felt to be the gravest injustice, against which +both Reason and feeling revolt. Imagination can conceive hell fire that +lasts a certain time and has an aim, like life with its praiseworthy and +wicked deeds, but it boggles at the idea of a hell from which there is +no escape and the agonies of which are endless. + +The Old Testament conceives the sanctions of the moral law enunciated by +God in a thoroughly realistic manner. Fulfil the commandment "that thy +days may be long in the land." If you disobey, the curse of the Lord +will be on you and you will be pursued by His anger unto the fourth +generation. Christianity considered it dubious to make this life the +scene of reward and punishment. It is imprudent to let divine justice +rule here below, so to say, in public, before an audience and +representatives of the Press who attentively follow the proceedings, +watch all its details, and can judge whether the verdict is put into +execution. Prudence demands that the trial should take place in the next +world, where it is protected from annoying curiosity. Mocking onlookers +cannot then observe that it is only in the dramas of noble-minded poets +that in the last act vice is inevitably punished and virtue rewarded, +while in real life only too often merit starves, suffers humiliation and +poverty and altogether leads a miserable existence, while sin flourishes +in an objectionable manner and to the very end revels in all the good +things of this earth. However, the religious moralists painted such a +vivid and arresting picture of what awaits the sinners in the next +world, that if men had not been obdurate in their disbelief they must +have shudderingly realized it, as if it actually happened in this world. +Words from the pulpit admonishing men to obey God's law under penalty of +most terrible punishment were greatly emphasized by the paintings and +sculpture over the altars and the church doors, where all the tortures +of hell were depicted by great artists who put all their imagination and +all their genius into the work. + +As innumerable people have testified, these representations were taken +so literally, not only by the simple-minded masses but also by the more +highly educated, that they were haunted by them, waking and sleeping, +and imagined that in their own flesh they felt the torture of flames, of +boiling pitch, of the prick of the pitchfork as the devil turned them on +the grid, of the teeth with which the spirits of hell tore their flesh +from their bones. The fear of hell poisoned many a life up till quite +recently, especially in Scotland, and kept people in a constant state of +agitation and anguish which occasionally rose to mad despair. It is +remarkable that only punishment was so impressively held up to man's +view, but not reward. Pictures of paradise are much less rich and varied +than those of hell, and its joys are peculiarly modest. The inventive +powers of painters, sculptors, and poets did not rise above a +beautifully illuminated hall where the blessed are ranged around God's +throne and with folded hands sing hymns of praise to Him, while angels +play an accompaniment on trumpets and fiddles. A prayer meeting, a choir +and a concert of music, that is all that Christian eschatology holds out +as an eternal reward to virtue. It redounds to its credit that it +assumes a sufficiently modest taste among the good to make them long for +these joys and find infinite happiness in them. + +Islam does not count on such moderation. The joys of paradise that it +promises are so crudely sensual that they may well arouse lust in coarse +natures, and can counterbalance the fear of hell fire. The ideas of the +reward of merit in the hereafter held by the northern nations, Germans +and Scandinavians, are just as low and coarse. For the Mohamedans +paradise is a harem; for the worshippers of Odin it is a pot-house where +there are free drinks and a jolly brawl to end up with. Heroes who fall +in battle--they knew no virtues but a warlike spirit and contempt of +death--enter Valhalla, where they partake of the everlasting orgies of +the gods, drink unlimited quantities of mead and beer, and fight for +them to their heart's content without taking any harm. The North +American Indians hope, after leading a model life, to be gathered to the +Great Spirit, and in the happy hunting grounds of heaven evermore to +kill abundant game. Only Buddhism comforts the virtuous man with finer +and more spiritual hopes. From out his world of weariness and pessimism +it opens up the prospect of Nirvana to him, that is, of the end of all +feeling, which after all can only be painful, and of all thought, which +after all is only melancholy and despair, and of the volatilization of +the personality, the only real release; while it condemns the sinner to +the worst punishment, continued existence in ever new incarnations. + +These are indeed extraordinarily vigorous sanctions, which, though they +fail to have any effect on the unbeliever, make a very deep impression +on the believer, and are well fitted to determine his actions. But they +imply a debasement of the motives for leading a moral life, which are no +longer the outcome of insight and a convinced desire for good, but the +result of fear and avidity, a speculation for profit, a prudent flight +from danger. The practice of morality becomes a safe investment for the +father of a family who hopes to find his savings augmented by interest +in the hereafter, and the avoidance of vice becomes a schoolboy's fear +of punishment. Nevertheless, the view is widely held by superficial, +practical men that these imaginary and deceptive sanctions of Morality +cannot be dispensed with, that only the fear of hell can keep the masses +from giving themselves up to every form of vice and crime, that only the +promise of paradise is capable of inducing them to act unselfishly and +make sacrifices, and that all bonds of discipline would be loosened if +they ceased to believe in a last judgment and an hereafter with its +rewards and punishments. + +This whole system of sanctions in a future life is a transcendental +projection (according with primitive, childlike thought) of immanent +practices and forms in the positive administration of justice which are +transferred to a class of actions that successfully evade it. +Traditional and customary Law, as well as written Law, puts its whole +emphasis on sanctions; it partakes itself of the nature of a sanction. +Without sanctions it has no meaning. It is not kindly counsel, nor +fatherly admonition, nor wise advice, it is a stern command, it is +coercion, and this arouses only scorn if it is not armed with the means +to make itself a reality to which the unwilling must also submit, +because they cannot help themselves. There is no law, there can be no +law, which is not supplemented by arrangements that make it binding for +everyone. + +In the British House of Commons it has been customary for many hundred +years to designate members as the representatives of their particular +constituency. Only if a member commits a grave offence against the rules +of the House does he run the risk of the Speaker's calling him by name, +but this case has not arisen within the memory of man. A disrespectful +Irish member of Parliament, urged by perverse curiosity, asked the +Speaker one day: "What would happen if you called me by my name?" The +Speaker thought for a short time and then answered with impressive +gravity: "I have no idea, but it must be something terrible." Such a +mysterious threat of an unknown catastrophe may suffice for a picked +assembly whose members would no doubt maintain order and observe all the +rules of parliamentary decency, even if they were not held in check by +the fear of some dark danger. It would not be sufficient by a long way +to guarantee the rule of Law in a society which includes individuals of +the most varied disposition, mind development, education and strength of +impulse. + +Positive Law, as I have shown, presents a very simplified excerpt of +Morality for the use of coarser natures. It is a summary of the minimum +of self-denial, consideration for one's fellow men, and the feeling of +joint responsibility, the observance of which the community must +pitilessly demand from all its members if it is to continue to exist and +not fall back within a very short time into the state of Hobbes's war of +all against all. The necessity of self-preservation makes it a duty for +the community to provide for the case that one of its members refuses to +accept the minimum of discipline and to recognize the claims of another +personality. The community prevents this revolt, which would frustrate +its aim and endanger its existence, by employing physical force to break +all resistance to the Law which it must, for the common weal, impose on +all its members. That is an extraneous compulsion that certainly has +something brutal and unworthy of man about it and may well arouse +discomfort in more highly developed minds. It would undoubtedly be more +dignified and better if there were no need for the handcuffs of the +police, for prison cells and executioners, if man's own insight and the +admonition of his conscience were enough to constrain everyone to +respect the Law, that is, to practise a minimum of Morality. + +But the community cannot wait until this stage of moral development has +been generally attained. It refuses to entrust its existence to the +spiritual purity of all its members. On principle it disregards +processes in the consciousness of the individual--I have cited in an +earlier chapter the few exceptions to this rule: investigation as to +premeditation, accountability, freedom from undue influence--and keeps +to actions which alone it judges. It declares itself incompetent to +pronounce sentence upon a "storm inside a skull," to quote Victor Hugo. +Its sphere is that of obvious facts. Not until subjective impulses and +decisions are manifested in outward form does it intervene with methods +of the same order, with outward coercion. The sanctions of its law are +material, are punishments and fines. It hits the wrongdoer over the head +and on his hands and forcibly empties his pockets. To look into his soul +and set matters to rights there is a task undertaken much later by +law-givers. It was only after they had remembered that the source of law +is Morality and that its ultimate aim is not the bare attainment of a +state of mutual respect for one another's rights, but the education of +the community to a universal condition of self-discipline, consideration +and neighbourly love, that the law-givers made a point not only of +requiting the bad man's misdeeds, but also of trying to elevate him +morally. + +At different times, at different stages of civilization, and according +to the current views of the universe, society has interpreted in +different ways the punishment it inflicts and which it carries out by +forcible means, so as to ensure respect for its laws. Its original +character is that of revenge for an offence. The wrongdoer has offended +the community, it attacks him furiously and breaks every bone in his +body just as an angry individual would do in his first access of +indignation. That is Draco's penal code. That is the law of literal +requital. The special characteristic of this sanction is its violence +and lack of moderation. It does not trouble to find the right proportion +between punishment and crime. It does not carefully and fairly weigh the +force of its blows. The club falls with a frightful crash, but its +dynamical effect is not calculated beforehand in kilogrammetres. "The +stab of a knife is not measured," as an Italian proverb says. Thus +conceived, punishment has something primitive about it, something +intolerably barbarous. The community does the very things it was +created, by Morality and Law, to prevent; it exercises the right of the +stronger against the challenger; it promotes war, not that of all +against all, but of all against one, and its punishment is an act of +war. + +In a strongly religious society which lives in the idea of immediate +community with the deity, every transgression of the law is felt to be a +sin against the gods, and the punishment becomes an expiation offered to +them so as to avert their dangerous anger from the commonwealth. In the +administration of justice dim religious ideas are mingled, punishment is +tinged with a veneer of civilization, the culprit is, so to speak, +offered as a sacrifice to the gods. This supernatural view was prolonged +by the Inquisition, at least for a certain class of offences, until +almost modern times. + +When society awakens to the consciousness that its bond of union is +Morality, and that its most important task is to educate its members in +Morality, it introduces the concept of betterment into its penal system. +It wants not only to punish the wrongdoer sharply but also to transform +him inwardly and purify him. He is to feel that the punishment is not +only a requital but a mental benefit. In the Austrian army, until +corporal punishment was abolished, it was a rule that the soldier, after +being flogged, should approach the officer on duty and say, as he +saluted, "I thank you for the kind punishment." That is the attitude +that society, when it gives a moralizing tendency to its penal laws, +wishes the person who has been punished to attain. In this there is much +pleasing self-deception not unmixed with a good deal of hypocrisy. Penal +law offers the wrongdoer but little scope for improvement. + +All misdemeanours and crimes flow from three sources: ignorance, passion +and innate, anti-social self-seeking. Ignorance is the main, almost the +exclusive cause of wrongdoing among young criminals who have been badly +brought up or neglected, who have never had anything but bad examples +before them, and who cannot distinguish between good and evil. Society +may hope to improve these by right treatment; it must not punish, it +must educate them. Men who commit crimes from passion are those who +possess a consciousness of Morality and a conscience, who know quite +well what is right and what wrong, but have not sufficient strength of +character, that is, not an adequately developed power of inhibition, to +resist an opportunity, a temptation, a turmoil of their instincts. To +want to improve them is senseless, for they are not bad; they are weak, +or at any rate not strong enough. What they need is a strengthening of +their character, of their faculty of inhibition, and to achieve this is +beyond the power of society. All it can do is to humiliate the guilty +party by publicly exposing his lapse and by condemning him, and then +grant a delay of the execution of the sentence. In so doing it says to +him: "You have acted basely and ought to be ashamed of yourself, now go +and do not do it again." If the warning is unavailing and he relapses, +then the earlier sentence, as well as the new one, is executed. Fear of +this is added to his motives for acting honestly, and may possibly +strengthen his resistance to the onslaught of his evil instincts. But +his good conduct will always be at stake in the struggle between his +power of inhibition and his instincts, and the stronger of the two will +always carry the day. And finally, upon the man whose organic +disposition makes him anti-social, upon Lombroso's born criminal, +society can have no educative effect whatever. It is a hopeless case. +Society can render him harmless, it cannot alter him. Consideration for +his neighbour will never find a place in his consciousness. He will +never learn to resist his impulses and desires. His spiritual +insensibility makes him indifferent to the sufferings of others. +Incapable of continuous and equable effort, he will always want to prey +on society by begging, deceiving, stealing and robbing. He has no +conscience and does not hear the voice of society in his mind. He knows +nothing of good and evil, which are both empty phrases for him, words +without any meaning, and he is convinced that he acts rightly every time +he seeks to satisfy his appetites. In his case it is love's labour lost +to try and give a moral meaning to the sanctions of the law. Punishment +is not directed against the soul of the born criminal, only against his +body. It overwhelms him, fetters him and makes him either for the time +being, or permanently, harmless; but his organic tendency continues to +sway him, and whenever he recovers his liberty he is the same as before +he was punished. + +The Mystics give to punishment the character of fatherly and chastening +discipline by which the sinner expiates his crime and is purged of the +sin; thus it purifies him and leads him back to the state of innocence; +a kind of anticipatory hell fire which enables him to enter paradise. In +"Gorgias" Plato says explicitly: "He who is punished is liberated from +the evil of his soul." And the Apostle Paul teaches us: "Punishment is +ordained for the betterment of man." Criminal anthropology recognizes +that it is useless to expect this moralizing and redeeming effect from +punishment. Lombroso altogether rejects punishment as a means of +discipline and expiation, and before him Bentham and J. S. Mill, and +simultaneously with him and after him Fouillée, Guyau and Maudsley +adopted the same view. According to them the sanction of criminal law, +which extends and completes it and ensures its efficacy, can have no +other aim than the law itself, and this aim is to defend society against +its active enemies, if possible by converting them, if necessary by +forcible subjugation. + +In a book which is full of interest, but whose value is considerably +diminished by a strong admixture of mysticism, "Esquisse d'une morale +sans obligation ni sanction," M. Guyau goes much farther than the +criminal anthropologists and sociological opponents of punishment, and +expresses the somewhat paradoxical view that "the real sanction seems to +imply complete freedom from punishment for the crime committed, as +punishment for any action that has been accomplished is useless." It is +quite correct that no punishment under the sun can undo what has been +done. But it is not feasible for that reason to dispense with all +punishment for misdeeds and to call this systematic freedom from +punishment a sanction. Guyau overlooks the fact that the punishment is +directed not to the crime but the perpetrator. It certainly alters +nothing in a past transgression of the law, and that is not its object, +but it may possibly have the effect of preventing fresh misdeeds on the +part of the same wrongdoer or of others, and that would justify it. + +If society must renounce the idea of improving the misdemeanant, +especially the man whose organic tendencies make him a criminal and who +is the most dangerous and commits the most numerous and worst crimes, it +nevertheless assumes that it makes an impression on morally doubtful +characters by punishing misdemeanours and crimes, that it warns them and +prevents them from erring. That is the theory of intimidation, which +also has many opponents. It will hardly be denied that psychologically +it is well founded. The conception of the evil consequences for himself +that his action may entail strengthens the impulsive man's power of +inhibition when he is about to do wrong, and perhaps enables him to +overcome his immoral instinct. Only it is difficult to measure the force +which the thought of punishment adds to the effort of inhibition. This +force does not come into question at all with the man who sins +occasionally from passion. The flood of his impulses sweeps away all +barriers which reason may oppose, and their power of resistance is not +materially increased by the fear of consequences, because the mental +horizon is completely darkened at the time of the storm and no prevision +is possible. The criminal from organic causes exercises no inhibition. +He knows that society condemns his actions, but he is convinced of his +personal right to carry them out, and fears no punishment, because he +hopes to escape it, and tries his utmost by means of planning, prudence +and self-control to outwit society. The theory of intimidation is not +applicable to these two classes of criminals, and they constitute a +large proportion of the army of wrongdoers against which society has to +defend itself by force. + +But there remains the great number of mediocre natures whose sympathy +with their fellow men, the emotional foundation of the subjective +impulse to Morality, is only slightly developed, who have a superficial +veneer of Morality, who act honourably out of prudence, but who would +feel no repugnance towards perpetrating profitable misdeeds, if they +were certain that they would incur no risk. These insipid characters +whose emotional temperature oscillates round about freezing point and +who are incapable of great excitement, of passion, would see no reason +to resist any temptation, to disregard any favourable opportunity, if +the penal code, the judge and the policeman did not warn them to be +careful. For this kind of man the penal sanction is really a useful and +perhaps an indispensable means of prevention, and it has been thought +out and developed by the community with a view to such people. + +Not content with theoretical considerations, people have also appealed +to practical experience to test the theory of intimidation. In some +countries capital punishment was either legally abolished or tacitly +suppressed, the judges either refraining from pronouncing the sentence +on the prisoner or the head of the state, when appealed to, commuting it +by an act of pardon to loss of liberty. Statistics seemed to show that +serious crimes meriting the death penalty increased, and capital +punishment was reintroduced or the practice of systematic pardons was +abandoned, with the alleged result that the worst crimes grew less +numerous. I express myself doubtfully, because I do not think that the +statistics were sufficiently conclusive. They embraced too small a +number of cases and too short a period of time. It cannot be +conclusively proved that the abolition of the death penalty resulted in +an increase of capital crimes; but it is certain that crimes were never +more frequent or more horrible than in the times when criminal justice +was most cruel and made use of the most terrible sanctions. Up to the +dawn of modern times legal torture was administered, at every street +corner there were gallows, the poor wretch under sentence of death was +pinched with red-hot pincers, the executioner tore the flesh from his +bones, poured boiling pitch over him, cut out his tongue, hacked off his +hands, broke him on the wheel or burnt him alive; executions were a sort +of public entertainment or popular holiday, and efforts were made to +attract as many spectators as possible; every inhabitant of one of the +larger towns was familiar from childhood with the horrid spectacle of +mutilated human bodies writhing in torture, and there rang in his ears +the echo of the screams of pain and of the shrill death rattle of the +victims. But these impressions were so far from intimidating the gaping +crowd that many hurried from the place of execution to commit the most +execrable crimes, the punishment of which they had just witnessed; +consequently punishments have gradually been made less cruel, and the +public is excluded from executions, which clearly indicates a decisive +rejection of the theory of intimidation. + +The truth is that the severity of the punishment has no effect upon the +frequency or the savagery of crimes. The criminality of a community +depends on the value and emphasis of the moral education which it +bestows upon the rising generation. It can prevent its members, at any +rate the average, normal type, from developing into criminals. But the +fear of punishment has no deterrent effect upon those whose criminal +impulses have not been subjugated by social discipline. The severity of +the punishment does not contribute anything to the defence of society. +It only proves that the lawgiver and the criminal judges are on the +lowest level of civilization which corresponds to a widespread and +barbarous criminality, and that their modes of thought and feeling are +horribly like those of the criminals whom they sentence to torture, the +gallows, and the wheel. + +Positive law aims at defending society, and tries to attain its end by +punishing transgressions. It provides no reward for conscientious +obedience. The law has no honours to bestow on blamelessness and virtue. +Society felt the want of this and made attempts to encourage honourable +conduct by conferring distinctions, just as it tries to intimidate vice +by punishing crime. These attempts were not particularly happy. The +bestowal of titles and orders is no recognition of virtue, but a means +adopted by governments to ensure devotion to power. An arrangement was +made in some places to honour model citizens in public and crown them +with laurels, but it soon came to grief owing to indifference and +mockery. A private individual wanted to fill this gap in social +institutions. The Count of Montyon, a son of the eighteenth century, +whose philosophy he had imbibed, instituted the prizes for virtue which +are distributed annually by the French Academy. They are bestowed on +modest integrity in humble circumstances which has manifested a sense of +duty, neighbourly love and self-sacrifice. This friend of man has had +few imitators, and that is understandable. Sound common sense realizes +that rewards like the Montyon prizes for virtue do not with the +infallibility of a natural law fall to the lot of merit, but are nearly +always adjudicated to the prizewinner by chance, by recommendation, and +by all sorts of influences that have nothing to do with virtue; and it +seems unjust that among equal claims some should be satisfied while +others, the great majority, are not. It would be vain to contend that +one virtue which goes empty-handed is not unfairly treated when another +gets a benefit on which it has not counted, and that in a moral +character, such as alone would be eligible for a prize for virtue, there +is no room for envy. That would be the moral of the Gospel concerning +the labourers who came at the eleventh hour, which has met with +opposition from others besides the contemporaries of Jesus. + +On the whole, the community has never felt called upon to solve the +moral problem of the reward of virtue. It has always contented itself +with the punishment of vice and has given its law threatening, but not +encouraging, sanctions. This attitude shows that it has always had a +clear conception of its moral task. In its positive law it never +included anything but that minimum of Morality that was absolutely +necessary to its existence, and without which it would dissolve into its +original elements, its order would be replaced by chaos, by the war of +all against all. It must insist on the observance of this minimum; it +must use forcible means to achieve this. But it does not feel justified +in demanding more than this minimum, because more is not claimed by its +instinct of self-preservation. A surplus of virtue over and above the +amount necessary for the life of society is desirable; but it does not +lie within the scope of the natural functions of the community, +determined by its organic necessities, to achieve this by compulsion +and the provision of legal rewards as an encouragement. It is the +business of the individual to work at his own moral improvement, and the +community cannot interfere directly in the matter. It is enough that it +encourage this work indirectly by bestowing care on the culture and +education of the individual, by making it the duty of its public schools +to inculcate good principles, and by creating a public opinion which +surrounds all the activities of higher morality with admiration, respect +and gratitude. The moral education of the individual is not an object +with which laws are concerned; it is the result of the constant, vital +influence of the community, and can have no sanction other than the +increase of well-being of every single person within the social union, +which is a natural consequence of raising the moral level of the +community. + +The penal sanctions of positive law have a gross materialism about them +corresponding to the definite concreteness of the actions with which +positive law deals. The broad field of Morality, however, which is +outside the narrow sphere of the laws, has no room for sanctions of a +material nature. The penalties prescribed by law are directed to actions +which, if they became general, would in a very short space of time +result in the dissolution of society. The community essays by forcible +measures to prevent this kind of action, and these measures more or less +fulfil their aim, whether you interpret their use on the theory of +discipline, of expiation and purification by repentance, of improvement +and moral re-birth, or of intimidation. All these theories were invented +later on, after the community had been convinced by experience that +punishment, if it does not entirely prevent crime, at least limits it +sufficiently to make the continued existence of society possible, and +more or less to guarantee to its members the safety of their life, their +property and their personal dignity. + +Against transgressions of the moral law, the results of which are not +immediately obvious, such as ruthless selfishness, blunted sympathy and +lack of active neighbourly kindness, the community does not proceed with +forcible measures; firstly, because it cannot establish their existence +convincingly and hence cannot try them in a court of justice, and +secondly, because it does not recognize them as constituting an +immediate danger to its existence. Now, as the sanctions set up by +society are not applicable to these transgressions, an individual whose +mind does not penetrate very far into matters is disquieted, for +accustomed as he is to the spectacle of the steady justice of the state, +he seeks the counterpart in the forms of this justice in the world of +Morality, and does not discover it at the first glance. He asks +anxiously where are the police, the public prosecutor, the examining +magistrate, the criminal court, the prison for sins against Morality, +and invents them, since he cannot find them. He transfers to the +hereafter the sanctions of Morality, which are not visible on earth. He +cannot make up his mind to renounce them, because the fact that sins +against the moral law go unpunished would seem to him to indicate +intolerable anarchy, comparable with the state of a community where +everyone could murder, rob and mutilate to his heart's content without +incurring the risk of the least personal unpleasantness. + +In the sphere of the moral law punishment certainly does not follow hot +foot upon crime, but it nevertheless does not fail to appear, and +becomes visible when the eye is capable of embracing long periods of +time and of tracing intricate connexions. The sanctions of the moral law +differ from those of criminal law, but they are not wanting. They are of +a subjective and of an objective character. The subjective punishment +for a sin against the laws of Morality is remorse. It is inflicted by +the inner judge who rules in the consciousness of the individual, by +conscience, and penetrates to the very deepest depths of a person's mind +which no outward punishment imposed by the community ever reaches. It is +not only religious and political martyrs who endure torture and death +with proud serenity, conscious that they are morally immeasurably +superior to their executioners; even common criminals remain perfectly +unmoved by their punishment and regret only that they are weaker than +their captors. Prisons are full of convicts who look upon their +condition as that of prisoners of war. They have been worsted in their +battle with law. That seems to them a misfortune but not a disgrace. +They are neither humble nor contrite, but revengeful. They are +determined and ready to take up the duel with society as soon as an +opportunity offers and they may hope to do so with some prospect of +success. + +But remorse is an unresisting submission to the verdict of conscience +and the consciousness of one's own unworthiness. It is the recognition +of the justice of the sentence which brands one, and the constant, +anguished realization that one's personality has been deservedly +humiliated, dishonoured and deprived of its rights. As a spiritual +process, remorse causes the sinner continually to relive the misdeed he +committed, while at the same time he is fully conscious of its atrocity. +The ego becomes dual, one part active, the other watching and judging. +The one again and again perpetrates its misdeed, the other looks on +horrified and suffers agonies. It is one long torture and disgrace of +self. Remorse condemns the sinner perpetually to repeat in his mind the +deed which fills him with horror of himself. This state of mind is the +nearest approach to eternal damnation in hell. There is only one means +of temporary escape: to extinguish memory by narcotics. That is why +remorse not seldom leads to drunkenness. Shakespeare, with a poet's +infallible insight into the soul, has grasped and depicted the nature of +remorse, the uninterrupted, torturing presence of the misdeed in man's +consciousness. Lady Macbeth sees her hands ever stained with the blood +of the innocent royal victim whom she herself did not even murder, and +she complains that "all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this +little hand." Leontes, in the "Winter's Tale," on hearing of Hermione's +alleged death, of which he believes himself guilty, mourns: + + "Once a day I'll visit + The chapel where they lie; and tears shed there + Shall be my recreation: so long as nature + Will bear up with this exercise, so long + I daily vow to use it." + +Remorse is the most effective of the subjective sanctions of Morality; +it is almost too effective, for owing to its duration and severity the +punishment easily grows disproportionate to the crime. But it has one +great disadvantage, it affects only better natures who have an active +conscience and spiritual delicacy, while it spares the wicked who have +no conscience, who perpetrate their misdeeds contentedly, without a +qualm, and regret them only when they are discovered and lead to +unpleasantness. + +Nevertheless, the actions of these hardened sinners do not go quite +unpunished. Moral law always takes vengeance for transgressions, but not +directly on the evildoer. In addition to the subjective, it also has an +objective sanction; when it is violated retribution falls on the +community. The masses have a dim idea that every evil deed meets with +requital and express it in the proverb that "Though the mills of God +grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small." They have noticed that +the curse of an evil deed never fails to come, and is consummated with +crushing force, only that it does not happen at once. It seems +objectionably unjust that the culprit should not feel the effect of his +crime, whilst others do who were not born when it was perpetrated. But +the concept of retributory justice is as little applicable to the +far-reaching relations in the life of humanity as to the actions of the +laws of Nature, for instance gravity or electricity. Morality is, as I +have shown, an adaptation of the species to the natural conditions in +which it is forced to live. Morality, therefore, has an aim, which is to +make social life in common possible for the individual, this life alone +enabling him to maintain his existence amid the conditions obtaining on +this earth. The discipline which Morality imposes on the individual +leaves him a certain amount of free play. If he escapes from this +discipline to a certain small extent which does not threaten the +existence of society, this revolt has no ill effect upon the life of the +species, the latter has no grounds for punishing him, and the only, yet +sufficient, sanction of the loose Morality of an undisciplined +individual lies in the fact that he is more or less inferior to the most +perfect type of the species, and visibly bears the stamp of his +worthlessness in his character, his bearing and his mode of thought. But +if in his disregard of Morality the individual goes so far as to +frustrate its aim and endanger the existence of society, then the latter +must either find ways and means of rendering the culprit harmless or +else it overlooks his misdeed and thereby becomes an accessory and +justly suffers the evils consequent upon a deterioration of Morals which +is universally tolerated. + +The means by which a society must defend the Morality necessary to its +existence can only be spiritual, for it is not a question of breaches of +the positive law which result in the intervention of justice and of +material penalties, but of a disregard of the commands of Morality, +which are not drawn up in paragraphs. Public opinion suffices to rouse +the individual who despises the Moral law to an uncomfortable sense of +his unworthiness; if he finds himself treated with contempt and sees +disapproval and dislike in everyone's face, either he will be spurred +to an effort to overcome his immoral instincts or his self-respect will +suffer from the universal contempt with which he meets; and this +suffering is his punishment, therefore it is the sanction of a breach of +the Moral law. + +If public opinion does not keep careful and severe watch, such as may be +termed the function of a higher moral police, then inevitably the moral +tone of the whole society will sink to a lower level, and this will +result in making life harder and more difficult, and in certain +circumstances may lead to dissolution. This is not a theoretical +assumption, but an observed fact, a lesson taught by history. It tells +us of epochs in which the licentiousness of individuals, favoured by a +society too dull, weak and indifferent to stand up against bad examples, +succeeded in corrupting all classes. Such a period is exemplified by the +fall of Rome. Common natures indulged and wallowed in every vice, the +better ones felt such disgust for a life without nobility and virtue +that they discarded it, and the community lost all excuse of joint +responsibility and became so loosely knit together that it was incapable +of common effort or sacrifice, and collapsed miserably at the first +onslaught of a foreign aggressor tempted by its depravity. + +The disintegration of a society, the sanction of its sins against +Morality, is a slow process. It does not often take place +catastrophically, with theatrical effect, so that even a dull observer +can grasp the connexion between cause and effect. But whoever +investigates closely will realize that all evils from which society +suffers, which make life more bitter and harder for its members, are +ultimately due to defective Morality. What are class struggles with +their consequent hostilities between groups of the same nation, their +coercion and damage, but manifestations of self-seeking, lack of +consideration and injustice, that is, of Immorality? Would they be +possible if members of all classes, capitalists and workers, +agriculturists and townsmen, rulers and subjects were inspired by +neighbourly kindness, understanding and appreciation of the needs, +pretensions and feelings of their opponents, and by a spirit of +self-sacrifice? Would the decay of character, the arbitrariness and +arrogance of the mighty, the cowardly slavishness of the masses, with +the resultant rottenness of public affairs, be conceivable if +individuals were conscious of their dignity and their duty to themselves +and the community, and if they had the strength and the determination to +overcome their fear of men? Could wars of aggression bring ruin upon +mankind if leading personalities did not give way to the desire for +outward honours, to the hunger for power, to avarice, to the itch of +vanity, that is to the lowest forms of selfishness, and if the masses +out of stupidity or fear of a mental effort, and out of dread for their +personal responsibility did not allow themselves to be misused for base +purposes? + +Thus we find insufficient Morality in individuals, or the complete lack +of it, to be at the root of all evils with which the community is +afflicted, and we are justified in conceiving war, party quarrels, +collisions between groups representing different interests, revolutions, +in fact, all tragedies of life in societies with the suffering and +destruction they entail, as the penal sanction of sins against Morality. +Morality, which was created to facilitate life for the individual or to +make it at all possible for him, is no longer able to fulfil its aim, +and the society finds itself by its own fault back in the condition of +misery and fear, owing to which its instinct of self-preservation +originally forced it to make the effort of setting up the Moral law. +Even the most merciless zealot cannot wish for a more efficacious and +painful punishment of Immorality. + +But Morality does not possess the sanction of punishment alone, it has +also the more amiable one of reward. We have seen that by strengthening +the faculty of inhibition it raises the individual to a higher level of +organic development, that by the inculcation of consideration and +neighbourly kindness it affords the community the possibility of working +together peacefully and profitably. But it does more than that. It gives +life an incomparably higher value than when it is dull and uniform, by +enriching and beautifying it with heroism and with ideals. + +Ideals and heroism are direct creations of Morality and inconceivable +without it. The ideal is a conception of perfection; the thought of +attaining it is accompanied by the most pleasurable emotions, and the +individual regards it as his life's task to strive for it. The struggle +for the ideal implies effort at all times, renunciation of the ease of a +thoughtless and care-free existence, an endless series of difficult +victories over appetites clamouring for immediate satisfaction, that is, +constant work in the service of Morality. He who has an ideal is never +troubled by the problem of the meaning of life. His life has an aim and +significance. He knows whither he goes, why he lives, for what he works. +He knows nothing of the doubts of the aimless wanderer, of the +discouraging consciousness of one's own uselessness, and his assurance, +his conviction that his efforts are useful and worthy come very near to +happiness. Heroism is the noblest victory of a thinking and volitional +personality over selfishness; it is altruism which rises to +self-sacrifice, the proud subjugation by Reason of the most primitive +and powerful of all instincts, that of self-preservation. It is the +highest achievement of which Morality is capable. It is never developed +for the profit of an individual, but always for that of a community, for +a thought, for an ideal. His heroic conduct raises the hero out of the +rut of his existence, liberates him from the trammels of his +individuality and enlarges this to represent a community, its longings, +its resolutions, its determination. At the moment of his heroic action +the hero lives innumerable lives, the lives of all for whom he risks his +own, and if death reaches him, it can destroy only his single person, +but cannot put an end to the dynamic activity of the community which is +included in the hero, while he is magnificently elevated far above +himself. The faculty of forming an ideal of existence and activity, and +of rising to the heights of heroism, is the royal reward of Morality +which the perfect subjection of animal instincts to the rule of human +Reason has achieved. Its punishment for those retrograde individuals who +never learn to control their instinctive reflex actions is that they are +denied the sight of the glory of the ideal, that heroism is unknown and +incomprehensible to them, that they lead their lives fettered and +imprisoned, unconscious of any task, without prospect or exaltation, as +if they dwelt in a cellar or in a dark dungeon. These are the sanctions +of Morality. It has no others, nor does it need them. + +In one passage of the book cited above Guyau makes the doubting remark: +"Who can tell us whether Morality is not ... at one and the same time a +beautiful and useful art? Perhaps it bewitches us and deceives us." Let +us assume that it is an illusion. That would not detract from its value +for mankind. Is not all our knowledge of the world, is not our whole +view of Nature an illusion? We are made conscious of the universe by its +qualities, and these qualities are conferred on it by our senses. But +all knowledge that we derive from our senses is an illusion. For the +senses do not convey reality to us, but the modifications which the +influence of reality produces in our sense organs. The universe has +neither sound nor colour nor scent. But we perceive it as sounding, +coloured and scented. These qualities we attribute to reality are +illusions of our senses, but these illusions make up all the beauty of +the world which without them would be dumb, blind and without charm for +us. + +Life for us is an unspeakably oppressive riddle. Has it an aim, and, if +so, what? We do not know. All thought only leads to the conclusion: life +is its own aim and end, we live for life's sake. And this conclusion is +no solution of the problem. Then Morality appears, and not only makes +life easier and possible, but even shows us an aim, if not for +universal, at least for individual life. That aim is the humanization of +the animal, the spiritualization of man, the exaltation and enrichment +of the individual by means of sympathy, neighbourly kindness, a sense of +joint responsibility, and the subjection of Instinct to Reason which, as +far as we know, is the noblest product of Nature. It is possible that +Morality, which hides the eerie unintelligibility of life from us, is an +illusion. Blessed be the illusion which makes life worth living. + + + Printed in England by Cassell & Company, Limited, London, E.C.4. + F17.122 + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Morals and the Evolution of Man, by +Max Simon Nordau + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + +***** This file should be named 37998-8.txt or 37998-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/9/9/37998/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Morals and the Evolution of Man + +Author: Max Simon Nordau + +Translator: Marie A. Lewenz + +Release Date: November 12, 2011 [EBook #37998] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + + + +<h2>MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION<br /> +OF MAN</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h1><span class="smcap">Morals and the<br /> +Evolution of Man</span></h1> + +<p> </p> +<h4><span class="smcap">By</span></h4> +<h2><span class="smcap">Max Nordau</span></h2> + +<p> </p> +<h4>A Translation of<br /> +"<span class="smcap">Biologie der Ethik</span>"</h4> + +<h4>By<br /> +<big>MARIE A. LEWENZ, M.A.</big><br /> +Fellow of University College, London</h4> +<p> </p> + +<h3>CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD<br /> +London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne<br /> +1922</h3> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h3>TO MY DEAR WIFE ANNA (née <span class="smcap">Dons</span>),</h3> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="center"> +the sunshine of my life in happy days, my brave<br /> +comrade in the storms of the world-catastrophe, with<br /> +love and gratitude I dedicate this book which helped<br /> +both her and me to endure the dark years when we<br /> +were homeless wanderers.<br /> +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Madrid</span>, <i>September 26th, 1916</i></p> +</div> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align='left'><small>CHAPTER</small></td><td align='right'><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>1. <span class="smcap">The Phenomenon of Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>2. <span class="smcap">The Immanence of the Concept of Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>3. <span class="smcap">The Biological Aspect of Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_84">84</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>4. <span class="smcap">Morality and Law</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_115">115</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>5. <span class="smcap">Individual Morality and Collective Immorality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>6. <span class="smcap">Freedom and Responsibility</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_185">185</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>7. <span class="smcap">Morality and Progress</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_215">215</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>8. <span class="smcap">The Sanctions of Morality</span></td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h1>MORALS AND THE<br /> +EVOLUTION OF MAN</h1> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY</h3> + + +<p>A very well-known experiment in animal +psychology was once made by Möbius. An +aquarium was divided into two compartments +by means of a pane of glass; in one of these a pike +was put and in the other a tench. Hardly had the +former caught sight of his prey, when he rushed to +the attack without noticing the transparent partition. +He crashed with extreme violence again the obstacle +and was hurled back stunned, with a badly battered +nose. No sooner had he recovered from the blow +than he again made an onslaught upon his neighbour—with +the same result. He repeated his efforts a +few times more, but succeeded only in badly hurting +his head and mouth. At last a dim idea dawned upon +his dull mind that some unknown and invisible power +was protecting the tench, and that any attempt to +devour it would be in vain; consequently from that +moment he ceased from all further endeavours to +molest his prey. Thereupon the pane of glass was +removed from the tank, and pike and tench swam<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +around together; the former took no notice whatever +of his defenceless neighbour, who had become sacred +to him. In the first instance the pike had not perceived +the glass partition against which he had dashed +his head; now he did not see that it had been taken +away. All he knew was this: he must not attack +this tench, otherwise he would fare badly. The pane +of glass, though no longer actually there, surrounded +the tench as with a coat of mail which effectually +warded off the murderous attacks of the pike.</p> + +<p>The fact so often observed, that man in many +cases does that which he passionately desires to leave +undone, and refrains from doing that which all his +instincts urge him to do—this phenomenon of +Morality is a generalization upon a huge scale of +the above experiment on animals with the pane +of glass in a tank.</p> + +<p>Jean Jacques Rousseau thought out a theoretical +human being who was by nature good. Such a +human being does not exist and has never existed. +From sheer annoyance at the provoking obliquity of +vision which led the enthusiast of Geneva to develop +such a theory, one is sorely tempted to go to the +opposite extreme and declare that man is by nature +fundamentally bad; but such an assertion is just as +naïve as Rousseau's contention. Good and bad are +values which we can only learn to appreciate when +we have felt the effect of the phenomenon of Morality. +The concepts of good and evil are of much later origin +than mankind, and can therefore no more constitute a +fundamental characteristic of man's original nature +than, for instance, the cut and colour of his clothes;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +though it is open to wiseacres to maintain that man's +nature to some extent actually finds expression in +the cut and colour of his clothes—that is, in his choice +of them. Anyone contemplating primitive man, man +as he emerges from the hands of Nature, stripped of +all the additions which he has acquired in the course +of his historical development, is bound to admit that +man is neither good nor bad; he is a living being +acting according to the instincts implanted in his +nature; just like the pike. But in most contingencies +he does not obey these instincts, and if he reflects +upon himself and his actions, he is astounded at +realizing this, and asks: "Why do I refrain from +revelling in the gratification of my desires?"</p> + +<p>Innumerable times every day of his life he would +like to break many or all of the Ten Commandments; +but he abstains from so doing, and, what is more, +mostly without effort, without having painfully to +suppress his desire. What prevents him from yielding +to his impulses? An invisible power which lays +its commands upon him: "Thou shalt not!" "Thou +shalt!" Often his aims and inclinations come into +violent collision with this order, or this prohibition, +and are hurled back by the painful impact. Man +hears the threatening, imperious voice, but cannot see +whence it comes. Accustomed to reason by analogy, +he concludes that it is, like thunder, a voice of Nature. +When the pike has sufficiently injured his nose against +the pane of glass, he assumes as an actual fact that +an insuperable barrier separates him from the tench, +and, moreover, that it is both useless and painful to +come into contact with this. He does not try to dis<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>cover +the nature of the obstacle, and gives up any +further attempt upon his mysteriously protected prey. +Man, with a more highly developed intelligence than +the pike, does not accept the phenomenon of Morality +with dull resignation. Since he has become conscious +of a mysterious barrier erected between his volitions +and his actions, he has not ceased to reflect upon this +barrier, to investigate it with a timid yet irresistible +desire for knowledge, and to try and discover its +nature.</p> + +<p>It redounds to man's credit that he has devoted +so much time and energy to investigating the character +and essence of Morality. But the result of +these investigations does not redound to his credit. +With the exception of theology, there is no subject +upon which so much has been written as upon ethics. +Yet whosoever plunges into this boundless sea of +literature will emerge with feelings bordering upon +horror and despair. Here a free rein is given to all +man's errors, to his habit of drawing false conclusions, +to his faulty modes of thought. Incapacity to interpret +facts, association of ideas, elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp +and uncurbed by any criticism, intemperate +mysticism, arrogant dogmatism, shallow self-sufficiency—all +these vie with one another in the presentment +of theories which either are patently foolish, +arbitrary or ill-founded, or else prove to be so when +impartially examined.</p> + +<p>It is hard for the few reasonable thinkers who +have taken part in this great investigation to make +their voices heard amid the uproar raised by the +solemn, unctuous, dictatorial or pedantic tomfools.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +And even the former are not entirely satisfactory, +because they do not distinguish clearly enough between +the form and the substance, the externals and +the essence of Morality, and because they do not discriminate +with sufficient care between questions as to +its nature, origin and aim, and its powers or sanctions—questions +which must on no account be confounded.</p> + +<p>What is Morality? Obviously it is necessary +to attempt a clear answer to this question before any +useful purpose can be served by inquiring into the +group of problems to which it gives rise: its aim, its +laws, its origin, its method, its assumptions. The +Stoics answer this question as follows: "Morality is +living according to Nature." Furthermore, it is quite +in accordance with the doctrine of the Stoics that +Cicero says: "Virtue, however, is nothing but Nature +developed to the highest possible degree of perfection" +("<i>ad summum perducta</i>"). Moral therefore +means natural; Morality and Nature are equivalent; +they are one. Really a simpler or more childlike explanation +is hardly possible. The most superficial +glance at human life and at our own soul teaches us +that Morality is contrary to Nature, that it must +struggle against Nature to assert itself, that it means +a victory over Nature, in so far as we understand by +Nature in this special sense the most primitive reaction +of man to simple and more complicated stimuli, +the first tendency of impulse, the immediate, instinctive +urge to act. Further, the definition of the Stoics +ignores the aggregation of concepts which the synthetic +conception, Morality, involves; as if this were +self-evident and required no definition. The Stoics<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +tacitly assume that Morality and Good are synonymous. +Cicero makes this assumption clearer by using +the word Virtue (<i>virtus</i>) instead of Morality. But in +all languages this word implies approbation and +praise. It is an appreciation of worth (<i>Werturteil</i>), to +use the expression so appropriately coined by Lotze.</p> + +<p>But the very fact that we recognize Morality as +being valuable is by no means a matter of course +and it demands an explanation.</p> + +<p>Certain actions could only be judged to be good +if they were distinguished from others which did not +suggest the same judgment, which were felt to be not +good, to be bad or indifferent. We come to the question, +What is Good, what is Bad? The Stoics reply, +"That which is good is natural." It is easy to call +facts which please us natural, and such as displease +us unnatural. In reality both series of facts are +equally natural; because everything that happens is +natural; because by definition Nature is the synthesis +of all phenomena; because nothing exists outside of +Nature, and within Nature everything is a part of her +and therefore is natural and can be nothing but +natural. If we nevertheless wish to distinguish between +natural and unnatural phenomena, if we call +Good, Morality, and Virtue natural, and compare them +favourably with the unnatural, this only proves that +we use the words natural and unnatural as synonyms +for good and bad, and that we have a ready-made +standard by which we measure the naturalness or unnaturalness +(that is, the goodness or badness) of +actions, and that there exists within ourselves the law +by which we judge them to be good or bad. But how<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +do we come by this law? How, of what material, and +why do we fashion this standard? Why do we approve +of one thing as good and condemn another as +bad? What qualities do the former and the latter +possess, or what qualities do we ascribe to them? +That is what we want to know when we inquire as to +the significance of Morality, and the definition of the +Stoics throws no light whatever upon the matter.</p> + +<p>According to Aristotle Morality is "the activity of +Practical Reason, which is accompanied by pleasurable +emotion." It is not worth while to dwell upon +this definition. It is absolutely valueless. Practical +Reason is not a definite concept; Aristotle does not +say anywhere what he understands by "practical" +when he applies this attribute to Reason; and to call +every activity of Practical Reason accompanied by +pleasurable emotion Morality is mere eccentricity.</p> + +<p>To take only one example: if I have a house built, +and accept the architect's plans because they please me +greatly, my practical reason is most certainly active; +the gratification induced by my reasonable choice of +the plans is doubtless a pleasurable emotion; but +assuredly no one will characterize as moral this +activity of my practical reason which is accompanied +by pleasurable emotion. It may be that Aristotle +was contemplating not a single action, but conduct +in life as a whole. In that case he has expressed in +an unfortunate, and much too loose a manner the +thought that Morality is Reason plus pleasurable +emotion. We shall frequently meet with and have +to examine this idea, which omits to explain why pleasurable +emotions attend certain activities of "Practi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>cal +Reason," whatever that may be, and fail to be +aroused by others.</p> + +<p>Judaism, as embodied in its law-givers and prophets, +teaches that Morality consists in living and +acting in accordance with the divine Will. Maimonides, +who, however, was regarded by many of +his contemporaries as a heretic, does not consider +Judaism a creed at all, but a code of Morality. He +maintains that anyone who repudiates the tenets of +the Jewish faith, even the most essential one, namely, +the belief in a single god, must not be excluded from +the Jewish community as long as he conforms to its +moral laws. This thinker, usually so accurate and +nice in his reasoning, overlooks the fact that in this +case he is contradicting himself in a manner wellnigh +comic. According to him, too, Morality consists in +the endeavour to live and act in accordance with the +divine Will. How is such an endeavour possible for +a man who does not believe in God and for whom +consequently no divine Will exists? Therefore either +Morality must be something different from an approximation +to the standard set up by the divine Will, or +else he who denies God cannot be moral. But I will +leave the author of the "Guide of those who have +gone astray" to his self-contradiction, and only retain +the Jewish definition of Morality as based upon the +Will of God.</p> + +<p>Without any restriction Christianity has taken +over this definition from the mother-religion. In +his zeal to claim that God alone is the source of +all Morality, St. Augustine allows himself to be +carried away to such an extent that he libels mankind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> +most hatefully. Just as for Rousseau man is by +nature good, for the Bishop of Hippo he is by nature +fundamentally bad. Left to his own devices he +would always wallow in the mire of sin and vice, and +would never even feel the wish to abandon his wickedness. +It is God's mercy alone which rescues him +from his depravity and sets his feet upon the path of +righteousness, leading him to virtue, salvation and +eternal bliss. Thomas Aquinas is no less definite on +this point. The scriptures of Judaism and Christianity +contain the eternal law which God has ordained +for mankind. He points out the paths that man +should follow. All Morality springs from Him alone.</p> + +<p>To this very day true believers adhere to this +doctrine. Morality did not originate on earth; the +knowledge of it is a gift of grace from heaven to mankind. +It is derived from God; it is that which God +has willed; or else it does not need any special act +of volition on the part of God, but is the essence of +God himself. That is the teaching of Paley, the classical +moral philosopher. Virtue consists in doing good +to mankind in obedience to the Will of God, and in +order to attain eternal salvation. Here stress is laid +upon the fact that Morality is active love for one's +neighbour, and this is a concession on the part of the +conciliatory Englishman to the utilitarian ethics of his +countrymen; but for him the necessary and sufficient +reason for this love of one's neighbour is the Will of +God and the desire for eternal salvation. The German +devotee, Baader, blustering like a capuchin, +preaches this twaddle: "Any Morality which is not +rooted in divine law is the intellectual impiety of our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +time raised to its highest power; it is the perfection +of atheism; for the idea of the absolute autonomy of +man atheistically denies the Father as law-giver; the +theistic denial of the necessity for divine aid in fulfilling +the law does away with the Son or Mediator, +and finally the materialistic-pantheistic apotheosis of +Matter does away with the Holy Ghost with its +sanctifying power." The Frenchman Jouffroy, +though more careful and reticent in his manner, unmistakably +expresses his conviction that "ethics, as +well as the philosophy of law, inevitably and necessarily +lead to theology."</p> + +<p>But this necessity only exists for minds whose +desire for knowledge and truth is easily satisfied by +words without a meaning that can be visualized, +by fabulous statements accepted without proof, by +fictions of the imagination, and by shallow juggling +with the association of ideas. Even those who do +not approve all Auguste Comte's arguments will +agree with him when he classifies the successive +steps in the mental development of mankind as the +theological, transcendental, and scientific modes of +thought. When man's understanding is in its infancy +he is content with a supernatural explanation of all +phenomena which strike him as mysterious, disquiet +him or rouse his curiosity. Only I have never been +able to understand why Comte discriminates between +the theological and the transcendental modes of +thought, and assigns to the latter a higher place than +the former. Both are on a footing of absolute +equality; both raise arbitrary fictions of the imagination +to the position of sources of knowledge; both<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> +substitute anthropomorphic trivialities for the observation +of phenomena and research into the conditions +under which they occur and their relationship to one +another. The only difference between them lies in +the fact that transcendentalism expresses itself in +choicer language than does theology, that it presents +formulæ that are more complicated and pretentious, +less transparent and honest—formulæ which the unpractised +mind does not immediately recognize as +mythological dogmas in a pseudo-scientific disguise.</p> + +<p>The relationship of theological to transcendental +thought is much the same as that of superstition to +religion. Both of them are one and the same. +Religion is shamefaced superstition, whereas superstition +has not yet learned to feel shame. Religion +is superstition in a dress-coat, and therefore fit for +polite circles; superstition is religion in a cotton +smock and therefore cannot be admitted to society. +Superstition is the religion of the poor and unassuming, +religion is the superstition of fine folk who plume +themselves on their formal and verbal scholarship.</p> + +<p>Ever since man has risen above the level of the +beasts, ever since the first faint glimmerings of thought +began in the thick-walled, narrow and dark skull of a +hunter of the Neanderthal or Cro Magnon, he has +ascribed everything unintelligible in life and in the +world around him to divine actions and divine sources. +How did the world come into existence? A god or +gods created it. How does Nature work? In accordance +with the will of a god or gods, in obedience to +divine commands, as a result of divine activities. +What is life? A divine gift of grace. What is con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>sciousness? +An irradiation of the divinity. What is +infinity, what eternity? Attributes of the god. God +is the name that from the beginning of time to the +present day men have given to their ignorance. They +find it easier to bear disguised by this pseudonym; +they are even proud of it. With cunning self-deception +they have endowed the word with the dignity +pertaining to a title of the most awe-inspiring majesty, +and they no longer feel ashamed of a poverty of mind +which can boast of such a magnificent name. Morality +also is one of those phenomena which are not intelligible +as a matter of course. The questions how, +whence, why, and to what end Morality exists, and +what it is, cannot be solved at a glance; its life-history +is not apparent to every observer, as is that of the +domestic cat. But why cudgel one's brains? Cheap +explanations are ready to hand. This way mythology, +you maid-of-all-work! Morality has been ordained by +God. A moral life is one in accordance with God's +commandments. He who will not content himself +with this answer is an infidel and does not deserve +to have any notice taken of him.</p> + +<p>Let us leave the paltry statements of theologians +and note how men who investigate questions more +thoroughly have dealt with Morality. Descartes defines +Morality as the sustained endeavour to do that +which one has recognized to be right. It is difficult +to discern in this definition the father of scientific +scepticism. What are the distinguishing marks of +Right? Is the decision as to what is right and what +is wrong to be left to the subjective judgment of the +individual? In that case Descartes must concede<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> +that the action of a burglar is moral, if he has recognized +that it is right for him to perpetrate his crime +between two and three o'clock in the morning, that +being the most favourable time for it, and then strives +to the best of his ability to effect an entrance into the +building he has selected, at the moment which he has +recognized as the right one. Or shall all mankind, +or at least the majority, and not the individual, decide +what is right? In that case the definition would certainly +approximate to the one which I hold to be true; +but for one thing it would suffer from vagueness; +and, moreover, its originator would lay himself open +to the reproach of not having shown why the individual +is worthy of praise when he acts in accordance +with the convictions of the majority, though these be +opposed to his own, and in so doing allows his action +to be determined by a judgment due to a psychic +mechanism other than his.</p> + +<p>Spinoza's "Ethics" leaves the reader in great discomfort, +the result of vacillating and contradictory +explanations. Obviously Descartes' great disciple +had no clear conception of the essence of Morality +and held either consecutively, or may be even simultaneously, +divers views on the subject, amongst which +those of all schools of thought are either quite clearly +expressed or at least implied. "By Good," he says, +"I mean that which we know for certain to be useful +to us."<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> I quote the wording of Berthold Auerbach's translation: "B. de +Spinoza's collected works. Translated from the Latin by Berthold Auerbach." +Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta, 1871. Second edition, Vol. II.</p></div> + +<p>And again: "To act absolutely virtuously is +merely to act, live, preserve one's being (these three +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>mean the same thing) in accordance with the dictates +of Reason, because one seeks one's own interest."</p> + +<p>According to that Morality is synonymous with egoism, +and its aim is man's individual profit or interest. +Even the most pronounced Utilitarians among ethical +theorists have not ventured to go to such lengths. +True, they have contended that the aim of moral +action is happiness, but at least they define it as the +happiness of the whole community and not that of +the individual, except in so far as he is a member of +the community and has his fair share of its well-being. +Spinoza foresees the objection that the pursuit of one's +own happiness cannot possibly deserve the universal +esteem in which virtue is held, and he tries to adduce +reasons whereby the egoism which he characterizes as +moral may be justified and palliated:</p> + +<p>"Everyone exists according to the supreme law of +Nature, and consequently everyone does, according to +the supreme law of Nature, that which results from the +necessities of his own nature; and therefore every man +forms his judgment as to what is good and bad according +to the supreme law of Nature, pursues his own +interest according to his lights, seeks revenge, strives +to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he +hates." That is possibly the most audacious and at +the same time the most ill-founded statement that has +ever been written on the subject of Morality. Morality +means behaviour calculated to further one's own +interest. Morality is therefore utility. But man +cannot act otherwise than morally, since he always +acts as he is compelled to do by his own nature. +There is no sense in discriminating between good and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +bad, moral and immoral, since one always acts in +accordance with the behests of Nature. Man automatically +executes the dictates of Nature which is +alone responsible for his deeds.</p> + +<p>For the Stoics, too, Morality is action in accordance +with the law of Nature, but Spinoza goes +further than the Stoics, in that he does away +with any universally applicable standard of moral +conduct, and sets up instead of Nature pure and +simple, which is the same for all, each man's +individual nature as the authority which shall +lay down rules of behaviour for him. So Morality +is something individual and subjective. Man +acts according to the requirements of his interest; +his own nature shows him what his interest requires; +no other person has any right or any qualification to +form a judgment upon the worth of his conduct, to +call it good or bad, for he cannot know what course +of action the man's personal nature, peculiar to himself +and to no other, may prescribe to him. This is +the doctrine of anarchy and amorality put in a nutshell, +a more wordy paraphrase of the <i>Fais ce que +vouldras</i> (please yourself), the terse inscription that +Rabelais put over the entrance to his Abbey of +Thélème, as the only law governing that abode of +alluring wantonness. Spinoza certainly does half-heartedly +concede to Reason the rôle which Aristotle +positively assigns to it ("To act in an absolutely +virtuous manner is merely to act according to the +guidance of Reason," etc.), but it is impossible to see +how Reason can exercise guidance and control if +"everyone does according to the supreme law of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> +Nature that which results from the necessities of his +nature." This can surely only mean that everyone +may yield to the unbridled desires of his natural instincts, +which is the very reverse of self-control by +Reason. If Nature is to rule despotically, there is +obviously no place for a constitutional limitation of +her sole power by the effective counsel and protests +of Reason.</p> + +<p>But Spinoza renounces in a much more definite +way his views recognizing the right of every individual +"to form his judgment as to what is good and bad +according to the supreme law of Nature," for he +calmly adds: "Society can be founded, if it reserves +to itself the right possessed by the individual to take +revenge, and to pronounce a verdict on what is good +and what is bad; thereby it acquires the power to +prescribe rules of conduct for the community, to make +laws, and to enforce them, not by means of Reason, +which cannot restrict passions, but by threats.... +Hence in a state of Nature, sin cannot even be +imagined."</p> + +<p>This concession to Society most emphatically +contradicts his first definition of Morality. It +does away with the right claimed for the individual +"to do according to the supreme law of Nature that +which results from the necessities of his own nature," +and by the same "supreme law of Nature" to "judge +what is good and what is bad." It subjects conduct +to the restraint, not of Nature, but of Society. It +bears witness to the admission that "Reason cannot +restrict passions," although Spinoza has just required +the virtuous man to "act according to the guidance of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> +Reason." Spinoza admits that Morality is not the +consequence of a law inherent in the individual, but +of an extraneous law forced upon him by society; that +it is not an individual but a social phenomenon. In +this he agrees with the conclusions of modern sociological +thought, but his merit is much diminished by +the fact that he skims lightly over the one great difficulty +which sociological ethics is struggling to overcome. +He says, society "reserves to itself the right +... to pronounce a verdict on what is good and +what is bad, and thereby acquires the power to prescribe +rules of conduct to the community," etc.</p> + +<p>It has the power right enough; police, judge, prison +and gallows bear witness to that; but has it the right? +That is not clear without further investigation. It +requires to be proved. The amoralist can emphatically +deny this, basing his conclusion on Spinoza's own +definition. He can legitimately declare that he need +submit to no dictates of society, that he owes obedience +only to his own nature and his own inner needs, and +the moral philosopher can only prove to him that he +is wrong by scornfully indicating the penal code and +its stalwart minions.</p> + +<p>Spinoza, we see, has already given a whole series +of mutually destructive and contradictory definitions +of Morality: it is the law of life and conduct +which society lays down for the individual, though +we do not learn from him on what principles it is +based; it is the pursuit of one's own interest as indicated +by Reason; it is obedience to necessity—that +is to say, to the demands of one's own nature. All +this does not suffice him. He discovers a new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +aspect of Morality. "Recognition of Good and Evil +is nothing but a pleasurable or a disagreeable +emotion in so far as we are conscious of it." And +again, "Pleasure is not actually bad (as the ascetics +probably contend), but good; pain, on the contrary, +is actually bad."</p> + +<p>In this case the ideas pleasure and pain are +treated as equivalents of good and bad, as were +useful and harmful in the former case. According +to the axiom that things that are equal to the same +thing must be equal to one another, pleasurable is +synonymous not only with good, but also with +beneficial, and in like manner painful with bad and +harmful. Brandy undoubtedly produces a sensation +of pleasure in the drinker; is brandy, then, good in +a moral sense? Above all, is it beneficial? Many +such questions could be put to Spinoza, but this one +is enough.</p> + +<p>Thus we discover Spinoza to be at one and the +same time a Utilitarian and a Hedonist, the champion +of Impulse and again of Reason, an anarchistic +individualist and a herald of the right of +society to rule the individual. Angry and disappointed, +we turn from him, for instead of finding +in him the definite standard we sought we have met +with the shifting hues of the chameleon and the uncanny +changes of form of Proteus.</p> + +<p>The views of the English thinkers are clearer +and more convincing although they, too, do not +carry their investigations far enough. Hobbes uses +Justice and Injustice as synonyms for Morality +and Immorality, and he definitely recognizes what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> +Spinoza only dimly guessed, namely, that these +ideas could only arise in man when living as a member +of society and not in a being dwelling alone. +According to him, therefore, Morality is a social and +not an individual phenomenon; just as the moral +philosophers of the theological school look upon it +as the Will of God, so he considers it to be the +Will of Society. But he was under the obligation +(non-existent for the theologian) to trace to its source +this social Will, to show how it is manifested, to +explain why the individual not only submits to it, +but values this submission far more highly than +mere utility. Man learns the Will of God by revelation, +and it is forbidden to inquire into its basis. +To the Will of Society Hobbes cannot possibly +ascribe the same incontestable sanctity. It should +not have escaped his notice that this Will is neither +uniform nor of assured stability, and that it often +wavers and is sometimes self-contradictory. Therefore, +if he wants to call the Will of Society Justice, +as the theologians call the Will of God Morality, +and if he wants to look upon Justice and Morality +as equivalents, then it is his duty to explain how +Society can make claims which conflict with the +principles on which the universal rules it has drawn +up are based, and which, consequently, not being just +or moral, are unjust and immoral, but which, nevertheless, +must be acknowledged by the individual as +being both just and moral, simply because they are +social claims.</p> + +<p>In Kant's moral philosophy we find the extremest +form of mystic dogmatism; its success would be in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>explicable +did one not know how prone mankind is +to be intimidated by brusque statements. Kant's +dictatorial pronouncements have become common-places. +"Act only on that maxim whereby thou +canst at the same time will that it should become +a universal law." That is very impressive. But +what is "the maxim" on which you act? This +maxim is the moral law. Now we yearn to know +what this moral law is, whence it comes, and on what +it is based.</p> + +<p>But our yearnings remains unsatisfied. The moral +law is a secret. It is an incomprehensible power +which rules our consciousness. Ask no questions. +Be silent, submit and obey. Even the theologian +discussing moral philosophy will listen to reason. +He gives us the information, sibylline though it be, +that the moral law emanates from the Will of God, +and is shown to us in the revelations of religion. +Kant does not even give such meagre information. +The moral law exists. That must suffice. "The +starry heavens above thee, the moral law within thee." +You retort that that is a metaphor which you may +call poetical, if you like, but it is no explanation. +You will get the following reply: this metaphor, +rightly understood, indicates that the moral law is +eternal, that it is part and parcel of uncreated +Nature like the stars, that it is a phenomenon of +the same order as all the elements that go to make +up the universe. "The moral law does not flow +from antecedent ideas of Good and Evil; on the +contrary, the moral law decides what is good and +what is evil." It is not derived from human experi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>ence. +The less so since "it cannot be proved by +experience that it has at any place or any time become +real." In other words, no one can testify that +the "Categorical Imperative" has ever been realized, +that the moral law has "at any place or any +time" ceased to be a Kantian theory productive of +sacred thrills, that it has ever emerged from the unapproachable +cell wherein it dwells in the temple of +human consciousness, to take a place and play an +active part among mortals.</p> + +<p>The lessee of all Kant's wisdom, Hermann Cohen, +with the clumsiness of an over-zealous assistant, has +expressed his master's thought in a perfectly ludicrous +form: "The moral law is to be conceived as a reality +of such kind that it must exist, that its being must be" +(note the elegance and euphony of the phrase "being +must be"!) "even if no creature existed for whom +it would be valid." True, the moral law is a maxim +on which you should "act," a standard of human +conduct, but it would still exist if there were no +human beings and no action. It would come to +exactly the same thing if Hermann Cohen said: the +railway is to be conceived as a reality of such kind +that it must exist if there were no human beings and +consequently no travellers; even if there were no +earth on the surface of which rails and sleepers could +be laid. This is such palpable nonsense that it +would be a work of supererogation to prove its +absurdity. By this grotesque exaggeration Hermann +Cohen has clearly brought to light the hollowness +and weakness of Kant's Moral philosophy which culminates +in the "Categorical Imperative." In spite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +of its arbitrary dogmatism, the formula of the "Categorical +Imperative" has taken a hold on the +imagination of the superficially educated, and has +never ceased to be repeated with the fervour evinced +by a devout man at prayer, by several generations +of those who have made it their business to cultivate +mental and moral science.</p> + +<p>In one of his early novels, "The Island of Dr. +Moreau," H. G. Wells has described how an audacious +scientist, by performing an operation on the +brains of the most savage beasts of prey, such as +panthers, wolves, etc., transformed them into creatures +with the powers of thought and speech. He succeeds +in suppressing, or at least in lulling for the time being, +their bloodthirsty instincts, but he is always afraid that +these may be roused again, and forbids the animals on +which he experiments to touch blood or fresh meat. +He takes good care to give no reason for this prohibition. +He merely issues it sternly and threateningly. +It is "the Law," an unknown, inexplicable, +but terrible power to which one must submit, because +opposition would expose one to unimaginable, but +terrible evils. If temptation assails the beasts they +flee it, whispering fearfully and warningly to one +another: "The Law! the Law!" Wells is a trained +philosopher, and often has his tongue in his cheek. +I shrewdly suspect that when he writes of the mysterious +"Law" which fills Dr. Moreau's semi-humanized +beasts of prey with superstitious terror, +he is poking fun at Kant's "Categorical Imperative."</p> + +<p>The great logical mistake in Kant's moral philosophy +is that he conceives Morality as a social or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +collective phenomenon, and yet defines it as an individual +one. According to Kant, the Categorical +Imperative exists within us. It is as immutable as +the starry heavens above us. It gives us the criterion +by which to discriminate between good and evil. +Its realm is our consciousness wherein it lives and +rules; it is not introduced from outside, it springs +from no power or conditions outside our person. All +the same, the only law which this ultra subjective +Categorical Imperative imposes on us is the most +centrifugal that can possibly be imagined: "Act +only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same +time will that it should become a universal law." +Hence our action is designed to produce an effect +on the world around us. It is "to become a universal +law" can, of course, only mean, it is to become a +universal law of human society, for Kant cannot +possibly have aspired to make the Categorical Imperative +impose laws upon the stars in their courses. +Our moral law, in so far as it applies to our actions, +deals with society. When we formulate it in our +minds, we associate it from its first inception with the +notion of the society to which it is to be applied. It +would have been logical to say: "Your standard of +conduct is to be what society recognizes as its universal +law." But Kant puts the cart before the horse +and says on the contrary: "The maxims on which +thy action is based are by thy will to become the +universal law of society."</p> + +<p>Other philosophers have avoided this mistake. +Hegel declares: "It is not until man becomes a +member of a moral community that the ideas of Duty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> +and Virtue attain a definite meaning and become direct +representatives of a universal spirit in subjectivity, +which knows that it is actuated in its aim by the universal +and realizes that its dignity and its particular +aims are founded upon it." If we translate this +horribly hazy language of Hegel's into plain speech +we find it means: "The ideas of Duty and Virtue only +acquire a meaning when they are applied to the acts +of commission and omission of the individual member +of a community." (When Hegel speaks of "moral +community" his use of the word "moral" is inadmissible, +for he takes it for granted that the meaning +of the word "moral" has been determined and is +clearly understood, whereas he ought first to have +defined its meaning.) The concepts of Duty and +Virtue denote that the individual in taking action +thinks of the community, that regard for its interests +determines him, that his actions do not attain dignity +and worth until his aim becomes the interests of the +community, that these interests must coincide with +those of the individual if his actions in his own +interests are to merit the appellations of dutiful and +virtuous. In short: to act morally is to act so as to +ensure the well-being of the community. The real +Categorical Imperative is a social conscience.</p> + +<p>Feuerbach expresses this thought clearly and distinctly +when he says: "There can be no question of +Morality in the strict sense of the word except +where the subject of discussion is the relationship +of man to man, of one person to another, of me to +thee."</p> + +<p>Recent contemporary French writers are in no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> +way doubtful of the meaning implied by the concept +of Morality. "Morality," says Littré, "is the whole +collection of rules which determine our conduct +towards others. Moral Good is the ideal, which at +any period of a civilization forms opinions and +customs with respect to this conduct; moral evil is +that which offends this ideal." This definition is very +incomplete and weak, as will be seen in the course +of our remarks, but on one point it is quite clear: it +treats Morality as a social phenomenon, it paraphrases +it as the adjustment of individual action to the standard +set up by the community. The question of the +origin and the aim of this standard is left open.</p> + +<p>L. Lévy-Brühl formulates Littré's idea more +clearly. "We call by the name of Morality the collection +of such conceptions, opinions, feelings and +customs respecting the mutual rights and duties of +men in their life as members of a community, as are +recognized and generally observed at a given time in +a given civilization."</p> + +<p>Thus, according to some, Morality is subjection +to an absolute law of divine, or at any rate of unexplained +and inexplicable origin, which religion or a +mysterious inner voice reveals to man; according to +others, it is the recognition that the claims of the community, +or at any rate of the majority of one's fellow +men, are of binding force upon the actions of the +individual. These different answers to an inquiry as +to the origin of Morality both contain the tacit admission +that it is a law which peremptorily dictates to man +what he shall do and what he shall not do. But by +means of what psychic mechanism does this law<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> +enforce obedience in the consciousness of man? It is +remarkable that all moral philosophers, no matter to +what age, nation or school they belong, dimly feel or +clearly recognize that in civilized man at any rate, +natural instincts and judgment are always at war; that +the latter opposes the former; that in the victory of +judgment over impulse lies the very essence of Morality; +that consequently the essence of Morality implies +the control and repression of instinct by Reason—in +a word, that it is inhibition.</p> + +<p>We have seen that Aristotle, in definite though +unconscious opposition to the Stoics, who consider +Morality synonymous with Nature, defines it as the +activity of Reason.</p> + +<p>Henry More was the first to express this quite +clearly: "Virtue is an intellectual force of the soul +which enables it to control ... animal instincts and +sensual passions."</p> + +<p>And Dr. Jodl sums up the character of Christian +morality in the statement: "Moral philosophy under +the influence of Christian ideas makes Morality +always appear in the guise of a prohibition; at any +rate it is apt to conceive Morality as acting in an +essentially restrictive and prohibitive manner upon +the natural impulses and instincts of man."</p> + +<p>This is not quite correct. This Christian code of +morals does not always manifest itself as a prohibition. +Its main precept is: "Love thy neighbour as thyself." +That is not a prohibition but a positive command. +Nevertheless, the point of departure of this command +is an inhibition. For the first instinctive movement of +man is selfishness and, as its consequence, indifference<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> +to one's neighbour; the first imperious impulse is to +sacrifice the latter's interests to one's own. But if +regard for one's neighbour, nay, love for him permeates +our feelings, thoughts and actions, that denotes +a victory of Christian ideas over the impulse of instinct, +a suppression of that impulse—that is, an inhibition +which, not content with mere prevention, prolongs +its efficacy in the same direction until it changes +the impulse of selfishness and inconsiderateness +into its very antithesis, that of unselfishness and +charity.</p> + +<p>It constitutes an important advance in knowledge +to recognize that Morality, and not, as Jodl makes +out, only Christian Morality, is manifested as an inhibition, +as the victory achieved by Reason over Instinct +which is contemptuously described as animal, +simply because its worth is judged by a standard +already supplied by current views on Morals. It is +inadmissible to judge by this standard when one +attempts an impartial investigation into the ultimate +foundations and the essence of Morality. We have +no plainly obvious right—no right which does not +require a proof—simply to scorn instinct as animal; +to run it down from the start and with a respectful +bow to give Reason precedence over it; to applaud +with satisfaction the suppression of rascally Instinct +by highly respectable Reason. Instinct is no more +animal than any other manifestation of life in man; +and he indulges in pleasant self-deception if he +imagines that he is other than an animal, that is, a +living organism in which all processes take place +according to the same laws as in all other living<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +beings, from the simplest one-celled creature to the +most highly developed and complicated.</p> + +<p>In itself Instinct has the same claim to dignity as +Reason; according to some people an even greater +one, because the former is more primitive, unpremeditated, +self-assured and firmly established than +the latter, and if Reason claims to be the superior, +it must substantiate that claim.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, that claim has never been +universally acknowledged.</p> + +<p>Periods during which Reason rules at least in +name and is treated with the obsequious reverence +which the model citizen has, or feigns to have, for +his sovereign, are followed by others in which +Instinct revolts; rebels dethrone Reason and set +up Instinct in its place, or, as they call it, passion +and nature. The parties which in turn wield power +in these periodic revolutions may be briefly termed +classical and romantic. The classicists are the +legitimist supporters of Reason; the romanticists are +revolutionaries, and their leaders are men like Cleon +or Jack Cade, Cromwell, Washington or Robespierre; +that is to say, rude demagogues or subtle +dialecticians in favour of Instinct. Among the legitimists +in Reason as in politics, are to be found those +who maintain the divine right, who base the right of +Reason to rule over Instinct upon the Will of God, +and others again, the constitutionalists, who base +their support on the Will of the people, on universal +suffrage, who force upon Instinct the law promulgated +by society. I need not carry the metaphor to extremes. +Every reader can work it out in all its details.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +I only wanted to show quite clearly that almost all +moral philosophers conceived Morality as a struggle +between Reason and Instinct, as the defeat of lawlessness +by law. But their views diverge widely when +they try to explain the source of this law and its claim +to obedience.</p> + +<p>The theologians find no difficulty in this explanation. +Just as the essence of Morality according to +their ideas is the nearest possible approximation to +divine perfection, so the moral law is one enacted by +God Himself, and it is a sin punishable with hell +fire to fail to observe it or to rebel against it. Others +look upon Man as his own law-giver, and trace his +moral conduct, his willingness to combat his own +instincts, to an inner voice which teaches him what is +right. They call this inner voice by different names. +They call it Nature, Reason or Conscience, and look +upon it as something innate, as a normal constituent +of man's psychic nature. That is the meaning of +Fichte's apodictic statement: "That which does not +meet with the approval of one's own conscience is +necessarily sin. Therefore he who acts on anyone +else's authority acts in a conscienceless manner."</p> + +<p>With this emphatic utterance Fichte dismisses +both the devout believers, for whom Morality is the +revealed Will of God, and the Rationalists who look +upon it as the dictate of society. He considers that +if man claims to act morally, he can do so only on +his own authority, i.e. on that of his conscience. He +is not aware that in so doing he frivolously abandons +all rights to pronounce an objective moral judgment +on any human action. He thereby relinquishes the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +power to ask any further question except: "Did he +act in accordance with his own conscience? If so, +then he has acted in a subjectively conscientious way, +even if it appears to me to be immoral or even +criminal and monstrous. If he has acted contrary +to the promptings of his own conscience, then he is +assuredly a sinner, even if his action be in my eyes +splendid and exemplary." Thus Fichte, with his +subjective basis of Morality, is led to a conclusion +which is a ludicrous reversal of generally accepted +ideas. According to him, a man would be acting +conscientiously if, despising what all others hold good, +right and sacred, he wallows in the satisfaction of his +selfish instincts, as long as his conscience approves +or even bids him do so; on the other hand, he is a +sinner if, in opposition to his inner voice, but according +to moral law, that is in obedience to extraneous +authority, he practices all the virtues.</p> + +<p>All these subjective moral philosophers tacitly +assume with Rousseau that man is by nature good. +They take no account of the empirically established +fact that there are men whose Fichtean conscience, or +whose Kantian categorical imperative, urges them to +a course of action which according to the general +opinion is bad, wicked and revolting. This criticism +applies to Beneke, according to whom Morality is "a +development of human nature which exists as such +within us, and which we need only continue or promote"; +it applies equally to Reid and Dugald Stewart, +who describe it as an inclination, which has become a +habit or a principle, to act according to the dictates of +conscience. But conscience must be explained. It is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +by no means self-evident that each individual conscience +will have the same standard of good and evil. +The moral philosopher must not shirk the duty of +showing how the conscience acquires its concepts of +moral values, with what weapons it provides Reason +to combat Instinct, which demands satisfaction +without paying any attention to the warnings of +conscience.</p> + +<p>The great majority of moral philosophers do not +endorse the view of Kant and Fichte, that conscience +is a piece of human nature, a sense inborn in man, +an inner voice that is independent of, and unmoved +by, external influences; on the contrary, they are +convinced that conscience originates outside the individual, +that, in his consciousness, it is the advocate +retained by society, commissioned to plead the cause +of the community before the reason of the individual +even, nay, especially, when the interests of the community +run counter to those of the individual.</p> + +<p>Bacon calls the presence in our consciousness of a +defender of the interests of society our innate social +affection, and treats it unreservedly as the source of +Morality. Long before his time the Stoics had noted +the existence of this social affection and called it +οἱκείωσις; Hugo Grotius, with the intellectual perspicuity +peculiar to himself, says that "Right and Morality +flow from the same source, and this source is a strong +social instinct natural to man, it is solicitude for the +community, a solicitude guided by Reason." The +English philosophers are practically unanimous in +ascribing both conscience and Morality in general to +a social source. The welfare of the community, says<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +Richard Cumberland, is the highest moral law; +Hutcheson remarks that, in the struggle between +egoism and universal benevolence, the decisive factor +in favour of the latter is the accompanying feeling, +the reflective emotion of approval.</p> + +<p>In modern parlance we call "universal benevolence," +altruism, and the "reflective emotion of approval" +is a paraphrase of conscience which contains +an indication of its mode of action. For the idea that +our action will meet with the approval of the community +and the pleasurable emotion of satisfaction +are in fact the reasons why we mostly submit to the +dictates of conscience voicing the commands of the +community. Only Hutcheson is too venturesome and +goes too far, when he maintains unreservedly that the +reflective emotion of approval in the struggle between +egoism and universal benevolence is the decisive +factor which turns the scales in favour of the latter. +This is by no means always the case. When it does +occur we call the action moral, but we characterize it +as immoral when, in spite of the "reflective emotion +of approval" "universal benevolence" is worsted by +egoism.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to quote the opinions of other +moral philosophers. It is enough to observe that most +of them describe the moral law as a social agreement +and make conscience its accredited representative. L. +Lévy-Brühl repeats a doctrine current since the days +of Pythagoras when he says: "The sense of duty and +that of responsibility, horror of crime, love of what is +good and reverence for justice—all these, which a +conscience sensitive to Morality thinks it derives from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +itself and from itself alone, have nevertheless a social +origin"; and Feuerbach expresses the same view in +an entertainingly melodramatic fashion when he calls +the voice of conscience "An echo of the cry of revenge +uttered by the injured party." This cry of revenge +would never wake an echo in us if we did not possess +a sounding board which cries of distress and lamentation +cause to vibrate. Schopenhauer, digging deeper +than his predecessor, clearly recognizes this sounding +board, and describes its characteristics when he says +that the foundation of ethics is pity, which in its +passive form warns us: "<i>Neminem laede!</i> Do harm +to no one!" And in its active form gives the order: +"<i>Imo omnes quantum potes juva!</i> Assist everyone +with all your might!"</p> + +<p>The assumption, that sympathy with his neighbour +must be present in man's consciousness before +he is capable of moral action, is one that need +not be made by subjective moral philosophers, who +hold with Kant and his school that the moral law is +an inborn categorical imperative, which proclaims its +commands without reference to any extraneous object, +or to the world, or mankind.</p> + +<p>In the same way the theologians have no need of +it, for they consider that what is morally good is the +Will of God.</p> + +<p>But he who holds with the moral philosophers of +sociological tendencies that Morality is regard for +one's fellow men, and the recognition that the claims +of the real or supposed interest of the community are +superior to those of the comfort of the individual, must +admit that sympathy is a necessary preliminary to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> +moral action; i.e. that the individual must have the +ability to picture the sufferings of others so vividly that +he feels their sorrows as his own, and with all his might +and all his will strives to prevent, alleviate and heal +them. The lack of this ability, psychic anæsthesia, +is a symptom of disease. It renders the person +affected incapable of moral action. It is a characteristic +of the born criminal, and is the essential symptom +of that state of mind which alienists term moral insanity. +Even in this condition, if reason and the +power of judgment are not affected, great offences +against current moral law can be avoided. But this +results from the fear of the painful and ruinous results +which a collision with public opinion entails, even if +the offender is not actually haled into court. It is +not due to any inner necessity, nor to the prompting +of one's own feelings.</p> + +<p>Only the Rationalists have any cause or reason to +inquire into the aims of Morality, whether they look +upon the moral law as dictated by society or are of +the opinion that it is the sum total of the rules by +which Reason, of its own initiative, successfully combats +the urging of Instinct. If the moral law is a +creation of society, and is obeyed by the individual +out of sympathy with his fellow-men or consideration +for society, the logical conclusion is that society has +set up the moral law to satisfy some real or imagined +need. Its aim in this case can only be the real or +supposed welfare of the community. This is the most +widely accepted view.</p> + +<p>"Morality and universal welfare," says Macchiavelli, +"are conceptions which coincide." In his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> +calm assurance this apodictic writer, who doubtlessly +slept well and had an excellent digestion, +is never troubled by a doubt as to whether there +is such a thing as an absolutely reliable measure +of universal welfare, and therefore whether Morality, +which is termed its equivalent, can provide +us with a perfectly unimpeachable standard. He +whose ethical conscience is more tender and timid +will inevitably anxiously ask himself: Who decides +what universal welfare demands and what is conducive +to it? Is it to be the masses? Is the mob, incapable +of thought, ignorant, swayed by momentary and shifting +impulses, to make moral laws for the select few +who are its natural guides? What tragedies would +necessarily result from this definition! How often a +strong personality, trained to come to independent +conclusions, refuses to obey the voice of the mob! Is +the sheep who trots bleating along with the herd to +be taken as the type of a moral being? Must we +necessarily condemn as immoral those who swim +against the stream, enlightened tyrants who force +upon their people hateful innovations calculated to +ensure their welfare,—such men as Peter the Great, +the Emperor Joseph II, the reformer who comes into +violent conflict with the majority who are creatures of +habit? "The aim of Morality is the welfare of +society; this is indeed the essence of Morality." A +sufficiently safe and most soothing formula this seems; +but really the security it gives is most deceptive, and +it leaves unsolved the most important problems relating +to the phenomenon of Morality.</p> + +<p>A numerous group of moral philosophers seeks the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> +aim of moral conduct in the individual himself, not +outside him. In spite of Schopenhauer's sympathy, +they doubt that consideration for the well-being of +the community would act forcibly enough upon the +individual to induce him to wage unceasing war on +his impulses and struggle to overcome them. Rather +they hold that the individual must find in his inner +consciousness not only the spur to moral action, but +also the reward for the same, and they characterize +this driving force as pleasurable emotions in every +sense of the words. According to them man acts +morally because, and in so far as, he anticipates +pleasurable results from so doing. Epicurus considers +the aim of Morality always to be Pleasure. He +makes only the one reservation, that a reasonable +man will renounce an immediate pleasure for the +sake of a greater one in the future, and that he may +delight in the anticipation of pleasurable emotions +which defeat and dull present pains. Thus the +martyr may be a true Epicurean, even if by his +actions he exposes himself to most cruel torture and +the most painful death, for he is convinced that the +everlasting joys of paradise will more than indemnify +him for his temporary sufferings.</p> + +<p>I have already shown that Aristotle considers +Morality the activity of practical Reason, which is +accompanied by pleasurable emotions. He makes +these pleasurable emotions an essential part of Morality, +and Spinoza shares this view, for he says: +"Knowledge of good and evil is nothing but a +pleasurable or a disagreeable emotion in so far as +we are conscious of it."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> + +<p>No less roundly, one might almost say brutally, +Leibnitz declares: "We term good that which gives +us pleasure; evil that which gives us pain," while +Feuerbach expresses himself rather more carefully +and indefinitely thus: "The instinct for +happiness is the most potent of all instincts. +Where existence always occurs together with volition, +volition and the will to be happy are inseparable; +they are, indeed, essentially one. 'I will,' means +'I have the will not to suffer, not to be hindered +and destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be assisted +and preserved; that is, I have the will to be happy.'" +This is a wordy paraphrase of Spinoza's: "All existence +is self-assertion, and Morality is only the +highest and purest form of this fundamental instinct +in a reasonable being."</p> + +<p>Among those moral philosophers who see in +pleasurable emotions the aim of Morality, its reward +and its incentive, we must distinguish two groups: +those who understand by pleasurable emotions such +as appeal to the senses—the Hedonists; and those +who spiritualize the meaning of the word and expect +of Morality not an immediate bodily gratification, +a pleasure, or an insipid satisfaction of +the sense, but lasting happiness—the Eudæmonists. +At the first glance the Eudæmonists seem to have a +higher and more worthy conception of the subjective +reaction of moral conduct than have the Hedonists; +for the satisfaction the former expect and promise +does not apply to the lower spheres of our organic +life, but to the loftiest functions of our mind, from +which alone a feeling of happiness can emanate.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> + +<p>But if we look into the matter more closely we find +that to draw a sharp distinction between the Hedonists +and Eudæmonists is more than a little arbitrary. +For Pleasure and Happiness differ hardly at all in +essentials, but chiefly in degree; and this would at +once be obvious if one only took the trouble to define +the two ideas, which, however, is mostly not done. +And with good reason, for it is impossible to explain +Pleasure. You can use synonyms for it; you can look +wise and say: Pleasure is that which is agreeable, or +that which one desires, that in which one delights, or +a certain quality of feeling which accompanies such +organic processes as strengthen or vitalize the system; +but all that this amounts to is to say in a +roundabout way, Pleasure is Pleasure. It is a fundamental +fact of our inner consciousness, just as inexplicable +as life, or as its antithesis, Pain. But if +we assume that Pleasure is something given by +subjective experience, then the idea of Happiness +can be defined. Happiness is a flooding of the consciousness +with sunshine; it is enjoyment of the +moment, a sense of living in the present accentuated +by pleasurable emotion. If this feeling is organically +differentiated, that is, if it springs from a certain +section of the mind or mechanism of the body and +can be located there, it is ecstasy. It is only felt +as Happiness when it is, so to speak, melted, dissolved, +distributed throughout the organism, cœnesthetically +diffused.</p> + +<p>If we agree to this definition we can take +Eudæmonism into consideration as an aim of moral +action, but Hedonism we shall have to discard from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> +the start. If Morality is to be inhibition, a victory +of Reason over Instinct, then it cannot possibly +arouse Pleasure, since the first and most immediate +source of Pleasure is the surrender to instinct, the +satisfaction of the organic appetites; but if one +resists them, suppresses them, then one experiences +a privation which at best occasions discomfort and +may easily cause pain. By its very nature and the +mechanism by which it works, Morality can therefore +give rise to no pleasure, but only to discomfort. All +the same, it can afford a feeling of happiness.</p> + +<p>It may be objected that I am guilty of a contradiction +when I assume the possibility of Happiness without +Pleasure, as I have just described Happiness as a +particular kind of Pleasure; but in reality there is no +contradiction. For Pleasure springs from a special +organic apparatus, whereas Happiness is not a condition +of any particular apparatus in our body, but +a general feeling that cannot be located; if it is +roused by moral actions it originates in the self-satisfaction +of Reason, in its pride in the victory over +Instinct, in the rapture occasioned by one's own +strength of will; therefore, it can well exist without +any differentiated pleasurable emotion located in any +particular organic apparatus.</p> + +<p>Many moral philosophers have for various reasons +rejected plausible Eudæmonism as well as Hedonism, +and these reasons can all be traced back to the +recognition, or at least an inkling, of the fact that +moral action in the nature of things must exclude +pleasurable emotions; at any rate immediate ones, +and such as are perceived by the senses. Perhaps<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +Fichte does this in the most naïve fashion, for he +rejects every form of Eudæmonism as the aim of +moral action, but admits as its purpose only bliss, +that is to say, the self-satisfaction of Reason resulting +from action in accordance with its own laws. +However, he struggles in vain to deny that this +"bliss" is of the nature of a pleasurable emotion, or +to interpret it as differing from Eudæmonism. He is +only giving the latter another name to make it conform +in an orthodox manner with his doctrine of the +Supreme Ego. "<i>Baptizo te carpam!</i>" I baptize +thee, carp! In this way the pious man complies +with the law enjoining abstinence from meat, and +with an easy conscience smacks his lips over a roast +pheasant which he has dubbed fish.</p> + +<p>Plato is among those who most emphatically deny +that Pleasure is either the motive force, the accompaniment, +the consequence, or the aim of Morality. +But a reasonable thinker can derive no profit from +his arguments in support of this point of view, for +they are rambling, fantastic, mystical and visionary. +Plato thinks it a necessary consequence of the very +nature of Good that it should be absolutely self-sufficient. +For Pleasure is a perpetual growth, a +ceaseless longing for more; it can therefore not be +self-sufficient, and on this account can not be the +foundation of Morality.</p> + +<p>However, it is by no means obvious why Morality +should not be in a perpetual state of growth (just as +Pleasure is, according to Plato), or why it should not +constantly desire an increase of its own activities. +On the contrary, this craving is just what one would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +most wish Morality to have. True, it would not then +attain self-satisfaction. But what is the good of +this self-satisfaction? It is a pleasurable emotion, +and according to Plato Morality is supposed to have +nothing in common with Pleasure. It is not to be +contentment and serene satisfaction, but rather tireless +endeavour. However, Plato, of course, cannot admit +this, because for him Good and the deity are identical, +and being perfect can therefore advance no farther in +perfection; and the striving after Good is merely an +effort of memory on man's part to call to mind more +clearly the deity whom he saw in his spiritual life +before birth, and of whom he retains a dim and confused +memory in his earthly life. It is plainly idle +to waste reasonable criticism upon such visionary +arguments.</p> + +<p>The Stoics, too, try to sever the connexion between +moral conduct and Pleasure, and to conceive +the former as a simple activity of human nature, one, +moreover, from which they expect no particular +satisfaction. They overlook the fact that every +activity of the impulses and instincts of man's own +nature affords him satisfaction, and that Pleasure is +nothing but this very satisfaction of natural instincts. +If, then, Morality were, as the Stoics contend, only +"Life in harmony with Nature herself," then, like +every other satisfaction of natural desires, it should +be an ever-flowing source of pleasurable emotions, +and this characteristic would be inseparable from it, +though the Stoics may vainly try to deny it.</p> + +<p>Christianity has an easier job than Stoicism. +With harsh severity, disregarding any plea for in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>dulgence +in view of the weakness of the flesh, it +absolutely excludes the factor of pleasure from the +fulfilment of moral duties. But this severity is only +apparent. The good and just man can expect no +reward for his moral conduct here on earth, but he +will find a much more ample one in the life to come. +To the devout believer who gives unlimited credit +to it, the promise of the joys of paradise has the +full value of a cash disbursement. It is somewhat +childish juggling with words to deny pleasurable +emotion to be the aim of moral conduct if at the +same time a most vivid foretaste of the eternal bliss +which awaits him after death be given to the virtuous +man; as if the anticipation of heavenly bliss were +not a pleasurable emotion of the highest degree!</p> + +<p>Kant finds it due to his point of view to spurn +every weak inclination to Eudæmonism. A Categorical +Imperative cannot issue commands with an +eye to profit or comfort. That is as clear as daylight. +"All Morality of action must be founded on +the necessity which arises from duty and respect for +the law, and not from love or inclination for the +desired result of the action." Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, +and John Stuart Mill have recorded such irrefutable +criticisms of the Kantian doctrine of the +absolute disinterestedness of moral action, that it is +unnecessary to add to their arguments.</p> + +<p>Only some moral philosophers, and particularly +Mill, are guilty of logical inaccuracy when they reject +Eudæmonism but retain Utility as the aim of morality. +Why do the Utilitarians not realize that they are +merely Eudæmonists under another name, and that he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +who disregards his own immediate interests in order to +further the well-being of the community experiences +a pleasurable emotion of high order in the satisfaction +he derives from the sacrifices whereby he has +contributed to the good of the community?</p> + +<p>The useless exertions of a section of moral philosophers +to eliminate not only Hedonism but also +Eudæmonism from moral action are a veritable labour +of Sisyphus. Hardly have these two with difficulty +been expelled by the door than they return by the +window or the chimney. It is a mere conjuring trick +to remove them from this world to the next, as do +the theologians, or to substitute universal well-being +for the feeling of happiness. All the same, the desire +to purge moral action of the least admixture of hope +of profit or pleasure is comprehensible. Common +experience, which is equally forced upon the profound +thinker and upon the plain man in the street +least inclined to cudgel his brain, teaches us that +Morality consists, with very few exceptions, in acting +against our own immediate interest, in denying +ourselves some coveted pleasure, in renouncing some +attainable profit, in undertaking some disagreeable +exertion because Reason bids us do so. From this +practical experience the man in the street gets the impression +that duty is a bitter necessity and that decency +is attended by many and varied inconveniences. The +theorist, the philosopher, derives a principle from his +empirical facts; he observes that the moral man often +acts against his own immediate interests, and expresses +this in the pretentious axiom: "Morality from +the very beginning excludes all thought of profit."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> + +<p>And yet the philosophers are guilty of the same +superficiality as the man in the street. They do not +go far enough into the matter to perceive that the +morality of pleasure, of interest, and of duty, +Hedonism, Utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative, +all lead in very slightly different ways to +the same goal—Eudæmonism. The fulfilment of +duty affords spiritual satisfaction, a pre-eminently +pleasurable emotion which increases in direct proportion +to the effort which its fulfilment demands. +Interest also implies pleasure, for every interest +ultimately comes to this, that it is an attempt to secure +a pleasure. This aim lies at the bottom of all interests; +it is the fundamental interest from which all +seemingly different interests are derived; it is the +universal goal to which all human effort tends, +whether it be a question of making money to satisfy +ambition, of winning love and friendship, of material, +spiritual, personal or social values. Interest is self-assertion +and the intensifying of the zest for life. +But these are always accompanied by pleasurable +emotions; thus interest is forthwith identified with +pleasurable emotion, even though one has to work +hard, even though at the moment it entails drudgery +and discomfort. Hedonism makes no secret of its +nature and its tendency. It openly admits what +the Categorical Imperative denies and what Utilitarianism +veils with vague phrases: that the aim and +object of moral action is Pleasure and nothing else.</p> + +<p>In our short survey of the immense field of literature +dealing with moral philosophy we have learnt +that, although the most various and divergent views<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +are expressed as to the essence and source of +Morality, nevertheless there is but one opinion, be +it clearly or vaguely stated, be it the result of knowledge +or surmise, as to the mechanism by means of +which moral concepts determine action, and as to the +conscious or unconscious aim of moral action: Moral +concepts do their work by means of inhibition, and +the aim of moral action is a feeling of happiness.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY</h3> + + +<p>It is natural for man's thoughts to be concentrated +on himself until he has learnt to rise from +the deep and narrow well of his egoism to a +higher and wider view of life and, free from the taint +of self-love, to form an idea of his place in the world +and his relationship to it. Not till the development +of his intellect is far advanced does any doubt assail +him as to the truth of his conviction that all his personal +affairs, the least as well as the most weighty, +are of the greatest importance to the universe, that +every ache or pain he feels must wake an echo in +the heavens, that the Earth shudders in anticipation +when he is about to stumble and sprain his ankle, +and that the stars in their courses mysteriously, +though intelligibly to the discerning, foretell the hour +of his birth and of his death. An Indian legend +pours cruel scorn upon this childlike megalomania: +A fox had fallen into a stream and was drowning. +"The world is coming to an end!" gasped the +animal in its agony. A peasant standing on the +brink replied coldly, "Oh, no, I see only a little +fox drowning."</p> + +<p>Many moral philosophers, those of the Kantian +school without exception, labour under the delusion +of this same, egocentric view. In their eyes the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> +phenomenon of Morality is a cosmic one. Morality +is the law of human conduct, therefore it is the law +of world processes, of the universe. Indeed, it is +the law of the universe before it becomes that of +human conduct. It would exist even if there were +no men, no humanity, no human conduct at all. The +solemn innocents who weightily give utterance to this +doctrine are unaware how ridiculous they are. They +do not hesitate to subject Sirius to the yoke of the +Ten Commandments. They are convinced that the +Milky Way practises virtue and shuns, or ought to +shun, vice, just as we inconsiderable human beings +do. The precept, "Thou shalt not steal," applies +with binding force to gravity, and the warning, "Thou +shalt not kill," to electricity, though the latter ruthlessly +disregards it, as the results of being struck by +lightning and accidents with high voltage installations +frequently prove. If they do not threaten +Nature with police and prison it is only because in +their eyes Morality is independent of all sanctions, +is superior to rewards and punishments, depends +upon itself alone, constitutes its own aim, is by its +very nature a compelling force, and therefore has +no need of adventitious compulsion.</p> + +<p>Such profound nonsense cannot lay claim to +serious treatment. It is a counterpart to the belief +that events in the history of mankind, like war and +pestilence, are foretold by heavenly signs such as +fiery comets. The stars revolve, the clockwork of the +universe continues undisturbed, as though the earth +were still uninhabited, as it was when it was a glowing +fluid globe or, earlier still, a nebular mass; and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +this although man's self-esteem be hurt by such a +lack of consideration. If we care to call the (so far +as we know) unalterable laws, according to which the +forces of Nature act and the mechanism of the world +works, the Morality of the Universe, that may pass. +Only we must in that case clearly realize that we are +speaking metaphorically, that we are making use of +a poetic simile, that we are anthropomorphically +attributing human traits to the universe. Morality is +a phenomenon restricted to mankind, or, to be strictly +accurate, a phenomenon which occurs only among +living beings; for the beginnings of Morality may +be traced in creatures of a lower order than man, +and it develops simultaneously with the consciousness +and the mentality of living beings. Morality +is a function of life, dependent upon it, begotten and +developed by it, to meet life's needs and serve its +interests. The existence of Morality apart from life +is as unthinkable as that of hunger, ambition, or +gratitude.</p> + +<p>Morality is a collection of laws and prohibitions +which Reason opposes to organic instincts, by means +of which the former forces the latter into actions +from which they would like to refrain, or prevents +them from carrying out that which they yearn to +do. The existence of Morality, therefore, presupposes +in the first place that of an intelligence sufficiently +developed to form a clear idea of something +that is still in the future, namely, an image of the +consequences resulting from an action.</p> + +<p>Guided by this inner contemplation of the image +of the consequences of an action, Reason decides<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +to carry out or prevent the action. This gives us +the lowest plane upon which Morality can occur as +the cause of action and of abstention from action. +It implies, above all things, foresight, and can therefore +only exist in a consciousness which is sufficiently +developed to grasp the idea of the future +and form a picture of it. This consciousness must +be capable of extracting the elements of a conception +from memory according to the laws of the association +of ideas, and be able to group them logically +in a new order. In other words, as long as the +mind cannot visualize the past and from it build +up a picture of the future, Morality can find no place +in it.</p> + +<p>This statement requires no limitation, but it +demands a short explanation. It is quite true that +Morality is foresight, but it is only among the elect +that the latter is developed to such a pitch that it +is possible to form images of the consequences of +action and abstention sufficiently clear and definite +to exercise a restraining or encouraging influence.</p> + +<p>The average man can act morally without first +working out a clear picture of the future. It is enough +that he has been trained to the habit of respecting +current precepts, and of accepting the views obtaining +in his circle as to what is good or bad, what is +admissible or inadmissible. This morality, of course, +is merely a matter of drill or training; it is unthinking +automatism; it is inferior, and not to be compared +with the living, creative morality of higher natures, +which, as a sovereign law-giver, comes to an independent +decision in every case and, like the guardian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +angel of childlike faith, guides man on his path +through life, indicates the right course at the cross-roads, +and warns him of pitfalls and stumbling-blocks. +But for everyday use mechanical morality +may suffice. In the uneventful existence of the +average man, which passes in a stereotyped way, +this mechanical morality is an acceptable guide and +counsellor, but it remains an outside influence foreign +to his inner consciousness; he is glad to deceive and +outwit it, as a slave does his master's bailiff if he can +do so without running the risk of a thrashing; but +if his destiny unexpectedly rises above its accustomed +dead level, then this dogmatic morality, which he +has never really assimilated, leaves him in the lurch, +and mournfully, in piteous tones, he utters the well-known +cry, "It is easy to do one's duty; it is difficult +to know where one's duty lies."</p> + +<p>Reason, then, which is capable of foreseeing the +results of actions, teaches a man what he must do +and from what he must abstain, where he may follow +his instinct and where he must resist it, according as +it considers the presumptive results of yielding to +impulse good or bad. But whence does Reason +obtain the standard it applies to the actions of men +and their results? How does it acquire the fundamental +concepts Good and Bad, and what is their +significance? Generally speaking, the answer will be +as follows: Moral values are appraised by a standard +supplied by a general consensus of opinion; Reason +acknowledges as good that which meets with the +approval of the community, that which the latter desires +and therefore praises; the community, for its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> +part, echoes the pronouncements of influential personages, +i.e. of the most respected, most powerful, +and most aristocratic; Reason condemns as bad +that which the community disapproves, and which it +therefore censures and rejects. This definition does +not solve the problem of good and bad, it only +shifts it.</p> + +<p>Later we shall have to show upon what grounds +the community discriminates between acceptable +and reprehensible facts, calling the former good +and the latter bad. For the present it is enough to +observe that Reason derives the laws, which it constantly +impresses on man, from the opinion of the +community.</p> + +<p>It can happen that Reason rejects the opinion of +the community and forms a conclusion opposed to it. +This revolt of individual morality against conventional +morality is the great tragedy of man. It can +only occur in the soul of a hero, for mediocre and +insipid people always bow to the opinion of the +majority. There is clearly imminent danger of making +a mistake. Not seldom, however, the individual +is right in his opposition to the community, and then +the latter is fired by his example to examine its +traditional dogmas and to correct or reject them. +This is not the only, but it is the most common +means by which Morality is developed and changed. +Its progress demands martyrs. Strong personalities +must be sacrificed to force a revision of moral values. +Socrates has to swallow the draft of hemlock so that +unfettered thought may acquire the right to doubt the +legend of the gods. Jesus has to incur the dangerous<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> +anger of the Pharisees so that the adulteress may be +treated with indulgence and human sympathy instead +of being punished according to rigorous law. But +the opposition of a self-willed, subjective Morality +to the accepted moral law is always exceptional; the +general rule is submission to the moral law. This is +indeed a necessary preliminary to revolt against the +moral law of the community, for it is only by means +of a vigorous social education that man develops such +a nicely balanced and keen sense of Good and Bad, +that he cannot prevail upon himself to carry out +generally approved actions which his own intelligence +does not recognize as moral. He whose moral sense +has not been intensified by strict discipline will never +be assailed by doubt, as long as he follows in the footsteps +of the multitude.</p> + +<p>Hence, as a rule, Reason exercises its control of +the actions of man in conformity with the laws prescribed +by the community. Before Morality develops +into the practice of Good and the rejection of Bad +it takes the form of consideration for the world at +large, since it is the latter which has created the +concepts of Good and Bad as well as the standard +by which they are judged, and in order to avoid +conflict with the community, and to maintain uninterrupted +agreement with it, the individual exerts +himself to persist in doing good and to refrain from +doing evil.</p> + +<p>The establishment of these facts gives deep +offence to the mystics among moral philosophers. +"What a debasement and belittling of Morality! +What! It is supposed to be nothing more than a sort<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> +of obsequiousness towards the multitude? Its laws +are observed for the sake of pleasing others? It is +a comedy played to win applause and a call before +the curtain? That is a libel and a calumny. The +truly moral man looks neither to the right nor to +the left. He does not condescend to ask, 'What +will the world say to this?' There is but one judge +in whose eyes he wishes to be justified: his conscience."</p> + +<p>Quite right. But what is conscience found to +be if we penetrate the fog of mystic words with which +it has come to be surrounded? Conscience is the +permanent representative of the community in the +consciousness of the individual, just as public opinion +may be termed the conscience of every member of +society made manifest. Metaphorically, it wields the +powers pertaining to society; it praises and blames, +it condemns and exalts, it punishes and rewards, as +society could do; and it actually pronounces judgment +in the name of society, even though it does not +preface such judgment with this formula which is +tacitly implied and must always be mentally added. +Conscience is the invisible link which unites the individual +with a social group, just as speech, custom, +tradition, and political institutions are the visible +links. But the social origin and representative nature +of conscience set limits to its power. Conscience is +a respected authority with wide powers only in the +consciousness of those individuals who have a highly +developed social sense. I purposely do not say those +in whom the instinct to follow the crowd preponderates, +because this mode of expression might imply<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +blame and condemnation which I do not intend to +convey.</p> + +<p>For social instinct comes natural to an individual +born, educated and working in a community, who +shares its feelings, views and interests, nay, even +its prejudices and mistakes; and if he lacks it, it is +a sign of a morbid deviation from the normal. Only +the decadent man is uncannily lonely in spirit, alien, +indifferent or definitely hostile to his human surroundings; +he is, according to the violence and polarization +of his instincts, the passionate anarchist or +the born criminal; the public opinion of his circle is +unintelligible to him and makes no impression on +him; it has no significance for him; he attaches no +importance to its approbation, and its anger leaves +him cold; he would take no notice of it, were it not +that he knows its power to destroy him, and fears +its police, its prisons, and its scaffolds. Such a man, +organically predisposed to crime, most urgently needs +a conscience. It would arrest him on the downward +path to which his evil instincts lead. It would warn +him to resist the wicked impulses of his selfishness. +But he, of all people, has no conscience. He can +have none. He is anti-social, he is at war with society, +diplomatic relations between him and it have been +broken off, and it has no representative in his consciousness. +A lively and active feeling of joint responsibility +with the community is a necessary predisposition +on the part of the individual before +conscience can have any power. Where the former +is lacking the latter is mute and paralysed.</p> + +<p>The essence of Morality, as we have found, is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> +the subjection of instinct and direct organic impulses +to the discipline of Reason. The latter exercises a +censorship in pursuance of a law which it derives not +from within, but from without, from the ordinances +of the community which instructs Reason as to what +it should permit, what it should forbid, and what it +should demand. Conscience ensures respect for its +commands, and may be called the executive power +or police of Reason, acting as the authorized representative +of Morality. It is the garrison which the +community maintains in the individual's consciousness, +which it arms and supplies with authority and +instructions; the power of conscience lies in the +strength of the community at its back, and is without +influence only upon those who refuse admission to the +troops of the community and yield to none but actual +physical force. All this proves irrefutably that +Morality is a phenomenon arising from the social life +of man, and its power is a function of society.</p> + +<p>If under the conditions in which humanity lives +nowadays one could imagine a man totally detached +from his species, leading a solitary life, Morality +would be absolutely meaningless to him. The idea +is one he could never conceive. It would have no +significance. Good and bad would always retain their +original meaning as labels for sensual qualities, for +pleasant or unpleasant sensations of taste, smell, etc.; +they would never be spiritualized or apply to the +quality of actions. He would be unable to attach +any meaning to the words duty and right. The +terms virtue, vice, conscience, repentance would convey +nothing to him. Morality can only originate when<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> +the individual lives united with fellow beings in a +social community. It is a consequence of this union. +It is the one condition on which alone this union can +be permanent.</p> + +<p>The solitary individual must, however, not be +confused with the lonely one. Robinson Crusoe, +shipwrecked on a desert island and forced to stay +there without companionship, is not primitive man. +He is a son of civilization who has fallen upon evil +days. In his enforced solitariness he maintains the +habits of thought of his original surroundings. He +preserves the concepts of Morality even though he +has no occasion to obey its dictates. He can, if not +actually yet potentially, be a paragon of virtue or a +sink of iniquity; he can have a very delicate or a +very dull conscience. He continues to be a man of +social instincts cut off from society, and goes on thinking +and feeling in a social manner. By primitive +man I mean man as he was before society originated. +For, contrary to the sociological school which denies +the individual and boldly refuses to allow him any +existence, declaring society to be older and earlier +than the individual, I think I have conclusively shown +("<i>Der Sinn der Geschichte</i>" [The Meaning of History]) +that man is not by nature a gregarious animal, +that he lived alone, being self-sufficing as long as +the climatic conditions, under which he first made his +appearance on earth, enabled him to exist by his own +unaided efforts and capabilities, and that he banded +himself together with others in gangs, troops and +hordes—the earliest forms of subsequent society—when, +after the first ice age following his appearance,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> +the struggle for existence grew ever harder, ever more +laborious, transcending the powers of the individual +so that he could only overcome Nature, now grown +hostile to him, by uniting with others of his kind.</p> + +<p>This primitive man of the golden geological period +before the Ice Age knew no Morality, and as far as +human intelligence can tell he would never have +known of it had there been a continuance of the +paradisaic conditions obtaining at the time of his +birth, and had the climate not deteriorated. The +occurrence of murderous frosts, the necessity of seeking +protection from them in natural caves or artificially +constructed shelters, and of kindling and +maintaining fires, the diminution or disappearance of +vegetable food, and the need to replace it by the booty +of the chase or fishing—all these forced him to unite +his efforts with those of other men who shared +his wretched lot on earth. But in order to maintain +this community with others he had to learn a new +science, one he had hitherto not known because he +had had no need of it: consideration for his fellows. +He might no longer think of himself alone, consider +his own inclinations in all eventualities, give way +to all his moods or yield to every whim; he had unceasingly +to bear his neighbour in mind and take care +not to annoy him, not to make an enemy of him, not +to become hateful to him. Forbearance towards his +neighbour was the necessary condition of their life +in common, just as their life in common was the +necessary condition of self-preservation. The penalty +for selfish indulgence was stern persecution, punishment, +perhaps death; in any case, expulsion from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +community. Man, therefore, stood before the choice +of self-control or destruction, and this dilemma taught +him Morality.</p> + +<p>Such, we must imagine, were the beginnings of +Morality. It was not prearranged or purposely +sought; it grew naturally from the companionship +of men and developed simultaneously with society. +If the struggle for existence made life in communities +a necessity, the first coercive law of the community +was to enjoin upon its members a mode of +conduct which alone rendered the existence of the +community possible, and the fundamental rule of +this conduct was mutual consideration. Without +this two egoisms cannot exist side by side and develop. +They either destroy or shun one another. +This phenomenon may also be observed among the +higher animals. Elephants, living in herds, expel +quarrelsome individuals and force them to wander +alone far from the rest. The natives of Ceylon +and India fear these "bachelor elephants" as being +specially savage and malicious. They think that +they grow like this because of their loneliness. That +is probably a false conclusion. It is much more +likely that these animals have been driven from their +herd because they were savage and malicious, because +their characters were opposed to discipline. +Here we come upon the first faint foreshadowing of +the phenomenon of Morality in an animal community.</p> + +<p>Now that we have introduced the idea of the +growth and development of Morality, it becomes +obvious that it must have begun with mere indica<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>tions, +and that from rude, dim, undeveloped beginnings +it gradually grows more perfect, more refined, +more nicely differentiated. At first man avoids only +the most brutal injuries to his neighbour, such as +hurting him, doing him bodily harm, threatening to +kill him, openly robbing him. In proportion as he +becomes more spiritually sensitive, as he learns to +feel the insult and humiliation of injuries other than +those inflicted with a fist or club, he is led to refrain +from giving his fellow-men similar offence, which +though it deals no gaping wounds, yet hurts his +spiritual sensibilities. A series of values is developed, +growing ever longer, ever more complicated, +with more and more gradations, until, going +far beyond the simple, artless commandments, +"Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal," +"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife nor his +goods," it reaches the pitch of agonized self-reproach, +because of the slightest and most secret +impulses to dislike, injustice, covetousness, dissimulation, +etc.</p> + +<p>Morality must be regarded as a support and a +weapon in the struggle for existence in so far as, +given present climatic conditions on earth and the +civilization arising therefrom, man can only exist +in societies, and society cannot exist without +Morality. The chain of thought runs as follows: +without morality no society, without society no individual +existence; consequently, Morality is the +essential condition for the existence of the individual +as well as for that of the community. However, +we must always bear in mind the reservation, "given<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> +the present climatic conditions on earth." Had the +earth continued to be the paradise it must have been +at the birth of our species (since otherwise the latter +could simply not have originated), the necessity +would never have arisen for the individual to band +himself together with others of his kind, no society +would ever have developed, and there would have +been no Morality. Serious as the subject is, one +cannot but smile at the thought of the comic figure +the learned, professorial Neo-Kantians would cut +with their dogma of the absolute and cosmic nature +of Morality, if they propounded it among men whose +wants Nature's bounty was able to satisfy as easily +as the frog is satisfied in his puddle or the crow on +his tree top. They would find no trace of absolute +Morality among mankind, and would be reduced to +seeking it among the stars.</p> + +<p>The very nature of Morality, in that it is an aid +to man in the struggle for existence, makes it easy +to understand the origin and nature of the concepts +Good and Bad. There are propensities and actions +which facilitate life in a community which, indeed, +alone make it possible: love of one's neighbour, +helpfulness, liberality, consideration for the feelings +of others, and amiability. There are others which +make such a life difficult or absolutely impossible: +uncompromising selfishness, violence, cruelty, +rapacity, instinctive hostility to one's neighbour. +Men recognized that the former were beneficial to +them, the latter harmful. The former aroused their +liking, the latter their disapproval, dislike and +animosity. The quality of feeling which accom<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>panied +the perceptions of actions of the former kind +was akin to that with which they responded to beneficial, +profitable, useful and welcome sense impressions. +The quality of feeling, which actions of the +second category gave rise to, was akin to that due +to harmful and repellent sense impressions. Following +the law of analogy, they placed on an equal +footing actions which were felt to be pleasing and +pleasant sensations of taste and smell; similarly with +disagreeable actions and unpleasant sense impressions; +and finally they called the former good and +the latter bad, using terms originally applicable only +to the realm of the senses.</p> + +<p>Not everything that is pleasant to the senses is +beneficial. There are poisons which are pleasing to +taste, but none the less noxious for that, such as (to +give only one example) alcoholic drinks and impressions +of a certain order, like voluptuousness, +which man greedily pursues, even though they ruin +his health. But these are exceptions. As a rule, +not only man, but all living creatures, derive pleasant +sensations from beneficial things; and it is probable +that that category of sensations, which we are conscious +of as being pleasant, is nothing but the state +of cœnesthesis, when the organism functions particularly +energetically under the influence of the absorption +of food or of a special stimulus of the senses, +when it feels its life processes carried on particularly +vigorously, freely and harmoniously; just as we feel +that state of cœnesthesis to be unpleasant, which +occurs when the organism functions badly, slackly, +and in a manner calculated to endanger the continu<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>ance +of life. With the reservation that has been +indicated we can say in general that Good is equivalent +to beneficial and pleasant, Bad to harmful and +unpleasant. This is true of the transferred and +spiritualized as well as of the immediate and material +meaning of these expressions of value. The significance +of the words Good and Bad, the point of departure, +development and change of conception they +indicate, suffice to justify the Utilitarians and the +Hedonists or Eudæmonists among the moral philosophers, +and to confute the contentions of their +critics, who deny all connexion between Morality and +a practical purpose, profit or pleasure, and declare +these to be unworthy humiliations of its majesty.</p> + +<p>They wriggle, with the agility of a contortionist +on the music-hall stage, to get over the obvious and +palpable aim of moral conduct. They display all +the cunning of dishonest sophistry in their arguments +to prove that the element of subjective satisfaction +which moral action yields is non-existent, and that, +therefore, the Hedonists and Eudæmonists are wrong. +They stir up an opaque cloud of words, phrases and +formulæ to hide the fact, which nevertheless emerges +clearly, that he who acts morally expects to derive +pleasurable emotions from his action, or at least tries +thereby to avoid probable painful emotions, and that +moral conduct, just as it is designed to give the individual +subjective satisfaction which is a kind of +pleasure, is also meant to be a benefit, or at any rate +a supposed benefit, to the community.</p> + +<p>Morality must never try for a reward and never +expect one. It must be absolutely disinterested. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +has no business to pursue any aim outside itself. Thus +say the mystics of moral philosophy, juggling with +words; and they think they are doing especial honour +to Morality and raising it to a particularly proud +eminence. But Morality has no need of this artificial +and false grandeur to maintain its lofty place +among the phenomena of life, and it is derogatory +neither to its authority nor to its influence to be +recognized as a beneficial force conducive to happiness.</p> + +<p>The opponents of Utilitarianism and Eudæmonism +in Ethics, if they speak in good faith, may be +excused on the grounds that their analysis of the +phenomenon of Morality is shallow. For them +Morality is something absolute, which exists by itself +as an eternal and unalterable law of the Universe, +but which is revealed in the individual and therefore +must be conceived individually as a quality which +has become human, as a human value. If anyone +persists in looking upon Morality as an absolutely +individual matter, without any connexion with anything +outside the individual, if anyone obstinately +shuts his eyes to the fact that Morality has not been +developed by the individual out of his own immediate +needs and in consideration of himself alone, but that +it is, on the contrary, a creation of society and has +no sense or significance except as a social phenomenon, +then indeed he can with some show of justification +deny Utilitarianism and Hedonism. For truly, +looked at from the point of view of the individual, +moral conduct appears neither pleasant nor immediately +beneficial. On the contrary, it is, as a rule,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +directly opposed to his own apparent interest, and +it is achieved with difficulty by sacrifice and renunciation, +which are never pleasant and often very +painful.</p> + +<p>Once in a drawing-room, during a game of +definitions, I heard a light-hearted young lady +define Duty in the following terms: "Duty is that +which we do unwillingly." A stern professor contradicted +her at once with the solemnity he thought +due to his position, and assured her reprovingly: +"It is my duty to give lectures, and I do this duty +gladly. If you were right, madam, expressions such +as 'zealous in one's duty' and 'willing performance +of duty' would have no meaning and could never +have been coined." That seems convincing, but yet +it is wrong. Expressions such as "zealous in one's +duty" and "willing performance of duty" were +not coined until society had developed its system +of Morality and had educated its members to strive +for its approval by conducting themselves in accordance +with this system, to look on its approval as a +flattering distinction and to fear its disapproval as +a disgrace. Such phrases are Pharisaical, calculated +to exercise a suggestive influence profitable to +society. They are the sugar to sweeten the pill; but +the young lady was honest and the professor conventional; +the pill is bitter. Thinkers recognized +and admitted this thousands of years ago. Antiphon, +the sophist, says: "The law, the outcome +of an agreement, coerces nature, the result of growth, +and goes against the interest of the individual." The +same idea is expressed by the tragic poet in the lines:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> +"The gods have placed sweat before virtue." This +was said in the very same words by Lao Tse, the +disciple of Meng Tse, the pupil of Confucius and the +reformer of his doctrine.</p> + +<p>The law, not only the law of the state which +Antiphon has principally in view, but also the moral +law, "goes against the interest of the individual"; +not in reality, but apparently, at the first superficial +glance. Moral conduct is the reverse of natural +conduct; it takes place in opposition to instinct by +deflecting the original impulse; it is a subjugation of +inclination, a victory over the real nature of the man. +Virtue has to exert its utmost strength in bitter +struggles, fought out within the individual, before it +can reveal itself actively in deeds. That is a natural +consequence of the manner in which Morality originated.</p> + +<p>The point is that it was not created directly +for the individual, but for the community, and for +the former only in so far as he is a part of the community, +and from its stability and well-being derives +a benefit which he may, or may not, be conscious of; +which he may, or may not, be able to appreciate; +which he accepts as something natural and self-understood +without further thought; for which he +does not consider any return service to be due; but +which is nevertheless of real magnitude, profiting the +individual, facilitating his existence, or even alone +making it possible; and for which, as for every other +gift, he must make sacrifices. For within society +there can be no gifts. It possesses nothing but what +it has acquired from its members, and the latter must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +pay full value for everything it provides, unasked +or otherwise.</p> + +<p>As the Moral law originated to meet the needs of +the community, and was gradually formulated in +definite precepts, it is comprehensible that the community +never paused to inquire what subjective +effect its law would have on the feelings of the individual. +If you impose a law upon someone you +hardly ever consider how great will be the emotions +of pleasure or displeasure which its enforcement will +entail. The order is, "Obey, whether you like it or +not; that which deeper insight and more far-seeing +wisdom prescribe is for your good." Thus the individual +is forced to work laboriously for his own good, +which in his purblindness he does not even recognize. +It would be comprehensible if the individual, who +does not see farther than his own nose and does not +look beyond the present moment, formed the opinion +that Morality is not perceptibly beneficial to him and +gives him no pleasure, and that, therefore, the Utilitarians +and the Hedonists talk nonsense. But the +moral philosopher, who observes the individual in +relationship to the community and surveys human +actions, the way they are connected, and the way they +interact upon one another, has no right to pursue +the same line of thought as the individual, and deny +that Morality aims at utility and pleasure, even +though the individual, when he acts morally, does not +perceive any personal advantage, nor feel any pleasure +except the self-satisfaction which he has been trained +to feel, since in the eyes of others he is so good and +honest. That Morality aims at utility, and is at the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> +same time a source of pleasure and happiness, may +seem dark and doubtful while we consider the individual, +but it becomes clear as day and indisputable +when we regard the community.</p> + +<p>Among creatures of a lower order than man, indeed +among all animals that live together in flocks +or herds, we find the first beginnings of that mode of +conduct which in man we call moral, and which is +not intended to be of direct benefit to the individual, +or to add to his momentary pleasure, but which subordinates +or sacrifices these personal satisfactions to +the good of the community.</p> + +<p>Chamois, when they are grazing, set one of their +number on guard upon a rocky eminence with a +distant view, and this individual is responsible for +the safety of the herd. While the others feed in +peace and comfort, this guardian chamois forgoes the +food which is doubtless just as attractive to it as to +the others, and tirelessly keeps a sharp look out over +its whole field of vision, warning its companions at +the first approach of danger by uttering a shrill cry.</p> + +<p>When the great herds of buffaloes still inhabited +the North American prairies, they had at the head +and on the flanks of the herd the strongest bulls, +while the centre was occupied by the cows with +their calves and the young animals. Before civilization +came to trouble them, the grizzly bear was +the only enemy that threatened them, and with him +they were able to deal; one of them would meet the +attacking bear in single combat, but did not always +emerge from it unhurt. Often enough at the end of +the fight both the bull and the bear would be terribly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +injured or even dead; yet by sacrificing his life the +bull saved the rest of the herd.</p> + +<p>The thrilling adventure of the Abyssinian baboon +is well known; first told by Alfred Brehm in his +"<i>Tierleben</i>" (animal life), it was afterwards quoted +by Darwin and many other writers. On a hunting +expedition Brehm surprised a party of monkeys in a +clearing. They fled at once and had found shelter in +the wood before the dogs could reach them. Only one +young one had got separated from the rest and was left +behind alone. It had scrambled up on to a solitary +rock standing in the plain, round which the dogs were +barking furiously, and in its terror the creature uttered +piercing cries for help. A little male monkey, hearing +it, detached himself from the group, turned back from +the safety of the forest, made quietly for the rock and +fetched away the trembling young baboon from among +the pack, silent now and shrinking in amazement; +and then stroking and caressing the little creature he +carried it safely in his arms to its family in the wood, +unmolested by the stupefied dogs and spared by the +hunter, lost in admiration of this self-sacrificing +courage.</p> + +<p>In these three instances we see how the joint responsibility +among gregarious animals develops in +them an ever increasing sense of duty, which teaches +the chamois to forgo its food during the hours it is +on guard, rouses in the buffalo a savage lust for +battle, and makes the baboon perform a premeditated +deed of epic heroism. When men act as these animals +did, we ascribe this to Morality. This is nothing but +joint responsibility in action, the joint responsibility<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +which the species is forced by the conditions of life +to adopt, if it is to survive.</p> + +<p>Among the moral philosophers the mystics are prevented, +by the haze which obscures all their thought, +from seeing that Morality originates from this joint +responsibility. Or rather, if they do see it, they think +this origin too low. They demand a more exalted +genealogy for the phenomenon of Morality. According +to them the Moral law comes straight from God. +The concepts Good and Evil are revealed. Commands +and prohibitions are imposed upon the soul +by that omnipotence which spiritualizes the universe +and of which the soul is an immortal part.</p> + +<p>If these phrases were anything but moonshine and +tinkling cymbals they certainly would make any other +explanation of this astonishing fact superfluous; the +fact, namely, that man does what is repugnant to him, +and refrains from doing what would give him pleasure, +that he is content with himself when he has voluntarily +curbed his impulses and made sacrifices, and that he +feels the pricks of conscience if he chances to experience +the pleasure of appeasement because he has satisfied +his desires. "Man obeys divine commands." +That suffices and obviates the necessity of seeking +for explanations of this phenomenon, which shall +satisfy Reason.</p> + +<p>It is a mere mirage, the reflection of an earthly +state of affairs in the heavens, to assume that +the universe is governed by an authority devoid of +responsibility, which imposes on its subjects, that is to +say men, laws and instructions, discipline and order.</p> + +<p>It is a form of anthropomorphism, the most wide<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>spread +and stubborn of errors in thought among those +men who try to understand the unintelligible, and +are content with the most unfounded explanation +which their naïve imagination freely invents for them. +This same anthropomorphism, not even at a loss to +solve the problem of the origin and essence of the +universe, replies unhesitatingly that God by an act +of volition created it out of nothing to prove to Himself +His own omnipotence and omniscience; in like +manner it has no scruple in ascribing the phenomenon +of Morality to a creative act of God's, and makes +Ethics, which properly speaking form the chief part +of psychology, anthropology and sociology, a subdivision +of theology, that is, of anthropomorphic +mythology.</p> + +<p>Critical Reason, which realizes that deceptive +fictions are not true thought, but dreams—not +the result of ripe intellectual effort, but of the +childish play of the imagination, seeks the roots of +Morality not in the air or in the ether, but in the +solid earth; not in some indemonstrable, transcendental +sphere, but in an obvious need of human +nature. The biological necessities of the species, +which can only survive by dint of living in communities, +sufficiently explain the origin of the feeling of +joint responsibility, of consideration for one's neighbour, +of the concepts Good and Evil and of conscience; +and we have no use for the dogmas of +revealed Morality derived from some fabulous, +supernatural source, or for the Kantian categorical +imperative.</p> + +<p>Morality, understood as a form of joint responsi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>bility, +determines the inner and outer relations of +the individual to the community; that is to say, to +as much of it as he comes in immediate contact with, +to wit, his neighbour. Morality provides him with +the notions of Duty and Right, of the consideration +he owes his neighbour and of that which he may +demand from his neighbour. It is customary to look +upon Rights and Duties as opposites. This is mere +indolence of thought. Right and Duty are supplementary, +forming together one concept. They are +in reality one and the same thing regarded from +different points of view. My Duty is the subjective +form of my neighbour's Right; my Right the subjective +form of other people's Duty. That which is +Duty, when I have to do it out of consideration for +others, becomes my Right, when others have to do it +out of consideration for me.</p> + +<p>Respect for the personality of others, which is +the feeling from which the concept of Right and +Duty emanates, seems to be a late and noble product +of Morality and a particularly praiseworthy victory +of prescient intelligence over selfishness. This factor +of our consciousness which determines our will and +which gradually becomes an instinct, is really only a +special application of the law of least resistance +which governs all organic life. We have no selfless, +ideal respect for the personality of another; but, made +wise by experience and observation, we assume that +that other has the power to resist and to retaliate if +a wrong is done to him or he is injured; hence we +avoid, to the best of our ability, actions to which he +is likely to object, so as not to come into conflict with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> +him, because to overcome his opposition would require +effort and expose us to danger. Respect for the +personality of another and for his rights may be +expressed by a mechanical formula which runs as +follows: this respect varies directly as the real or +supposed might of the other person, and inversely +as our own real or supposed might.</p> + +<p>The society of which he is a member, and which +makes his existence possible, prescribes to the individual +the laws governing his moral conduct. That +which a community at any given time approves and +demands, rejects or forbids, constitutes the precept +whereby its members regulate their conduct, and offers +ample security for their conscience.</p> + +<p>The concepts Good and Bad originate simultaneously +with society; they are the form in which its +actual conditions of existence are conveyed to the +consciousness of its members. The only immutable +thing about them is the fact of their continued existence. +Without the coercive discipline of a rule conducive +to the common weal and governing the mutual +relations between its members, no society could +be imagined to exist, unless its members were all +similar in nature, reacted in an identical fashion to +all impressions and possessed the same feelings and +sensations, the same inclinations and the same impulses +of volition. In that case no difference could +ever arise between one individual and another, or +between an individual and the community, which +would have to be smoothed over by the moral law +emanating from the community and controlling the +individual, or be suppressed by the community's order.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +Every individual could be left to the guidance of +his own instincts, for he would know himself always +to be in agreement with the community; no consideration +for others need hamper or modify his actions; +he could behave just as if he were alone in the world. +But as individuals differ from one another, feel, think +and want different things, collisions in which they +hurt, cripple or even kill one another are the inevitable +consequence of their opposing movements; and +the interference of the moral law is absolutely +necessary to polarize these movements and guide +them into parallel courses, so that they do not run +counter to one another.</p> + +<p>But Good and Bad derive not only their existence +but their measure and their significance +from the views of the community. They are +therefore not absolute but variable; they are not +an immutable standard amid the ever-changing conditions +of humanity, a rule by which the value of the +actions and aims of mortals are indisputably determined, +but are subject to the laws of evolution in +society and therefore in a constant state of flux. At +different times and in different places they present +the most varied aspects. What is virtue here and now +may have been vice formerly and at another spot, +and <i>vice versa</i>. In the royal family of ancient Egypt +marriage between brothers and sisters was the prescribed +custom. We call this incest and it fills us +with horror. To the sons of Egypt it seemed meritorious +and constituted a claim to special veneration. +The Babylonians and Canaanites burnt their first-born +in Moloch's fiery furnace, and this sacrifice was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> +accounted a highly praiseworthy act of piety and of +the fear of God. The Spartans taught their sons, +their future warriors, the art of stealing without being +caught; and he who did this most cleverly achieved +the most flattering recognition. The Cherusci +butchered the Roman prisoners taken from the legions +of Varus as a sacrifice to their tribal gods, and a noble-minded +and brave man like Arminius considered this +absolutely honourable and knightly. The Aztecs, +who had undeniably attained an advanced degree of +civilization, at high festivals used with obsidian knives +to cut open the breasts of human sacrifices on the +altars of their gods, and tear the heart out of their +living bodies. That was an action finding favour in +the sight of the gods, and the people watched it with +awe and those mystic emotions which religious rites +are intended to arouse.</p> + +<p>Moral law in Europe, during the Middle +Ages and almost up to modern times, permitted, +and even ordained, the punishment by horrible +torture and death of those whose religious convictions +differed from the teaching of the established +church; and with its consent supposed witches +were sent to the stake. In feudal times the most +terrible and revolting of crimes was felony—that is, +a breach of faith on the part of the vassal against +his overlord—and no torture was too cruel as a +punishment. Nobles, who had so delicate a sense +of honour that for a wry look or the accidental touch +of an elbow they would draw their swords, enunciated +the principle: "the king's blood does not defile," +and vied with each other in forcing their daughters<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +upon the king as concubines. Until Wilberforce +roused the English conscience at the end of the +eighteenth century, and Schölcher did the same in +France in the middle of the nineteenth, slavery was +considered a state of affairs which a moral community +could tolerate. The North American descendants of +those Puritans whom no persecution and no martyrdom +could prevent from leading a life consonant with the +dictates of their conscience, did not scruple to exercise +proprietary rights over human beings who, in the +case of octoroons and even of quadroons, did not even +differ from them in colour, supposing that difference +of colour could be considered an excuse. The code, +which began with the "Declaration of Rights," contained +heavy penalties for those who helped a slave +to escape. Men, whose uprightness no one could +doubt, did not hesitate to set bloodhounds on the +track of an escaped nigger, and four years of a bloody +civil war were needed before refractory slave-owners +were forced to acknowledge the immorality of forced +labour.</p> + +<p>These examples have been taken from the customs +of civilized nations. Amongst races that have not +attained the high degree of development to which the +white man has risen, we meet with much more revolting +deviations from the moral law obtaining among +white men. Tribes are known in which the commandment, +"Honour thy father and thy mother," is interpreted +so, that the children kill and eat their parents +as soon as the latter have attained a considerable age. +The North American Indians, who had a well developed +sense of honour, were capable of chivalrous feel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>ings +and kept their word with absolute loyalty, used +to torture helpless prisoners and scalp their defeated +enemies, even the women. Among the Dyaks, who +are under Dutch rule and are familiar with the laws +and customs of Christian Europe, a marriageable +youth must first cut off a human being's head before +he is allowed to wed. He need not overcome his +victim in honourable combat; he may creep upon him +surreptitiously, and even fall upon him in his sleep +and murder him in cowardly fashion without danger +to himself.</p> + +<p>All these are instances which we unhesitatingly +condemn. To our idea they are crimes and misdeeds +which among us would make their perpetrators liable +either to contempt and expulsion from decent society +or to the extremest penalties of the law; yet at their +time and in their place they were considered meritorious +and virtuous, and were approved by public +opinion and the conscience of their authors. But we +can go farther and subject our own moral law to a +similar independent consideration. We shall find +that to us also deeds appear permissible, virtuous and +even splendid, which do not differ essentially from +the thefts of the Spartans or the head-hunting of the +Dyaks. A company promoter who sells on the Stock +Exchange shares that he must know to be worthless, +can with Spartan cunning rob thousands of trustful +victims of the fruits of their labour and economy, and +reduce them to beggary; and not only does he go +unpunished, but if by his knavery he becomes a +millionaire and uses his wealth cleverly, he can attain +the highest political and social honours and distinc<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>tions. +We may admit that financial roguery of this +sort can now no longer be classed among strictly moral +actions, that public opinion is on the verge of placing +it in the category of vice and crime, and that legislators +are beginning to make attempts to inflict severe +and humiliating penalties on its perpetrators.</p> + +<p>But another series of deeds is still generally considered +so undoubtedly virtuous and laudable, that it +evokes the highest homage from the best intellects of +the age, poets, musicians, scientists, teachers, sculptors +and painters, and the leaders of the people—the deeds +of war. The most horrible butchery of men, the theft +of property and liberty, ill-treatment, destruction are +not only permissible but obligatory and laudable, if +they occur in war, and if their authors can point to +the fact that they are acting in the service of their +country at the order of a legitimate authority. Neither +the soldiers nor their leaders are bound to inquire +whether the authority, whether their mother country +is waging war for a purpose that moral law can approve. +"Right or wrong, my country." In the eyes +of her sons the country is always in the right, even +if it be objectively in the wrong, and by its orders +every soldier murders, robs, burns and ravages, plays +the executioner to harmless, unarmed, innocent +strangers, compels prisoners to forced labour, steals +letters that fall into his hands and prevents families +who are cruelly separated from communicating with +one another; and his conscience does not reproach +him in the least, nor is he conscious of being a +criminal deserving of all the penalties of the law. +Every single one of these actions, if perpetrated by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +an individual on his own account and for his own +purposes, would result in the death penalty, and it +would be richly deserved, too. But in war, carried out +collectively at the bidding of a government, they become +deeds of heroism, filling the doer with pride, +moving the community to tears of enthusiasm, and +they are held up to youth as shining examples to be +imitated. It is more than likely that future times will +judge the esteem in which these deeds are held not +otherwise than we do the value placed by other forms +of society on human sacrifices, the slaughter of parents +and head-hunting.</p> + +<p>It is hard to determine the exact part which conscience +plays in the changes undergone by the concepts +Good and Evil. As conscience is the voice of +the community in the consciousness of the individual, +it approves on principle what seems right and praiseworthy +to the community. Just as little as conscience +prevented a Babylonian mother from sacrificing her +child to Moloch, does it in these days stop the average +citizen from doing a soldier's work of killing and +destroying in time of war. If an individual knows +himself to be in complete agreement with the general +opinion, then he lives at peace with his conscience. +No impulse to change the customs, to set up a new +Morality, to condemn long-established usages, is to +be expected from such an one.</p> + +<p>The mechanism whereby changes are wrought in +views on Good and Evil is quite different. Everywhere +and at all times there are exceptional persons whose +abilities render them specially fit to feel and think +independently. To their idea the community has no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> +determining but only an advisory voice. They reserve +to themselves the right of decision in every case. In +their consciousness there persists a clear recognition of +the fact that the essence of Morality lies in consideration +for others, and when the current acceptation of the +moral law among the majority allows them, nay, commands +them to disregard this consideration, they +experience a feeling of discomfort which dull, unthinking +imitation of the general example does not +soothe. They meditate upon the deviation from the +fundamental rule of considering one's neighbour, they +test its justification, and they condemn it, if its difference +with the general moral law cannot be adjusted. +If the essence of Morality is consideration for one's +neighbour, its purpose is the well-being of the community; +its essence must be adapted to this purpose, +that is to say, consideration for one's neighbour must +be subordinated to the general welfare. The thief, +the robber and the murderer have no claim upon consideration, +and even a man with the most delicate +sense of Morality will agree that coercion of the +criminal is desirable. Tolstoy's warning: "Do not +oppose the evildoer," is not Morality, but an exaggerated +parody of it, which renders it nugatory. Thus +the most moral person will not raise any objection to +a war waged in defence of hearth and home when +their safety is threatened by a ruthless attack.</p> + +<p>But, if a mode of action which, though it be generally +practised and approved, injures the individual +and causes him to suffer, cannot be justified on the +grounds of an obvious benefit to the community, then +a small, sometimes an almost infinitesimal minority of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +independent thinkers will rise against the custom; +they are not afraid of coming into violent conflict with +generally accepted views; they defend the fundamental +principle of Morality, namely, consideration +for the individual, against the exception, namely, +oppression of the individual for the ostensible good +of the community; they brand as immoral what is +generally accounted moral; they announce that the +current acceptation of the goodness or badness of a +certain order of actions must cease.</p> + +<p>The intervention of such reformers always gives +offence, and arouses anger which at times rises to +murderous fury. But this wrathful indignation is just +what makes a break in the automatic fashion in which +the majority of average men act according to traditional +custom; the attention of more and more minds +is arrested, critically they examine the accepted moral +law, they are penetrated first by the suspicion and +finally by the clear conviction that it is contrary to +the essence of Morality, and they swell the ranks of +the innovators who inveigh against the tradition. The +struggle lasts long and is carried on pitilessly. The +preachers of the new Morality seem corrupt and +criminal to the supporters of the old. They are persecuted +and slandered and not seldom have to suffer +martyrdom, but they always emerge victorious if their +doctrine is in agreement with the logic of the fundamental +principles of Moral law. That is the history +of the abolition of human sacrifices, of the vendetta, +of slavery, of legal torture, of religious coercion.</p> + +<p>Whoever looks about him with open eyes will note +that civilized men are at the moment adopting new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> +ideas with regard to the operation of state omnipotence, +to war, to the right of the economically strong to exploit +others, to the rights of women, to sexual morality, +to the penal system. The advocates of a new Morality +must still put up with the most humiliating abuse. +He who wishes to defend the individual from coercion +by the state is an anarchist and deserves to be hanged +or broken on the wheel. He who maintains that war +is immoral belongs to the rabble of vagabonds who +own no nationality, for whom no contempt is too deep +and no punishment too severe. He who refuses a +duel is a dishonoured coward, and thereby cuts himself +off from decent society. He who recognizes +woman's right to motherhood is a dastardly purveyor +of opportunities for prostitution. He who attacks the +present relation between Capital and Labour as a +hypocritical continuation of slavery is an ignorant +agitator or an enemy of society. He who would like +to see the idea of punishment excluded from the law, +as being retrograde and unscientific, and who wishes +only the point of view of the defence of society to +be recognized as valid, talks sentimental nonsense, +disarms justice and places the community at large at +the mercy of criminals.</p> + +<p>But the issue of the struggle is not in doubt. +The present systems, which present exceptions +to the moral law of consideration for one's +neighbour, must go. Although they are considered +moral to-day, are, in fact, Morality itself, to-morrow +they will be felt to be immoral and be abhorred by +all men of moral feelings. Thus the concepts Good +and Bad gradually change their meaning; views on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +what is moral and what immoral are constantly in +a state of flux; and the only permanent thing is +recognition of the fact that man's actions must be +withdrawn from the control of subjective choice +and whim, and must be subject to a law set up by +the community; the justification of this law lies in +its being necessary to the existence of society. +Every revision of Moral values originates in some +vexation, and ends by refining and deepening moral +sentiment. In this chapter only the scheme of development +of moral views and of their changes has +been indicated. The question of moral progress +will be dealt with fully later on.</p> + +<p>To sum up the arguments of this section, Morality +is not transcendental but immanent; it is a social +phenomenon and restricted to the sphere of living +beings. Its beginnings may be traced in animal +societies, it is developed among mankind. The +preliminary condition necessary for this development +is the ability to visualize future happenings, +since moral conduct is determined by estimating its +effects and results, that is, by conceiving something +in the future. Morality has a positive, concrete aim. +It makes the existence of society possible, and this, +given the circumstances obtaining on our planet, is +the necessary condition for the preservation of each +individual, and it originated from the instinct of self-preservation +in the species. Its essence lies in consideration +for one's neighbour, because without this +the communal life of individuals, that is, a society, +would be impossible.</p> + +<p>If individuals had been able to live alone,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +Morality could never have come into existence. +The concepts Good and Bad characterize those +actions which society feels to be beneficial or +harmful to itself. As moral conduct implies consideration +for one's neighbour, it is often, if not +always, in conflict with selfishness, that is, with the +immediate and instinctive impulses, and is, in the +first place, accompanied by disagreeable sensations. +The pleasurable emotion of satisfaction arises later +through habit and reflection; it accompanies the +thought of the merit and praiseworthiness of the victory +over self. Conscience is the voice of the community +in the individual's consciousness. The idea +of Duty is the subjective conception of the Rights +of our neighbour; the idea of Rights is the subjective +conception of our neighbour's Duty to us. Morality +is not absolute, but relative, and is subject to continual +changes. To maintain that Morality is cosmic, +eternal, immutable, that it aims neither at profit nor +pleasure, but constitutes its own aim, is pure anthropomorphic +superstition.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY</h3> + + +<p>Morality is a restraint which the community +imposes on each of its members. It +demands from the individual the sacrifice +of his transitory and momentary comfort in favour +of his general welfare which is dependent on that +of the community. It prohibits the pleasure of gratifying +his desires in order that by this unpleasant +renunciation his lasting well-being may be ensured. +Subjectively experienced and viewed, therefore, +Morality always implies the limitation of free will, +the curbing of desire, opposition to inclinations and +appetites, and the diminution or suppression of free, +or let us rather say of unbridled, action. Before +Morality can profit the community, it disturbs and +incommodes the individual, it rouses in him disagreeable +sensations which may reach such a pitch as to +be intense pain. It is only after deep reflection, of +which not everyone is capable, that the individual +realizes that Morality is an essential condition of the +life of society, and that the preservation of society +is an essential condition of his own life; before he +investigates, before he even meditates on Morality, +the individual feels it directly to be unpleasant, +laborious, stern—nay, hostile.</p> + +<p>The control which Morality exercises over the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +actions, and indeed in many cases over the most secret +thoughts of the individual, appears at the first glance +to be somewhat paradoxical. It is by no means obvious +why the individual should always take sides against +himself and, adopting a defensive and disapproving +attitude, hold his instinctive tendencies in check. +Moral conduct would be intelligible if the community +were always ready with means of coercion and could +constrain the individual by brute force to place its +interest before his own pleasure. But the individual +does not wait for police intervention on the part of +the community. He frowns upon himself with the +awful severity of the law. He threatens himself with +a cudgel. He divides himself into two beings, one +of which wants to follow its instincts, while the other +curbs them vigorously; one is a rearing, often a refractory, +horse, the other a rider with bridle, whip +and spur.</p> + +<p>This reduplication of the ego, one-half of which +establishes control over the other, one-half of which +tries to remain true to itself, while the other +divests itself of its identity and denies itself—this +is the inner process, the outward manifestation of +which is moral conduct. This demands investigation +and explanation. We must show how the organism +could develop from within itself the power to +paralyse, or completely repress, its own elemental +activities, and how Morality was able to become +an integral part in the general scheme of life +processes.</p> + +<p>The mechanism whereby the mind, appraising, +foreseeing and judging, checks the first movement of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> +impulse, is inhibition or repression. Without inhibition +moral conduct would not be possible. The mind +would have no method of indicating the path and +prescribing rules to the organism's instinct. It +would have no means of making its insight prevail +over the desires of the senses. It would +have no weapon with which to force its being to +actions opposed to its organic inclinations. Without +inhibition the individual would never give precedence +to the demands of the community and lay +himself open to disagreeable emotions in order to +please the community. Inhibition was the necessary +organic preliminary to the phenomenon of Morality. +It had to be pre-existent in the individual, so that +Morality could make itself at home in his intellectual +life, so that it could acquire creative, ruling and practical +power among the elect, and become an unconscious +and easy habit among the average. Morality +took possession of a pre-existent organic aptitude +and made it serve its own purposes. But organic +aptitudes are not alike in all individuals. In some +cases they are more or less perfect; in others they +may be lacking altogether. Indeed only individuals +with highly developed powers of inhibition are capable +of that heroic Morality which liberates them from the +weakness of the flesh and makes them independent +of the demands of the body; those in whom this +power of inhibition is scantily developed evade the +influence of Morality entirely, and it has no authority +over them.</p> + +<p>That which is called character is at bottom the +name we give to the power of inhibition. Where<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +it is weak we speak of lack of character, whereas +by strength of character we mean that the power +of inhibition is great. The will makes use of +inhibition. With its help the will guides the living +machine in a certain direction and urges it to perform +given tasks. At the first glance it may not seem +obvious that positive actions can come of repression, +which is something negative. But if we analyse +psychologically the actions demanded and promoted +by the will, and trace them back to their organic +origins, we shall find that, as a rule, the first elements +consist in the prevention of impulsive movements, +and that the impetus to positive effort is given by the +will, which converts these movements into contrary +ones. A few instances may make this psychic process +clearer. Winkelried, at Sempach, cleaves a path +through the cuirassiers while they bury their lances +in his breast; he becomes capable of this great deed +of self-sacrifice in that, by a mighty effort of will power, +he suppresses the strongest of all instincts, that of +self-preservation, and forces all his energies, which +are naturally directed towards flight from danger, to +challenge danger and yield completely to it. The +lover who overcomes his passion and renounces its +object, because his idol is the bride of his best friend, +begins with the determined inhibition of the impulse +which urges him towards the woman, and attains renunciation +by the suppression of his desire; this +renunciation finds expression in positive actions, in +the rupture of relations which bring him happiness, +the avoidance of meetings which would prevent the +wound in his heart from healing, and so on. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> +brave rescuer who plunges into the waves to save a +drowning man, or enters a burning house to save a +fellow creature threatened by the flames, must first +overcome his natural shrinking fear of the water and +the fire; and not till after the suppression of strong +impulses to avoid the uncanny adventure, does he +succeed in making his muscles obey the impulse to +save life.</p> + +<p>Inhibition, therefore, is the organic foundation on +which Morality builds, not only that Morality which +consists in abstention from certain actions, but that +which is manifested in active virtue. But inhibition is a +faculty which the organism has developed for its own +ends, the better and more easily to preserve its own +life, and to render its power of achievement greater. +Morality makes use of this faculty, which it finds ready +to hand, for the ends of the community, and very +often against the immediate interests of the individual +for whose advantage it is nevertheless intended. Now +the individual would not put up with this inexpedient +use, one is tempted to say this clever misuse, of one +of its organic capacities, if this yielding up of the +mechanism of inhibition to Morality were not beneficial +to life and therefore came within the sphere +of the biological purpose of inhibition. By being +grafted on a pre-existent organic faculty Morality becomes +such itself; it forms a link in the chain of +biological processes within the individual organism; +it ceases to be purely a product of society forced upon +the individual to his molestation and in spite of his +annoyance; it acquires the character of a differentiation +of inhibition in order to help the individual, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> +even to make it at all possible for him to adapt himself +to life in a society.</p> + +<p>That under the present conditions obtaining on +our planet the human individual can only live in +society demands no proof. And as he can only live +in society if he submits to its rules of good and bad, +Morality, which urges him to this submission, aids +and even preserves his life. We shall now show that +inhibition, of which Morality is a differentiation making +it easier for the individual to adapt himself +to the conditions of social life, is of the greatest value +to the individual from the biological point of view.</p> + +<p>The lowest forms of life it is possible for us to +observe show nothing which can be interpreted as inhibition. +All external influences to which they are +not indifferent invariably produce the same effects. +They respond to every stimulus with a reflex action +which reveals nothing that we should be justified in +describing as an activity of the will. The reaction +follows with strictly automatic regularity upon the +stimulus, and nothing intervenes between the two +which would permit the conclusion that in the simple +organism there is any faculty that could delay, modify +or change the reaction to the external stimulus.</p> + +<p>Just as iron filings always respond to the attraction +of a magnet in the same way, just as certain combinations +of mercury at the impact of a blow flare up with an +explosion, just as ice when warmed melts and becomes +water, and water when cooled to a definite point +freezes into ice, so do the simplest living things seek +out certain rays in the spectrum, certain temperatures, +certain chemical conditions and avoid others. Not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> +only unicellular organisms do this, but also comparatively +highly developed animals, such as the daphniæ, +for if light is sent through a prism into a vessel containing +water, these little creatures collect at the violet +end of the spectrum; such as the wood-lice, which +hate the light and creep into dark crevices; such as +gnats, which are attracted by the sun and dance in +their hundreds in its rays. Moreover, we meet with +a similar phenomenon in man. We, too, in winter +and spring seek the sun and in summer the shade; +in the cold season the warm stove attracts us; bad +smells put us to flight, sweet scents of flowers allure +us. The simplest automatic reflex actions are at the +root of these attractions and repulsions, exactly the +same as with the daphniæ, wood-lice and gnats. Only +we are able to control and suppress these reflex +actions which the lower animals apparently cannot.</p> + +<p>Anthropomorphic modes of thought easily mislead +us into thinking that the processes we observe in lower +animals are due to an exercise of will power. We +draw near to the fire in winter because it is pleasant, +but we can quit it if duty calls us into the cold +streets. One is apt to imagine that the simple +organisms also experience pleasant and unpleasant +feelings, that they try and avoid the latter, that the +daphnia seeks the violet rays because it likes them, +that the wood-louse flees the light because it dislikes +it; in fact, that these creatures possess a consciousness +which becomes aware of and distinguishes between +pleasing and displeasing impressions, and that +they possess a will which responds to these impressions +with suitable reactions. Very distinguished<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> +scientists have been unable to resist the temptation +to assume in the lower animals, even in unicellular +organisms, the existence of processes with which we +are familiar in the human consciousness. William +Roux introduces us to a "psychology of protista," +and W. Kleinsorge goes so far as to maintain the +existence of "cellular ethics," and to devote himself +to research into its laws. The work of both these +biologists is as fascinating as the most beautiful fairy-tale, +but it is probably the creation of a lively and +fertile imagination, just as the fairy story is.</p> + +<p>More prosaic and less imaginative scientists do not +see evidences of psychology in the signs of life in +the protista, or ethics in the movements of a cell, but +merely the effects of universal chemical and physical +laws which also control lifeless inorganic matter. To +these laws they trace the tropisms of simple organisms +which tempt the imagination, prone as it is to anthropomorphism, +into errors; such tropisms, that is +to say, as their tendency to seek moderate warmth, +certain rays of light and weak alkaline solutions, or +to avoid acids, heat and ultra-violet rays. The little +organisms probably do not obey these impulses for +reasons of pleasure or pain any more than the iron +filings obey the attraction of a magnet for such +reasons. They do not fly to it because it gives them +pleasure; the little metal leaves of an electroscope +do not move apart because contact with each other +displeases them. All forms of tropism, chemicotropic, +thermotropic, phototropic manifestations, +active and passive tropisms clearly show that minute +organisms involuntarily and unresistingly respond to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> +the influence of natural forces, just as if they were +inanimate particles.</p> + +<p>Microscopic investigations reveal many phenomena +which one is tempted to consider signs of life, +but which cannot be such, as they occur in connexion +with inanimate matter. The Brownian movements are +rhythmical molecular changes of position, not due to +any mechanical impulse emanating from the surroundings, +nor to a current in the fluid in which the +object of investigation is immersed, but arising from +the object itself, mostly very finely divided, tiny balls +of mercury. A very small drop of chloroform introduced +into a fluid of different density behaves exactly +like a unicellular organism. It sends out pseudopods, +wriggles and draws them in again. The pseudopods +seem to feel and examine particles of matter +with which they come in contact, and then either to +withdraw quickly from them or to surround and incorporate +them in the drop. This is deceptively +similar to the behaviour of a living cell absorbing +food, though there can be no question of this in the +case of the drop of chloroform. In the latter it is +merely a question of the effects of surface tension, +that is, of the normal behaviour of matter in accordance +with the laws governing the forces of nature, the +investigation of which lies in the domain of chemistry +and physics.</p> + +<p>Impartial thought comes to a conclusion about +these phenomena different from that derived from +anthropomorphic delusions. It does not try to +smuggle dim, dark life into the collections of mercury +molecules apparently obeying some inner impulse, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +into the seeking or feeling about of a pseudopod of +chloroform. On the contrary, it understands life as +the play of natural forces under the conditions supplied +by a living organism, as the automatic working +of a machine-like apparatus to which natural forces +supply the motive power. Similar manifestations in +inanimate matter and in elementary organisms seem +to justify the conclusion that the distinction between +living and non-living matter is arbitrary, that there +are only forces, or perhaps one single force, that is +to say, one movement, in the universe, whose activity +is manifested in the most manifold forms, of which +life is one. Modern Monism has come to this conclusion, +but it is not alone in so doing. Long before +Monism there was a philosophy which conceived all +cosmic energies to form a unity; and really it is only +an obstinate quarrel about words, for the Hylozoists +regard the universe as something living and +ascribe life to all matter and all atoms of which +matter is made up, while the Materialists regard life +as a play of forces in matter. Fundamentally the Hylozoists +and Materialists hold the same views, only that +the former call force life and the latter call life force; +just as the only point of difference between them and +the Pantheists is that these have given the majestic +title of God to the universal life they assume—as +Spinoza has it, "<i>Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus +animata sunt</i>."</p> + +<p>The question, what is life? is the greatest that +the human understanding can ask of itself. For +thousands of years man has cudgelled his brain over +this, and is as far from finding an answer to-day<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +as he was on the first day. The definition most often +repeated runs thus: Life is the ability possessed by +certain bodies to react to stimuli, to absorb nourishment +and to reproduce themselves. That is a statement +of observed facts, but it is no explanation. It +informs us that we are familiar with bodies which +behave in a way distinguishing them from other +bodies; but why they conduct themselves differently +from others, what the particular thing is which is +present in certain combinations of matter and absent +in others—that is an impenetrable secret.</p> + +<p>Science has tried by the most varied methods to +solve the problem. It seemed a triumph of research +that Woehler produced urea, that chemists later on +manufactured carbohydrates, that Fischer is on the +high road to the production of synthetic albumen. +What is gained by these discoveries? We bring about +the same combinations as the living cell does. That is, +no doubt, an interesting achievement, but its value as +an addition to our knowledge on this point is infinitesimal. +For we accomplish the production of +sugar, urea and amine in a manner very different to +that of the living cell, and he who copies the things +turned out in a workshop has contributed nothing to +our knowledge of the workman who plies his trade +in the workshop. The dividing line between life and +lifelessness was supposed to have been obliterated +when elementary manifestations of life were proved +to exist in inanimate matter; the Brownian movements +in the smallest particles; the growth of crystals +immersed in a solution of the same chemical composition +as themselves; crystallization itself which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> +represents a kind of very simple organization of +matter, and at any rate proves the sway of a regulating +and directive force; the tendency of certain +elements to combine, which has been called their +affinity. But this name is only a poetical metaphor +which no one will take literally. The growth of +crystals in their mother liquor is merely mechanical +precipitation on their surface, an external addition of +layers of the same material; but not growth by the +incorporation of such matter, that is, through the +absorption of nourishment.</p> + +<p>These and similar results of observation do +not suffice absolutely to justify the assumption, +seductive though it be, that life is a fundamental +attribute of matter, that it is present everywhere +though graduated in intensity, that therefore +apparently inanimate matter differs not qualitatively, +but only quantitatively from living beings, +that life stretches in an unbroken line from the block +of metal or rock, in which it is completely obscured, +to man, the most highly developed organism we know +of; and that at a certain point in its range it reveals +itself in a form which permits no distinction between +organic and inorganic matter.</p> + +<p>The origin of life is as completely unknown to +us as its essence. For thousands of years the assumption +was lightheartedly made that under certain, +somewhat vague circumstances, life originated of its +own accord. Pasteur showed that a <i>generatio spontanea</i> +cannot be proved to exist, that every living +thing comes from another living thing, a parent +organism, and that the old philosophers were right in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> +propounding "<i>omne vivum ex ovo</i>" as a law, although +they only guessed it and had not proved it experimentally. +A very few critics, who are hard to convince, +still dare to assert in a small voice that +Pasteur's work and all the facts established by microbiology +do not prove conclusively that life does not +nevertheless originate from inorganic matter under +conditions which we cannot nowadays reproduce in +our laboratories. No answer can be made to this objection. +An experiment is only conclusive for the +conditions in which it is made, and not for others. All +that we can positively assert is that on earth the +genesis of life without a demonstrable parent organism +has never been observed. To go farther, and to +assert that a <i>generatio spontanea</i> is absolutely impossible +under any conditions, on earth or elsewhere, is +arbitrary, just as it is to assert the contrary.</p> + +<p>Those who are supporters of the theory that life can +be developed from non-living matter for a long time +thought they had conclusively proved their case; they +argued as follows: At the present time life exists on +our planet; according to the Kant-Laplace hypothesis +our planet was formed from a cosmic nebula and +passed through a state of fluid incandescence; in this +state life is impossible; therefore life must have +originated spontaneously one day after the Earth had +cooled down; consequently either the Kant-Laplace +hypothesis is wrong or the assertion that life can only +be generated by life is erroneous; the two assumptions +are incompatible. This conclusion no longer presents +any insuperable difficulties. It has been observed that +spores which have been kept for months at the tem<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>perature +of frozen hydrogen, that is, very nearly at +absolute zero, have retained their germinative power +and have developed when they were brought back to +a favourable temperature. Therefore they would not +be killed by the cold of interstellar space on their way +from one heavenly body to another, and could become +the seeds of life on another hitherto inanimate star. +That large numbers of tiny particles of matter exist +in interstellar space and are precipitated on the +heavenly bodies is proved by the cosmic dust that +arctic explorers have collected from the surface of +snow and ice. Therefore the Earth may well have +been in an incandescent state, and may yet have received +from interstellar space the germs of life +which developed and multiplied when the Earth's +crust had cooled sufficiently to provide the conditions +favourable to their existence; and these germs may +have been the ancestors of all the life that exists on +earth to-day after a period of evolution lasting hundreds +of millions of years.</p> + +<p>This would account for the origin of life upon the +Earth, but not of life in general. The germs, which +travel as carriers of life from an older heavenly body +to a younger one, must have sprung from parents, and +however far back we trace their genealogical tree we +are always finally faced by this dilemma: either life +did, after all, originate at one time from something +lifeless, and what has happened once must be able to +happen again, now and always; or life never originated +at all, but has always existed; it is eternal like +matter, in forms whose variety we cannot even dimly +grasp, its threads, having neither beginning nor end,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> +wind through eternity. Of these two assumptions the +latter is incomparably more in harmony with our +present-day views on the universe. We believe the +matter of which the universe is built up to be everlasting. +It costs no great effort to believe life to be +eternal too. True, the idea of eternity is inconceivable +to us; it is a dim conception which has given rise +to a word, a tone picture which portrays something +indefinite, but within the bounds of the inconceivable +there is room for both semi-obscurities, the everlastingness +of matter and the everlastingness of +life.</p> + +<p>But the most enigmatical point in the riddle of +life is not life itself, which is a form of being, and is +neither more nor less comprehensible than the existence +of an inanimate object, of a stone, of water, of +the air; it is consciousness. Descartes proves his +own existence to himself by the fact that he thinks. +Life must be accompanied by consciousness in order +to convince the living being that it exists. The +formula: "<i>cogito ergo sum</i>" has been admired for +hundreds of years. It certainly is specious. But +how many questions it leaves unanswered! Has it +the right to deny life to an entity that does not conceive +itself? Must it not be completed by the proof +that life without thought, that is, without consciousness, +does not exist, that consciousness is the necessary +complement of life? And, above all, ought not +Descartes to have given us an explanation of what +thought and consciousness are?</p> + +<p>I will attempt to answer the questions left unanswered +by Descartes. But I must premise one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +thing. Every definition of consciousness implies a +postulate: life. Though at a pinch we can picture +life without consciousness, consciousness without life +is absolutely inconceivable. I do not undertake to +explain what life is, any more than I attempted it +above. We must take it as something given. Consciousness, +then, is the subjective realization of something +objective, the inward realization of something +outside. If in a living being a picture of its surroundings +is developed, then it absorbs something +which is not a necessary part of itself. Of course, +this inner image must not be understood to imply an +absorption of matter. It is a process in the matter of +which the living being is built up. But, all the same, +the image of the outer world in the inner being does +signify a penetration of the latter by the former. +This image, which follows the changes of the outer +world and repeats them in the inner being, is consciousness. +It may be shadowy and blurred, or clear +and distinct; it may in rapid succession be formed and +pass away, and it can be preserved as a memory; it +may reflect a greater or a lesser portion of the outer +world; consciousness is accordingly duller or sharper; +its contents are scant or plentiful, it retains the images +of a shorter or longer series of conditions in the surrounding +world. Between nutrition, which is recognized +as an essential phenomenon of life, and consciousness +a surprising parallelism subsists. Both +consist in an absorption of the outer world by the +organism; nutrition is the assimilation of matter, consciousness +that of stimuli. In the process of nutrition +the organism digests small quantities of the outside<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +world; in consciousness it digests the world as a +whole.</p> + +<p>This parallelism is no mere play of the intellect. +If it is followed out it leads to significant ideas if +not to actual knowledge. What penetrates from the +outer world into the inner being of the organism is +vibration, movement, force. Is the matter which is +absorbed as nourishment ultimately anything different? +Here we come up against the ultimate +problems of physics, the various hypotheses regarding +the nature of force and matter, the theories that in +addition to matter there is an ether, or that the ether +is a different, more subtle, form of matter, or that +neither matter nor ether exist, but atoms out of which +everything is built up, which themselves consist of +electrons which are centres of force, motions without +material consistency. All these theories, of which +the last cannot be grasped by the human understanding, +we can leave severely alone. This is not the +place to investigate them. But the attitude of the +living organism towards the outer world from which +it absorbs nourishment and impressions, converting +them into power to drive the life machine and transmuting +them into consciousness, lends peculiar support +to the supposition that force and matter are not +only inseparable but identical, that in them we must +seek a principle, or perhaps regard them themselves as +a principle, which must be of the same nature as consciousness, +for otherwise it could not be transmuted +into the latter.</p> + +<p>The senses are the means by which the outer world +penetrates as an image into the inner being. Before<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +the senses are differentiated the living organism possesses +a general sensitiveness; that is to say, that +under the influence of the outer world its cell protoplasm +undergoes a process of regrouping, resulting +in chemical and dynamic changes. The chemical +results of stimulus are anabolism and katabolism, a +building up and breaking down of the cell content; +the dynamic results are movements which in the lowest +forms of life are purely mechanical, but in the higher +forms adapt the organism to the external influence in +so far as they place it either so as to be affected by +the latter as long and as powerfully as possible, or +else so as to evade it. The living organism can +experience no stimulus and respond to it without +absorbing and transmuting it, converting it into a +chemical process or a movement. This inner process +is a subjective realization of something objective, a +penetration by the outer world, therefore an elementary +consciousness. In proportion as the general +sensitiveness becomes differentiated into specific ones, +as the image of the outer world filters through the +different coloured glass panes of the various senses +into the inner being of the organism, this image becomes +multicoloured and varied.</p> + +<p>It lies in the nature of this mechanism that the +subjective image is not identical with the objective +original, but is modified and even distorted by +the panes through which it penetrates to the +inner being of the organism. What the subject +perceives is never anything but a symbol of the +object, never the object itself; but this symbol +suffices to enable the consciousness to form an idea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> +of the object, just as letters enable the reader to +take in words and thoughts. We must conceive the +development of consciousness to go hand in hand +with that of the senses. The more windows the +organism can open to the outer world the more easily +and the more clearly does its image penetrate. The +number of objects which the subject can take in is the +measure of the perfection of its consciousness. The +protista, lacking specific sense organs and possessing +only the general sensitiveness of protoplasm, can form +only to a very limited extent and with very little +variety an inner realization of the stimuli of the outer +world. Its consciousness is necessarily very restricted +and exceedingly dim. Consciousness is enlarged and +grows clearer as the organism develops and its general +sensitiveness is differentiated into specific senses, until +we reach the level of man whose consciousness embraces +far more of the outer world than does that of +any other living creature; because, lacking new senses, +he has succeeded in amplifying and enlarging those +he possesses, and has by artificial means made himself +capable of perceiving stimuli to which he is not directly +susceptible and which therefore would have remained +unknown to him; to a certain extent he has translated +them into a form which his senses can perceive.</p> + +<p>I do not overlook any of the difficulties which my +attempt to explain consciousness leaves untouched. +On all sides the most urgent and disquieting questions +arise. Above all, the fundamental question, the most +enigmatic of all: how is an external stimulus, that +is a movement, a vibration, converted into a sensation, +a perception? Further: must we in the consciousness<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> +distinguish between the frame and its contents, the +conceptual mechanism and the concept? Or do the +two coincide? Is there no consciousness without a +conceptual content? And is it the movement entering +into the organism, the inner realization of the +outer world which, transmuting itself in an incomprehensible +manner into a concept, creates consciousness, +becomes consciousness? Is the consciousness +of the man standing upon the highest plane of intellectuality +the greatest consciousness possible? Does +there exist anywhere in the universe a more abundant, +perhaps an infinitely more abundant consciousness +than that of human beings on the Earth, and will the +latter ever rise to this height? It is obvious that a +development is in progress. There was a time when +the most comprehensive, the clearest consciousness +on earth was that of the trilobite or the cephalopod. +Evolution has gone as far as man. Does it stop at +that or will it continue?</p> + +<p>According to Herbert Spencer evolution is progress +from the simple to the complicated. Let +us accept this definition. Have we the right to +set up a scale of values and place the complicated +above the simple? Is the latter not the more +perfect because it has more power of resistance, +greater durability, and can hold its own triumphantly +against all destructive influences? Is not +evolution, then, a retrogression from the perfect, because +simple, to the more complicated, and therefore +more fragile, more easily upset and less capable of +resistance to harm? Is it not sheer egocentrism if +we appraise the value of living beings according to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> +their greater or less resemblance to ourselves, and +judge them to be less or more worthy in proportion +to their disparity with us? Are the fish which, living +in the sea wherein we cannot exist, can inhabit the +greater part of the globe, are wild duck which fly, +swim and walk, not more perfect than we, who have +had to conquer the air and the water by artificial +means? Is not the mouse's hearing sharper than +ours? The eagle's sight keener? The dog's scent +incomparably more delicate? Has not the carrier +pigeon an infinitely better sense of locality than we +have? Are not many beasts physically stronger, more +nimble and agile than man? His only claim to +superiority rests on the greater perfection of his consciousness. +Why do not all living creatures participate +equally in the evolution to which this superiority +is due? Why does it not take place in every organism +and lead the unicellular living being in an unbroken +ascent to the level of Goethe or Napoleon, or to a +still more lofty one, if such an one exist anywhere in +the universe?</p> + +<p>If one could believe in a Ruling Power and the +plan of the universe as its work, would it not be +terribly cruel and revoltingly unjust that this power, +instead of treating all living beings alike, should make +a kind of selection of grace and lead some up to a +higher level while it condemned others to lasting lowliness, +and that it should ordain that on the road from +the unicellular organism to man, countless connecting +links should be left hopelessly behind and not be +permitted to continue their ascent? Or must we +admit the humiliating conclusion that a greater amount<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> +of consciousness does not necessarily imply higher +rank and greater dignity, and that a protista, with its +almost unimaginably pale and narrow consciousness, +can have just as great a feeling of well-being as man +with his immeasurably superior intellectual life; that +therefore the protista suffers no wrong if it never gets +beyond its present stage of evolution; and finally that +the amount of the outer world which man can absorb +in his consciousness is as far removed from the entirety +of the universe as the contents of the protista's consciousness +are from that of the human mind? No +answer can be found to these questions. Whatever +purports to be an answer, be it introduced as theology +or as philosophy, is visionary or nonsensical. +We must resign ourselves to moving in a very small +circle moderately illuminated by Reason, while all +around, if we seek to penetrate beyond it, we perceive +gruesome darkness.</p> + +<p>Evolution, that is a progress from the comparatively +simple to the more complicated, is a striking +fact—I say comparatively simple advisedly, for even +in the unicellular organism the processes are far +removed from the absolutely simple. We do not +know from what part of the organism the impulse to +evolution comes. Here we meet with the same mystery +which shrouds growth, its duration, its measure +and its bounds. As the conception is lacking, a word +has been found, viz., entelechy, which Driesch introduced +into biology, the co-operation of all parts of the +organism for the purpose not only of preserving it but +also of making it more efficient in the matter of self-preservation +and more perfect. A critical investiga<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>tion +of entelechy would involve the broaching of the +whole question of life. It does not come within the +scope of this work. I shall therefore content myself +with a very few remarks. Entelechy works as if it +were reasonable and acted with a set purpose. If +you think it out exhaustively it forces you to the +assumption that life is an intellectual principle, even +in the protoplasm of the cell, long before there is any +perceptible trace of consciousness; that this intellectual +principle makes use of matter, builds it up, +organizes it, moulds it into material and tools for +construction, and sets up a mechanism in which and +by which it develops itself. As far as we can see +the purpose of life is life itself. Entelechy directs +all the work of the organism in such a way that it +becomes more and more capable of self-preservation, +that its efficiency becomes greater, that it can absorb +more of the outer world and can react more vigorously +upon the outer world. In other words, life strives +continuously to make its embodiments more permanent, +securer, richer and more manifold.</p> + +<p>However, if we do not know how the impulse to +evolution originates, we can at least form an idea of +the mechanism of evolution. Fundamentally life +consists in the absorption of cosmic movements or +vibrations, and their transformation into another form +of movement. The living cell is a machine which +makes use of cosmic energy for physio-chemical work. +Metabolism, warmth, electric manifestations, movement, +and as their concomitant a graduated consciousness, +are the result of this work which is carried out +by cosmic energy in the cell power machine.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span></p> + +<p>To start with, this machine works in the very +simplest fashion. It uses up its motive power as fast +as it acquires it. Energy flows in and immediately +flows out again in another form. The organism is +like a pipe or a vessel without a bottom, so that its +contents cannot be stored. The lower organisms +which obey tropisms are such bottomless vessels. +They are continually and inevitably subjected to the +same attractions and repulsions and have no means +to withstand them. But at a certain stage of evolution—how? +why? Driesch replies: Entelechy!—a +new part is developed in the machine, something like +the cam on a cogwheel which forces it to come to rest. +Or, to keep to the earlier simile, the bottomless vessel +acquires a bottom with a tap that can be opened and +closed. With this arrangement the organism is able +to store the energy it has received and then to make +use of it according to its needs, to do much more or +much less work with it, to achieve much greater or +much smaller effects, than it would be capable of +doing with the amount of energy it receives from outside +in a given unit of time. It is obvious how much +more efficient the organism becomes if it can store +up energy and can adapt to its needs the amount used +up. This new part of the machine is Inhibition.</p> + +<p>It appears early, and takes part in the general +development of the organism; it is indeed the +strongest factor in this development. Before Inhibition +intervenes the organism has only one response +to stimulus: reflex action. This is of the character +of an electric discharge. It may be stronger or +weaker, but is uniform in kind. It varies quantita<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span>tively +but not qualitatively. In the lower organisms +it is a contraction of the cell protoplasm, a movement. +In the higher organisms, in which the life processes +are carried out on the principle of the division of +labour and which have developed various organs for +this purpose, each organ performs the action of its +specific function; the muscle contracts, the nerve sends +out a nervous impulse, the gland forms a secretion, +and so on. All reflex actions have this in common, +that they serve no other purpose than that of relaxing +tension in the organism. They do not imply any co-ordinated +effort to promote the comfort and the welfare +of the living being. They cannot fulfil any +complicated task. They exhaust the organism which, +after a series of reflex actions, becomes insensitive to +stimuli and must rest for a time before it can react +again.</p> + +<p>Beginning from that stage of evolution where inhibition +intervenes, reflex action loses the character +of an automatic response to impulse and becomes +disciplined. Inhibition tries to suppress reflex action. +Its success is more or less complete according to the +sensitiveness and life energy of the tissue receiving +the stimulus and the degree to which the mechanism +of inhibition is developed. The organism retains its +tension, remains charged with energy, and is able to +carry out work for definite purposes. In place of +anarchistic reflex action which occurs regardless of +the needs of the organism, we find economy of energy, +co-ordination of effort, movement directed to a profitable +end. It is only inhibition which can raise the +organism from its state of passivity, its helpless de<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>pendence +upon tropism, to a being in which a will is +beginning to dawn and which by its will becomes +self-determinative. Inhibition is a function of the +will; it is the will's tool. Even Plato dimly perceived +this, and he expresses it in the metaphorical +language peculiar to himself, when, in the "Republic," +he compares a human being to a creature made up of +three animals: a hundred-headed sea-serpent which +must at one and the same time be fed and tamed, a +blind lion, and a man who tames the serpent by means +of the lion. These three animals are desire (ἐπιθυμία), +courage (θυμός), and mind (νοῦς). We say in biological +language, reflex action, inhibition, and will or +volitional reason.</p> + +<p>All the concepts that are referred to here: purpose, +co-ordination, inhibition and will, are every one of +them dependent upon one fundamental concept, consciousness. +Without it they are unthinkable. Schopenhauer's +unconscious will is a word without meaning. +I have postulated consciousness as the inseparable +concomitant of life. It is probably the essence +of life. In its lowest stage it is too dim, its contents +too meagre and blurred, properly to distinguish the +organism in which it dwells from the world around. +In a higher state of development, when it gradually +grows clearer and begins to be filled with more sharply +defined ideas, it learns to keep its organism and the +surrounding world apart, and tries to make the attitude +of the former to the latter one of self-defence, +self-preservation and self-development. From this +stage of development onward, concepts begin to connect +and group themselves in such a way that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> +consciousness contains not only an image of the immediate +present, but also memories of the past and a +forecast of the future. The ability to prolong the +present into the future, to understand the actual as +a cause of the effects that follow and to foresee these +effects, that is the starting point of logic and reason. It +is the necessary antecedent of the will, which would +have no meaning if it were not the effort to realize +a conception of actions and their consequences, previously +worked out by consciousness. Will is a +function of consciousness which, in pursuance of the +well-known biological law, creates an instrument for +its purposes, and this instrument is inhibition. The +higher an organism stands on the ladder of evolution +the more energetically and surely does inhibition +work, the nicer and the more masterly does its intervention +in the original reflex actions grow.</p> + +<p>Thanks to the piling up of reserves of energy, +which is a result of inhibition, the organism can carry +out its work of differentiation, can develop organs +and organic systems, and obtain the power to perform +more complicated functions; these render it ever more +independent of the outer world and enable it to affect +the outer world to an increasing extent. Inhibition +plays an important part in differentiation. Its apparatus +becomes organized. The nerve centres from +which the inhibition proceeds form a ladder of which +each rung is subordinate to the next. The peripheral +nerves are controlled by the nerve centres in the +spinal cord, these again by the centres in the medulla +oblongata, and then in succession by the cerebellum +and the cerebrum, and finally by the corticle. On the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> +principle of least resistance, on which all life is based, +the highest centres of inhibition unburden themselves +by granting the lower ones a certain measure of independence. +The reaction to the most ordinary and +frequent stimuli is controlled and organized in its +character and strength by the apparatus of inhibition, +so that it ensues automatically, and no active inhibition, +that is, no conscious effort of the will, is required. +The simplest of these automatic reflex +movements take place below the level of consciousness.</p> + +<p>Those organized complexes of movement, however, +which we call instincts, are carefully watched by the +consciousness and subjected to severe check if they +appear to run counter to the supposed interest of the +organism. The hereditary complexes of movement +constituting instinct are highly organized and oppose +inhibition, only yielding to it when it is stronger than +they are. This can be observed in animals which are +capable of taming and training. All the artificial +actions and omissions that man teaches them are +triumphs of inhibition over automatism. Among +human beings it is only the elect who can vigorously +suppress their instincts by inhibition directed by +Reason. The being that has attained the summit of +organic evolution on earth is man, in whom only the +lower, vegetative life processes are liable to the influence +of tropism and primary reflex actions, while +all the higher and highest functions are the work of +Reason, which arms the will with inhibition and suppresses +all impulses and actions that hinder its purposes. +It is characteristic of these functions that they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> +are first worked out as concepts by the consciousness +before they are realized as movements.</p> + +<p>It was essential for Morality to find this whole +organic structure ready to its hand before it could +become a factor in human life. This structure had +been developed and perfected by the organism for its +own purposes, for the defence and enrichment of its +life, to ward off painful and obtain pleasurable feelings. +Morality took possession of it and used it for +its own ends, which do not at the first glance coincide +with the aims which the individual immediately perceives +and imagines, and may indeed be diametrically +opposed to these, preventing pleasurable emotions, +causing him pain and even endangering his life.</p> + +<p>But Morality, which is a creation of society, was +only able to dominate the individual and gain control +of the organic apparatus of his vital economy, because +its purpose is directed towards the same goal +as the tendencies of the individual organism, prolonging +them beyond the individual's scope, aiming +at his preservation, and thus coinciding with his instinct +for self-preservation.</p> + +<p>Morality limits the individual's vainglory and +subordinates him to the community; it is the condition +on which the community allows the individual to participate +in the mightier and more varied means of +protection and the enrichment of existence which it +has to offer. But apart from this somewhat remote +advantage of Morality, there is another immediate one +for the individual: it consists in the continual exercise +and consequent strengthening of inhibition; +therefore, as we have learnt to see in inhibition the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> +main factor in the development and differentiation of +all living creatures, it offers a means of raising the +individual to biological perfection. The faculty of +inhibition, being in a continual state of strong tension, +makes automatic reflexes subject to the will, makes +blind impulses obedient to the somewhat less blind +reason, and helps man along the path of evolution +from the status of a creature of instinct to that of a +thinking personality of strong character, capable of +judgment and foresight, a personality which does not +seek to attain the pleasurable emotions necessary to +every living creature by pandering to his senses and +satisfying the appetites of the flesh, but achieves them +by gratification of a higher order, by the triumph of +the intellect over vegetative life, by strengthening the +will in relation to the stimuli of the outer world and +the organs, by taking pleasure in the fact that the +will is content with its sway. These are harsh but +subtle pleasures which, when they continue to preponderate +in the consciousness, bring about that state +of subjective happiness which is in the highest degree +beneficial to life.</p> + +<p>Morality is an arrangement which has arisen from +the needs of society; that is to say, it is not innate, +but is an artificial institution of the race. However, it +grafts itself upon the natural organs and attributes of +man, and thus, from being a sociological phenomenon, +it becomes a biological one. The idea that Morality +is something absolute, a cosmic force, and that it +would still exist and be valid if there were no human +beings, and even if the earth had no existence, I have +refuted with scorn. We must hold fast to the fact<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +that Morality is a law of human conduct, that it is in +force only among mankind, and that apart from mankind +it is unthinkable. As, however, it becomes a +differentiated function of the apparatus of inhibition, +it participates in the general processes of life and +leads us to that point where, indeed, we face the unnerving +outlook upon the absolute and the question +of eternity.</p> + +<p>My arguments have led me to many phenomena +that can be established and interpreted as facts of +experience, but the explanation of which lies beyond +the power of the human mind. We have examined +the riddle of life, and we have distinguished therein +a number of inexplicable things: the lack of a beginning, +sensitiveness to stimuli, consciousness, the transformation +of vibrations into sensations and concepts, +the will, and inhibition. We are forced to the conclusion +that the only discernible aim of life's activities +is the preservation of life, or, more shortly, that life +is its own aim and object. Morality, too, either openly +or by implication, sets itself the one clearly demonstrable +task of ensuring to the individual the preservation +and security of his existence in a higher sphere +than that of individual vegetative life processes. +Thereby it fits into the scheme of existence, its mysteries +and aims, and becomes an integral part of the +cycle of life which emerges from eternity and returns +to it.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>MORALITY AND LAW</h3> + + +<p>The coercion which the community exercises +upon its members, by means of which it forces +them to adapt their actions and abstention from +action to the standard it has set up, has two forms: +Custom and Law. Are the two really different? +What is their relation, one to the other? These are +questions worth investigating.</p> + +<p>Ever since the earliest times, grave men have +meditated on the relation between Custom and Law. +They were forced by evidence and practical experience +to note a difference between the two institutions, +but at the same time they had the definite impression +that they trace their origin to the same source. +Socrates distinguishes between the written laws of +his country and the unwritten ones which express the +will of the gods. The former constitute positive Law +which the citizen must observe and to which he must +submit; the latter, however, are higher, for they emanate +from the gods themselves. The immutability of +the unwritten laws is a proof that they are superior to +the written ones. Written laws vary from state to +state. They are the work of individual law-givers +who were sometimes wise men and sometimes unreasonable +tyrants. But all contain certain precepts +which are everywhere alike, which everywhere impose<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> +the same rules upon man. It is almost as if one and +the same law-giver had co-operated in the making of +all the laws that obtain in the different towns and +countries, and are so unlike one another in many points. +This common law-giver, whose will is manifest in all +laws, however far removed they be from one another, +is the Deity. That is essentially Socrates' train of +thought as given by Xenophon in his <i>Memorabilia</i>. +The Attic sage speaks the language of his time, which, +by the way, is still that of many present-day people. +The Deity, whose will permeates all written laws and +to whom they may be traced, is the principle of +Morality. Hugo Grotius, in a manner more appropriate +to modern thought, expresses it thus: "Law +and Morality spring from the same source, namely, +the strong social instinct natural to man. They bear +witness to reasonable solicitude for the welfare of the +community." This placing on an equality of Law and +Custom, of <i>jus</i> and <i>mos</i>, is very remarkable in such a +strictly professional thinker, such a positive jurist as +Grotius. Kant discriminates between the doctrine +of Virtue and the doctrine of Law; he keeps them +apart, but he emphasizes their connexion, and the +two together make up his doctrine of Ethics.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, no fundamental difference +between Law and Custom exists; only Law is enforced +differently to Custom. It would be going too +far to say: Law has sanctions and Custom has none. +The latter has sanctions too, but they are of a different +kind to those of the Law. He who transgresses +Custom will suffer the contempt of his fellow men, +and this may become so penetratingly severe that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> +most hardened and shameless rascal must feel it. In +an old, loose form of society where individualism is +highly developed, and each one goes his own way, +paying little regard to the others, there an unscrupulous, +conscienceless rogue may sin against +Socrates' unwritten law without being penalized. In +a young, closely-knit community, however, in which +the feeling of intimate connexion between the +members is lively and vivid, he would be proscribed, +as soon as he was found out, and it would be impossible +for him to remain, say, for example, in a small +town of the United States. Public opinion would +make it so hot for him that he would be glad to escape +with a whole skin. But this punishment is exceptional +for transgressions of Custom, whereas it is the rule for +those of the Law.</p> + +<p>The sanction of the Law is stricter than that of +Custom, just as the Law itself is stricter than is +Custom. The Law concerns itself with concrete +cases in which consideration for one's fellow men must +be practised, duties to him fulfilled, and his claims +respected. These cases are defined by Law as clearly +as possible, whereas Custom confines itself to generalities +and determines the whole attitude of the individual +to his neighbour. Custom embraces the outer +and inner life of man and supervises his opinions, +which are the parents of his deeds, and also his deeds +themselves; Law is only concerned with actions, and +refrains from penetrating to the intimacy of thoughts, +unless the latter alter the essential character of the +action, as premeditation in an act of revenge and +temporary or permanent irresponsibility alter the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +judgment of offences and crimes. Law is a miserly +extract of custom, a meagre selection from its variety, +a concentration and embodiment of its surging vagueness. +It may be compared with crystals, which in +their geometrically accurate forms are crystallized +clearly and definitely out of a liquid, the mother +liquor; or with the heavenly bodies which agglomerate +out of surging primal nebulæ. Custom is the +primitive thing, Law is derived from it. It appeals +to its descent from Custom, and founds, at any rate +tacitly, its claim to respect on these grounds. A law +which ran counter to Custom, which was confessedly +in opposition to Custom, could never be maintained +or prevail, though it bristled with the menace of the +most dreadful punishments.</p> + +<p>The relationship of mother to child between +Custom and Law may be obscure to the majority; it +is clear to the analytical mind. Recognition of the +essential unity of both phenomena explains an assumption +which was widespread among the best intellects +from the Middle Ages until well into the +eighteenth century, but which has now been abandoned +as erroneous by more positive, though indeed +narrower, legal minds. This assumption is that there +is a natural Law antecedent to historical Law, which +exists and acts beside and above the latter, and which +forms the basis and the measure of every positive law, +of every concrete legal judgment. It is comprehensible +that the nineteenth century swept away the +idea of natural Law and freely made fun of it. To +a sternly disciplined legal mind it must indeed seem +grotesque if a judge, in order to arrive at a verdict<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +in some concrete dispute, cites the rights to which +man is born instead of a certain text of the law, or +even, following Schiller's advice, reaches up to the +stars and brings down thence the eternal Law. Even +this procedure is not so farcical as it seems to stupid +article-mongers and hair-splitting paragraphists, for +the procedure of equity of the English judges, who +are not prone to clowning, is at bottom nothing but +this reaching up to the stars and this judging by the +rights to which man is born. The feud between +natural Law and historical Law was really a quarrel +about a word. Jean Jacques Rousseau, his contemporaries +and disciples, simply made a mistake in +their choice of an expression. They were guilty of +an inaccuracy when they spoke of natural Law. They +should have said: "the innate claim of man that his +person should be respected," or, "natural consideration +for one's fellow man," or, most shortly and +simply, "Morality." To the latter legal lights would +have raised none of the objections with which they +victoriously opposed natural Law.</p> + +<p>The beginnings of Morality coincide with the beginnings +of society, as the latter could not have +existed for a single day without the former. Since +men, forced by the struggle for existence, emerged +from their original, natural solitude and united in a +community, they have had to watch over their impulses, +suppress their desires, do things they disliked, +and in all their actions and abstentions from action +consider their neighbours' feelings, as they demanded +that their feelings, too, should be considered. That +was Morality which limited the vainglory and arbitrary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +conduct of unfettered man. It included all rules +that determine the attitude of man to man. There +was no distinction between Custom and Law. Men +were ruled by custom which was traditional in their +community and observed by all; and their Custom +had the force of Law.</p> + +<p>Formulated laws, and more especially written +laws, appear comparatively late. True, Asia has old +examples of such; the Manava Dharma Shastra, the +book of laws of the Indian Manu, the Chinese Chings, +the law of Hammu Rabi, and that other law, akin to +this, though not derived from it, but probably drawn +from a similar older source, the law of the Pentateuch. +The laws of Draco, Solon and Lycurgus and the +Roman Twelve table law are appreciably younger; +much later still the <i>leges barbarorum</i> were written +down, some of them, like the prescriptive Law of the +Germans set down in the "<i>Sachsenspiegel</i>," not till +the end of the Middle Ages. It is peculiar to most +of the old Asiatic laws that they contain both rules of +conduct and legal regulations, and that they do not +differentiate between these two kinds of precepts.</p> + +<p>Let us take one example: the Ten Commandments. +Beside such positive orders as "Thou shalt +not steal"; "Thou shalt not kill"; "Honour thy +father and thy mother"; we find such as give rules +for the character and course of spiritual happenings, +regarding which others cannot observe whether they +are obeyed or not, like the commandments respecting +man's relationship to God, or admonishing man +not to covet his neighbour's wife or goods. Those are +subjective impulses, spiritual moods which are re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>vealed +only to the eye of conscience as long as they do +not betray themselves in action, and which by their +very nature cannot be the subject of Law which deals +only with outward manifestations of thought and will, +and is concerned only with things done.</p> + +<p>In constitutional Law, too, no less than in criminal +and civil Law, the eighteenth century tends to preface +certain laws with universal moral principles, and to +establish by formal law that the former are derived +from the latter. The Declaration of Independence +of the United States in July, 1774, says: We consider +the following truths self-evident: that all men are born +equal; that the Creator has bestowed upon them inalienable +rights, amongst which are the right to life, to +freedom, to the pursuit of happiness, etc. So before +these rights are guaranteed by the Law, they are announced +to belong by birth and nature to man, to be +independent of any particular and express bestowal +by the law-giver, and beyond all dispute or even +argument. Of the thirteen States which formed the +original Union, ten accompanied their constitution +by a Bill of Rights which repeated the essential contents +of the Declaration of Independence of July, +1774; seven of them placed them as an introduction +before their fundamental law, and three of them incorporated +them in the latter. Two others, New York +and Georgia, distributed them among various articles +of their constitution. Rhode Island alone refrained +from a general declaration. The States which joined +the Union later, with few exceptions followed the +example of their predecessors and built up their constitution +on the foundation of an explicit statement<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +of the natural rights of man. The French Revolution +followed the course which the United States had +indicated, and began its constitution of 1791 with the +"Declaration of the rights of men and citizens," +which is not a law in the technical sense of the word, +but is superior to all positive Law, constitutes the +latter's standard and touchstone, and straightway +makes all laws invalid which are not animated by its +spirit or which contradict it.</p> + +<p>In the beginning, therefore, there was Morality, +and the first laws, which formulated its precepts either +in oral tradition or in writing, recommended without +distinction what was good and desirable, and what +was necessary and expedient. The differentiation of +the Morality, which the commonwealth felt to be its +code of right and wrong, into Custom and Law took +place in late times. It was most definite in Rome, +where for the first time a clear distinction was made +between men's relation to their gods and their relation +to one another; the former was left to the individual's +conscience, the latter subjected to the power of the +State; the elements of feeling and of dim perception +were banished from the Law which confined its +attention to deeds which it regulated in a high-handed +manner. Law chose from out the all-embracing +sphere of Morality one narrow area, that of mankind's +immediate, material interests, and took this as its sole +theme. The object of all Morality is to enable men +to live together in a community peacefully and prosperously; +within the bounds of this more general +purpose, the task of the Law is to suppress by force +the grosser hindrances to this harmony among indivi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span>duals, +and by material means of coercion emphatically +oblige everyone to respect the interests of his neighbour. +What every responsible man of sound mind +demands first and foremost is a proper respect for the +possessions that are his by birth and acquisition, that +is for his life, for his bodily welfare, for all the goods +he owns that minister to his needs, his comfort and +his pleasure. He who lays violent hands on these +possessions, or threatens to endanger them, is recognized +to be an enemy; man arms himself against such +an one, fights against him, tries, if he have a strong +character, to destroy him, or flees from him if he is +too weak to triumph over him; man only yields to such +an one if he simply cannot help himself, but he does +so with hatred and revenge in his heart, and in a state +of mind which, if it becomes fairly widespread, sets +every man's hand against his fellow-men and leads +to the ruin and even to the dissolution of the community. +Hence the task of Law is effectively to +protect the individual from the infringement of his +rights by others. It places the organized forces of +the community at the service of the individual whose +interests are threatened, for the criminal law penalizes +more or less severely attempts against life and health, +unlawful seizure of property whether by force or +cunning, malicious molestation and offence; the laws +of commerce keep watch over the faithful fulfilment +of contracts dealing with the fair exchange of goods +or the execution of work, and in case of need +enforce it.</p> + +<p>A select few, everywhere only a small minority, +has a different scale of values to that of the masses.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> +For them "life is not the supreme thing." There are +things they value more highly. The masses have no +understanding for these people's needs and fine feelings. +Their self-respect and their dignity are dear to +them as wealth, their honour more sacred than life +itself. Unhesitatingly they sacrifice their property to +freedom, and more unbearable than anxiety for their +material interests is life in surroundings in which +brutality, vulgar sentiments, harsh egotism, malice, +hypocrisy and treachery preponderate. The Law +does not consider this minority. It is the creation +and the servant of the great majority. It clings to +earth and is incapable of lofty flights. It is of no +service to the elect in the preservation of their noblest +spiritual possessions or the defence of their ideals +against clumsy maltreatment. It declares itself +to be incompetent to deal with any but material +affairs.</p> + +<p>Therein lies at one and the same time the strength +and the weakness of the Law. Its strength lies in +the fact that it definitely limits its sphere of action +and strives to achieve positive results by positive +means, results intelligible even to a mean understanding. +Its weakness lies in the fact that it ignores man's +highest and noblest interests. And these interests are +there, they too deserve consideration and protection, +they have a right to demand that the guarantee of +the community should embrace them as well. The +well-being of the community, which is the object of +Morality and of Law too, demands that such conditions +should be created and maintained, as should +enable the elect also to enjoy life or at least find<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> +existence bearable. But Law does not suffice for that. +No law enjoins upon the careless throng of pachyderms +to spare the tenderest and noblest sensibilities +of lofty natures; no judge punishes thoughtless or +purposely malicious injury to them. To remedy this +evil we must rise from the lowly plain of Law, the +natural dwelling-place of the masses, to the heights +of Morality, the habitual abode of superior minds. At +the theological stage of civilization refuge is sought +with the gods in whose hands the protection of essential, +spiritual possessions is placed. They are expected +to punish the wicked whose evil deeds are +beyond the reach of any penal code, they are expected +to soothe and comfort when life is hard or even unendurable. +That is the compromise that the elect +made with life in the hard times of European +barbarism. They escaped from the world and thus +avoided contact with the repugnant masses. They +shut themselves up in cloistered cells away from +mankind and held mystic intercourse with God. +Among the people, cruel authorities with difficulty +maintained discipline and scanty law and order +by means of flogging and the pillory, torture, the +gallows and the wheel. The minority of the elect +disciplined themselves, suppressed their lower impulses +by self-imposed mortification, and with the help +of prayer and belief in God's promised millennium +managed to keep their heads above water despite the +crushing spectacle of the life of those times.</p> + +<p>Long before the Christian era, the Greeks of noble +disposition felt the need of living in an atmosphere of +higher intellectuality and morality than that of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> +market-place, and they hid themselves behind the +cloud-curtain of the Eleusinian Mysteries, where they +kept to themselves, escaped the rule of the rude Law, +and followed the nobler precepts of Morality. Whenever +the measure of Morality contained in positive law +did not suffice for the minority with higher aspirations, +this minority adopted the same expedient, a form of +esotericism; small circles were formed outside the +community in which there was added to the current +legal code a superstructure of stricter rules, more +finely shaded duties, more courteous consideration. +Present-day life also offers examples of this tendency +which is met with in all ages. There are select circles +and professions in which the standard of irreproachableness +is far higher than among the mass of the +people. There a man is not held blameless, simply +because he has never transgressed a positive law, never +come into conflict with the powers of justice. He +must be as unspotted in the eye of moral justice as he +is in that of the Law. A club or association that is +self-respecting will not admit to membership a candidate +reputed to lie, to have an evil tongue, to break +his word, to be a toady and a snob, though none of +these offences are punishable by law. It has happened +that a corps of German officers has forced one +of their number to send in his papers because he has +seduced and deserted a respectable girl, an adventure +flattering to the vanity of puppies who, as like as not, +boast of it, and with which a judge can only deal if +the injured girl appeals to him—and even then he +cannot punish the offender, but merely sentence him +to pay damages.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> + +<p>Almost the whole world is agreed on the point +that the Law does not sufficiently protect honour. +Positive Law evidently does not consider it of such +value as material possessions, for the defence of which +it knows itself to be qualified. But there are numbers +of people whose honour is dearer to them than +their fortune, even than their life, and trembling with +indignation they see that a thief who steals their +purse with a few shillings is haled off to prison, +while a slanderer who sullies their honour either goes +unpunished, or at most gets off with a fine, which +merely adds official insult to the injury. In this case +the Law has lagged so far behind Morality that individuals +try of their own accord to bridge the gulf +without counting on the intervention of the community. +For aspersions of their honour the masses take +revenge with fists and cudgels, often with bloody results; +and among the elect they resort to duels with +lethal weapons, a preposterous proceeding due to +desperation, and a bitter indictment of the prevailing +laws. It is a deed of self-help, like the formation of +a vigilance committee among the anarchical throng of +a lawless rabble. Hardly to be justified on reasonable +grounds, it is intelligible from the point of view +of historical tradition, and as a survival of dim and +primitive ideas. In early days a properly regulated +duel was an ordeal showing the judgment of heaven. +It was the general conviction that God would give +victory to the right and crush the wrong. When +human Law failed, the injured party appealed to the +source of all Law and placed his cause in the hands +of the Almighty. From this point of view the duel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> +is no unsuitable means of preventing plots to evade +the law. Even if the injured party is inexperienced +in the use of the weapon, even if his opponent is +skilled and vastly his superior, he need not worry, +for God fights on his side. Therefore he is more +sure of success than if he entrusted his cause to +fallible human judges. But from the moment that the +duel ceases to be regarded as a means of arriving at +the verdict of God, nothing can be urged in its defence, +and that it nevertheless persists is a fact that +can only be accounted for by the inadequacy of the +current laws.</p> + +<p>It really is astonishing that the Law does not +yet appraise honour at its true value. Educated +people almost unanimously regret and condemn +the backwardness of the Law in this respect, all the +more so because the tremendous development of the +respectable, as well as of the disreputable, Press +facilitates and aggravates libel to a hitherto undreamed-of +extent, and no defence can overtake the +slander which is quickly spread broadcast. Doubtless +public opinion will urge that measures be taken to +bring the Law into line with the views now held on +all sides on the significance of honour, its defencelessness +and its need for protection. That this has not +yet been done is due to the slowness with which the +Law adapts itself to the demands of a Morality which +grows ever more profound and more refined. Law, +which originally devoted itself only to the crudest +material interests, very slowly extends the range of +its protection, but it does so continually, with an ever-widening +embrace, including more and more delicate,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> +more and more noble, possessions, taking into consideration +ever higher and ever finer needs. What +early legislator would have thought of man's needing +protection not only against murder, grievous bodily +harm and maltreatment, but also against the dangers +due to ignorance and carelessness in light-heartedly +spreading infectious diseases, and contaminating +water and the air? Who would have dreamed in +former times that positive Law would consider the +sensitiveness of nerves, desire for beauty, dislike of +ugliness and forbid disturbing street noises, protect +the countryside from wicked disfigurement, and prevent +the construction of buildings which would spoil +the artistic architectural plan of a city?</p> + +<p>These little traits, these concessions to personal +demands, which to a coarse mind do not seem +obviously justified, go to prove that positive Law +continues to grow beyond the bounds of its unavoidably +crude materialism, and strives to rise into the +regions of the unwritten law of the Peripatetics, where +ideal possessions are of more importance than those +which have traditionally come within the scope of +criminal and civil Law. Law and Custom have a natural +tendency to approach more and more nearly to one +another, to become merged in one another where the +line that divides them is but faintly indicated. The +closer the union between them, the more perfect is +the Morality of a society. Absolute perfection would +be reached if Law, which has been derived by differentiation +from Morality, should, after a protracted +period of development, return to its source and be +completely merged again in Morality. But that is a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +dream which can never be realized as long as man +is constituted as he is at the present time. Enthusiasts +have dreamed of it, and in their imagination have seen +an anarchical and lawless society in which no positive +Law, no sanctions of force were needed, and in which +the understanding and conscience of individuals +would suffice to ensure the rule of good faith and goodness, +and the curbing of selfishness. As far as man +can tell we shall never attain this Utopia. We shall +never be able to do without positive Law, not only +on account of undeveloped and perverse natures, in +which animalism has the upper hand of humanity, +and which must be kept under strict discipline, but +because a sure guide is needed in cases of doubt and +irresolution which confuse even the good, nay, the +best, men when passion and violent desire, with their +heavy thunderclouds, darken the outlook of Reason, +and judgment wavers amid the hurly-burly of a +spiritual tempest. All that we may hope for and +should desire is that Law should be filled with the +spirit of Morality and embrace as many moral ideas +as possible.</p> + +<p>It lies in the nature of the thing that Morality +was never clearly and definitely formulated, for as +soon as this was done it assumed the character of +Law. It remained general and slightly vague, it +spoke to men in such indefinite terms as "good," +"virtue," "duty," "love of one's neighbour," "unselfishness," +"patience"—terms into which everyone +can read the meaning which suits his thoughts and +feelings. Mankind has never lacked moral teachers. +The Indian Shastras and the Chings, Confucius and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> +Meng Tse, the prophets of Israel and Ben Sirach, +Plato and the wise men of the Stoics, the Zend +Avesta, Jesus and Paul, the platonic ethics of Nicomachus, +those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, +thousands of years ago preached the principles which +exhaust the whole field of Morality, and beyond the +essentials of which none of the later moralists have +gone; neither the "Imitation of Christ" nor Ibn +Bachia, Spinoza, the Scotch school and Kant, up to +Wundt and Guyau.</p> + +<p>But what about the effect of the doctrines which +they advocated gently or passionately, adducing +proofs or uttering threats? To lend weight to them +they either appealed to God, threatening mankind +with His wrath and vengeance, or to Reason, +which, according to them, could advise man only for +his good. Perhaps they could intimidate those who +had blind faith and convince the reasonable. But +there are many of little faith, and more still who are +unreasonable, and on these the persuasion, warnings +and conclusions of the Moralists had no effect. For +these it was imperative to clothe the minimum of +Morality, the minimum without which no society can +exist, in the definite form of laws, and so create the +Law to which the weapons of the community lend +compelling force. Thus the whole material of Ethics +is divided into Morality and Law. The Theologians +and Scholiasts who trace all binding rules of human +conduct back to revelations of the Divine Will recognized +on principle only one single law: but the aspect +of practical life made even them distinguish between +the "<i>lex indicativa</i>" and the "<i>lex præceptiva</i>,"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> +between an indication or counsel and precept or +command. The "<i>lex indicativa</i>" is Morality, the +"<i>lex præceptiva</i>" is the Law.</p> + +<p>Codes are the normal expression of the Law. Not +all Law is formulated in this way, for there is a recognized +Law of custom, but all laws, codified or not, +become a part of the prevailing Law. Naturally, +and as is only reasonable, all Law is pre-existent in +the consciousness of the majority, and the law-giver's +rôle is limited to setting down in paragraphs universally +acknowledged principles dictated by public +opinion. However, there are an appreciable number +of historical instances in which this procedure is reversed; +the law-giver, without inquiring whether his +ideas were in accord with the general conscience, +arbitrarily clothed his dictates to the community in +paragraphs which it had to accept as Law. It is clear +that this procedure is extremely risky. Even if the +law-giver possesses superior wisdom, even if he is +far in advance of his people and his age, even if +his intentions are of the best, there is grave danger +that the moral feeling of the people will revolt against +the laws thus forced on them. Outwardly they yield +to the pressure of public authority, but they obey the +Law with a keen inner sense of opposition; a chasm +yawns between conscience and the practice of the +Law, ideas of Morality and Law become confused, +the moral foundation of all laws totters, and the +public gets into the habit of regarding the Law as +something alien and hostile, which cannot be disregarded +with impunity, but which it is not only not +culpable, but even meritorious to evade.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> + +<p>An enormous amount has been written on the subject +of what a law is, and all this literature expresses +in endless words very few and, almost without exception, +very mediocre thoughts. I should consider +it an unpardonable waste of time to devote any considerable +space to this rubbish, either in order merely +to quote opinions or to investigate and confute them. +Perhaps the best thing said of the laws is Hobbes's +description: Civil Law (the law of the country) is +nothing but a guarantee of natural Law. It is true +that this definition implies a supposition: the existence +of natural Law which, however, is not binding +in itself but requires the sanctions of the law of the +country. Moreover, it is only correct if we add the +limitation that it does not guarantee all natural Law, +but only a part of it. Hobbes is also forced by his +definition of the law of a country to explain what he +means by natural Law, and he does not evade this +duty. "Natural Law," he says, "is the decree of +true Reason (<i>ratiocinatio recta</i>) with regard to what +we must do and what avoid for our self-preservation.... +Transgression of natural Laws is due to false +Reason (<i>ratiocinatio falsa</i>)."</p> + +<p>In spite of its vagueness this explanation of +Hobbes's shows that what he really means by +natural Law is Morality, and in this respect his +views on the relation of natural Law to civil Law, +that is, of Morality to Law, practically coincide +with mine. Nevertheless, he ignobly denies the +moral decency of his doctrine of Law when later +on he coldly and dryly remarks: All that the state +commands is just, all that it forbids is unjust. Say<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span>ing +this he stupidly and obsequiously makes the +civil code the source of Law, whereas by his own definition +Law (he says "Natural Law") is the source of +the civil code. It is more pardonable for Pusendorf, +a formal jurist, to say: "Law is the decree (<i>decretum</i>) +with which a superior binds his subject (<i>sibi subjectum</i>)." +That interpretation of Law is possible if +it is considered from outside; it is a means of coercion +in the hands of the mighty to subjugate the dependant; +this point of view ignores the essential; but +Pusendorf has no concern with this, for he makes no +claim to be a philosopher, he keeps within the bounds +of juridical practice.</p> + +<p>The Bishop of Seville, Saint Isidor, the most respected +theologian of the time between the last +patristic writers and St. Thomas Aquinas, gives the +following definition of Law: "Law is an institution +(<i>constitutio</i>) made by the people, by which the nobles +(<i>majores natu</i>), together with the common folk, have +given a sanction to some ordinance." This says little +about the essence of Law, but it leads to the question +of the origin of laws. On this subject, too, whole +libraries full of books have been written since the +time of Plato and Aristotle; luckily, for the most +part, they now only serve as food for moths and +worms.</p> + +<p>From this tangle of hair-splitting and sophistry, +from this muddle of syllogisms, dogmatism and deep-sounding +phrases which mean nothing at all, one +thought emerges pretty clearly, to wit, that only the +highest authority in the State has the right to make +laws. On this point there is perfect unanimity; and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> +that is natural, for it is so obvious that it has no need +to be circumstantially investigated and proved in the +fifty thousand books that have been written on the +subject. It is perfectly clear that one cannot possibly +force all the members of a state to obey certain commands +and prohibitions which the Law contains, +unless one is stronger than each one of them, and +therefore the Law must necessarily emanate from the +highest power in the state. It is beside the point to +obscure this simplest and most transparent fact by +questions as to the right of the law-giver. He needs +no theoretical right since he has the might. To use +Kant's expression, positive Law is not a creation of +the mind (νουμενον), it is a phenomenon; its existence +is a matter of empiricism, not of reason; it is a +matter of fact and is under no obligation to justify +itself intellectually to the intellect. No law-giver has +ever troubled to tack on a preamble or an addition +to the law he promulgates proving that he has the +right to enact it.</p> + +<p>But in the literature dealing with this matter +opinions differ widely as to who embodies or possesses +the highest power in the state. According to some it is +the king, because he wields the sword and therefore +can enforce unconditional obedience; according to +others it is the Church, because the Law, to be binding, +must be moral, and Morality is established by +God since the Church is the representative of God on +earth. Others again regard the people as a whole as +the highest power, because without their assent no law +can prevail, and because even the king only has +the power of which the people divests itself to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> +transfer it to him. History has advanced beyond this +quarrel.</p> + +<p>To-day no one dares to dispute the fact that the +nation alone is qualified to enact laws for itself +through the agency of its chosen representatives, and +that no law can be binding for the people without their +explicit or tacit consent. In Switzerland, where they +have instituted the referendum, the people by their +vote can repudiate a law, made by their representatives +in their name, before it comes into force; and +in the other constitutional states they have recourse +to the following expedient: whenever a law is promulgated +which seems inacceptable to them, at the +next Parliamentary election they vote for men who +are pledged to do away with it. The people have the +power to make laws, therefore they also have the right +to do so, and they do not hesitate to revolt if this +right is tampered with. In recent times no nation outside +Russia has submitted to having laws forced on +it, in framing which it has not co-operated, and which +it has not expressly accepted. The United States tore +themselves away from the Mother Country with the +cry: "No taxation without representation!" and more +than a hundred years before that the English people +had irrefutably proved to the Stuart king, Charles I, +that he had no right to make and unmake laws, by +condemning him in a court of law with legal formalities +and then having his head cut off by a masked +executioner.</p> + +<p>The legal code is the concrete form of the Law, +and the Law is the crystallization of the most material +part of Morality. And as Morality binds every mem<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>ber +of the community, as man is only tolerated in the +community on condition that he respects Morality, it +is a matter of logic that he should also respect the +Law; that is to say, that he must not only submit to +it because he fears punishment if he fails to do so, +but that he must feel obedience to the Law to be part +of his Morality, that he must act lawfully at the +dictate of his own conscience, and not because of the +threat of the power of the state. This might be +enunciated as a principle without reservation and +without limitation, if in practice the laws always were, +as in theory they should be, moral. But this is not +necessarily the case. The law is a form, and every +form can be abused by filling it with unlawful contents. +If an unscrupulous adulterator of wine fills a +champagne bottle of the usual shape, complete with +metalled and wired cork and a label recommending +it, with some disgusting mixture and puts it on the +market, he is severely punished for adulteration of +food and infringement of the law protecting trade +marks. But if the government publish in the <i>Gazette</i> +foolish, risky, and perhaps absolutely immoral orders +in the form of a law, duly arranged in chapters, +articles and paragraphs, as the people are accustomed +to seeing their moral laws expressed, who impugns +them for it?</p> + +<p>The examples of this in history are only +too numerous. To this category belong all laws +seeking to maintain the validity of state authority at +the expense of the natural rights of thinking and feeling +men, e.g. all religious persecutions, the maltreatment +of socialists, excise laws and duties which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> +hamper freedom of work and movement, or are tantamount +to robbing a particular man or all citizens. As +a rule, laws of this kind can be imposed upon the +people only in a despotically ruled state, since the +people in this case has no share in legislation; but +constitutional government is no guarantee against it, +for parliamentary majorities can be forced to enact +tyrannical laws, by fanning the flame of national or +party fanaticism, by encouraging prejudices, or by intimidation; +this is proved by Bismarck's May laws +and Socialist laws, and also by the laws passed by the +National Assembly at Versailles against the rebels of +the Commune and against Paris. Obedience to such +laws cannot reasonably be demanded. Only a Hobbes +will dispute this, for whom "everything that the state +commands is just, everything that it prohibits is unjust," +or the Digest according to which "<i>quod principi +placuit, legis habet vigorem</i>" (what pleases the +ruler has the force of law). Legal enactments, though +they be immoral, are yet formal Law; as a matter of +fact, however, they are wrong, and even if their +originator has the power by brute force to secure +obedience to them, no man who tries to evade them +and to get them abolished will be accused of immorality.</p> + +<p>A trivial objection strikes one at once. Only a +despotic megalomaniac will forbid his subjects to +make representations in the proper quarters, and in +the proper way, for the purpose of getting a bad law +abrogated; but as long as it is in force it must be +obeyed. For if every citizen were allowed to make +a selection of the laws according to his choice, ac<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>quiescing +in some and rejecting others, this would +lead straight to anarchy. The reply to this is that +anarchy, although a terrible evil, is notwithstanding a +lesser one than an immoral law, that is, a law which +sins against Morality. For the maintenance of law +and order which the State guarantees is only preferable +to anarchy because it enables individuals to live +together in peace, and guarantees liberty of movement +and respect for persons, life and property. But if the +State acts wrongly, and interferes in the feelings and +convictions of individuals, if it uses brute force to +compel them to actions and abstentions against which +all the good in them rebels, then its law and order is +law and disorder, and it is the State itself which brings +about a condition of anarchy by making force the ruling +factor in the life of the individual. For the latter it +is all one whether he has to yield to the force of the +State or that of his neighbour. Nay, more, his position +is worse in a condition of anarchy caused by the +State, than in that which existed before the State was +formed, because it is easier to meet force with force, +when this emanates from an individual who is one's +equal, than when it is exercised by the superior organization +of the State. The State which enacts immoral +laws denies its own principle and causes its own +dissolution.</p> + +<p>The intellectual constructions of the eighteenth +century, of which the most famous is J. J. Rousseau's +"Social Contract," are not taken literally by anyone +nowadays. Nobody seriously believes that one day +individuals living in a state of nature banded themselves +together and made a contract, by virtue of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> +which they renounced certain liberties and rights and +transferred them to a superior authority which was to +rule them so as to promote the general welfare, peace +and happiness. But if the procedure was not quite +so simple as this, at least it is certain that the State +undertakes the task which Rousseau expressly prescribes +as its aim. If, however, through its fault, the +fault of its legislation, the welfare of the community +suffers, and peace and happiness are not promoted but +hindered, disturbed and destroyed, then every citizen +has the moral right to revolt against the State and +paralyse its pernicious might; not because it has broken +a formal contract with its citizens, but because it has +become inimical to the peaceful life of mankind, the +purpose of every social community. If anyone is +troubled at the thought that there is no reliable +standard whereby to test the morality of a law and no +place indicated where such a measure can be applied, +he may take comfort by remembering that all Morality +is surrendered to the feelings and judgment of the +majority and has no other sanction than this. History +teaches us that the majority does not acquit itself too +badly of its duty. Public opinion suffices to maintain +Morality at a certain level in a community. And if +public opinion is capable of ensuring respect for the +unwritten law of Morality without the sanctions of +State Law, it may surely be recognized as a fit judge +of the morality of a law. That is the theory of the +right of citizens to defend themselves by all means, +even by force, against immoral laws. Practically, it +is of no importance, because nowadays, at least in all +progressive and liberally governed States, the people<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> +have constitutional means at their disposal to prevent +or quickly to rid themselves of laws that are +obnoxious.</p> + +<p>Morality includes the Law, whereas Law is only +a part of Morality. Owing to its coercive nature, the +Law is obliged to be concrete and material and to +ignore all the imponderable, barely perceptible, +spiritual and dream-like things which hover round +Morality, surround it with an atmosphere and transport +it beyond definite boundaries into the realm of +the unconscious and visionary. The total exclusion +of the element of feeling which Morality includes, +constitutes the most profound difference between it +and the Law. Law protects order but knows no love. +The separation of Law from Morality is due to the +pressure of selfishness which thinks it has made the +greatest possible concession when it rises to the height +of saying with Ulpian: "<i>Neminem laedere. Suum +cuique reddere. Honeste vivere.</i>" Injure no one; +that is, refrain from the ruthless use of force; render +to each his own; that is, do not retain in rascally +fashion what belongs to another; live honourably; +that is, give no offence to your neighbour by disorderly +conduct and depravity.</p> + +<p>Well and good. At a pinch one can live like +that. But the words pity, kindness, love of one's +neighbour do not occur in Ulpian's pithy statements, +and the Law knows nothing of them.</p> + +<p>The Law guards each man's well-earned possessions, +but it bids no one make sacrifices. Morality +can demand these. It can insist that the individual +should freely, and urged by his own inner impulse,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> +impose sacrifices upon himself, reduce his possessions +in favour of another, disturb his personal comfort at +any moment, perhaps even risk his life; that is to +say, that of his own free will he should do just those +things from which the Law carefully shields him. +Where the Law says: injure no one! Morality says +often enough: injure yourself to do good to your +neighbour. Where the Law says: to each man his +own! Morality not seldom says: to each man your +own if he needs it more than you do. Morality counts +on the existence of a quality of which the Law has +no need: Sympathy. To be moral we must feel in +our own being at the time, or retrospectively, the +subjective experiences of our neighbour, with the same +quality of emotion that he feels; his pain must be our +pain, as his pleasure must be our pleasure. For the +man who cannot do this—who realizes in his mind the +circumstances of his neighbour only as an image, and +without the concomitant note of feeling—it is impossible +to rise to the height of Morality. It is not his +fault, for the gift of sympathy is an organic disposition, +which you either do or do not possess, which you +can develop or suppress, but which you cannot create +if it is lacking. Nevertheless, the lack of sympathy +is a pitiable infirmity, for it prevents a man from +scaling the heights of Morality.</p> + +<p>To respect the Law is to practise a wise selfishness. +To act morally is to divest oneself of selfishness and +attain the privilege of unselfishness. To behave in +strict accordance with the Law earns the merited +praise of civic blamelessness. But to act morally is +a virtue which is of incomparably higher quality than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> +that of mere blamelessness. The law-abiding man, +the honest man, is praised as having been "<i>Integer +vitae sceleris purus</i>." That is an acceptable epitaph. +But the man of active Morality, willingly suffering +for others, provides an example which reconciles +millions to the hardships of life. The former is a +worthy man, but the latter is a saint.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY</h3> + + +<p>Men, who would be deeply offended if their +Morality were called into question, quite +coolly investigate the problem as to whether +the State in its actions and omissions is bound by the +same moral laws as the individual, and the majority +of them come to the conclusion that in its relation +to other States, the State must not be guided, that is +to say, hampered, by moral considerations. They go +further than this and not only liberate the State in +its dealings with other countries from the trammels +of Morality, but claim for the government the privilege +of standing beyond and above the moral law in the +conduct of public affairs, because to their mind both +foreign and home politics move on a different plane +to that of ethics. If anyone objects to this shameless +contention, its advocates contemptuously dismiss him +with the disdainful remark: "That is the drivel of a +layman, and no man of science would waste his time +on it." And if you were to reply: "Your views are +those of gaolbirds who try after the event to hatch a +theory justifying their misdeeds," they would probably +shrug their shoulders and murmur scornfully: "The +man is obviously mad."</p> + +<p>Professorial wisdom has formulated pedantically +what practical politicians, the heads of states and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> +leading ministers have thought, said and done. +Napoleon remarked at St. Helena to Count de +Las Cases, who respectfully notes the fact in his +"<i>Mémorial de Sainte Hélène</i>": "The actions of a +ruler who labours for the community, must be distinguished +from those of a private individual who is free +to indulge his feelings; policy permits, nay, commands, +the one to do what in the case of the other +would often be inexcusable." Perhaps it was under +the influence of this remark, with which he, no doubt, +was familiar, that Professor Nisard one day in a +lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris propounded the +theory that there was a dual Morality, one public or +political, the other private, and that these two did not +follow the same rules. That was shortly after the +Coup d'Etat of Napoleon III, and it was easy to +descry, in the words of the celebrated professor of +literary history, obsequiousness towards the new Emperor +and the effort of a courtier to excuse the violence +which the Emperor had just done to the constitution +he had sworn to uphold. Nisard was one of the ornaments +of the university, a teacher of youth, who was +as popular as he was respected. But the sound ethical +feeling of his hearers revolted against the depravity +of the principles he had just enunciated, and the +violent expression of their indignation drove him in +shame and disgrace from his chair and out of the +lecture hall.</p> + +<p>Macchiavelli is the most famous advocate of the +Immorality of the State and the right of politics to be +unethical, and his name is identified with this infamous +theory. An enormous amount has been written about<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> +the Florentine statesman, his book of the "Prince" +and the doctrines he advances in it; among these works +those in which his theories are endorsed preponderate +to a horrifying extent over those which oppose and +refute them. Mohl and Paul Janet have furnished +us with the best abstracts of these very numerous +writings, and I refer the reader to them. Here I can +only dwell on the main points of the investigation.</p> + +<p>Macchiavelli writes: "A man who wishes to be +perfectly good is without doubt in danger among those +who are not good. It is therefore advisable that a +prince should learn not always to be good, so as to +be able to put these rules of life into practice, or not, +as circumstances may demand." "A prince cannot +maintain loyalty to a treaty if it become dangerous +to his interests." In short, the prince not only may, +but must, do what is in his own interests. He need +not stop to think whether his actions are honest. The +only measure of their worth and appropriateness is +the profit they promise. Their success always justifies +them, only their failure proves them to be bad.</p> + +<p>The most revolting thing in the arguments of the +"Prince" is the equanimity with which the author +adduces them. Never does he let slip a word of +excitement, never does an indication of feeling appear. +He treats his subject not as an investigation of principles +to which one adopts a mental attitude and which +one should approve or disapprove, but as a description +of existing facts which arouse one's emotions as +little as, for instance, the enumeration of the qualities +and characteristics of a mineral. It has been said in +his defence that his book is a concrete study, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> +presentation of the character of Cæsar Borgia, of his +psychology and of his principles of government; and +that Macchiavelli wished to give an objective account +of the philosophy of the events he had observed, but +did not wish to judge them subjectively; and this, if +for no other reason, because an expression of his own +opinion would have been too dangerous for him. It +is further urged that his personal views are revealed +in the treatise on Livy.</p> + +<p>This defence, however, is far from convincing. +In the "Prince" Macchiavelli maintains the same +unconcerned and cool note that prevails in his +account of the treacherous assassinations perpetrated +in Senigaglia by his hero Cæsar Borgia. +The only personal feeling, which peeps out occasionally +in both works, is a certain perverse, æsthetic +satisfaction, experienced by the artist with the eye +of a connoisseur who lingers over a work of nature, +perfect in its way, and delights in the harmony of +actions which, with absolute logic, almost with mathematical +precision, result from the definite premise supplied +by a certain character. Des Esseintes, the ideal +æsthete invented by Joris Karl Huysmans, may appraise +the worth of a monster solely by its beauty, +without a thought for its morality. But by such appraisement +he cuts himself off from the community +of men, though he, in his arrogance, being morally +insane, may abuse them as philistines.</p> + +<p>Since it first appeared, Macchiavellism has found +disciples and admirers in every age; and these, in +liberating politics from all fetters of Morality, go +further than its originator. The German jurist of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> +the century of the Reformation, Schoppe (1576-1649), +declares sententiously that politics differ from Morality +and have their own principles, just as Morality +has: he considers that the chief difference between +them is that the latter takes as its subject of study +that which should be; the former, that which is. For +this one phrase this pedant, who has otherwise rightly +deserved oblivion, has some claim to be remembered. +For here he consigns Morality to the realm of pure +thought, of theoretical and meditative idealism, while +for politics he claims the sphere of practical reality +and shows the first dim dawning of that practical +policy (<i>Realpolitik</i>) which, two hundred and fifty +years later, was to be as the light of the sun to statesmen.</p> + +<p>The Frenchman, Gabriel Naudé, almost a +contemporary of Schoppe's, constituted himself the +champion of Coups d'Etat, if they promised political +advantages; further, he justifies and praises the Night +of Saint Bartholomew, a very energetic measure taken +in his lifetime to put an end to the religious strife +which was weakening France and causing the government +much embarrassment; his only regret is that the +happy idea of slaughtering all the Huguenots was +not carried out more completely; in other words, +that the massacre of the obnoxious Protestants was +not continued until they had been completely wiped +out.</p> + +<p>Even in Descartes, who confessed to a somewhat +shady opportunism in questions of state and, for +instance, concedes reasonable and moral justification +to Absolutism, we find the depressing statement:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> +"Against the enemy one is, so to speak ('<i>quasi</i>'), +permitted to do anything," a conscious and determined +denial of the Christian commandment "Love thine +enemies," which perhaps demands too much of the +average man and can only be expected from saints, +but which, anyway, contains an exhortation for all the +world at least to be just to one's enemies and act +according to the dictates of Morality.</p> + +<p>D'Holbach does not beat about the bush, but +declares roundly: "In politics the only crime is +not to succeed." Even Macchiavelli did not express +it as baldly as that. To quote the Duke of +La Rochefoucauld, he at least pays virtue the compliment +of hypocrisy, for he gives this advice: "Do +(the evil which is profitable) and excuse it afterwards." +This is a paraphrase of the old advice +given by a pettifogging lawyer for the benefit of the +criminal: "If you have done it, deny it," and of the +well-known phrase of Frederick the Great which runs +something like this: "If I have a desire for a foreign +country, I begin by seizing it, then I send for lawyers +who prove that I had a right to it." This, then, was +the opinion of that king who wrote an "Anti-Macchiavelli," +of whom, however, Paul Janet neatly +remarks: "Nothing is more typical of Macchiavellism +than as heir presumptive to the throne to refute Macchiavelli's +principles, and then as ruling monarch to +apply them with the more determination."</p> + +<p>For the sake of the incorruptible Morality which +Kant defends in his little work "<i>Vom ewigen +Frieden</i>" ("Of Eternal Peace"), he may be forgiven +for his weakly worldly wisdom in following up the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> +"Critique of Pure Reason" with the "Critique of +Practical Reason." In "<i>Vom ewigen Frieden</i>" he +bravely demands harmony between Politics and +Morality. More sweepingly than the English proverb, +"Honesty is the best policy," he demonstrates that +honesty is better than policy. It is an old tradition +of all governments, and especially of diplomacy, to +affect secrecy, since their inavowable intrigues shun +the light of day and the eye of outsiders. To-day +the democracy in all constitutional states demands +that foreign policy should be given full publicity. +Kant expressed his opinion shortly and sharply a +hundred and fifty years ago: "All political actions +which cannot be made public are unjust." In the +eighteenth century, in which he lived and which +began with the war of the Spanish Succession, went on +to the wars of Frederick the Great, and ended with the +war of the Coalition against the French Revolution, +he does not dare to make a definite claim that force +should be expelled from inter-state relations and +Law put in its place, but he does say, if somewhat +timidly, that one may "dream of" an ideal in which +the quarrels of nations are adjusted, like those of +private persons, by laws which have been framed and +approved by all. Kant is a comforting exception +amid the many teachers of constitutional law who are +almost unanimously Macchiavellian in their attitude, +and who regard his point of view with contemptuous +and condescending leniency because he was an unworldly +philosopher, a theorist in politics.</p> + +<p>The English and Scottish moral philosophers, +from Locke to J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> +all untainted by Macchiavellism and recognize only +one Morality for the state as for the individual, for +political as for private action. But it must be admitted +that their doctrines have not yet been generally +assimilated by the consciousness of their own people. +Now, as ever, it is a fundamental principle of +English law that "the king can do no wrong." That +means that the king, the embodiment and epitome of +the state, as the source of Law is Law itself, and is +superior to all the laws of the country, which is a still +more drastic paraphrase of the doctrine of the Digest: +"<i>quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem</i>"; every +whim of the potentate has the force of law, and the +English have coined the horrible phrase, "My +country, right or wrong," a dictum which allows +ruthless deceivers of the people and destroyers of +their country to hide their most appalling misdeeds +beneath the mask of patriotism and to disguise +deeds worthy of a criminal in the habiliments of +virtue.</p> + +<p>Real patriotism demands that a true citizen and an +honourable man should with might and main, even at +the price of his life, oppose any injustice about to be +committed by his government and his misguided compatriots; +and, further, that he should strive to maintain +his country in the path of Right and Morality +even if, as sometimes happens, in a dispute between +his nation and a foreign one the latter has Right and +Morality on its side. On the plea of inevitable partiality +a judge may refuse to try a case in which a +near relative of his is involved. That is a permissible +concession to that human imperfection which causes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> +reason to fall silent when feeling raises its voice; +and justice does not suffer, for there are other judges +who can take the seat that has been voluntarily +vacated. No citizen has the right to evade the duty +of judging his country, because, if he fails, there is +no other judge who can be put in his place and fulfil +his duty. Every citizen is personally responsible for +the just and moral behaviour of his community, responsible +to his own conscience, to his nation, to the +world, to the present and to the future; and if he is +powerless to prevent depravity and misdeeds, he must +at least solemnly and loudly condemn them, as this +is his only means of avoiding joint responsibility for +the infamy. If he fails to do this, the public crime +becomes his personal crime as well. The elder +Brutus, so much and so justly admired by the Romans, +is an example to all, for without mercy he handed his +own flesh and blood over to the executioner, when +according to the law his life was forfeit. The state has +no greater claim to indulgence and mercy than had +Brutus's son, if knowingly and intentionally it indulges +in vice. For if you allow the dictum, "Right +or wrong, my country," to be valid, then you must +also apply it to the state of filibusterers that once +existed in the Antilles, and must demand of its citizens +that their patriotism should approve and defend +theft, piracy, rape and assassination, for the systematic +perpetration of which their state was founded.</p> + +<p>In contrast with this wretched "My country, right +or wrong," the inflexible dictum of the ancients stands +out: "<i>Fiat justitia, pereat mundus!</i>" (Let justice +be done though the world perish!). And what does<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> +most honour to the French Revolution is the phrase +so often mocked by political profiteers: "Sooner shall +the colonies perish than a principle!" That was the +standpoint of the prophets of Israel, who truly did +not love their people less than do the wretched scoundrels +who shout "hurray!" and yell songs, when their +country deals Morality and Right a brutal blow, because +the leaders think that this will profit the country, +or themselves.</p> + +<p>Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as heads of +the state, acted in accordance with Macchiavelli's +views. At their time this was expressed by saying +that they were guided by the necessities of the state. +In the second half of the nineteenth century Macchiavellism +received the name of practical policy (<i>Realpolitik</i>). +The despisers of Morality, who call the misdeeds +of the state <i>Realpolitik</i>, apparently do not know +that this one word implies a very comprehensive +admission. To their idea <i>Realpolitik</i> is a policy which +reckons only with realities, not with desires, yearnings +or hope, or as Schoppe brutally expresses it: with +that which is, not with that which ought to be. It +is active in the domain of facts, not in that of +principles.</p> + +<p>But, according to the advocates of <i>Realpolitik</i>, +facts and realities mean nothing but the sole rule +of interest, selfishness, ruthlessness, force, cunning +and contempt for all foreign rights; whereas fairness, +justice, the curbing and suppression of one's +own desires, consideration for one's neighbour, +love of mankind—all these are phrases, or let +us rather say ideals, which are to be found, not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> +in the world, but in the brains of a small minority +of enthusiasts without influence. He who confesses +to such views, to whom the worst impulses alone are +real, while he relegates Morality to the sphere of the +unreal, of visions far from reality, is a pessimist as +long as his convictions remain theory; but if he puts +them into practice, or urges the leaders of the state +to do so, then he is an evildoer who breaks the moral +law as soon as it appears unaccompanied by the +police, the prison and the gallows. In private life a +man with such views is a criminal who obeys his evil +instincts whenever he may hope to evade the law of +the state. The bandit, who is clever enough to +manage so that police and court of justice cannot +touch him, is a practical politician, for the riches he +acquires by theft, robbery and murder are realities; +the criminal code is but a scrap of paper, something +visionary, as long as its minions do not seize him +by the collar.</p> + +<p>The immorality of politics, the way in which the +foundations of Morality are ignored by the state, is +the natural consequence of the power of rulers; for +in them all the original instincts of the human beast +still untamed by moral law are exaggerated by the +intense realization of their loftiness, the glory and the +illustriousness of their position, and they are not +forced by wholesome fear of the means of coercion +wielded by the moral administration to control themselves, +to exercise and develop their organic powers +of inhibition. The elevation of this fact of the Immorality +of the state to a theory that the state is not +bound by moral law, is derived from the conception<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> +which philosophers of all ages, from ancient times to +the present day, have formed of the character and +the purpose of the state. Plato, in the Republic, +maintains the omnipotence of the state, which nothing +and no one can limit; and Aristotle, not rising to such +heights of error as his master, says more soberly: "It +is a grave mistake to believe that every citizen is his +own master." The Italian philosopher Filangieri +considers the guiding principle and motive power of +the state to be "love of power," which a fool three +centuries later called the "will to power," whereupon +other fools declared this to be a brand-new +discovery.</p> + +<p>Hegel goes farthest of all in his idolatry of the +state; according to him the state is not alone moral, +but Morality itself, just as God is according to the +theologians. As it would be arrogant blasphemy to +characterize anything that God ordains as immoral, as +it would be nonsensical to wish to impose upon God +a moral law from outside, not emanating from Him, +to which He would have to submit even against His +will, so it is reprehensible to judge the actions of the +state by the standard of individual Morality; and it +is equally absurd to admit any moral coercion imposed +on the state from outside, any guiding principle other +than the law of its necessities and the logic which +indicates the means needed to attain the necessary +end.</p> + +<p>According to Treitschke the state is the highest +form of human existence; nothing higher than the +state exists. He has never asked himself the question +whether, after all, humanity itself is not superior to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> +the state which is the form, a form, of its existence +and therefore not its essence.</p> + +<p>From his conviction that the state is the highest +thing existing, Treitschke concludes that certain +moral duties, e.g. that of self-sacrifice, cannot possibly +exist for the state. "The individual is to sacrifice +himself for the sake of a higher community of which +he is a member; but the state is itself the highest +thing in the outer community of mankind, therefore +it can never be confronted with the duty of self-destruction."</p> + +<p>How obvious that seems! How grossly mistaken +it is all the same! First of all the state is not +the highest thing; there is something higher, and that +is humanity; if then we recognize a moral duty of +self-sacrifice for humanity, theoretically this duty may +arise just as much for the state as for the individual.</p> + +<p>Secondly, the idea that owing to Morality the state +might one day actually be in such a position as to be +forced to sacrifice itself is the most shocking nonsense. +How could that possibly be? If the state always acts +with strict Morality towards its citizens and foreign +states, it is simply impossible that it should have to +sacrifice its existence in the fulfilment of some task; +for tasks only arise when, and as long as, the state +exists. Once it is disintegrated there can be no task, +either theoretically or practically, for it to accomplish, +therefore it cannot have to sacrifice itself for such a +task. But if the Immorality of another state, or of a +minority of its citizens, should endanger it, threaten +it with an unjust attack from within or without, then +there is no rule of Morality that can forbid it to defend<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> +itself to the last, and its self-sacrifice could then only +be a result of its complete annihilation in a justifiable +war of necessity. On the other hand, even the most +unscrupulous practical politicians do not possess any +absolute guarantee against defeat, though they declare +a war of aggression to be permissible, whether waged +on account of an itching for power, for purposes of +conquest, for the winning of prestige, predominance +or economic advantages.</p> + +<p>Thirdly and lastly, the duty of self-sacrifice for +the state can only be envisaged and seriously discussed, +if the state be conceived as a person to whom +the duty of Morality applies in every way; but this +conception is mystic anthropomorphism, not sober, +sensible recognition of realities such as the practical +politicians love to boast of.</p> + +<p>For, as a matter of fact, the state is not a person +but a concept, an institution created by man in the +interests of one individual, of a few, of many or of +all; an organization of habits and interests, a relation +in which individuals live together. The mysticism of +the weak-minded has transformed it into a person +with human features, with the qualities, desires, duties, +and aims of an individual; these men are intellectually +incapable of penetrating to the fundamental facts +underlying the concept, and cling entirely to word-pictures +which are mere verbalism. Scholasticism in +the eleventh and twelfth centuries was chiefly occupied +in a quarrel about Nominalism and Realism. It +was allowed to drop and was not fought out to a +decision. Perhaps because it is impossible to convince +these superficial babblers who take a name or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> +a word for an object actually existent in time and +space, that they are in error. The fight between +Abelard and Roscelet and that between the two of +them and Duns Scotus ought to be taken up again. +Above all, one ought to knock it into the heads of +those who make a fetish of the state that it is a mere +word, the famous "<i>flatus vocis</i>" of the Nominalists, +which they worship, to which they build altars and +make human sacrifices.</p> + +<p>This humiliating form of idolatry is practised by +the school of sociologists known as organicistic, as +well as by the practical politicians. This school maintains +that the individual has no independent existence +at all, that he continues to exist only in the community, +by the community, as a totally subordinate, +dependent and incomplete fraction of the community; +that the only real thing in the species is society, the +state; that this must be regarded as a living organism, +in which the individual human being is merely a cell +which in solitude, outside the community and detached +from it, is as little capable of life and has as little +significance as a cell separated from a highly differentiated +creature, such as a man or some other mammal. +In my book "<i>Der Sinn der Geschichte</i>" (The +Meaning of History), I threw as much light as I possibly +could on this superstition, and I pointed out in +detail its lack of sense as well as its dangers. I can, +therefore, content myself here with a résumé and a +few indications.</p> + +<p>There is nothing mysterious or supernatural about +the historic or even the prehistoric origin of the state; +part we can learn from reliable documentary evidence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> +part we can gather with certainty from obvious facts. +From the primitive human family, which more probably +consisted of a pair than of a man and several +women, there arose the formless horde, a crowd of +individuals of all ages, connected by blood; this developed +into a tribe in which age, strength, courage +and intelligence were appreciated in a certain order, +and thereby were produced the beginnings of discipline, +co-operation and regularized mutual relations; +that is to say, of organization. This embryo of later +formations, this sketchy beginning of an economic and +political community, evolved more definite and differentiated +forms when the wandering huntsmen and +shepherds, seeking prolific hunting grounds and pasture +lands, and later on arable land too, came upon +other groups of men and fought with them for the +possession of the desired domain. In the conflict +strong and brave men came to the front, and the victor +became the natural, and for the most part willingly +recognized, leader and master of his companions, +while any who opposed him were reduced by force +to submit to his authority. The state crystallized +around this war-hero, and by all its members its aim +was clearly and obviously recognized to be defence +and the increase of property outside the state; that is, +the warding off of attacks by foreign robbers and acquisitive +invasions of neighbouring domains—wars of defence +and conquest, but always war; and within the +state the maintenance of a certain measure of safety +for individuals. This safety, however, had to be purchased +dearly by the limitation, often enough the +complete surrender, of the right of self-determination,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> +of independence of will and freedom; so dearly, in +fact, that the price was far higher than the value of +the advantages acquired.</p> + +<p>The leader in warfare became the ruler and bequeathed +his privileges to his descendants. The state +was he himself, the land his property, the people his +family in the old sense of the word—that is, his +kindred, his servants, his slaves. His comrades in +arms who had most distinguished themselves became +an aristocracy of the sword, the supporters and tools +of his power, though often enough they became +his rebellious rivals and overthrew him. Defeated +enemies were robbed of all their possessions and +slaughtered; later on they were degraded to serfs, a +position little better than that of beasts of burden. +A regular parasitism developed, by means of which +the ruler and his companions in arms exploited the +subjugated and productive masses for their own profit.</p> + +<p>The acute form of this parasitism was warfare in its +chronic form, its prolongation in times of peace, the +extortion of contributions and duties, the imposition of +taxes and forced labour from the people. The ruler was +clever enough to provide himself with a moral right +to his exercise of brute force, by inventing a divine +origin for his person and power, and making worship +of his person an essential tenet of the national religion. +The systematic suppression of the masses without +rights became the universal practice of the ruler +and of the instruments of his power, and this gradually +spread to the higher classes who could still play +the master to the lower strata, but were of no more +account than the vulgar herd in the eyes of the ruler,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> +having to bow their proud heads beneath the same +yoke. A very few races followed a different course +of development from the primitive horde to an organized +state. They remained free members of the community +with equal rights, they allowed no hereditary +ruler from among themselves to become their superior, +and governed themselves as republicans, who nevertheless +also waged war without exception, either +forced thereto by the attacks of greedy neighbours or +lured into doing so by the example of the monarchies +within their purview or by lust for booty. In warfare +they won slaves and subjects, and changed into +oligarchies, most often into despotic states, and +before they ultimately declined to the parasitism of +a single man and his aids fell victims to a collective +parasitism which gave the conquered and subjugated +population up to the spoliation of the victors.</p> + +<p>Up till modern times the state preserved the +character of a private domain belonging to the ruler +and his house. Wars were waged in the interests of +dynasties, and as late as the eighteenth century the +succession in Spain and in certain provinces of +Austria was the origin and purpose of various campaigns. +The French Revolution first wrought a +change in this. Since this great event it has been +impossible to plunge any European state into war +in order to support the claims to property, more or +less legally justified, made by its ruling house. The +people have taken the place of princes, and now +the principle of nationalities furnishes the reason or +excuse for bloody conflicts between states; and this +has become a factor in modern politics and history<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> +merely because dynasties had built up their realms +regardless of the origin and language of the inhabitants +of the districts which they had conquered, +stolen, bought, or acquired by exchange, by marriage +or by inheritance, and were indifferent to the national +unity of their subjects as long as they could gain +possession of the country and the people.</p> + +<p>From the time of its first vague beginnings up +till the rise of modern democracy, the state has been +nothing but a means of parasitism in the hands of +the ruling person or group, and an instrument for the +preparation for, and the waging of, war. All the +state's tasks, which apparently lie outside the sphere +of war, if they are carefully examined, will be found, +after all, to aim at efficiency in war, and it has gradually +selected these tasks from the simple consideration +that their execution increases the guarantees of +success in warfare and in government.</p> + +<p>The deification of the ruler in Asiatic and Egyptian +lands, the unconditional identification of the +realm with his person, the uniform enslavement of +the whole people, its naïve exploitation for the sole +benefit of the sovereign and his assistants are no +longer possible in Europe at the present day. The +development of the nations to a higher plane of +civilization and a clearer consciousness of their own +worth forced the state to alter its constitution to a +certain extent and to devote itself, at least theoretically, +more to the interests of its citizens than the +service of its prince. The intellectual constructions +of the eighteenth century correspond to no historical +reality. The Social Contract, the inception of which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> +J. J. Rousseau described so graphically, was never +made. Hutcheson, who had expressed the idea long +before the enthusiast of Geneva, conceived it only +as the epitome of the principles which the state should +embody; according to Hume, the relations of the +citizens to each other and to the state are a tacit +contract which need not be explicitly formulated, because +it originates in human nature; and Fichte even +assures us that Rousseau himself did not mean his +Social Contract to be taken literally. According to +him it was only an idea. But societies must act in +pursuance of this idea, and they were founded, if +not actually, yet legally upon an unwritten contract. +Anyway, the ideas of Hutcheson, Hume and Rousseau +have nowadays been assimilated by the general +consciousness. The masses believe in the natural, +inborn rights of man, some of which he certainly has +surrendered in favour of the community; they demand +and expect of the state that it should serve their just +interests, and they are no longer ready to be made +use of by the ruler and a powerful, often very small, +minority, for purposes which are foreign to them, +which they do not know, and for which they do not +care.</p> + +<p>Those who juggle with words, who talk dark and +mysterious nonsense about the concept of the state, +or dogmatize fanatically on the subject, contemptuously +call this conception of the nature of the state +and the relation of its citizens to it shallow rationalism, +and from the heights of their supposed knowledge +they look down disdainfully upon arguments +which they libellously call the laymen's babble. They<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> +are only in part bumptious fools who pretend that +uncritical, parrotlike repetition of traditional formulæ +is erudition and confused thought is profundity, and +who declare the clear-headed men who mock their +silly mysticism, their superstitious dread of word +phantoms, to be simply incapable of understanding +their depth. Partly they are very sly toadies, very +cunning sycophants of power, or ruthless egoists, unscrupulous +freebooters, who pretend to be enthusiastic +and devout apostles of the divinity of the state and +demand the most humble submission, adoration and +unconditional devotion in order that, as priests in its +temple, they may grind their own axes at its altars.</p> + +<p>Such are those folk who maintain the double +thesis that the state is everything, the individual +nothing, the former the sole reality, the latter +without any separate existence, and that the state, +as mankind's highest form of existence, need recognize +nothing as superior to itself, neither right nor +law, and may therefore take as sole guide for its +actions its own interests and not Morality.</p> + +<p>You cannot maintain a single one of these contentions +unless you and all men are deprived of +reasoning power; they crumble away instantly in the +light of Reason. It is not true that the state alone is +real and that it is superior to the individual, not only +because of the forces at its disposal, the complex of +which it represents, but also as an entity, as a thought, +a principle. The individual alone in the species, +that is, living, feeling, thinking and acting man, is +real. The individual created the state out of himself. +He can also destroy it. The practical poli<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>ticians +above all people should be of this opinion; +as he can do it, he may do it; as he has the power +to do it, he has the right to do it. The individualist +will not make this a question of law, but +will simply assert that, though the individual is the +father of the state, yet he has no reasonable grounds +for destroying it, so long as it makes no murderous +attacks on its creator. The individual did not create +the state consciously, intentionally and formally by +means of a social contract, but naturally and organically, +under pressure of circumstances. It is clearly +to his interests to maintain it, to furnish the necessary +means for its existence and efficiency, but always +on the one condition that the state should really protect +and promote the interests of the individual, +lighten his burdens in the struggle for existence, and +make that prosperity, comfort and happiness possible +which he cannot secure unaided in his struggle with +the hostile forces of Nature and with rival fellow-men.</p> + +<p>But if the state oppresses the individual with +burdens and duties which he feels no inner necessity +to fulfil, if it confiscates him, body and soul, instead +of respecting his freedom and his right to self-determination, +then the assumption falls to the +ground; the state is no longer an institution which +benefits the individual; it is inimical to the individual, +hinders him in his struggle for existence, destroys +his happiness; and he obeys his primitive instinct for +self-preservation if he turns against it, masters it as +he would a monster, draws its teeth and claws, and +forces it back to the place it was meant to occupy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> +that of a docile and industrious servant of the individual, +not of one individual who aspires to rule +the others, but of all individuals who are of the +people that make up the state.</p> + +<p>I consider it unnecessary and a little ridiculous +to quote authorities in support of the statement that +twice two are four; what is reasonable and clear is +convincing without further recommendation; nevertheless, +it is a fact that may be worthy of mention +that some of the best intellects of all nations have +sided with the individual against the state. On the +one side we have Plato, whose ideal is Sparta and +who would like to see the despotism of this model +state and its communal meals completed by the addition +of community of property, of wives, and of children; +we have Hegel, who has gone farther than any +one in his idolatry of the state; we have Auguste +Comte, who, in his zeal for his newly founded science +of Sociology, conceives society as an organism biologically +superior to the individual, and thereby has +become the father of the Organicists. But against +these we can put the Englishman, Jeremy Bentham, +the embodiment of sound common sense, whom the +muddle-headed fools that pose as deep thinkers have +good reason to hate and fear, and whom they try to +depreciate as vulgar and shallow; further, his compatriot, +Herbert Spencer, who is his kindred spirit; +the Frenchman, Frédéric Bastiat, whose writings +sparkle with flashes of wit; the German, Wilhelm +Humboldt, who bravely and successfully combated +the state tyranny defended by Fichte. All these are +convinced individualists who adduce irrefutable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> +reasons for their views. We may also include Kant +among them, as he gave utterance to this decisive +sentence: "Man is his own aim and end, and must +never be a mere means"; consequently it is never +permissible to sacrifice the sovereignty of one's own +person to that of the state, or make use of it for the +realization of political aims by disregarding, and +doing violence to, one's right of self-determination. +Harald Höfding contends that progress should be +measured by the extent to which, in Kant's sense of +the words, man is recognized to be his own aim and +end; but that is not only a measure of progress, it +is the measure of all civilization.</p> + +<p>For civilization, to my idea, means a state worthy +of man, implying his mental, moral and material independence +of all motive forces other than those of his +own nature; its aim is the most complete attainment +possible of this independence; its measure the extent +to which the individual determines his own fate and is +able to ward off from it undesired outside influences. +At the first awakening of his consciousness primitive +man was aware of being exposed to unknown forces +which controlled him at will and against which his +will was powerless. From the very beginning, at first +dimly and then more and more clearly, man has felt +this to be unworthy and intolerable. The best of the +species have always laboured with all their strength +to liberate themselves, and the great ambition of man +throughout his development has always been not +submissively to accept whatever fate was accorded +him, but to work out his destiny according to his needs +and his own ideas.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span></p> + +<p>The anguish caused by wretched dependence upon +external forces is the origin of religion as of superstition, +which both spring from the same root. With +the anthropomorphism peculiar to the earliest stages +of thought, man personified the mysterious powers +which ruled his fate. He created gods for himself, and +then, as far as his knowledge permitted, he sought +some relation between himself and them, and tried to +get at them by every means available. He imagined +them like unto himself, that is, vain, capricious, greedy, +easily frightened by dark threats, and then, very +reasonably on this hypothesis, he importuned them +with prayers, sacrifices, hymns of praise and vows, as +well as magic formulæ and incantations, always with +the inflexible intention of making them serve his +purposes, not of serving theirs. The contrite Jewish +prayer: "Thy will be done, Lord, Thy will, not +mine," is a new trait in the religious thought of man. +The heathen always strives to have his will done in +opposition to that of the gods, and to divert them from +their decisions if he dislikes them.</p> + +<p>In a state of advanced development theological +thought gave way before the scientific. Man learnt +to conceive Nature's rule, not transcendentally, but +intrinsically. He recognized that the forces around +him, which so often crossed his purpose, are not to +be influenced by prayer and sacrifice, but that it is +expedient and possible to discover their character and +the conditions of their activity. By dint of long-sustained +efforts he has succeeded in effectively standing +up to hostile Nature and in warding off her undesired +interference in his destiny. If the tribulations, which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> +formerly suddenly brought his schemes to nought and +often destroyed him, are not entirely overcome, it is +merely because his practice does not conform closely +enough to the directions evolved by his theoretical +knowledge, because he is too careless or too clumsy +to make proper use of the weapons against the elements +with which science has armed him.</p> + +<p>But this same man, who has learnt to be a match +for Nature, his creator, is powerless against his +creature, the state. He can neither evade it nor +escape from it. The state disposes of him without +his consent, against his most obvious interests, in +spite of his powerless opposition; it hurls him hither +and thither, annihilates him, crushes him by its will +and is unmoved by the will of the individual.</p> + +<p>True, man has sought to maintain his right of self-determination +against the forces of politics, as against +all others that broke his will and intervened in his +life without his consent. For thousands of years all +state development has tried to protect the modest individual, +lost in the crowd and featureless, but nevertheless +a person, that is, a world to himself, against +the arbitrariness of rulers or leading statesmen. That +is the one unchanging tendency which leads from +Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the slayers of a tyrant, +the rebellion of the elder Brutus, the murder of Cæsar, +by way of the Revolt of the Netherlands and the +execution of Charles I of England, to the great Revolution, +the risings of 1848 and the struggle for constitutional +government in all states of the Old World +and the New. The formula has long been discovered +whereby the individual can maintain the dignity of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> +his sovereign personality and his own responsibility +for the shaping of his destiny. It is civil freedom, +constitutionalism, sovereignty of the people. There +are arrangements, carefully thought out, nicely +weighed, cleverly worked out to the smallest detail, +by which the individual is fitted into his place in the +community without being deprived of the management +of his own affairs, by which the sacrifices needful for +the fulfilment of collective tasks are exacted without +his being reduced to a condition of slavery, by which +the independence of the individual is safeguarded and +yet a state of chaos and anarchy is avoided.</p> + +<p>But this formula fares as do the doctrines of +science: hitherto it has remained a theory everywhere. +The franchise, representation of the people, responsibility +of ministers, constitutional limitation of the +ruler's power, are infallibly effective weapons or instruments, +but no people has yet learnt how to handle +them rightly. That is why pessimists speak of the bankruptcy +of civilization, that is why the aim of civilization, +the liberation of the person and the enforcement +of its sovereignty, has nowhere been attained, that is +why, to quote Napoleon I in his interview with Goethe +at Erfurt, "In our times the power of fate is politics." +And yet all these institutions of a modern constitutional +state, from the ballot-paper and the voting of +taxes in Parliament to the enforced resignation of the +ministry on a vote of censure and the oath of the +ruler to observe the constitution, recognize the rights +of the individual as opposed to the state, and at least +theoretically give the lie to the bold declaration that +the state is everything and the individual nothing.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> + +<p>It is no less untrue to say that the state is superior +to Morality and is not bound by it. In order to prove +this we need only be brave enough not to be intimidated +by the mysterious mien and gestures and the +dark, pompous phrases of the mystics who worship +the state, and to penetrate to the real, conceptual idea +of the word.</p> + +<p>The hocus pocus that the worshippers of the +state perform around their idol puts one in mind of +Kempelen, who created a sensation with his automaton +in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This +figure, got up as a Turkish woman, gave rise to astonishment +and, among not a few, to superstitious fear. +It played chess, and so well, too, that it almost always +succeeded in winning, even against its most skilled +opponents. People cudgelled their brains to solve the +riddle, all sorts of explanations were suggested, one +more impossible than the other, but still the mystery +remained dark, until the owner, having made enough +money and sick of the part of an itinerant swindler, +revealed the trick. In the hollow figure there sat a +clever chess player who worked its hands and with +them carried out the moves on the board.</p> + +<p>This anecdote can be applied literally to the state. +Simpletons, drunk with phrases, and cunning cheats +contend that the state is a supernatural creation in +which the "spirit of the universe," the "spirit of +history" takes shape, and through which it realizes +its aims; these aims, utterly transcending the understanding +of the individual, are unintelligible to man. +Such overwhelming phrases strike the simple, credulous +hearer dumb and send cold shudders of awe up<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> +his spine. But let us look at the inside of this magic +machine whose works are driven by the "spirit of the +world" and with whose help this spirit fulfils its impenetrable +designs. What do we find? Men, quite +ordinary mortals, who sit in the machine and work its +levers; men whose intellectual powers are only in rare +cases superior to those of their enslaved subjects +bereft of will; men who are, as a rule, of average +intelligence and not seldom even below the average.</p> + +<p>These men are the rulers, ministers who cling to +office, high officials, party leaders and professional +politicians who would like to become ministers, +generals who seek to make themselves conspicuous, +publicists who hope to derive personal profit by dint +of bowing and scraping before the men in power, by +flattering the stupidest and most despicable prejudices +of the masses, or even by implanting such prejudices +with persuasive talk and purposely leading them +astray. These men are formed on the same model +as all individuals of the species and are therefore full +of human weaknesses, a prey to all human desires, +moved by all human impulses. They are selfish, vain, +the sport of likes and dislikes, of self-deception as +to the value of their ideas, opinions and judgments, +disputatious, arrogant, greedy of possessions, power +and pleasure, spurred by the instinct to magnify and +swell their personality and impose it upon others. +And these men are to be liberated from the discipline +of the moral law? They are to be superior to the +moral law?</p> + +<p>For whom, then, was the moral law created and +developed if not for these men—whose actions,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> +although they spring from the same motives and +aspire to the same satisfaction of self as those of +all other men, can be fraught with consequences incomparably +more evil, because they make use of the +state machine for their purposes. Through the force +and momentum given by the machinery of the +state these actions are boundlessly augmented, +their range being indefinitely increased and their +results multiplied a thousandfold. The simplest +logic shows that these men within the state machine, +rendered so specially dangerous by their terrible +armament and weapons, far from being liberated from +the coercion of moral law, ought to be subjected to +it with extraordinary severity, a severity which should +be greater than that which suffices for the average +man, in proportion as their power to do harm is +greater than that of the man in the street.</p> + +<p>Now all this time, rather carelessly, or at any rate +weakly, I am making a concession to the pious +devotees of the religion of the state, by speaking of +the state machine,—a dubious expression, coined +to deceive by rousing superstitious ideas. The +phrase is a picture, a rhetorical figure that one must +be careful not to take literally. There is no state +machine. There is only a relation of men to one +another and to traditional habits, organized rules +of command, obedience and equable conduct—habits +into which the community of men has fallen in accordance +with the law of least resistance, in order to +promote their own interests, at least theoretically, +without being forced to exert themselves continually +to form new judgments, decisions and arrangements<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> +which the ever-shifting, ever-changing conditions of +life render necessary.</p> + +<p>Here again, behind the word, we find men, +always only men. Just as those who command, +from whose will all state action emanates, are men, +so also the instruments by which they carry out +their decisions are only metaphorically speaking, +levers and wheels, parts of a machine of steel and +iron; in reality they are officials, soldiers and policemen, +they are judges and bailiffs; in short, they are +men. And these men, who in all private relations +with their fellow men are sternly required to submit to +the dictates of Morality and the demands of the Law, +are the same on whom other men, the leaders of the +state, impose the duty of breaking all these precepts +and laws; as ambassadors they must deny and dishonour +the signatures to treaties; as leaders or paid +servants of the press bureau they must systematically +spread lies; as attorneys of the state they must persecute +and maltreat those who tell the truth; as policemen +they must tear the fathers of families from wife +and children and hunt them into the barracks; as +soldiers they must invade a foreign land, murder unknown +and innocent men, rob them of their property, +burn down their houses, lay waste their lands, in a +word, do everything that is punishable with prison +and gallows; they must perpetrate all crimes which +the aim and end of Morality and Law are to prevent +and condemn. If one defends such action, where +can one find the courage and the justification to +require these men at one time to honour the Ten +Commandments and at another to disregard them, to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> +be criminals in the name of the state in the morning +and to be moral private persons and law-abiding +citizens in the afternoon? After all, they only have +one nature, one mind, one character and one set of +perceptive faculties.</p> + +<p>To realize the monstrosity of this doctrine of twofold +Morality, public and private, and of the non-compulsoriness +of moral law for the state, it suffices to +refer again to the fundamental concepts of Morality. +Individuals have banded themselves together in a +community in order to be able to live more easily, or +to live at all, under the present conditions obtaining +on our planet. Lest society should be disintegrated +by the quarrels of its members, and the latter should +find themselves exposed single-handed to a hopeless +struggle for existence, a limitation of their unfettered +whims and desires, the curbing of their selfishness, +control of their impulses and the exercise of consideration +for their neighbours have been imposed +upon them.</p> + +<p>This coercion is Morality, and society can enforce +it by vigorous measures; but for the most part +this is unnecessary, for society has inculcated in its +members the faculty of urging upon themselves +in every situation the dictates of the community +and of insisting on obedience to them. This +faculty is conscience. The means by which conscience, +inspired and assisted by reason, determines +the will to keep in check or to suppress organic +impulses and inclinations, desires and appetites, is +inhibition; moreover, the development and strengthening +of inhibition does not alone promote the aims<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> +of the community, but is of the highest biological +importance to the individual himself, apart from his +relations to society, as it renders him stronger and +more efficient, differentiates him more subtly, and +raises him to a higher level of development.</p> + +<p>Now the state is a special development of society; +it owes its existence to the same necessities as the +latter, its task is to minimize the struggle for existence +for the individual, to protect him from avoidable +dangers and to ensure the safety of his life, the fruits +of his labour and that measure of freedom which is +compatible with life in a community. But if the state +puts an end to the coercion instituted by the community +and therefore by the state itself; if it does away +with Morality for itself, that is, for a number of individuals, +be they few or many, that act in its name; if it +allows selfishness, appetites and ruthlessness to have +the same free play as with creatures of a lower order +than man, or as with men before they formed themselves +into communities; if in the pursuit of its plans +beyond the bounds of Morality it intensifies the +struggle for existence in a tragic manner, exposes +men to the most terrible dangers, brutally destroys +their liberty, gravely threatens their life and property +or even devotes them to ruin—why, then it destroys +the assumptions on which the state itself is based, +denies its own aim, deprives itself of any right to +existence, and the individuals have thenceforward but +one interest, namely, to drive away this bogey of the +state and with all possible means to force the men, +who make use of it and the superstitions clinging to +it, to respect the moral law which the community has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> +created to overwhelm anti-social, immoral individuals, +to render them harmless and if necessary to destroy +them.</p> + +<p>One point there is on which the Machiavellian or +practical politicians are particularly fond of talking +nonsense, and that is the state's loyalty to treaties. +Is the state bound by a treaty? Must it honour its +signature? Must it perform what it has undertaken +to do? The detestable, unanimous answer is "No. +A treaty cannot hinder the state from doing what its +interest demands." Prince Bismarck is often cited +on this point, as he once said: "The only sound +foundation for the state is state egoism." And +another time: "A treaty is only valid <i>rebus sic +stantibus</i>, if the situation is the same as when it was +concluded; if the circumstances change, it becomes +invalid by the very fact." Such views are revolting, +however great a name be appended to them. Contract, +or treaty, is the basis of the law. Whoever breaks it +is dishonoured, and doubly dishonoured is he who +from the beginning enters upon it with the idea at +the back of his mind of deriving every possible advantage +from it and of breaking it when the time comes +to fulfil obligations.</p> + +<p>The phrase, "sound egoism," whether it refer +to a private person or to the state, must make +every decent man blush for shame. Egoism may +be sound, but it is always the contrary of moral. +It is just as convenient for the individual as for the +state to think only of his own advantage and unhesitatingly +to sacrifice his neighbour's rights to it; +but Morality arose and was constituted a rule of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> +human relations in order to break the back of this +selfishness and to teach man consideration for his +neighbour. It is no valid excuse to say that state +egoism is no sin, but a virtue and a merit, that it is +different in character from the egoism of the individual. +That is not true. It is not different in +character. It is of exactly the same character as in +private life. The responsible leader of the state +who is guilty of a breach of treaty makes believe to +himself and others that he does not do it for his own +sake, but in the interests of the state. But who is +the state? I have already given the answer to this. +The state consists of men, the interests served by a +breach of treaty are those of men, not, as a rule, of +all, not even of many members of the state, but of a +few, of a class, a group, perhaps of only one family +whose power, wealth and reputation it is intended to +increase. So-called state egoism is in actual fact the +private egoism of many individuals, who break the +law, or tolerate and condone a breach of the law, for +the sake of pocketing ill-gotten gains; and no one +is so stupid as to let himself be bamboozled +into believing that the shameful crime of breaking +a treaty for the purpose of "sound" egoistic grabbing +becomes moral when it is perpetrated not +by one individual but by thousands or millions of +individuals.</p> + +<p>The <i>reservatio mentalis</i>, too, of "<i>rebus sic +stantibus</i>" is an unwarrantable and wicked reservation. +Nothing prevents a decent man when making a contract +from adding a clause reserving the right to +terminate it if the essential conditions should change.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> +If the other party to the contract does not agree to +this, well, then the contract cannot be concluded. +But to sign it with the mental reservation that one +will disavow one's signature if the obligations undertaken +become irksome, that is swindling. There is +one consideration so simple that it is inconceivable +that those who break contracts do not realize it. In +some concrete case the leader of the state judges it +to be profitable to the state to disregard good faith. +What guarantee has he that his judgment is right? +He is a man, and no man is infallible. But all mankind +have made good faith the foundation of their +life in communities, and if a single man has the +temerity to draw a conclusion violating the immutable +convictions and doctrines of all mankind, he must be +mad not to see that most probably he is wrong and +that all mankind in every age and every clime is +right. I have left out of consideration the fact that +any possible advantage arising from the breach of +faith would not excuse him morally, and setting aside +the ethical aspect of the case, I dwell only on the +logical argument.</p> + +<p>There is one case and one only in which a contract +is not binding, either on the state or on the private +individual, and that is when the signatory was forced +to enter upon it with a knife at his throat. Obligations +which a victor imposes on his defeated and disarmed +opponent are by their very nature invalid. The old +cry of Brennus: "<i>Vae victis!</i>" is might and cannot +constitute a right. Civil law calls this kind of thing +compulsion and decrees that it invalidates any contract. +Only a pedantic mind, stupid and depraved,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> +immersed in hair-splitting trickery and incapable of +a straight thought, could complacently maintain in the +face of all common sense that might and compulsion, +far from doing away with right, are the source of all +right. The silly formula coined for this is: "Might +is right." Might may be a fact, but it is not right. +The source of right is not might but Morality, which +might disavows and destroys. The necessary condition +of any obligation which is to be valid is freedom. +Kant proved this, but his proof was unnecessary, for +it is self-evident. A forced treaty is no treaty, for it +is the victor's fist which has guided the hand of the +vanquished, and it is he who wrote the latter's signature +under the document. The will, the consciousness +of the seeming signatory were absent at the +time.</p> + +<p>But the worst and most immoral action of the state, +beside which a breach of treaty for selfish reasons pales +to insignificance, is the war of aggression for purposes +of profit, that is, for the conquest of territory, extortion +of money, increase of power, or fame. War is the +quintessence of all crimes against life and property, +against the body and mind of a person, the prevention +of which is the aim and object of all Morality +and all laws derived from it. Any means are permissible +whereby this wickedness may be prevented; +the war of defence, waged by the party attacked, is +not only justified but sacred, as are the functions of +the institutions that society has developed to hunt +down and punish those who do not respect Morality +and Law. And just as it is the duty of every society +to maintain courts of justice, police and prisons, so<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> +it is the duty of every state to be well armed, well +versed in the use of weapons and strong, so long as +it must count on the fact that there are practical +politicians who do not recognize Morality as binding +the state, and nations that are ready on the first hint +of their leaders to perpetrate every crime that conscience, +the Ten Commandments and penal law +forbid.</p> + +<p>It is idle, in my opinion, to discuss the question +whether war will ever disappear from the world. It +serves no purpose to contradict those who declare it +to be eternal. It is possible that it will continue to +exist as long as there is vice, sin and crime; and I +do not believe that these will ever be completely +exterminated. Among mankind there will probably +never be a lack of sick and depraved people whose +selfishness is monstrously exaggerated, whose instincts +urge them with stormy violence, whose powers of +inhibition are scantily developed or altogether wanting, +who suffer from anæsthesia of the feelings and +are therefore incapable of any sympathy with their +fellow men and who are mentally too weak to foresee +the results of their actions. Individuals of this kind +are born criminals whose existence society will probably +never be able to prevent and against whom it is +obliged to protect itself. Now war arises from the +same psychic conditions as the antisocial actions of +these born criminals, and therefore the pessimists may +be right in maintaining that it can never be abolished. +But it is one thing to assert the existence of a deplorable +fact and quite another to glorify it. To say that +war is a part of the universe constituted by God is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> +blasphemy, even though the saying emanates from +Moltke. To extol war ecstatically and to sing hymns +of praise to it, to declare that it evokes the highest +virtues of man is a panegyric of crime, a thing anticipated +and punishable in the penal code.</p> + +<p>I am not here attempting to solve the problem of +what practical measures can be taken whereby right +may be set in the place of might in inter-state relations, +and instead of ruthless selfishness, Morality, that is, +self-control, consideration and respect for the just +claims of one's fellow men and love of one's neighbour. +That is as far beyond the scope of this work +as is the investigation of the methods of education, +criminal justice, police organization or prison conditions +intended to deal with the tide of crime and to +stem it as far as possible. I am concerned with moral +philosophy, and from that point of view I show that +all Morality is rooted in the desire of men to live +together peaceably in a society, to have greater +security of life and property, greater possibilities of +happiness, and that the same needs must impose the +rules of Morality upon states in their relations to one +another. According to Hobbes the primitive condition +of mankind is that of a war of every man against +all other men, and only the creation of society makes +an end of it. But if the state unleashes the dogs of +aggressive warfare it hurls mankind back into its +primitive condition and destroys the work it was +created to do. The Stoic Seneca says: "<i>Homo sacra +res homini</i>," "Man is sacred to man." The practical +politicians who praise war repeat with Hobbes: +"<i>Homo homini lupus</i>," "Man is a wolf to man."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> +The moral man demands a return from Hobbes to +Seneca. If it has been possible in the state to tame +the wolfish instincts of the individual and to make him +bow down before Custom and Law, it must be equally +possible to do so in the relations of states to one +another. He who denies this in principle disavows +Morality altogether, not only for the state but also +for the individual; he who admits it in principle but +in practice scornfully disregards it is a bandit, and +it is desirable to treat him like any other robber and +murderer who, to satisfy his wolfish appetites, +tramples on Morality and Right and acts like a wild +beast.</p> + +<p>To this, however, the Moralist will object sadly, +and the practical politician with scornful superiority, +that the state has created institutions for suppressing +the bandit, but that there are none such to control +bandit states, and that self-defence alone, the only +means of self-protection for man in Hobbes's primitive +condition, can gain a footing between them. +Clearly only the party attacked is in a state of self-defence, +but the bandit who has a sufficient sense of +humour to play the pettifogging lawyer can always +maintain that attack is also self-defence, the preventive +form of self-defence. The answer to this is: if +society has managed to provide judges and police in +order to secure peace, then mankind will for the same +purpose learn how to provide courts of justice and a +police force to deal with the bandits of practical +politics who endanger peace among nations. But that +is a practical question, not a theoretical one, not a +principle of moral philosophy. The latter shows irre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span>futably +that there is only one Morality, not a private +one and a public one which is its negation, not one +kind for the individual and another for politics, for +the state.</p> + +<p>He who defends the thesis of a twofold Morality +merely shows that he does not possess simple Morality.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY</h3> + + +<p>Theological thought is faced with a +problem in ethics which presents the greatest +difficulties. It is the problem of Free Will.</p> + +<p>Is man who perceives, judges, has volition and +acts, a free being inwardly? Can he, guided only by +his own reasonable thoughts and conclusions, determined +entirely by his own inner impulses and uninfluenced +by outer circumstances, choose one or the +other of two conflicting possibilities? When he has +to make a decision, is he always like Hercules at the +cross-roads who has to make up his mind alone as to +which path he shall take, whether he is to follow quiet, +modest virtue, or alluring, voluptuous vice? Does he +do evil because he willed to do so and not otherwise, +although it was in his power to avoid it? Does he +decide for the good, because after due investigation +and consideration he recognized it as preferable, +though he might have rejected it? Or is man always +subject to coercion from which at no time and no place +he can escape? Are all his actions determined by +the law of Nature which regulates every one of his +movements just as mechanically as the course of the +stars or the fall of a body to our earth when its support +is removed? Is he an automaton, set going by cosmic +forces, who possesses the doubtful privilege con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>sciously +to be able to follow the turning of his wheels, +the action of his levers, rods and indicators and to +listen to their humming and knocking without being +allowed to interfere in their movements or to change +the least thing in their functions or work? Is he +fettered by the chain of causes which have existed +eternally and continue to act immutably to all +eternity?</p> + +<p>Theological thought is condemned to find an +answer to the question of freedom or determinism, as +it is the necessary condition for the essential concepts +of the theological doctrine of Morality, that is, the +concept of responsibility and those consequent upon +this, namely, sin, reward and punishment. For the +true believer God is the source of Morality. He Himself +is Morality. What He ordains is good in itself +and cannot be otherwise, for there is no room for +evil in His nature, since if He could be conceived to +do evil, it would by the very fact of His doing it +become good. A man, to be moral, must approximate +to the nature of God as nearly as it is granted +to mortals to do. The moral law is revealed by God's +mercy to give man a light which shows him the right +path and lights him on his way. Thanks to Him the +poor mortal is relieved of the incertitude due to his +limited mental powers and is endowed with the priceless +possession of a certain precept which he need only +obey in order to be sure of salvation.</p> + +<p>However, granted the correctness of this assumption, +it is not comprehensible how evil came into the +world. It contradicts all attributes with which faith +has endowed the deity. It cannot appear without<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> +God's knowledge, for He is omniscient and nothing is +hidden from Him. It cannot occur against His will, +for He is omnipotent and nothing resists His bidding. +But least of all can it rage with His knowledge and +consent, for He is infinitely good and therefore does +not permit his creatures to fall victims to evil. But +experience teaches us that evil has a permanent place +in human life, and this forces one to the conclusion +that either God is hard and cruel, and therefore not +infinitely good and not Morality itself, or that He +has no knowledge of evil and therefore is not omniscient, +but, on the contrary, blind as well as stupid, +or that He sees the evil but cannot prevent it, and +therefore is not omnipotent and must recognize the +existence of higher powers than Himself against whom +He is impotent.</p> + +<p>These terrifying conclusions have not escaped the +notice of the devout, and they have always made the +most desperate efforts to evade them. Some have +chosen the easiest way out of the difficulty; they close +their eyes before the yawning abyss, fold their hands +devoutly and invent pious phrases about the inscrutable +ways of Providence and its infinite wisdom, which +the weak intelligence of mortals cannot grasp. Others +take infinite pains; in the sweat of their brow they +with difficulty evolve tortuous and hypocritical explanations, +which in reality explain nothing, but in a +mind which lends itself willingly to them give rise to +the illusion that the contradiction has been solved. +Perhaps the most astounding piece of work accomplished +by this miserable juggling, or this delusion of +self by means of an exuberant flow of words, is pre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>sented +in the four volumes of the "Théodicée," by +which Leibnitz made himself a laughing-stock. Mazdeism +has invented an alluring but at the same time +risky expedient. It lightly assumes that two principles +obtain in the universe, a good one and a bad one, the +creator and the destroyer, the merciful God and the +cruel demon, Ormuzd and Ahriman. In this way +everything is easy to understand. Good is the work +of radiant Ormuzd, evil the deed of dark Ahriman. +The two fight together with very nearly equal forces, +but this doctrine reveals the comforting prospect of a +distant future in which Ormuzd shall finally triumph +over Ahriman, and fills the trembling believer with +elation at the thought that after æons of the tragic +struggle between good and evil, at the end of the +world the curtain will fall on the victory of good. By +this victory Mazdeism, which claims to be monotheistic, +rescues its single god, although the introduction +of a second principle of very nearly equal power, +which holds the one god in check for an immeasurable +period of time, brings this system perilously close to +polytheism.</p> + +<p>To the purer monotheism of Christianity there is +indeed something repugnant in the assumption of a +second, opposite principle of almost equal power, but +yet it has admitted the existence of the devil, who +is undoubtedly reminiscent of Ahriman. Only he +lacks the independence of the Mazdean demon. He +is not on a footing of equality with God, but is subject +to Him as is every creature. He is not strong enough +to oppose God and can only do evil because God +allows it. But why does He allow it? Why does<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> +He tolerate the devil? Why can the latter proceed +with his evil work with God's consent? To this theology +gives a crafty answer which Goethe has clothed +in the glorious beauty of inimitable poetry. God has +assigned to the devil the task of tempting man with +all the arts of seduction in order to give him the +opportunity of testing and developing his moral +strength in resistance, of purging himself, of attaining +purity and salvation by his own efforts. In short, he +exists in order to give man a sort of Swedish gymnastics +in virtue. The struggle is not quite fair, for +the devil is held by a halter and is pulled up if he +gets too big an advantage, and man is always assisted +by redeeming mercy, a hand being stretched out to +him from the clouds which sets him on his feet as +often as he stumbles. But theology is not bound by +rules of sport. That is how the picture of the universe +is presented in "<i>Faust</i>." But he who painted it is +the same Goethe who on another occasion angrily +complains: "You allow man to become guilty—and +then leave him to his suffering." Does the divinity +allow man to fall a victim to evil without turning it +aside from him? Does he only try him in order mercifully +to rescue him at the moment when he is about to +succumb? Goethe does not answer this question without +ambiguity. That is not his business either. He +may contradict himself. He is a poet who is allowed +to express contradictory views. He is not a theologian +whose duty it is, by means of a definite dogma, to +support those who totter in doubt.</p> + +<p>All these attempts to reconcile the attributes of +the deity with the fact that there is evil in the world<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> +which continually leads man into danger, emanate +from the explicit or tacit assumption that man possesses +Free Will. For if his will is not free and he +does evil, then he does it because he must and because +he cannot do otherwise. But this must can only come +from the deity who is almighty; it is the deity who +condemns man, who forces him to do evil. Man +therefore does evil as God's tool without volition; +therefore, as a matter of fact, it is God Himself who +does evil. But if God is capable of doing evil He +is not Morality itself, or every distinction between +good and evil is destroyed, and we must recognize +what seems evil to us to be just as moral as what +seems good, because the one is as much the work of +God as the other. But if this is admitted, and it is +logically impossible not to admit it, then the whole +foundation of transcendental, that is, of theological, +ethics breaks down. The latter is therefore forced, +on pain of suicide, to maintain that man has Free +Will.</p> + +<p>But with this assertion theological ethics by no +means disarms all the objections which threaten its +life. Renouvier's book on Free Will is probably the +most thorough and exhaustive work on this subject +which has been treated by thousands of thinkers and +not a few babblers since the time of the ancient +Greeks, and he describes it as follows: "Will is free +and spontaneous if Reason cannot foretell its untrammelled +action at any time other than that at which +it actually takes place." Renouvier makes no limitation +and no reservation. He does not say, "if human +reason cannot foretell its action," and this omission<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> +of the particularizing adjective is not carelessness or +a mistake on his part, it is duly considered; for the +prudent dialectician knows very well that he would +ruin his theory of Free Will if he only maintained +that human reason alone should be able to foretell its +action. There are many happenings which human +reason cannot foretell, and which nevertheless obey +immutable laws and take place according to absolutely +fixed rules without the exercise of any inner +freedom or authority on the part of the individual. +If human reason cannot foretell these happenings, it +is not because no external force of the universe determines +them and they are entirely spontaneous, but +simply because the laws controlling them are unknown. +Therefore the impossibility of foretelling +them is no proof of their freedom, it is only a proof +of the ignorance of the human mind. There was a +time when no human intellect could foretell the occurrence +of a solar or lunar eclipse. Was that because the +heavenly bodies act freely and are eclipsed only at +their own spontaneous desire, when and how they +please? No, because man had not discovered and +comprehended their movements. To this very day +we are unable to foretell the weather on a particular +day next year, or the result of the next harvest, or an +earthquake. Does this prove the freedom, the absolute +independence of these occurrences? No; it only +proves the inadequacy of our knowledge. Renouvier +therefore would achieve nothing for his theory of Free +Will, if only human understanding were to be unable +to foretell the actions of the Will. That is why he +does not say "human reason," but simply "Reason."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> +The essence of Free Will is that its actions altogether +shall be incapable of being foreseen; it is not in its +nature to act in accordance with some predetermination +which must necessarily reckon with outer circumstances +and given forces; and the impossibility of +foretelling its actions exists not only for human +Reason but for every Reason—for Reason in +general.</p> + +<p>For every Reason and therefore for the divine +Reason as well. And now theological ethics must +find a way out of this dilemma: either God does not +foresee the decisions of free human Will, then this is +a denial of his omniscience, that is, of one of His +essential attributes; or God foresees the decisions of +free human Will, then this is a denial of the Freedom +of the Will, the essence of which, according to +Renouvier, lies in the fact that it cannot be foreseen. +For this impossibility of being foreseen is indeed the +quality by which Free Will stands or falls. Let us +realize the significance of this concept. Nothing can +be foreseen which will not with certainty occur. But +whatever at some future time will become a reality, +must even now be virtually a reality for an omniscient +Reason not bound by the human categories of time +and space, since for this Reason neither proximity +nor distance exists, but everything is on one plane, +and there is no future or past, but everything is +present. So if the divine Reason foresees now how +the free Will of man will act in the future, that is +equivalent to saying that this free Will is forced to +act in the particular way which God foresees and not +otherwise. Therefore the Will is not free but, on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> +the contrary, strictly bound. It is obliged to make +the event foreseen by God a fact, as God can only +foresee what must certainly come to pass, and a foreseen +event that does not happen would mean a mistake, +a false assumption, of which one cannot believe +God capable without denying Him. This apparent +free Will is coercion at sight. As its action is foreseen +by God, the Will is subject to the law of fate, +but a period of delay is granted. Every movement +of the supposedly free Will becomes a part of the +order of the universe which has been unalterably laid +down from eternity, and which the human Will cannot +upset without burying God in the ruins. Man may +imagine that his Will is free. But that is self-deception, +and he can only indulge in it because what God +sees clearly is hidden from him, namely, the goal +towards which, though he does not realize it, he is +inevitably led along strictly defined paths by the iron +hand of fate.</p> + +<p>It would be unjust towards theology to say that +it has never seen the incompatibility of Free Will +with divine omniscience. This has not escaped its +notice, but it has attempted by the use of familiar +formulæ to get out of the difficulty. In his book +<i>De libero Arbitrio</i> Saint Augustine stoutly maintains +that the human Will is free, but he tries to rescue the +attributes of the deity by reserving to it the right or +the power to intervene by its mercy in the actions +of the Will, if in its freedom it comes to a decision +which endangers the salvation of the soul. Saint +Thomas Aquinas takes good care not to differ in +opinion from the Bishop of Hippo. The reformers,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> +Calvin, Luther and Bishop Jansen, too, were better +logicians than the patristic writers, and unhesitatingly +denied the freedom of the Will, but they did not +notice that they made God responsible for all the +misdeeds of man, lacking freedom and acting with +God's foreknowledge and at His behest. The +Council of Trent scorned all these contradictions and +unintelligible points, and declared with infallible +authority that man's Will is free and that at the same +time God is omniscient. The Catholic Church at the +time was in some countries still in a position to meet +Reason, if it raised objections, with an unanswerable +argument: the stake.</p> + +<p>That is the peculiarity of theological as distinguished +from scientific thought, the purest form of +which is mathematics. The former never follows a +train of thought to its strictly logical conclusion, but +only follows a certain distance, to a point where it +loses itself in an impenetrable black fog, or in a cloud +of glory which dazzles the beholder. Mathematical +thought, on the contrary, develops the train of thought +to the bitter end, to its ultimate conclusions. These +are necessarily absurd if the premises are erroneous, +and their absurdity is so clear that it convincingly +proves the mistake in the point of departure. Such a +scrupulous confutation of self is to be expected as +little from mystic visions as from arrogant dogmatism. +The former obey the laws of dreams, in which the +association of ideas, unfettered by logic, holds sway +and strings together the most incompatible ideas to +form an apparently connected series; the latter +demands the privilege of being independent of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> +judgment of Reason, and of being tried by Faith, a +judge who always decides in its favour.</p> + +<p>Those who believe in Free Will adduce a proof of +it which they derive by the method of introspection. +Man, they say, will never be convinced that he is not +free, that his actions are not determined by his own +will alone, for he has the incontrovertible consciousness +of the contrary. He is quite clear on the point +that he does a thing because it is his will to do so, +that he had the choice of doing it or not, that he does +what he wants, that he comes to his decision owing +to considerations, inclinations, moods or intentions +which are perfectly known to him, if to him only. At +the Sorbonne in Paris they still remember the professor—when +the anecdote was told me Victor Cousin +was named as the hero, but I cannot guarantee that +it was he and no other—who used to say in his lecture +on Free Will: "Man's will is free. There is no need +to prove this by giving reasons. We feel it immediately +as a truth. I will show you. I will raise my +right arm. I raise it"—here he raised his right arm +with a commanding gesture, kept it for a short time +in this position, and added triumphantly: "You see +that my will is free." His hearers broke into enthusiastic +applause at this triumphant demonstration. +To-day they would receive it with loud laughter.</p> + +<p>We have learnt to seek the roots of most, perhaps +of all, human actions in the subconsciousness. There +they are worked out under influences which cannot be +perceived by introspection and in which inborn and acquired +inclinations, experiences, organic conditions at +the time, instincts, attractions and repulsions play a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> +decisive part. They rise ready made into consciousness, +and the latter, not having seen them being +formed, persuades itself that it has produced them +spontaneously, and imagines reasons why it willed to +do actions that were determined outside its sphere. +The professor who authoritatively states, "I wish to +raise my right arm and therefore I do it," certainly +says this in all good faith, but equally certainly he is +ignorant. He is not aware of the play of forces which +end in his gesture. He raises his right arm, which he +believes he chooses with complete freedom, because +he is in the habit of using his right arm by preference; +if he had been left-handed he would have announced +his wish to raise his left arm, and would have been +equally convinced that he had decided, with complete +freedom, for his left arm. If he suffered from chronic +muscular rheumatism in one of his arms, so that it +would trouble him or hurt him to move it, he would +unconsciously choose the other, sound arm, and maintain +just as positively that he had done so with complete +freedom. I have mentioned as instances two +particularly crude and therefore very obvious reasons +which may determine the action of this simple-minded +professor without his being aware of it. But each +one of our more complicated, and even of our +simplest, movements is the outcome of numberless +subtle causes which are partly due to the organized +experiences and habits of our individual life, partly +a necessary consequence of our inherited qualities, +our bodily and intellectual constitution, and their +origin goes back to the far distant past of our species, +to the beginnings of life, we may even say to eternity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> +Our consciousness can tell nothing of these causes. +They elude our observation and investigation and +remain ever unknown to us. Renouvier is quite right +when he says no understanding—and I say without +his ambiguity no human understanding of the present +time—can foretell the actions of another, nor indeed +his own, but not because they come to pass independently +of inevitable causes, but simply because these +causes cannot be descried by our ignorance.</p> + +<p>It is vain labour to try and derive the solution of +the question of Free Will, or even a contribution +towards it, from introspection. It is a method unsuitable +for this purpose. The Greek sage well knew +what a great and difficult task he set man when he +admonished him: "γνῶθι σεαυτόν." That is easy +to say but difficult if not impossible to do. Spinoza +very happily characterized the self-deception in which +the individual is plunged with regard to the part +played in determining his actions by his conscious +Will aided by Reason; he says that if a stone, flung +by some hand, had consciousness, it would imagine +it was flying of its own free will; and in another place +he points out without any illustrative metaphor, that a +drunk man and a child, who certainly do not act on +their own initiative, also believe in the freedom of +their will. It has been possible to prove experimentally +how ignorant of the real motives of his +actions the individual may be. It is suggested to a +person who has been hypnotized that on awakening +he is to carry out a certain action, something +particularly absurd, unjustified and aimless being +intentionally chosen. The subject of the experiment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> +on awaking faithfully carries out the suggestion, and as +he has no memory of what happened while he was in +the hypnotic state, he is convinced that he is yielding +to a sudden idea, a whim, but that in any case his +action is determined by his own will. But since he +must realize the absurdity of what he is doing, he +seeks for some sufficient motive to explain it, and +always finds one to his own satisfaction.</p> + +<p>All the efforts of anguished sophists to prove their +thesis of the Freedom of the Will from data supplied +by introspection have failed miserably. But they +were forced to undertake them, for theology cannot +give up the contention that man acts with free Will. +It is an important part of the religious conception of +the universe and of the relation in which, according +to this, man stands to God.</p> + +<p>To put it shortly, religion sees in man's life on +earth a preparation for eternity. It gives him the +opportunity of coming nearer to God by his own +efforts and thus making himself worthy of the salvation +which secures him a place in the sight of God +to the end of time. Thus the life of the flesh is +made a method of selection by which the sheep are +sundered from the goats. God provides man with +free Will for this special purpose, so that he may +make use of it to choose good of his own accord and +to avoid evil. This undoubtedly wearisome task is +made much easier for him, because God in His goodness +has given him laws, doctrines of Morality and +examples which point out the way of salvation. If +man makes proper use of his gifts, if in pursuance of +divine admonition, he treads of his own free will the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> +path of virtue, he acquires merit which gives him a +legitimate claim to the reward of finding favour in +God's eyes and to be admitted to the company of the +just and pure. But if man purposely turns to evil, +of which he is warned by revelation and which he has +been given the power to avoid, then he is a sinner and +deserves the punishment of damnation, which, however, +he may yet escape if God in His mercy forgives +him his sin. Therefore man holds in his hand the +fate of his immortal soul. It depends on him whether +this fate be salvation or damnation. He is responsible +for directing it to the former or the latter. Of +course, God has the power to force him to virtue and +to stop him from vice. But it is not His plan to condemn +man to be the slave of virtue. He wants man +to choose virtue of his own accord, He wants noble +souls about Him who by freedom have attained +Morality.</p> + +<p>This religious view of the universe, which deals +in assertions and disdains on principle to prove even +one of them to Reason by facts that can be tested, +contrasts with the scientific view of the universe which +asserts nothing but what can be objectively ascertained +to be true, which distinguishes sharply between the +account of what has been observed and can be tested +by everyone and hypotheses for which it demands no +belief, but only the recognition of their possibility or +probability, and which it discards as soon as an ascertained +fact definitely disproves them. No compromise +is possible between these two views of the universe. +Nothing can bridge the chasm between them. It +would be superficial to say that the theme of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> +scientific view is realities and that of the religious one +imagination. Imagination is also a reality, only of a +different order to that which is called so in common +parlance. It is a subjective reality; it exists only in +the mind that conceives it. Reality itself is for the +thinking mind only a state of consciousness, but it is +an image of conditions which have an objective existence, +though in another form, outside the consciousness. +The supporters of religion maintain that there +is an objective reality corresponding to their concepts, +but this cannot be ascertained by any of the senses +which the living organism has developed in order to +establish a relation between the world, of which it is +a part, and itself. It is perfectly useless for supporters +of the one view of the universe to try and +convince those of the other. Each of them moves +on a different plane and is unapproachable to the +other. All that can be done is to define both the +one and the other as clearly as possible and prove +their incompatibility.</p> + +<p>For the scientific view of the Universe the problem +of Free Will does not exist and cannot exist. +All facts that science has observed force it to the +assumption of causation, which does not only mean +that every phenomenon is produced by a cause, is +the effect of a cause and could never have occurred +but for this cause, but also means that the effect +represents the exact equivalent of the energy which +was its cause. Thus the hypothesis of the indestructibility +of the total energy in the universe is an essential +part of the concept of causation, the fundamental +hypothesis without which the phenomenon of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> +universe and the things which occur in it are simply +unintelligible to Reason; and everything in and outside +ourselves, everything that we perceive, becomes +chaos, chance, lawless whim or miracle in the theological +sense of the word.</p> + +<p>It is inconceivable that an effect should be anything +other than the reappearance in a different form +of the exact quantity of energy that caused it; for if +the energy of the effect exceeded that of its cause, +then part of the effect would have been produced +without cause; and if the energy of the effect fell +short of that of the cause, then part of the energy +of the cause would have been expended without +producing an effect. That, however, would +be the negation of causation, it would be an admission +that part of the effect (i.e. an effect) could be +produced without sufficient cause, i.e. out of nothing, +and that a part of the cause (i.e. energy) could disappear +(into nothing) without producing an equivalent +effect, which is obviously absurd.</p> + +<p>The human Will manifests itself by an action or +the prevention of an action according to the impulse +felt by our organism. Both these are an exercise of +force, the amount of which can be measured. Indeed, +inhibition, too, is a dynamical effort which represents +the exact equivalent of the force with which the impulse +which it has checked acted on the motory +centres. The Will, therefore, expends energy which +does work that can be measured. But the Will must +derive this energy from some source. It therefore +also only converts energy derived from the energy +of the universe, the total amount of which can neither<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> +be augmented nor diminished; the Will consequently +is a part of the dynamic energy of the universe, and +must necessarily be subject to its mechanical law; +that is, to the law of causation. It is therefore not +free, but dependent, as is every phenomenon in the +universe. Whoever maintains its freedom maintains +that it is independent, that it is not subject to the +law of causation, that it has no cause of which the +elements, if they could be fully known to us, would +be measurable, that it expends energy which it derives +from nowhere, that it produces energy out of nothing. +Whoever maintains this contradicts all experience +from which the knowledge of Nature and her laws +has been built up; it is obviously hopeless to expect +a reasonable discussion with such a person.</p> + +<p>Now the supporters of free Will may reply that +they do not deny that the Will derives its energy from +the organism and therefore from the universal source +of cosmic energy, and that it makes use of it according +to the laws of mechanics; but they assert that the +direction in which energy is expended by the Will +is freely determined by it; further, that the direction +does not affect the amount of energy used, and consequently +the Will can act absolutely in accordance +with the mechanical laws of the universe and yet can, +independently of outside causes, determine the manner +in which the energy shall be expended; that is +to say, the Will can be free. But this objection +is pure sophistry, for the determination of the direction, +in so far as it is not mere imagination and therefore +ineffective and sterile, but really controls the +action, is an expenditure of energy. The controlling<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> +power uses up energy and obeys a cause, so we have +arrived at the same dilemma again—either the controlling +Will is subject to the law of causation, then +it is not free; or it is free and is determined by no +outside cause, then we must ascribe to it motion without +driving power and energy derived from nothing—which +is absurd.</p> + +<p>No. There is no such thing as Free Will. The +concept of freedom itself is an illusion of thought +which cannot survey sufficiently extensive connexions. +Nothing in the universe is free; all things mutually +determine each other. All are cause and effect, and +they fit into one another like cog wheels. Everything +is linked up and dovetailed. The philosopher's +phrase, "Everything is in flux," is the description +of the outward appearance of things. Against it we +must set the reality which is: "Everything is eternally +at rest." For a circumscribed system of motion without +beginning or end may mean motion for every +individual point which describes the course, but is, as +a whole, virtually at rest. Everything that exists, or +ever will exist, has its necessary and sufficient cause +in that which has always been; the sequence of +phenomena has been unalterably determined since all +eternity for all eternity; what we call chance is an +occurrence for which our ignorance cannot perceive +the necessary causes and conditions; past and future +would be in the same plane, therefore would be +present for an omniscience, which knew and understood +the machine of the universe down to its smallest +wheel and pin.</p> + +<p>One of the logical consequences of this is that,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> +without any miracle or the assumption of any supernatural +influences, it would be possible to foretell +the most distant events in all their smallest details. +An intelligence sufficiently wide and penetrating +would, following the strict law of causation, be able +to produce all lines of the present with absolute certainty +immeasurably far into the future. As everything +that ever will be necessarily must be, it virtually +exists at present and has always existed; therefore +it is only a question of clarity of vision, which +however, is denied to man, to see it at any time and +to any extent.</p> + +<p>The illusion of flux is explicable. Life, which +like all world processes is a cyclical motion, is passed +in an endless alternation between the shining forth +and extinction of consciousness, the bearers of which +are an everlasting series of organisms following one +another. Every organism lasts a limited time, during +which it is carried along an inconceivably small fraction +of the tremendous cycle. It sees all the points +of this short stretch but once, and does not learn that +they are eternally the same. It gathers the false impression +that they fly past it, whereas they are at rest +and it passes them, until it ceases to be a suitable +bearer of consciousness and disappears, making room +for a successor. This rigid immutability of the whole +Universe is certainly intolerably gruesome to the +imagination, but then, every time we look beyond the +narrow confines of life and human circumstances, to +peep into the infinity and eternity which surrounds +us, do not terrifying vistas open up before us?</p> + +<p>Not only the religious minded, but many free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> +thinkers, too, have Free Will at heart, though the +latter are otherwise guiltless of any mysticism. They +claim it in the name of man's dignity, which would +be deeply humiliated if we had to confess ourselves +the slaves of outside influences, automata moved by +universal causation without our having any say in +the matter. We are not entitled to such trumpery +pride. Let us seek our dignity in our striving for +knowledge, in the subjection of our own instincts to +the control of our Reason, but not in an imaginary +independence of the laws of Nature, whose commands +we should oppose in vain.</p> + +<p>With Free Will responsibility also disappears. +That is obvious. But that means a collapse only for +theological Morality. Scientific ethics can manage +very well without responsibility. Nay, more; there is +no room in it for this concept. In the system of theological +Morality responsibility has a transcendental +significance. To sum up once more shortly what +has been dealt with in detail above: according to this +system Morality is a divine command, obedience to, +or disregard of which results in salvation or damnation; +in order that reward and punishment may be +just, one as well as the other must be merited; that +implies the assumption that virtue is practised or vice +chosen intentionally and with forethought; but this +mode of action must be freely willed if man is to be +responsible for it before his divine Judge.</p> + +<p>Scientific ethics knows nothing of this supernatural +dream. In its view Morality is an immanent +phenomenon which occurs only within +humanity—or to define it more accurately, within<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> +humanity organized as a society. It arose from a +definite necessity; from the undeniable need of men +to unite, so as to be able, in company with one +another, shoulder to shoulder, to succeed more easily, +or indeed to succeed at all, in the struggle for existence +which is too hard for the solitary individual. It +has a clearly recognizable aim: to teach man to curb +his selfish instincts and to practise consideration for +his neighbour, by which means alone peaceable life +in common and productive co-operation are possible. +The instinct of self-preservation supplies society with +the laws of Morality which it imperiously imposes on +all its members, and unconditional obedience to which +it demands. Society does not dream of saying to the +individual: "You are free; you must yourself decide +whether you will follow the path of virtue or that of +vice." On the contrary, it says to him: "Whether +you wish it or not, you must do that which my doctrine +of Morality indicates as good and eschew that +which it declares to be evil. You have no choice. +I tolerate you in my midst only if you submit to the +laws of Morality. If you transgress them I shall +draw your teeth and claws or destroy you altogether." +By discipline lasting many thousands of years society +has developed in the individual, though not in all, +an organ that watches that his conduct is moral, and +this is the conscience. But this is only supplementary +to, and representative of, society, which in the main +exercises police supervision itself, and sees that in +general the moral law is obeyed. It judges all the +actions of the individual that come to its knowledge. +Conscience only is the competent authority where<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> +occurrences are concerned which take place simply in +the consciousness of the individual, and which he +alone is aware of. Conscience is only too often a +lenient judge who acquits the individual too easily +and nearly always admits extenuating circumstances. +Society does not let him off so lightly; his punishment +is certain if he cannot prevent his sin from becoming +known.</p> + +<p>Responsibility therefore also exists in Morality as +understood by sociologists. As far as his intentions +are concerned the individual must come to terms with +his conscience, which, as a rule, he does not find difficult. +For his deeds he must account to society, and +it does not ask what took place in his consciousness, +but only how his spiritual impulses were manifested. +For his deeds, then, he is summoned before society's +court of justice and must answer for them without +having recourse to the excuse that he acted as he +was forced to do by his disposition and the pressure +of circumstances, and that he had no choice and could +not act otherwise. Though Morality has always been +necessary for the life of the community, and though +the latter has, under the pressure of the law of self-preservation, +always had to make its members strictly +subservient to Morality, it has ever had a dim idea +that the responsibility of the individual for his actions +is only of practical, not of fundamental or ideal significance. +It has never pushed investigation as to +how far the individual acted freely or not to any +great lengths, never attempted to trace it to the +foundations of his consciousness, to the inception of +the impulses of his Will. Where the lack of free<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>dom +was obvious, for instance, where every layman +could see there was insanity, the Moral law has been +disregarded ever since ancient times, and society has +contented itself with protecting itself from the intolerable +actions of the lunatic by rendering him harmless. +Since positive Law, made concrete in the laws +with penal sanctions, was evolved from the universal +Moral law, it has admitted the plea of irresponsibility +and refrained from exercising its coercive powers +where such irresponsibility has been established. In +addition to madness, demonstrable coercion and self-defence +relieve the individual from responsibility +for the crime and render him immune from punishment.</p> + +<p>In the course of evolution society has conceded +still further limitations of individual responsibility. +It willingly admits new knowledge gained +by scientific psychology and concedes limited responsibility, +not only in case of madness, but in such +cases, too, where experts can convincingly prove to the +judges, the guardians of its Law, that the individual +was in an abnormal condition and affected by morbid +influences at the time of the crime. Farther society +cannot go, if it does not want to put an end to Moral +law and do away altogether with positive law. Concern +for its continued existence forbids this. It must leave +it to the philosophers to continue the investigation. +They must show that the Will is never free, always +fettered, not only in the extreme cases of madness or +when under the influence of suggestion. They must +make it clear that there is only a difference of degree +and not of kind between the determining influences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> +under which the individual is constrained to act, and +that the causation which binds him proceeds by imperceptible +degrees from the delirium of the maniac +and the obsession of the abnormal man to the passion, +lust and desire of the man with strongly developed +instincts, and to the slight stimulus of habits, the +colourless judgment and shallow considerations of the +ordinary man with a deformed character and no definite +features. Society can draw no practical conclusion +from the theoretical recognition of the lasting +limitation and lack of freedom of the Will, because +moral law by its very nature implies coercion, and +therefore excludes freedom. Whether the individual +submits to the Moral law of his own accord, or because +he is forced thereto by the community's powers +of coercion, is of no account to society. It deals only +with the visible results.</p> + +<p>But it is not merely a matter of flat utilitarianism, +it is not even unjust, if society, without inquiring +whether the Will is free or not, makes the individual +responsible for his actions and only makes an exception +from this universal rule in extreme cases. Even +though his will is subject to the law of causation, +and the individual always acts as he must, he nevertheless +has a means of keeping within the moral law +despite inner impulses and outer pressure, and that +is by his judgment and its instrument, inhibition. +Like every organic function which is not purely vegetative +and therefore beyond the influence of the Will, +judgment and inhibition can be strengthened and +perfected by methodical exercise, while total neglect +of them will weaken and finally atrophy them. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> +community may demand that each of its members shall +devote attention to the development of the natural +functions which permit him to discriminate and to +suppress any inclination to evil which may appear. +It facilitates this duty towards itself and himself for +the individual—for it is a question of the increase of +his organic efficiency and of his personal worth—by +the institutions it founds for the education of youth, +by schools which not only impart knowledge, but +also form the character, by instruction after the school +age, by the honours with which it distinguishes especially +excellent persons, thereby holding them up to +example. The community prescribes that everyone +should acquire a certain minimum of knowledge, and +for this purpose forces each individual by law to go +to school for a certain number of years. It may and +ought to force him also to render himself more capable +of obeying the moral law by methodical exercise of +his will. Every citizen is responsible to the state +for being able to read and write. In this sense the +individual is also responsible for sufficiently strengthening +his faculty of inhibition to be able to control +his selfish, anti-social and immoral desires.</p> + +<p>The particular purpose for which he is to employ +his faculty of inhibition depends on the current moral +law of the age, which is determined not by the individual, +but by the community. The individual does +quite enough and is free of blame if he strives with +all his might to approximate his actions to the ideal +which the community demands at a given time for +the life of its members in common and for their mutual +relations. To alter and perfect this ideal is the busi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span>ness +of a few select men with wider judgment, stronger +will and warmer sympathies than the average. In +these exceptional cases it is not the community which +imposes its ideal on the individual, but, on the contrary, +the individual who works out a new ideal for +the community, and, so to speak, thanks to his personal +qualities, establishes a new record in the +gymnastic of the Will which beats all earlier ones.</p> + +<p>Finally, it is true, the individual is dependent on +his natural disposition. To say that he can be, and +is to be, raised above himself is a very impressive, but +really nonsensical, phrase. He can get out of himself +only what is in him by nature, and however hard +he may try to reach out beyond the boundaries drawn +by his organic disposition, he finds it impossible to +overstep them. But, as a rule, they are far wider than +the individual has any idea of until he attempts to +reach them, and he will find many surprises if he +labours untiringly to develop to their fullest extent all +the possibilities latent in him. Even a born weakling +can, by dint of methodical practice, harden his flaccid +muscles sufficiently to become a gymnast of average +skill, though he is hardly likely to become a first-class +athlete.</p> + +<p>In just the same way a weak-willed or simple +person can by earnest endeavours rise to a consistent +morality; if, nevertheless, there appear in him, +continually or occasionally, organic impulses which +carry him away, it is not his fault but his misfortune. +In that case he is subjectively not responsible +for his immorality. But the community can, all +the same, not liberate him from responsibility, be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>cause +the law of self-preservation forces it to insist +on observance of the moral law, and it has no means +of accurately measuring how strong the pressure of +instincts and the power of inhibition is in any individual, +and to what extent he has fulfilled the duty +of exercising and strengthening the latter. The +phrase "To understand everything is to forgive everything" +shows insight, but is only true in the sense +that one must not blame an individual for his natural +imperfection. It comprehends recognition of the +Will's lack of freedom, and the inadmissibility, from +the philosophical point of view, of the concept of responsibility, +but it does not affect the right and the +duty of the community to demand moral conduct +regardless of this lack of freedom. It is not permitted +to forgive because it understands. Moreover, +there would be no sense in forgiveness by the community, +for the concept of forgiveness implies feeling +and kindly forgetfulness of an injury inflicted of +malice prepense; but insult and offence play no part +in the punishment by society of transgressions of the +moral law, and indulgence due to sensibility would +endanger its existence.</p> + +<p>The certainty possessed by the individual that his +evil deeds, if they become known, will have evil consequences +for him is one of the determining factors +which is indispensable in helping him to make a decision. +It is an inadmissible affectation to condemn +the fear of punishment as a motive for moral action, +because it ought to be the result of the conviction that +it is absolutely right. It is a powerful aid to self-discipline, +as also are the thought and the foretaste<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> +of the satisfaction upon which self-respect may count +if general respect and praise are to be the reward of +exemplary conduct.</p> + +<p>The great weakness of the Kantian doctrine of +Morality lies in the fact that it retains Free Will, +even though it gives it another name. It is called +autonomy of Will and is contrasted with heteronomy. +This doctrine demands, and considers it possible, that +the Will should be its own lawgiver and should not +allow others to lay down laws for it; but it fails to +examine how the Will comes to make laws for itself, +of what hypothesis these laws are the necessary conclusions, +by what means the Will secures respect for +its law, and whether this seemingly self-imposed law +is not really the inner realization of a ready-made law +of extraneous origin. The dogma of the autonomy +of the Will is a consequence of the preliminary error +of excluding utility from Morality and of declaring +its imperative to be categorical, that is, not dependent +on the aim, but independent and regardless of any +aim. The whole tomfoolery of the categorical imperative +and of the autonomy of the Will is transcendental +mysticism, and is all the more surprising +as it is the result of an investigation which claims +to be the work of pure Reason. It is the shadow +of the ghostly bogies of religious conceptions in the +daylight of "pure Reason."</p> + +<p>From the point of view of the community we +may speak of merit and sin, but not from the subjective +point of view. For the community the moral +conduct of the individual is useful, immoral conduct +is disadvantageous, therefore it praises the one and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> +condemns and punishes the other. That is opportunism, +but not moral philosophy. Considered subjectively, +moral conduct is just as little meritorious +as beauty, great stature, muscular strength, keen intelligence, +health, a good memory, prompt reactions +of consciousness and all other advantages that the +individual has received without his personal intervention +as a gift of nature. And immoral conduct +is just as little blameworthy as ugliness, stupidity, +sickness and other misfortunes which the individual +is burdened with by heredity or which a hard fate +has imposed on him. Happy is the favoured man! +Pitiable the unfortunate one! Both are the work of +forces which are absolutely beyond the control of their +wills. In the same way the good man acts morally +because he possesses insight and restraining will-power, +and the bad man acts immorally because these +perfections have been denied him, and neither the +one nor the other can do anything in the matter.</p> + +<p>That does not relieve man of the duty of labouring +assiduously at his moral development, but it does +relieve him of responsibility for the result of his +efforts. On one point the sociological, the biological +and the theological moralists agree: they all bow +down humbly before Grace.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>MORALITY AND PROGRESS</h3> + + +<p>I have fully investigated in another book ("<i>Der +Sinn der Geschichte</i>") the problem of progress in +all its details. I therefore refer the reader to +that for all particulars, and will here give only a +summary of the main points.</p> + +<p>Progress implies motion from one point to +another. This simple concept is supplemented by +others, some clear and some dim, which group themselves +round it: the conception that the point towards +which motion is directed signifies something +better and more desirable than the one from which +the motion takes place, and the assumption that the +motion is due to an impulse, either inherent in the +moving object or complex of objects and an essential +part of it, or else impressed upon it by outside +forces; further, that the impulse connotes a conscious +image of the goal arrived at, recognition of its +higher worth and the desire for greater perfection.</p> + +<p>All these ideas, which are concomitants of the concept +of progress, are childish anthropomorphism when +applied to the universe. To define progress as motion +from a worse point to a better one implies the existence +of a scale whereby value may be measured. Now +values are clearly determined and graded as far as +human beings or any similar creatures are concerned.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> +Worse or better means to man less or more pleasant, +useful, pleasing; progress, therefore, is a development +to a condition which man considers more suitable and +useful for him and feels to be more harmonious and +pleasanter. The universe, from this standpoint, would +make progress to prepare itself for the appearance of +man, to become more intelligible, habitable and comfortable +for man, to please and delight him. Whether +it obeys its own natural disposition or a higher intelligence, +a god, in carrying out this work, in either case +it would realize progress to serve mankind. But if +this ceases to exist, there is no point in characterizing +a development as progress in the sense of +amelioration, beautification and perfection. One +would then have no right to describe, for instance, +the solar system with its planets as indicating progress +from the original condition of nebula, because +the latter in itself, apart from man and the conditions +of his existence, is not better or worse, not more +beautiful or uglier, not more perfect or more defective +than the former; the original nebula and the +solar system are equally the result of the play of the +same cosmic forces, and the dynamic formula of the +one is the same as that of the other. But Reason +rejects as nonsensical any view which declares man +to be the aim of the universe, which puts all the work +of the universe at his service, and conceives it as a +huge machine functioning for his advantage.</p> + +<p>For reasons of formal logic, too, the idea of progress +in the universe is unthinkable. The understanding +cannot conceive of the universe as other +than eternal. Now in eternity all progress, that is,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> +all motion from a point of departure, must have +reached its goal eternities ago, however slow the +motion, however distant the goal. Eternity and progress +are two concepts which logically exclude one +another.</p> + +<p>In the universe there can be no progress in the +sense of ascent, of motion from a worse to a better +thing; the only thing in the universe, in Nature, which +is comprehensible to the understanding and which +experience, derived from sense perceptions, can establish, +is evolution, an eternal, equable motion always +on the same level; and human standards of value are +not applicable to its regular, successive stages. One +state is merged without a break in another, the simple +becomes more manifold until a maximum of complexity +is reached; thereupon what is intricate gradually +falls to pieces, and the complicated is dissolved +and returns to the simple; then, when this point is +attained, the same course begins again, and so on +for all eternity. Thus evolution in the universe is +an endless succession of cyclic movements from the +simple to the intricate and back to the simple; with +a constant alternation from one point of each single +circle to the other; with the most extreme, crushing +uniformity in the totality of all cycles; with absolutely +equal dignity of all the phases of the endless course +as they develop one from the other; with a synchronism, +inconceivable to man, of all forms of evolution +in numberless circles revolving side by side +within the infinite whole of the universe.</p> + +<p>But the concept of progress, which cannot be derived +from the processes in the universe and has no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> +sense when applied to them, becomes a reasonable +one as soon as its validity is limited to the evolution +of humanity. Here we no longer deal with conceptions +of eternity and infinity. It is a question of +temporal and spacial phenomena. The existence of +man had a beginning. No doubt it will have an +end. It appeared on earth latest at the commencement +of the Quaternary geological period, but more +probably towards the end of the Tertiary period. It +must necessarily disappear when the earth, owing to +cold and evaporation, becomes incapable of supporting +life, a state of affairs which, according to our +present knowledge of natural laws, must inevitably +come to pass. A few million years are allotted +to it in which to fulfil its destiny, certainly a short +span of time compared with the eternity of the universe, +but compared with the duration of individual +and national life, with personal destinies and historical +occurrences, an immeasurably vast prospect. +Within the limits of its genesis, its being and its +disappearance, it is in a constant state of evolution. +It is impossible to deny this. Comparisons between +the skulls found among remains of the paleolithic +age and those of our times, between the state of the +undeveloped tribes of central Africa and Australia +and that of the peoples of Europe and America, between +the beginnings of human speech and the +present-day languages, between the thought, knowledge +and abilities of former generations and ours—all +these prove this incontrovertibly.</p> + +<p>The purpose of this evolution is unmistakable. +It is directed towards an ever closer, ever subtler<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> +adaptation to the unalterable conditions which are +imposed on men by Nature, and which they must +make the best of if they are not to perish. And it +is synonymous with progress; that is to say, not only +with change, simple motion from one point to another, +but with amelioration and improvement.</p> + +<p>Here we may apply standards of value. The aim +and object of evolution, which we know and desire, +supply us with them. Here we may judge and +appraise anthropomorphically. Not only may we do +so, but we must, for it is a question of matters which +concern mankind alone. All evolution of mankind, +corporal and intellectual, the enlargement of the +brain case so as to accommodate a larger brain; the +development of the muscles of the larynx, palate and +hand, and the accurate co-ordination of their movements, +which things make clearer and more emphatic +speech possible and render the hands defter; the +acquisition, interpretation and storing up of experiences +leading to discoveries and inventions, all are +directed to the same end: to provide men with more +reliable weapons in the struggle for existence; to +defend them from the dangers surrounding them, the +destructive forces of Nature; to render their life more +secure, longer and richer; to save them from fatigue +and suffering; to give them pleasurable emotions and +possibilities of happiness. And as we have a clear +idea of the object of our evolution, as we desire this +object and continually seek to find new means whereby +to reach it, we are absolutely justified in calling +every movement that brings us nearer to the aim we +have in view, and aspire to reach, a progressive step,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> +and in calling every stage of evolution which realizes +a biggish part of the object desired an amelioration, +an improvement, an ascent.</p> + +<p>The total amount of progress which has secured +to mankind its development we sum up in the +concept of civilization. The latter, however, is +still far removed from ideal perfection. What we +know is infinitesimally small compared with the +tremendous bulk of the unknown, perhaps the unknowable, +which greets our view on all sides. Our +technical achievements often leave us in the lurch and +indicate no way out of many difficulties. In the human +being who knows and can do something, too much +still remains of the stupid, helpless, untamed, primitive +beast.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, what has been achieved is of +value, and it is childish to depreciate it. Paradoxical +minds, like J. J. Rousseau and his parrot-like +imitators, may deny the use of all civilization and +declare that the so-called state of nature, the ignorance +and helplessness of undeveloped man amid all +too mighty Nature, is preferable. That is an intellectual +joke which is not very amusing. We have +not vanquished death, but we have prolonged life, +as the mortality statistics prove. We cannot cure all +diseases; crowded dwellings in great cities, the nature +and intensity of our occupations—civilization, in short—bring +diseases from which we should probably not +suffer if we were savages; but the cave-dwellers, too, +were subject to illnesses, and our antisepsis and +hygiene effectually prevent many and grave bodily ills. +Division of labour makes the individual dependent on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> +the whole economic organism; it makes it easier for +the favoured few to exploit the many and to be parasites +at their expense, but nevertheless the individual +can more easily satisfy his needs than if, being completely +free and independent, he alone had to provide +all the objects he requires. The speed and +facility with which the exchange of goods is effected, +thanks to ever new and ever more excellent means +of communication, often give rise to artificial wants; +cheap travel occasions useless restlessness, but the +emancipation of the individual from the place of his +birth, the conversion of the whole globe into one single +economic domain, of which every part with its own +particular superabundance of men and products supplies +the lack of the same in other parts, has at least +this invaluable advantage, that it makes man more +independent of local hazards and makes the earth +more habitable for him. Many things provided by +civilization are obtainable only by the rich, and the +spectacle of the luxury of these favoured mortals +makes the lot of the poor harder to bear, but the +possibility of working one's way up into the ranks of +the fortunate is a mighty spur to strong characters, +and gives rise to efforts which are profitable to many. +All the great technical achievements of civilization +can certainly not bring happiness either to the individual +or to the community, because happiness is a +spiritual state which does not depend on bodily satisfactions +and, though it may be troubled by material +conditions, can never be created by them; but the +moments of happiness which the individual experiences +derive an extraordinary intensity from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> +instruments of civilization which surround and +serve us.</p> + +<p>Certainly civilization has its bad points, and it requires +no great cleverness to discover them, to point +them out and to exaggerate them. Certainly many +of its most boasted, supposed benefits are not really +a blessing, but either merely imaginary or else unimportant—little, +superfluous things which may be +pleasant, but lacking which we can live without great +deprivation, and for which we undoubtedly pay far +too dearly. But, on the whole, it is a mighty achievement +of man's struggling intellect, an invaluable improvement +of the lot of man, and if anyone denies +this he forfeits any claim to serious refutation. Rousseau's +state of nature may be a very pleasant change +for a summer holiday, but every man of sound common +sense would decline it as a permanent abode.</p> + +<p>We may therefore freely concede the fact of progress +in civilization in so far as the latter implies +greater safety, facility, order and equability of life, +deeper and more widely diffused knowledge and more +perfect adaptation of man to the natural conditions in +which he finds himself. For it is no reservation to +note in the course of evolution both individual deviations +from the path which leads to the goal of civilization, +the amelioration of the constitution of mankind, +and occasional relapses into bygone barbarisms. To +make use of Gumplowicz's expression, it is not an acrochronic +and acrotopic illusion (that is, a form of self-deception +which consists in thinking the time when +one lives and the place where one lives the best of all +times and the most wonderful of all places) if we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> +place the present far above all past ages and declare +our civilization to be incomparably richer and more +perfect than anything that has preceded it. The +<i>laudator acti</i>, the cross-grained Nestor who praises the +past at the expense of the present, the enthusiast for +"the good old times," is a figure that has always been +familiar. But it proves nothing. This tender love +of the past is not the outcome of objective comparison +and consideration, but an impulse of subjective +psychology. It is simply the emotion and longing +which fill an old man's heart when he looks back on +his youth. He remembers the pleasurable emotions +which once accompanied all his impressions and which +are now unknown to his worn-out organism, and he +thinks the world was better because he found more +joy in it. The aged man is convinced that in his +youth the sky was bluer, the rose more odorous, the +women more beautiful than now, but an impartial +observer would pityingly shake his head at this.</p> + +<p>But can the progress, which cannot reasonably be +denied in civilization, also be traced in Morality? +Philosophers who are by no means negligible have +roundly replied in the negative. Buckle declares uncompromisingly +that the only progress possible to man +is intellectual, and by this he means that mankind +grows in knowledge, foresight and clarity of thought, +but not at the same time in Morality, which, according +to him, differs from the intellect and understanding +and is not included in them. Buckle's unfavourable +judgment has been turned into a formula which has +often been repeated. Scientifically, technically, we +progress; morally we stand still or slip back; the two<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> +orders of development move neither in the same direction +nor with the same speed. That is a view that is +widely held. Fr. Bouillier comes to the same conclusion +as Buckle, though from different considerations. +He asserts that "a savage who obeys his conscience, +however ignorant this may be, can be as virtuous as a +Socrates or an Aristides; one can even go so far as +to defend the view that social progress instead of +strengthening individual morality weakens it, for +society, in proportion as it is better ordered, saves +the individual the trouble of a great many virtuous +actions."</p> + +<p>However, there are other moralists who take the +opposite view. Shaftesbury cannot imagine a moral +system in which there is no place for the idea of +constant progress, of continuous improvement. The +great Frenchmen of the eighteenth century are convinced +of the moral rise of humanity. "The mass +of mankind," says Turgot, "advances constantly +towards an ever-growing perfection," and elsewhere: +"Men taught by experience grow in ever greater +measure and in a better sense humane." Condorcet +defends no less emphatically the view that the faculty +of growing more perfect is inherent in man. This is +a case of pessimism and optimism which have their +roots less in reasonable thought than in temperament. +A worn-out, weary individual, or generation, looks +back and spends the time in futile yearning and +melancholy visions of the past; but a sturdy generation, +full of life, and conscious of it, looks forward, +and planning, inventing, and determined to realize +its creative ideas, it conjures up the image of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> +future. Pessimism regrets and groans; optimism +hopes and promises. The former, like Ovid, thinks +the Golden Age is in the past, the latter, like the +fathers of the great Revolution, looks for it in the +future. In neither case do they reach conclusions as +a result of observation and logical thought, rather they +invent reasons afterwards for their conclusions, as +they do interpretations of their observations. But he +who regards life neither with bitterness nor with pride, +and tries to understand it objectively, will come to the +opinion that Morality too has its fair share in the +progress of civilization.</p> + +<p>Theological thought interprets moral perfection +differently from scientific thought. According to the +former it is independent of intellectual development +and purely a matter of faith. God is the ideal of +Morality, belief in Him the necessary condition for +a moral life. Through its fall mankind withdrew +from God and was left a prey to Immorality; original +sin perpetually burdened it; by redemption and grace +it has been purified from this inborn stain, led back +to God and once more rendered capable of Morality. +For mankind only one kind of progress in Morality +was possible, and this took place, not gradually and +step by step, but with one sudden swift advance, by +which it immediately attained the highest degree of +moral perfection possible, and that was when the true +faith was revealed to it. Before the revelation mankind +did not know real Morality, only its dim shadow, +only a vague yearning for it; by the revelation at one +blow it was in full possession of Morality, and now it +is the business of every individual, whether he will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> +draw near to the divine example by pious efforts or +ruthlessly withdraw from it. Since the glad tidings +of faith were announced to humanity there can be no +question of moral progress for mankind as a whole; +it has become a personal matter which everyone has +to deal with himself. Criticism of this dogmatism is +superfluous. It is quite enough to place it before the +reader.</p> + +<p>It is quite comprehensible, too, that those whose +views permit them to talk with Bouillier of a savage +who obeys his conscience should deny moral progress. +They assume that a savage has a conscience, that +conscience is an element of human nature, that it is +a quality or a capacity like sensation or memory, that +it is born with man like his limbs and organs. In +that case it might well be asserted that subjective +Morality has made no progress in historic and perhaps +even in prehistoric times, and that actually a "savage +who obeys his conscience can be just as virtuous as +a Socrates or an Aristides."</p> + +<p>It would hardly be possible to give a concrete +proof of the contrary; if for no other reason because +for a long time there have been no savages +in the strict sense of the word anywhere on +earth. By savages we mean human beings in their +primitive, zoological condition who have developed +solely according to the biological forms of the species +and under the influence of surrounding Nature and +have taken over nothing of an intellectual character +from the group to which they belong. All savages +of whom we know form societies which for the most +part are not even loosely, but firmly, knit together, with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> +laws that may seem nonsensical and barbaric to us, +but are none the less binding with clearly defined +duties which they impose on every member, with sanctions +whose cruelty supersedes that of any punishment +permitted by civilization. A man who is a member +of a society, no matter how primitive it may be, may +certainly have a conscience, but the point is that he +is not a savage, but the contrary of a savage, namely: +a social being who has received an education from +his society, who is bound to conform to its habits, +customs and views, and who in all his actions must +consider its opinion. But these conditions, as I have +shown, produce a conscience, the representative of +society in the consciousness of the individual. Conscience +is no innate feature of man uninfluenced by +society, it is not a product of Nature, it is the result +of education; he who possesses a conscience is no +savage, but a person formed by discipline and subservient +to it; conscience is the fruit of civilization, +of a certain civilization; in itself it represents progress +compared with the primitive state of man. Consequently +it is an objectionable contradiction to talk of +conscience and at the same time deny moral progress.</p> + +<p>It is peculiarly arbitrary, too, to think that a +savage, if he had a conscience, could obey it to +the same extent, that is, be just as virtuous, as a +Socrates or an Aristides. This would contradict all +the observations and experience from which I have +derived the doctrine that conscience works by means +of inhibition, and that Morality and Virtue from the +biological point of view are inhibition. For inhibition +is developed by practice and use. Except in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> +cases of morbid disturbance it develops simultaneously +with the understanding which manipulates it +and demands efficiency from it. There can be no +two opinions about the fact that the understanding +and the faculty of inhibition in living beings have +developed progressively. There is no need to adduce +any proof that the frog is intellectually superior to +the zoospore, and man to the frog, and that as we +ascend the scale of organisms we find their reactions +to stimuli are increasingly subject to individual modification, +and that there is a gradual transition from +the original, purely mechanical tropism to differentiated +reflex action, which, however, is still beyond +the control of the will, and finally to resistances which +suppress every externally visible reply on the part of +the organism to the impression it has received.</p> + +<p>In the course of this development the faculty +of inhibition grows stronger and more efficient and +obeys the behests of the understanding more and +more swiftly, surely and reliably; it can reach a pitch +of invincibility against which all the revolts of instinct, +all the storms of passion, are powerless.</p> + +<p>In the savage, or rather in man at a low stage of +civilization, the power of inhibition is far from having +reached such perfect development. It is not very +robust, works defectively and often fails. Little civilized +man, if he has a conscience, cannot even with the +best intentions always obey it punctually. His instinct +is stronger than his insight. He is not master of his +impulses; rather it is they that master him. All who +have described tribes of low civilization have observed +that their reactions resemble reflex movements and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> +that they lack self-control. Moral conduct, that is, +control of their selfishness and consideration for their +fellow men, is difficult for them if it demands effort, +sacrifice and painful renunciation. However, we +need not trouble to go to the negroes of the Congo +or the inhabitants of the Solomon Islands to observe +the inefficiency of the power of inhibition. We need +only look around us. We shall find enough instances +among ourselves. The uneducated, the badly educated +and abnormal people on whom teaching and +example make no impression cannot follow the precepts +of Morality, although they know them. To +express it as the Roman poet does, they know the +better and approve it, but they have a longing for +the worse. So it is wrong to say that a savage can +be just as virtuous as a Socrates or an Aristides. He +could not, even if he would. He would lack the +organic means: a sufficiently trained intelligence to +point out his moral duty, a sufficiently developed +faculty of inhibition to follow the admonition of his +intelligence. Bouillier's objection to moral progress +will not hold water. The Romantics who have invented +the fairy tale of the noble savage and who +declare in Seume's words: "See, we savages are +better men after all," are out of touch with reality. +Like civilization, and simultaneously with civilization, +Morality progresses towards improvement, towards +perfection.</p> + +<p>The Kantian moralist, like the theologian, is forbidden +by the logic of his system to admit the possibility +of moral progress. If the moral law is categorical, +that is, unlimited by any special purpose, if it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> +exists within us, eternal and immutable as the stars +above us, we should be hard put to it to say how this +unalterable block, placed in our souls we know not +how or by whom, could receive an impetus to progressive +development, or in what way this development +could be carried out. That which is categorical is +absolute, and the concept of progress in the absolute, +as in the infinite and the eternal, has no sense. But +whoever regards Morality from the biological and +sociological point of view is forced to assert its progress, +just as the dogmatic mystic, who believes in the +categorical imperative, is forced to deny it.</p> + +<p>Let us recapitulate the fundamental concepts. +Regarded biologically Morality is Inhibition, the +development of which is of the greatest importance +to the individual, as it enables him not to waste the +living force of his cell plasm and of his organs in +sterile reflex movements, but to store it up and hold +it ready for useful purposes. The stronger his power +of inhibition the better he is armed for the struggle +for existence, and the better he is armed the more +efficient he is. Denial of the progressive development +of Inhibition implies a denial that modern man +can maintain himself with more ease and security +against Nature and hostile or injurious natural phenomena, +and that he is more successful in competition +with other men than his predecessors on earth. But +this latter denial is obviously nonsense. The only +individuals who do not take part in progressive +development are the degenerates. They are organically +inferior, their faculty of inhibition is defective +or altogether lacking, they are slaves of impulses<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> +which their will and intelligence have no means of +controlling, they are the outcome of morbidly arrested +or retrograde development, they are the victims and +refuse of a civilization too intensive, too exhausting +and wearing for some men, and they are destined to +fall out of the ranks of a race moving majestically +forward and to lie helplessly by the roadside.</p> + +<p>From the sociological point of view Morality is +the bond which unites the individuals in a community, +the foundation upon which alone society can be built +up and maintained. For it implies a victory over self, +consideration for one's neighbour, recognition of his +rights, concession of his claims, even when valued +possessions must unwillingly be given up and painful +renunciation of attainable satisfaction is required. +This is neighbourly kindness and the charity of the +Bible, Hutcheson's and Hume's benevolence, Adam +Smith's sympathy and Herbert Spencer's altruism; it +is the necessary condition on which alone individuals +can live peaceably together and helpfully assist each +other to make life easier. If most or all individuals +lack it, we have Hobbes's war of all against all; then +man is as a wolf to other men, and each one is condemned +to the state of a beast roaming in loneliness. +If a few, a minority, lack it, then the majority will not +tolerate them in its midst, but will expel them from +the community as a dangerous nuisance and deprive +them of the privilege of mutual aid and of the +advantage of joint responsibility.</p> + +<p>The species of man, like every other species of +organism and like every individual, wants to live. It +can only achieve this by adapting itself to existing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> +natural conditions. The more suitable and perfect +the adaptation the more easily and securely it lives. +Under the present conditions of the universe and the +earth a solitary human individual could not manage +to exist, let alone develop into an intelligent being. +The form his adaptation to circumstances has taken is +that of union in an organized community. For the +existence of society and the adjustment of the individual +in it is the indispensable condition for the life +of the species as well as of the individual. Society +can only continue to exist if individuals learn to consider +one another and practise benevolence towards +each other. Society therefore created Morality and +inculcated it in all its members, because it was its +first need, the essential condition which rendered its +existence possible, just as the species created society, +because it could only continue to live as an organized +society.</p> + +<p>Thus Morality with the strictest logical necessity +has its place in the totality of efforts which +human beings had to make, and still have to make, +in order to preserve life, to make it sufficiently profound +and to enrich it with satisfactions, that is, with +pleasurable emotions of every kind, so that they may +continue to have the will and the eager desire to maintain +their existence by effort and struggle; in short, in +order to make life seem worth living, even at the cost +of constant toil and moil. Without society it is impossible +for the individual to exist; without Morality +it is impossible for society to exist; the instinct of +self-preservation furnishes society with habits and +rules governing the mutual relations of its members<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> +and with institutions for economizing force; all these +together we call civilization. The development and +improvement of civilization is obvious; it is proved by +the fact that it draws nearer and nearer to its goal, +namely, the establishment of satisfactory relations +between individuals and groups, and the attainment +of a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of individual +effort. But it would be incomprehensible if +Morality, the essential condition for the existence of +society which creates civilization, should have no part +in the indisputable, because easily demonstrable, +progress of the latter.</p> + +<p>Morality occupies such a large place in civilization +that the mistaken view has arisen among many moral +philosophers that it is the aim of civilization and has +no aim other than itself. Closer investigation shows +this to be an error, a reversal of the true relation. +Morality is no aim, certainly no aim to itself, it is a +means to an end, the most important, most indispensable +means to the one end, to bring about civilization, +to maintain and refine it, and adapt it more and more +to its task. But the task of civilization, as I have +shown, is to preserve, facilitate and enrich the life of +the individual and the species. Morality therefore is +the most important form in which the instinct of self-preservation +in the species is manifested, and to deny +progress to it implies the assumption that the species +does not possess the impulse to preserve and beautify +its existence, that its instinct of self-preservation flags, +that it does not recognize its aim and is ignorant of +the path leading to its goal. This assumption, however, +is contradicted by all, and supported by none,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> +of the phenomena observable in the life of the species—the +absolute increase of the population of the earth, +the prolongation of individual life and of the age of +efficiency, the combating of every kind of harmful +thing.</p> + +<p>The steadfast self-control of civilized man compared +with the unreliability of the savage, who appears +capricious and unaccountable because he freely obeys +every impulse, proves the progressive development of +the faculty of inhibition in the individual organism. +The order and definite organization of modern society, +the rule of law, men's equality before the law, the +guarantee of freedom and respect for the person, all +these compared with the state of nations in earlier +times (actually anarchy under a mantle of tyranny +and the unlimited power of a few mighty ones over +the helpless masses) prove the progressive development +of civilization in the social organism. But +logically the progressive development of Morality +itself must correspond to the progressive development +of its instrument, inhibition, and of its product, +civilization.</p> + +<p>The conclusion to which we are forced by +theoretical considerations is fully endorsed by observation +of actual life. It is sufficient to indicate +broad facts to one who denies moral progress. +Slavery, which Aristotle thought a law of Nature, +which Christianity tolerated, which modern states, +such as England, France, the United States and +Brazil, defended and protected by law, was everywhere +abolished some years ago. The objection is +raised that modern hired labour is merely slavery of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> +the proletariat under another name, that the exploitation +of workmen by employers is a hypocritical continuation +of serfdom. But that is sophistry. The +hired labourer is not bound to his contract. He can +break it. "Yes, at the price of starvation." That +used to be the case, but nowadays organized working +men are no longer at the mercy of powerful capital, +and therein lies progress. They are in a position to +make conditions and not seldom to force their acceptance. +They have the right to strike, to move from +place to place, to form unions. The community has +recognized the duty of mitigating, at least to some +extent, the evils to which faulty economic organization +exposes the workman. It has instituted accident +and health insurance, old age pensions, and, in some +places, assistance for those who are out of work +through no fault of their own. All this is still very +defective, but these are hopeful beginnings, all the +same, and, above all, it shows the awakening of a +social conscience that earlier ages did not know.</p> + +<p>Justice is administered more and more humanely, +that is, morally. It is a century since legal torture +was abolished. Society is ashamed to get at the truth +easily by torturing a suspect who after all may be +innocent. The condemned man is no longer branded +or mutilated; he suffers no corporal ill-treatment of +which the results can never be obliterated. Capital +punishment is still a blot on the honour of civilization. +But for more than a century now, since the time of +Beccaria, it has been violently opposed and has +already been abolished in some states; the others will +no doubt have to follow suit within a short time.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> +Consider that in England at the beginning of the +nineteenth century a thief was hanged if he had +stolen a thing of no more value than the rope that +was to hang him, and even children of fourteen years +were condemned to this fate. To-day the judge +pronounces sentence of death, even where it is still +legal, with grave misgivings and searchings of conscience, +and the execution, formerly a public spectacle, +is carried out more or less secretly, because the conviction +is gradually ripening in society that by the +cold-blooded killing of a man it is perpetrating a +crime which it must keep as secret as possible. The +sentence is now almost everywhere deferred, and thus +the conviction becomes a very emphatic warning +which points out the path of repentance, of conversion +and improvement to the guilty man, and leaves +him the possibility of becoming a decent human being +again. Special courts for children mitigate the stern +penal code and modify it according to the needs of +unripe, youthful characters. Imprisonment for debt +is a half-forgotten thing of the past and regarded +more or less as a joke. What these changes have in +common is that they one and all indicate a deepening +of the community's feeling of duty and responsibility +towards the individual, greater respect for +persons on the part of the law, an increase of the +will to resist the first impulse of anger, revenge and +mercilessness. These tendencies, however, are the +very essence of Morality.</p> + +<p>I forbear to adduce as a proof of progress that the +Inquisition no longer rules and nowhere burns its +victims. For actually there is no greater toleration<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> +of those who hold other opinions than there was +formerly. Religious toleration is explained by the +fact that the people's consciousness no longer attaches +such enormous importance to religion as in past +centuries. But political, æsthetic and philosophical +antagonisms arouse as much bloodthirsty rage to-day +as did formerly heresy in religion, and opponents +would unhesitatingly apply torture and the stake to +one another if the great mass of the people would +develop sufficiently enthusiastic zeal for their views +to allow their raging fanaticism to have recourse to +violence, as it once permitted domineering religious +orthodoxy to do.</p> + +<p>Other aspects of civilization, not so essential, are +hardly less encouraging than the developments on +which I have hitherto dwelt. Drunkenness, formerly +an almost universal vice, is on the decrease. Among +the educated classes it is only met with exceptionally, +and is recognized as a morbid aberration; among the +lower classes it continually grows less. The statistics +of the savings banks show an ever-growing determination +to save. The masses who used to rejoice in dirt +now manifest an increasingly vigorous desire for a +cleanliness that demands soap and baths. This indicates +control of impulse, of the inclination for alcoholic +drinks and the tendency to squander, and an +increase of self-respect which recognizes dirt to be +humiliating. These are activities of the moral feelings, +their material activities.</p> + +<p>If, in spite of these material proofs of the progress +of Morality in all social functions and in many individual +habits, serious-minded men still maintain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> +that it stands still or even that it shows retrogression +compared with former times, this view, which is undoubtedly +a mistaken one, is due to wrong interpretation +of facts.</p> + +<p>Bouillier's remark that "social progress instead +of increasing individual Morality weakens it, because +society, in proportion as it is better organized, saves +the individual the trouble of a number of virtuous +actions" has a perfectly correct point of departure. +Many tasks of neighbourly kindness and humane +joint responsibility which used to be left to the inclination, +the free choice and the noble zeal of individuals, +and could be carried out or neglected by +them, are now methodically fulfilled by the community. +Saint Martin no longer needs to divide his +cloak to give half to a poor shivering man. The +public charity commission gives him winter clothes +if he cannot afford to buy any. No knights are needed +to protect innocence, weakness and humility from +oppressors. The oppressed appeal successfully to the +police, the court of justice, or, by writing to the papers, +to public opinion. There is no need for Knights +Templar or Knights of St. John to care for strangers +and tend the sick. Inns and public hospitals are at +their disposal. To-day there would be neither occasion +nor reason for the miracle of St. Elizabeth of +Hungary, who against the orders of her hard husband +took to the starving bread which was turned into +roses. The poor are regularly fed in municipal +and communal kitchens. Individual deeds of mercy +are less necessary now than formerly, when, if +they occurred, they were the outcome of exception<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>ally +noble and devout sympathy and heroic self-sacrifice.</p> + +<p>One is therefore inclined to believe that men are +less capable of such deeds than they were in the past. +But that is doing them a grave injustice. Dr. Barnardo, +who opened a home for the little waifs and +strays of the East End of London, is not inferior +to St. Vincent de Paul who adopted and brought up +forsaken children. John Brown who suffered a +martyr's death by hanging because he attempted with +arms to liberate the negro slaves of the Southern +States, Henry Dumont who devoted the efforts of a +lifetime to founding the Red Cross to help those +wounded in war, Emile Zola who sacrificed his fortune, +his reputation as an author, his personal safety, +and suffered persecution, calumny, exile, a shameful +condemnation in court, and violent threats to his life +in order to get justice for Captain Dreyfus who had +been wrongfully accused—all these can well compare +with the saints in the Golden Legend. Virtue exists +potentially in as many cases as formerly, probably in +more; and it is actively practised whenever and wherever +it is appealed to.</p> + +<p>Another result of the long evolution of civilization +and Morality is the development of an ethical +instinct in all except abnormal, degenerate individuals, +which causes men to act morally in nearly +all situations without conscious reflection, choice or +effort. The individual who is ethically well grounded, +in whom moral conduct has become an organized +reflex action, does what is right without any conscious +effort, and therefore does not in so doing evoke any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> +idea of merit either in himself or in witnesses. But +to do right habitually, carelessly and almost without +thought, as one breathes and eats, easily makes one +unjust in one's judgments. The battle between +Reason and blind instinct, between the Will and refractory +Impulse, the victory of the lofty principle, +of spirituality over what is irrational and materialistic, +which give us the illusion that free humanity +is superior to the fatality of cosmic forces, have something +so elevated and beautiful about them that we are +disappointed if they are absent, and practical Morality +without this dramatic setting does not appear to be +real Morality.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless we must not give way to this +æsthetic point of view. We must always remember +that Morality has a biological and sociological aim +and must soberly admit that it is all the better if +this aim is realized without in every single case depending +on uncertain individual decisions. It would +be an ideal state of affairs if in a society there were +such clear knowledge of all its vital necessities, and +this had been so inculcated in all its members, that +their harmonious life together and their co-operation +for the common weal would never more be troubled +by the revolt of ruthless individual selfishness against +the love of one's neighbour and willingness to sacrifice +oneself for the community. The ideal of +Morality would be attained, but the concept of Merit +would be transferred from the individual to the community. +Superficial observation might object to finding +in individuals no victorious struggle against resistance, +hence no virtue, and might bemoan the stag<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span>nation, +nay, the retrogression, of Morality. But +whoever views matters as a whole would have to +admit that it would imply the greatest progress in +virtue if the latter from being an individual merit +had become an attribute of the community. I am +far from maintaining that we have reached this ideal +state; but evolution tends unmistakably in this direction; +and this is one of the reasons why Morality may +appear to make no progress.</p> + +<p>The very rise of the community to a higher stage +of Morality may be a fresh cause of error concerning +the progress of Morality. The work of the strongest +and most clear-headed thinkers for many thousand +years, who have bequeathed as a legacy to the community +their lifelong labours for the amelioration of +the lot of mankind, has developed in us an ideal of +active and passive Morality which is always present, +even to the mind of the weak or bad man who cannot +or will not live up to it. By this ideal, which is +that of the community and which we bear within us, +we involuntarily judge real life as we observe it, without +applying the necessary corrections. We necessarily +note a discrepancy between theory and practice, +which appears to us to be not mere inadequacy +but a contradiction of principles, not a quantitative, +but a qualitative difference, and thus he who is not +forewarned easily becomes doubtful, pessimistic, and +bitterly contemptuous of mankind.</p> + +<p>This is the theme with which light literature +unweariedly deals. Novels and the drama constantly +show us types: "Pillars of society" and +other worthy men, who pretend to be honourable,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> +who are full of good principles, preach unctuously +and condemn others with pious indignation, but +who themselves in all situations behave with the +most horrible selfishness and are sinks of iniquity. +The creators of these rogues professing virtue, of +these secret sinners, think they are mightily superior; +they think they know mankind, that they are deceived +by no one and can see deep down into men's souls; +they call their method realism, and they look down +with the greatest contempt upon poets who depict +good, unselfish, noble, in short, moral characters, and +call them optimists, flirts, distillers of rosewater, who +are either too silly or too dishonest to see the truth +or to confess it. If realism happens to be the fashion, +the public believes these men who depict what is +ugly and disgusting, admires them, is impressed by +them, and scorns the idealists who have a better +opinion of mankind.</p> + +<p>However, realism is onesided and exaggerated, +and therefore just as far from the truth as enthusiastic +idealism. It picks out certain characteristics +of human nature, generalizes from them and +neglects the others, thereby libelling mankind. The +same people who in their flat, insipid daily life unhesitatingly +indulge their poor little vanities, their +naïve selfishness, their childish jealousy, their secret +sensuality and their moral cowardice because it is +of no consequence, because it alters nothing in the +general constitution of society, because the community +takes good care that moral principles shall be +maintained, these same people can, on great occasions, +which, however, seldom occur, reveal virtues<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> +which they themselves never suspected and which +we gaze at in blank astonishment with reverent awe. +The hypocritical Philistines of realistic literature, +rotten at the core, when the <i>Titanic</i> sank, during the +plague in Manchuria, at the earthquake of Messina, +in the mine disaster at Courrières, and on Arctic and +Antarctic expeditions, proved to be heroes who came +very near to the theatrical ideal of Morality, if they +did not quite reach it. If one takes the valet's point +of view and observes man in his dressing-gown and +slippers when he does not feel called upon to pull +himself together, one may very well form a poor +opinion of him. But if one considers the actions of +the community and dwells on the loftiest deeds of +individuals, one will no longer believe that the +Morality of the present time is inferior to that of any +other age.</p> + +<p>There is one phenomenon, though, which seems to +prove that those who deny moral progress are in the +right, and that is war. This is indeed the triumph +of the beast in mankind, a bestial trampling under +foot of civilization, its principles, methods and aims, +and it might be adduced as a crushing proof of the +stagnation or retrogression of Morality that to this +very day its horrors can devastate the earth, as they +did hundreds and thousands of years ago, only to an +incomparably greater extent, more cruelly and more +thoroughly. But this, too, would be a false conclusion. +It is certain that the men who take it upon +themselves freely, purposely and intentionally to +make war are monsters; their action is a crime that +cannot be expiated. Unhesitatingly they have re<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span>course +to massacre, robbery, fire and all other horrors +in order to satisfy their devilish self-seeking which +desires the fulfilment of their ambition, that is, of +their self-love and vanity, which covets riches, increase +of power, a ruling position and its privileges. +These they pursue either for themselves or for a +family or caste, and they pretend that they wish to +defend their country from its enemies, to acquire new +boundaries for it affording better protection than the +old, to promote the development of the nation by +getting fresh territory, to spread its civilization and +secure a glorious future for it.</p> + +<p>Nations, however, which allow their rulers to +plunge them into a war of aggression may be +foolish and clumsy, but they need not be immoral. +They are made drunk with phrases which appeal +to their noblest feelings, which their government +and its intellectual bailiffs pour out to them in +overflowing measure; they believe the shameless +lies which are told them boastfully; and this is +undoubtedly a lamentable, mental weakness which +drew from Dante the bitter cry: "Often one hears +the people in their intoxication cry: 'Long live our +death! Down with our life!'" But having simply +accepted these preliminary ideas the people act with +such Morality as one cannot forbear to admire. In +a grand flight they rise superior to all thought of +self, raise their feeling of joint responsibility to the +pitch of heroism and martyrdom, and gladly sacrifice +to their duty to their neighbour and to the community +their possessions, their comfort, their health and +their lives. That is very great virtue whose subjec<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span>tive +merit is no whit diminished by the fact that it +is manifested in a cause that is objectively unjust. +And this virtue on the part of nations which have +been misled was never so widespread or so real as now. +The attitude of mercenaries who served the highest +bidder, the lack of ideals among the soldiers who followed +foreign conquerors at whose command they +tyrannized over nations who did not concern them at +all, the cynicism of the leaders who unhesitatingly +went over to the enemy and fought against their own +country and people, these are things that are not to +be found nowadays and are almost unthinkable. No +Napoleon of to-day could lead the men of Würtemberg +and Bavaria to Spain and Russia, nor could an +Elector of Hesse sell recruits to England for the +conquest of North America; no Louis XIV could +induce a Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to fight his battles +against German adversaries, no Constable of Bourbon +ally himself with Spain against his native France. +Leonidas, once admired and praised as an exception, +is to-day the rule. "The guards who die but do not +yield" are to be found on every battlefield nowadays.</p> + +<p>In modern warfare a higher, more perfect Morality +of the masses obtains than was the case in +the past. That war itself is the most immoral thing +does not detract from the moral worth of those who +are led and misled. The masses lack insight and judgment, +their understanding is not sufficiently developed +to realize the bestiality of the rulers who put them to +such evil use; but the way they suppress their own +feelings, the way their will controls their impulses,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> +their social discipline, in short, their Morality, is +admirable. Moreover, the conscience of mankind revolts +more and more against the wickedness of war, +and the best men of the time are striving to bring +the mutual relations of nations, like those of individuals, +within the jurisdiction of Law and Morality. +Morality will doubtless at no distant date do away +with war, as it has abolished human sacrifice, slavery, +blood feuds, head hunting and cannibalism.</p> + +<p>No phenomenon of individual worthlessness observed +within a narrow sphere can detract from the +fact that the community constantly improves. A +pessimistic view of the development of Morality has +no justification. Progress of civilization implies progress +of Morality, its most important instrument in +the work of adapting the race to the immutable conditions +of its existence.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<h3>THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY</h3> + + +<p>The concept of Morality includes an idea of +compulsion, of coercion. A voice says to +man: "You must!" or "You may not!" +It commands him to do, or to refrain from doing, +something. If he obeys, all is well; but if he takes +no notice of it, pays no heed to it, the question arises: +"What now? Will the voice rest content with crying +in the wilderness? Will it not mind speaking to +deaf ears? Will the refractory individual not suffer +for disregarding it, or has it means to enforce obedience, +and what are these means?"</p> + +<p>The answer to this question depends on what view +one holds as to the nature of this monitory, warning, +commanding voice. Whoever believes in Kant's +categorical imperative must admit that this word of +command is denuded of all power of coercion and +must absolutely rely on the good will of the individual +in whose soul it makes itself heard. According to +Kant the moral law aims at no extraneous result, no +utility. It is its own aim and object. But its own +aim is fulfilled as soon as the categorical imperative +has spoken, whether the individual acts in accordance +with it or not. It has therefore in principle no +sanction.</p> + +<p>True, Kant contradicts himself, for after having<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> +sternly excluded from his doctrine all utility as +the end of Morality, all trace of feeling from +moral action, he smuggles blissful happiness in by +a back door; the result of submission to the moral +law and its dutiful fulfilment, he declares, will be +bliss. Bliss, however you interpret it, is a pleasurable +emotion. Whether you act morally with the declared +intention of attaining the pleasurable emotion +of bliss, or whether this pleasurable emotion comes +of its own accord as an undesired reward when you +have acted morally merely from a feeling of duty, +without a thought for such a result, without a wish +to attain it, it makes no difference to the fact that +moral action actually meets with a reward. Kant +does not openly promise this, but with a wink he +whispers in your ear that there is a prospect of it.</p> + +<p>Nor does it alter the further fact that Kant, having +contemptuously expelled Eudæmonism from his +system, reinstates it with full honours. Once it has +been conceded that moral conduct makes man blissful, +in other words gives him a reward, the categorical +imperative also has a sanction, albeit a very insufficient +one. He who fulfils the moral law attains bliss; +that is a spur whether you admit it or not. But he +who does not fulfil it loses this advantage, otherwise, +however, nothing happens to him. The sanction, +therefore, is onesided. A reward is offered for the +fulfilment of the moral law, but there is no punishment +for its non-fulfilment. For it is no penalty if +bliss is withheld from him who has no conception of +it and no desire for it. No matter, then, if the moral +law be eternal and immutable as the stars above us,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> +if it be categorical, if it be fulfilled, not owing to a +conception of its effect, not from liking for this effect, +but from an inner necessity, it ceases to be a living +force for mankind or to have any practical significance; +for the single thread which unites it with +human feelings—the whispered, vague promise of +bliss—is too thin. Feeling which has no knowledge +of this misty bliss, and therefore no yearning for +it, is uninfluenced by the categorical moral law. +Reason is not necessarily convinced that it is right +and valid. The moral law abides like the stars with +which it is arbitrarily compared, itself a star in airless +space, pursuing its course regardless of humanity, +having no relation to it or connexion with it; regard +for or disregard of the moral law makes no perceptible +difference, and it ceases to have any but a kind +of astronomical interest for mankind, a purely theoretical +interest for purposes of scientific observation +and calculation, and is in no way applicable to the +feelings, thoughts and actions of men.</p> + +<p>Theological Morality adopts a widely different +point of view. Its logic compels it to provide the +most effective sanctions. God is the lawgiver of +Morality. He prescribes with dictatorial omniscience +what is good, what is bad, what should be practised +and what avoided. Obedience earns a glorious reward, +revolt entails the most terrible punishment. +Reward and punishment are eternal, or may in certain +circumstances be so, and this, by the way, is +cruelty which ill accords with the universal goodness +ascribed to God. For human understanding will +never be persuaded, will never be able to grasp, that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> +a sinner, however grave and numerous his sins committed +during the brief period of the fleeting life of +man, can ever deserve an eternity of the most fearful +punishment. The lack of proportion between the +deed and the penalty is so monstrous that it is felt +to be the gravest injustice, against which both Reason +and feeling revolt. Imagination can conceive hell +fire that lasts a certain time and has an aim, like life +with its praiseworthy and wicked deeds, but it boggles +at the idea of a hell from which there is no escape +and the agonies of which are endless.</p> + +<p>The Old Testament conceives the sanctions of the +moral law enunciated by God in a thoroughly realistic +manner. Fulfil the commandment "that thy days may +be long in the land." If you disobey, the curse of the +Lord will be on you and you will be pursued by His +anger unto the fourth generation. Christianity considered +it dubious to make this life the scene of reward +and punishment. It is imprudent to let divine justice +rule here below, so to say, in public, before an audience +and representatives of the Press who attentively +follow the proceedings, watch all its details, and can +judge whether the verdict is put into execution. +Prudence demands that the trial should take place +in the next world, where it is protected from annoying +curiosity. Mocking onlookers cannot then +observe that it is only in the dramas of noble-minded +poets that in the last act vice is inevitably punished +and virtue rewarded, while in real life only too often +merit starves, suffers humiliation and poverty and +altogether leads a miserable existence, while sin +flourishes in an objectionable manner and to the very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> +end revels in all the good things of this earth. However, +the religious moralists painted such a vivid +and arresting picture of what awaits the sinners in +the next world, that if men had not been obdurate in +their disbelief they must have shudderingly realized +it, as if it actually happened in this world. +Words from the pulpit admonishing men to obey +God's law under penalty of most terrible punishment +were greatly emphasized by the paintings and sculpture +over the altars and the church doors, where all +the tortures of hell were depicted by great artists who +put all their imagination and all their genius into the +work.</p> + +<p>As innumerable people have testified, these +representations were taken so literally, not only by +the simple-minded masses but also by the more +highly educated, that they were haunted by them, +waking and sleeping, and imagined that in their own +flesh they felt the torture of flames, of boiling pitch, +of the prick of the pitchfork as the devil turned +them on the grid, of the teeth with which the spirits +of hell tore their flesh from their bones. The fear +of hell poisoned many a life up till quite recently, +especially in Scotland, and kept people in a constant +state of agitation and anguish which occasionally +rose to mad despair. It is remarkable that only +punishment was so impressively held up to man's +view, but not reward. Pictures of paradise are much +less rich and varied than those of hell, and its joys +are peculiarly modest. The inventive powers of +painters, sculptors, and poets did not rise above a +beautifully illuminated hall where the blessed are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> +ranged around God's throne and with folded hands +sing hymns of praise to Him, while angels play an +accompaniment on trumpets and fiddles. A prayer +meeting, a choir and a concert of music, that is all +that Christian eschatology holds out as an eternal +reward to virtue. It redounds to its credit that it +assumes a sufficiently modest taste among the good +to make them long for these joys and find infinite +happiness in them.</p> + +<p>Islam does not count on such moderation. The +joys of paradise that it promises are so crudely +sensual that they may well arouse lust in coarse +natures, and can counterbalance the fear of hell +fire. The ideas of the reward of merit in the hereafter +held by the northern nations, Germans and +Scandinavians, are just as low and coarse. For the +Mohamedans paradise is a harem; for the worshippers +of Odin it is a pot-house where there are free +drinks and a jolly brawl to end up with. Heroes who +fall in battle—they knew no virtues but a warlike +spirit and contempt of death—enter Valhalla, where +they partake of the everlasting orgies of the gods, +drink unlimited quantities of mead and beer, and +fight for them to their heart's content without taking +any harm. The North American Indians hope, after +leading a model life, to be gathered to the Great +Spirit, and in the happy hunting grounds of heaven +evermore to kill abundant game. Only Buddhism +comforts the virtuous man with finer and more +spiritual hopes. From out his world of weariness +and pessimism it opens up the prospect of Nirvana +to him, that is, of the end of all feeling, which after<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> +all can only be painful, and of all thought, which +after all is only melancholy and despair, and of the +volatilization of the personality, the only real release; +while it condemns the sinner to the worst punishment, +continued existence in ever new incarnations.</p> + +<p>These are indeed extraordinarily vigorous sanctions, +which, though they fail to have any effect on +the unbeliever, make a very deep impression on the +believer, and are well fitted to determine his actions. +But they imply a debasement of the motives for leading +a moral life, which are no longer the outcome +of insight and a convinced desire for good, but the +result of fear and avidity, a speculation for profit, +a prudent flight from danger. The practice of +morality becomes a safe investment for the father of +a family who hopes to find his savings augmented +by interest in the hereafter, and the avoidance of +vice becomes a schoolboy's fear of punishment. +Nevertheless, the view is widely held by superficial, +practical men that these imaginary and deceptive sanctions +of Morality cannot be dispensed with, that only +the fear of hell can keep the masses from giving themselves +up to every form of vice and crime, that only the +promise of paradise is capable of inducing them to +act unselfishly and make sacrifices, and that all bonds +of discipline would be loosened if they ceased to believe +in a last judgment and an hereafter with its +rewards and punishments.</p> + +<p>This whole system of sanctions in a future life +is a transcendental projection (according with primitive, +childlike thought) of immanent practices and +forms in the positive administration of justice which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> +are transferred to a class of actions that successfully +evade it. Traditional and customary Law, as +well as written Law, puts its whole emphasis on sanctions; +it partakes itself of the nature of a sanction. +Without sanctions it has no meaning. It is not +kindly counsel, nor fatherly admonition, nor wise +advice, it is a stern command, it is coercion, and this +arouses only scorn if it is not armed with the means to +make itself a reality to which the unwilling must also +submit, because they cannot help themselves. There +is no law, there can be no law, which is not supplemented +by arrangements that make it binding for +everyone.</p> + +<p>In the British House of Commons it has been +customary for many hundred years to designate members +as the representatives of their particular constituency. +Only if a member commits a grave offence +against the rules of the House does he run the risk +of the Speaker's calling him by name, but this +case has not arisen within the memory of man. A +disrespectful Irish member of Parliament, urged by +perverse curiosity, asked the Speaker one day: +"What would happen if you called me by my +name?" The Speaker thought for a short time and +then answered with impressive gravity: "I have no +idea, but it must be something terrible." Such a +mysterious threat of an unknown catastrophe may +suffice for a picked assembly whose members would +no doubt maintain order and observe all the rules of +parliamentary decency, even if they were not held in +check by the fear of some dark danger. It would +not be sufficient by a long way to guarantee the rule<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> +of Law in a society which includes individuals of +the most varied disposition, mind development, education +and strength of impulse.</p> + +<p>Positive Law, as I have shown, presents a very +simplified excerpt of Morality for the use of coarser +natures. It is a summary of the minimum of self-denial, +consideration for one's fellow men, and the +feeling of joint responsibility, the observance of which +the community must pitilessly demand from all its +members if it is to continue to exist and not fall back +within a very short time into the state of Hobbes's war +of all against all. The necessity of self-preservation +makes it a duty for the community to provide for the +case that one of its members refuses to accept the +minimum of discipline and to recognize the claims of +another personality. The community prevents this +revolt, which would frustrate its aim and endanger its +existence, by employing physical force to break all +resistance to the Law which it must, for the common +weal, impose on all its members. That is an extraneous +compulsion that certainly has something brutal +and unworthy of man about it and may well arouse +discomfort in more highly developed minds. It +would undoubtedly be more dignified and better if +there were no need for the handcuffs of the police, +for prison cells and executioners, if man's own insight +and the admonition of his conscience were enough +to constrain everyone to respect the Law, that is, to +practise a minimum of Morality.</p> + +<p>But the community cannot wait until this stage +of moral development has been generally attained. +It refuses to entrust its existence to the spiritual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> +purity of all its members. On principle it disregards +processes in the consciousness of the +individual—I have cited in an earlier chapter +the few exceptions to this rule: investigation +as to premeditation, accountability, freedom from +undue influence—and keeps to actions which alone it +judges. It declares itself incompetent to pronounce +sentence upon a "storm inside a skull," to quote +Victor Hugo. Its sphere is that of obvious facts. +Not until subjective impulses and decisions are +manifested in outward form does it intervene with +methods of the same order, with outward coercion. +The sanctions of its law are material, are punishments +and fines. It hits the wrongdoer over the head +and on his hands and forcibly empties his pockets. +To look into his soul and set matters to rights there +is a task undertaken much later by law-givers. It +was only after they had remembered that the source +of law is Morality and that its ultimate aim is not the +bare attainment of a state of mutual respect for one +another's rights, but the education of the community +to a universal condition of self-discipline, consideration +and neighbourly love, that the law-givers made a +point not only of requiting the bad man's misdeeds, +but also of trying to elevate him morally.</p> + +<p>At different times, at different stages of civilization, +and according to the current views of the universe, +society has interpreted in different ways the +punishment it inflicts and which it carries out by +forcible means, so as to ensure respect for its laws. +Its original character is that of revenge for an offence. +The wrongdoer has offended the community, it attacks<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> +him furiously and breaks every bone in his body just +as an angry individual would do in his first access of +indignation. That is Draco's penal code. That is +the law of literal requital. The special characteristic +of this sanction is its violence and lack of moderation. +It does not trouble to find the right proportion between +punishment and crime. It does not carefully +and fairly weigh the force of its blows. The club +falls with a frightful crash, but its dynamical effect +is not calculated beforehand in kilogrammetres. +"The stab of a knife is not measured," as an Italian +proverb says. Thus conceived, punishment has something +primitive about it, something intolerably barbarous. +The community does the very things it +was created, by Morality and Law, to prevent; it +exercises the right of the stronger against the challenger; +it promotes war, not that of all against all, +but of all against one, and its punishment is an act +of war.</p> + +<p>In a strongly religious society which lives in the +idea of immediate community with the deity, every +transgression of the law is felt to be a sin against the +gods, and the punishment becomes an expiation +offered to them so as to avert their dangerous anger +from the commonwealth. In the administration of +justice dim religious ideas are mingled, punishment +is tinged with a veneer of civilization, the culprit is, +so to speak, offered as a sacrifice to the gods. This +supernatural view was prolonged by the Inquisition, +at least for a certain class of offences, until almost +modern times.</p> + +<p>When society awakens to the consciousness that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> +its bond of union is Morality, and that its most important +task is to educate its members in Morality, it +introduces the concept of betterment into its penal +system. It wants not only to punish the wrongdoer +sharply but also to transform him inwardly and purify +him. He is to feel that the punishment is not only +a requital but a mental benefit. In the Austrian army, +until corporal punishment was abolished, it was a rule +that the soldier, after being flogged, should approach +the officer on duty and say, as he saluted, "I thank +you for the kind punishment." That is the attitude +that society, when it gives a moralizing tendency to +its penal laws, wishes the person who has been punished +to attain. In this there is much pleasing self-deception +not unmixed with a good deal of hypocrisy. +Penal law offers the wrongdoer but little scope for +improvement.</p> + +<p>All misdemeanours and crimes flow from three +sources: ignorance, passion and innate, anti-social +self-seeking. Ignorance is the main, almost +the exclusive cause of wrongdoing among young +criminals who have been badly brought up or +neglected, who have never had anything but bad +examples before them, and who cannot distinguish +between good and evil. Society may hope to improve +these by right treatment; it must not punish, it must +educate them. Men who commit crimes from passion +are those who possess a consciousness of Morality and +a conscience, who know quite well what is right and +what wrong, but have not sufficient strength of character, +that is, not an adequately developed power of +inhibition, to resist an opportunity, a temptation, a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> +turmoil of their instincts. To want to improve them +is senseless, for they are not bad; they are weak, or +at any rate not strong enough. What they need is +a strengthening of their character, of their faculty of +inhibition, and to achieve this is beyond the power of +society. All it can do is to humiliate the guilty party +by publicly exposing his lapse and by condemning +him, and then grant a delay of the execution of the +sentence. In so doing it says to him: "You have +acted basely and ought to be ashamed of yourself, +now go and do not do it again." If the warning is +unavailing and he relapses, then the earlier sentence, +as well as the new one, is executed. Fear of this +is added to his motives for acting honestly, and may +possibly strengthen his resistance to the onslaught of +his evil instincts. But his good conduct will always +be at stake in the struggle between his power of inhibition +and his instincts, and the stronger of the two +will always carry the day. And finally, upon the man +whose organic disposition makes him anti-social, upon +Lombroso's born criminal, society can have no educative +effect whatever. It is a hopeless case. Society +can render him harmless, it cannot alter him. Consideration +for his neighbour will never find a place +in his consciousness. He will never learn to resist +his impulses and desires. His spiritual insensibility +makes him indifferent to the sufferings of others. +Incapable of continuous and equable effort, he will +always want to prey on society by begging, deceiving, +stealing and robbing. He has no conscience and does +not hear the voice of society in his mind. He knows +nothing of good and evil, which are both empty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> +phrases for him, words without any meaning, and he +is convinced that he acts rightly every time he seeks +to satisfy his appetites. In his case it is love's labour +lost to try and give a moral meaning to the sanctions +of the law. Punishment is not directed against the +soul of the born criminal, only against his body. It +overwhelms him, fetters him and makes him either +for the time being, or permanently, harmless; but his +organic tendency continues to sway him, and whenever +he recovers his liberty he is the same as before he was +punished.</p> + +<p>The Mystics give to punishment the character of +fatherly and chastening discipline by which the sinner +expiates his crime and is purged of the sin; thus it +purifies him and leads him back to the state of innocence; +a kind of anticipatory hell fire which enables +him to enter paradise. In "Gorgias" Plato says +explicitly: "He who is punished is liberated from +the evil of his soul." And the Apostle Paul teaches +us: "Punishment is ordained for the betterment of +man." Criminal anthropology recognizes that it is +useless to expect this moralizing and redeeming effect +from punishment. Lombroso altogether rejects punishment +as a means of discipline and expiation, and +before him Bentham and J. S. Mill, and simultaneously +with him and after him Fouillée, Guyau and +Maudsley adopted the same view. According to +them the sanction of criminal law, which extends and +completes it and ensures its efficacy, can have no other +aim than the law itself, and this aim is to defend +society against its active enemies, if possible by +converting them, if necessary by forcible subjugation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span></p> + +<p>In a book which is full of interest, but whose value +is considerably diminished by a strong admixture of +mysticism, "Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation +ni sanction," M. Guyau goes much farther than the +criminal anthropologists and sociological opponents +of punishment, and expresses the somewhat paradoxical +view that "the real sanction seems to imply +complete freedom from punishment for the crime +committed, as punishment for any action that has +been accomplished is useless." It is quite correct +that no punishment under the sun can undo what has +been done. But it is not feasible for that reason to +dispense with all punishment for misdeeds and to call +this systematic freedom from punishment a sanction. +Guyau overlooks the fact that the punishment is +directed not to the crime but the perpetrator. It certainly +alters nothing in a past transgression of the +law, and that is not its object, but it may possibly +have the effect of preventing fresh misdeeds on the +part of the same wrongdoer or of others, and that +would justify it.</p> + +<p>If society must renounce the idea of improving +the misdemeanant, especially the man whose organic +tendencies make him a criminal and who is the most +dangerous and commits the most numerous and worst +crimes, it nevertheless assumes that it makes an impression +on morally doubtful characters by punishing +misdemeanours and crimes, that it warns them and +prevents them from erring. That is the theory of +intimidation, which also has many opponents. It +will hardly be denied that psychologically it is well +founded. The conception of the evil consequences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> +for himself that his action may entail strengthens the +impulsive man's power of inhibition when he is about +to do wrong, and perhaps enables him to overcome +his immoral instinct. Only it is difficult to measure +the force which the thought of punishment adds to +the effort of inhibition. This force does not come +into question at all with the man who sins occasionally +from passion. The flood of his impulses sweeps +away all barriers which reason may oppose, and their +power of resistance is not materially increased by the +fear of consequences, because the mental horizon is +completely darkened at the time of the storm and no +prevision is possible. The criminal from organic +causes exercises no inhibition. He knows that society +condemns his actions, but he is convinced of his personal +right to carry them out, and fears no punishment, +because he hopes to escape it, and tries his utmost by +means of planning, prudence and self-control to outwit +society. The theory of intimidation is not applicable +to these two classes of criminals, and they constitute +a large proportion of the army of wrongdoers against +which society has to defend itself by force.</p> + +<p>But there remains the great number of mediocre +natures whose sympathy with their fellow men, the +emotional foundation of the subjective impulse to +Morality, is only slightly developed, who have a superficial +veneer of Morality, who act honourably out of +prudence, but who would feel no repugnance towards +perpetrating profitable misdeeds, if they were certain +that they would incur no risk. These insipid characters +whose emotional temperature oscillates round +about freezing point and who are incapable of great<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> +excitement, of passion, would see no reason to resist +any temptation, to disregard any favourable opportunity, +if the penal code, the judge and the policeman +did not warn them to be careful. For this kind of +man the penal sanction is really a useful and perhaps +an indispensable means of prevention, and it has been +thought out and developed by the community with a +view to such people.</p> + +<p>Not content with theoretical considerations, people +have also appealed to practical experience to test the +theory of intimidation. In some countries capital +punishment was either legally abolished or tacitly +suppressed, the judges either refraining from pronouncing +the sentence on the prisoner or the head of +the state, when appealed to, commuting it by an act +of pardon to loss of liberty. Statistics seemed to +show that serious crimes meriting the death penalty +increased, and capital punishment was reintroduced +or the practice of systematic pardons was abandoned, +with the alleged result that the worst crimes grew less +numerous. I express myself doubtfully, because I do +not think that the statistics were sufficiently conclusive. +They embraced too small a number of cases and too +short a period of time. It cannot be conclusively +proved that the abolition of the death penalty resulted +in an increase of capital crimes; but it is certain that +crimes were never more frequent or more horrible than +in the times when criminal justice was most cruel and +made use of the most terrible sanctions. Up to the +dawn of modern times legal torture was administered, +at every street corner there were gallows, the poor +wretch under sentence of death was pinched with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> +red-hot pincers, the executioner tore the flesh from +his bones, poured boiling pitch over him, cut out his +tongue, hacked off his hands, broke him on the wheel +or burnt him alive; executions were a sort of public +entertainment or popular holiday, and efforts were +made to attract as many spectators as possible; every +inhabitant of one of the larger towns was familiar +from childhood with the horrid spectacle of mutilated +human bodies writhing in torture, and there rang in +his ears the echo of the screams of pain and of the +shrill death rattle of the victims. But these impressions +were so far from intimidating the gaping crowd +that many hurried from the place of execution to +commit the most execrable crimes, the punishment of +which they had just witnessed; consequently punishments +have gradually been made less cruel, and the +public is excluded from executions, which clearly +indicates a decisive rejection of the theory of +intimidation.</p> + +<p>The truth is that the severity of the punishment +has no effect upon the frequency or the savagery of +crimes. The criminality of a community depends on +the value and emphasis of the moral education which +it bestows upon the rising generation. It can prevent +its members, at any rate the average, normal type, +from developing into criminals. But the fear of +punishment has no deterrent effect upon those whose +criminal impulses have not been subjugated by social +discipline. The severity of the punishment does not +contribute anything to the defence of society. It only +proves that the lawgiver and the criminal judges are +on the lowest level of civilization which corresponds<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> +to a widespread and barbarous criminality, and that +their modes of thought and feeling are horribly like +those of the criminals whom they sentence to torture, +the gallows, and the wheel.</p> + +<p>Positive law aims at defending society, and tries +to attain its end by punishing transgressions. It provides +no reward for conscientious obedience. The +law has no honours to bestow on blamelessness and +virtue. Society felt the want of this and made attempts +to encourage honourable conduct by conferring +distinctions, just as it tries to intimidate vice by +punishing crime. These attempts were not particularly +happy. The bestowal of titles and orders is +no recognition of virtue, but a means adopted by +governments to ensure devotion to power. An +arrangement was made in some places to honour +model citizens in public and crown them with laurels, +but it soon came to grief owing to indifference and +mockery. A private individual wanted to fill this gap +in social institutions. The Count of Montyon, a son +of the eighteenth century, whose philosophy he had +imbibed, instituted the prizes for virtue which are distributed +annually by the French Academy. They +are bestowed on modest integrity in humble circumstances +which has manifested a sense of duty, neighbourly +love and self-sacrifice. This friend of man has +had few imitators, and that is understandable. Sound +common sense realizes that rewards like the Montyon +prizes for virtue do not with the infallibility of a +natural law fall to the lot of merit, but are nearly +always adjudicated to the prizewinner by chance, by +recommendation, and by all sorts of influences that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> +have nothing to do with virtue; and it seems unjust +that among equal claims some should be satisfied +while others, the great majority, are not. It would be +vain to contend that one virtue which goes empty-handed +is not unfairly treated when another gets a +benefit on which it has not counted, and that in a +moral character, such as alone would be eligible for +a prize for virtue, there is no room for envy. That +would be the moral of the Gospel concerning the +labourers who came at the eleventh hour, which has +met with opposition from others besides the contemporaries +of Jesus.</p> + +<p>On the whole, the community has never felt called +upon to solve the moral problem of the reward of +virtue. It has always contented itself with the punishment +of vice and has given its law threatening, but +not encouraging, sanctions. This attitude shows that it +has always had a clear conception of its moral task. +In its positive law it never included anything but that +minimum of Morality that was absolutely necessary +to its existence, and without which it would dissolve +into its original elements, its order would be replaced +by chaos, by the war of all against all. It must insist +on the observance of this minimum; it must use +forcible means to achieve this. But it does not feel +justified in demanding more than this minimum, because +more is not claimed by its instinct of self-preservation. +A surplus of virtue over and above +the amount necessary for the life of society is desirable; +but it does not lie within the scope of the +natural functions of the community, determined by its +organic necessities, to achieve this by compulsion and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> +the provision of legal rewards as an encouragement. +It is the business of the individual to work at his own +moral improvement, and the community cannot interfere +directly in the matter. It is enough that it +encourage this work indirectly by bestowing care +on the culture and education of the individual, by +making it the duty of its public schools to inculcate +good principles, and by creating a public opinion +which surrounds all the activities of higher morality +with admiration, respect and gratitude. The moral +education of the individual is not an object with +which laws are concerned; it is the result of the constant, +vital influence of the community, and can have +no sanction other than the increase of well-being of +every single person within the social union, which is +a natural consequence of raising the moral level of +the community.</p> + +<p>The penal sanctions of positive law have a gross +materialism about them corresponding to the definite +concreteness of the actions with which positive law +deals. The broad field of Morality, however, which +is outside the narrow sphere of the laws, has no room +for sanctions of a material nature. The penalties +prescribed by law are directed to actions which, if they +became general, would in a very short space of time +result in the dissolution of society. The community +essays by forcible measures to prevent this kind of +action, and these measures more or less fulfil their +aim, whether you interpret their use on the theory +of discipline, of expiation and purification by repentance, +of improvement and moral re-birth, or of intimidation. +All these theories were invented later<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> +on, after the community had been convinced by experience +that punishment, if it does not entirely +prevent crime, at least limits it sufficiently to make +the continued existence of society possible, and more +or less to guarantee to its members the safety of their +life, their property and their personal dignity.</p> + +<p>Against transgressions of the moral law, the results +of which are not immediately obvious, such as ruthless +selfishness, blunted sympathy and lack of active +neighbourly kindness, the community does not proceed +with forcible measures; firstly, because it cannot establish +their existence convincingly and hence cannot +try them in a court of justice, and secondly, because +it does not recognize them as constituting an immediate +danger to its existence. Now, as the sanctions +set up by society are not applicable to these +transgressions, an individual whose mind does not +penetrate very far into matters is disquieted, for +accustomed as he is to the spectacle of the steady +justice of the state, he seeks the counterpart in the +forms of this justice in the world of Morality, and +does not discover it at the first glance. He asks +anxiously where are the police, the public prosecutor, +the examining magistrate, the criminal court, the +prison for sins against Morality, and invents them, +since he cannot find them. He transfers to the hereafter +the sanctions of Morality, which are not visible +on earth. He cannot make up his mind to renounce +them, because the fact that sins against the moral +law go unpunished would seem to him to indicate +intolerable anarchy, comparable with the state of a +community where everyone could murder, rob and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> +mutilate to his heart's content without incurring the +risk of the least personal unpleasantness.</p> + +<p>In the sphere of the moral law punishment certainly +does not follow hot foot upon crime, but it +nevertheless does not fail to appear, and becomes +visible when the eye is capable of embracing long +periods of time and of tracing intricate connexions. +The sanctions of the moral law differ from those of +criminal law, but they are not wanting. They are +of a subjective and of an objective character. The +subjective punishment for a sin against the laws of +Morality is remorse. It is inflicted by the inner judge +who rules in the consciousness of the individual, by +conscience, and penetrates to the very deepest depths +of a person's mind which no outward punishment imposed +by the community ever reaches. It is not only +religious and political martyrs who endure torture +and death with proud serenity, conscious that they are +morally immeasurably superior to their executioners; +even common criminals remain perfectly unmoved by +their punishment and regret only that they are weaker +than their captors. Prisons are full of convicts who +look upon their condition as that of prisoners of war. +They have been worsted in their battle with law. +That seems to them a misfortune but not a disgrace. +They are neither humble nor contrite, but revengeful. +They are determined and ready to take up the duel +with society as soon as an opportunity offers and they +may hope to do so with some prospect of success.</p> + +<p>But remorse is an unresisting submission to the +verdict of conscience and the consciousness of one's +own unworthiness. It is the recognition of the justice<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> +of the sentence which brands one, and the constant, +anguished realization that one's personality has been +deservedly humiliated, dishonoured and deprived of +its rights. As a spiritual process, remorse causes the +sinner continually to relive the misdeed he committed, +while at the same time he is fully conscious of its +atrocity. The ego becomes dual, one part active, the +other watching and judging. The one again and +again perpetrates its misdeed, the other looks on +horrified and suffers agonies. It is one long torture +and disgrace of self. Remorse condemns the sinner +perpetually to repeat in his mind the deed which fills +him with horror of himself. This state of mind is the +nearest approach to eternal damnation in hell. There +is only one means of temporary escape: to extinguish +memory by narcotics. That is why remorse not +seldom leads to drunkenness. Shakespeare, with a +poet's infallible insight into the soul, has grasped +and depicted the nature of remorse, the uninterrupted, +torturing presence of the misdeed in man's consciousness. +Lady Macbeth sees her hands ever stained +with the blood of the innocent royal victim whom she +herself did not even murder, and she complains that +"all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little +hand." Leontes, in the "Winter's Tale," on hearing +of Hermione's alleged death, of which he believes +himself guilty, mourns:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +<span style="margin-left: 10em;">"Once a day I'll visit</span><br /> +The chapel where they lie; and tears shed there<br /> +Shall be my recreation: so long as nature<br /> +Will bear up with this exercise, so long<br /> +I daily vow to use it."</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span></p> + +<p>Remorse is the most effective of the subjective +sanctions of Morality; it is almost too effective, for +owing to its duration and severity the punishment +easily grows disproportionate to the crime. But it +has one great disadvantage, it affects only better +natures who have an active conscience and spiritual +delicacy, while it spares the wicked who have no +conscience, who perpetrate their misdeeds contentedly, +without a qualm, and regret them only when +they are discovered and lead to unpleasantness.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the actions of these hardened sinners +do not go quite unpunished. Moral law always takes +vengeance for transgressions, but not directly on the +evildoer. In addition to the subjective, it also has +an objective sanction; when it is violated retribution +falls on the community. The masses have a dim idea +that every evil deed meets with requital and express +it in the proverb that "Though the mills of God +grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small." They +have noticed that the curse of an evil deed never fails +to come, and is consummated with crushing force, +only that it does not happen at once. It seems objectionably +unjust that the culprit should not feel +the effect of his crime, whilst others do who were +not born when it was perpetrated. But the concept +of retributory justice is as little applicable to the far-reaching +relations in the life of humanity as to the +actions of the laws of Nature, for instance gravity +or electricity. Morality is, as I have shown, an +adaptation of the species to the natural conditions in +which it is forced to live. Morality, therefore, has +an aim, which is to make social life in common pos<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>sible +for the individual, this life alone enabling him +to maintain his existence amid the conditions obtaining +on this earth. The discipline which Morality +imposes on the individual leaves him a certain amount +of free play. If he escapes from this discipline to +a certain small extent which does not threaten the +existence of society, this revolt has no ill effect upon +the life of the species, the latter has no grounds for +punishing him, and the only, yet sufficient, sanction +of the loose Morality of an undisciplined individual +lies in the fact that he is more or less inferior to +the most perfect type of the species, and visibly bears +the stamp of his worthlessness in his character, his +bearing and his mode of thought. But if in his disregard +of Morality the individual goes so far as to +frustrate its aim and endanger the existence of +society, then the latter must either find ways and +means of rendering the culprit harmless or else it +overlooks his misdeed and thereby becomes an +accessory and justly suffers the evils consequent +upon a deterioration of Morals which is universally +tolerated.</p> + +<p>The means by which a society must defend +the Morality necessary to its existence can only be +spiritual, for it is not a question of breaches of the +positive law which result in the intervention of justice +and of material penalties, but of a disregard of +the commands of Morality, which are not drawn up +in paragraphs. Public opinion suffices to rouse the +individual who despises the Moral law to an uncomfortable +sense of his unworthiness; if he finds +himself treated with contempt and sees disapproval<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> +and dislike in everyone's face, either he will be +spurred to an effort to overcome his immoral instincts +or his self-respect will suffer from the universal +contempt with which he meets; and this +suffering is his punishment, therefore it is the sanction +of a breach of the Moral law.</p> + +<p>If public opinion does not keep careful and +severe watch, such as may be termed the function of +a higher moral police, then inevitably the moral tone +of the whole society will sink to a lower level, and +this will result in making life harder and more difficult, +and in certain circumstances may lead to dissolution. +This is not a theoretical assumption, but +an observed fact, a lesson taught by history. +It tells us of epochs in which the licentiousness +of individuals, favoured by a society too dull, +weak and indifferent to stand up against bad examples, +succeeded in corrupting all classes. Such +a period is exemplified by the fall of Rome. Common +natures indulged and wallowed in every vice, +the better ones felt such disgust for a life without +nobility and virtue that they discarded it, and the +community lost all excuse of joint responsibility and +became so loosely knit together that it was incapable +of common effort or sacrifice, and collapsed miserably +at the first onslaught of a foreign aggressor +tempted by its depravity.</p> + +<p>The disintegration of a society, the sanction of +its sins against Morality, is a slow process. It does +not often take place catastrophically, with theatrical +effect, so that even a dull observer can grasp the +connexion between cause and effect. But whoever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> +investigates closely will realize that all evils from +which society suffers, which make life more bitter and +harder for its members, are ultimately due to defective +Morality. What are class struggles with their +consequent hostilities between groups of the same +nation, their coercion and damage, but manifestations +of self-seeking, lack of consideration and injustice, +that is, of Immorality? Would they be +possible if members of all classes, capitalists and +workers, agriculturists and townsmen, rulers and subjects +were inspired by neighbourly kindness, understanding +and appreciation of the needs, pretensions +and feelings of their opponents, and by a spirit of +self-sacrifice? Would the decay of character, the +arbitrariness and arrogance of the mighty, the +cowardly slavishness of the masses, with the resultant +rottenness of public affairs, be conceivable if individuals +were conscious of their dignity and their +duty to themselves and the community, and if they +had the strength and the determination to overcome +their fear of men? Could wars of aggression bring +ruin upon mankind if leading personalities did not +give way to the desire for outward honours, to the +hunger for power, to avarice, to the itch of vanity, +that is to the lowest forms of selfishness, and if the +masses out of stupidity or fear of a mental effort, +and out of dread for their personal responsibility +did not allow themselves to be misused for base +purposes?</p> + +<p>Thus we find insufficient Morality in individuals, +or the complete lack of it, to be at the root +of all evils with which the community is afflicted,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> +and we are justified in conceiving war, party quarrels, +collisions between groups representing different interests, +revolutions, in fact, all tragedies of life in +societies with the suffering and destruction they +entail, as the penal sanction of sins against Morality. +Morality, which was created to facilitate life for the +individual or to make it at all possible for him, is no +longer able to fulfil its aim, and the society finds +itself by its own fault back in the condition of misery +and fear, owing to which its instinct of self-preservation +originally forced it to make the effort of setting +up the Moral law. Even the most merciless zealot +cannot wish for a more efficacious and painful punishment +of Immorality.</p> + +<p>But Morality does not possess the sanction of +punishment alone, it has also the more amiable one +of reward. We have seen that by strengthening the +faculty of inhibition it raises the individual to a +higher level of organic development, that by the inculcation +of consideration and neighbourly kindness +it affords the community the possibility of working +together peacefully and profitably. But it does more +than that. It gives life an incomparably higher value +than when it is dull and uniform, by enriching and +beautifying it with heroism and with ideals.</p> + +<p>Ideals and heroism are direct creations of Morality +and inconceivable without it. The ideal is a conception +of perfection; the thought of attaining it is +accompanied by the most pleasurable emotions, and +the individual regards it as his life's task to strive +for it. The struggle for the ideal implies effort at +all times, renunciation of the ease of a thoughtless<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> +and care-free existence, an endless series of difficult +victories over appetites clamouring for immediate +satisfaction, that is, constant work in the service of +Morality. He who has an ideal is never troubled +by the problem of the meaning of life. His life has +an aim and significance. He knows whither he goes, +why he lives, for what he works. He knows nothing +of the doubts of the aimless wanderer, of the discouraging +consciousness of one's own uselessness, +and his assurance, his conviction that his efforts are +useful and worthy come very near to happiness. +Heroism is the noblest victory of a thinking and +volitional personality over selfishness; it is altruism +which rises to self-sacrifice, the proud subjugation by +Reason of the most primitive and powerful of all +instincts, that of self-preservation. It is the highest +achievement of which Morality is capable. It is +never developed for the profit of an individual, but +always for that of a community, for a thought, for +an ideal. His heroic conduct raises the hero out of +the rut of his existence, liberates him from the +trammels of his individuality and enlarges this to +represent a community, its longings, its resolutions, its +determination. At the moment of his heroic action +the hero lives innumerable lives, the lives of all for +whom he risks his own, and if death reaches him, it +can destroy only his single person, but cannot put +an end to the dynamic activity of the community +which is included in the hero, while he is magnificently +elevated far above himself. The faculty of forming +an ideal of existence and activity, and of rising to the +heights of heroism, is the royal reward of Morality<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> +which the perfect subjection of animal instincts to the +rule of human Reason has achieved. Its punishment +for those retrograde individuals who never learn to +control their instinctive reflex actions is that they are +denied the sight of the glory of the ideal, that heroism +is unknown and incomprehensible to them, that they +lead their lives fettered and imprisoned, unconscious +of any task, without prospect or exaltation, as if they +dwelt in a cellar or in a dark dungeon. These are +the sanctions of Morality. It has no others, nor does +it need them.</p> + +<p>In one passage of the book cited above Guyau +makes the doubting remark: "Who can tell us +whether Morality is not ... at one and the same time +a beautiful and useful art? Perhaps it bewitches us +and deceives us." Let us assume that it is an illusion. +That would not detract from its value for mankind. +Is not all our knowledge of the world, is not our whole +view of Nature an illusion? We are made conscious +of the universe by its qualities, and these qualities +are conferred on it by our senses. But all knowledge +that we derive from our senses is an illusion. For +the senses do not convey reality to us, but the modifications +which the influence of reality produces in our +sense organs. The universe has neither sound nor +colour nor scent. But we perceive it as sounding, +coloured and scented. These qualities we attribute +to reality are illusions of our senses, but these illusions +make up all the beauty of the world which +without them would be dumb, blind and without charm +for us.</p> + +<p>Life for us is an unspeakably oppressive riddle.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> +Has it an aim, and, if so, what? We do not know. +All thought only leads to the conclusion: life is its +own aim and end, we live for life's sake. And this +conclusion is no solution of the problem. Then +Morality appears, and not only makes life easier and +possible, but even shows us an aim, if not for universal, +at least for individual life. That aim is the humanization +of the animal, the spiritualization of man, the +exaltation and enrichment of the individual by means +of sympathy, neighbourly kindness, a sense of joint +responsibility, and the subjection of Instinct to Reason +which, as far as we know, is the noblest product of +Nature. It is possible that Morality, which hides the +eerie unintelligibility of life from us, is an illusion. +Blessed be the illusion which makes life worth living.</p> + +<hr /> +<p class="smcap center">Printed in England by Cassell & Company, Limited, London, E.C.4.<br /> +F17.122</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Morals and the Evolution of Man, by +Max Simon Nordau + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + +***** This file should be named 37998-h.htm or 37998-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/9/9/37998/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Morals and the Evolution of Man + +Author: Max Simon Nordau + +Translator: Marie A. Lewenz + +Release Date: November 12, 2011 [EBook #37998] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION + OF MAN + + + + MORALS AND THE + EVOLUTION OF MAN + + BY + MAX NORDAU + + A Translation of + "BIOLOGIE DER ETHIK" + + By + MARIE A. LEWENZ, M.A. + Fellow of University College, London + + CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD + London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne + 1922 + + + + TO MY DEAR WIFE ANNA (nee DONS), + + the sunshine of my life in happy days, my brave + comrade in the storms of the world-catastrophe, with + love and gratitude I dedicate this book which helped + both her and me to endure the dark years when we + were homeless wanderers. + + MADRID, _September 26th, 1916_ + + + +CONTENTS + + CHAPTER PAGE + 1. THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY 1 + 2. THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY 46 + 3. THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY 84 + 4. MORALITY AND LAW 115 + 5. INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY 144 + 6. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 185 + 7. MORALITY AND PROGRESS 215 + 8. THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY 247 + + + + +MORALS AND THE + +EVOLUTION OF MAN + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PHENOMENON OF MORALITY + + +A very well-known experiment in animal psychology was once made by +Moebius. An aquarium was divided into two compartments by means of a pane +of glass; in one of these a pike was put and in the other a tench. +Hardly had the former caught sight of his prey, when he rushed to the +attack without noticing the transparent partition. He crashed with +extreme violence again the obstacle and was hurled back stunned, with a +badly battered nose. No sooner had he recovered from the blow than he +again made an onslaught upon his neighbour--with the same result. He +repeated his efforts a few times more, but succeeded only in badly +hurting his head and mouth. At last a dim idea dawned upon his dull mind +that some unknown and invisible power was protecting the tench, and that +any attempt to devour it would be in vain; consequently from that moment +he ceased from all further endeavours to molest his prey. Thereupon the +pane of glass was removed from the tank, and pike and tench swam around +together; the former took no notice whatever of his defenceless +neighbour, who had become sacred to him. In the first instance the pike +had not perceived the glass partition against which he had dashed his +head; now he did not see that it had been taken away. All he knew was +this: he must not attack this tench, otherwise he would fare badly. The +pane of glass, though no longer actually there, surrounded the tench as +with a coat of mail which effectually warded off the murderous attacks +of the pike. + +The fact so often observed, that man in many cases does that which he +passionately desires to leave undone, and refrains from doing that which +all his instincts urge him to do--this phenomenon of Morality is a +generalization upon a huge scale of the above experiment on animals with +the pane of glass in a tank. + +Jean Jacques Rousseau thought out a theoretical human being who was by +nature good. Such a human being does not exist and has never existed. +From sheer annoyance at the provoking obliquity of vision which led the +enthusiast of Geneva to develop such a theory, one is sorely tempted to +go to the opposite extreme and declare that man is by nature +fundamentally bad; but such an assertion is just as naive as Rousseau's +contention. Good and bad are values which we can only learn to +appreciate when we have felt the effect of the phenomenon of Morality. +The concepts of good and evil are of much later origin than mankind, and +can therefore no more constitute a fundamental characteristic of man's +original nature than, for instance, the cut and colour of his clothes; +though it is open to wiseacres to maintain that man's nature to some +extent actually finds expression in the cut and colour of his +clothes--that is, in his choice of them. Anyone contemplating primitive +man, man as he emerges from the hands of Nature, stripped of all the +additions which he has acquired in the course of his historical +development, is bound to admit that man is neither good nor bad; he is a +living being acting according to the instincts implanted in his nature; +just like the pike. But in most contingencies he does not obey these +instincts, and if he reflects upon himself and his actions, he is +astounded at realizing this, and asks: "Why do I refrain from revelling +in the gratification of my desires?" + +Innumerable times every day of his life he would like to break many or +all of the Ten Commandments; but he abstains from so doing, and, what is +more, mostly without effort, without having painfully to suppress his +desire. What prevents him from yielding to his impulses? An invisible +power which lays its commands upon him: "Thou shalt not!" "Thou shalt!" +Often his aims and inclinations come into violent collision with this +order, or this prohibition, and are hurled back by the painful impact. +Man hears the threatening, imperious voice, but cannot see whence it +comes. Accustomed to reason by analogy, he concludes that it is, like +thunder, a voice of Nature. When the pike has sufficiently injured his +nose against the pane of glass, he assumes as an actual fact that an +insuperable barrier separates him from the tench, and, moreover, that it +is both useless and painful to come into contact with this. He does not +try to discover the nature of the obstacle, and gives up any further +attempt upon his mysteriously protected prey. Man, with a more highly +developed intelligence than the pike, does not accept the phenomenon of +Morality with dull resignation. Since he has become conscious of a +mysterious barrier erected between his volitions and his actions, he has +not ceased to reflect upon this barrier, to investigate it with a timid +yet irresistible desire for knowledge, and to try and discover its +nature. + +It redounds to man's credit that he has devoted so much time and energy +to investigating the character and essence of Morality. But the result +of these investigations does not redound to his credit. With the +exception of theology, there is no subject upon which so much has been +written as upon ethics. Yet whosoever plunges into this boundless sea of +literature will emerge with feelings bordering upon horror and despair. +Here a free rein is given to all man's errors, to his habit of drawing +false conclusions, to his faulty modes of thought. Incapacity to +interpret facts, association of ideas, elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp and +uncurbed by any criticism, intemperate mysticism, arrogant dogmatism, +shallow self-sufficiency--all these vie with one another in the +presentment of theories which either are patently foolish, arbitrary or +ill-founded, or else prove to be so when impartially examined. + +It is hard for the few reasonable thinkers who have taken part in this +great investigation to make their voices heard amid the uproar raised by +the solemn, unctuous, dictatorial or pedantic tomfools. And even the +former are not entirely satisfactory, because they do not distinguish +clearly enough between the form and the substance, the externals and the +essence of Morality, and because they do not discriminate with +sufficient care between questions as to its nature, origin and aim, and +its powers or sanctions--questions which must on no account be +confounded. + +What is Morality? Obviously it is necessary to attempt a clear answer to +this question before any useful purpose can be served by inquiring into +the group of problems to which it gives rise: its aim, its laws, its +origin, its method, its assumptions. The Stoics answer this question as +follows: "Morality is living according to Nature." Furthermore, it is +quite in accordance with the doctrine of the Stoics that Cicero says: +"Virtue, however, is nothing but Nature developed to the highest +possible degree of perfection" ("_ad summum perducta_"). Moral therefore +means natural; Morality and Nature are equivalent; they are one. Really +a simpler or more childlike explanation is hardly possible. The most +superficial glance at human life and at our own soul teaches us that +Morality is contrary to Nature, that it must struggle against Nature to +assert itself, that it means a victory over Nature, in so far as we +understand by Nature in this special sense the most primitive reaction +of man to simple and more complicated stimuli, the first tendency of +impulse, the immediate, instinctive urge to act. Further, the definition +of the Stoics ignores the aggregation of concepts which the synthetic +conception, Morality, involves; as if this were self-evident and +required no definition. The Stoics tacitly assume that Morality and +Good are synonymous. Cicero makes this assumption clearer by using the +word Virtue (_virtus_) instead of Morality. But in all languages this +word implies approbation and praise. It is an appreciation of worth +(_Werturteil_), to use the expression so appropriately coined by Lotze. + +But the very fact that we recognize Morality as being valuable is by no +means a matter of course and it demands an explanation. + +Certain actions could only be judged to be good if they were +distinguished from others which did not suggest the same judgment, which +were felt to be not good, to be bad or indifferent. We come to the +question, What is Good, what is Bad? The Stoics reply, "That which is +good is natural." It is easy to call facts which please us natural, and +such as displease us unnatural. In reality both series of facts are +equally natural; because everything that happens is natural; because by +definition Nature is the synthesis of all phenomena; because nothing +exists outside of Nature, and within Nature everything is a part of her +and therefore is natural and can be nothing but natural. If we +nevertheless wish to distinguish between natural and unnatural +phenomena, if we call Good, Morality, and Virtue natural, and compare +them favourably with the unnatural, this only proves that we use the +words natural and unnatural as synonyms for good and bad, and that we +have a ready-made standard by which we measure the naturalness or +unnaturalness (that is, the goodness or badness) of actions, and that +there exists within ourselves the law by which we judge them to be good +or bad. But how do we come by this law? How, of what material, and why +do we fashion this standard? Why do we approve of one thing as good and +condemn another as bad? What qualities do the former and the latter +possess, or what qualities do we ascribe to them? That is what we want +to know when we inquire as to the significance of Morality, and the +definition of the Stoics throws no light whatever upon the matter. + +According to Aristotle Morality is "the activity of Practical Reason, +which is accompanied by pleasurable emotion." It is not worth while to +dwell upon this definition. It is absolutely valueless. Practical Reason +is not a definite concept; Aristotle does not say anywhere what he +understands by "practical" when he applies this attribute to Reason; and +to call every activity of Practical Reason accompanied by pleasurable +emotion Morality is mere eccentricity. + +To take only one example: if I have a house built, and accept the +architect's plans because they please me greatly, my practical reason is +most certainly active; the gratification induced by my reasonable choice +of the plans is doubtless a pleasurable emotion; but assuredly no one +will characterize as moral this activity of my practical reason which is +accompanied by pleasurable emotion. It may be that Aristotle was +contemplating not a single action, but conduct in life as a whole. In +that case he has expressed in an unfortunate, and much too loose a +manner the thought that Morality is Reason plus pleasurable emotion. We +shall frequently meet with and have to examine this idea, which omits to +explain why pleasurable emotions attend certain activities of +"Practical Reason," whatever that may be, and fail to be aroused by +others. + +Judaism, as embodied in its law-givers and prophets, teaches that +Morality consists in living and acting in accordance with the divine +Will. Maimonides, who, however, was regarded by many of his +contemporaries as a heretic, does not consider Judaism a creed at all, +but a code of Morality. He maintains that anyone who repudiates the +tenets of the Jewish faith, even the most essential one, namely, the +belief in a single god, must not be excluded from the Jewish community +as long as he conforms to its moral laws. This thinker, usually so +accurate and nice in his reasoning, overlooks the fact that in this case +he is contradicting himself in a manner wellnigh comic. According to +him, too, Morality consists in the endeavour to live and act in +accordance with the divine Will. How is such an endeavour possible for a +man who does not believe in God and for whom consequently no divine Will +exists? Therefore either Morality must be something different from an +approximation to the standard set up by the divine Will, or else he who +denies God cannot be moral. But I will leave the author of the "Guide of +those who have gone astray" to his self-contradiction, and only retain +the Jewish definition of Morality as based upon the Will of God. + +Without any restriction Christianity has taken over this definition from +the mother-religion. In his zeal to claim that God alone is the source +of all Morality, St. Augustine allows himself to be carried away to such +an extent that he libels mankind most hatefully. Just as for Rousseau +man is by nature good, for the Bishop of Hippo he is by nature +fundamentally bad. Left to his own devices he would always wallow in the +mire of sin and vice, and would never even feel the wish to abandon his +wickedness. It is God's mercy alone which rescues him from his depravity +and sets his feet upon the path of righteousness, leading him to virtue, +salvation and eternal bliss. Thomas Aquinas is no less definite on this +point. The scriptures of Judaism and Christianity contain the eternal +law which God has ordained for mankind. He points out the paths that man +should follow. All Morality springs from Him alone. + +To this very day true believers adhere to this doctrine. Morality did +not originate on earth; the knowledge of it is a gift of grace from +heaven to mankind. It is derived from God; it is that which God has +willed; or else it does not need any special act of volition on the part +of God, but is the essence of God himself. That is the teaching of +Paley, the classical moral philosopher. Virtue consists in doing good to +mankind in obedience to the Will of God, and in order to attain eternal +salvation. Here stress is laid upon the fact that Morality is active +love for one's neighbour, and this is a concession on the part of the +conciliatory Englishman to the utilitarian ethics of his countrymen; but +for him the necessary and sufficient reason for this love of one's +neighbour is the Will of God and the desire for eternal salvation. The +German devotee, Baader, blustering like a capuchin, preaches this +twaddle: "Any Morality which is not rooted in divine law is the +intellectual impiety of our time raised to its highest power; it is the +perfection of atheism; for the idea of the absolute autonomy of man +atheistically denies the Father as law-giver; the theistic denial of the +necessity for divine aid in fulfilling the law does away with the Son or +Mediator, and finally the materialistic-pantheistic apotheosis of Matter +does away with the Holy Ghost with its sanctifying power." The Frenchman +Jouffroy, though more careful and reticent in his manner, unmistakably +expresses his conviction that "ethics, as well as the philosophy of law, +inevitably and necessarily lead to theology." + +But this necessity only exists for minds whose desire for knowledge and +truth is easily satisfied by words without a meaning that can be +visualized, by fabulous statements accepted without proof, by fictions +of the imagination, and by shallow juggling with the association of +ideas. Even those who do not approve all Auguste Comte's arguments will +agree with him when he classifies the successive steps in the mental +development of mankind as the theological, transcendental, and +scientific modes of thought. When man's understanding is in its infancy +he is content with a supernatural explanation of all phenomena which +strike him as mysterious, disquiet him or rouse his curiosity. Only I +have never been able to understand why Comte discriminates between the +theological and the transcendental modes of thought, and assigns to the +latter a higher place than the former. Both are on a footing of absolute +equality; both raise arbitrary fictions of the imagination to the +position of sources of knowledge; both substitute anthropomorphic +trivialities for the observation of phenomena and research into the +conditions under which they occur and their relationship to one another. +The only difference between them lies in the fact that transcendentalism +expresses itself in choicer language than does theology, that it +presents formulae that are more complicated and pretentious, less +transparent and honest--formulae which the unpractised mind does not +immediately recognize as mythological dogmas in a pseudo-scientific +disguise. + +The relationship of theological to transcendental thought is much the +same as that of superstition to religion. Both of them are one and the +same. Religion is shamefaced superstition, whereas superstition has not +yet learned to feel shame. Religion is superstition in a dress-coat, and +therefore fit for polite circles; superstition is religion in a cotton +smock and therefore cannot be admitted to society. Superstition is the +religion of the poor and unassuming, religion is the superstition of +fine folk who plume themselves on their formal and verbal scholarship. + +Ever since man has risen above the level of the beasts, ever since the +first faint glimmerings of thought began in the thick-walled, narrow and +dark skull of a hunter of the Neanderthal or Cro Magnon, he has ascribed +everything unintelligible in life and in the world around him to divine +actions and divine sources. How did the world come into existence? A god +or gods created it. How does Nature work? In accordance with the will of +a god or gods, in obedience to divine commands, as a result of divine +activities. What is life? A divine gift of grace. What is +consciousness? An irradiation of the divinity. What is infinity, what +eternity? Attributes of the god. God is the name that from the beginning +of time to the present day men have given to their ignorance. They find +it easier to bear disguised by this pseudonym; they are even proud of +it. With cunning self-deception they have endowed the word with the +dignity pertaining to a title of the most awe-inspiring majesty, and +they no longer feel ashamed of a poverty of mind which can boast of such +a magnificent name. Morality also is one of those phenomena which are +not intelligible as a matter of course. The questions how, whence, why, +and to what end Morality exists, and what it is, cannot be solved at a +glance; its life-history is not apparent to every observer, as is that +of the domestic cat. But why cudgel one's brains? Cheap explanations are +ready to hand. This way mythology, you maid-of-all-work! Morality has +been ordained by God. A moral life is one in accordance with God's +commandments. He who will not content himself with this answer is an +infidel and does not deserve to have any notice taken of him. + +Let us leave the paltry statements of theologians and note how men who +investigate questions more thoroughly have dealt with Morality. +Descartes defines Morality as the sustained endeavour to do that which +one has recognized to be right. It is difficult to discern in this +definition the father of scientific scepticism. What are the +distinguishing marks of Right? Is the decision as to what is right and +what is wrong to be left to the subjective judgment of the individual? +In that case Descartes must concede that the action of a burglar is +moral, if he has recognized that it is right for him to perpetrate his +crime between two and three o'clock in the morning, that being the most +favourable time for it, and then strives to the best of his ability to +effect an entrance into the building he has selected, at the moment +which he has recognized as the right one. Or shall all mankind, or at +least the majority, and not the individual, decide what is right? In +that case the definition would certainly approximate to the one which I +hold to be true; but for one thing it would suffer from vagueness; and, +moreover, its originator would lay himself open to the reproach of not +having shown why the individual is worthy of praise when he acts in +accordance with the convictions of the majority, though these be opposed +to his own, and in so doing allows his action to be determined by a +judgment due to a psychic mechanism other than his. + +Spinoza's "Ethics" leaves the reader in great discomfort, the result of +vacillating and contradictory explanations. Obviously Descartes' great +disciple had no clear conception of the essence of Morality and held +either consecutively, or may be even simultaneously, divers views on the +subject, amongst which those of all schools of thought are either quite +clearly expressed or at least implied. "By Good," he says, "I mean that +which we know for certain to be useful to us."[1] + + [1] I quote the wording of Berthold Auerbach's translation: + "B. de Spinoza's collected works. Translated from the Latin + by Berthold Auerbach." Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta, 1871. Second + edition, Vol. II. + +And again: "To act absolutely virtuously is merely to act, live, +preserve one's being (these three mean the same thing) in accordance +with the dictates of Reason, because one seeks one's own interest." + +According to that Morality is synonymous with egoism, and its aim is +man's individual profit or interest. Even the most pronounced +Utilitarians among ethical theorists have not ventured to go to such +lengths. True, they have contended that the aim of moral action is +happiness, but at least they define it as the happiness of the whole +community and not that of the individual, except in so far as he is a +member of the community and has his fair share of its well-being. +Spinoza foresees the objection that the pursuit of one's own happiness +cannot possibly deserve the universal esteem in which virtue is held, +and he tries to adduce reasons whereby the egoism which he characterizes +as moral may be justified and palliated: + +"Everyone exists according to the supreme law of Nature, and +consequently everyone does, according to the supreme law of Nature, that +which results from the necessities of his own nature; and therefore +every man forms his judgment as to what is good and bad according to the +supreme law of Nature, pursues his own interest according to his lights, +seeks revenge, strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he +hates." That is possibly the most audacious and at the same time the +most ill-founded statement that has ever been written on the subject of +Morality. Morality means behaviour calculated to further one's own +interest. Morality is therefore utility. But man cannot act otherwise +than morally, since he always acts as he is compelled to do by his own +nature. There is no sense in discriminating between good and bad, moral +and immoral, since one always acts in accordance with the behests of +Nature. Man automatically executes the dictates of Nature which is alone +responsible for his deeds. + +For the Stoics, too, Morality is action in accordance with the law of +Nature, but Spinoza goes further than the Stoics, in that he does away +with any universally applicable standard of moral conduct, and sets up +instead of Nature pure and simple, which is the same for all, each man's +individual nature as the authority which shall lay down rules of +behaviour for him. So Morality is something individual and subjective. +Man acts according to the requirements of his interest; his own nature +shows him what his interest requires; no other person has any right or +any qualification to form a judgment upon the worth of his conduct, to +call it good or bad, for he cannot know what course of action the man's +personal nature, peculiar to himself and to no other, may prescribe to +him. This is the doctrine of anarchy and amorality put in a nutshell, a +more wordy paraphrase of the _Fais ce que vouldras_ (please yourself), +the terse inscription that Rabelais put over the entrance to his Abbey +of Theleme, as the only law governing that abode of alluring wantonness. +Spinoza certainly does half-heartedly concede to Reason the role which +Aristotle positively assigns to it ("To act in an absolutely virtuous +manner is merely to act according to the guidance of Reason," etc.), but +it is impossible to see how Reason can exercise guidance and control if +"everyone does according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his nature." This can surely only mean +that everyone may yield to the unbridled desires of his natural +instincts, which is the very reverse of self-control by Reason. If +Nature is to rule despotically, there is obviously no place for a +constitutional limitation of her sole power by the effective counsel and +protests of Reason. + +But Spinoza renounces in a much more definite way his views recognizing +the right of every individual "to form his judgment as to what is good +and bad according to the supreme law of Nature," for he calmly adds: +"Society can be founded, if it reserves to itself the right possessed by +the individual to take revenge, and to pronounce a verdict on what is +good and what is bad; thereby it acquires the power to prescribe rules +of conduct for the community, to make laws, and to enforce them, not by +means of Reason, which cannot restrict passions, but by threats.... +Hence in a state of Nature, sin cannot even be imagined." + +This concession to Society most emphatically contradicts his first +definition of Morality. It does away with the right claimed for the +individual "to do according to the supreme law of Nature that which +results from the necessities of his own nature," and by the same +"supreme law of Nature" to "judge what is good and what is bad." It +subjects conduct to the restraint, not of Nature, but of Society. It +bears witness to the admission that "Reason cannot restrict passions," +although Spinoza has just required the virtuous man to "act according to +the guidance of Reason." Spinoza admits that Morality is not the +consequence of a law inherent in the individual, but of an extraneous +law forced upon him by society; that it is not an individual but a +social phenomenon. In this he agrees with the conclusions of modern +sociological thought, but his merit is much diminished by the fact that +he skims lightly over the one great difficulty which sociological ethics +is struggling to overcome. He says, society "reserves to itself the +right ... to pronounce a verdict on what is good and what is bad, and +thereby acquires the power to prescribe rules of conduct to the +community," etc. + +It has the power right enough; police, judge, prison and gallows bear +witness to that; but has it the right? That is not clear without further +investigation. It requires to be proved. The amoralist can emphatically +deny this, basing his conclusion on Spinoza's own definition. He can +legitimately declare that he need submit to no dictates of society, that +he owes obedience only to his own nature and his own inner needs, and +the moral philosopher can only prove to him that he is wrong by +scornfully indicating the penal code and its stalwart minions. + +Spinoza, we see, has already given a whole series of mutually +destructive and contradictory definitions of Morality: it is the law of +life and conduct which society lays down for the individual, though we +do not learn from him on what principles it is based; it is the pursuit +of one's own interest as indicated by Reason; it is obedience to +necessity--that is to say, to the demands of one's own nature. All this +does not suffice him. He discovers a new aspect of Morality. +"Recognition of Good and Evil is nothing but a pleasurable or a +disagreeable emotion in so far as we are conscious of it." And again, +"Pleasure is not actually bad (as the ascetics probably contend), but +good; pain, on the contrary, is actually bad." + +In this case the ideas pleasure and pain are treated as equivalents of +good and bad, as were useful and harmful in the former case. According +to the axiom that things that are equal to the same thing must be equal +to one another, pleasurable is synonymous not only with good, but also +with beneficial, and in like manner painful with bad and harmful. Brandy +undoubtedly produces a sensation of pleasure in the drinker; is brandy, +then, good in a moral sense? Above all, is it beneficial? Many such +questions could be put to Spinoza, but this one is enough. + +Thus we discover Spinoza to be at one and the same time a Utilitarian +and a Hedonist, the champion of Impulse and again of Reason, an +anarchistic individualist and a herald of the right of society to rule +the individual. Angry and disappointed, we turn from him, for instead of +finding in him the definite standard we sought we have met with the +shifting hues of the chameleon and the uncanny changes of form of +Proteus. + +The views of the English thinkers are clearer and more convincing +although they, too, do not carry their investigations far enough. Hobbes +uses Justice and Injustice as synonyms for Morality and Immorality, and +he definitely recognizes what Spinoza only dimly guessed, namely, that +these ideas could only arise in man when living as a member of society +and not in a being dwelling alone. According to him, therefore, Morality +is a social and not an individual phenomenon; just as the moral +philosophers of the theological school look upon it as the Will of God, +so he considers it to be the Will of Society. But he was under the +obligation (non-existent for the theologian) to trace to its source this +social Will, to show how it is manifested, to explain why the individual +not only submits to it, but values this submission far more highly than +mere utility. Man learns the Will of God by revelation, and it is +forbidden to inquire into its basis. To the Will of Society Hobbes +cannot possibly ascribe the same incontestable sanctity. It should not +have escaped his notice that this Will is neither uniform nor of assured +stability, and that it often wavers and is sometimes self-contradictory. +Therefore, if he wants to call the Will of Society Justice, as the +theologians call the Will of God Morality, and if he wants to look upon +Justice and Morality as equivalents, then it is his duty to explain how +Society can make claims which conflict with the principles on which the +universal rules it has drawn up are based, and which, consequently, not +being just or moral, are unjust and immoral, but which, nevertheless, +must be acknowledged by the individual as being both just and moral, +simply because they are social claims. + +In Kant's moral philosophy we find the extremest form of mystic +dogmatism; its success would be inexplicable did one not know how prone +mankind is to be intimidated by brusque statements. Kant's dictatorial +pronouncements have become common-places. "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." That is very impressive. But what is "the maxim" on +which you act? This maxim is the moral law. Now we yearn to know what +this moral law is, whence it comes, and on what it is based. + +But our yearnings remains unsatisfied. The moral law is a secret. It is +an incomprehensible power which rules our consciousness. Ask no +questions. Be silent, submit and obey. Even the theologian discussing +moral philosophy will listen to reason. He gives us the information, +sibylline though it be, that the moral law emanates from the Will of +God, and is shown to us in the revelations of religion. Kant does not +even give such meagre information. The moral law exists. That must +suffice. "The starry heavens above thee, the moral law within thee." You +retort that that is a metaphor which you may call poetical, if you like, +but it is no explanation. You will get the following reply: this +metaphor, rightly understood, indicates that the moral law is eternal, +that it is part and parcel of uncreated Nature like the stars, that it +is a phenomenon of the same order as all the elements that go to make up +the universe. "The moral law does not flow from antecedent ideas of Good +and Evil; on the contrary, the moral law decides what is good and what +is evil." It is not derived from human experience. The less so since +"it cannot be proved by experience that it has at any place or any time +become real." In other words, no one can testify that the "Categorical +Imperative" has ever been realized, that the moral law has "at any place +or any time" ceased to be a Kantian theory productive of sacred thrills, +that it has ever emerged from the unapproachable cell wherein it dwells +in the temple of human consciousness, to take a place and play an active +part among mortals. + +The lessee of all Kant's wisdom, Hermann Cohen, with the clumsiness of +an over-zealous assistant, has expressed his master's thought in a +perfectly ludicrous form: "The moral law is to be conceived as a reality +of such kind that it must exist, that its being must be" (note the +elegance and euphony of the phrase "being must be"!) "even if no +creature existed for whom it would be valid." True, the moral law is a +maxim on which you should "act," a standard of human conduct, but it +would still exist if there were no human beings and no action. It would +come to exactly the same thing if Hermann Cohen said: the railway is to +be conceived as a reality of such kind that it must exist if there were +no human beings and consequently no travellers; even if there were no +earth on the surface of which rails and sleepers could be laid. This is +such palpable nonsense that it would be a work of supererogation to +prove its absurdity. By this grotesque exaggeration Hermann Cohen has +clearly brought to light the hollowness and weakness of Kant's Moral +philosophy which culminates in the "Categorical Imperative." In spite +of its arbitrary dogmatism, the formula of the "Categorical Imperative" +has taken a hold on the imagination of the superficially educated, and +has never ceased to be repeated with the fervour evinced by a devout man +at prayer, by several generations of those who have made it their +business to cultivate mental and moral science. + +In one of his early novels, "The Island of Dr. Moreau," H. G. Wells has +described how an audacious scientist, by performing an operation on the +brains of the most savage beasts of prey, such as panthers, wolves, +etc., transformed them into creatures with the powers of thought and +speech. He succeeds in suppressing, or at least in lulling for the time +being, their bloodthirsty instincts, but he is always afraid that these +may be roused again, and forbids the animals on which he experiments to +touch blood or fresh meat. He takes good care to give no reason for this +prohibition. He merely issues it sternly and threateningly. It is "the +Law," an unknown, inexplicable, but terrible power to which one must +submit, because opposition would expose one to unimaginable, but +terrible evils. If temptation assails the beasts they flee it, +whispering fearfully and warningly to one another: "The Law! the Law!" +Wells is a trained philosopher, and often has his tongue in his cheek. I +shrewdly suspect that when he writes of the mysterious "Law" which fills +Dr. Moreau's semi-humanized beasts of prey with superstitious terror, he +is poking fun at Kant's "Categorical Imperative." + +The great logical mistake in Kant's moral philosophy is that he +conceives Morality as a social or collective phenomenon, and yet +defines it as an individual one. According to Kant, the Categorical +Imperative exists within us. It is as immutable as the starry heavens +above us. It gives us the criterion by which to discriminate between +good and evil. Its realm is our consciousness wherein it lives and +rules; it is not introduced from outside, it springs from no power or +conditions outside our person. All the same, the only law which this +ultra subjective Categorical Imperative imposes on us is the most +centrifugal that can possibly be imagined: "Act only on that maxim +whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a +universal law." Hence our action is designed to produce an effect on the +world around us. It is "to become a universal law" can, of course, only +mean, it is to become a universal law of human society, for Kant cannot +possibly have aspired to make the Categorical Imperative impose laws +upon the stars in their courses. Our moral law, in so far as it applies +to our actions, deals with society. When we formulate it in our minds, +we associate it from its first inception with the notion of the society +to which it is to be applied. It would have been logical to say: "Your +standard of conduct is to be what society recognizes as its universal +law." But Kant puts the cart before the horse and says on the contrary: +"The maxims on which thy action is based are by thy will to become the +universal law of society." + +Other philosophers have avoided this mistake. Hegel declares: "It is not +until man becomes a member of a moral community that the ideas of Duty +and Virtue attain a definite meaning and become direct representatives +of a universal spirit in subjectivity, which knows that it is actuated +in its aim by the universal and realizes that its dignity and its +particular aims are founded upon it." If we translate this horribly hazy +language of Hegel's into plain speech we find it means: "The ideas of +Duty and Virtue only acquire a meaning when they are applied to the acts +of commission and omission of the individual member of a community." +(When Hegel speaks of "moral community" his use of the word "moral" is +inadmissible, for he takes it for granted that the meaning of the word +"moral" has been determined and is clearly understood, whereas he ought +first to have defined its meaning.) The concepts of Duty and Virtue +denote that the individual in taking action thinks of the community, +that regard for its interests determines him, that his actions do not +attain dignity and worth until his aim becomes the interests of the +community, that these interests must coincide with those of the +individual if his actions in his own interests are to merit the +appellations of dutiful and virtuous. In short: to act morally is to act +so as to ensure the well-being of the community. The real Categorical +Imperative is a social conscience. + +Feuerbach expresses this thought clearly and distinctly when he says: +"There can be no question of Morality in the strict sense of the word +except where the subject of discussion is the relationship of man to +man, of one person to another, of me to thee." + +Recent contemporary French writers are in no way doubtful of the +meaning implied by the concept of Morality. "Morality," says Littre, +"is the whole collection of rules which determine our conduct towards +others. Moral Good is the ideal, which at any period of a civilization +forms opinions and customs with respect to this conduct; moral evil is +that which offends this ideal." This definition is very incomplete and +weak, as will be seen in the course of our remarks, but on one point it +is quite clear: it treats Morality as a social phenomenon, it +paraphrases it as the adjustment of individual action to the standard +set up by the community. The question of the origin and the aim of this +standard is left open. + +L. Levy-Bruehl formulates Littre's idea more clearly. "We call by the +name of Morality the collection of such conceptions, opinions, feelings +and customs respecting the mutual rights and duties of men in their life +as members of a community, as are recognized and generally observed at a +given time in a given civilization." + +Thus, according to some, Morality is subjection to an absolute law of +divine, or at any rate of unexplained and inexplicable origin, which +religion or a mysterious inner voice reveals to man; according to +others, it is the recognition that the claims of the community, or at +any rate of the majority of one's fellow men, are of binding force upon +the actions of the individual. These different answers to an inquiry as +to the origin of Morality both contain the tacit admission that it is a +law which peremptorily dictates to man what he shall do and what he +shall not do. But by means of what psychic mechanism does this law +enforce obedience in the consciousness of man? It is remarkable that all +moral philosophers, no matter to what age, nation or school they belong, +dimly feel or clearly recognize that in civilized man at any rate, +natural instincts and judgment are always at war; that the latter +opposes the former; that in the victory of judgment over impulse lies +the very essence of Morality; that consequently the essence of Morality +implies the control and repression of instinct by Reason--in a word, +that it is inhibition. + +We have seen that Aristotle, in definite though unconscious opposition +to the Stoics, who consider Morality synonymous with Nature, defines it +as the activity of Reason. + +Henry More was the first to express this quite clearly: "Virtue is an +intellectual force of the soul which enables it to control ... animal +instincts and sensual passions." + +And Dr. Jodl sums up the character of Christian morality in the +statement: "Moral philosophy under the influence of Christian ideas +makes Morality always appear in the guise of a prohibition; at any rate +it is apt to conceive Morality as acting in an essentially restrictive +and prohibitive manner upon the natural impulses and instincts of man." + +This is not quite correct. This Christian code of morals does not always +manifest itself as a prohibition. Its main precept is: "Love thy +neighbour as thyself." That is not a prohibition but a positive command. +Nevertheless, the point of departure of this command is an inhibition. +For the first instinctive movement of man is selfishness and, as its +consequence, indifference to one's neighbour; the first imperious +impulse is to sacrifice the latter's interests to one's own. But if +regard for one's neighbour, nay, love for him permeates our feelings, +thoughts and actions, that denotes a victory of Christian ideas over the +impulse of instinct, a suppression of that impulse--that is, an +inhibition which, not content with mere prevention, prolongs its +efficacy in the same direction until it changes the impulse of +selfishness and inconsiderateness into its very antithesis, that of +unselfishness and charity. + +It constitutes an important advance in knowledge to recognize that +Morality, and not, as Jodl makes out, only Christian Morality, is +manifested as an inhibition, as the victory achieved by Reason over +Instinct which is contemptuously described as animal, simply because its +worth is judged by a standard already supplied by current views on +Morals. It is inadmissible to judge by this standard when one attempts +an impartial investigation into the ultimate foundations and the essence +of Morality. We have no plainly obvious right--no right which does not +require a proof--simply to scorn instinct as animal; to run it down from +the start and with a respectful bow to give Reason precedence over it; +to applaud with satisfaction the suppression of rascally Instinct by +highly respectable Reason. Instinct is no more animal than any other +manifestation of life in man; and he indulges in pleasant self-deception +if he imagines that he is other than an animal, that is, a living +organism in which all processes take place according to the same laws as +in all other living beings, from the simplest one-celled creature to +the most highly developed and complicated. + +In itself Instinct has the same claim to dignity as Reason; according to +some people an even greater one, because the former is more primitive, +unpremeditated, self-assured and firmly established than the latter, and +if Reason claims to be the superior, it must substantiate that claim. + +As a matter of fact, that claim has never been universally acknowledged. + +Periods during which Reason rules at least in name and is treated with +the obsequious reverence which the model citizen has, or feigns to have, +for his sovereign, are followed by others in which Instinct revolts; +rebels dethrone Reason and set up Instinct in its place, or, as they +call it, passion and nature. The parties which in turn wield power in +these periodic revolutions may be briefly termed classical and romantic. +The classicists are the legitimist supporters of Reason; the +romanticists are revolutionaries, and their leaders are men like Cleon +or Jack Cade, Cromwell, Washington or Robespierre; that is to say, rude +demagogues or subtle dialecticians in favour of Instinct. Among the +legitimists in Reason as in politics, are to be found those who maintain +the divine right, who base the right of Reason to rule over Instinct +upon the Will of God, and others again, the constitutionalists, who base +their support on the Will of the people, on universal suffrage, who +force upon Instinct the law promulgated by society. I need not carry the +metaphor to extremes. Every reader can work it out in all its details. +I only wanted to show quite clearly that almost all moral philosophers +conceived Morality as a struggle between Reason and Instinct, as the +defeat of lawlessness by law. But their views diverge widely when they +try to explain the source of this law and its claim to obedience. + +The theologians find no difficulty in this explanation. Just as the +essence of Morality according to their ideas is the nearest possible +approximation to divine perfection, so the moral law is one enacted by +God Himself, and it is a sin punishable with hell fire to fail to +observe it or to rebel against it. Others look upon Man as his own +law-giver, and trace his moral conduct, his willingness to combat his +own instincts, to an inner voice which teaches him what is right. They +call this inner voice by different names. They call it Nature, Reason or +Conscience, and look upon it as something innate, as a normal +constituent of man's psychic nature. That is the meaning of Fichte's +apodictic statement: "That which does not meet with the approval of +one's own conscience is necessarily sin. Therefore he who acts on anyone +else's authority acts in a conscienceless manner." + +With this emphatic utterance Fichte dismisses both the devout believers, +for whom Morality is the revealed Will of God, and the Rationalists who +look upon it as the dictate of society. He considers that if man claims +to act morally, he can do so only on his own authority, i.e. on that of +his conscience. He is not aware that in so doing he frivolously abandons +all rights to pronounce an objective moral judgment on any human action. +He thereby relinquishes the power to ask any further question except: +"Did he act in accordance with his own conscience? If so, then he has +acted in a subjectively conscientious way, even if it appears to me to +be immoral or even criminal and monstrous. If he has acted contrary to +the promptings of his own conscience, then he is assuredly a sinner, +even if his action be in my eyes splendid and exemplary." Thus Fichte, +with his subjective basis of Morality, is led to a conclusion which is a +ludicrous reversal of generally accepted ideas. According to him, a man +would be acting conscientiously if, despising what all others hold good, +right and sacred, he wallows in the satisfaction of his selfish +instincts, as long as his conscience approves or even bids him do so; on +the other hand, he is a sinner if, in opposition to his inner voice, but +according to moral law, that is in obedience to extraneous authority, he +practices all the virtues. + +All these subjective moral philosophers tacitly assume with Rousseau +that man is by nature good. They take no account of the empirically +established fact that there are men whose Fichtean conscience, or whose +Kantian categorical imperative, urges them to a course of action which +according to the general opinion is bad, wicked and revolting. This +criticism applies to Beneke, according to whom Morality is "a +development of human nature which exists as such within us, and which we +need only continue or promote"; it applies equally to Reid and Dugald +Stewart, who describe it as an inclination, which has become a habit or +a principle, to act according to the dictates of conscience. But +conscience must be explained. It is by no means self-evident that each +individual conscience will have the same standard of good and evil. The +moral philosopher must not shirk the duty of showing how the conscience +acquires its concepts of moral values, with what weapons it provides +Reason to combat Instinct, which demands satisfaction without paying any +attention to the warnings of conscience. + +The great majority of moral philosophers do not endorse the view of Kant +and Fichte, that conscience is a piece of human nature, a sense inborn +in man, an inner voice that is independent of, and unmoved by, external +influences; on the contrary, they are convinced that conscience +originates outside the individual, that, in his consciousness, it is the +advocate retained by society, commissioned to plead the cause of the +community before the reason of the individual even, nay, especially, +when the interests of the community run counter to those of the +individual. + +Bacon calls the presence in our consciousness of a defender of the +interests of society our innate social affection, and treats it +unreservedly as the source of Morality. Long before his time the +Stoics had noted the existence of this social affection and called it +[Greek: oikeiosis]; Hugo Grotius, with the intellectual perspicuity +peculiar to himself, says that "Right and Morality flow from the same +source, and this source is a strong social instinct natural to man, it +is solicitude for the community, a solicitude guided by Reason." The +English philosophers are practically unanimous in ascribing both +conscience and Morality in general to a social source. The welfare of +the community, says Richard Cumberland, is the highest moral law; +Hutcheson remarks that, in the struggle between egoism and universal +benevolence, the decisive factor in favour of the latter is the +accompanying feeling, the reflective emotion of approval. + +In modern parlance we call "universal benevolence," altruism, and the +"reflective emotion of approval" is a paraphrase of conscience which +contains an indication of its mode of action. For the idea that our +action will meet with the approval of the community and the pleasurable +emotion of satisfaction are in fact the reasons why we mostly submit to +the dictates of conscience voicing the commands of the community. Only +Hutcheson is too venturesome and goes too far, when he maintains +unreservedly that the reflective emotion of approval in the struggle +between egoism and universal benevolence is the decisive factor which +turns the scales in favour of the latter. This is by no means always the +case. When it does occur we call the action moral, but we characterize +it as immoral when, in spite of the "reflective emotion of approval" +"universal benevolence" is worsted by egoism. + +It is unnecessary to quote the opinions of other moral philosophers. +It is enough to observe that most of them describe the moral law as a +social agreement and make conscience its accredited representative. +L. Levy-Bruehl repeats a doctrine current since the days of Pythagoras +when he says: "The sense of duty and that of responsibility, horror of +crime, love of what is good and reverence for justice--all these, which +a conscience sensitive to Morality thinks it derives from itself and +from itself alone, have nevertheless a social origin"; and Feuerbach +expresses the same view in an entertainingly melodramatic fashion when +he calls the voice of conscience "An echo of the cry of revenge uttered +by the injured party." This cry of revenge would never wake an echo in +us if we did not possess a sounding board which cries of distress and +lamentation cause to vibrate. Schopenhauer, digging deeper than his +predecessor, clearly recognizes this sounding board, and describes its +characteristics when he says that the foundation of ethics is pity, +which in its passive form warns us: "_Neminem laede!_ Do harm to no +one!" And in its active form gives the order: "_Imo omnes quantum potes +juva!_ Assist everyone with all your might!" + +The assumption, that sympathy with his neighbour must be present in +man's consciousness before he is capable of moral action, is one that +need not be made by subjective moral philosophers, who hold with Kant +and his school that the moral law is an inborn categorical imperative, +which proclaims its commands without reference to any extraneous object, +or to the world, or mankind. + +In the same way the theologians have no need of it, for they consider +that what is morally good is the Will of God. + +But he who holds with the moral philosophers of sociological tendencies +that Morality is regard for one's fellow men, and the recognition that +the claims of the real or supposed interest of the community are +superior to those of the comfort of the individual, must admit that +sympathy is a necessary preliminary to moral action; i.e. that the +individual must have the ability to picture the sufferings of others so +vividly that he feels their sorrows as his own, and with all his might +and all his will strives to prevent, alleviate and heal them. The lack +of this ability, psychic anaesthesia, is a symptom of disease. It renders +the person affected incapable of moral action. It is a characteristic of +the born criminal, and is the essential symptom of that state of mind +which alienists term moral insanity. Even in this condition, if reason +and the power of judgment are not affected, great offences against +current moral law can be avoided. But this results from the fear of the +painful and ruinous results which a collision with public opinion +entails, even if the offender is not actually haled into court. It is +not due to any inner necessity, nor to the prompting of one's own +feelings. + +Only the Rationalists have any cause or reason to inquire into the aims +of Morality, whether they look upon the moral law as dictated by society +or are of the opinion that it is the sum total of the rules by which +Reason, of its own initiative, successfully combats the urging of +Instinct. If the moral law is a creation of society, and is obeyed by +the individual out of sympathy with his fellow-men or consideration for +society, the logical conclusion is that society has set up the moral law +to satisfy some real or imagined need. Its aim in this case can only be +the real or supposed welfare of the community. This is the most widely +accepted view. + +"Morality and universal welfare," says Macchiavelli, "are conceptions +which coincide." In his calm assurance this apodictic writer, who +doubtlessly slept well and had an excellent digestion, is never troubled +by a doubt as to whether there is such a thing as an absolutely reliable +measure of universal welfare, and therefore whether Morality, which is +termed its equivalent, can provide us with a perfectly unimpeachable +standard. He whose ethical conscience is more tender and timid will +inevitably anxiously ask himself: Who decides what universal welfare +demands and what is conducive to it? Is it to be the masses? Is the mob, +incapable of thought, ignorant, swayed by momentary and shifting +impulses, to make moral laws for the select few who are its natural +guides? What tragedies would necessarily result from this definition! +How often a strong personality, trained to come to independent +conclusions, refuses to obey the voice of the mob! Is the sheep who +trots bleating along with the herd to be taken as the type of a moral +being? Must we necessarily condemn as immoral those who swim against the +stream, enlightened tyrants who force upon their people hateful +innovations calculated to ensure their welfare,--such men as Peter the +Great, the Emperor Joseph II, the reformer who comes into violent +conflict with the majority who are creatures of habit? "The aim of +Morality is the welfare of society; this is indeed the essence of +Morality." A sufficiently safe and most soothing formula this seems; but +really the security it gives is most deceptive, and it leaves unsolved +the most important problems relating to the phenomenon of Morality. + +A numerous group of moral philosophers seeks the aim of moral conduct +in the individual himself, not outside him. In spite of Schopenhauer's +sympathy, they doubt that consideration for the well-being of the +community would act forcibly enough upon the individual to induce him to +wage unceasing war on his impulses and struggle to overcome them. Rather +they hold that the individual must find in his inner consciousness not +only the spur to moral action, but also the reward for the same, and +they characterize this driving force as pleasurable emotions in every +sense of the words. According to them man acts morally because, and in +so far as, he anticipates pleasurable results from so doing. Epicurus +considers the aim of Morality always to be Pleasure. He makes only the +one reservation, that a reasonable man will renounce an immediate +pleasure for the sake of a greater one in the future, and that he may +delight in the anticipation of pleasurable emotions which defeat and +dull present pains. Thus the martyr may be a true Epicurean, even if by +his actions he exposes himself to most cruel torture and the most +painful death, for he is convinced that the everlasting joys of paradise +will more than indemnify him for his temporary sufferings. + +I have already shown that Aristotle considers Morality the activity of +practical Reason, which is accompanied by pleasurable emotions. He makes +these pleasurable emotions an essential part of Morality, and Spinoza +shares this view, for he says: "Knowledge of good and evil is nothing +but a pleasurable or a disagreeable emotion in so far as we are +conscious of it." + +No less roundly, one might almost say brutally, Leibnitz declares: "We +term good that which gives us pleasure; evil that which gives us pain," +while Feuerbach expresses himself rather more carefully and indefinitely +thus: "The instinct for happiness is the most potent of all instincts. +Where existence always occurs together with volition, volition and the +will to be happy are inseparable; they are, indeed, essentially one. 'I +will,' means 'I have the will not to suffer, not to be hindered and +destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be assisted and preserved; that is, +I have the will to be happy.'" This is a wordy paraphrase of Spinoza's: +"All existence is self-assertion, and Morality is only the highest and +purest form of this fundamental instinct in a reasonable being." + +Among those moral philosophers who see in pleasurable emotions the aim +of Morality, its reward and its incentive, we must distinguish two +groups: those who understand by pleasurable emotions such as appeal to +the senses--the Hedonists; and those who spiritualize the meaning of the +word and expect of Morality not an immediate bodily gratification, a +pleasure, or an insipid satisfaction of the sense, but lasting +happiness--the Eudaemonists. At the first glance the Eudaemonists seem to +have a higher and more worthy conception of the subjective reaction of +moral conduct than have the Hedonists; for the satisfaction the former +expect and promise does not apply to the lower spheres of our organic +life, but to the loftiest functions of our mind, from which alone a +feeling of happiness can emanate. + +But if we look into the matter more closely we find that to draw a sharp +distinction between the Hedonists and Eudaemonists is more than a little +arbitrary. For Pleasure and Happiness differ hardly at all in +essentials, but chiefly in degree; and this would at once be obvious if +one only took the trouble to define the two ideas, which, however, is +mostly not done. And with good reason, for it is impossible to explain +Pleasure. You can use synonyms for it; you can look wise and say: +Pleasure is that which is agreeable, or that which one desires, that in +which one delights, or a certain quality of feeling which accompanies +such organic processes as strengthen or vitalize the system; but all +that this amounts to is to say in a roundabout way, Pleasure is +Pleasure. It is a fundamental fact of our inner consciousness, just as +inexplicable as life, or as its antithesis, Pain. But if we assume that +Pleasure is something given by subjective experience, then the idea of +Happiness can be defined. Happiness is a flooding of the consciousness +with sunshine; it is enjoyment of the moment, a sense of living in the +present accentuated by pleasurable emotion. If this feeling is +organically differentiated, that is, if it springs from a certain +section of the mind or mechanism of the body and can be located there, +it is ecstasy. It is only felt as Happiness when it is, so to speak, +melted, dissolved, distributed throughout the organism, +coenesthetically diffused. + +If we agree to this definition we can take Eudaemonism into consideration +as an aim of moral action, but Hedonism we shall have to discard from +the start. If Morality is to be inhibition, a victory of Reason over +Instinct, then it cannot possibly arouse Pleasure, since the first and +most immediate source of Pleasure is the surrender to instinct, the +satisfaction of the organic appetites; but if one resists them, +suppresses them, then one experiences a privation which at best +occasions discomfort and may easily cause pain. By its very nature and +the mechanism by which it works, Morality can therefore give rise to no +pleasure, but only to discomfort. All the same, it can afford a feeling +of happiness. + +It may be objected that I am guilty of a contradiction when I assume the +possibility of Happiness without Pleasure, as I have just described +Happiness as a particular kind of Pleasure; but in reality there is no +contradiction. For Pleasure springs from a special organic apparatus, +whereas Happiness is not a condition of any particular apparatus in our +body, but a general feeling that cannot be located; if it is roused by +moral actions it originates in the self-satisfaction of Reason, in its +pride in the victory over Instinct, in the rapture occasioned by one's +own strength of will; therefore, it can well exist without any +differentiated pleasurable emotion located in any particular organic +apparatus. + +Many moral philosophers have for various reasons rejected plausible +Eudaemonism as well as Hedonism, and these reasons can all be traced back +to the recognition, or at least an inkling, of the fact that moral +action in the nature of things must exclude pleasurable emotions; at any +rate immediate ones, and such as are perceived by the senses. Perhaps +Fichte does this in the most naive fashion, for he rejects every form of +Eudaemonism as the aim of moral action, but admits as its purpose only +bliss, that is to say, the self-satisfaction of Reason resulting from +action in accordance with its own laws. However, he struggles in vain to +deny that this "bliss" is of the nature of a pleasurable emotion, or to +interpret it as differing from Eudaemonism. He is only giving the latter +another name to make it conform in an orthodox manner with his doctrine +of the Supreme Ego. "_Baptizo te carpam!_" I baptize thee, carp! In this +way the pious man complies with the law enjoining abstinence from meat, +and with an easy conscience smacks his lips over a roast pheasant which +he has dubbed fish. + +Plato is among those who most emphatically deny that Pleasure is either +the motive force, the accompaniment, the consequence, or the aim of +Morality. But a reasonable thinker can derive no profit from his +arguments in support of this point of view, for they are rambling, +fantastic, mystical and visionary. Plato thinks it a necessary +consequence of the very nature of Good that it should be absolutely +self-sufficient. For Pleasure is a perpetual growth, a ceaseless longing +for more; it can therefore not be self-sufficient, and on this account +can not be the foundation of Morality. + +However, it is by no means obvious why Morality should not be in a +perpetual state of growth (just as Pleasure is, according to Plato), or +why it should not constantly desire an increase of its own activities. +On the contrary, this craving is just what one would most wish Morality +to have. True, it would not then attain self-satisfaction. But what is +the good of this self-satisfaction? It is a pleasurable emotion, and +according to Plato Morality is supposed to have nothing in common with +Pleasure. It is not to be contentment and serene satisfaction, but +rather tireless endeavour. However, Plato, of course, cannot admit this, +because for him Good and the deity are identical, and being perfect can +therefore advance no farther in perfection; and the striving after Good +is merely an effort of memory on man's part to call to mind more clearly +the deity whom he saw in his spiritual life before birth, and of whom he +retains a dim and confused memory in his earthly life. It is plainly +idle to waste reasonable criticism upon such visionary arguments. + +The Stoics, too, try to sever the connexion between moral conduct and +Pleasure, and to conceive the former as a simple activity of human +nature, one, moreover, from which they expect no particular +satisfaction. They overlook the fact that every activity of the impulses +and instincts of man's own nature affords him satisfaction, and that +Pleasure is nothing but this very satisfaction of natural instincts. If, +then, Morality were, as the Stoics contend, only "Life in harmony with +Nature herself," then, like every other satisfaction of natural desires, +it should be an ever-flowing source of pleasurable emotions, and this +characteristic would be inseparable from it, though the Stoics may +vainly try to deny it. + +Christianity has an easier job than Stoicism. With harsh severity, +disregarding any plea for indulgence in view of the weakness of the +flesh, it absolutely excludes the factor of pleasure from the fulfilment +of moral duties. But this severity is only apparent. The good and just +man can expect no reward for his moral conduct here on earth, but he +will find a much more ample one in the life to come. To the devout +believer who gives unlimited credit to it, the promise of the joys of +paradise has the full value of a cash disbursement. It is somewhat +childish juggling with words to deny pleasurable emotion to be the aim +of moral conduct if at the same time a most vivid foretaste of the +eternal bliss which awaits him after death be given to the virtuous man; +as if the anticipation of heavenly bliss were not a pleasurable emotion +of the highest degree! + +Kant finds it due to his point of view to spurn every weak inclination +to Eudaemonism. A Categorical Imperative cannot issue commands with an +eye to profit or comfort. That is as clear as daylight. "All Morality of +action must be founded on the necessity which arises from duty and +respect for the law, and not from love or inclination for the desired +result of the action." Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and John Stuart Mill +have recorded such irrefutable criticisms of the Kantian doctrine of the +absolute disinterestedness of moral action, that it is unnecessary to +add to their arguments. + +Only some moral philosophers, and particularly Mill, are guilty of +logical inaccuracy when they reject Eudaemonism but retain Utility as the +aim of morality. Why do the Utilitarians not realize that they are +merely Eudaemonists under another name, and that he who disregards his +own immediate interests in order to further the well-being of the +community experiences a pleasurable emotion of high order in the +satisfaction he derives from the sacrifices whereby he has contributed +to the good of the community? + +The useless exertions of a section of moral philosophers to eliminate +not only Hedonism but also Eudaemonism from moral action are a veritable +labour of Sisyphus. Hardly have these two with difficulty been expelled +by the door than they return by the window or the chimney. It is a mere +conjuring trick to remove them from this world to the next, as do the +theologians, or to substitute universal well-being for the feeling of +happiness. All the same, the desire to purge moral action of the least +admixture of hope of profit or pleasure is comprehensible. Common +experience, which is equally forced upon the profound thinker and upon +the plain man in the street least inclined to cudgel his brain, teaches +us that Morality consists, with very few exceptions, in acting against +our own immediate interest, in denying ourselves some coveted pleasure, +in renouncing some attainable profit, in undertaking some disagreeable +exertion because Reason bids us do so. From this practical experience +the man in the street gets the impression that duty is a bitter +necessity and that decency is attended by many and varied +inconveniences. The theorist, the philosopher, derives a principle from +his empirical facts; he observes that the moral man often acts against +his own immediate interests, and expresses this in the pretentious +axiom: "Morality from the very beginning excludes all thought of +profit." + +And yet the philosophers are guilty of the same superficiality as the +man in the street. They do not go far enough into the matter to perceive +that the morality of pleasure, of interest, and of duty, Hedonism, +Utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative, all lead in very slightly +different ways to the same goal--Eudaemonism. The fulfilment of duty +affords spiritual satisfaction, a pre-eminently pleasurable emotion +which increases in direct proportion to the effort which its fulfilment +demands. Interest also implies pleasure, for every interest ultimately +comes to this, that it is an attempt to secure a pleasure. This aim lies +at the bottom of all interests; it is the fundamental interest from +which all seemingly different interests are derived; it is the universal +goal to which all human effort tends, whether it be a question of making +money to satisfy ambition, of winning love and friendship, of material, +spiritual, personal or social values. Interest is self-assertion and the +intensifying of the zest for life. But these are always accompanied by +pleasurable emotions; thus interest is forthwith identified with +pleasurable emotion, even though one has to work hard, even though at +the moment it entails drudgery and discomfort. Hedonism makes no secret +of its nature and its tendency. It openly admits what the Categorical +Imperative denies and what Utilitarianism veils with vague phrases: that +the aim and object of moral action is Pleasure and nothing else. + +In our short survey of the immense field of literature dealing with +moral philosophy we have learnt that, although the most various and +divergent views are expressed as to the essence and source of Morality, +nevertheless there is but one opinion, be it clearly or vaguely stated, +be it the result of knowledge or surmise, as to the mechanism by means +of which moral concepts determine action, and as to the conscious or +unconscious aim of moral action: Moral concepts do their work by means +of inhibition, and the aim of moral action is a feeling of happiness. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE IMMANENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY + + +It is natural for man's thoughts to be concentrated on himself until he +has learnt to rise from the deep and narrow well of his egoism to a +higher and wider view of life and, free from the taint of self-love, to +form an idea of his place in the world and his relationship to it. Not +till the development of his intellect is far advanced does any doubt +assail him as to the truth of his conviction that all his personal +affairs, the least as well as the most weighty, are of the greatest +importance to the universe, that every ache or pain he feels must wake +an echo in the heavens, that the Earth shudders in anticipation when he +is about to stumble and sprain his ankle, and that the stars in their +courses mysteriously, though intelligibly to the discerning, foretell +the hour of his birth and of his death. An Indian legend pours cruel +scorn upon this childlike megalomania: A fox had fallen into a stream +and was drowning. "The world is coming to an end!" gasped the animal in +its agony. A peasant standing on the brink replied coldly, "Oh, no, I +see only a little fox drowning." + +Many moral philosophers, those of the Kantian school without exception, +labour under the delusion of this same, egocentric view. In their eyes +the phenomenon of Morality is a cosmic one. Morality is the law of +human conduct, therefore it is the law of world processes, of the +universe. Indeed, it is the law of the universe before it becomes that +of human conduct. It would exist even if there were no men, no humanity, +no human conduct at all. The solemn innocents who weightily give +utterance to this doctrine are unaware how ridiculous they are. They do +not hesitate to subject Sirius to the yoke of the Ten Commandments. They +are convinced that the Milky Way practises virtue and shuns, or ought to +shun, vice, just as we inconsiderable human beings do. The precept, +"Thou shalt not steal," applies with binding force to gravity, and the +warning, "Thou shalt not kill," to electricity, though the latter +ruthlessly disregards it, as the results of being struck by lightning +and accidents with high voltage installations frequently prove. If they +do not threaten Nature with police and prison it is only because in +their eyes Morality is independent of all sanctions, is superior to +rewards and punishments, depends upon itself alone, constitutes its own +aim, is by its very nature a compelling force, and therefore has no need +of adventitious compulsion. + +Such profound nonsense cannot lay claim to serious treatment. It is a +counterpart to the belief that events in the history of mankind, like +war and pestilence, are foretold by heavenly signs such as fiery comets. +The stars revolve, the clockwork of the universe continues undisturbed, +as though the earth were still uninhabited, as it was when it was a +glowing fluid globe or, earlier still, a nebular mass; and this +although man's self-esteem be hurt by such a lack of consideration. If +we care to call the (so far as we know) unalterable laws, according to +which the forces of Nature act and the mechanism of the world works, the +Morality of the Universe, that may pass. Only we must in that case +clearly realize that we are speaking metaphorically, that we are making +use of a poetic simile, that we are anthropomorphically attributing +human traits to the universe. Morality is a phenomenon restricted to +mankind, or, to be strictly accurate, a phenomenon which occurs only +among living beings; for the beginnings of Morality may be traced in +creatures of a lower order than man, and it develops simultaneously with +the consciousness and the mentality of living beings. Morality is a +function of life, dependent upon it, begotten and developed by it, to +meet life's needs and serve its interests. The existence of Morality +apart from life is as unthinkable as that of hunger, ambition, or +gratitude. + +Morality is a collection of laws and prohibitions which Reason opposes +to organic instincts, by means of which the former forces the latter +into actions from which they would like to refrain, or prevents them +from carrying out that which they yearn to do. The existence of +Morality, therefore, presupposes in the first place that of an +intelligence sufficiently developed to form a clear idea of something +that is still in the future, namely, an image of the consequences +resulting from an action. + +Guided by this inner contemplation of the image of the consequences of +an action, Reason decides to carry out or prevent the action. This +gives us the lowest plane upon which Morality can occur as the cause of +action and of abstention from action. It implies, above all things, +foresight, and can therefore only exist in a consciousness which is +sufficiently developed to grasp the idea of the future and form a +picture of it. This consciousness must be capable of extracting the +elements of a conception from memory according to the laws of the +association of ideas, and be able to group them logically in a new +order. In other words, as long as the mind cannot visualize the past and +from it build up a picture of the future, Morality can find no place in +it. + +This statement requires no limitation, but it demands a short +explanation. It is quite true that Morality is foresight, but it is only +among the elect that the latter is developed to such a pitch that it is +possible to form images of the consequences of action and abstention +sufficiently clear and definite to exercise a restraining or encouraging +influence. + +The average man can act morally without first working out a clear +picture of the future. It is enough that he has been trained to the +habit of respecting current precepts, and of accepting the views +obtaining in his circle as to what is good or bad, what is admissible or +inadmissible. This morality, of course, is merely a matter of drill or +training; it is unthinking automatism; it is inferior, and not to be +compared with the living, creative morality of higher natures, which, as +a sovereign law-giver, comes to an independent decision in every case +and, like the guardian angel of childlike faith, guides man on his path +through life, indicates the right course at the cross-roads, and warns +him of pitfalls and stumbling-blocks. But for everyday use mechanical +morality may suffice. In the uneventful existence of the average man, +which passes in a stereotyped way, this mechanical morality is an +acceptable guide and counsellor, but it remains an outside influence +foreign to his inner consciousness; he is glad to deceive and outwit it, +as a slave does his master's bailiff if he can do so without running the +risk of a thrashing; but if his destiny unexpectedly rises above its +accustomed dead level, then this dogmatic morality, which he has never +really assimilated, leaves him in the lurch, and mournfully, in piteous +tones, he utters the well-known cry, "It is easy to do one's duty; it is +difficult to know where one's duty lies." + +Reason, then, which is capable of foreseeing the results of actions, +teaches a man what he must do and from what he must abstain, where he +may follow his instinct and where he must resist it, according as it +considers the presumptive results of yielding to impulse good or bad. +But whence does Reason obtain the standard it applies to the actions of +men and their results? How does it acquire the fundamental concepts Good +and Bad, and what is their significance? Generally speaking, the answer +will be as follows: Moral values are appraised by a standard supplied by +a general consensus of opinion; Reason acknowledges as good that which +meets with the approval of the community, that which the latter desires +and therefore praises; the community, for its part, echoes the +pronouncements of influential personages, i.e. of the most respected, +most powerful, and most aristocratic; Reason condemns as bad that which +the community disapproves, and which it therefore censures and rejects. +This definition does not solve the problem of good and bad, it only +shifts it. + +Later we shall have to show upon what grounds the community +discriminates between acceptable and reprehensible facts, calling the +former good and the latter bad. For the present it is enough to observe +that Reason derives the laws, which it constantly impresses on man, from +the opinion of the community. + +It can happen that Reason rejects the opinion of the community and forms +a conclusion opposed to it. This revolt of individual morality against +conventional morality is the great tragedy of man. It can only occur in +the soul of a hero, for mediocre and insipid people always bow to the +opinion of the majority. There is clearly imminent danger of making a +mistake. Not seldom, however, the individual is right in his opposition +to the community, and then the latter is fired by his example to examine +its traditional dogmas and to correct or reject them. This is not the +only, but it is the most common means by which Morality is developed and +changed. Its progress demands martyrs. Strong personalities must be +sacrificed to force a revision of moral values. Socrates has to swallow +the draft of hemlock so that unfettered thought may acquire the right to +doubt the legend of the gods. Jesus has to incur the dangerous anger of +the Pharisees so that the adulteress may be treated with indulgence and +human sympathy instead of being punished according to rigorous law. But +the opposition of a self-willed, subjective Morality to the accepted +moral law is always exceptional; the general rule is submission to the +moral law. This is indeed a necessary preliminary to revolt against the +moral law of the community, for it is only by means of a vigorous social +education that man develops such a nicely balanced and keen sense of +Good and Bad, that he cannot prevail upon himself to carry out generally +approved actions which his own intelligence does not recognize as moral. +He whose moral sense has not been intensified by strict discipline will +never be assailed by doubt, as long as he follows in the footsteps of +the multitude. + +Hence, as a rule, Reason exercises its control of the actions of man in +conformity with the laws prescribed by the community. Before Morality +develops into the practice of Good and the rejection of Bad it takes the +form of consideration for the world at large, since it is the latter +which has created the concepts of Good and Bad as well as the standard +by which they are judged, and in order to avoid conflict with the +community, and to maintain uninterrupted agreement with it, the +individual exerts himself to persist in doing good and to refrain from +doing evil. + +The establishment of these facts gives deep offence to the mystics among +moral philosophers. "What a debasement and belittling of Morality! What! +It is supposed to be nothing more than a sort of obsequiousness towards +the multitude? Its laws are observed for the sake of pleasing others? It +is a comedy played to win applause and a call before the curtain? That +is a libel and a calumny. The truly moral man looks neither to the right +nor to the left. He does not condescend to ask, 'What will the world say +to this?' There is but one judge in whose eyes he wishes to be +justified: his conscience." + +Quite right. But what is conscience found to be if we penetrate the fog +of mystic words with which it has come to be surrounded? Conscience is +the permanent representative of the community in the consciousness of +the individual, just as public opinion may be termed the conscience of +every member of society made manifest. Metaphorically, it wields the +powers pertaining to society; it praises and blames, it condemns and +exalts, it punishes and rewards, as society could do; and it actually +pronounces judgment in the name of society, even though it does not +preface such judgment with this formula which is tacitly implied and +must always be mentally added. Conscience is the invisible link which +unites the individual with a social group, just as speech, custom, +tradition, and political institutions are the visible links. But the +social origin and representative nature of conscience set limits to its +power. Conscience is a respected authority with wide powers only in the +consciousness of those individuals who have a highly developed social +sense. I purposely do not say those in whom the instinct to follow the +crowd preponderates, because this mode of expression might imply blame +and condemnation which I do not intend to convey. + +For social instinct comes natural to an individual born, educated and +working in a community, who shares its feelings, views and interests, +nay, even its prejudices and mistakes; and if he lacks it, it is a sign +of a morbid deviation from the normal. Only the decadent man is +uncannily lonely in spirit, alien, indifferent or definitely hostile to +his human surroundings; he is, according to the violence and +polarization of his instincts, the passionate anarchist or the born +criminal; the public opinion of his circle is unintelligible to him and +makes no impression on him; it has no significance for him; he attaches +no importance to its approbation, and its anger leaves him cold; he +would take no notice of it, were it not that he knows its power to +destroy him, and fears its police, its prisons, and its scaffolds. Such +a man, organically predisposed to crime, most urgently needs a +conscience. It would arrest him on the downward path to which his evil +instincts lead. It would warn him to resist the wicked impulses of his +selfishness. But he, of all people, has no conscience. He can have none. +He is anti-social, he is at war with society, diplomatic relations +between him and it have been broken off, and it has no representative in +his consciousness. A lively and active feeling of joint responsibility +with the community is a necessary predisposition on the part of the +individual before conscience can have any power. Where the former is +lacking the latter is mute and paralysed. + +The essence of Morality, as we have found, is the subjection of +instinct and direct organic impulses to the discipline of Reason. The +latter exercises a censorship in pursuance of a law which it derives not +from within, but from without, from the ordinances of the community +which instructs Reason as to what it should permit, what it should +forbid, and what it should demand. Conscience ensures respect for its +commands, and may be called the executive power or police of Reason, +acting as the authorized representative of Morality. It is the garrison +which the community maintains in the individual's consciousness, which +it arms and supplies with authority and instructions; the power of +conscience lies in the strength of the community at its back, and is +without influence only upon those who refuse admission to the troops of +the community and yield to none but actual physical force. All this +proves irrefutably that Morality is a phenomenon arising from the social +life of man, and its power is a function of society. + +If under the conditions in which humanity lives nowadays one could +imagine a man totally detached from his species, leading a solitary +life, Morality would be absolutely meaningless to him. The idea is one +he could never conceive. It would have no significance. Good and bad +would always retain their original meaning as labels for sensual +qualities, for pleasant or unpleasant sensations of taste, smell, etc.; +they would never be spiritualized or apply to the quality of actions. He +would be unable to attach any meaning to the words duty and right. The +terms virtue, vice, conscience, repentance would convey nothing to him. +Morality can only originate when the individual lives united with +fellow beings in a social community. It is a consequence of this union. +It is the one condition on which alone this union can be permanent. + +The solitary individual must, however, not be confused with the lonely +one. Robinson Crusoe, shipwrecked on a desert island and forced to stay +there without companionship, is not primitive man. He is a son of +civilization who has fallen upon evil days. In his enforced solitariness +he maintains the habits of thought of his original surroundings. He +preserves the concepts of Morality even though he has no occasion to +obey its dictates. He can, if not actually yet potentially, be a paragon +of virtue or a sink of iniquity; he can have a very delicate or a very +dull conscience. He continues to be a man of social instincts cut off +from society, and goes on thinking and feeling in a social manner. By +primitive man I mean man as he was before society originated. For, +contrary to the sociological school which denies the individual and +boldly refuses to allow him any existence, declaring society to be older +and earlier than the individual, I think I have conclusively shown +("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" [The Meaning of History]) that man is not +by nature a gregarious animal, that he lived alone, being self-sufficing +as long as the climatic conditions, under which he first made his +appearance on earth, enabled him to exist by his own unaided efforts and +capabilities, and that he banded himself together with others in gangs, +troops and hordes--the earliest forms of subsequent society--when, after +the first ice age following his appearance, the struggle for existence +grew ever harder, ever more laborious, transcending the powers of the +individual so that he could only overcome Nature, now grown hostile to +him, by uniting with others of his kind. + +This primitive man of the golden geological period before the Ice Age +knew no Morality, and as far as human intelligence can tell he would +never have known of it had there been a continuance of the paradisaic +conditions obtaining at the time of his birth, and had the climate not +deteriorated. The occurrence of murderous frosts, the necessity of +seeking protection from them in natural caves or artificially +constructed shelters, and of kindling and maintaining fires, the +diminution or disappearance of vegetable food, and the need to replace +it by the booty of the chase or fishing--all these forced him to unite +his efforts with those of other men who shared his wretched lot on +earth. But in order to maintain this community with others he had to +learn a new science, one he had hitherto not known because he had had no +need of it: consideration for his fellows. He might no longer think of +himself alone, consider his own inclinations in all eventualities, give +way to all his moods or yield to every whim; he had unceasingly to bear +his neighbour in mind and take care not to annoy him, not to make an +enemy of him, not to become hateful to him. Forbearance towards his +neighbour was the necessary condition of their life in common, just as +their life in common was the necessary condition of self-preservation. +The penalty for selfish indulgence was stern persecution, punishment, +perhaps death; in any case, expulsion from the community. Man, +therefore, stood before the choice of self-control or destruction, and +this dilemma taught him Morality. + +Such, we must imagine, were the beginnings of Morality. It was not +prearranged or purposely sought; it grew naturally from the +companionship of men and developed simultaneously with society. If the +struggle for existence made life in communities a necessity, the first +coercive law of the community was to enjoin upon its members a mode of +conduct which alone rendered the existence of the community possible, +and the fundamental rule of this conduct was mutual consideration. +Without this two egoisms cannot exist side by side and develop. They +either destroy or shun one another. This phenomenon may also be observed +among the higher animals. Elephants, living in herds, expel quarrelsome +individuals and force them to wander alone far from the rest. The +natives of Ceylon and India fear these "bachelor elephants" as being +specially savage and malicious. They think that they grow like this +because of their loneliness. That is probably a false conclusion. It is +much more likely that these animals have been driven from their herd +because they were savage and malicious, because their characters were +opposed to discipline. Here we come upon the first faint foreshadowing +of the phenomenon of Morality in an animal community. + +Now that we have introduced the idea of the growth and development of +Morality, it becomes obvious that it must have begun with mere +indications, and that from rude, dim, undeveloped beginnings it +gradually grows more perfect, more refined, more nicely differentiated. +At first man avoids only the most brutal injuries to his neighbour, such +as hurting him, doing him bodily harm, threatening to kill him, openly +robbing him. In proportion as he becomes more spiritually sensitive, as +he learns to feel the insult and humiliation of injuries other than +those inflicted with a fist or club, he is led to refrain from giving +his fellow-men similar offence, which though it deals no gaping wounds, +yet hurts his spiritual sensibilities. A series of values is developed, +growing ever longer, ever more complicated, with more and more +gradations, until, going far beyond the simple, artless commandments, +"Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not covet thy +neighbour's wife nor his goods," it reaches the pitch of agonized +self-reproach, because of the slightest and most secret impulses to +dislike, injustice, covetousness, dissimulation, etc. + +Morality must be regarded as a support and a weapon in the struggle for +existence in so far as, given present climatic conditions on earth and +the civilization arising therefrom, man can only exist in societies, and +society cannot exist without Morality. The chain of thought runs as +follows: without morality no society, without society no individual +existence; consequently, Morality is the essential condition for the +existence of the individual as well as for that of the community. +However, we must always bear in mind the reservation, "given the +present climatic conditions on earth." Had the earth continued to be the +paradise it must have been at the birth of our species (since otherwise +the latter could simply not have originated), the necessity would never +have arisen for the individual to band himself together with others of +his kind, no society would ever have developed, and there would have +been no Morality. Serious as the subject is, one cannot but smile at the +thought of the comic figure the learned, professorial Neo-Kantians would +cut with their dogma of the absolute and cosmic nature of Morality, if +they propounded it among men whose wants Nature's bounty was able to +satisfy as easily as the frog is satisfied in his puddle or the crow on +his tree top. They would find no trace of absolute Morality among +mankind, and would be reduced to seeking it among the stars. + +The very nature of Morality, in that it is an aid to man in the struggle +for existence, makes it easy to understand the origin and nature of the +concepts Good and Bad. There are propensities and actions which +facilitate life in a community which, indeed, alone make it possible: +love of one's neighbour, helpfulness, liberality, consideration for the +feelings of others, and amiability. There are others which make such a +life difficult or absolutely impossible: uncompromising selfishness, +violence, cruelty, rapacity, instinctive hostility to one's neighbour. +Men recognized that the former were beneficial to them, the latter +harmful. The former aroused their liking, the latter their disapproval, +dislike and animosity. The quality of feeling which accompanied the +perceptions of actions of the former kind was akin to that with which +they responded to beneficial, profitable, useful and welcome sense +impressions. The quality of feeling, which actions of the second +category gave rise to, was akin to that due to harmful and repellent +sense impressions. Following the law of analogy, they placed on an equal +footing actions which were felt to be pleasing and pleasant sensations +of taste and smell; similarly with disagreeable actions and unpleasant +sense impressions; and finally they called the former good and the +latter bad, using terms originally applicable only to the realm of the +senses. + +Not everything that is pleasant to the senses is beneficial. There are +poisons which are pleasing to taste, but none the less noxious for that, +such as (to give only one example) alcoholic drinks and impressions of a +certain order, like voluptuousness, which man greedily pursues, even +though they ruin his health. But these are exceptions. As a rule, not +only man, but all living creatures, derive pleasant sensations from +beneficial things; and it is probable that that category of sensations, +which we are conscious of as being pleasant, is nothing but the state of +coenesthesis, when the organism functions particularly energetically +under the influence of the absorption of food or of a special stimulus +of the senses, when it feels its life processes carried on particularly +vigorously, freely and harmoniously; just as we feel that state of +coenesthesis to be unpleasant, which occurs when the organism +functions badly, slackly, and in a manner calculated to endanger the +continuance of life. With the reservation that has been indicated we +can say in general that Good is equivalent to beneficial and pleasant, +Bad to harmful and unpleasant. This is true of the transferred and +spiritualized as well as of the immediate and material meaning of these +expressions of value. The significance of the words Good and Bad, the +point of departure, development and change of conception they indicate, +suffice to justify the Utilitarians and the Hedonists or Eudaemonists +among the moral philosophers, and to confute the contentions of their +critics, who deny all connexion between Morality and a practical +purpose, profit or pleasure, and declare these to be unworthy +humiliations of its majesty. + +They wriggle, with the agility of a contortionist on the music-hall +stage, to get over the obvious and palpable aim of moral conduct. They +display all the cunning of dishonest sophistry in their arguments to +prove that the element of subjective satisfaction which moral action +yields is non-existent, and that, therefore, the Hedonists and +Eudaemonists are wrong. They stir up an opaque cloud of words, phrases +and formulae to hide the fact, which nevertheless emerges clearly, that +he who acts morally expects to derive pleasurable emotions from his +action, or at least tries thereby to avoid probable painful emotions, +and that moral conduct, just as it is designed to give the individual +subjective satisfaction which is a kind of pleasure, is also meant to be +a benefit, or at any rate a supposed benefit, to the community. + +Morality must never try for a reward and never expect one. It must be +absolutely disinterested. It has no business to pursue any aim outside +itself. Thus say the mystics of moral philosophy, juggling with words; +and they think they are doing especial honour to Morality and raising it +to a particularly proud eminence. But Morality has no need of this +artificial and false grandeur to maintain its lofty place among the +phenomena of life, and it is derogatory neither to its authority nor to +its influence to be recognized as a beneficial force conducive to +happiness. + +The opponents of Utilitarianism and Eudaemonism in Ethics, if they speak +in good faith, may be excused on the grounds that their analysis of the +phenomenon of Morality is shallow. For them Morality is something +absolute, which exists by itself as an eternal and unalterable law of +the Universe, but which is revealed in the individual and therefore must +be conceived individually as a quality which has become human, as a +human value. If anyone persists in looking upon Morality as an +absolutely individual matter, without any connexion with anything +outside the individual, if anyone obstinately shuts his eyes to the fact +that Morality has not been developed by the individual out of his own +immediate needs and in consideration of himself alone, but that it is, +on the contrary, a creation of society and has no sense or significance +except as a social phenomenon, then indeed he can with some show of +justification deny Utilitarianism and Hedonism. For truly, looked at +from the point of view of the individual, moral conduct appears neither +pleasant nor immediately beneficial. On the contrary, it is, as a rule, +directly opposed to his own apparent interest, and it is achieved with +difficulty by sacrifice and renunciation, which are never pleasant and +often very painful. + +Once in a drawing-room, during a game of definitions, I heard a +light-hearted young lady define Duty in the following terms: "Duty is +that which we do unwillingly." A stern professor contradicted her at +once with the solemnity he thought due to his position, and assured her +reprovingly: "It is my duty to give lectures, and I do this duty gladly. +If you were right, madam, expressions such as 'zealous in one's duty' +and 'willing performance of duty' would have no meaning and could never +have been coined." That seems convincing, but yet it is wrong. +Expressions such as "zealous in one's duty" and "willing performance of +duty" were not coined until society had developed its system of Morality +and had educated its members to strive for its approval by conducting +themselves in accordance with this system, to look on its approval as a +flattering distinction and to fear its disapproval as a disgrace. Such +phrases are Pharisaical, calculated to exercise a suggestive influence +profitable to society. They are the sugar to sweeten the pill; but the +young lady was honest and the professor conventional; the pill is +bitter. Thinkers recognized and admitted this thousands of years ago. +Antiphon, the sophist, says: "The law, the outcome of an agreement, +coerces nature, the result of growth, and goes against the interest of +the individual." The same idea is expressed by the tragic poet in the +lines: "The gods have placed sweat before virtue." This was said in the +very same words by Lao Tse, the disciple of Meng Tse, the pupil of +Confucius and the reformer of his doctrine. + +The law, not only the law of the state which Antiphon has principally in +view, but also the moral law, "goes against the interest of the +individual"; not in reality, but apparently, at the first superficial +glance. Moral conduct is the reverse of natural conduct; it takes place +in opposition to instinct by deflecting the original impulse; it is a +subjugation of inclination, a victory over the real nature of the man. +Virtue has to exert its utmost strength in bitter struggles, fought out +within the individual, before it can reveal itself actively in deeds. +That is a natural consequence of the manner in which Morality +originated. + +The point is that it was not created directly for the individual, but +for the community, and for the former only in so far as he is a part of +the community, and from its stability and well-being derives a benefit +which he may, or may not, be conscious of; which he may, or may not, be +able to appreciate; which he accepts as something natural and +self-understood without further thought; for which he does not consider +any return service to be due; but which is nevertheless of real +magnitude, profiting the individual, facilitating his existence, or even +alone making it possible; and for which, as for every other gift, he +must make sacrifices. For within society there can be no gifts. It +possesses nothing but what it has acquired from its members, and the +latter must pay full value for everything it provides, unasked or +otherwise. + +As the Moral law originated to meet the needs of the community, and was +gradually formulated in definite precepts, it is comprehensible that the +community never paused to inquire what subjective effect its law would +have on the feelings of the individual. If you impose a law upon someone +you hardly ever consider how great will be the emotions of pleasure or +displeasure which its enforcement will entail. The order is, "Obey, +whether you like it or not; that which deeper insight and more +far-seeing wisdom prescribe is for your good." Thus the individual is +forced to work laboriously for his own good, which in his purblindness +he does not even recognize. It would be comprehensible if the +individual, who does not see farther than his own nose and does not look +beyond the present moment, formed the opinion that Morality is not +perceptibly beneficial to him and gives him no pleasure, and that, +therefore, the Utilitarians and the Hedonists talk nonsense. But the +moral philosopher, who observes the individual in relationship to the +community and surveys human actions, the way they are connected, and the +way they interact upon one another, has no right to pursue the same line +of thought as the individual, and deny that Morality aims at utility and +pleasure, even though the individual, when he acts morally, does not +perceive any personal advantage, nor feel any pleasure except the +self-satisfaction which he has been trained to feel, since in the eyes +of others he is so good and honest. That Morality aims at utility, and +is at the same time a source of pleasure and happiness, may seem dark +and doubtful while we consider the individual, but it becomes clear as +day and indisputable when we regard the community. + +Among creatures of a lower order than man, indeed among all animals that +live together in flocks or herds, we find the first beginnings of that +mode of conduct which in man we call moral, and which is not intended to +be of direct benefit to the individual, or to add to his momentary +pleasure, but which subordinates or sacrifices these personal +satisfactions to the good of the community. + +Chamois, when they are grazing, set one of their number on guard upon a +rocky eminence with a distant view, and this individual is responsible +for the safety of the herd. While the others feed in peace and comfort, +this guardian chamois forgoes the food which is doubtless just as +attractive to it as to the others, and tirelessly keeps a sharp look out +over its whole field of vision, warning its companions at the first +approach of danger by uttering a shrill cry. + +When the great herds of buffaloes still inhabited the North American +prairies, they had at the head and on the flanks of the herd the +strongest bulls, while the centre was occupied by the cows with their +calves and the young animals. Before civilization came to trouble them, +the grizzly bear was the only enemy that threatened them, and with him +they were able to deal; one of them would meet the attacking bear in +single combat, but did not always emerge from it unhurt. Often enough at +the end of the fight both the bull and the bear would be terribly +injured or even dead; yet by sacrificing his life the bull saved the +rest of the herd. + +The thrilling adventure of the Abyssinian baboon is well known; first +told by Alfred Brehm in his "_Tierleben_" (animal life), it was +afterwards quoted by Darwin and many other writers. On a hunting +expedition Brehm surprised a party of monkeys in a clearing. They fled +at once and had found shelter in the wood before the dogs could reach +them. Only one young one had got separated from the rest and was left +behind alone. It had scrambled up on to a solitary rock standing in the +plain, round which the dogs were barking furiously, and in its terror +the creature uttered piercing cries for help. A little male monkey, +hearing it, detached himself from the group, turned back from the safety +of the forest, made quietly for the rock and fetched away the trembling +young baboon from among the pack, silent now and shrinking in amazement; +and then stroking and caressing the little creature he carried it safely +in his arms to its family in the wood, unmolested by the stupefied dogs +and spared by the hunter, lost in admiration of this self-sacrificing +courage. + +In these three instances we see how the joint responsibility among +gregarious animals develops in them an ever increasing sense of duty, +which teaches the chamois to forgo its food during the hours it is on +guard, rouses in the buffalo a savage lust for battle, and makes the +baboon perform a premeditated deed of epic heroism. When men act as +these animals did, we ascribe this to Morality. This is nothing but +joint responsibility in action, the joint responsibility which the +species is forced by the conditions of life to adopt, if it is to +survive. + +Among the moral philosophers the mystics are prevented, by the haze +which obscures all their thought, from seeing that Morality originates +from this joint responsibility. Or rather, if they do see it, they think +this origin too low. They demand a more exalted genealogy for the +phenomenon of Morality. According to them the Moral law comes straight +from God. The concepts Good and Evil are revealed. Commands and +prohibitions are imposed upon the soul by that omnipotence which +spiritualizes the universe and of which the soul is an immortal part. + +If these phrases were anything but moonshine and tinkling cymbals they +certainly would make any other explanation of this astonishing fact +superfluous; the fact, namely, that man does what is repugnant to him, +and refrains from doing what would give him pleasure, that he is content +with himself when he has voluntarily curbed his impulses and made +sacrifices, and that he feels the pricks of conscience if he chances to +experience the pleasure of appeasement because he has satisfied his +desires. "Man obeys divine commands." That suffices and obviates the +necessity of seeking for explanations of this phenomenon, which shall +satisfy Reason. + +It is a mere mirage, the reflection of an earthly state of affairs in +the heavens, to assume that the universe is governed by an authority +devoid of responsibility, which imposes on its subjects, that is to say +men, laws and instructions, discipline and order. + +It is a form of anthropomorphism, the most widespread and stubborn of +errors in thought among those men who try to understand the +unintelligible, and are content with the most unfounded explanation +which their naive imagination freely invents for them. This same +anthropomorphism, not even at a loss to solve the problem of the origin +and essence of the universe, replies unhesitatingly that God by an act +of volition created it out of nothing to prove to Himself His own +omnipotence and omniscience; in like manner it has no scruple in +ascribing the phenomenon of Morality to a creative act of God's, and +makes Ethics, which properly speaking form the chief part of psychology, +anthropology and sociology, a subdivision of theology, that is, of +anthropomorphic mythology. + +Critical Reason, which realizes that deceptive fictions are not true +thought, but dreams--not the result of ripe intellectual effort, but of +the childish play of the imagination, seeks the roots of Morality not in +the air or in the ether, but in the solid earth; not in some +indemonstrable, transcendental sphere, but in an obvious need of human +nature. The biological necessities of the species, which can only +survive by dint of living in communities, sufficiently explain the +origin of the feeling of joint responsibility, of consideration for +one's neighbour, of the concepts Good and Evil and of conscience; and we +have no use for the dogmas of revealed Morality derived from some +fabulous, supernatural source, or for the Kantian categorical +imperative. + +Morality, understood as a form of joint responsibility, determines the +inner and outer relations of the individual to the community; that is to +say, to as much of it as he comes in immediate contact with, to wit, his +neighbour. Morality provides him with the notions of Duty and Right, of +the consideration he owes his neighbour and of that which he may demand +from his neighbour. It is customary to look upon Rights and Duties as +opposites. This is mere indolence of thought. Right and Duty are +supplementary, forming together one concept. They are in reality one and +the same thing regarded from different points of view. My Duty is the +subjective form of my neighbour's Right; my Right the subjective form of +other people's Duty. That which is Duty, when I have to do it out of +consideration for others, becomes my Right, when others have to do it +out of consideration for me. + +Respect for the personality of others, which is the feeling from which +the concept of Right and Duty emanates, seems to be a late and noble +product of Morality and a particularly praiseworthy victory of prescient +intelligence over selfishness. This factor of our consciousness which +determines our will and which gradually becomes an instinct, is really +only a special application of the law of least resistance which governs +all organic life. We have no selfless, ideal respect for the personality +of another; but, made wise by experience and observation, we assume that +that other has the power to resist and to retaliate if a wrong is done +to him or he is injured; hence we avoid, to the best of our ability, +actions to which he is likely to object, so as not to come into conflict +with him, because to overcome his opposition would require effort and +expose us to danger. Respect for the personality of another and for his +rights may be expressed by a mechanical formula which runs as follows: +this respect varies directly as the real or supposed might of the other +person, and inversely as our own real or supposed might. + +The society of which he is a member, and which makes his existence +possible, prescribes to the individual the laws governing his moral +conduct. That which a community at any given time approves and demands, +rejects or forbids, constitutes the precept whereby its members regulate +their conduct, and offers ample security for their conscience. + +The concepts Good and Bad originate simultaneously with society; they +are the form in which its actual conditions of existence are conveyed to +the consciousness of its members. The only immutable thing about them is +the fact of their continued existence. Without the coercive discipline +of a rule conducive to the common weal and governing the mutual +relations between its members, no society could be imagined to exist, +unless its members were all similar in nature, reacted in an identical +fashion to all impressions and possessed the same feelings and +sensations, the same inclinations and the same impulses of volition. In +that case no difference could ever arise between one individual and +another, or between an individual and the community, which would have to +be smoothed over by the moral law emanating from the community and +controlling the individual, or be suppressed by the community's order. +Every individual could be left to the guidance of his own instincts, for +he would know himself always to be in agreement with the community; no +consideration for others need hamper or modify his actions; he could +behave just as if he were alone in the world. But as individuals differ +from one another, feel, think and want different things, collisions in +which they hurt, cripple or even kill one another are the inevitable +consequence of their opposing movements; and the interference of the +moral law is absolutely necessary to polarize these movements and guide +them into parallel courses, so that they do not run counter to one +another. + +But Good and Bad derive not only their existence but their measure and +their significance from the views of the community. They are therefore +not absolute but variable; they are not an immutable standard amid the +ever-changing conditions of humanity, a rule by which the value of the +actions and aims of mortals are indisputably determined, but are subject +to the laws of evolution in society and therefore in a constant state of +flux. At different times and in different places they present the most +varied aspects. What is virtue here and now may have been vice formerly +and at another spot, and _vice versa_. In the royal family of ancient +Egypt marriage between brothers and sisters was the prescribed custom. +We call this incest and it fills us with horror. To the sons of Egypt it +seemed meritorious and constituted a claim to special veneration. The +Babylonians and Canaanites burnt their first-born in Moloch's fiery +furnace, and this sacrifice was accounted a highly praiseworthy act of +piety and of the fear of God. The Spartans taught their sons, their +future warriors, the art of stealing without being caught; and he who +did this most cleverly achieved the most flattering recognition. The +Cherusci butchered the Roman prisoners taken from the legions of Varus +as a sacrifice to their tribal gods, and a noble-minded and brave man +like Arminius considered this absolutely honourable and knightly. The +Aztecs, who had undeniably attained an advanced degree of civilization, +at high festivals used with obsidian knives to cut open the breasts of +human sacrifices on the altars of their gods, and tear the heart out of +their living bodies. That was an action finding favour in the sight of +the gods, and the people watched it with awe and those mystic emotions +which religious rites are intended to arouse. + +Moral law in Europe, during the Middle Ages and almost up to modern +times, permitted, and even ordained, the punishment by horrible torture +and death of those whose religious convictions differed from the +teaching of the established church; and with its consent supposed +witches were sent to the stake. In feudal times the most terrible and +revolting of crimes was felony--that is, a breach of faith on the part +of the vassal against his overlord--and no torture was too cruel as a +punishment. Nobles, who had so delicate a sense of honour that for a wry +look or the accidental touch of an elbow they would draw their swords, +enunciated the principle: "the king's blood does not defile," and vied +with each other in forcing their daughters upon the king as concubines. +Until Wilberforce roused the English conscience at the end of the +eighteenth century, and Schoelcher did the same in France in the middle +of the nineteenth, slavery was considered a state of affairs which a +moral community could tolerate. The North American descendants of those +Puritans whom no persecution and no martyrdom could prevent from leading +a life consonant with the dictates of their conscience, did not scruple +to exercise proprietary rights over human beings who, in the case of +octoroons and even of quadroons, did not even differ from them in +colour, supposing that difference of colour could be considered an +excuse. The code, which began with the "Declaration of Rights," +contained heavy penalties for those who helped a slave to escape. Men, +whose uprightness no one could doubt, did not hesitate to set +bloodhounds on the track of an escaped nigger, and four years of a +bloody civil war were needed before refractory slave-owners were forced +to acknowledge the immorality of forced labour. + +These examples have been taken from the customs of civilized nations. +Amongst races that have not attained the high degree of development to +which the white man has risen, we meet with much more revolting +deviations from the moral law obtaining among white men. Tribes are +known in which the commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother," is +interpreted so, that the children kill and eat their parents as soon as +the latter have attained a considerable age. The North American Indians, +who had a well developed sense of honour, were capable of chivalrous +feelings and kept their word with absolute loyalty, used to torture +helpless prisoners and scalp their defeated enemies, even the women. +Among the Dyaks, who are under Dutch rule and are familiar with the laws +and customs of Christian Europe, a marriageable youth must first cut off +a human being's head before he is allowed to wed. He need not overcome +his victim in honourable combat; he may creep upon him surreptitiously, +and even fall upon him in his sleep and murder him in cowardly fashion +without danger to himself. + +All these are instances which we unhesitatingly condemn. To our idea +they are crimes and misdeeds which among us would make their +perpetrators liable either to contempt and expulsion from decent society +or to the extremest penalties of the law; yet at their time and in their +place they were considered meritorious and virtuous, and were approved +by public opinion and the conscience of their authors. But we can go +farther and subject our own moral law to a similar independent +consideration. We shall find that to us also deeds appear permissible, +virtuous and even splendid, which do not differ essentially from the +thefts of the Spartans or the head-hunting of the Dyaks. A company +promoter who sells on the Stock Exchange shares that he must know to be +worthless, can with Spartan cunning rob thousands of trustful victims of +the fruits of their labour and economy, and reduce them to beggary; and +not only does he go unpunished, but if by his knavery he becomes a +millionaire and uses his wealth cleverly, he can attain the highest +political and social honours and distinctions. We may admit that +financial roguery of this sort can now no longer be classed among +strictly moral actions, that public opinion is on the verge of placing +it in the category of vice and crime, and that legislators are beginning +to make attempts to inflict severe and humiliating penalties on its +perpetrators. + +But another series of deeds is still generally considered so undoubtedly +virtuous and laudable, that it evokes the highest homage from the best +intellects of the age, poets, musicians, scientists, teachers, sculptors +and painters, and the leaders of the people--the deeds of war. The most +horrible butchery of men, the theft of property and liberty, +ill-treatment, destruction are not only permissible but obligatory and +laudable, if they occur in war, and if their authors can point to the +fact that they are acting in the service of their country at the order +of a legitimate authority. Neither the soldiers nor their leaders are +bound to inquire whether the authority, whether their mother country is +waging war for a purpose that moral law can approve. "Right or wrong, my +country." In the eyes of her sons the country is always in the right, +even if it be objectively in the wrong, and by its orders every soldier +murders, robs, burns and ravages, plays the executioner to harmless, +unarmed, innocent strangers, compels prisoners to forced labour, steals +letters that fall into his hands and prevents families who are cruelly +separated from communicating with one another; and his conscience does +not reproach him in the least, nor is he conscious of being a criminal +deserving of all the penalties of the law. Every single one of these +actions, if perpetrated by an individual on his own account and for his +own purposes, would result in the death penalty, and it would be richly +deserved, too. But in war, carried out collectively at the bidding of a +government, they become deeds of heroism, filling the doer with pride, +moving the community to tears of enthusiasm, and they are held up to +youth as shining examples to be imitated. It is more than likely that +future times will judge the esteem in which these deeds are held not +otherwise than we do the value placed by other forms of society on human +sacrifices, the slaughter of parents and head-hunting. + +It is hard to determine the exact part which conscience plays in the +changes undergone by the concepts Good and Evil. As conscience is the +voice of the community in the consciousness of the individual, it +approves on principle what seems right and praiseworthy to the +community. Just as little as conscience prevented a Babylonian mother +from sacrificing her child to Moloch, does it in these days stop the +average citizen from doing a soldier's work of killing and destroying in +time of war. If an individual knows himself to be in complete agreement +with the general opinion, then he lives at peace with his conscience. No +impulse to change the customs, to set up a new Morality, to condemn +long-established usages, is to be expected from such an one. + +The mechanism whereby changes are wrought in views on Good and Evil is +quite different. Everywhere and at all times there are exceptional +persons whose abilities render them specially fit to feel and think +independently. To their idea the community has no determining but only +an advisory voice. They reserve to themselves the right of decision in +every case. In their consciousness there persists a clear recognition of +the fact that the essence of Morality lies in consideration for others, +and when the current acceptation of the moral law among the majority +allows them, nay, commands them to disregard this consideration, they +experience a feeling of discomfort which dull, unthinking imitation of +the general example does not soothe. They meditate upon the deviation +from the fundamental rule of considering one's neighbour, they test its +justification, and they condemn it, if its difference with the general +moral law cannot be adjusted. If the essence of Morality is +consideration for one's neighbour, its purpose is the well-being of the +community; its essence must be adapted to this purpose, that is to say, +consideration for one's neighbour must be subordinated to the general +welfare. The thief, the robber and the murderer have no claim upon +consideration, and even a man with the most delicate sense of Morality +will agree that coercion of the criminal is desirable. Tolstoy's +warning: "Do not oppose the evildoer," is not Morality, but an +exaggerated parody of it, which renders it nugatory. Thus the most moral +person will not raise any objection to a war waged in defence of hearth +and home when their safety is threatened by a ruthless attack. + +But, if a mode of action which, though it be generally practised and +approved, injures the individual and causes him to suffer, cannot be +justified on the grounds of an obvious benefit to the community, then a +small, sometimes an almost infinitesimal minority of independent +thinkers will rise against the custom; they are not afraid of coming +into violent conflict with generally accepted views; they defend the +fundamental principle of Morality, namely, consideration for the +individual, against the exception, namely, oppression of the individual +for the ostensible good of the community; they brand as immoral what is +generally accounted moral; they announce that the current acceptation of +the goodness or badness of a certain order of actions must cease. + +The intervention of such reformers always gives offence, and arouses +anger which at times rises to murderous fury. But this wrathful +indignation is just what makes a break in the automatic fashion in which +the majority of average men act according to traditional custom; the +attention of more and more minds is arrested, critically they examine +the accepted moral law, they are penetrated first by the suspicion and +finally by the clear conviction that it is contrary to the essence of +Morality, and they swell the ranks of the innovators who inveigh against +the tradition. The struggle lasts long and is carried on pitilessly. The +preachers of the new Morality seem corrupt and criminal to the +supporters of the old. They are persecuted and slandered and not seldom +have to suffer martyrdom, but they always emerge victorious if their +doctrine is in agreement with the logic of the fundamental principles of +Moral law. That is the history of the abolition of human sacrifices, of +the vendetta, of slavery, of legal torture, of religious coercion. + +Whoever looks about him with open eyes will note that civilized men are +at the moment adopting new ideas with regard to the operation of state +omnipotence, to war, to the right of the economically strong to exploit +others, to the rights of women, to sexual morality, to the penal system. +The advocates of a new Morality must still put up with the most +humiliating abuse. He who wishes to defend the individual from coercion +by the state is an anarchist and deserves to be hanged or broken on the +wheel. He who maintains that war is immoral belongs to the rabble of +vagabonds who own no nationality, for whom no contempt is too deep and +no punishment too severe. He who refuses a duel is a dishonoured coward, +and thereby cuts himself off from decent society. He who recognizes +woman's right to motherhood is a dastardly purveyor of opportunities for +prostitution. He who attacks the present relation between Capital and +Labour as a hypocritical continuation of slavery is an ignorant agitator +or an enemy of society. He who would like to see the idea of punishment +excluded from the law, as being retrograde and unscientific, and who +wishes only the point of view of the defence of society to be recognized +as valid, talks sentimental nonsense, disarms justice and places the +community at large at the mercy of criminals. + +But the issue of the struggle is not in doubt. The present systems, +which present exceptions to the moral law of consideration for one's +neighbour, must go. Although they are considered moral to-day, are, in +fact, Morality itself, to-morrow they will be felt to be immoral and be +abhorred by all men of moral feelings. Thus the concepts Good and Bad +gradually change their meaning; views on what is moral and what immoral +are constantly in a state of flux; and the only permanent thing is +recognition of the fact that man's actions must be withdrawn from the +control of subjective choice and whim, and must be subject to a law set +up by the community; the justification of this law lies in its being +necessary to the existence of society. Every revision of Moral values +originates in some vexation, and ends by refining and deepening moral +sentiment. In this chapter only the scheme of development of moral views +and of their changes has been indicated. The question of moral progress +will be dealt with fully later on. + +To sum up the arguments of this section, Morality is not transcendental +but immanent; it is a social phenomenon and restricted to the sphere of +living beings. Its beginnings may be traced in animal societies, it is +developed among mankind. The preliminary condition necessary for this +development is the ability to visualize future happenings, since moral +conduct is determined by estimating its effects and results, that is, by +conceiving something in the future. Morality has a positive, concrete +aim. It makes the existence of society possible, and this, given the +circumstances obtaining on our planet, is the necessary condition for +the preservation of each individual, and it originated from the instinct +of self-preservation in the species. Its essence lies in consideration +for one's neighbour, because without this the communal life of +individuals, that is, a society, would be impossible. + +If individuals had been able to live alone, Morality could never have +come into existence. The concepts Good and Bad characterize those +actions which society feels to be beneficial or harmful to itself. As +moral conduct implies consideration for one's neighbour, it is often, if +not always, in conflict with selfishness, that is, with the immediate +and instinctive impulses, and is, in the first place, accompanied by +disagreeable sensations. The pleasurable emotion of satisfaction arises +later through habit and reflection; it accompanies the thought of the +merit and praiseworthiness of the victory over self. Conscience is the +voice of the community in the individual's consciousness. The idea of +Duty is the subjective conception of the Rights of our neighbour; the +idea of Rights is the subjective conception of our neighbour's Duty to +us. Morality is not absolute, but relative, and is subject to continual +changes. To maintain that Morality is cosmic, eternal, immutable, that +it aims neither at profit nor pleasure, but constitutes its own aim, is +pure anthropomorphic superstition. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF MORALITY + + +Morality is a restraint which the community imposes on each of its +members. It demands from the individual the sacrifice of his transitory +and momentary comfort in favour of his general welfare which is +dependent on that of the community. It prohibits the pleasure of +gratifying his desires in order that by this unpleasant renunciation his +lasting well-being may be ensured. Subjectively experienced and viewed, +therefore, Morality always implies the limitation of free will, the +curbing of desire, opposition to inclinations and appetites, and the +diminution or suppression of free, or let us rather say of unbridled, +action. Before Morality can profit the community, it disturbs and +incommodes the individual, it rouses in him disagreeable sensations +which may reach such a pitch as to be intense pain. It is only after +deep reflection, of which not everyone is capable, that the individual +realizes that Morality is an essential condition of the life of society, +and that the preservation of society is an essential condition of his +own life; before he investigates, before he even meditates on Morality, +the individual feels it directly to be unpleasant, laborious, +stern--nay, hostile. + +The control which Morality exercises over the actions, and indeed in +many cases over the most secret thoughts of the individual, appears at +the first glance to be somewhat paradoxical. It is by no means obvious +why the individual should always take sides against himself and, +adopting a defensive and disapproving attitude, hold his instinctive +tendencies in check. Moral conduct would be intelligible if the +community were always ready with means of coercion and could constrain +the individual by brute force to place its interest before his own +pleasure. But the individual does not wait for police intervention on +the part of the community. He frowns upon himself with the awful +severity of the law. He threatens himself with a cudgel. He divides +himself into two beings, one of which wants to follow its instincts, +while the other curbs them vigorously; one is a rearing, often a +refractory, horse, the other a rider with bridle, whip and spur. + +This reduplication of the ego, one-half of which establishes control +over the other, one-half of which tries to remain true to itself, while +the other divests itself of its identity and denies itself--this is the +inner process, the outward manifestation of which is moral conduct. This +demands investigation and explanation. We must show how the organism +could develop from within itself the power to paralyse, or completely +repress, its own elemental activities, and how Morality was able to +become an integral part in the general scheme of life processes. + +The mechanism whereby the mind, appraising, foreseeing and judging, +checks the first movement of impulse, is inhibition or repression. +Without inhibition moral conduct would not be possible. The mind would +have no method of indicating the path and prescribing rules to the +organism's instinct. It would have no means of making its insight +prevail over the desires of the senses. It would have no weapon with +which to force its being to actions opposed to its organic inclinations. +Without inhibition the individual would never give precedence to the +demands of the community and lay himself open to disagreeable emotions +in order to please the community. Inhibition was the necessary organic +preliminary to the phenomenon of Morality. It had to be pre-existent in +the individual, so that Morality could make itself at home in his +intellectual life, so that it could acquire creative, ruling and +practical power among the elect, and become an unconscious and easy +habit among the average. Morality took possession of a pre-existent +organic aptitude and made it serve its own purposes. But organic +aptitudes are not alike in all individuals. In some cases they are more +or less perfect; in others they may be lacking altogether. Indeed only +individuals with highly developed powers of inhibition are capable of +that heroic Morality which liberates them from the weakness of the flesh +and makes them independent of the demands of the body; those in whom +this power of inhibition is scantily developed evade the influence of +Morality entirely, and it has no authority over them. + +That which is called character is at bottom the name we give to the +power of inhibition. Where it is weak we speak of lack of character, +whereas by strength of character we mean that the power of inhibition is +great. The will makes use of inhibition. With its help the will guides +the living machine in a certain direction and urges it to perform given +tasks. At the first glance it may not seem obvious that positive actions +can come of repression, which is something negative. But if we analyse +psychologically the actions demanded and promoted by the will, and trace +them back to their organic origins, we shall find that, as a rule, the +first elements consist in the prevention of impulsive movements, and +that the impetus to positive effort is given by the will, which converts +these movements into contrary ones. A few instances may make this +psychic process clearer. Winkelried, at Sempach, cleaves a path through +the cuirassiers while they bury their lances in his breast; he becomes +capable of this great deed of self-sacrifice in that, by a mighty effort +of will power, he suppresses the strongest of all instincts, that of +self-preservation, and forces all his energies, which are naturally +directed towards flight from danger, to challenge danger and yield +completely to it. The lover who overcomes his passion and renounces its +object, because his idol is the bride of his best friend, begins with +the determined inhibition of the impulse which urges him towards the +woman, and attains renunciation by the suppression of his desire; this +renunciation finds expression in positive actions, in the rupture of +relations which bring him happiness, the avoidance of meetings which +would prevent the wound in his heart from healing, and so on. The brave +rescuer who plunges into the waves to save a drowning man, or enters a +burning house to save a fellow creature threatened by the flames, must +first overcome his natural shrinking fear of the water and the fire; and +not till after the suppression of strong impulses to avoid the uncanny +adventure, does he succeed in making his muscles obey the impulse to +save life. + +Inhibition, therefore, is the organic foundation on which Morality +builds, not only that Morality which consists in abstention from certain +actions, but that which is manifested in active virtue. But inhibition +is a faculty which the organism has developed for its own ends, the +better and more easily to preserve its own life, and to render its power +of achievement greater. Morality makes use of this faculty, which it +finds ready to hand, for the ends of the community, and very often +against the immediate interests of the individual for whose advantage it +is nevertheless intended. Now the individual would not put up with this +inexpedient use, one is tempted to say this clever misuse, of one of its +organic capacities, if this yielding up of the mechanism of inhibition +to Morality were not beneficial to life and therefore came within the +sphere of the biological purpose of inhibition. By being grafted on a +pre-existent organic faculty Morality becomes such itself; it forms a +link in the chain of biological processes within the individual +organism; it ceases to be purely a product of society forced upon the +individual to his molestation and in spite of his annoyance; it acquires +the character of a differentiation of inhibition in order to help the +individual, or even to make it at all possible for him to adapt himself +to life in a society. + +That under the present conditions obtaining on our planet the human +individual can only live in society demands no proof. And as he can only +live in society if he submits to its rules of good and bad, Morality, +which urges him to this submission, aids and even preserves his life. We +shall now show that inhibition, of which Morality is a differentiation +making it easier for the individual to adapt himself to the conditions +of social life, is of the greatest value to the individual from the +biological point of view. + +The lowest forms of life it is possible for us to observe show nothing +which can be interpreted as inhibition. All external influences to which +they are not indifferent invariably produce the same effects. They +respond to every stimulus with a reflex action which reveals nothing +that we should be justified in describing as an activity of the will. +The reaction follows with strictly automatic regularity upon the +stimulus, and nothing intervenes between the two which would permit the +conclusion that in the simple organism there is any faculty that could +delay, modify or change the reaction to the external stimulus. + +Just as iron filings always respond to the attraction of a magnet in the +same way, just as certain combinations of mercury at the impact of a +blow flare up with an explosion, just as ice when warmed melts and +becomes water, and water when cooled to a definite point freezes into +ice, so do the simplest living things seek out certain rays in the +spectrum, certain temperatures, certain chemical conditions and avoid +others. Not only unicellular organisms do this, but also comparatively +highly developed animals, such as the daphniae, for if light is sent +through a prism into a vessel containing water, these little creatures +collect at the violet end of the spectrum; such as the wood-lice, which +hate the light and creep into dark crevices; such as gnats, which are +attracted by the sun and dance in their hundreds in its rays. Moreover, +we meet with a similar phenomenon in man. We, too, in winter and spring +seek the sun and in summer the shade; in the cold season the warm stove +attracts us; bad smells put us to flight, sweet scents of flowers allure +us. The simplest automatic reflex actions are at the root of these +attractions and repulsions, exactly the same as with the daphniae, +wood-lice and gnats. Only we are able to control and suppress these +reflex actions which the lower animals apparently cannot. + +Anthropomorphic modes of thought easily mislead us into thinking that +the processes we observe in lower animals are due to an exercise of will +power. We draw near to the fire in winter because it is pleasant, but we +can quit it if duty calls us into the cold streets. One is apt to +imagine that the simple organisms also experience pleasant and +unpleasant feelings, that they try and avoid the latter, that the +daphnia seeks the violet rays because it likes them, that the wood-louse +flees the light because it dislikes it; in fact, that these creatures +possess a consciousness which becomes aware of and distinguishes between +pleasing and displeasing impressions, and that they possess a will which +responds to these impressions with suitable reactions. Very +distinguished scientists have been unable to resist the temptation to +assume in the lower animals, even in unicellular organisms, the +existence of processes with which we are familiar in the human +consciousness. William Roux introduces us to a "psychology of protista," +and W. Kleinsorge goes so far as to maintain the existence of "cellular +ethics," and to devote himself to research into its laws. The work of +both these biologists is as fascinating as the most beautiful +fairy-tale, but it is probably the creation of a lively and fertile +imagination, just as the fairy story is. + +More prosaic and less imaginative scientists do not see evidences of +psychology in the signs of life in the protista, or ethics in the +movements of a cell, but merely the effects of universal chemical and +physical laws which also control lifeless inorganic matter. To these +laws they trace the tropisms of simple organisms which tempt the +imagination, prone as it is to anthropomorphism, into errors; such +tropisms, that is to say, as their tendency to seek moderate warmth, +certain rays of light and weak alkaline solutions, or to avoid acids, +heat and ultra-violet rays. The little organisms probably do not obey +these impulses for reasons of pleasure or pain any more than the iron +filings obey the attraction of a magnet for such reasons. They do not +fly to it because it gives them pleasure; the little metal leaves of an +electroscope do not move apart because contact with each other +displeases them. All forms of tropism, chemicotropic, thermotropic, +phototropic manifestations, active and passive tropisms clearly show +that minute organisms involuntarily and unresistingly respond to the +influence of natural forces, just as if they were inanimate particles. + +Microscopic investigations reveal many phenomena which one is tempted to +consider signs of life, but which cannot be such, as they occur in +connexion with inanimate matter. The Brownian movements are rhythmical +molecular changes of position, not due to any mechanical impulse +emanating from the surroundings, nor to a current in the fluid in which +the object of investigation is immersed, but arising from the object +itself, mostly very finely divided, tiny balls of mercury. A very small +drop of chloroform introduced into a fluid of different density behaves +exactly like a unicellular organism. It sends out pseudopods, wriggles +and draws them in again. The pseudopods seem to feel and examine +particles of matter with which they come in contact, and then either to +withdraw quickly from them or to surround and incorporate them in the +drop. This is deceptively similar to the behaviour of a living cell +absorbing food, though there can be no question of this in the case of +the drop of chloroform. In the latter it is merely a question of the +effects of surface tension, that is, of the normal behaviour of matter +in accordance with the laws governing the forces of nature, the +investigation of which lies in the domain of chemistry and physics. + +Impartial thought comes to a conclusion about these phenomena different +from that derived from anthropomorphic delusions. It does not try to +smuggle dim, dark life into the collections of mercury molecules +apparently obeying some inner impulse, or into the seeking or feeling +about of a pseudopod of chloroform. On the contrary, it understands life +as the play of natural forces under the conditions supplied by a living +organism, as the automatic working of a machine-like apparatus to which +natural forces supply the motive power. Similar manifestations in +inanimate matter and in elementary organisms seem to justify the +conclusion that the distinction between living and non-living matter is +arbitrary, that there are only forces, or perhaps one single force, that +is to say, one movement, in the universe, whose activity is manifested +in the most manifold forms, of which life is one. Modern Monism has come +to this conclusion, but it is not alone in so doing. Long before Monism +there was a philosophy which conceived all cosmic energies to form a +unity; and really it is only an obstinate quarrel about words, for the +Hylozoists regard the universe as something living and ascribe life to +all matter and all atoms of which matter is made up, while the +Materialists regard life as a play of forces in matter. Fundamentally +the Hylozoists and Materialists hold the same views, only that the +former call force life and the latter call life force; just as the only +point of difference between them and the Pantheists is that these have +given the majestic title of God to the universal life they assume--as +Spinoza has it, "_Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt_." + +The question, what is life? is the greatest that the human understanding +can ask of itself. For thousands of years man has cudgelled his brain +over this, and is as far from finding an answer to-day as he was on the +first day. The definition most often repeated runs thus: Life is the +ability possessed by certain bodies to react to stimuli, to absorb +nourishment and to reproduce themselves. That is a statement of observed +facts, but it is no explanation. It informs us that we are familiar with +bodies which behave in a way distinguishing them from other bodies; but +why they conduct themselves differently from others, what the particular +thing is which is present in certain combinations of matter and absent +in others--that is an impenetrable secret. + +Science has tried by the most varied methods to solve the problem. It +seemed a triumph of research that Woehler produced urea, that chemists +later on manufactured carbohydrates, that Fischer is on the high road to +the production of synthetic albumen. What is gained by these +discoveries? We bring about the same combinations as the living cell +does. That is, no doubt, an interesting achievement, but its value as an +addition to our knowledge on this point is infinitesimal. For we +accomplish the production of sugar, urea and amine in a manner very +different to that of the living cell, and he who copies the things +turned out in a workshop has contributed nothing to our knowledge of the +workman who plies his trade in the workshop. The dividing line between +life and lifelessness was supposed to have been obliterated when +elementary manifestations of life were proved to exist in inanimate +matter; the Brownian movements in the smallest particles; the growth of +crystals immersed in a solution of the same chemical composition as +themselves; crystallization itself which represents a kind of very +simple organization of matter, and at any rate proves the sway of a +regulating and directive force; the tendency of certain elements to +combine, which has been called their affinity. But this name is only a +poetical metaphor which no one will take literally. The growth of +crystals in their mother liquor is merely mechanical precipitation on +their surface, an external addition of layers of the same material; but +not growth by the incorporation of such matter, that is, through the +absorption of nourishment. + +These and similar results of observation do not suffice absolutely to +justify the assumption, seductive though it be, that life is a +fundamental attribute of matter, that it is present everywhere though +graduated in intensity, that therefore apparently inanimate matter +differs not qualitatively, but only quantitatively from living beings, +that life stretches in an unbroken line from the block of metal or rock, +in which it is completely obscured, to man, the most highly developed +organism we know of; and that at a certain point in its range it reveals +itself in a form which permits no distinction between organic and +inorganic matter. + +The origin of life is as completely unknown to us as its essence. For +thousands of years the assumption was lightheartedly made that under +certain, somewhat vague circumstances, life originated of its own +accord. Pasteur showed that a _generatio spontanea_ cannot be proved to +exist, that every living thing comes from another living thing, a parent +organism, and that the old philosophers were right in propounding +"_omne vivum ex ovo_" as a law, although they only guessed it and had +not proved it experimentally. A very few critics, who are hard to +convince, still dare to assert in a small voice that Pasteur's work and +all the facts established by microbiology do not prove conclusively that +life does not nevertheless originate from inorganic matter under +conditions which we cannot nowadays reproduce in our laboratories. No +answer can be made to this objection. An experiment is only conclusive +for the conditions in which it is made, and not for others. All that we +can positively assert is that on earth the genesis of life without a +demonstrable parent organism has never been observed. To go farther, and +to assert that a _generatio spontanea_ is absolutely impossible under +any conditions, on earth or elsewhere, is arbitrary, just as it is to +assert the contrary. + +Those who are supporters of the theory that life can be developed from +non-living matter for a long time thought they had conclusively proved +their case; they argued as follows: At the present time life exists on +our planet; according to the Kant-Laplace hypothesis our planet was +formed from a cosmic nebula and passed through a state of fluid +incandescence; in this state life is impossible; therefore life must +have originated spontaneously one day after the Earth had cooled down; +consequently either the Kant-Laplace hypothesis is wrong or the +assertion that life can only be generated by life is erroneous; the two +assumptions are incompatible. This conclusion no longer presents any +insuperable difficulties. It has been observed that spores which have +been kept for months at the temperature of frozen hydrogen, that is, +very nearly at absolute zero, have retained their germinative power and +have developed when they were brought back to a favourable temperature. +Therefore they would not be killed by the cold of interstellar space on +their way from one heavenly body to another, and could become the seeds +of life on another hitherto inanimate star. That large numbers of tiny +particles of matter exist in interstellar space and are precipitated on +the heavenly bodies is proved by the cosmic dust that arctic explorers +have collected from the surface of snow and ice. Therefore the Earth may +well have been in an incandescent state, and may yet have received from +interstellar space the germs of life which developed and multiplied when +the Earth's crust had cooled sufficiently to provide the conditions +favourable to their existence; and these germs may have been the +ancestors of all the life that exists on earth to-day after a period of +evolution lasting hundreds of millions of years. + +This would account for the origin of life upon the Earth, but not of +life in general. The germs, which travel as carriers of life from an +older heavenly body to a younger one, must have sprung from parents, and +however far back we trace their genealogical tree we are always finally +faced by this dilemma: either life did, after all, originate at one time +from something lifeless, and what has happened once must be able to +happen again, now and always; or life never originated at all, but has +always existed; it is eternal like matter, in forms whose variety we +cannot even dimly grasp, its threads, having neither beginning nor end, +wind through eternity. Of these two assumptions the latter is +incomparably more in harmony with our present-day views on the universe. +We believe the matter of which the universe is built up to be +everlasting. It costs no great effort to believe life to be eternal too. +True, the idea of eternity is inconceivable to us; it is a dim +conception which has given rise to a word, a tone picture which portrays +something indefinite, but within the bounds of the inconceivable there +is room for both semi-obscurities, the everlastingness of matter and the +everlastingness of life. + +But the most enigmatical point in the riddle of life is not life itself, +which is a form of being, and is neither more nor less comprehensible +than the existence of an inanimate object, of a stone, of water, of the +air; it is consciousness. Descartes proves his own existence to himself +by the fact that he thinks. Life must be accompanied by consciousness in +order to convince the living being that it exists. The formula: "_cogito +ergo sum_" has been admired for hundreds of years. It certainly is +specious. But how many questions it leaves unanswered! Has it the right +to deny life to an entity that does not conceive itself? Must it not be +completed by the proof that life without thought, that is, without +consciousness, does not exist, that consciousness is the necessary +complement of life? And, above all, ought not Descartes to have given us +an explanation of what thought and consciousness are? + +I will attempt to answer the questions left unanswered by Descartes. But +I must premise one thing. Every definition of consciousness implies a +postulate: life. Though at a pinch we can picture life without +consciousness, consciousness without life is absolutely inconceivable. I +do not undertake to explain what life is, any more than I attempted it +above. We must take it as something given. Consciousness, then, is the +subjective realization of something objective, the inward realization of +something outside. If in a living being a picture of its surroundings is +developed, then it absorbs something which is not a necessary part of +itself. Of course, this inner image must not be understood to imply an +absorption of matter. It is a process in the matter of which the living +being is built up. But, all the same, the image of the outer world in +the inner being does signify a penetration of the latter by the former. +This image, which follows the changes of the outer world and repeats +them in the inner being, is consciousness. It may be shadowy and +blurred, or clear and distinct; it may in rapid succession be formed and +pass away, and it can be preserved as a memory; it may reflect a greater +or a lesser portion of the outer world; consciousness is accordingly +duller or sharper; its contents are scant or plentiful, it retains the +images of a shorter or longer series of conditions in the surrounding +world. Between nutrition, which is recognized as an essential phenomenon +of life, and consciousness a surprising parallelism subsists. Both +consist in an absorption of the outer world by the organism; nutrition +is the assimilation of matter, consciousness that of stimuli. In the +process of nutrition the organism digests small quantities of the +outside world; in consciousness it digests the world as a whole. + +This parallelism is no mere play of the intellect. If it is followed out +it leads to significant ideas if not to actual knowledge. What +penetrates from the outer world into the inner being of the organism is +vibration, movement, force. Is the matter which is absorbed as +nourishment ultimately anything different? Here we come up against the +ultimate problems of physics, the various hypotheses regarding the +nature of force and matter, the theories that in addition to matter +there is an ether, or that the ether is a different, more subtle, form +of matter, or that neither matter nor ether exist, but atoms out of +which everything is built up, which themselves consist of electrons +which are centres of force, motions without material consistency. All +these theories, of which the last cannot be grasped by the human +understanding, we can leave severely alone. This is not the place to +investigate them. But the attitude of the living organism towards the +outer world from which it absorbs nourishment and impressions, +converting them into power to drive the life machine and transmuting +them into consciousness, lends peculiar support to the supposition that +force and matter are not only inseparable but identical, that in them we +must seek a principle, or perhaps regard them themselves as a principle, +which must be of the same nature as consciousness, for otherwise it +could not be transmuted into the latter. + +The senses are the means by which the outer world penetrates as an image +into the inner being. Before the senses are differentiated the living +organism possesses a general sensitiveness; that is to say, that under +the influence of the outer world its cell protoplasm undergoes a process +of regrouping, resulting in chemical and dynamic changes. The chemical +results of stimulus are anabolism and katabolism, a building up and +breaking down of the cell content; the dynamic results are movements +which in the lowest forms of life are purely mechanical, but in the +higher forms adapt the organism to the external influence in so far as +they place it either so as to be affected by the latter as long and as +powerfully as possible, or else so as to evade it. The living organism +can experience no stimulus and respond to it without absorbing and +transmuting it, converting it into a chemical process or a movement. +This inner process is a subjective realization of something objective, a +penetration by the outer world, therefore an elementary consciousness. +In proportion as the general sensitiveness becomes differentiated into +specific ones, as the image of the outer world filters through the +different coloured glass panes of the various senses into the inner +being of the organism, this image becomes multicoloured and varied. + +It lies in the nature of this mechanism that the subjective image is not +identical with the objective original, but is modified and even +distorted by the panes through which it penetrates to the inner being of +the organism. What the subject perceives is never anything but a symbol +of the object, never the object itself; but this symbol suffices to +enable the consciousness to form an idea of the object, just as letters +enable the reader to take in words and thoughts. We must conceive the +development of consciousness to go hand in hand with that of the senses. +The more windows the organism can open to the outer world the more +easily and the more clearly does its image penetrate. The number of +objects which the subject can take in is the measure of the perfection +of its consciousness. The protista, lacking specific sense organs and +possessing only the general sensitiveness of protoplasm, can form only +to a very limited extent and with very little variety an inner +realization of the stimuli of the outer world. Its consciousness is +necessarily very restricted and exceedingly dim. Consciousness is +enlarged and grows clearer as the organism develops and its general +sensitiveness is differentiated into specific senses, until we reach the +level of man whose consciousness embraces far more of the outer world +than does that of any other living creature; because, lacking new +senses, he has succeeded in amplifying and enlarging those he possesses, +and has by artificial means made himself capable of perceiving stimuli +to which he is not directly susceptible and which therefore would have +remained unknown to him; to a certain extent he has translated them into +a form which his senses can perceive. + +I do not overlook any of the difficulties which my attempt to explain +consciousness leaves untouched. On all sides the most urgent and +disquieting questions arise. Above all, the fundamental question, the +most enigmatic of all: how is an external stimulus, that is a movement, +a vibration, converted into a sensation, a perception? Further: must we +in the consciousness distinguish between the frame and its contents, +the conceptual mechanism and the concept? Or do the two coincide? Is +there no consciousness without a conceptual content? And is it the +movement entering into the organism, the inner realization of the outer +world which, transmuting itself in an incomprehensible manner into a +concept, creates consciousness, becomes consciousness? Is the +consciousness of the man standing upon the highest plane of +intellectuality the greatest consciousness possible? Does there exist +anywhere in the universe a more abundant, perhaps an infinitely more +abundant consciousness than that of human beings on the Earth, and will +the latter ever rise to this height? It is obvious that a development is +in progress. There was a time when the most comprehensive, the clearest +consciousness on earth was that of the trilobite or the cephalopod. +Evolution has gone as far as man. Does it stop at that or will it +continue? + +According to Herbert Spencer evolution is progress from the simple to +the complicated. Let us accept this definition. Have we the right to set +up a scale of values and place the complicated above the simple? Is the +latter not the more perfect because it has more power of resistance, +greater durability, and can hold its own triumphantly against all +destructive influences? Is not evolution, then, a retrogression from the +perfect, because simple, to the more complicated, and therefore more +fragile, more easily upset and less capable of resistance to harm? Is it +not sheer egocentrism if we appraise the value of living beings +according to their greater or less resemblance to ourselves, and judge +them to be less or more worthy in proportion to their disparity with us? +Are the fish which, living in the sea wherein we cannot exist, can +inhabit the greater part of the globe, are wild duck which fly, swim and +walk, not more perfect than we, who have had to conquer the air and the +water by artificial means? Is not the mouse's hearing sharper than ours? +The eagle's sight keener? The dog's scent incomparably more delicate? +Has not the carrier pigeon an infinitely better sense of locality than +we have? Are not many beasts physically stronger, more nimble and agile +than man? His only claim to superiority rests on the greater perfection +of his consciousness. Why do not all living creatures participate +equally in the evolution to which this superiority is due? Why does it +not take place in every organism and lead the unicellular living being +in an unbroken ascent to the level of Goethe or Napoleon, or to a still +more lofty one, if such an one exist anywhere in the universe? + +If one could believe in a Ruling Power and the plan of the universe as +its work, would it not be terribly cruel and revoltingly unjust that +this power, instead of treating all living beings alike, should make a +kind of selection of grace and lead some up to a higher level while it +condemned others to lasting lowliness, and that it should ordain that on +the road from the unicellular organism to man, countless connecting +links should be left hopelessly behind and not be permitted to continue +their ascent? Or must we admit the humiliating conclusion that a greater +amount of consciousness does not necessarily imply higher rank and +greater dignity, and that a protista, with its almost unimaginably pale +and narrow consciousness, can have just as great a feeling of well-being +as man with his immeasurably superior intellectual life; that therefore +the protista suffers no wrong if it never gets beyond its present stage +of evolution; and finally that the amount of the outer world which man +can absorb in his consciousness is as far removed from the entirety of +the universe as the contents of the protista's consciousness are from +that of the human mind? No answer can be found to these questions. +Whatever purports to be an answer, be it introduced as theology or as +philosophy, is visionary or nonsensical. We must resign ourselves to +moving in a very small circle moderately illuminated by Reason, while +all around, if we seek to penetrate beyond it, we perceive gruesome +darkness. + +Evolution, that is a progress from the comparatively simple to the more +complicated, is a striking fact--I say comparatively simple advisedly, +for even in the unicellular organism the processes are far removed from +the absolutely simple. We do not know from what part of the organism the +impulse to evolution comes. Here we meet with the same mystery which +shrouds growth, its duration, its measure and its bounds. As the +conception is lacking, a word has been found, viz., entelechy, which +Driesch introduced into biology, the co-operation of all parts of the +organism for the purpose not only of preserving it but also of making it +more efficient in the matter of self-preservation and more perfect. A +critical investigation of entelechy would involve the broaching of the +whole question of life. It does not come within the scope of this work. +I shall therefore content myself with a very few remarks. Entelechy +works as if it were reasonable and acted with a set purpose. If you +think it out exhaustively it forces you to the assumption that life is +an intellectual principle, even in the protoplasm of the cell, long +before there is any perceptible trace of consciousness; that this +intellectual principle makes use of matter, builds it up, organizes it, +moulds it into material and tools for construction, and sets up a +mechanism in which and by which it develops itself. As far as we can see +the purpose of life is life itself. Entelechy directs all the work of +the organism in such a way that it becomes more and more capable of +self-preservation, that its efficiency becomes greater, that it can +absorb more of the outer world and can react more vigorously upon the +outer world. In other words, life strives continuously to make its +embodiments more permanent, securer, richer and more manifold. + +However, if we do not know how the impulse to evolution originates, we +can at least form an idea of the mechanism of evolution. Fundamentally +life consists in the absorption of cosmic movements or vibrations, and +their transformation into another form of movement. The living cell is a +machine which makes use of cosmic energy for physio-chemical work. +Metabolism, warmth, electric manifestations, movement, and as their +concomitant a graduated consciousness, are the result of this work which +is carried out by cosmic energy in the cell power machine. + +To start with, this machine works in the very simplest fashion. It uses +up its motive power as fast as it acquires it. Energy flows in and +immediately flows out again in another form. The organism is like a pipe +or a vessel without a bottom, so that its contents cannot be stored. The +lower organisms which obey tropisms are such bottomless vessels. They +are continually and inevitably subjected to the same attractions and +repulsions and have no means to withstand them. But at a certain stage +of evolution--how? why? Driesch replies: Entelechy!--a new part is +developed in the machine, something like the cam on a cogwheel which +forces it to come to rest. Or, to keep to the earlier simile, the +bottomless vessel acquires a bottom with a tap that can be opened and +closed. With this arrangement the organism is able to store the energy +it has received and then to make use of it according to its needs, to do +much more or much less work with it, to achieve much greater or much +smaller effects, than it would be capable of doing with the amount of +energy it receives from outside in a given unit of time. It is obvious +how much more efficient the organism becomes if it can store up energy +and can adapt to its needs the amount used up. This new part of the +machine is Inhibition. + +It appears early, and takes part in the general development of the +organism; it is indeed the strongest factor in this development. Before +Inhibition intervenes the organism has only one response to stimulus: +reflex action. This is of the character of an electric discharge. It may +be stronger or weaker, but is uniform in kind. It varies quantitatively +but not qualitatively. In the lower organisms it is a contraction of the +cell protoplasm, a movement. In the higher organisms, in which the life +processes are carried out on the principle of the division of labour and +which have developed various organs for this purpose, each organ +performs the action of its specific function; the muscle contracts, the +nerve sends out a nervous impulse, the gland forms a secretion, and so +on. All reflex actions have this in common, that they serve no other +purpose than that of relaxing tension in the organism. They do not imply +any co-ordinated effort to promote the comfort and the welfare of the +living being. They cannot fulfil any complicated task. They exhaust the +organism which, after a series of reflex actions, becomes insensitive to +stimuli and must rest for a time before it can react again. + +Beginning from that stage of evolution where inhibition intervenes, +reflex action loses the character of an automatic response to impulse +and becomes disciplined. Inhibition tries to suppress reflex action. Its +success is more or less complete according to the sensitiveness and life +energy of the tissue receiving the stimulus and the degree to which the +mechanism of inhibition is developed. The organism retains its tension, +remains charged with energy, and is able to carry out work for definite +purposes. In place of anarchistic reflex action which occurs regardless +of the needs of the organism, we find economy of energy, co-ordination +of effort, movement directed to a profitable end. It is only inhibition +which can raise the organism from its state of passivity, its helpless +dependence upon tropism, to a being in which a will is beginning to +dawn and which by its will becomes self-determinative. Inhibition is a +function of the will; it is the will's tool. Even Plato dimly perceived +this, and he expresses it in the metaphorical language peculiar to +himself, when, in the "Republic," he compares a human being to a +creature made up of three animals: a hundred-headed sea-serpent which +must at one and the same time be fed and tamed, a blind lion, and a man +who tames the serpent by means of the lion. These three animals are +desire ([Greek: epithumia]), courage ([Greek: thumos]), and mind +([Greek: nous]). We say in biological language, reflex action, +inhibition, and will or volitional reason. + +All the concepts that are referred to here: purpose, co-ordination, +inhibition and will, are every one of them dependent upon one +fundamental concept, consciousness. Without it they are unthinkable. +Schopenhauer's unconscious will is a word without meaning. I have +postulated consciousness as the inseparable concomitant of life. It is +probably the essence of life. In its lowest stage it is too dim, its +contents too meagre and blurred, properly to distinguish the organism in +which it dwells from the world around. In a higher state of development, +when it gradually grows clearer and begins to be filled with more +sharply defined ideas, it learns to keep its organism and the +surrounding world apart, and tries to make the attitude of the former to +the latter one of self-defence, self-preservation and self-development. +From this stage of development onward, concepts begin to connect and +group themselves in such a way that consciousness contains not only an +image of the immediate present, but also memories of the past and a +forecast of the future. The ability to prolong the present into the +future, to understand the actual as a cause of the effects that follow +and to foresee these effects, that is the starting point of logic and +reason. It is the necessary antecedent of the will, which would have no +meaning if it were not the effort to realize a conception of actions and +their consequences, previously worked out by consciousness. Will is a +function of consciousness which, in pursuance of the well-known +biological law, creates an instrument for its purposes, and this +instrument is inhibition. The higher an organism stands on the ladder of +evolution the more energetically and surely does inhibition work, the +nicer and the more masterly does its intervention in the original reflex +actions grow. + +Thanks to the piling up of reserves of energy, which is a result of +inhibition, the organism can carry out its work of differentiation, can +develop organs and organic systems, and obtain the power to perform more +complicated functions; these render it ever more independent of the +outer world and enable it to affect the outer world to an increasing +extent. Inhibition plays an important part in differentiation. Its +apparatus becomes organized. The nerve centres from which the inhibition +proceeds form a ladder of which each rung is subordinate to the next. +The peripheral nerves are controlled by the nerve centres in the spinal +cord, these again by the centres in the medulla oblongata, and then in +succession by the cerebellum and the cerebrum, and finally by the +corticle. On the principle of least resistance, on which all life is +based, the highest centres of inhibition unburden themselves by granting +the lower ones a certain measure of independence. The reaction to the +most ordinary and frequent stimuli is controlled and organized in its +character and strength by the apparatus of inhibition, so that it ensues +automatically, and no active inhibition, that is, no conscious effort of +the will, is required. The simplest of these automatic reflex movements +take place below the level of consciousness. + +Those organized complexes of movement, however, which we call instincts, +are carefully watched by the consciousness and subjected to severe check +if they appear to run counter to the supposed interest of the organism. +The hereditary complexes of movement constituting instinct are highly +organized and oppose inhibition, only yielding to it when it is stronger +than they are. This can be observed in animals which are capable of +taming and training. All the artificial actions and omissions that man +teaches them are triumphs of inhibition over automatism. Among human +beings it is only the elect who can vigorously suppress their instincts +by inhibition directed by Reason. The being that has attained the summit +of organic evolution on earth is man, in whom only the lower, vegetative +life processes are liable to the influence of tropism and primary reflex +actions, while all the higher and highest functions are the work of +Reason, which arms the will with inhibition and suppresses all impulses +and actions that hinder its purposes. It is characteristic of these +functions that they are first worked out as concepts by the +consciousness before they are realized as movements. + +It was essential for Morality to find this whole organic structure ready +to its hand before it could become a factor in human life. This +structure had been developed and perfected by the organism for its own +purposes, for the defence and enrichment of its life, to ward off +painful and obtain pleasurable feelings. Morality took possession of it +and used it for its own ends, which do not at the first glance coincide +with the aims which the individual immediately perceives and imagines, +and may indeed be diametrically opposed to these, preventing pleasurable +emotions, causing him pain and even endangering his life. + +But Morality, which is a creation of society, was only able to dominate +the individual and gain control of the organic apparatus of his vital +economy, because its purpose is directed towards the same goal as the +tendencies of the individual organism, prolonging them beyond the +individual's scope, aiming at his preservation, and thus coinciding with +his instinct for self-preservation. + +Morality limits the individual's vainglory and subordinates him to the +community; it is the condition on which the community allows the +individual to participate in the mightier and more varied means of +protection and the enrichment of existence which it has to offer. But +apart from this somewhat remote advantage of Morality, there is another +immediate one for the individual: it consists in the continual exercise +and consequent strengthening of inhibition; therefore, as we have learnt +to see in inhibition the main factor in the development and +differentiation of all living creatures, it offers a means of raising +the individual to biological perfection. The faculty of inhibition, +being in a continual state of strong tension, makes automatic reflexes +subject to the will, makes blind impulses obedient to the somewhat less +blind reason, and helps man along the path of evolution from the status +of a creature of instinct to that of a thinking personality of strong +character, capable of judgment and foresight, a personality which does +not seek to attain the pleasurable emotions necessary to every living +creature by pandering to his senses and satisfying the appetites of the +flesh, but achieves them by gratification of a higher order, by the +triumph of the intellect over vegetative life, by strengthening the will +in relation to the stimuli of the outer world and the organs, by taking +pleasure in the fact that the will is content with its sway. These are +harsh but subtle pleasures which, when they continue to preponderate in +the consciousness, bring about that state of subjective happiness which +is in the highest degree beneficial to life. + +Morality is an arrangement which has arisen from the needs of society; +that is to say, it is not innate, but is an artificial institution of +the race. However, it grafts itself upon the natural organs and +attributes of man, and thus, from being a sociological phenomenon, it +becomes a biological one. The idea that Morality is something absolute, +a cosmic force, and that it would still exist and be valid if there were +no human beings, and even if the earth had no existence, I have refuted +with scorn. We must hold fast to the fact that Morality is a law of +human conduct, that it is in force only among mankind, and that apart +from mankind it is unthinkable. As, however, it becomes a differentiated +function of the apparatus of inhibition, it participates in the general +processes of life and leads us to that point where, indeed, we face the +unnerving outlook upon the absolute and the question of eternity. + +My arguments have led me to many phenomena that can be established and +interpreted as facts of experience, but the explanation of which lies +beyond the power of the human mind. We have examined the riddle of life, +and we have distinguished therein a number of inexplicable things: the +lack of a beginning, sensitiveness to stimuli, consciousness, the +transformation of vibrations into sensations and concepts, the will, and +inhibition. We are forced to the conclusion that the only discernible +aim of life's activities is the preservation of life, or, more shortly, +that life is its own aim and object. Morality, too, either openly or by +implication, sets itself the one clearly demonstrable task of ensuring +to the individual the preservation and security of his existence in a +higher sphere than that of individual vegetative life processes. Thereby +it fits into the scheme of existence, its mysteries and aims, and +becomes an integral part of the cycle of life which emerges from +eternity and returns to it. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MORALITY AND LAW + + +The coercion which the community exercises upon its members, by means of +which it forces them to adapt their actions and abstention from action +to the standard it has set up, has two forms: Custom and Law. Are the +two really different? What is their relation, one to the other? These +are questions worth investigating. + +Ever since the earliest times, grave men have meditated on the relation +between Custom and Law. They were forced by evidence and practical +experience to note a difference between the two institutions, but at the +same time they had the definite impression that they trace their origin +to the same source. Socrates distinguishes between the written laws of +his country and the unwritten ones which express the will of the gods. +The former constitute positive Law which the citizen must observe and to +which he must submit; the latter, however, are higher, for they emanate +from the gods themselves. The immutability of the unwritten laws is a +proof that they are superior to the written ones. Written laws vary from +state to state. They are the work of individual law-givers who were +sometimes wise men and sometimes unreasonable tyrants. But all contain +certain precepts which are everywhere alike, which everywhere impose +the same rules upon man. It is almost as if one and the same law-giver +had co-operated in the making of all the laws that obtain in the +different towns and countries, and are so unlike one another in many +points. This common law-giver, whose will is manifest in all laws, +however far removed they be from one another, is the Deity. That is +essentially Socrates' train of thought as given by Xenophon in his +_Memorabilia_. The Attic sage speaks the language of his time, which, by +the way, is still that of many present-day people. The Deity, whose will +permeates all written laws and to whom they may be traced, is the +principle of Morality. Hugo Grotius, in a manner more appropriate to +modern thought, expresses it thus: "Law and Morality spring from the +same source, namely, the strong social instinct natural to man. They +bear witness to reasonable solicitude for the welfare of the community." +This placing on an equality of Law and Custom, of _jus_ and _mos_, is +very remarkable in such a strictly professional thinker, such a positive +jurist as Grotius. Kant discriminates between the doctrine of Virtue and +the doctrine of Law; he keeps them apart, but he emphasizes their +connexion, and the two together make up his doctrine of Ethics. + +As a matter of fact, no fundamental difference between Law and Custom +exists; only Law is enforced differently to Custom. It would be going +too far to say: Law has sanctions and Custom has none. The latter has +sanctions too, but they are of a different kind to those of the Law. He +who transgresses Custom will suffer the contempt of his fellow men, and +this may become so penetratingly severe that the most hardened and +shameless rascal must feel it. In an old, loose form of society where +individualism is highly developed, and each one goes his own way, paying +little regard to the others, there an unscrupulous, conscienceless rogue +may sin against Socrates' unwritten law without being penalized. In a +young, closely-knit community, however, in which the feeling of intimate +connexion between the members is lively and vivid, he would be +proscribed, as soon as he was found out, and it would be impossible for +him to remain, say, for example, in a small town of the United States. +Public opinion would make it so hot for him that he would be glad to +escape with a whole skin. But this punishment is exceptional for +transgressions of Custom, whereas it is the rule for those of the Law. + +The sanction of the Law is stricter than that of Custom, just as the Law +itself is stricter than is Custom. The Law concerns itself with concrete +cases in which consideration for one's fellow men must be practised, +duties to him fulfilled, and his claims respected. These cases are +defined by Law as clearly as possible, whereas Custom confines itself to +generalities and determines the whole attitude of the individual to his +neighbour. Custom embraces the outer and inner life of man and +supervises his opinions, which are the parents of his deeds, and also +his deeds themselves; Law is only concerned with actions, and refrains +from penetrating to the intimacy of thoughts, unless the latter alter +the essential character of the action, as premeditation in an act of +revenge and temporary or permanent irresponsibility alter the judgment +of offences and crimes. Law is a miserly extract of custom, a meagre +selection from its variety, a concentration and embodiment of its +surging vagueness. It may be compared with crystals, which in their +geometrically accurate forms are crystallized clearly and definitely out +of a liquid, the mother liquor; or with the heavenly bodies which +agglomerate out of surging primal nebulae. Custom is the primitive thing, +Law is derived from it. It appeals to its descent from Custom, and +founds, at any rate tacitly, its claim to respect on these grounds. A +law which ran counter to Custom, which was confessedly in opposition to +Custom, could never be maintained or prevail, though it bristled with +the menace of the most dreadful punishments. + +The relationship of mother to child between Custom and Law may be +obscure to the majority; it is clear to the analytical mind. Recognition +of the essential unity of both phenomena explains an assumption which +was widespread among the best intellects from the Middle Ages until well +into the eighteenth century, but which has now been abandoned as +erroneous by more positive, though indeed narrower, legal minds. This +assumption is that there is a natural Law antecedent to historical Law, +which exists and acts beside and above the latter, and which forms the +basis and the measure of every positive law, of every concrete legal +judgment. It is comprehensible that the nineteenth century swept away +the idea of natural Law and freely made fun of it. To a sternly +disciplined legal mind it must indeed seem grotesque if a judge, in +order to arrive at a verdict in some concrete dispute, cites the rights +to which man is born instead of a certain text of the law, or even, +following Schiller's advice, reaches up to the stars and brings down +thence the eternal Law. Even this procedure is not so farcical as it +seems to stupid article-mongers and hair-splitting paragraphists, for +the procedure of equity of the English judges, who are not prone to +clowning, is at bottom nothing but this reaching up to the stars and +this judging by the rights to which man is born. The feud between +natural Law and historical Law was really a quarrel about a word. Jean +Jacques Rousseau, his contemporaries and disciples, simply made a +mistake in their choice of an expression. They were guilty of an +inaccuracy when they spoke of natural Law. They should have said: "the +innate claim of man that his person should be respected," or, "natural +consideration for one's fellow man," or, most shortly and simply, +"Morality." To the latter legal lights would have raised none of the +objections with which they victoriously opposed natural Law. + +The beginnings of Morality coincide with the beginnings of society, as +the latter could not have existed for a single day without the former. +Since men, forced by the struggle for existence, emerged from their +original, natural solitude and united in a community, they have had to +watch over their impulses, suppress their desires, do things they +disliked, and in all their actions and abstentions from action consider +their neighbours' feelings, as they demanded that their feelings, too, +should be considered. That was Morality which limited the vainglory and +arbitrary conduct of unfettered man. It included all rules that +determine the attitude of man to man. There was no distinction between +Custom and Law. Men were ruled by custom which was traditional in their +community and observed by all; and their Custom had the force of Law. + +Formulated laws, and more especially written laws, appear comparatively +late. True, Asia has old examples of such; the Manava Dharma Shastra, +the book of laws of the Indian Manu, the Chinese Chings, the law of +Hammu Rabi, and that other law, akin to this, though not derived from +it, but probably drawn from a similar older source, the law of the +Pentateuch. The laws of Draco, Solon and Lycurgus and the Roman Twelve +table law are appreciably younger; much later still the _leges +barbarorum_ were written down, some of them, like the prescriptive Law +of the Germans set down in the "_Sachsenspiegel_," not till the end of +the Middle Ages. It is peculiar to most of the old Asiatic laws that +they contain both rules of conduct and legal regulations, and that they +do not differentiate between these two kinds of precepts. + +Let us take one example: the Ten Commandments. Beside such positive +orders as "Thou shalt not steal"; "Thou shalt not kill"; "Honour thy +father and thy mother"; we find such as give rules for the character and +course of spiritual happenings, regarding which others cannot observe +whether they are obeyed or not, like the commandments respecting man's +relationship to God, or admonishing man not to covet his neighbour's +wife or goods. Those are subjective impulses, spiritual moods which are +revealed only to the eye of conscience as long as they do not betray +themselves in action, and which by their very nature cannot be the +subject of Law which deals only with outward manifestations of thought +and will, and is concerned only with things done. + +In constitutional Law, too, no less than in criminal and civil Law, the +eighteenth century tends to preface certain laws with universal moral +principles, and to establish by formal law that the former are derived +from the latter. The Declaration of Independence of the United States in +July, 1774, says: We consider the following truths self-evident: that +all men are born equal; that the Creator has bestowed upon them +inalienable rights, amongst which are the right to life, to freedom, to +the pursuit of happiness, etc. So before these rights are guaranteed by +the Law, they are announced to belong by birth and nature to man, to be +independent of any particular and express bestowal by the law-giver, and +beyond all dispute or even argument. Of the thirteen States which formed +the original Union, ten accompanied their constitution by a Bill of +Rights which repeated the essential contents of the Declaration of +Independence of July, 1774; seven of them placed them as an introduction +before their fundamental law, and three of them incorporated them in the +latter. Two others, New York and Georgia, distributed them among various +articles of their constitution. Rhode Island alone refrained from a +general declaration. The States which joined the Union later, with few +exceptions followed the example of their predecessors and built up their +constitution on the foundation of an explicit statement of the natural +rights of man. The French Revolution followed the course which the +United States had indicated, and began its constitution of 1791 with the +"Declaration of the rights of men and citizens," which is not a law in +the technical sense of the word, but is superior to all positive Law, +constitutes the latter's standard and touchstone, and straightway makes +all laws invalid which are not animated by its spirit or which +contradict it. + +In the beginning, therefore, there was Morality, and the first laws, +which formulated its precepts either in oral tradition or in writing, +recommended without distinction what was good and desirable, and what +was necessary and expedient. The differentiation of the Morality, which +the commonwealth felt to be its code of right and wrong, into Custom and +Law took place in late times. It was most definite in Rome, where for +the first time a clear distinction was made between men's relation to +their gods and their relation to one another; the former was left to the +individual's conscience, the latter subjected to the power of the State; +the elements of feeling and of dim perception were banished from the Law +which confined its attention to deeds which it regulated in a +high-handed manner. Law chose from out the all-embracing sphere of +Morality one narrow area, that of mankind's immediate, material +interests, and took this as its sole theme. The object of all Morality +is to enable men to live together in a community peacefully and +prosperously; within the bounds of this more general purpose, the task +of the Law is to suppress by force the grosser hindrances to this +harmony among individuals, and by material means of coercion +emphatically oblige everyone to respect the interests of his neighbour. +What every responsible man of sound mind demands first and foremost is a +proper respect for the possessions that are his by birth and +acquisition, that is for his life, for his bodily welfare, for all the +goods he owns that minister to his needs, his comfort and his pleasure. +He who lays violent hands on these possessions, or threatens to endanger +them, is recognized to be an enemy; man arms himself against such an +one, fights against him, tries, if he have a strong character, to +destroy him, or flees from him if he is too weak to triumph over him; +man only yields to such an one if he simply cannot help himself, but he +does so with hatred and revenge in his heart, and in a state of mind +which, if it becomes fairly widespread, sets every man's hand against +his fellow-men and leads to the ruin and even to the dissolution of the +community. Hence the task of Law is effectively to protect the +individual from the infringement of his rights by others. It places the +organized forces of the community at the service of the individual whose +interests are threatened, for the criminal law penalizes more or less +severely attempts against life and health, unlawful seizure of property +whether by force or cunning, malicious molestation and offence; the laws +of commerce keep watch over the faithful fulfilment of contracts dealing +with the fair exchange of goods or the execution of work, and in case of +need enforce it. + +A select few, everywhere only a small minority, has a different scale of +values to that of the masses. For them "life is not the supreme thing." +There are things they value more highly. The masses have no +understanding for these people's needs and fine feelings. Their +self-respect and their dignity are dear to them as wealth, their honour +more sacred than life itself. Unhesitatingly they sacrifice their +property to freedom, and more unbearable than anxiety for their material +interests is life in surroundings in which brutality, vulgar sentiments, +harsh egotism, malice, hypocrisy and treachery preponderate. The Law +does not consider this minority. It is the creation and the servant of +the great majority. It clings to earth and is incapable of lofty +flights. It is of no service to the elect in the preservation of their +noblest spiritual possessions or the defence of their ideals against +clumsy maltreatment. It declares itself to be incompetent to deal with +any but material affairs. + +Therein lies at one and the same time the strength and the weakness of +the Law. Its strength lies in the fact that it definitely limits its +sphere of action and strives to achieve positive results by positive +means, results intelligible even to a mean understanding. Its weakness +lies in the fact that it ignores man's highest and noblest interests. +And these interests are there, they too deserve consideration and +protection, they have a right to demand that the guarantee of the +community should embrace them as well. The well-being of the community, +which is the object of Morality and of Law too, demands that such +conditions should be created and maintained, as should enable the elect +also to enjoy life or at least find existence bearable. But Law does +not suffice for that. No law enjoins upon the careless throng of +pachyderms to spare the tenderest and noblest sensibilities of lofty +natures; no judge punishes thoughtless or purposely malicious injury to +them. To remedy this evil we must rise from the lowly plain of Law, the +natural dwelling-place of the masses, to the heights of Morality, the +habitual abode of superior minds. At the theological stage of +civilization refuge is sought with the gods in whose hands the +protection of essential, spiritual possessions is placed. They are +expected to punish the wicked whose evil deeds are beyond the reach of +any penal code, they are expected to soothe and comfort when life is +hard or even unendurable. That is the compromise that the elect made +with life in the hard times of European barbarism. They escaped from the +world and thus avoided contact with the repugnant masses. They shut +themselves up in cloistered cells away from mankind and held mystic +intercourse with God. Among the people, cruel authorities with +difficulty maintained discipline and scanty law and order by means of +flogging and the pillory, torture, the gallows and the wheel. The +minority of the elect disciplined themselves, suppressed their lower +impulses by self-imposed mortification, and with the help of prayer and +belief in God's promised millennium managed to keep their heads above +water despite the crushing spectacle of the life of those times. + +Long before the Christian era, the Greeks of noble disposition felt the +need of living in an atmosphere of higher intellectuality and morality +than that of the market-place, and they hid themselves behind the +cloud-curtain of the Eleusinian Mysteries, where they kept to +themselves, escaped the rule of the rude Law, and followed the nobler +precepts of Morality. Whenever the measure of Morality contained in +positive law did not suffice for the minority with higher aspirations, +this minority adopted the same expedient, a form of esotericism; small +circles were formed outside the community in which there was added to +the current legal code a superstructure of stricter rules, more finely +shaded duties, more courteous consideration. Present-day life also +offers examples of this tendency which is met with in all ages. There +are select circles and professions in which the standard of +irreproachableness is far higher than among the mass of the people. +There a man is not held blameless, simply because he has never +transgressed a positive law, never come into conflict with the powers of +justice. He must be as unspotted in the eye of moral justice as he is in +that of the Law. A club or association that is self-respecting will not +admit to membership a candidate reputed to lie, to have an evil tongue, +to break his word, to be a toady and a snob, though none of these +offences are punishable by law. It has happened that a corps of German +officers has forced one of their number to send in his papers because he +has seduced and deserted a respectable girl, an adventure flattering to +the vanity of puppies who, as like as not, boast of it, and with which a +judge can only deal if the injured girl appeals to him--and even then he +cannot punish the offender, but merely sentence him to pay damages. + +Almost the whole world is agreed on the point that the Law does not +sufficiently protect honour. Positive Law evidently does not consider it +of such value as material possessions, for the defence of which it knows +itself to be qualified. But there are numbers of people whose honour is +dearer to them than their fortune, even than their life, and trembling +with indignation they see that a thief who steals their purse with a few +shillings is haled off to prison, while a slanderer who sullies their +honour either goes unpunished, or at most gets off with a fine, which +merely adds official insult to the injury. In this case the Law has +lagged so far behind Morality that individuals try of their own accord +to bridge the gulf without counting on the intervention of the +community. For aspersions of their honour the masses take revenge with +fists and cudgels, often with bloody results; and among the elect they +resort to duels with lethal weapons, a preposterous proceeding due to +desperation, and a bitter indictment of the prevailing laws. It is a +deed of self-help, like the formation of a vigilance committee among the +anarchical throng of a lawless rabble. Hardly to be justified on +reasonable grounds, it is intelligible from the point of view of +historical tradition, and as a survival of dim and primitive ideas. In +early days a properly regulated duel was an ordeal showing the judgment +of heaven. It was the general conviction that God would give victory to +the right and crush the wrong. When human Law failed, the injured party +appealed to the source of all Law and placed his cause in the hands of +the Almighty. From this point of view the duel is no unsuitable means +of preventing plots to evade the law. Even if the injured party is +inexperienced in the use of the weapon, even if his opponent is skilled +and vastly his superior, he need not worry, for God fights on his side. +Therefore he is more sure of success than if he entrusted his cause to +fallible human judges. But from the moment that the duel ceases to be +regarded as a means of arriving at the verdict of God, nothing can be +urged in its defence, and that it nevertheless persists is a fact that +can only be accounted for by the inadequacy of the current laws. + +It really is astonishing that the Law does not yet appraise honour at +its true value. Educated people almost unanimously regret and condemn +the backwardness of the Law in this respect, all the more so because the +tremendous development of the respectable, as well as of the +disreputable, Press facilitates and aggravates libel to a hitherto +undreamed-of extent, and no defence can overtake the slander which is +quickly spread broadcast. Doubtless public opinion will urge that +measures be taken to bring the Law into line with the views now held on +all sides on the significance of honour, its defencelessness and its +need for protection. That this has not yet been done is due to the +slowness with which the Law adapts itself to the demands of a Morality +which grows ever more profound and more refined. Law, which originally +devoted itself only to the crudest material interests, very slowly +extends the range of its protection, but it does so continually, with an +ever-widening embrace, including more and more delicate, more and more +noble, possessions, taking into consideration ever higher and ever finer +needs. What early legislator would have thought of man's needing +protection not only against murder, grievous bodily harm and +maltreatment, but also against the dangers due to ignorance and +carelessness in light-heartedly spreading infectious diseases, and +contaminating water and the air? Who would have dreamed in former times +that positive Law would consider the sensitiveness of nerves, desire for +beauty, dislike of ugliness and forbid disturbing street noises, protect +the countryside from wicked disfigurement, and prevent the construction +of buildings which would spoil the artistic architectural plan of a +city? + +These little traits, these concessions to personal demands, which to a +coarse mind do not seem obviously justified, go to prove that positive +Law continues to grow beyond the bounds of its unavoidably crude +materialism, and strives to rise into the regions of the unwritten law +of the Peripatetics, where ideal possessions are of more importance than +those which have traditionally come within the scope of criminal and +civil Law. Law and Custom have a natural tendency to approach more and +more nearly to one another, to become merged in one another where the +line that divides them is but faintly indicated. The closer the union +between them, the more perfect is the Morality of a society. Absolute +perfection would be reached if Law, which has been derived by +differentiation from Morality, should, after a protracted period of +development, return to its source and be completely merged again in +Morality. But that is a dream which can never be realized as long as +man is constituted as he is at the present time. Enthusiasts have +dreamed of it, and in their imagination have seen an anarchical and +lawless society in which no positive Law, no sanctions of force were +needed, and in which the understanding and conscience of individuals +would suffice to ensure the rule of good faith and goodness, and the +curbing of selfishness. As far as man can tell we shall never attain +this Utopia. We shall never be able to do without positive Law, not only +on account of undeveloped and perverse natures, in which animalism has +the upper hand of humanity, and which must be kept under strict +discipline, but because a sure guide is needed in cases of doubt and +irresolution which confuse even the good, nay, the best, men when +passion and violent desire, with their heavy thunderclouds, darken the +outlook of Reason, and judgment wavers amid the hurly-burly of a +spiritual tempest. All that we may hope for and should desire is that +Law should be filled with the spirit of Morality and embrace as many +moral ideas as possible. + +It lies in the nature of the thing that Morality was never clearly and +definitely formulated, for as soon as this was done it assumed the +character of Law. It remained general and slightly vague, it spoke to +men in such indefinite terms as "good," "virtue," "duty," "love of one's +neighbour," "unselfishness," "patience"--terms into which everyone can +read the meaning which suits his thoughts and feelings. Mankind has +never lacked moral teachers. The Indian Shastras and the Chings, +Confucius and Meng Tse, the prophets of Israel and Ben Sirach, Plato +and the wise men of the Stoics, the Zend Avesta, Jesus and Paul, the +platonic ethics of Nicomachus, those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, +thousands of years ago preached the principles which exhaust the whole +field of Morality, and beyond the essentials of which none of the later +moralists have gone; neither the "Imitation of Christ" nor Ibn Bachia, +Spinoza, the Scotch school and Kant, up to Wundt and Guyau. + +But what about the effect of the doctrines which they advocated gently +or passionately, adducing proofs or uttering threats? To lend weight to +them they either appealed to God, threatening mankind with His wrath and +vengeance, or to Reason, which, according to them, could advise man only +for his good. Perhaps they could intimidate those who had blind faith +and convince the reasonable. But there are many of little faith, and +more still who are unreasonable, and on these the persuasion, warnings +and conclusions of the Moralists had no effect. For these it was +imperative to clothe the minimum of Morality, the minimum without which +no society can exist, in the definite form of laws, and so create the +Law to which the weapons of the community lend compelling force. Thus +the whole material of Ethics is divided into Morality and Law. The +Theologians and Scholiasts who trace all binding rules of human conduct +back to revelations of the Divine Will recognized on principle only one +single law: but the aspect of practical life made even them distinguish +between the "_lex indicativa_" and the "_lex praeceptiva_," between an +indication or counsel and precept or command. The "_lex indicativa_" is +Morality, the "_lex praeceptiva_" is the Law. + +Codes are the normal expression of the Law. Not all Law is formulated in +this way, for there is a recognized Law of custom, but all laws, +codified or not, become a part of the prevailing Law. Naturally, and as +is only reasonable, all Law is pre-existent in the consciousness of the +majority, and the law-giver's role is limited to setting down in +paragraphs universally acknowledged principles dictated by public +opinion. However, there are an appreciable number of historical +instances in which this procedure is reversed; the law-giver, without +inquiring whether his ideas were in accord with the general conscience, +arbitrarily clothed his dictates to the community in paragraphs which it +had to accept as Law. It is clear that this procedure is extremely +risky. Even if the law-giver possesses superior wisdom, even if he is +far in advance of his people and his age, even if his intentions are of +the best, there is grave danger that the moral feeling of the people +will revolt against the laws thus forced on them. Outwardly they yield +to the pressure of public authority, but they obey the Law with a keen +inner sense of opposition; a chasm yawns between conscience and the +practice of the Law, ideas of Morality and Law become confused, the +moral foundation of all laws totters, and the public gets into the habit +of regarding the Law as something alien and hostile, which cannot be +disregarded with impunity, but which it is not only not culpable, but +even meritorious to evade. + +An enormous amount has been written on the subject of what a law is, and +all this literature expresses in endless words very few and, almost +without exception, very mediocre thoughts. I should consider it an +unpardonable waste of time to devote any considerable space to this +rubbish, either in order merely to quote opinions or to investigate and +confute them. Perhaps the best thing said of the laws is Hobbes's +description: Civil Law (the law of the country) is nothing but a +guarantee of natural Law. It is true that this definition implies a +supposition: the existence of natural Law which, however, is not binding +in itself but requires the sanctions of the law of the country. +Moreover, it is only correct if we add the limitation that it does not +guarantee all natural Law, but only a part of it. Hobbes is also forced +by his definition of the law of a country to explain what he means by +natural Law, and he does not evade this duty. "Natural Law," he says, +"is the decree of true Reason (_ratiocinatio recta_) with regard to what +we must do and what avoid for our self-preservation.... Transgression of +natural Laws is due to false Reason (_ratiocinatio falsa_)." + +In spite of its vagueness this explanation of Hobbes's shows that what +he really means by natural Law is Morality, and in this respect his +views on the relation of natural Law to civil Law, that is, of Morality +to Law, practically coincide with mine. Nevertheless, he ignobly denies +the moral decency of his doctrine of Law when later on he coldly and +dryly remarks: All that the state commands is just, all that it forbids +is unjust. Saying this he stupidly and obsequiously makes the civil +code the source of Law, whereas by his own definition Law (he says +"Natural Law") is the source of the civil code. It is more pardonable +for Pusendorf, a formal jurist, to say: "Law is the decree (_decretum_) +with which a superior binds his subject (_sibi subjectum_)." That +interpretation of Law is possible if it is considered from outside; it +is a means of coercion in the hands of the mighty to subjugate the +dependant; this point of view ignores the essential; but Pusendorf has +no concern with this, for he makes no claim to be a philosopher, he +keeps within the bounds of juridical practice. + +The Bishop of Seville, Saint Isidor, the most respected theologian of +the time between the last patristic writers and St. Thomas Aquinas, +gives the following definition of Law: "Law is an institution +(_constitutio_) made by the people, by which the nobles (_majores +natu_), together with the common folk, have given a sanction to some +ordinance." This says little about the essence of Law, but it leads to +the question of the origin of laws. On this subject, too, whole +libraries full of books have been written since the time of Plato and +Aristotle; luckily, for the most part, they now only serve as food for +moths and worms. + +From this tangle of hair-splitting and sophistry, from this muddle of +syllogisms, dogmatism and deep-sounding phrases which mean nothing at +all, one thought emerges pretty clearly, to wit, that only the highest +authority in the State has the right to make laws. On this point there +is perfect unanimity; and that is natural, for it is so obvious that it +has no need to be circumstantially investigated and proved in the fifty +thousand books that have been written on the subject. It is perfectly +clear that one cannot possibly force all the members of a state to obey +certain commands and prohibitions which the Law contains, unless one is +stronger than each one of them, and therefore the Law must necessarily +emanate from the highest power in the state. It is beside the point to +obscure this simplest and most transparent fact by questions as to the +right of the law-giver. He needs no theoretical right since he has the +might. To use Kant's expression, positive Law is not a creation of the +mind ([Greek: noumenon]), it is a phenomenon; its existence is a matter +of empiricism, not of reason; it is a matter of fact and is under no +obligation to justify itself intellectually to the intellect. No +law-giver has ever troubled to tack on a preamble or an addition to the +law he promulgates proving that he has the right to enact it. + +But in the literature dealing with this matter opinions differ widely as +to who embodies or possesses the highest power in the state. According +to some it is the king, because he wields the sword and therefore can +enforce unconditional obedience; according to others it is the Church, +because the Law, to be binding, must be moral, and Morality is +established by God since the Church is the representative of God on +earth. Others again regard the people as a whole as the highest power, +because without their assent no law can prevail, and because even the +king only has the power of which the people divests itself to transfer +it to him. History has advanced beyond this quarrel. + +To-day no one dares to dispute the fact that the nation alone is +qualified to enact laws for itself through the agency of its chosen +representatives, and that no law can be binding for the people without +their explicit or tacit consent. In Switzerland, where they have +instituted the referendum, the people by their vote can repudiate a law, +made by their representatives in their name, before it comes into force; +and in the other constitutional states they have recourse to the +following expedient: whenever a law is promulgated which seems +inacceptable to them, at the next Parliamentary election they vote for +men who are pledged to do away with it. The people have the power to +make laws, therefore they also have the right to do so, and they do not +hesitate to revolt if this right is tampered with. In recent times no +nation outside Russia has submitted to having laws forced on it, in +framing which it has not co-operated, and which it has not expressly +accepted. The United States tore themselves away from the Mother Country +with the cry: "No taxation without representation!" and more than a +hundred years before that the English people had irrefutably proved to +the Stuart king, Charles I, that he had no right to make and unmake +laws, by condemning him in a court of law with legal formalities and +then having his head cut off by a masked executioner. + +The legal code is the concrete form of the Law, and the Law is the +crystallization of the most material part of Morality. And as Morality +binds every member of the community, as man is only tolerated in the +community on condition that he respects Morality, it is a matter of +logic that he should also respect the Law; that is to say, that he must +not only submit to it because he fears punishment if he fails to do so, +but that he must feel obedience to the Law to be part of his Morality, +that he must act lawfully at the dictate of his own conscience, and not +because of the threat of the power of the state. This might be +enunciated as a principle without reservation and without limitation, if +in practice the laws always were, as in theory they should be, moral. +But this is not necessarily the case. The law is a form, and every form +can be abused by filling it with unlawful contents. If an unscrupulous +adulterator of wine fills a champagne bottle of the usual shape, +complete with metalled and wired cork and a label recommending it, with +some disgusting mixture and puts it on the market, he is severely +punished for adulteration of food and infringement of the law protecting +trade marks. But if the government publish in the _Gazette_ foolish, +risky, and perhaps absolutely immoral orders in the form of a law, duly +arranged in chapters, articles and paragraphs, as the people are +accustomed to seeing their moral laws expressed, who impugns them for +it? + +The examples of this in history are only too numerous. To this category +belong all laws seeking to maintain the validity of state authority at +the expense of the natural rights of thinking and feeling men, e.g. all +religious persecutions, the maltreatment of socialists, excise laws and +duties which hamper freedom of work and movement, or are tantamount to +robbing a particular man or all citizens. As a rule, laws of this kind +can be imposed upon the people only in a despotically ruled state, since +the people in this case has no share in legislation; but constitutional +government is no guarantee against it, for parliamentary majorities can +be forced to enact tyrannical laws, by fanning the flame of national or +party fanaticism, by encouraging prejudices, or by intimidation; this is +proved by Bismarck's May laws and Socialist laws, and also by the laws +passed by the National Assembly at Versailles against the rebels of the +Commune and against Paris. Obedience to such laws cannot reasonably be +demanded. Only a Hobbes will dispute this, for whom "everything that the +state commands is just, everything that it prohibits is unjust," or the +Digest according to which "_quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem_" +(what pleases the ruler has the force of law). Legal enactments, though +they be immoral, are yet formal Law; as a matter of fact, however, they +are wrong, and even if their originator has the power by brute force to +secure obedience to them, no man who tries to evade them and to get them +abolished will be accused of immorality. + +A trivial objection strikes one at once. Only a despotic megalomaniac +will forbid his subjects to make representations in the proper quarters, +and in the proper way, for the purpose of getting a bad law abrogated; +but as long as it is in force it must be obeyed. For if every citizen +were allowed to make a selection of the laws according to his choice, +acquiescing in some and rejecting others, this would lead straight to +anarchy. The reply to this is that anarchy, although a terrible evil, is +notwithstanding a lesser one than an immoral law, that is, a law which +sins against Morality. For the maintenance of law and order which the +State guarantees is only preferable to anarchy because it enables +individuals to live together in peace, and guarantees liberty of +movement and respect for persons, life and property. But if the State +acts wrongly, and interferes in the feelings and convictions of +individuals, if it uses brute force to compel them to actions and +abstentions against which all the good in them rebels, then its law and +order is law and disorder, and it is the State itself which brings about +a condition of anarchy by making force the ruling factor in the life of +the individual. For the latter it is all one whether he has to yield to +the force of the State or that of his neighbour. Nay, more, his position +is worse in a condition of anarchy caused by the State, than in that +which existed before the State was formed, because it is easier to meet +force with force, when this emanates from an individual who is one's +equal, than when it is exercised by the superior organization of the +State. The State which enacts immoral laws denies its own principle and +causes its own dissolution. + +The intellectual constructions of the eighteenth century, of which the +most famous is J. J. Rousseau's "Social Contract," are not taken +literally by anyone nowadays. Nobody seriously believes that one day +individuals living in a state of nature banded themselves together and +made a contract, by virtue of which they renounced certain liberties +and rights and transferred them to a superior authority which was to +rule them so as to promote the general welfare, peace and happiness. But +if the procedure was not quite so simple as this, at least it is certain +that the State undertakes the task which Rousseau expressly prescribes +as its aim. If, however, through its fault, the fault of its +legislation, the welfare of the community suffers, and peace and +happiness are not promoted but hindered, disturbed and destroyed, then +every citizen has the moral right to revolt against the State and +paralyse its pernicious might; not because it has broken a formal +contract with its citizens, but because it has become inimical to the +peaceful life of mankind, the purpose of every social community. If +anyone is troubled at the thought that there is no reliable standard +whereby to test the morality of a law and no place indicated where such +a measure can be applied, he may take comfort by remembering that all +Morality is surrendered to the feelings and judgment of the majority and +has no other sanction than this. History teaches us that the majority +does not acquit itself too badly of its duty. Public opinion suffices to +maintain Morality at a certain level in a community. And if public +opinion is capable of ensuring respect for the unwritten law of Morality +without the sanctions of State Law, it may surely be recognized as a fit +judge of the morality of a law. That is the theory of the right of +citizens to defend themselves by all means, even by force, against +immoral laws. Practically, it is of no importance, because nowadays, at +least in all progressive and liberally governed States, the people have +constitutional means at their disposal to prevent or quickly to rid +themselves of laws that are obnoxious. + +Morality includes the Law, whereas Law is only a part of Morality. Owing +to its coercive nature, the Law is obliged to be concrete and material +and to ignore all the imponderable, barely perceptible, spiritual and +dream-like things which hover round Morality, surround it with an +atmosphere and transport it beyond definite boundaries into the realm of +the unconscious and visionary. The total exclusion of the element of +feeling which Morality includes, constitutes the most profound +difference between it and the Law. Law protects order but knows no love. +The separation of Law from Morality is due to the pressure of +selfishness which thinks it has made the greatest possible concession +when it rises to the height of saying with Ulpian: "_Neminem laedere. +Suum cuique reddere. Honeste vivere._" Injure no one; that is, refrain +from the ruthless use of force; render to each his own; that is, do not +retain in rascally fashion what belongs to another; live honourably; +that is, give no offence to your neighbour by disorderly conduct and +depravity. + +Well and good. At a pinch one can live like that. But the words pity, +kindness, love of one's neighbour do not occur in Ulpian's pithy +statements, and the Law knows nothing of them. + +The Law guards each man's well-earned possessions, but it bids no one +make sacrifices. Morality can demand these. It can insist that the +individual should freely, and urged by his own inner impulse, impose +sacrifices upon himself, reduce his possessions in favour of another, +disturb his personal comfort at any moment, perhaps even risk his life; +that is to say, that of his own free will he should do just those things +from which the Law carefully shields him. Where the Law says: injure no +one! Morality says often enough: injure yourself to do good to your +neighbour. Where the Law says: to each man his own! Morality not seldom +says: to each man your own if he needs it more than you do. Morality +counts on the existence of a quality of which the Law has no need: +Sympathy. To be moral we must feel in our own being at the time, or +retrospectively, the subjective experiences of our neighbour, with the +same quality of emotion that he feels; his pain must be our pain, as his +pleasure must be our pleasure. For the man who cannot do this--who +realizes in his mind the circumstances of his neighbour only as an +image, and without the concomitant note of feeling--it is impossible to +rise to the height of Morality. It is not his fault, for the gift of +sympathy is an organic disposition, which you either do or do not +possess, which you can develop or suppress, but which you cannot create +if it is lacking. Nevertheless, the lack of sympathy is a pitiable +infirmity, for it prevents a man from scaling the heights of Morality. + +To respect the Law is to practise a wise selfishness. To act morally is +to divest oneself of selfishness and attain the privilege of +unselfishness. To behave in strict accordance with the Law earns the +merited praise of civic blamelessness. But to act morally is a virtue +which is of incomparably higher quality than that of mere +blamelessness. The law-abiding man, the honest man, is praised as having +been "_Integer vitae sceleris purus_." That is an acceptable epitaph. +But the man of active Morality, willingly suffering for others, provides +an example which reconciles millions to the hardships of life. The +former is a worthy man, but the latter is a saint. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +INDIVIDUAL MORALITY AND COLLECTIVE IMMORALITY + + +Men, who would be deeply offended if their Morality were called into +question, quite coolly investigate the problem as to whether the State +in its actions and omissions is bound by the same moral laws as the +individual, and the majority of them come to the conclusion that in its +relation to other States, the State must not be guided, that is to say, +hampered, by moral considerations. They go further than this and not +only liberate the State in its dealings with other countries from the +trammels of Morality, but claim for the government the privilege of +standing beyond and above the moral law in the conduct of public +affairs, because to their mind both foreign and home politics move on a +different plane to that of ethics. If anyone objects to this shameless +contention, its advocates contemptuously dismiss him with the disdainful +remark: "That is the drivel of a layman, and no man of science would +waste his time on it." And if you were to reply: "Your views are those +of gaolbirds who try after the event to hatch a theory justifying their +misdeeds," they would probably shrug their shoulders and murmur +scornfully: "The man is obviously mad." + +Professorial wisdom has formulated pedantically what practical +politicians, the heads of states and leading ministers have thought, +said and done. Napoleon remarked at St. Helena to Count de Las Cases, +who respectfully notes the fact in his "_Memorial de Sainte Helene_": +"The actions of a ruler who labours for the community, must be +distinguished from those of a private individual who is free to indulge +his feelings; policy permits, nay, commands, the one to do what in the +case of the other would often be inexcusable." Perhaps it was under the +influence of this remark, with which he, no doubt, was familiar, that +Professor Nisard one day in a lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris +propounded the theory that there was a dual Morality, one public or +political, the other private, and that these two did not follow the same +rules. That was shortly after the Coup d'Etat of Napoleon III, and it +was easy to descry, in the words of the celebrated professor of literary +history, obsequiousness towards the new Emperor and the effort of a +courtier to excuse the violence which the Emperor had just done to the +constitution he had sworn to uphold. Nisard was one of the ornaments of +the university, a teacher of youth, who was as popular as he was +respected. But the sound ethical feeling of his hearers revolted against +the depravity of the principles he had just enunciated, and the violent +expression of their indignation drove him in shame and disgrace from his +chair and out of the lecture hall. + +Macchiavelli is the most famous advocate of the Immorality of the State +and the right of politics to be unethical, and his name is identified +with this infamous theory. An enormous amount has been written about +the Florentine statesman, his book of the "Prince" and the doctrines he +advances in it; among these works those in which his theories are +endorsed preponderate to a horrifying extent over those which oppose and +refute them. Mohl and Paul Janet have furnished us with the best +abstracts of these very numerous writings, and I refer the reader to +them. Here I can only dwell on the main points of the investigation. + +Macchiavelli writes: "A man who wishes to be perfectly good is without +doubt in danger among those who are not good. It is therefore advisable +that a prince should learn not always to be good, so as to be able to +put these rules of life into practice, or not, as circumstances may +demand." "A prince cannot maintain loyalty to a treaty if it become +dangerous to his interests." In short, the prince not only may, but +must, do what is in his own interests. He need not stop to think whether +his actions are honest. The only measure of their worth and +appropriateness is the profit they promise. Their success always +justifies them, only their failure proves them to be bad. + +The most revolting thing in the arguments of the "Prince" is the +equanimity with which the author adduces them. Never does he let slip a +word of excitement, never does an indication of feeling appear. He +treats his subject not as an investigation of principles to which one +adopts a mental attitude and which one should approve or disapprove, but +as a description of existing facts which arouse one's emotions as little +as, for instance, the enumeration of the qualities and characteristics +of a mineral. It has been said in his defence that his book is a +concrete study, the presentation of the character of Caesar Borgia, of +his psychology and of his principles of government; and that +Macchiavelli wished to give an objective account of the philosophy of +the events he had observed, but did not wish to judge them subjectively; +and this, if for no other reason, because an expression of his own +opinion would have been too dangerous for him. It is further urged that +his personal views are revealed in the treatise on Livy. + +This defence, however, is far from convincing. In the "Prince" +Macchiavelli maintains the same unconcerned and cool note that prevails +in his account of the treacherous assassinations perpetrated in +Senigaglia by his hero Caesar Borgia. The only personal feeling, which +peeps out occasionally in both works, is a certain perverse, aesthetic +satisfaction, experienced by the artist with the eye of a connoisseur +who lingers over a work of nature, perfect in its way, and delights in +the harmony of actions which, with absolute logic, almost with +mathematical precision, result from the definite premise supplied by a +certain character. Des Esseintes, the ideal aesthete invented by Joris +Karl Huysmans, may appraise the worth of a monster solely by its beauty, +without a thought for its morality. But by such appraisement he cuts +himself off from the community of men, though he, in his arrogance, +being morally insane, may abuse them as philistines. + +Since it first appeared, Macchiavellism has found disciples and admirers +in every age; and these, in liberating politics from all fetters of +Morality, go further than its originator. The German jurist of the +century of the Reformation, Schoppe (1576-1649), declares sententiously +that politics differ from Morality and have their own principles, just +as Morality has: he considers that the chief difference between them is +that the latter takes as its subject of study that which should be; the +former, that which is. For this one phrase this pedant, who has +otherwise rightly deserved oblivion, has some claim to be remembered. +For here he consigns Morality to the realm of pure thought, of +theoretical and meditative idealism, while for politics he claims the +sphere of practical reality and shows the first dim dawning of that +practical policy (_Realpolitik_) which, two hundred and fifty years +later, was to be as the light of the sun to statesmen. + +The Frenchman, Gabriel Naude, almost a contemporary of Schoppe's, +constituted himself the champion of Coups d'Etat, if they promised +political advantages; further, he justifies and praises the Night of +Saint Bartholomew, a very energetic measure taken in his lifetime to put +an end to the religious strife which was weakening France and causing +the government much embarrassment; his only regret is that the happy +idea of slaughtering all the Huguenots was not carried out more +completely; in other words, that the massacre of the obnoxious +Protestants was not continued until they had been completely wiped out. + +Even in Descartes, who confessed to a somewhat shady opportunism in +questions of state and, for instance, concedes reasonable and moral +justification to Absolutism, we find the depressing statement: "Against +the enemy one is, so to speak ('_quasi_'), permitted to do anything," a +conscious and determined denial of the Christian commandment "Love thine +enemies," which perhaps demands too much of the average man and can only +be expected from saints, but which, anyway, contains an exhortation for +all the world at least to be just to one's enemies and act according to +the dictates of Morality. + +D'Holbach does not beat about the bush, but declares roundly: "In +politics the only crime is not to succeed." Even Macchiavelli did not +express it as baldly as that. To quote the Duke of La Rochefoucauld, he +at least pays virtue the compliment of hypocrisy, for he gives this +advice: "Do (the evil which is profitable) and excuse it afterwards." +This is a paraphrase of the old advice given by a pettifogging lawyer +for the benefit of the criminal: "If you have done it, deny it," and of +the well-known phrase of Frederick the Great which runs something like +this: "If I have a desire for a foreign country, I begin by seizing it, +then I send for lawyers who prove that I had a right to it." This, then, +was the opinion of that king who wrote an "Anti-Macchiavelli," of whom, +however, Paul Janet neatly remarks: "Nothing is more typical of +Macchiavellism than as heir presumptive to the throne to refute +Macchiavelli's principles, and then as ruling monarch to apply them with +the more determination." + +For the sake of the incorruptible Morality which Kant defends in his +little work "_Vom ewigen Frieden_" ("Of Eternal Peace"), he may be +forgiven for his weakly worldly wisdom in following up the "Critique of +Pure Reason" with the "Critique of Practical Reason." In "_Vom ewigen +Frieden_" he bravely demands harmony between Politics and Morality. More +sweepingly than the English proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," he +demonstrates that honesty is better than policy. It is an old tradition +of all governments, and especially of diplomacy, to affect secrecy, +since their inavowable intrigues shun the light of day and the eye of +outsiders. To-day the democracy in all constitutional states demands +that foreign policy should be given full publicity. Kant expressed his +opinion shortly and sharply a hundred and fifty years ago: "All +political actions which cannot be made public are unjust." In the +eighteenth century, in which he lived and which began with the war of +the Spanish Succession, went on to the wars of Frederick the Great, and +ended with the war of the Coalition against the French Revolution, he +does not dare to make a definite claim that force should be expelled +from inter-state relations and Law put in its place, but he does say, if +somewhat timidly, that one may "dream of" an ideal in which the quarrels +of nations are adjusted, like those of private persons, by laws which +have been framed and approved by all. Kant is a comforting exception +amid the many teachers of constitutional law who are almost unanimously +Macchiavellian in their attitude, and who regard his point of view with +contemptuous and condescending leniency because he was an unworldly +philosopher, a theorist in politics. + +The English and Scottish moral philosophers, from Locke to J. S. Mill +and Herbert Spencer, are all untainted by Macchiavellism and recognize +only one Morality for the state as for the individual, for political as +for private action. But it must be admitted that their doctrines have +not yet been generally assimilated by the consciousness of their own +people. Now, as ever, it is a fundamental principle of English law that +"the king can do no wrong." That means that the king, the embodiment and +epitome of the state, as the source of Law is Law itself, and is +superior to all the laws of the country, which is a still more drastic +paraphrase of the doctrine of the Digest: "_quod principi placuit legis +habet vigorem_"; every whim of the potentate has the force of law, and +the English have coined the horrible phrase, "My country, right or +wrong," a dictum which allows ruthless deceivers of the people and +destroyers of their country to hide their most appalling misdeeds +beneath the mask of patriotism and to disguise deeds worthy of a +criminal in the habiliments of virtue. + +Real patriotism demands that a true citizen and an honourable man should +with might and main, even at the price of his life, oppose any injustice +about to be committed by his government and his misguided compatriots; +and, further, that he should strive to maintain his country in the path +of Right and Morality even if, as sometimes happens, in a dispute +between his nation and a foreign one the latter has Right and Morality +on its side. On the plea of inevitable partiality a judge may refuse to +try a case in which a near relative of his is involved. That is a +permissible concession to that human imperfection which causes reason +to fall silent when feeling raises its voice; and justice does not +suffer, for there are other judges who can take the seat that has been +voluntarily vacated. No citizen has the right to evade the duty of +judging his country, because, if he fails, there is no other judge who +can be put in his place and fulfil his duty. Every citizen is personally +responsible for the just and moral behaviour of his community, +responsible to his own conscience, to his nation, to the world, to the +present and to the future; and if he is powerless to prevent depravity +and misdeeds, he must at least solemnly and loudly condemn them, as this +is his only means of avoiding joint responsibility for the infamy. If he +fails to do this, the public crime becomes his personal crime as well. +The elder Brutus, so much and so justly admired by the Romans, is an +example to all, for without mercy he handed his own flesh and blood over +to the executioner, when according to the law his life was forfeit. The +state has no greater claim to indulgence and mercy than had Brutus's +son, if knowingly and intentionally it indulges in vice. For if you +allow the dictum, "Right or wrong, my country," to be valid, then you +must also apply it to the state of filibusterers that once existed in +the Antilles, and must demand of its citizens that their patriotism +should approve and defend theft, piracy, rape and assassination, for the +systematic perpetration of which their state was founded. + +In contrast with this wretched "My country, right or wrong," the +inflexible dictum of the ancients stands out: "_Fiat justitia, pereat +mundus!_" (Let justice be done though the world perish!). And what does +most honour to the French Revolution is the phrase so often mocked by +political profiteers: "Sooner shall the colonies perish than a +principle!" That was the standpoint of the prophets of Israel, who truly +did not love their people less than do the wretched scoundrels who shout +"hurray!" and yell songs, when their country deals Morality and Right a +brutal blow, because the leaders think that this will profit the +country, or themselves. + +Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as heads of the state, acted in +accordance with Macchiavelli's views. At their time this was expressed +by saying that they were guided by the necessities of the state. In the +second half of the nineteenth century Macchiavellism received the name +of practical policy (_Realpolitik_). The despisers of Morality, who call +the misdeeds of the state _Realpolitik_, apparently do not know that +this one word implies a very comprehensive admission. To their idea +_Realpolitik_ is a policy which reckons only with realities, not with +desires, yearnings or hope, or as Schoppe brutally expresses it: with +that which is, not with that which ought to be. It is active in the +domain of facts, not in that of principles. + +But, according to the advocates of _Realpolitik_, facts and realities +mean nothing but the sole rule of interest, selfishness, ruthlessness, +force, cunning and contempt for all foreign rights; whereas fairness, +justice, the curbing and suppression of one's own desires, consideration +for one's neighbour, love of mankind--all these are phrases, or let us +rather say ideals, which are to be found, not in the world, but in the +brains of a small minority of enthusiasts without influence. He who +confesses to such views, to whom the worst impulses alone are real, +while he relegates Morality to the sphere of the unreal, of visions far +from reality, is a pessimist as long as his convictions remain theory; +but if he puts them into practice, or urges the leaders of the state to +do so, then he is an evildoer who breaks the moral law as soon as it +appears unaccompanied by the police, the prison and the gallows. In +private life a man with such views is a criminal who obeys his evil +instincts whenever he may hope to evade the law of the state. The +bandit, who is clever enough to manage so that police and court of +justice cannot touch him, is a practical politician, for the riches he +acquires by theft, robbery and murder are realities; the criminal code +is but a scrap of paper, something visionary, as long as its minions do +not seize him by the collar. + +The immorality of politics, the way in which the foundations of Morality +are ignored by the state, is the natural consequence of the power of +rulers; for in them all the original instincts of the human beast still +untamed by moral law are exaggerated by the intense realization of their +loftiness, the glory and the illustriousness of their position, and they +are not forced by wholesome fear of the means of coercion wielded by the +moral administration to control themselves, to exercise and develop +their organic powers of inhibition. The elevation of this fact of the +Immorality of the state to a theory that the state is not bound by moral +law, is derived from the conception which philosophers of all ages, +from ancient times to the present day, have formed of the character and +the purpose of the state. Plato, in the Republic, maintains the +omnipotence of the state, which nothing and no one can limit; and +Aristotle, not rising to such heights of error as his master, says more +soberly: "It is a grave mistake to believe that every citizen is his own +master." The Italian philosopher Filangieri considers the guiding +principle and motive power of the state to be "love of power," which a +fool three centuries later called the "will to power," whereupon other +fools declared this to be a brand-new discovery. + +Hegel goes farthest of all in his idolatry of the state; according to +him the state is not alone moral, but Morality itself, just as God is +according to the theologians. As it would be arrogant blasphemy to +characterize anything that God ordains as immoral, as it would be +nonsensical to wish to impose upon God a moral law from outside, not +emanating from Him, to which He would have to submit even against His +will, so it is reprehensible to judge the actions of the state by the +standard of individual Morality; and it is equally absurd to admit any +moral coercion imposed on the state from outside, any guiding principle +other than the law of its necessities and the logic which indicates the +means needed to attain the necessary end. + +According to Treitschke the state is the highest form of human +existence; nothing higher than the state exists. He has never asked +himself the question whether, after all, humanity itself is not superior +to the state which is the form, a form, of its existence and therefore +not its essence. + +From his conviction that the state is the highest thing existing, +Treitschke concludes that certain moral duties, e.g. that of +self-sacrifice, cannot possibly exist for the state. "The individual is +to sacrifice himself for the sake of a higher community of which he is a +member; but the state is itself the highest thing in the outer community +of mankind, therefore it can never be confronted with the duty of +self-destruction." + +How obvious that seems! How grossly mistaken it is all the same! First +of all the state is not the highest thing; there is something higher, +and that is humanity; if then we recognize a moral duty of +self-sacrifice for humanity, theoretically this duty may arise just as +much for the state as for the individual. + +Secondly, the idea that owing to Morality the state might one day +actually be in such a position as to be forced to sacrifice itself is +the most shocking nonsense. How could that possibly be? If the state +always acts with strict Morality towards its citizens and foreign +states, it is simply impossible that it should have to sacrifice its +existence in the fulfilment of some task; for tasks only arise when, and +as long as, the state exists. Once it is disintegrated there can be no +task, either theoretically or practically, for it to accomplish, +therefore it cannot have to sacrifice itself for such a task. But if the +Immorality of another state, or of a minority of its citizens, should +endanger it, threaten it with an unjust attack from within or without, +then there is no rule of Morality that can forbid it to defend itself +to the last, and its self-sacrifice could then only be a result of its +complete annihilation in a justifiable war of necessity. On the other +hand, even the most unscrupulous practical politicians do not possess +any absolute guarantee against defeat, though they declare a war of +aggression to be permissible, whether waged on account of an itching for +power, for purposes of conquest, for the winning of prestige, +predominance or economic advantages. + +Thirdly and lastly, the duty of self-sacrifice for the state can only be +envisaged and seriously discussed, if the state be conceived as a person +to whom the duty of Morality applies in every way; but this conception +is mystic anthropomorphism, not sober, sensible recognition of realities +such as the practical politicians love to boast of. + +For, as a matter of fact, the state is not a person but a concept, an +institution created by man in the interests of one individual, of a few, +of many or of all; an organization of habits and interests, a relation +in which individuals live together. The mysticism of the weak-minded has +transformed it into a person with human features, with the qualities, +desires, duties, and aims of an individual; these men are intellectually +incapable of penetrating to the fundamental facts underlying the +concept, and cling entirely to word-pictures which are mere verbalism. +Scholasticism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was chiefly occupied +in a quarrel about Nominalism and Realism. It was allowed to drop and +was not fought out to a decision. Perhaps because it is impossible to +convince these superficial babblers who take a name or a word for an +object actually existent in time and space, that they are in error. The +fight between Abelard and Roscelet and that between the two of them and +Duns Scotus ought to be taken up again. Above all, one ought to knock it +into the heads of those who make a fetish of the state that it is a mere +word, the famous "_flatus vocis_" of the Nominalists, which they +worship, to which they build altars and make human sacrifices. + +This humiliating form of idolatry is practised by the school of +sociologists known as organicistic, as well as by the practical +politicians. This school maintains that the individual has no +independent existence at all, that he continues to exist only in the +community, by the community, as a totally subordinate, dependent and +incomplete fraction of the community; that the only real thing in the +species is society, the state; that this must be regarded as a living +organism, in which the individual human being is merely a cell which in +solitude, outside the community and detached from it, is as little +capable of life and has as little significance as a cell separated from +a highly differentiated creature, such as a man or some other mammal. In +my book "_Der Sinn der Geschichte_" (The Meaning of History), I threw as +much light as I possibly could on this superstition, and I pointed out +in detail its lack of sense as well as its dangers. I can, therefore, +content myself here with a resume and a few indications. + +There is nothing mysterious or supernatural about the historic or even +the prehistoric origin of the state; part we can learn from reliable +documentary evidence, part we can gather with certainty from obvious +facts. From the primitive human family, which more probably consisted of +a pair than of a man and several women, there arose the formless horde, +a crowd of individuals of all ages, connected by blood; this developed +into a tribe in which age, strength, courage and intelligence were +appreciated in a certain order, and thereby were produced the beginnings +of discipline, co-operation and regularized mutual relations; that is to +say, of organization. This embryo of later formations, this sketchy +beginning of an economic and political community, evolved more definite +and differentiated forms when the wandering huntsmen and shepherds, +seeking prolific hunting grounds and pasture lands, and later on arable +land too, came upon other groups of men and fought with them for the +possession of the desired domain. In the conflict strong and brave men +came to the front, and the victor became the natural, and for the most +part willingly recognized, leader and master of his companions, while +any who opposed him were reduced by force to submit to his authority. +The state crystallized around this war-hero, and by all its members its +aim was clearly and obviously recognized to be defence and the increase +of property outside the state; that is, the warding off of attacks by +foreign robbers and acquisitive invasions of neighbouring domains--wars +of defence and conquest, but always war; and within the state the +maintenance of a certain measure of safety for individuals. This safety, +however, had to be purchased dearly by the limitation, often enough the +complete surrender, of the right of self-determination, of independence +of will and freedom; so dearly, in fact, that the price was far higher +than the value of the advantages acquired. + +The leader in warfare became the ruler and bequeathed his privileges to +his descendants. The state was he himself, the land his property, the +people his family in the old sense of the word--that is, his kindred, +his servants, his slaves. His comrades in arms who had most +distinguished themselves became an aristocracy of the sword, the +supporters and tools of his power, though often enough they became his +rebellious rivals and overthrew him. Defeated enemies were robbed of all +their possessions and slaughtered; later on they were degraded to serfs, +a position little better than that of beasts of burden. A regular +parasitism developed, by means of which the ruler and his companions in +arms exploited the subjugated and productive masses for their own +profit. + +The acute form of this parasitism was warfare in its chronic form, its +prolongation in times of peace, the extortion of contributions and +duties, the imposition of taxes and forced labour from the people. The +ruler was clever enough to provide himself with a moral right to his +exercise of brute force, by inventing a divine origin for his person and +power, and making worship of his person an essential tenet of the +national religion. The systematic suppression of the masses without +rights became the universal practice of the ruler and of the instruments +of his power, and this gradually spread to the higher classes who could +still play the master to the lower strata, but were of no more account +than the vulgar herd in the eyes of the ruler, having to bow their +proud heads beneath the same yoke. A very few races followed a different +course of development from the primitive horde to an organized state. +They remained free members of the community with equal rights, they +allowed no hereditary ruler from among themselves to become their +superior, and governed themselves as republicans, who nevertheless also +waged war without exception, either forced thereto by the attacks of +greedy neighbours or lured into doing so by the example of the +monarchies within their purview or by lust for booty. In warfare they +won slaves and subjects, and changed into oligarchies, most often into +despotic states, and before they ultimately declined to the parasitism +of a single man and his aids fell victims to a collective parasitism +which gave the conquered and subjugated population up to the spoliation +of the victors. + +Up till modern times the state preserved the character of a private +domain belonging to the ruler and his house. Wars were waged in the +interests of dynasties, and as late as the eighteenth century the +succession in Spain and in certain provinces of Austria was the origin +and purpose of various campaigns. The French Revolution first wrought a +change in this. Since this great event it has been impossible to plunge +any European state into war in order to support the claims to property, +more or less legally justified, made by its ruling house. The people +have taken the place of princes, and now the principle of nationalities +furnishes the reason or excuse for bloody conflicts between states; and +this has become a factor in modern politics and history merely because +dynasties had built up their realms regardless of the origin and +language of the inhabitants of the districts which they had conquered, +stolen, bought, or acquired by exchange, by marriage or by inheritance, +and were indifferent to the national unity of their subjects as long as +they could gain possession of the country and the people. + +From the time of its first vague beginnings up till the rise of modern +democracy, the state has been nothing but a means of parasitism in the +hands of the ruling person or group, and an instrument for the +preparation for, and the waging of, war. All the state's tasks, which +apparently lie outside the sphere of war, if they are carefully +examined, will be found, after all, to aim at efficiency in war, and it +has gradually selected these tasks from the simple consideration that +their execution increases the guarantees of success in warfare and in +government. + +The deification of the ruler in Asiatic and Egyptian lands, the +unconditional identification of the realm with his person, the uniform +enslavement of the whole people, its naive exploitation for the sole +benefit of the sovereign and his assistants are no longer possible in +Europe at the present day. The development of the nations to a higher +plane of civilization and a clearer consciousness of their own worth +forced the state to alter its constitution to a certain extent and to +devote itself, at least theoretically, more to the interests of its +citizens than the service of its prince. The intellectual constructions +of the eighteenth century correspond to no historical reality. The +Social Contract, the inception of which J. J. Rousseau described so +graphically, was never made. Hutcheson, who had expressed the idea long +before the enthusiast of Geneva, conceived it only as the epitome of the +principles which the state should embody; according to Hume, the +relations of the citizens to each other and to the state are a tacit +contract which need not be explicitly formulated, because it originates +in human nature; and Fichte even assures us that Rousseau himself did +not mean his Social Contract to be taken literally. According to him it +was only an idea. But societies must act in pursuance of this idea, and +they were founded, if not actually, yet legally upon an unwritten +contract. Anyway, the ideas of Hutcheson, Hume and Rousseau have +nowadays been assimilated by the general consciousness. The masses +believe in the natural, inborn rights of man, some of which he certainly +has surrendered in favour of the community; they demand and expect of +the state that it should serve their just interests, and they are no +longer ready to be made use of by the ruler and a powerful, often very +small, minority, for purposes which are foreign to them, which they do +not know, and for which they do not care. + +Those who juggle with words, who talk dark and mysterious nonsense about +the concept of the state, or dogmatize fanatically on the subject, +contemptuously call this conception of the nature of the state and the +relation of its citizens to it shallow rationalism, and from the heights +of their supposed knowledge they look down disdainfully upon arguments +which they libellously call the laymen's babble. They are only in part +bumptious fools who pretend that uncritical, parrotlike repetition of +traditional formulae is erudition and confused thought is profundity, and +who declare the clear-headed men who mock their silly mysticism, their +superstitious dread of word phantoms, to be simply incapable of +understanding their depth. Partly they are very sly toadies, very +cunning sycophants of power, or ruthless egoists, unscrupulous +freebooters, who pretend to be enthusiastic and devout apostles of the +divinity of the state and demand the most humble submission, adoration +and unconditional devotion in order that, as priests in its temple, they +may grind their own axes at its altars. + +Such are those folk who maintain the double thesis that the state is +everything, the individual nothing, the former the sole reality, the +latter without any separate existence, and that the state, as mankind's +highest form of existence, need recognize nothing as superior to itself, +neither right nor law, and may therefore take as sole guide for its +actions its own interests and not Morality. + +You cannot maintain a single one of these contentions unless you and all +men are deprived of reasoning power; they crumble away instantly in the +light of Reason. It is not true that the state alone is real and that it +is superior to the individual, not only because of the forces at its +disposal, the complex of which it represents, but also as an entity, as +a thought, a principle. The individual alone in the species, that is, +living, feeling, thinking and acting man, is real. The individual +created the state out of himself. He can also destroy it. The practical +politicians above all people should be of this opinion; as he can do +it, he may do it; as he has the power to do it, he has the right to do +it. The individualist will not make this a question of law, but will +simply assert that, though the individual is the father of the state, +yet he has no reasonable grounds for destroying it, so long as it makes +no murderous attacks on its creator. The individual did not create the +state consciously, intentionally and formally by means of a social +contract, but naturally and organically, under pressure of +circumstances. It is clearly to his interests to maintain it, to furnish +the necessary means for its existence and efficiency, but always on the +one condition that the state should really protect and promote the +interests of the individual, lighten his burdens in the struggle for +existence, and make that prosperity, comfort and happiness possible +which he cannot secure unaided in his struggle with the hostile forces +of Nature and with rival fellow-men. + +But if the state oppresses the individual with burdens and duties which +he feels no inner necessity to fulfil, if it confiscates him, body and +soul, instead of respecting his freedom and his right to +self-determination, then the assumption falls to the ground; the state +is no longer an institution which benefits the individual; it is +inimical to the individual, hinders him in his struggle for existence, +destroys his happiness; and he obeys his primitive instinct for +self-preservation if he turns against it, masters it as he would a +monster, draws its teeth and claws, and forces it back to the place it +was meant to occupy, that of a docile and industrious servant of the +individual, not of one individual who aspires to rule the others, but of +all individuals who are of the people that make up the state. + +I consider it unnecessary and a little ridiculous to quote authorities +in support of the statement that twice two are four; what is reasonable +and clear is convincing without further recommendation; nevertheless, it +is a fact that may be worthy of mention that some of the best intellects +of all nations have sided with the individual against the state. On the +one side we have Plato, whose ideal is Sparta and who would like to see +the despotism of this model state and its communal meals completed by +the addition of community of property, of wives, and of children; we +have Hegel, who has gone farther than any one in his idolatry of the +state; we have Auguste Comte, who, in his zeal for his newly founded +science of Sociology, conceives society as an organism biologically +superior to the individual, and thereby has become the father of the +Organicists. But against these we can put the Englishman, Jeremy +Bentham, the embodiment of sound common sense, whom the muddle-headed +fools that pose as deep thinkers have good reason to hate and fear, and +whom they try to depreciate as vulgar and shallow; further, his +compatriot, Herbert Spencer, who is his kindred spirit; the Frenchman, +Frederic Bastiat, whose writings sparkle with flashes of wit; the +German, Wilhelm Humboldt, who bravely and successfully combated the +state tyranny defended by Fichte. All these are convinced individualists +who adduce irrefutable reasons for their views. We may also include +Kant among them, as he gave utterance to this decisive sentence: "Man is +his own aim and end, and must never be a mere means"; consequently it is +never permissible to sacrifice the sovereignty of one's own person to +that of the state, or make use of it for the realization of political +aims by disregarding, and doing violence to, one's right of +self-determination. Harald Hoefding contends that progress should be +measured by the extent to which, in Kant's sense of the words, man is +recognized to be his own aim and end; but that is not only a measure of +progress, it is the measure of all civilization. + +For civilization, to my idea, means a state worthy of man, implying his +mental, moral and material independence of all motive forces other than +those of his own nature; its aim is the most complete attainment +possible of this independence; its measure the extent to which the +individual determines his own fate and is able to ward off from it +undesired outside influences. At the first awakening of his +consciousness primitive man was aware of being exposed to unknown forces +which controlled him at will and against which his will was powerless. +From the very beginning, at first dimly and then more and more clearly, +man has felt this to be unworthy and intolerable. The best of the +species have always laboured with all their strength to liberate +themselves, and the great ambition of man throughout his development has +always been not submissively to accept whatever fate was accorded him, +but to work out his destiny according to his needs and his own ideas. + +The anguish caused by wretched dependence upon external forces is the +origin of religion as of superstition, which both spring from the same +root. With the anthropomorphism peculiar to the earliest stages of +thought, man personified the mysterious powers which ruled his fate. He +created gods for himself, and then, as far as his knowledge permitted, +he sought some relation between himself and them, and tried to get at +them by every means available. He imagined them like unto himself, that +is, vain, capricious, greedy, easily frightened by dark threats, and +then, very reasonably on this hypothesis, he importuned them with +prayers, sacrifices, hymns of praise and vows, as well as magic formulae +and incantations, always with the inflexible intention of making them +serve his purposes, not of serving theirs. The contrite Jewish prayer: +"Thy will be done, Lord, Thy will, not mine," is a new trait in the +religious thought of man. The heathen always strives to have his will +done in opposition to that of the gods, and to divert them from their +decisions if he dislikes them. + +In a state of advanced development theological thought gave way before +the scientific. Man learnt to conceive Nature's rule, not +transcendentally, but intrinsically. He recognized that the forces +around him, which so often crossed his purpose, are not to be influenced +by prayer and sacrifice, but that it is expedient and possible to +discover their character and the conditions of their activity. By dint +of long-sustained efforts he has succeeded in effectively standing up to +hostile Nature and in warding off her undesired interference in his +destiny. If the tribulations, which formerly suddenly brought his +schemes to nought and often destroyed him, are not entirely overcome, it +is merely because his practice does not conform closely enough to the +directions evolved by his theoretical knowledge, because he is too +careless or too clumsy to make proper use of the weapons against the +elements with which science has armed him. + +But this same man, who has learnt to be a match for Nature, his creator, +is powerless against his creature, the state. He can neither evade it +nor escape from it. The state disposes of him without his consent, +against his most obvious interests, in spite of his powerless +opposition; it hurls him hither and thither, annihilates him, crushes +him by its will and is unmoved by the will of the individual. + +True, man has sought to maintain his right of self-determination against +the forces of politics, as against all others that broke his will and +intervened in his life without his consent. For thousands of years all +state development has tried to protect the modest individual, lost in +the crowd and featureless, but nevertheless a person, that is, a world +to himself, against the arbitrariness of rulers or leading statesmen. +That is the one unchanging tendency which leads from Harmodius and +Aristogeiton, the slayers of a tyrant, the rebellion of the elder +Brutus, the murder of Caesar, by way of the Revolt of the Netherlands and +the execution of Charles I of England, to the great Revolution, the +risings of 1848 and the struggle for constitutional government in all +states of the Old World and the New. The formula has long been +discovered whereby the individual can maintain the dignity of his +sovereign personality and his own responsibility for the shaping of his +destiny. It is civil freedom, constitutionalism, sovereignty of the +people. There are arrangements, carefully thought out, nicely weighed, +cleverly worked out to the smallest detail, by which the individual is +fitted into his place in the community without being deprived of the +management of his own affairs, by which the sacrifices needful for the +fulfilment of collective tasks are exacted without his being reduced to +a condition of slavery, by which the independence of the individual is +safeguarded and yet a state of chaos and anarchy is avoided. + +But this formula fares as do the doctrines of science: hitherto it has +remained a theory everywhere. The franchise, representation of the +people, responsibility of ministers, constitutional limitation of the +ruler's power, are infallibly effective weapons or instruments, but no +people has yet learnt how to handle them rightly. That is why pessimists +speak of the bankruptcy of civilization, that is why the aim of +civilization, the liberation of the person and the enforcement of its +sovereignty, has nowhere been attained, that is why, to quote Napoleon I +in his interview with Goethe at Erfurt, "In our times the power of fate +is politics." And yet all these institutions of a modern constitutional +state, from the ballot-paper and the voting of taxes in Parliament to +the enforced resignation of the ministry on a vote of censure and the +oath of the ruler to observe the constitution, recognize the rights of +the individual as opposed to the state, and at least theoretically give +the lie to the bold declaration that the state is everything and the +individual nothing. + +It is no less untrue to say that the state is superior to Morality and +is not bound by it. In order to prove this we need only be brave enough +not to be intimidated by the mysterious mien and gestures and the dark, +pompous phrases of the mystics who worship the state, and to penetrate +to the real, conceptual idea of the word. + +The hocus pocus that the worshippers of the state perform around their +idol puts one in mind of Kempelen, who created a sensation with his +automaton in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This figure, got +up as a Turkish woman, gave rise to astonishment and, among not a few, +to superstitious fear. It played chess, and so well, too, that it almost +always succeeded in winning, even against its most skilled opponents. +People cudgelled their brains to solve the riddle, all sorts of +explanations were suggested, one more impossible than the other, but +still the mystery remained dark, until the owner, having made enough +money and sick of the part of an itinerant swindler, revealed the trick. +In the hollow figure there sat a clever chess player who worked its +hands and with them carried out the moves on the board. + +This anecdote can be applied literally to the state. Simpletons, drunk +with phrases, and cunning cheats contend that the state is a +supernatural creation in which the "spirit of the universe," the "spirit +of history" takes shape, and through which it realizes its aims; these +aims, utterly transcending the understanding of the individual, are +unintelligible to man. Such overwhelming phrases strike the simple, +credulous hearer dumb and send cold shudders of awe up his spine. But +let us look at the inside of this magic machine whose works are driven +by the "spirit of the world" and with whose help this spirit fulfils its +impenetrable designs. What do we find? Men, quite ordinary mortals, who +sit in the machine and work its levers; men whose intellectual powers +are only in rare cases superior to those of their enslaved subjects +bereft of will; men who are, as a rule, of average intelligence and not +seldom even below the average. + +These men are the rulers, ministers who cling to office, high officials, +party leaders and professional politicians who would like to become +ministers, generals who seek to make themselves conspicuous, publicists +who hope to derive personal profit by dint of bowing and scraping before +the men in power, by flattering the stupidest and most despicable +prejudices of the masses, or even by implanting such prejudices with +persuasive talk and purposely leading them astray. These men are formed +on the same model as all individuals of the species and are therefore +full of human weaknesses, a prey to all human desires, moved by all +human impulses. They are selfish, vain, the sport of likes and dislikes, +of self-deception as to the value of their ideas, opinions and +judgments, disputatious, arrogant, greedy of possessions, power and +pleasure, spurred by the instinct to magnify and swell their personality +and impose it upon others. And these men are to be liberated from the +discipline of the moral law? They are to be superior to the moral law? + +For whom, then, was the moral law created and developed if not for these +men--whose actions, although they spring from the same motives and +aspire to the same satisfaction of self as those of all other men, can +be fraught with consequences incomparably more evil, because they make +use of the state machine for their purposes. Through the force and +momentum given by the machinery of the state these actions are +boundlessly augmented, their range being indefinitely increased and +their results multiplied a thousandfold. The simplest logic shows that +these men within the state machine, rendered so specially dangerous by +their terrible armament and weapons, far from being liberated from the +coercion of moral law, ought to be subjected to it with extraordinary +severity, a severity which should be greater than that which suffices +for the average man, in proportion as their power to do harm is greater +than that of the man in the street. + +Now all this time, rather carelessly, or at any rate weakly, I am making +a concession to the pious devotees of the religion of the state, by +speaking of the state machine,--a dubious expression, coined to deceive +by rousing superstitious ideas. The phrase is a picture, a rhetorical +figure that one must be careful not to take literally. There is no state +machine. There is only a relation of men to one another and to +traditional habits, organized rules of command, obedience and equable +conduct--habits into which the community of men has fallen in accordance +with the law of least resistance, in order to promote their own +interests, at least theoretically, without being forced to exert +themselves continually to form new judgments, decisions and +arrangements which the ever-shifting, ever-changing conditions of life +render necessary. + +Here again, behind the word, we find men, always only men. Just as those +who command, from whose will all state action emanates, are men, so also +the instruments by which they carry out their decisions are only +metaphorically speaking, levers and wheels, parts of a machine of steel +and iron; in reality they are officials, soldiers and policemen, they +are judges and bailiffs; in short, they are men. And these men, who in +all private relations with their fellow men are sternly required to +submit to the dictates of Morality and the demands of the Law, are the +same on whom other men, the leaders of the state, impose the duty of +breaking all these precepts and laws; as ambassadors they must deny and +dishonour the signatures to treaties; as leaders or paid servants of the +press bureau they must systematically spread lies; as attorneys of the +state they must persecute and maltreat those who tell the truth; as +policemen they must tear the fathers of families from wife and children +and hunt them into the barracks; as soldiers they must invade a foreign +land, murder unknown and innocent men, rob them of their property, burn +down their houses, lay waste their lands, in a word, do everything that +is punishable with prison and gallows; they must perpetrate all crimes +which the aim and end of Morality and Law are to prevent and condemn. If +one defends such action, where can one find the courage and the +justification to require these men at one time to honour the Ten +Commandments and at another to disregard them, to be criminals in the +name of the state in the morning and to be moral private persons and +law-abiding citizens in the afternoon? After all, they only have one +nature, one mind, one character and one set of perceptive faculties. + +To realize the monstrosity of this doctrine of twofold Morality, public +and private, and of the non-compulsoriness of moral law for the state, +it suffices to refer again to the fundamental concepts of Morality. +Individuals have banded themselves together in a community in order to +be able to live more easily, or to live at all, under the present +conditions obtaining on our planet. Lest society should be disintegrated +by the quarrels of its members, and the latter should find themselves +exposed single-handed to a hopeless struggle for existence, a limitation +of their unfettered whims and desires, the curbing of their selfishness, +control of their impulses and the exercise of consideration for their +neighbours have been imposed upon them. + +This coercion is Morality, and society can enforce it by vigorous +measures; but for the most part this is unnecessary, for society has +inculcated in its members the faculty of urging upon themselves in every +situation the dictates of the community and of insisting on obedience to +them. This faculty is conscience. The means by which conscience, +inspired and assisted by reason, determines the will to keep in check or +to suppress organic impulses and inclinations, desires and appetites, is +inhibition; moreover, the development and strengthening of inhibition +does not alone promote the aims of the community, but is of the highest +biological importance to the individual himself, apart from his +relations to society, as it renders him stronger and more efficient, +differentiates him more subtly, and raises him to a higher level of +development. + +Now the state is a special development of society; it owes its existence +to the same necessities as the latter, its task is to minimize the +struggle for existence for the individual, to protect him from avoidable +dangers and to ensure the safety of his life, the fruits of his labour +and that measure of freedom which is compatible with life in a +community. But if the state puts an end to the coercion instituted by +the community and therefore by the state itself; if it does away with +Morality for itself, that is, for a number of individuals, be they few +or many, that act in its name; if it allows selfishness, appetites and +ruthlessness to have the same free play as with creatures of a lower +order than man, or as with men before they formed themselves into +communities; if in the pursuit of its plans beyond the bounds of +Morality it intensifies the struggle for existence in a tragic manner, +exposes men to the most terrible dangers, brutally destroys their +liberty, gravely threatens their life and property or even devotes them +to ruin--why, then it destroys the assumptions on which the state itself +is based, denies its own aim, deprives itself of any right to existence, +and the individuals have thenceforward but one interest, namely, to +drive away this bogey of the state and with all possible means to force +the men, who make use of it and the superstitions clinging to it, to +respect the moral law which the community has created to overwhelm +anti-social, immoral individuals, to render them harmless and if +necessary to destroy them. + +One point there is on which the Machiavellian or practical politicians +are particularly fond of talking nonsense, and that is the state's +loyalty to treaties. Is the state bound by a treaty? Must it honour its +signature? Must it perform what it has undertaken to do? The detestable, +unanimous answer is "No. A treaty cannot hinder the state from doing +what its interest demands." Prince Bismarck is often cited on this +point, as he once said: "The only sound foundation for the state is +state egoism." And another time: "A treaty is only valid _rebus sic +stantibus_, if the situation is the same as when it was concluded; if +the circumstances change, it becomes invalid by the very fact." Such +views are revolting, however great a name be appended to them. Contract, +or treaty, is the basis of the law. Whoever breaks it is dishonoured, +and doubly dishonoured is he who from the beginning enters upon it with +the idea at the back of his mind of deriving every possible advantage +from it and of breaking it when the time comes to fulfil obligations. + +The phrase, "sound egoism," whether it refer to a private person or to +the state, must make every decent man blush for shame. Egoism may be +sound, but it is always the contrary of moral. It is just as convenient +for the individual as for the state to think only of his own advantage +and unhesitatingly to sacrifice his neighbour's rights to it; but +Morality arose and was constituted a rule of human relations in order +to break the back of this selfishness and to teach man consideration for +his neighbour. It is no valid excuse to say that state egoism is no sin, +but a virtue and a merit, that it is different in character from the +egoism of the individual. That is not true. It is not different in +character. It is of exactly the same character as in private life. The +responsible leader of the state who is guilty of a breach of treaty +makes believe to himself and others that he does not do it for his own +sake, but in the interests of the state. But who is the state? I have +already given the answer to this. The state consists of men, the +interests served by a breach of treaty are those of men, not, as a rule, +of all, not even of many members of the state, but of a few, of a class, +a group, perhaps of only one family whose power, wealth and reputation +it is intended to increase. So-called state egoism is in actual fact the +private egoism of many individuals, who break the law, or tolerate and +condone a breach of the law, for the sake of pocketing ill-gotten gains; +and no one is so stupid as to let himself be bamboozled into believing +that the shameful crime of breaking a treaty for the purpose of "sound" +egoistic grabbing becomes moral when it is perpetrated not by one +individual but by thousands or millions of individuals. + +The _reservatio mentalis_, too, of "_rebus sic stantibus_" is an +unwarrantable and wicked reservation. Nothing prevents a decent man when +making a contract from adding a clause reserving the right to terminate +it if the essential conditions should change. If the other party to the +contract does not agree to this, well, then the contract cannot be +concluded. But to sign it with the mental reservation that one will +disavow one's signature if the obligations undertaken become irksome, +that is swindling. There is one consideration so simple that it is +inconceivable that those who break contracts do not realize it. In some +concrete case the leader of the state judges it to be profitable to the +state to disregard good faith. What guarantee has he that his judgment +is right? He is a man, and no man is infallible. But all mankind have +made good faith the foundation of their life in communities, and if a +single man has the temerity to draw a conclusion violating the immutable +convictions and doctrines of all mankind, he must be mad not to see that +most probably he is wrong and that all mankind in every age and every +clime is right. I have left out of consideration the fact that any +possible advantage arising from the breach of faith would not excuse him +morally, and setting aside the ethical aspect of the case, I dwell only +on the logical argument. + +There is one case and one only in which a contract is not binding, +either on the state or on the private individual, and that is when the +signatory was forced to enter upon it with a knife at his throat. +Obligations which a victor imposes on his defeated and disarmed opponent +are by their very nature invalid. The old cry of Brennus: "_Vae +victis!_" is might and cannot constitute a right. Civil law calls this +kind of thing compulsion and decrees that it invalidates any contract. +Only a pedantic mind, stupid and depraved, immersed in hair-splitting +trickery and incapable of a straight thought, could complacently +maintain in the face of all common sense that might and compulsion, far +from doing away with right, are the source of all right. The silly +formula coined for this is: "Might is right." Might may be a fact, but +it is not right. The source of right is not might but Morality, which +might disavows and destroys. The necessary condition of any obligation +which is to be valid is freedom. Kant proved this, but his proof was +unnecessary, for it is self-evident. A forced treaty is no treaty, for +it is the victor's fist which has guided the hand of the vanquished, and +it is he who wrote the latter's signature under the document. The will, +the consciousness of the seeming signatory were absent at the time. + +But the worst and most immoral action of the state, beside which a +breach of treaty for selfish reasons pales to insignificance, is the war +of aggression for purposes of profit, that is, for the conquest of +territory, extortion of money, increase of power, or fame. War is the +quintessence of all crimes against life and property, against the body +and mind of a person, the prevention of which is the aim and object of +all Morality and all laws derived from it. Any means are permissible +whereby this wickedness may be prevented; the war of defence, waged by +the party attacked, is not only justified but sacred, as are the +functions of the institutions that society has developed to hunt down +and punish those who do not respect Morality and Law. And just as it is +the duty of every society to maintain courts of justice, police and +prisons, so it is the duty of every state to be well armed, well versed +in the use of weapons and strong, so long as it must count on the fact +that there are practical politicians who do not recognize Morality as +binding the state, and nations that are ready on the first hint of their +leaders to perpetrate every crime that conscience, the Ten Commandments +and penal law forbid. + +It is idle, in my opinion, to discuss the question whether war will ever +disappear from the world. It serves no purpose to contradict those who +declare it to be eternal. It is possible that it will continue to exist +as long as there is vice, sin and crime; and I do not believe that these +will ever be completely exterminated. Among mankind there will probably +never be a lack of sick and depraved people whose selfishness is +monstrously exaggerated, whose instincts urge them with stormy violence, +whose powers of inhibition are scantily developed or altogether wanting, +who suffer from anaesthesia of the feelings and are therefore incapable +of any sympathy with their fellow men and who are mentally too weak to +foresee the results of their actions. Individuals of this kind are born +criminals whose existence society will probably never be able to prevent +and against whom it is obliged to protect itself. Now war arises from +the same psychic conditions as the antisocial actions of these born +criminals, and therefore the pessimists may be right in maintaining that +it can never be abolished. But it is one thing to assert the existence +of a deplorable fact and quite another to glorify it. To say that war is +a part of the universe constituted by God is blasphemy, even though the +saying emanates from Moltke. To extol war ecstatically and to sing hymns +of praise to it, to declare that it evokes the highest virtues of man is +a panegyric of crime, a thing anticipated and punishable in the penal +code. + +I am not here attempting to solve the problem of what practical measures +can be taken whereby right may be set in the place of might in +inter-state relations, and instead of ruthless selfishness, Morality, +that is, self-control, consideration and respect for the just claims of +one's fellow men and love of one's neighbour. That is as far beyond the +scope of this work as is the investigation of the methods of education, +criminal justice, police organization or prison conditions intended to +deal with the tide of crime and to stem it as far as possible. I am +concerned with moral philosophy, and from that point of view I show that +all Morality is rooted in the desire of men to live together peaceably +in a society, to have greater security of life and property, greater +possibilities of happiness, and that the same needs must impose the +rules of Morality upon states in their relations to one another. +According to Hobbes the primitive condition of mankind is that of a war +of every man against all other men, and only the creation of society +makes an end of it. But if the state unleashes the dogs of aggressive +warfare it hurls mankind back into its primitive condition and destroys +the work it was created to do. The Stoic Seneca says: "_Homo sacra res +homini_," "Man is sacred to man." The practical politicians who praise +war repeat with Hobbes: "_Homo homini lupus_," "Man is a wolf to man." +The moral man demands a return from Hobbes to Seneca. If it has been +possible in the state to tame the wolfish instincts of the individual +and to make him bow down before Custom and Law, it must be equally +possible to do so in the relations of states to one another. He who +denies this in principle disavows Morality altogether, not only for the +state but also for the individual; he who admits it in principle but in +practice scornfully disregards it is a bandit, and it is desirable to +treat him like any other robber and murderer who, to satisfy his wolfish +appetites, tramples on Morality and Right and acts like a wild beast. + +To this, however, the Moralist will object sadly, and the practical +politician with scornful superiority, that the state has created +institutions for suppressing the bandit, but that there are none such to +control bandit states, and that self-defence alone, the only means of +self-protection for man in Hobbes's primitive condition, can gain a +footing between them. Clearly only the party attacked is in a state of +self-defence, but the bandit who has a sufficient sense of humour to +play the pettifogging lawyer can always maintain that attack is also +self-defence, the preventive form of self-defence. The answer to this +is: if society has managed to provide judges and police in order to +secure peace, then mankind will for the same purpose learn how to +provide courts of justice and a police force to deal with the bandits of +practical politics who endanger peace among nations. But that is a +practical question, not a theoretical one, not a principle of moral +philosophy. The latter shows irrefutably that there is only one +Morality, not a private one and a public one which is its negation, not +one kind for the individual and another for politics, for the state. + +He who defends the thesis of a twofold Morality merely shows that he +does not possess simple Morality. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY + + +Theological thought is faced with a problem in ethics which presents the +greatest difficulties. It is the problem of Free Will. + +Is man who perceives, judges, has volition and acts, a free being +inwardly? Can he, guided only by his own reasonable thoughts and +conclusions, determined entirely by his own inner impulses and +uninfluenced by outer circumstances, choose one or the other of two +conflicting possibilities? When he has to make a decision, is he always +like Hercules at the cross-roads who has to make up his mind alone as to +which path he shall take, whether he is to follow quiet, modest virtue, +or alluring, voluptuous vice? Does he do evil because he willed to do so +and not otherwise, although it was in his power to avoid it? Does he +decide for the good, because after due investigation and consideration +he recognized it as preferable, though he might have rejected it? Or is +man always subject to coercion from which at no time and no place he can +escape? Are all his actions determined by the law of Nature which +regulates every one of his movements just as mechanically as the course +of the stars or the fall of a body to our earth when its support is +removed? Is he an automaton, set going by cosmic forces, who possesses +the doubtful privilege consciously to be able to follow the turning of +his wheels, the action of his levers, rods and indicators and to listen +to their humming and knocking without being allowed to interfere in +their movements or to change the least thing in their functions or work? +Is he fettered by the chain of causes which have existed eternally and +continue to act immutably to all eternity? + +Theological thought is condemned to find an answer to the question of +freedom or determinism, as it is the necessary condition for the +essential concepts of the theological doctrine of Morality, that is, the +concept of responsibility and those consequent upon this, namely, sin, +reward and punishment. For the true believer God is the source of +Morality. He Himself is Morality. What He ordains is good in itself and +cannot be otherwise, for there is no room for evil in His nature, since +if He could be conceived to do evil, it would by the very fact of His +doing it become good. A man, to be moral, must approximate to the nature +of God as nearly as it is granted to mortals to do. The moral law is +revealed by God's mercy to give man a light which shows him the right +path and lights him on his way. Thanks to Him the poor mortal is +relieved of the incertitude due to his limited mental powers and is +endowed with the priceless possession of a certain precept which he need +only obey in order to be sure of salvation. + +However, granted the correctness of this assumption, it is not +comprehensible how evil came into the world. It contradicts all +attributes with which faith has endowed the deity. It cannot appear +without God's knowledge, for He is omniscient and nothing is hidden +from Him. It cannot occur against His will, for He is omnipotent and +nothing resists His bidding. But least of all can it rage with His +knowledge and consent, for He is infinitely good and therefore does not +permit his creatures to fall victims to evil. But experience teaches us +that evil has a permanent place in human life, and this forces one to +the conclusion that either God is hard and cruel, and therefore not +infinitely good and not Morality itself, or that He has no knowledge of +evil and therefore is not omniscient, but, on the contrary, blind as +well as stupid, or that He sees the evil but cannot prevent it, and +therefore is not omnipotent and must recognize the existence of higher +powers than Himself against whom He is impotent. + +These terrifying conclusions have not escaped the notice of the devout, +and they have always made the most desperate efforts to evade them. Some +have chosen the easiest way out of the difficulty; they close their eyes +before the yawning abyss, fold their hands devoutly and invent pious +phrases about the inscrutable ways of Providence and its infinite +wisdom, which the weak intelligence of mortals cannot grasp. Others take +infinite pains; in the sweat of their brow they with difficulty evolve +tortuous and hypocritical explanations, which in reality explain +nothing, but in a mind which lends itself willingly to them give rise to +the illusion that the contradiction has been solved. Perhaps the most +astounding piece of work accomplished by this miserable juggling, or +this delusion of self by means of an exuberant flow of words, is +presented in the four volumes of the "Theodicee," by which Leibnitz +made himself a laughing-stock. Mazdeism has invented an alluring but at +the same time risky expedient. It lightly assumes that two principles +obtain in the universe, a good one and a bad one, the creator and the +destroyer, the merciful God and the cruel demon, Ormuzd and Ahriman. In +this way everything is easy to understand. Good is the work of radiant +Ormuzd, evil the deed of dark Ahriman. The two fight together with very +nearly equal forces, but this doctrine reveals the comforting prospect +of a distant future in which Ormuzd shall finally triumph over Ahriman, +and fills the trembling believer with elation at the thought that after +aeons of the tragic struggle between good and evil, at the end of the +world the curtain will fall on the victory of good. By this victory +Mazdeism, which claims to be monotheistic, rescues its single god, +although the introduction of a second principle of very nearly equal +power, which holds the one god in check for an immeasurable period of +time, brings this system perilously close to polytheism. + +To the purer monotheism of Christianity there is indeed something +repugnant in the assumption of a second, opposite principle of almost +equal power, but yet it has admitted the existence of the devil, who is +undoubtedly reminiscent of Ahriman. Only he lacks the independence of +the Mazdean demon. He is not on a footing of equality with God, but is +subject to Him as is every creature. He is not strong enough to oppose +God and can only do evil because God allows it. But why does He allow +it? Why does He tolerate the devil? Why can the latter proceed with his +evil work with God's consent? To this theology gives a crafty answer +which Goethe has clothed in the glorious beauty of inimitable poetry. +God has assigned to the devil the task of tempting man with all the arts +of seduction in order to give him the opportunity of testing and +developing his moral strength in resistance, of purging himself, of +attaining purity and salvation by his own efforts. In short, he exists +in order to give man a sort of Swedish gymnastics in virtue. The +struggle is not quite fair, for the devil is held by a halter and is +pulled up if he gets too big an advantage, and man is always assisted by +redeeming mercy, a hand being stretched out to him from the clouds which +sets him on his feet as often as he stumbles. But theology is not bound +by rules of sport. That is how the picture of the universe is presented +in "_Faust_." But he who painted it is the same Goethe who on another +occasion angrily complains: "You allow man to become guilty--and then +leave him to his suffering." Does the divinity allow man to fall a +victim to evil without turning it aside from him? Does he only try him +in order mercifully to rescue him at the moment when he is about to +succumb? Goethe does not answer this question without ambiguity. That is +not his business either. He may contradict himself. He is a poet who is +allowed to express contradictory views. He is not a theologian whose +duty it is, by means of a definite dogma, to support those who totter in +doubt. + +All these attempts to reconcile the attributes of the deity with the +fact that there is evil in the world which continually leads man into +danger, emanate from the explicit or tacit assumption that man possesses +Free Will. For if his will is not free and he does evil, then he does it +because he must and because he cannot do otherwise. But this must can +only come from the deity who is almighty; it is the deity who condemns +man, who forces him to do evil. Man therefore does evil as God's tool +without volition; therefore, as a matter of fact, it is God Himself who +does evil. But if God is capable of doing evil He is not Morality +itself, or every distinction between good and evil is destroyed, and we +must recognize what seems evil to us to be just as moral as what seems +good, because the one is as much the work of God as the other. But if +this is admitted, and it is logically impossible not to admit it, then +the whole foundation of transcendental, that is, of theological, ethics +breaks down. The latter is therefore forced, on pain of suicide, to +maintain that man has Free Will. + +But with this assertion theological ethics by no means disarms all the +objections which threaten its life. Renouvier's book on Free Will is +probably the most thorough and exhaustive work on this subject which has +been treated by thousands of thinkers and not a few babblers since the +time of the ancient Greeks, and he describes it as follows: "Will is +free and spontaneous if Reason cannot foretell its untrammelled action +at any time other than that at which it actually takes place." Renouvier +makes no limitation and no reservation. He does not say, "if human +reason cannot foretell its action," and this omission of the +particularizing adjective is not carelessness or a mistake on his part, +it is duly considered; for the prudent dialectician knows very well that +he would ruin his theory of Free Will if he only maintained that human +reason alone should be able to foretell its action. There are many +happenings which human reason cannot foretell, and which nevertheless +obey immutable laws and take place according to absolutely fixed rules +without the exercise of any inner freedom or authority on the part of +the individual. If human reason cannot foretell these happenings, it is +not because no external force of the universe determines them and they +are entirely spontaneous, but simply because the laws controlling them +are unknown. Therefore the impossibility of foretelling them is no proof +of their freedom, it is only a proof of the ignorance of the human mind. +There was a time when no human intellect could foretell the occurrence +of a solar or lunar eclipse. Was that because the heavenly bodies act +freely and are eclipsed only at their own spontaneous desire, when and +how they please? No, because man had not discovered and comprehended +their movements. To this very day we are unable to foretell the weather +on a particular day next year, or the result of the next harvest, or an +earthquake. Does this prove the freedom, the absolute independence of +these occurrences? No; it only proves the inadequacy of our knowledge. +Renouvier therefore would achieve nothing for his theory of Free Will, +if only human understanding were to be unable to foretell the actions of +the Will. That is why he does not say "human reason," but simply +"Reason." The essence of Free Will is that its actions altogether shall +be incapable of being foreseen; it is not in its nature to act in +accordance with some predetermination which must necessarily reckon with +outer circumstances and given forces; and the impossibility of +foretelling its actions exists not only for human Reason but for every +Reason--for Reason in general. + +For every Reason and therefore for the divine Reason as well. And now +theological ethics must find a way out of this dilemma: either God does +not foresee the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of +his omniscience, that is, of one of His essential attributes; or God +foresees the decisions of free human Will, then this is a denial of the +Freedom of the Will, the essence of which, according to Renouvier, lies +in the fact that it cannot be foreseen. For this impossibility of being +foreseen is indeed the quality by which Free Will stands or falls. Let +us realize the significance of this concept. Nothing can be foreseen +which will not with certainty occur. But whatever at some future time +will become a reality, must even now be virtually a reality for an +omniscient Reason not bound by the human categories of time and space, +since for this Reason neither proximity nor distance exists, but +everything is on one plane, and there is no future or past, but +everything is present. So if the divine Reason foresees now how the free +Will of man will act in the future, that is equivalent to saying that +this free Will is forced to act in the particular way which God foresees +and not otherwise. Therefore the Will is not free but, on the contrary, +strictly bound. It is obliged to make the event foreseen by God a fact, +as God can only foresee what must certainly come to pass, and a foreseen +event that does not happen would mean a mistake, a false assumption, of +which one cannot believe God capable without denying Him. This apparent +free Will is coercion at sight. As its action is foreseen by God, the +Will is subject to the law of fate, but a period of delay is granted. +Every movement of the supposedly free Will becomes a part of the order +of the universe which has been unalterably laid down from eternity, and +which the human Will cannot upset without burying God in the ruins. Man +may imagine that his Will is free. But that is self-deception, and he +can only indulge in it because what God sees clearly is hidden from him, +namely, the goal towards which, though he does not realize it, he is +inevitably led along strictly defined paths by the iron hand of fate. + +It would be unjust towards theology to say that it has never seen the +incompatibility of Free Will with divine omniscience. This has not +escaped its notice, but it has attempted by the use of familiar formulae +to get out of the difficulty. In his book _De libero Arbitrio_ Saint +Augustine stoutly maintains that the human Will is free, but he tries to +rescue the attributes of the deity by reserving to it the right or the +power to intervene by its mercy in the actions of the Will, if in its +freedom it comes to a decision which endangers the salvation of the +soul. Saint Thomas Aquinas takes good care not to differ in opinion from +the Bishop of Hippo. The reformers, Calvin, Luther and Bishop Jansen, +too, were better logicians than the patristic writers, and +unhesitatingly denied the freedom of the Will, but they did not notice +that they made God responsible for all the misdeeds of man, lacking +freedom and acting with God's foreknowledge and at His behest. The +Council of Trent scorned all these contradictions and unintelligible +points, and declared with infallible authority that man's Will is free +and that at the same time God is omniscient. The Catholic Church at the +time was in some countries still in a position to meet Reason, if it +raised objections, with an unanswerable argument: the stake. + +That is the peculiarity of theological as distinguished from scientific +thought, the purest form of which is mathematics. The former never +follows a train of thought to its strictly logical conclusion, but only +follows a certain distance, to a point where it loses itself in an +impenetrable black fog, or in a cloud of glory which dazzles the +beholder. Mathematical thought, on the contrary, develops the train of +thought to the bitter end, to its ultimate conclusions. These are +necessarily absurd if the premises are erroneous, and their absurdity is +so clear that it convincingly proves the mistake in the point of +departure. Such a scrupulous confutation of self is to be expected as +little from mystic visions as from arrogant dogmatism. The former obey +the laws of dreams, in which the association of ideas, unfettered by +logic, holds sway and strings together the most incompatible ideas to +form an apparently connected series; the latter demands the privilege of +being independent of the judgment of Reason, and of being tried by +Faith, a judge who always decides in its favour. + +Those who believe in Free Will adduce a proof of it which they derive by +the method of introspection. Man, they say, will never be convinced that +he is not free, that his actions are not determined by his own will +alone, for he has the incontrovertible consciousness of the contrary. He +is quite clear on the point that he does a thing because it is his will +to do so, that he had the choice of doing it or not, that he does what +he wants, that he comes to his decision owing to considerations, +inclinations, moods or intentions which are perfectly known to him, if +to him only. At the Sorbonne in Paris they still remember the +professor--when the anecdote was told me Victor Cousin was named as the +hero, but I cannot guarantee that it was he and no other--who used to +say in his lecture on Free Will: "Man's will is free. There is no need +to prove this by giving reasons. We feel it immediately as a truth. I +will show you. I will raise my right arm. I raise it"--here he raised +his right arm with a commanding gesture, kept it for a short time in +this position, and added triumphantly: "You see that my will is free." +His hearers broke into enthusiastic applause at this triumphant +demonstration. To-day they would receive it with loud laughter. + +We have learnt to seek the roots of most, perhaps of all, human actions +in the subconsciousness. There they are worked out under influences +which cannot be perceived by introspection and in which inborn and +acquired inclinations, experiences, organic conditions at the time, +instincts, attractions and repulsions play a decisive part. They rise +ready made into consciousness, and the latter, not having seen them +being formed, persuades itself that it has produced them spontaneously, +and imagines reasons why it willed to do actions that were determined +outside its sphere. The professor who authoritatively states, "I wish to +raise my right arm and therefore I do it," certainly says this in all +good faith, but equally certainly he is ignorant. He is not aware of the +play of forces which end in his gesture. He raises his right arm, which +he believes he chooses with complete freedom, because he is in the habit +of using his right arm by preference; if he had been left-handed he +would have announced his wish to raise his left arm, and would have been +equally convinced that he had decided, with complete freedom, for his +left arm. If he suffered from chronic muscular rheumatism in one of his +arms, so that it would trouble him or hurt him to move it, he would +unconsciously choose the other, sound arm, and maintain just as +positively that he had done so with complete freedom. I have mentioned +as instances two particularly crude and therefore very obvious reasons +which may determine the action of this simple-minded professor without +his being aware of it. But each one of our more complicated, and even of +our simplest, movements is the outcome of numberless subtle causes which +are partly due to the organized experiences and habits of our individual +life, partly a necessary consequence of our inherited qualities, our +bodily and intellectual constitution, and their origin goes back to the +far distant past of our species, to the beginnings of life, we may even +say to eternity. Our consciousness can tell nothing of these causes. +They elude our observation and investigation and remain ever unknown to +us. Renouvier is quite right when he says no understanding--and I say +without his ambiguity no human understanding of the present time--can +foretell the actions of another, nor indeed his own, but not because +they come to pass independently of inevitable causes, but simply because +these causes cannot be descried by our ignorance. + +It is vain labour to try and derive the solution of the question of +Free Will, or even a contribution towards it, from introspection. +It is a method unsuitable for this purpose. The Greek sage well knew +what a great and difficult task he set man when he admonished him: +"[Greek: gnothi seauton]." That is easy to say but difficult if not +impossible to do. Spinoza very happily characterized the self-deception +in which the individual is plunged with regard to the part played in +determining his actions by his conscious Will aided by Reason; he says +that if a stone, flung by some hand, had consciousness, it would imagine +it was flying of its own free will; and in another place he points out +without any illustrative metaphor, that a drunk man and a child, who +certainly do not act on their own initiative, also believe in the +freedom of their will. It has been possible to prove experimentally how +ignorant of the real motives of his actions the individual may be. It is +suggested to a person who has been hypnotized that on awakening he is to +carry out a certain action, something particularly absurd, unjustified +and aimless being intentionally chosen. The subject of the experiment +on awaking faithfully carries out the suggestion, and as he has no +memory of what happened while he was in the hypnotic state, he is +convinced that he is yielding to a sudden idea, a whim, but that in any +case his action is determined by his own will. But since he must realize +the absurdity of what he is doing, he seeks for some sufficient motive +to explain it, and always finds one to his own satisfaction. + +All the efforts of anguished sophists to prove their thesis of the +Freedom of the Will from data supplied by introspection have failed +miserably. But they were forced to undertake them, for theology cannot +give up the contention that man acts with free Will. It is an important +part of the religious conception of the universe and of the relation in +which, according to this, man stands to God. + +To put it shortly, religion sees in man's life on earth a preparation +for eternity. It gives him the opportunity of coming nearer to God by +his own efforts and thus making himself worthy of the salvation which +secures him a place in the sight of God to the end of time. Thus the +life of the flesh is made a method of selection by which the sheep are +sundered from the goats. God provides man with free Will for this +special purpose, so that he may make use of it to choose good of his own +accord and to avoid evil. This undoubtedly wearisome task is made much +easier for him, because God in His goodness has given him laws, +doctrines of Morality and examples which point out the way of salvation. +If man makes proper use of his gifts, if in pursuance of divine +admonition, he treads of his own free will the path of virtue, he +acquires merit which gives him a legitimate claim to the reward of +finding favour in God's eyes and to be admitted to the company of the +just and pure. But if man purposely turns to evil, of which he is warned +by revelation and which he has been given the power to avoid, then he is +a sinner and deserves the punishment of damnation, which, however, he +may yet escape if God in His mercy forgives him his sin. Therefore man +holds in his hand the fate of his immortal soul. It depends on him +whether this fate be salvation or damnation. He is responsible for +directing it to the former or the latter. Of course, God has the power +to force him to virtue and to stop him from vice. But it is not His plan +to condemn man to be the slave of virtue. He wants man to choose virtue +of his own accord, He wants noble souls about Him who by freedom have +attained Morality. + +This religious view of the universe, which deals in assertions and +disdains on principle to prove even one of them to Reason by facts that +can be tested, contrasts with the scientific view of the universe which +asserts nothing but what can be objectively ascertained to be true, +which distinguishes sharply between the account of what has been +observed and can be tested by everyone and hypotheses for which it +demands no belief, but only the recognition of their possibility or +probability, and which it discards as soon as an ascertained fact +definitely disproves them. No compromise is possible between these two +views of the universe. Nothing can bridge the chasm between them. It +would be superficial to say that the theme of the scientific view is +realities and that of the religious one imagination. Imagination is also +a reality, only of a different order to that which is called so in +common parlance. It is a subjective reality; it exists only in the mind +that conceives it. Reality itself is for the thinking mind only a state +of consciousness, but it is an image of conditions which have an +objective existence, though in another form, outside the consciousness. +The supporters of religion maintain that there is an objective reality +corresponding to their concepts, but this cannot be ascertained by any +of the senses which the living organism has developed in order to +establish a relation between the world, of which it is a part, and +itself. It is perfectly useless for supporters of the one view of the +universe to try and convince those of the other. Each of them moves on a +different plane and is unapproachable to the other. All that can be done +is to define both the one and the other as clearly as possible and prove +their incompatibility. + +For the scientific view of the Universe the problem of Free Will does +not exist and cannot exist. All facts that science has observed force it +to the assumption of causation, which does not only mean that every +phenomenon is produced by a cause, is the effect of a cause and could +never have occurred but for this cause, but also means that the effect +represents the exact equivalent of the energy which was its cause. Thus +the hypothesis of the indestructibility of the total energy in the +universe is an essential part of the concept of causation, the +fundamental hypothesis without which the phenomenon of the universe and +the things which occur in it are simply unintelligible to Reason; and +everything in and outside ourselves, everything that we perceive, +becomes chaos, chance, lawless whim or miracle in the theological sense +of the word. + +It is inconceivable that an effect should be anything other than the +reappearance in a different form of the exact quantity of energy that +caused it; for if the energy of the effect exceeded that of its cause, +then part of the effect would have been produced without cause; and if +the energy of the effect fell short of that of the cause, then part of +the energy of the cause would have been expended without producing an +effect. That, however, would be the negation of causation, it would be +an admission that part of the effect (i.e. an effect) could be produced +without sufficient cause, i.e. out of nothing, and that a part of the +cause (i.e. energy) could disappear (into nothing) without producing an +equivalent effect, which is obviously absurd. + +The human Will manifests itself by an action or the prevention of an +action according to the impulse felt by our organism. Both these are an +exercise of force, the amount of which can be measured. Indeed, +inhibition, too, is a dynamical effort which represents the exact +equivalent of the force with which the impulse which it has checked +acted on the motory centres. The Will, therefore, expends energy which +does work that can be measured. But the Will must derive this energy +from some source. It therefore also only converts energy derived from +the energy of the universe, the total amount of which can neither be +augmented nor diminished; the Will consequently is a part of the dynamic +energy of the universe, and must necessarily be subject to its +mechanical law; that is, to the law of causation. It is therefore not +free, but dependent, as is every phenomenon in the universe. Whoever +maintains its freedom maintains that it is independent, that it is not +subject to the law of causation, that it has no cause of which the +elements, if they could be fully known to us, would be measurable, that +it expends energy which it derives from nowhere, that it produces energy +out of nothing. Whoever maintains this contradicts all experience from +which the knowledge of Nature and her laws has been built up; it is +obviously hopeless to expect a reasonable discussion with such a person. + +Now the supporters of free Will may reply that they do not deny that the +Will derives its energy from the organism and therefore from the +universal source of cosmic energy, and that it makes use of it according +to the laws of mechanics; but they assert that the direction in which +energy is expended by the Will is freely determined by it; further, that +the direction does not affect the amount of energy used, and +consequently the Will can act absolutely in accordance with the +mechanical laws of the universe and yet can, independently of outside +causes, determine the manner in which the energy shall be expended; that +is to say, the Will can be free. But this objection is pure sophistry, +for the determination of the direction, in so far as it is not mere +imagination and therefore ineffective and sterile, but really controls +the action, is an expenditure of energy. The controlling power uses up +energy and obeys a cause, so we have arrived at the same dilemma +again--either the controlling Will is subject to the law of causation, +then it is not free; or it is free and is determined by no outside +cause, then we must ascribe to it motion without driving power and +energy derived from nothing--which is absurd. + +No. There is no such thing as Free Will. The concept of freedom itself +is an illusion of thought which cannot survey sufficiently extensive +connexions. Nothing in the universe is free; all things mutually +determine each other. All are cause and effect, and they fit into one +another like cog wheels. Everything is linked up and dovetailed. The +philosopher's phrase, "Everything is in flux," is the description of the +outward appearance of things. Against it we must set the reality which +is: "Everything is eternally at rest." For a circumscribed system of +motion without beginning or end may mean motion for every individual +point which describes the course, but is, as a whole, virtually at rest. +Everything that exists, or ever will exist, has its necessary and +sufficient cause in that which has always been; the sequence of +phenomena has been unalterably determined since all eternity for all +eternity; what we call chance is an occurrence for which our ignorance +cannot perceive the necessary causes and conditions; past and future +would be in the same plane, therefore would be present for an +omniscience, which knew and understood the machine of the universe down +to its smallest wheel and pin. + +One of the logical consequences of this is that, without any miracle or +the assumption of any supernatural influences, it would be possible to +foretell the most distant events in all their smallest details. An +intelligence sufficiently wide and penetrating would, following the +strict law of causation, be able to produce all lines of the present +with absolute certainty immeasurably far into the future. As everything +that ever will be necessarily must be, it virtually exists at present +and has always existed; therefore it is only a question of clarity of +vision, which however, is denied to man, to see it at any time and to +any extent. + +The illusion of flux is explicable. Life, which like all world processes +is a cyclical motion, is passed in an endless alternation between the +shining forth and extinction of consciousness, the bearers of which are +an everlasting series of organisms following one another. Every organism +lasts a limited time, during which it is carried along an inconceivably +small fraction of the tremendous cycle. It sees all the points of this +short stretch but once, and does not learn that they are eternally the +same. It gathers the false impression that they fly past it, whereas +they are at rest and it passes them, until it ceases to be a suitable +bearer of consciousness and disappears, making room for a successor. +This rigid immutability of the whole Universe is certainly intolerably +gruesome to the imagination, but then, every time we look beyond the +narrow confines of life and human circumstances, to peep into the +infinity and eternity which surrounds us, do not terrifying vistas open +up before us? + +Not only the religious minded, but many free thinkers, too, have Free +Will at heart, though the latter are otherwise guiltless of any +mysticism. They claim it in the name of man's dignity, which would be +deeply humiliated if we had to confess ourselves the slaves of outside +influences, automata moved by universal causation without our having any +say in the matter. We are not entitled to such trumpery pride. Let us +seek our dignity in our striving for knowledge, in the subjection of our +own instincts to the control of our Reason, but not in an imaginary +independence of the laws of Nature, whose commands we should oppose in +vain. + +With Free Will responsibility also disappears. That is obvious. But that +means a collapse only for theological Morality. Scientific ethics can +manage very well without responsibility. Nay, more; there is no room in +it for this concept. In the system of theological Morality +responsibility has a transcendental significance. To sum up once more +shortly what has been dealt with in detail above: according to this +system Morality is a divine command, obedience to, or disregard of which +results in salvation or damnation; in order that reward and punishment +may be just, one as well as the other must be merited; that implies the +assumption that virtue is practised or vice chosen intentionally and +with forethought; but this mode of action must be freely willed if man +is to be responsible for it before his divine Judge. + +Scientific ethics knows nothing of this supernatural dream. In its view +Morality is an immanent phenomenon which occurs only within humanity--or +to define it more accurately, within humanity organized as a society. +It arose from a definite necessity; from the undeniable need of men to +unite, so as to be able, in company with one another, shoulder to +shoulder, to succeed more easily, or indeed to succeed at all, in the +struggle for existence which is too hard for the solitary individual. It +has a clearly recognizable aim: to teach man to curb his selfish +instincts and to practise consideration for his neighbour, by which +means alone peaceable life in common and productive co-operation are +possible. The instinct of self-preservation supplies society with the +laws of Morality which it imperiously imposes on all its members, and +unconditional obedience to which it demands. Society does not dream of +saying to the individual: "You are free; you must yourself decide +whether you will follow the path of virtue or that of vice." On the +contrary, it says to him: "Whether you wish it or not, you must do that +which my doctrine of Morality indicates as good and eschew that which it +declares to be evil. You have no choice. I tolerate you in my midst only +if you submit to the laws of Morality. If you transgress them I shall +draw your teeth and claws or destroy you altogether." By discipline +lasting many thousands of years society has developed in the individual, +though not in all, an organ that watches that his conduct is moral, and +this is the conscience. But this is only supplementary to, and +representative of, society, which in the main exercises police +supervision itself, and sees that in general the moral law is obeyed. It +judges all the actions of the individual that come to its knowledge. +Conscience only is the competent authority where occurrences are +concerned which take place simply in the consciousness of the +individual, and which he alone is aware of. Conscience is only too often +a lenient judge who acquits the individual too easily and nearly always +admits extenuating circumstances. Society does not let him off so +lightly; his punishment is certain if he cannot prevent his sin from +becoming known. + +Responsibility therefore also exists in Morality as understood by +sociologists. As far as his intentions are concerned the individual must +come to terms with his conscience, which, as a rule, he does not find +difficult. For his deeds he must account to society, and it does not ask +what took place in his consciousness, but only how his spiritual +impulses were manifested. For his deeds, then, he is summoned before +society's court of justice and must answer for them without having +recourse to the excuse that he acted as he was forced to do by his +disposition and the pressure of circumstances, and that he had no choice +and could not act otherwise. Though Morality has always been necessary +for the life of the community, and though the latter has, under the +pressure of the law of self-preservation, always had to make its members +strictly subservient to Morality, it has ever had a dim idea that the +responsibility of the individual for his actions is only of practical, +not of fundamental or ideal significance. It has never pushed +investigation as to how far the individual acted freely or not to any +great lengths, never attempted to trace it to the foundations of his +consciousness, to the inception of the impulses of his Will. Where the +lack of freedom was obvious, for instance, where every layman could see +there was insanity, the Moral law has been disregarded ever since +ancient times, and society has contented itself with protecting itself +from the intolerable actions of the lunatic by rendering him harmless. +Since positive Law, made concrete in the laws with penal sanctions, was +evolved from the universal Moral law, it has admitted the plea of +irresponsibility and refrained from exercising its coercive powers where +such irresponsibility has been established. In addition to madness, +demonstrable coercion and self-defence relieve the individual from +responsibility for the crime and render him immune from punishment. + +In the course of evolution society has conceded still further +limitations of individual responsibility. It willingly admits new +knowledge gained by scientific psychology and concedes limited +responsibility, not only in case of madness, but in such cases, too, +where experts can convincingly prove to the judges, the guardians of its +Law, that the individual was in an abnormal condition and affected by +morbid influences at the time of the crime. Farther society cannot go, +if it does not want to put an end to Moral law and do away altogether +with positive law. Concern for its continued existence forbids this. It +must leave it to the philosophers to continue the investigation. They +must show that the Will is never free, always fettered, not only in the +extreme cases of madness or when under the influence of suggestion. They +must make it clear that there is only a difference of degree and not of +kind between the determining influences under which the individual is +constrained to act, and that the causation which binds him proceeds by +imperceptible degrees from the delirium of the maniac and the obsession +of the abnormal man to the passion, lust and desire of the man with +strongly developed instincts, and to the slight stimulus of habits, the +colourless judgment and shallow considerations of the ordinary man with +a deformed character and no definite features. Society can draw no +practical conclusion from the theoretical recognition of the lasting +limitation and lack of freedom of the Will, because moral law by its +very nature implies coercion, and therefore excludes freedom. Whether +the individual submits to the Moral law of his own accord, or because he +is forced thereto by the community's powers of coercion, is of no +account to society. It deals only with the visible results. + +But it is not merely a matter of flat utilitarianism, it is not even +unjust, if society, without inquiring whether the Will is free or not, +makes the individual responsible for his actions and only makes an +exception from this universal rule in extreme cases. Even though his +will is subject to the law of causation, and the individual always acts +as he must, he nevertheless has a means of keeping within the moral law +despite inner impulses and outer pressure, and that is by his judgment +and its instrument, inhibition. Like every organic function which is not +purely vegetative and therefore beyond the influence of the Will, +judgment and inhibition can be strengthened and perfected by methodical +exercise, while total neglect of them will weaken and finally atrophy +them. The community may demand that each of its members shall devote +attention to the development of the natural functions which permit him +to discriminate and to suppress any inclination to evil which may +appear. It facilitates this duty towards itself and himself for the +individual--for it is a question of the increase of his organic +efficiency and of his personal worth--by the institutions it founds for +the education of youth, by schools which not only impart knowledge, but +also form the character, by instruction after the school age, by the +honours with which it distinguishes especially excellent persons, +thereby holding them up to example. The community prescribes that +everyone should acquire a certain minimum of knowledge, and for this +purpose forces each individual by law to go to school for a certain +number of years. It may and ought to force him also to render himself +more capable of obeying the moral law by methodical exercise of his +will. Every citizen is responsible to the state for being able to read +and write. In this sense the individual is also responsible for +sufficiently strengthening his faculty of inhibition to be able to +control his selfish, anti-social and immoral desires. + +The particular purpose for which he is to employ his faculty of +inhibition depends on the current moral law of the age, which is +determined not by the individual, but by the community. The individual +does quite enough and is free of blame if he strives with all his might +to approximate his actions to the ideal which the community demands at a +given time for the life of its members in common and for their mutual +relations. To alter and perfect this ideal is the business of a few +select men with wider judgment, stronger will and warmer sympathies than +the average. In these exceptional cases it is not the community which +imposes its ideal on the individual, but, on the contrary, the +individual who works out a new ideal for the community, and, so to +speak, thanks to his personal qualities, establishes a new record in the +gymnastic of the Will which beats all earlier ones. + +Finally, it is true, the individual is dependent on his natural +disposition. To say that he can be, and is to be, raised above himself +is a very impressive, but really nonsensical, phrase. He can get out of +himself only what is in him by nature, and however hard he may try to +reach out beyond the boundaries drawn by his organic disposition, he +finds it impossible to overstep them. But, as a rule, they are far wider +than the individual has any idea of until he attempts to reach them, and +he will find many surprises if he labours untiringly to develop to their +fullest extent all the possibilities latent in him. Even a born weakling +can, by dint of methodical practice, harden his flaccid muscles +sufficiently to become a gymnast of average skill, though he is hardly +likely to become a first-class athlete. + +In just the same way a weak-willed or simple person can by earnest +endeavours rise to a consistent morality; if, nevertheless, there appear +in him, continually or occasionally, organic impulses which carry him +away, it is not his fault but his misfortune. In that case he is +subjectively not responsible for his immorality. But the community can, +all the same, not liberate him from responsibility, because the law of +self-preservation forces it to insist on observance of the moral law, +and it has no means of accurately measuring how strong the pressure of +instincts and the power of inhibition is in any individual, and to what +extent he has fulfilled the duty of exercising and strengthening the +latter. The phrase "To understand everything is to forgive everything" +shows insight, but is only true in the sense that one must not blame an +individual for his natural imperfection. It comprehends recognition of +the Will's lack of freedom, and the inadmissibility, from the +philosophical point of view, of the concept of responsibility, but it +does not affect the right and the duty of the community to demand moral +conduct regardless of this lack of freedom. It is not permitted to +forgive because it understands. Moreover, there would be no sense in +forgiveness by the community, for the concept of forgiveness implies +feeling and kindly forgetfulness of an injury inflicted of malice +prepense; but insult and offence play no part in the punishment by +society of transgressions of the moral law, and indulgence due to +sensibility would endanger its existence. + +The certainty possessed by the individual that his evil deeds, if they +become known, will have evil consequences for him is one of the +determining factors which is indispensable in helping him to make a +decision. It is an inadmissible affectation to condemn the fear of +punishment as a motive for moral action, because it ought to be the +result of the conviction that it is absolutely right. It is a powerful +aid to self-discipline, as also are the thought and the foretaste of +the satisfaction upon which self-respect may count if general respect +and praise are to be the reward of exemplary conduct. + +The great weakness of the Kantian doctrine of Morality lies in the fact +that it retains Free Will, even though it gives it another name. It is +called autonomy of Will and is contrasted with heteronomy. This doctrine +demands, and considers it possible, that the Will should be its own +lawgiver and should not allow others to lay down laws for it; but it +fails to examine how the Will comes to make laws for itself, of what +hypothesis these laws are the necessary conclusions, by what means the +Will secures respect for its law, and whether this seemingly +self-imposed law is not really the inner realization of a ready-made law +of extraneous origin. The dogma of the autonomy of the Will is a +consequence of the preliminary error of excluding utility from Morality +and of declaring its imperative to be categorical, that is, not +dependent on the aim, but independent and regardless of any aim. The +whole tomfoolery of the categorical imperative and of the autonomy of +the Will is transcendental mysticism, and is all the more surprising as +it is the result of an investigation which claims to be the work of pure +Reason. It is the shadow of the ghostly bogies of religious conceptions +in the daylight of "pure Reason." + +From the point of view of the community we may speak of merit and sin, +but not from the subjective point of view. For the community the moral +conduct of the individual is useful, immoral conduct is disadvantageous, +therefore it praises the one and condemns and punishes the other. That +is opportunism, but not moral philosophy. Considered subjectively, moral +conduct is just as little meritorious as beauty, great stature, muscular +strength, keen intelligence, health, a good memory, prompt reactions of +consciousness and all other advantages that the individual has received +without his personal intervention as a gift of nature. And immoral +conduct is just as little blameworthy as ugliness, stupidity, sickness +and other misfortunes which the individual is burdened with by heredity +or which a hard fate has imposed on him. Happy is the favoured man! +Pitiable the unfortunate one! Both are the work of forces which are +absolutely beyond the control of their wills. In the same way the good +man acts morally because he possesses insight and restraining +will-power, and the bad man acts immorally because these perfections +have been denied him, and neither the one nor the other can do anything +in the matter. + +That does not relieve man of the duty of labouring assiduously at his +moral development, but it does relieve him of responsibility for the +result of his efforts. On one point the sociological, the biological and +the theological moralists agree: they all bow down humbly before Grace. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +MORALITY AND PROGRESS + + +I have fully investigated in another book ("_Der Sinn der Geschichte_") +the problem of progress in all its details. I therefore refer the reader +to that for all particulars, and will here give only a summary of the +main points. + +Progress implies motion from one point to another. This simple concept +is supplemented by others, some clear and some dim, which group +themselves round it: the conception that the point towards which motion +is directed signifies something better and more desirable than the one +from which the motion takes place, and the assumption that the motion is +due to an impulse, either inherent in the moving object or complex of +objects and an essential part of it, or else impressed upon it by +outside forces; further, that the impulse connotes a conscious image of +the goal arrived at, recognition of its higher worth and the desire for +greater perfection. + +All these ideas, which are concomitants of the concept of progress, are +childish anthropomorphism when applied to the universe. To define +progress as motion from a worse point to a better one implies the +existence of a scale whereby value may be measured. Now values are +clearly determined and graded as far as human beings or any similar +creatures are concerned. Worse or better means to man less or more +pleasant, useful, pleasing; progress, therefore, is a development to a +condition which man considers more suitable and useful for him and feels +to be more harmonious and pleasanter. The universe, from this +standpoint, would make progress to prepare itself for the appearance of +man, to become more intelligible, habitable and comfortable for man, to +please and delight him. Whether it obeys its own natural disposition or +a higher intelligence, a god, in carrying out this work, in either case +it would realize progress to serve mankind. But if this ceases to exist, +there is no point in characterizing a development as progress in the +sense of amelioration, beautification and perfection. One would then +have no right to describe, for instance, the solar system with its +planets as indicating progress from the original condition of nebula, +because the latter in itself, apart from man and the conditions of his +existence, is not better or worse, not more beautiful or uglier, not +more perfect or more defective than the former; the original nebula and +the solar system are equally the result of the play of the same cosmic +forces, and the dynamic formula of the one is the same as that of the +other. But Reason rejects as nonsensical any view which declares man to +be the aim of the universe, which puts all the work of the universe at +his service, and conceives it as a huge machine functioning for his +advantage. + +For reasons of formal logic, too, the idea of progress in the universe +is unthinkable. The understanding cannot conceive of the universe as +other than eternal. Now in eternity all progress, that is, all motion +from a point of departure, must have reached its goal eternities ago, +however slow the motion, however distant the goal. Eternity and progress +are two concepts which logically exclude one another. + +In the universe there can be no progress in the sense of ascent, of +motion from a worse to a better thing; the only thing in the universe, +in Nature, which is comprehensible to the understanding and which +experience, derived from sense perceptions, can establish, is evolution, +an eternal, equable motion always on the same level; and human standards +of value are not applicable to its regular, successive stages. One state +is merged without a break in another, the simple becomes more manifold +until a maximum of complexity is reached; thereupon what is intricate +gradually falls to pieces, and the complicated is dissolved and returns +to the simple; then, when this point is attained, the same course begins +again, and so on for all eternity. Thus evolution in the universe is an +endless succession of cyclic movements from the simple to the intricate +and back to the simple; with a constant alternation from one point of +each single circle to the other; with the most extreme, crushing +uniformity in the totality of all cycles; with absolutely equal dignity +of all the phases of the endless course as they develop one from the +other; with a synchronism, inconceivable to man, of all forms of +evolution in numberless circles revolving side by side within the +infinite whole of the universe. + +But the concept of progress, which cannot be derived from the processes +in the universe and has no sense when applied to them, becomes a +reasonable one as soon as its validity is limited to the evolution of +humanity. Here we no longer deal with conceptions of eternity and +infinity. It is a question of temporal and spacial phenomena. The +existence of man had a beginning. No doubt it will have an end. It +appeared on earth latest at the commencement of the Quaternary +geological period, but more probably towards the end of the Tertiary +period. It must necessarily disappear when the earth, owing to cold and +evaporation, becomes incapable of supporting life, a state of affairs +which, according to our present knowledge of natural laws, must +inevitably come to pass. A few million years are allotted to it in which +to fulfil its destiny, certainly a short span of time compared with the +eternity of the universe, but compared with the duration of individual +and national life, with personal destinies and historical occurrences, +an immeasurably vast prospect. Within the limits of its genesis, its +being and its disappearance, it is in a constant state of evolution. It +is impossible to deny this. Comparisons between the skulls found among +remains of the paleolithic age and those of our times, between the state +of the undeveloped tribes of central Africa and Australia and that of +the peoples of Europe and America, between the beginnings of human +speech and the present-day languages, between the thought, knowledge and +abilities of former generations and ours--all these prove this +incontrovertibly. + +The purpose of this evolution is unmistakable. It is directed towards an +ever closer, ever subtler adaptation to the unalterable conditions +which are imposed on men by Nature, and which they must make the best of +if they are not to perish. And it is synonymous with progress; that is +to say, not only with change, simple motion from one point to another, +but with amelioration and improvement. + +Here we may apply standards of value. The aim and object of evolution, +which we know and desire, supply us with them. Here we may judge and +appraise anthropomorphically. Not only may we do so, but we must, for it +is a question of matters which concern mankind alone. All evolution of +mankind, corporal and intellectual, the enlargement of the brain case so +as to accommodate a larger brain; the development of the muscles of the +larynx, palate and hand, and the accurate co-ordination of their +movements, which things make clearer and more emphatic speech possible +and render the hands defter; the acquisition, interpretation and storing +up of experiences leading to discoveries and inventions, all are +directed to the same end: to provide men with more reliable weapons in +the struggle for existence; to defend them from the dangers surrounding +them, the destructive forces of Nature; to render their life more +secure, longer and richer; to save them from fatigue and suffering; to +give them pleasurable emotions and possibilities of happiness. And as we +have a clear idea of the object of our evolution, as we desire this +object and continually seek to find new means whereby to reach it, we +are absolutely justified in calling every movement that brings us nearer +to the aim we have in view, and aspire to reach, a progressive step, +and in calling every stage of evolution which realizes a biggish part of +the object desired an amelioration, an improvement, an ascent. + +The total amount of progress which has secured to mankind its +development we sum up in the concept of civilization. The latter, +however, is still far removed from ideal perfection. What we know is +infinitesimally small compared with the tremendous bulk of the unknown, +perhaps the unknowable, which greets our view on all sides. Our +technical achievements often leave us in the lurch and indicate no way +out of many difficulties. In the human being who knows and can do +something, too much still remains of the stupid, helpless, untamed, +primitive beast. + +Nevertheless, what has been achieved is of value, and it is childish to +depreciate it. Paradoxical minds, like J. J. Rousseau and his +parrot-like imitators, may deny the use of all civilization and declare +that the so-called state of nature, the ignorance and helplessness of +undeveloped man amid all too mighty Nature, is preferable. That is an +intellectual joke which is not very amusing. We have not vanquished +death, but we have prolonged life, as the mortality statistics prove. We +cannot cure all diseases; crowded dwellings in great cities, the nature +and intensity of our occupations--civilization, in short--bring diseases +from which we should probably not suffer if we were savages; but the +cave-dwellers, too, were subject to illnesses, and our antisepsis and +hygiene effectually prevent many and grave bodily ills. Division of +labour makes the individual dependent on the whole economic organism; +it makes it easier for the favoured few to exploit the many and to be +parasites at their expense, but nevertheless the individual can more +easily satisfy his needs than if, being completely free and independent, +he alone had to provide all the objects he requires. The speed and +facility with which the exchange of goods is effected, thanks to ever +new and ever more excellent means of communication, often give rise to +artificial wants; cheap travel occasions useless restlessness, but the +emancipation of the individual from the place of his birth, the +conversion of the whole globe into one single economic domain, of which +every part with its own particular superabundance of men and products +supplies the lack of the same in other parts, has at least this +invaluable advantage, that it makes man more independent of local +hazards and makes the earth more habitable for him. Many things provided +by civilization are obtainable only by the rich, and the spectacle of +the luxury of these favoured mortals makes the lot of the poor harder to +bear, but the possibility of working one's way up into the ranks of the +fortunate is a mighty spur to strong characters, and gives rise to +efforts which are profitable to many. All the great technical +achievements of civilization can certainly not bring happiness either to +the individual or to the community, because happiness is a spiritual +state which does not depend on bodily satisfactions and, though it may +be troubled by material conditions, can never be created by them; but +the moments of happiness which the individual experiences derive an +extraordinary intensity from the instruments of civilization which +surround and serve us. + +Certainly civilization has its bad points, and it requires no great +cleverness to discover them, to point them out and to exaggerate them. +Certainly many of its most boasted, supposed benefits are not really a +blessing, but either merely imaginary or else unimportant--little, +superfluous things which may be pleasant, but lacking which we can live +without great deprivation, and for which we undoubtedly pay far too +dearly. But, on the whole, it is a mighty achievement of man's +struggling intellect, an invaluable improvement of the lot of man, and +if anyone denies this he forfeits any claim to serious refutation. +Rousseau's state of nature may be a very pleasant change for a summer +holiday, but every man of sound common sense would decline it as a +permanent abode. + +We may therefore freely concede the fact of progress in civilization in +so far as the latter implies greater safety, facility, order and +equability of life, deeper and more widely diffused knowledge and more +perfect adaptation of man to the natural conditions in which he finds +himself. For it is no reservation to note in the course of evolution +both individual deviations from the path which leads to the goal of +civilization, the amelioration of the constitution of mankind, and +occasional relapses into bygone barbarisms. To make use of Gumplowicz's +expression, it is not an acrochronic and acrotopic illusion (that is, a +form of self-deception which consists in thinking the time when one +lives and the place where one lives the best of all times and the most +wonderful of all places) if we place the present far above all past +ages and declare our civilization to be incomparably richer and more +perfect than anything that has preceded it. The _laudator acti_, the +cross-grained Nestor who praises the past at the expense of the present, +the enthusiast for "the good old times," is a figure that has always +been familiar. But it proves nothing. This tender love of the past is +not the outcome of objective comparison and consideration, but an +impulse of subjective psychology. It is simply the emotion and longing +which fill an old man's heart when he looks back on his youth. He +remembers the pleasurable emotions which once accompanied all his +impressions and which are now unknown to his worn-out organism, and he +thinks the world was better because he found more joy in it. The aged +man is convinced that in his youth the sky was bluer, the rose more +odorous, the women more beautiful than now, but an impartial observer +would pityingly shake his head at this. + +But can the progress, which cannot reasonably be denied in civilization, +also be traced in Morality? Philosophers who are by no means negligible +have roundly replied in the negative. Buckle declares uncompromisingly +that the only progress possible to man is intellectual, and by this he +means that mankind grows in knowledge, foresight and clarity of thought, +but not at the same time in Morality, which, according to him, differs +from the intellect and understanding and is not included in them. +Buckle's unfavourable judgment has been turned into a formula which has +often been repeated. Scientifically, technically, we progress; morally +we stand still or slip back; the two orders of development move neither +in the same direction nor with the same speed. That is a view that is +widely held. Fr. Bouillier comes to the same conclusion as Buckle, +though from different considerations. He asserts that "a savage who +obeys his conscience, however ignorant this may be, can be as virtuous +as a Socrates or an Aristides; one can even go so far as to defend the +view that social progress instead of strengthening individual morality +weakens it, for society, in proportion as it is better ordered, saves +the individual the trouble of a great many virtuous actions." + +However, there are other moralists who take the opposite view. +Shaftesbury cannot imagine a moral system in which there is no place for +the idea of constant progress, of continuous improvement. The great +Frenchmen of the eighteenth century are convinced of the moral rise of +humanity. "The mass of mankind," says Turgot, "advances constantly +towards an ever-growing perfection," and elsewhere: "Men taught by +experience grow in ever greater measure and in a better sense humane." +Condorcet defends no less emphatically the view that the faculty of +growing more perfect is inherent in man. This is a case of pessimism and +optimism which have their roots less in reasonable thought than in +temperament. A worn-out, weary individual, or generation, looks back and +spends the time in futile yearning and melancholy visions of the past; +but a sturdy generation, full of life, and conscious of it, looks +forward, and planning, inventing, and determined to realize its creative +ideas, it conjures up the image of the future. Pessimism regrets and +groans; optimism hopes and promises. The former, like Ovid, thinks the +Golden Age is in the past, the latter, like the fathers of the great +Revolution, looks for it in the future. In neither case do they reach +conclusions as a result of observation and logical thought, rather they +invent reasons afterwards for their conclusions, as they do +interpretations of their observations. But he who regards life neither +with bitterness nor with pride, and tries to understand it objectively, +will come to the opinion that Morality too has its fair share in the +progress of civilization. + +Theological thought interprets moral perfection differently from +scientific thought. According to the former it is independent of +intellectual development and purely a matter of faith. God is the ideal +of Morality, belief in Him the necessary condition for a moral life. +Through its fall mankind withdrew from God and was left a prey to +Immorality; original sin perpetually burdened it; by redemption and +grace it has been purified from this inborn stain, led back to God and +once more rendered capable of Morality. For mankind only one kind of +progress in Morality was possible, and this took place, not gradually +and step by step, but with one sudden swift advance, by which it +immediately attained the highest degree of moral perfection possible, +and that was when the true faith was revealed to it. Before the +revelation mankind did not know real Morality, only its dim shadow, only +a vague yearning for it; by the revelation at one blow it was in full +possession of Morality, and now it is the business of every individual, +whether he will draw near to the divine example by pious efforts or +ruthlessly withdraw from it. Since the glad tidings of faith were +announced to humanity there can be no question of moral progress for +mankind as a whole; it has become a personal matter which everyone has +to deal with himself. Criticism of this dogmatism is superfluous. It is +quite enough to place it before the reader. + +It is quite comprehensible, too, that those whose views permit them to +talk with Bouillier of a savage who obeys his conscience should deny +moral progress. They assume that a savage has a conscience, that +conscience is an element of human nature, that it is a quality or a +capacity like sensation or memory, that it is born with man like his +limbs and organs. In that case it might well be asserted that subjective +Morality has made no progress in historic and perhaps even in +prehistoric times, and that actually a "savage who obeys his conscience +can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or an Aristides." + +It would hardly be possible to give a concrete proof of the contrary; if +for no other reason because for a long time there have been no savages +in the strict sense of the word anywhere on earth. By savages we mean +human beings in their primitive, zoological condition who have developed +solely according to the biological forms of the species and under the +influence of surrounding Nature and have taken over nothing of an +intellectual character from the group to which they belong. All savages +of whom we know form societies which for the most part are not even +loosely, but firmly, knit together, with laws that may seem nonsensical +and barbaric to us, but are none the less binding with clearly defined +duties which they impose on every member, with sanctions whose cruelty +supersedes that of any punishment permitted by civilization. A man who +is a member of a society, no matter how primitive it may be, may +certainly have a conscience, but the point is that he is not a savage, +but the contrary of a savage, namely: a social being who has received an +education from his society, who is bound to conform to its habits, +customs and views, and who in all his actions must consider its opinion. +But these conditions, as I have shown, produce a conscience, the +representative of society in the consciousness of the individual. +Conscience is no innate feature of man uninfluenced by society, it is +not a product of Nature, it is the result of education; he who possesses +a conscience is no savage, but a person formed by discipline and +subservient to it; conscience is the fruit of civilization, of a certain +civilization; in itself it represents progress compared with the +primitive state of man. Consequently it is an objectionable +contradiction to talk of conscience and at the same time deny moral +progress. + +It is peculiarly arbitrary, too, to think that a savage, if he had a +conscience, could obey it to the same extent, that is, be just as +virtuous, as a Socrates or an Aristides. This would contradict all the +observations and experience from which I have derived the doctrine that +conscience works by means of inhibition, and that Morality and Virtue +from the biological point of view are inhibition. For inhibition is +developed by practice and use. Except in cases of morbid disturbance it +develops simultaneously with the understanding which manipulates it and +demands efficiency from it. There can be no two opinions about the fact +that the understanding and the faculty of inhibition in living beings +have developed progressively. There is no need to adduce any proof that +the frog is intellectually superior to the zoospore, and man to the +frog, and that as we ascend the scale of organisms we find their +reactions to stimuli are increasingly subject to individual +modification, and that there is a gradual transition from the original, +purely mechanical tropism to differentiated reflex action, which, +however, is still beyond the control of the will, and finally to +resistances which suppress every externally visible reply on the part of +the organism to the impression it has received. + +In the course of this development the faculty of inhibition grows +stronger and more efficient and obeys the behests of the understanding +more and more swiftly, surely and reliably; it can reach a pitch of +invincibility against which all the revolts of instinct, all the storms +of passion, are powerless. + +In the savage, or rather in man at a low stage of civilization, the +power of inhibition is far from having reached such perfect development. +It is not very robust, works defectively and often fails. Little +civilized man, if he has a conscience, cannot even with the best +intentions always obey it punctually. His instinct is stronger than his +insight. He is not master of his impulses; rather it is they that master +him. All who have described tribes of low civilization have observed +that their reactions resemble reflex movements and that they lack +self-control. Moral conduct, that is, control of their selfishness and +consideration for their fellow men, is difficult for them if it demands +effort, sacrifice and painful renunciation. However, we need not trouble +to go to the negroes of the Congo or the inhabitants of the Solomon +Islands to observe the inefficiency of the power of inhibition. We need +only look around us. We shall find enough instances among ourselves. The +uneducated, the badly educated and abnormal people on whom teaching and +example make no impression cannot follow the precepts of Morality, +although they know them. To express it as the Roman poet does, they know +the better and approve it, but they have a longing for the worse. So it +is wrong to say that a savage can be just as virtuous as a Socrates or +an Aristides. He could not, even if he would. He would lack the organic +means: a sufficiently trained intelligence to point out his moral duty, +a sufficiently developed faculty of inhibition to follow the admonition +of his intelligence. Bouillier's objection to moral progress will not +hold water. The Romantics who have invented the fairy tale of the noble +savage and who declare in Seume's words: "See, we savages are better men +after all," are out of touch with reality. Like civilization, and +simultaneously with civilization, Morality progresses towards +improvement, towards perfection. + +The Kantian moralist, like the theologian, is forbidden by the logic of +his system to admit the possibility of moral progress. If the moral law +is categorical, that is, unlimited by any special purpose, if it exists +within us, eternal and immutable as the stars above us, we should be +hard put to it to say how this unalterable block, placed in our souls we +know not how or by whom, could receive an impetus to progressive +development, or in what way this development could be carried out. That +which is categorical is absolute, and the concept of progress in the +absolute, as in the infinite and the eternal, has no sense. But whoever +regards Morality from the biological and sociological point of view is +forced to assert its progress, just as the dogmatic mystic, who believes +in the categorical imperative, is forced to deny it. + +Let us recapitulate the fundamental concepts. Regarded biologically +Morality is Inhibition, the development of which is of the greatest +importance to the individual, as it enables him not to waste the living +force of his cell plasm and of his organs in sterile reflex movements, +but to store it up and hold it ready for useful purposes. The stronger +his power of inhibition the better he is armed for the struggle for +existence, and the better he is armed the more efficient he is. Denial +of the progressive development of Inhibition implies a denial that +modern man can maintain himself with more ease and security against +Nature and hostile or injurious natural phenomena, and that he is more +successful in competition with other men than his predecessors on earth. +But this latter denial is obviously nonsense. The only individuals who +do not take part in progressive development are the degenerates. They +are organically inferior, their faculty of inhibition is defective or +altogether lacking, they are slaves of impulses which their will and +intelligence have no means of controlling, they are the outcome of +morbidly arrested or retrograde development, they are the victims and +refuse of a civilization too intensive, too exhausting and wearing for +some men, and they are destined to fall out of the ranks of a race +moving majestically forward and to lie helplessly by the roadside. + +From the sociological point of view Morality is the bond which unites +the individuals in a community, the foundation upon which alone society +can be built up and maintained. For it implies a victory over self, +consideration for one's neighbour, recognition of his rights, concession +of his claims, even when valued possessions must unwillingly be given up +and painful renunciation of attainable satisfaction is required. This is +neighbourly kindness and the charity of the Bible, Hutcheson's and +Hume's benevolence, Adam Smith's sympathy and Herbert Spencer's +altruism; it is the necessary condition on which alone individuals can +live peaceably together and helpfully assist each other to make life +easier. If most or all individuals lack it, we have Hobbes's war of all +against all; then man is as a wolf to other men, and each one is +condemned to the state of a beast roaming in loneliness. If a few, a +minority, lack it, then the majority will not tolerate them in its +midst, but will expel them from the community as a dangerous nuisance +and deprive them of the privilege of mutual aid and of the advantage of +joint responsibility. + +The species of man, like every other species of organism and like every +individual, wants to live. It can only achieve this by adapting itself +to existing natural conditions. The more suitable and perfect the +adaptation the more easily and securely it lives. Under the present +conditions of the universe and the earth a solitary human individual +could not manage to exist, let alone develop into an intelligent being. +The form his adaptation to circumstances has taken is that of union in +an organized community. For the existence of society and the adjustment +of the individual in it is the indispensable condition for the life of +the species as well as of the individual. Society can only continue to +exist if individuals learn to consider one another and practise +benevolence towards each other. Society therefore created Morality and +inculcated it in all its members, because it was its first need, the +essential condition which rendered its existence possible, just as the +species created society, because it could only continue to live as an +organized society. + +Thus Morality with the strictest logical necessity has its place in the +totality of efforts which human beings had to make, and still have to +make, in order to preserve life, to make it sufficiently profound and to +enrich it with satisfactions, that is, with pleasurable emotions of +every kind, so that they may continue to have the will and the eager +desire to maintain their existence by effort and struggle; in short, in +order to make life seem worth living, even at the cost of constant toil +and moil. Without society it is impossible for the individual to exist; +without Morality it is impossible for society to exist; the instinct of +self-preservation furnishes society with habits and rules governing the +mutual relations of its members and with institutions for economizing +force; all these together we call civilization. The development and +improvement of civilization is obvious; it is proved by the fact that it +draws nearer and nearer to its goal, namely, the establishment of +satisfactory relations between individuals and groups, and the +attainment of a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of individual +effort. But it would be incomprehensible if Morality, the essential +condition for the existence of society which creates civilization, +should have no part in the indisputable, because easily demonstrable, +progress of the latter. + +Morality occupies such a large place in civilization that the mistaken +view has arisen among many moral philosophers that it is the aim of +civilization and has no aim other than itself. Closer investigation +shows this to be an error, a reversal of the true relation. Morality is +no aim, certainly no aim to itself, it is a means to an end, the most +important, most indispensable means to the one end, to bring about +civilization, to maintain and refine it, and adapt it more and more to +its task. But the task of civilization, as I have shown, is to preserve, +facilitate and enrich the life of the individual and the species. +Morality therefore is the most important form in which the instinct of +self-preservation in the species is manifested, and to deny progress to +it implies the assumption that the species does not possess the impulse +to preserve and beautify its existence, that its instinct of +self-preservation flags, that it does not recognize its aim and is +ignorant of the path leading to its goal. This assumption, however, is +contradicted by all, and supported by none, of the phenomena observable +in the life of the species--the absolute increase of the population of +the earth, the prolongation of individual life and of the age of +efficiency, the combating of every kind of harmful thing. + +The steadfast self-control of civilized man compared with the +unreliability of the savage, who appears capricious and unaccountable +because he freely obeys every impulse, proves the progressive +development of the faculty of inhibition in the individual organism. The +order and definite organization of modern society, the rule of law, +men's equality before the law, the guarantee of freedom and respect for +the person, all these compared with the state of nations in earlier +times (actually anarchy under a mantle of tyranny and the unlimited +power of a few mighty ones over the helpless masses) prove the +progressive development of civilization in the social organism. But +logically the progressive development of Morality itself must correspond +to the progressive development of its instrument, inhibition, and of its +product, civilization. + +The conclusion to which we are forced by theoretical considerations is +fully endorsed by observation of actual life. It is sufficient to +indicate broad facts to one who denies moral progress. Slavery, which +Aristotle thought a law of Nature, which Christianity tolerated, which +modern states, such as England, France, the United States and Brazil, +defended and protected by law, was everywhere abolished some years ago. +The objection is raised that modern hired labour is merely slavery of +the proletariat under another name, that the exploitation of workmen by +employers is a hypocritical continuation of serfdom. But that is +sophistry. The hired labourer is not bound to his contract. He can break +it. "Yes, at the price of starvation." That used to be the case, but +nowadays organized working men are no longer at the mercy of powerful +capital, and therein lies progress. They are in a position to make +conditions and not seldom to force their acceptance. They have the right +to strike, to move from place to place, to form unions. The community +has recognized the duty of mitigating, at least to some extent, the +evils to which faulty economic organization exposes the workman. It has +instituted accident and health insurance, old age pensions, and, in some +places, assistance for those who are out of work through no fault of +their own. All this is still very defective, but these are hopeful +beginnings, all the same, and, above all, it shows the awakening of a +social conscience that earlier ages did not know. + +Justice is administered more and more humanely, that is, morally. It is +a century since legal torture was abolished. Society is ashamed to get +at the truth easily by torturing a suspect who after all may be +innocent. The condemned man is no longer branded or mutilated; he +suffers no corporal ill-treatment of which the results can never be +obliterated. Capital punishment is still a blot on the honour of +civilization. But for more than a century now, since the time of +Beccaria, it has been violently opposed and has already been abolished +in some states; the others will no doubt have to follow suit within a +short time. Consider that in England at the beginning of the nineteenth +century a thief was hanged if he had stolen a thing of no more value +than the rope that was to hang him, and even children of fourteen years +were condemned to this fate. To-day the judge pronounces sentence of +death, even where it is still legal, with grave misgivings and +searchings of conscience, and the execution, formerly a public +spectacle, is carried out more or less secretly, because the conviction +is gradually ripening in society that by the cold-blooded killing of a +man it is perpetrating a crime which it must keep as secret as possible. +The sentence is now almost everywhere deferred, and thus the conviction +becomes a very emphatic warning which points out the path of repentance, +of conversion and improvement to the guilty man, and leaves him the +possibility of becoming a decent human being again. Special courts for +children mitigate the stern penal code and modify it according to the +needs of unripe, youthful characters. Imprisonment for debt is a +half-forgotten thing of the past and regarded more or less as a joke. +What these changes have in common is that they one and all indicate a +deepening of the community's feeling of duty and responsibility towards +the individual, greater respect for persons on the part of the law, an +increase of the will to resist the first impulse of anger, revenge and +mercilessness. These tendencies, however, are the very essence of +Morality. + +I forbear to adduce as a proof of progress that the Inquisition no +longer rules and nowhere burns its victims. For actually there is no +greater toleration of those who hold other opinions than there was +formerly. Religious toleration is explained by the fact that the +people's consciousness no longer attaches such enormous importance to +religion as in past centuries. But political, aesthetic and philosophical +antagonisms arouse as much bloodthirsty rage to-day as did formerly +heresy in religion, and opponents would unhesitatingly apply torture and +the stake to one another if the great mass of the people would develop +sufficiently enthusiastic zeal for their views to allow their raging +fanaticism to have recourse to violence, as it once permitted +domineering religious orthodoxy to do. + +Other aspects of civilization, not so essential, are hardly less +encouraging than the developments on which I have hitherto dwelt. +Drunkenness, formerly an almost universal vice, is on the decrease. +Among the educated classes it is only met with exceptionally, and is +recognized as a morbid aberration; among the lower classes it +continually grows less. The statistics of the savings banks show an +ever-growing determination to save. The masses who used to rejoice in +dirt now manifest an increasingly vigorous desire for a cleanliness that +demands soap and baths. This indicates control of impulse, of the +inclination for alcoholic drinks and the tendency to squander, and an +increase of self-respect which recognizes dirt to be humiliating. These +are activities of the moral feelings, their material activities. + +If, in spite of these material proofs of the progress of Morality in all +social functions and in many individual habits, serious-minded men still +maintain that it stands still or even that it shows retrogression +compared with former times, this view, which is undoubtedly a mistaken +one, is due to wrong interpretation of facts. + +Bouillier's remark that "social progress instead of increasing +individual Morality weakens it, because society, in proportion as it is +better organized, saves the individual the trouble of a number of +virtuous actions" has a perfectly correct point of departure. Many tasks +of neighbourly kindness and humane joint responsibility which used to be +left to the inclination, the free choice and the noble zeal of +individuals, and could be carried out or neglected by them, are now +methodically fulfilled by the community. Saint Martin no longer needs to +divide his cloak to give half to a poor shivering man. The public +charity commission gives him winter clothes if he cannot afford to buy +any. No knights are needed to protect innocence, weakness and humility +from oppressors. The oppressed appeal successfully to the police, the +court of justice, or, by writing to the papers, to public opinion. There +is no need for Knights Templar or Knights of St. John to care for +strangers and tend the sick. Inns and public hospitals are at their +disposal. To-day there would be neither occasion nor reason for the +miracle of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, who against the orders of her hard +husband took to the starving bread which was turned into roses. The poor +are regularly fed in municipal and communal kitchens. Individual deeds +of mercy are less necessary now than formerly, when, if they occurred, +they were the outcome of exceptionally noble and devout sympathy and +heroic self-sacrifice. + +One is therefore inclined to believe that men are less capable of such +deeds than they were in the past. But that is doing them a grave +injustice. Dr. Barnardo, who opened a home for the little waifs and +strays of the East End of London, is not inferior to St. Vincent de Paul +who adopted and brought up forsaken children. John Brown who suffered a +martyr's death by hanging because he attempted with arms to liberate the +negro slaves of the Southern States, Henry Dumont who devoted the +efforts of a lifetime to founding the Red Cross to help those wounded in +war, Emile Zola who sacrificed his fortune, his reputation as an author, +his personal safety, and suffered persecution, calumny, exile, a +shameful condemnation in court, and violent threats to his life in order +to get justice for Captain Dreyfus who had been wrongfully accused--all +these can well compare with the saints in the Golden Legend. Virtue +exists potentially in as many cases as formerly, probably in more; and +it is actively practised whenever and wherever it is appealed to. + +Another result of the long evolution of civilization and Morality is the +development of an ethical instinct in all except abnormal, degenerate +individuals, which causes men to act morally in nearly all situations +without conscious reflection, choice or effort. The individual who is +ethically well grounded, in whom moral conduct has become an organized +reflex action, does what is right without any conscious effort, and +therefore does not in so doing evoke any idea of merit either in +himself or in witnesses. But to do right habitually, carelessly and +almost without thought, as one breathes and eats, easily makes one +unjust in one's judgments. The battle between Reason and blind instinct, +between the Will and refractory Impulse, the victory of the lofty +principle, of spirituality over what is irrational and materialistic, +which give us the illusion that free humanity is superior to the +fatality of cosmic forces, have something so elevated and beautiful +about them that we are disappointed if they are absent, and practical +Morality without this dramatic setting does not appear to be real +Morality. + +Nevertheless we must not give way to this aesthetic point of view. We +must always remember that Morality has a biological and sociological aim +and must soberly admit that it is all the better if this aim is realized +without in every single case depending on uncertain individual +decisions. It would be an ideal state of affairs if in a society there +were such clear knowledge of all its vital necessities, and this had +been so inculcated in all its members, that their harmonious life +together and their co-operation for the common weal would never more be +troubled by the revolt of ruthless individual selfishness against the +love of one's neighbour and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the +community. The ideal of Morality would be attained, but the concept of +Merit would be transferred from the individual to the community. +Superficial observation might object to finding in individuals no +victorious struggle against resistance, hence no virtue, and might +bemoan the stagnation, nay, the retrogression, of Morality. But whoever +views matters as a whole would have to admit that it would imply the +greatest progress in virtue if the latter from being an individual merit +had become an attribute of the community. I am far from maintaining that +we have reached this ideal state; but evolution tends unmistakably in +this direction; and this is one of the reasons why Morality may appear +to make no progress. + +The very rise of the community to a higher stage of Morality may be a +fresh cause of error concerning the progress of Morality. The work of +the strongest and most clear-headed thinkers for many thousand years, +who have bequeathed as a legacy to the community their lifelong labours +for the amelioration of the lot of mankind, has developed in us an ideal +of active and passive Morality which is always present, even to the mind +of the weak or bad man who cannot or will not live up to it. By this +ideal, which is that of the community and which we bear within us, we +involuntarily judge real life as we observe it, without applying the +necessary corrections. We necessarily note a discrepancy between theory +and practice, which appears to us to be not mere inadequacy but a +contradiction of principles, not a quantitative, but a qualitative +difference, and thus he who is not forewarned easily becomes doubtful, +pessimistic, and bitterly contemptuous of mankind. + +This is the theme with which light literature unweariedly deals. Novels +and the drama constantly show us types: "Pillars of society" and other +worthy men, who pretend to be honourable, who are full of good +principles, preach unctuously and condemn others with pious indignation, +but who themselves in all situations behave with the most horrible +selfishness and are sinks of iniquity. The creators of these rogues +professing virtue, of these secret sinners, think they are mightily +superior; they think they know mankind, that they are deceived by no one +and can see deep down into men's souls; they call their method realism, +and they look down with the greatest contempt upon poets who depict +good, unselfish, noble, in short, moral characters, and call them +optimists, flirts, distillers of rosewater, who are either too silly or +too dishonest to see the truth or to confess it. If realism happens to +be the fashion, the public believes these men who depict what is ugly +and disgusting, admires them, is impressed by them, and scorns the +idealists who have a better opinion of mankind. + +However, realism is onesided and exaggerated, and therefore just as far +from the truth as enthusiastic idealism. It picks out certain +characteristics of human nature, generalizes from them and neglects the +others, thereby libelling mankind. The same people who in their flat, +insipid daily life unhesitatingly indulge their poor little vanities, +their naive selfishness, their childish jealousy, their secret +sensuality and their moral cowardice because it is of no consequence, +because it alters nothing in the general constitution of society, +because the community takes good care that moral principles shall be +maintained, these same people can, on great occasions, which, however, +seldom occur, reveal virtues which they themselves never suspected and +which we gaze at in blank astonishment with reverent awe. The +hypocritical Philistines of realistic literature, rotten at the core, +when the _Titanic_ sank, during the plague in Manchuria, at the +earthquake of Messina, in the mine disaster at Courrieres, and on Arctic +and Antarctic expeditions, proved to be heroes who came very near to the +theatrical ideal of Morality, if they did not quite reach it. If one +takes the valet's point of view and observes man in his dressing-gown +and slippers when he does not feel called upon to pull himself together, +one may very well form a poor opinion of him. But if one considers the +actions of the community and dwells on the loftiest deeds of +individuals, one will no longer believe that the Morality of the present +time is inferior to that of any other age. + +There is one phenomenon, though, which seems to prove that those who +deny moral progress are in the right, and that is war. This is indeed +the triumph of the beast in mankind, a bestial trampling under foot of +civilization, its principles, methods and aims, and it might be adduced +as a crushing proof of the stagnation or retrogression of Morality that +to this very day its horrors can devastate the earth, as they did +hundreds and thousands of years ago, only to an incomparably greater +extent, more cruelly and more thoroughly. But this, too, would be a +false conclusion. It is certain that the men who take it upon themselves +freely, purposely and intentionally to make war are monsters; their +action is a crime that cannot be expiated. Unhesitatingly they have +recourse to massacre, robbery, fire and all other horrors in order to +satisfy their devilish self-seeking which desires the fulfilment of +their ambition, that is, of their self-love and vanity, which covets +riches, increase of power, a ruling position and its privileges. These +they pursue either for themselves or for a family or caste, and they +pretend that they wish to defend their country from its enemies, to +acquire new boundaries for it affording better protection than the old, +to promote the development of the nation by getting fresh territory, to +spread its civilization and secure a glorious future for it. + +Nations, however, which allow their rulers to plunge them into a war of +aggression may be foolish and clumsy, but they need not be immoral. They +are made drunk with phrases which appeal to their noblest feelings, +which their government and its intellectual bailiffs pour out to them in +overflowing measure; they believe the shameless lies which are told them +boastfully; and this is undoubtedly a lamentable, mental weakness which +drew from Dante the bitter cry: "Often one hears the people in their +intoxication cry: 'Long live our death! Down with our life!'" But having +simply accepted these preliminary ideas the people act with such +Morality as one cannot forbear to admire. In a grand flight they rise +superior to all thought of self, raise their feeling of joint +responsibility to the pitch of heroism and martyrdom, and gladly +sacrifice to their duty to their neighbour and to the community their +possessions, their comfort, their health and their lives. That is very +great virtue whose subjective merit is no whit diminished by the fact +that it is manifested in a cause that is objectively unjust. And this +virtue on the part of nations which have been misled was never so +widespread or so real as now. The attitude of mercenaries who served the +highest bidder, the lack of ideals among the soldiers who followed +foreign conquerors at whose command they tyrannized over nations who did +not concern them at all, the cynicism of the leaders who unhesitatingly +went over to the enemy and fought against their own country and people, +these are things that are not to be found nowadays and are almost +unthinkable. No Napoleon of to-day could lead the men of Wuertemberg and +Bavaria to Spain and Russia, nor could an Elector of Hesse sell recruits +to England for the conquest of North America; no Louis XIV could induce +a Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to fight his battles against German +adversaries, no Constable of Bourbon ally himself with Spain against his +native France. Leonidas, once admired and praised as an exception, is +to-day the rule. "The guards who die but do not yield" are to be found +on every battlefield nowadays. + +In modern warfare a higher, more perfect Morality of the masses obtains +than was the case in the past. That war itself is the most immoral thing +does not detract from the moral worth of those who are led and misled. +The masses lack insight and judgment, their understanding is not +sufficiently developed to realize the bestiality of the rulers who put +them to such evil use; but the way they suppress their own feelings, the +way their will controls their impulses, their social discipline, in +short, their Morality, is admirable. Moreover, the conscience of mankind +revolts more and more against the wickedness of war, and the best men of +the time are striving to bring the mutual relations of nations, like +those of individuals, within the jurisdiction of Law and Morality. +Morality will doubtless at no distant date do away with war, as it has +abolished human sacrifice, slavery, blood feuds, head hunting and +cannibalism. + +No phenomenon of individual worthlessness observed within a narrow +sphere can detract from the fact that the community constantly improves. +A pessimistic view of the development of Morality has no justification. +Progress of civilization implies progress of Morality, its most +important instrument in the work of adapting the race to the immutable +conditions of its existence. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY + + +The concept of Morality includes an idea of compulsion, of coercion. A +voice says to man: "You must!" or "You may not!" It commands him to do, +or to refrain from doing, something. If he obeys, all is well; but if he +takes no notice of it, pays no heed to it, the question arises: "What +now? Will the voice rest content with crying in the wilderness? Will it +not mind speaking to deaf ears? Will the refractory individual not +suffer for disregarding it, or has it means to enforce obedience, and +what are these means?" + +The answer to this question depends on what view one holds as to the +nature of this monitory, warning, commanding voice. Whoever believes in +Kant's categorical imperative must admit that this word of command is +denuded of all power of coercion and must absolutely rely on the good +will of the individual in whose soul it makes itself heard. According to +Kant the moral law aims at no extraneous result, no utility. It is its +own aim and object. But its own aim is fulfilled as soon as the +categorical imperative has spoken, whether the individual acts in +accordance with it or not. It has therefore in principle no sanction. + +True, Kant contradicts himself, for after having sternly excluded from +his doctrine all utility as the end of Morality, all trace of feeling +from moral action, he smuggles blissful happiness in by a back door; the +result of submission to the moral law and its dutiful fulfilment, he +declares, will be bliss. Bliss, however you interpret it, is a +pleasurable emotion. Whether you act morally with the declared intention +of attaining the pleasurable emotion of bliss, or whether this +pleasurable emotion comes of its own accord as an undesired reward when +you have acted morally merely from a feeling of duty, without a thought +for such a result, without a wish to attain it, it makes no difference +to the fact that moral action actually meets with a reward. Kant does +not openly promise this, but with a wink he whispers in your ear that +there is a prospect of it. + +Nor does it alter the further fact that Kant, having contemptuously +expelled Eudaemonism from his system, reinstates it with full honours. +Once it has been conceded that moral conduct makes man blissful, in +other words gives him a reward, the categorical imperative also has a +sanction, albeit a very insufficient one. He who fulfils the moral law +attains bliss; that is a spur whether you admit it or not. But he who +does not fulfil it loses this advantage, otherwise, however, nothing +happens to him. The sanction, therefore, is onesided. A reward is +offered for the fulfilment of the moral law, but there is no punishment +for its non-fulfilment. For it is no penalty if bliss is withheld from +him who has no conception of it and no desire for it. No matter, then, +if the moral law be eternal and immutable as the stars above us, if it +be categorical, if it be fulfilled, not owing to a conception of its +effect, not from liking for this effect, but from an inner necessity, it +ceases to be a living force for mankind or to have any practical +significance; for the single thread which unites it with human +feelings--the whispered, vague promise of bliss--is too thin. Feeling +which has no knowledge of this misty bliss, and therefore no yearning +for it, is uninfluenced by the categorical moral law. Reason is not +necessarily convinced that it is right and valid. The moral law abides +like the stars with which it is arbitrarily compared, itself a star in +airless space, pursuing its course regardless of humanity, having no +relation to it or connexion with it; regard for or disregard of the +moral law makes no perceptible difference, and it ceases to have any but +a kind of astronomical interest for mankind, a purely theoretical +interest for purposes of scientific observation and calculation, and is +in no way applicable to the feelings, thoughts and actions of men. + +Theological Morality adopts a widely different point of view. Its logic +compels it to provide the most effective sanctions. God is the lawgiver +of Morality. He prescribes with dictatorial omniscience what is good, +what is bad, what should be practised and what avoided. Obedience earns +a glorious reward, revolt entails the most terrible punishment. Reward +and punishment are eternal, or may in certain circumstances be so, and +this, by the way, is cruelty which ill accords with the universal +goodness ascribed to God. For human understanding will never be +persuaded, will never be able to grasp, that a sinner, however grave +and numerous his sins committed during the brief period of the fleeting +life of man, can ever deserve an eternity of the most fearful +punishment. The lack of proportion between the deed and the penalty is +so monstrous that it is felt to be the gravest injustice, against which +both Reason and feeling revolt. Imagination can conceive hell fire that +lasts a certain time and has an aim, like life with its praiseworthy and +wicked deeds, but it boggles at the idea of a hell from which there is +no escape and the agonies of which are endless. + +The Old Testament conceives the sanctions of the moral law enunciated by +God in a thoroughly realistic manner. Fulfil the commandment "that thy +days may be long in the land." If you disobey, the curse of the Lord +will be on you and you will be pursued by His anger unto the fourth +generation. Christianity considered it dubious to make this life the +scene of reward and punishment. It is imprudent to let divine justice +rule here below, so to say, in public, before an audience and +representatives of the Press who attentively follow the proceedings, +watch all its details, and can judge whether the verdict is put into +execution. Prudence demands that the trial should take place in the next +world, where it is protected from annoying curiosity. Mocking onlookers +cannot then observe that it is only in the dramas of noble-minded poets +that in the last act vice is inevitably punished and virtue rewarded, +while in real life only too often merit starves, suffers humiliation and +poverty and altogether leads a miserable existence, while sin flourishes +in an objectionable manner and to the very end revels in all the good +things of this earth. However, the religious moralists painted such a +vivid and arresting picture of what awaits the sinners in the next +world, that if men had not been obdurate in their disbelief they must +have shudderingly realized it, as if it actually happened in this world. +Words from the pulpit admonishing men to obey God's law under penalty of +most terrible punishment were greatly emphasized by the paintings and +sculpture over the altars and the church doors, where all the tortures +of hell were depicted by great artists who put all their imagination and +all their genius into the work. + +As innumerable people have testified, these representations were taken +so literally, not only by the simple-minded masses but also by the more +highly educated, that they were haunted by them, waking and sleeping, +and imagined that in their own flesh they felt the torture of flames, of +boiling pitch, of the prick of the pitchfork as the devil turned them on +the grid, of the teeth with which the spirits of hell tore their flesh +from their bones. The fear of hell poisoned many a life up till quite +recently, especially in Scotland, and kept people in a constant state of +agitation and anguish which occasionally rose to mad despair. It is +remarkable that only punishment was so impressively held up to man's +view, but not reward. Pictures of paradise are much less rich and varied +than those of hell, and its joys are peculiarly modest. The inventive +powers of painters, sculptors, and poets did not rise above a +beautifully illuminated hall where the blessed are ranged around God's +throne and with folded hands sing hymns of praise to Him, while angels +play an accompaniment on trumpets and fiddles. A prayer meeting, a choir +and a concert of music, that is all that Christian eschatology holds out +as an eternal reward to virtue. It redounds to its credit that it +assumes a sufficiently modest taste among the good to make them long for +these joys and find infinite happiness in them. + +Islam does not count on such moderation. The joys of paradise that it +promises are so crudely sensual that they may well arouse lust in coarse +natures, and can counterbalance the fear of hell fire. The ideas of the +reward of merit in the hereafter held by the northern nations, Germans +and Scandinavians, are just as low and coarse. For the Mohamedans +paradise is a harem; for the worshippers of Odin it is a pot-house where +there are free drinks and a jolly brawl to end up with. Heroes who fall +in battle--they knew no virtues but a warlike spirit and contempt of +death--enter Valhalla, where they partake of the everlasting orgies of +the gods, drink unlimited quantities of mead and beer, and fight for +them to their heart's content without taking any harm. The North +American Indians hope, after leading a model life, to be gathered to the +Great Spirit, and in the happy hunting grounds of heaven evermore to +kill abundant game. Only Buddhism comforts the virtuous man with finer +and more spiritual hopes. From out his world of weariness and pessimism +it opens up the prospect of Nirvana to him, that is, of the end of all +feeling, which after all can only be painful, and of all thought, which +after all is only melancholy and despair, and of the volatilization of +the personality, the only real release; while it condemns the sinner to +the worst punishment, continued existence in ever new incarnations. + +These are indeed extraordinarily vigorous sanctions, which, though they +fail to have any effect on the unbeliever, make a very deep impression +on the believer, and are well fitted to determine his actions. But they +imply a debasement of the motives for leading a moral life, which are no +longer the outcome of insight and a convinced desire for good, but the +result of fear and avidity, a speculation for profit, a prudent flight +from danger. The practice of morality becomes a safe investment for the +father of a family who hopes to find his savings augmented by interest +in the hereafter, and the avoidance of vice becomes a schoolboy's fear +of punishment. Nevertheless, the view is widely held by superficial, +practical men that these imaginary and deceptive sanctions of Morality +cannot be dispensed with, that only the fear of hell can keep the masses +from giving themselves up to every form of vice and crime, that only the +promise of paradise is capable of inducing them to act unselfishly and +make sacrifices, and that all bonds of discipline would be loosened if +they ceased to believe in a last judgment and an hereafter with its +rewards and punishments. + +This whole system of sanctions in a future life is a transcendental +projection (according with primitive, childlike thought) of immanent +practices and forms in the positive administration of justice which are +transferred to a class of actions that successfully evade it. +Traditional and customary Law, as well as written Law, puts its whole +emphasis on sanctions; it partakes itself of the nature of a sanction. +Without sanctions it has no meaning. It is not kindly counsel, nor +fatherly admonition, nor wise advice, it is a stern command, it is +coercion, and this arouses only scorn if it is not armed with the means +to make itself a reality to which the unwilling must also submit, +because they cannot help themselves. There is no law, there can be no +law, which is not supplemented by arrangements that make it binding for +everyone. + +In the British House of Commons it has been customary for many hundred +years to designate members as the representatives of their particular +constituency. Only if a member commits a grave offence against the rules +of the House does he run the risk of the Speaker's calling him by name, +but this case has not arisen within the memory of man. A disrespectful +Irish member of Parliament, urged by perverse curiosity, asked the +Speaker one day: "What would happen if you called me by my name?" The +Speaker thought for a short time and then answered with impressive +gravity: "I have no idea, but it must be something terrible." Such a +mysterious threat of an unknown catastrophe may suffice for a picked +assembly whose members would no doubt maintain order and observe all the +rules of parliamentary decency, even if they were not held in check by +the fear of some dark danger. It would not be sufficient by a long way +to guarantee the rule of Law in a society which includes individuals of +the most varied disposition, mind development, education and strength of +impulse. + +Positive Law, as I have shown, presents a very simplified excerpt of +Morality for the use of coarser natures. It is a summary of the minimum +of self-denial, consideration for one's fellow men, and the feeling of +joint responsibility, the observance of which the community must +pitilessly demand from all its members if it is to continue to exist and +not fall back within a very short time into the state of Hobbes's war of +all against all. The necessity of self-preservation makes it a duty for +the community to provide for the case that one of its members refuses to +accept the minimum of discipline and to recognize the claims of another +personality. The community prevents this revolt, which would frustrate +its aim and endanger its existence, by employing physical force to break +all resistance to the Law which it must, for the common weal, impose on +all its members. That is an extraneous compulsion that certainly has +something brutal and unworthy of man about it and may well arouse +discomfort in more highly developed minds. It would undoubtedly be more +dignified and better if there were no need for the handcuffs of the +police, for prison cells and executioners, if man's own insight and the +admonition of his conscience were enough to constrain everyone to +respect the Law, that is, to practise a minimum of Morality. + +But the community cannot wait until this stage of moral development has +been generally attained. It refuses to entrust its existence to the +spiritual purity of all its members. On principle it disregards +processes in the consciousness of the individual--I have cited in an +earlier chapter the few exceptions to this rule: investigation as to +premeditation, accountability, freedom from undue influence--and keeps +to actions which alone it judges. It declares itself incompetent to +pronounce sentence upon a "storm inside a skull," to quote Victor Hugo. +Its sphere is that of obvious facts. Not until subjective impulses and +decisions are manifested in outward form does it intervene with methods +of the same order, with outward coercion. The sanctions of its law are +material, are punishments and fines. It hits the wrongdoer over the head +and on his hands and forcibly empties his pockets. To look into his soul +and set matters to rights there is a task undertaken much later by +law-givers. It was only after they had remembered that the source of law +is Morality and that its ultimate aim is not the bare attainment of a +state of mutual respect for one another's rights, but the education of +the community to a universal condition of self-discipline, consideration +and neighbourly love, that the law-givers made a point not only of +requiting the bad man's misdeeds, but also of trying to elevate him +morally. + +At different times, at different stages of civilization, and according +to the current views of the universe, society has interpreted in +different ways the punishment it inflicts and which it carries out by +forcible means, so as to ensure respect for its laws. Its original +character is that of revenge for an offence. The wrongdoer has offended +the community, it attacks him furiously and breaks every bone in his +body just as an angry individual would do in his first access of +indignation. That is Draco's penal code. That is the law of literal +requital. The special characteristic of this sanction is its violence +and lack of moderation. It does not trouble to find the right proportion +between punishment and crime. It does not carefully and fairly weigh the +force of its blows. The club falls with a frightful crash, but its +dynamical effect is not calculated beforehand in kilogrammetres. "The +stab of a knife is not measured," as an Italian proverb says. Thus +conceived, punishment has something primitive about it, something +intolerably barbarous. The community does the very things it was +created, by Morality and Law, to prevent; it exercises the right of the +stronger against the challenger; it promotes war, not that of all +against all, but of all against one, and its punishment is an act of +war. + +In a strongly religious society which lives in the idea of immediate +community with the deity, every transgression of the law is felt to be a +sin against the gods, and the punishment becomes an expiation offered to +them so as to avert their dangerous anger from the commonwealth. In the +administration of justice dim religious ideas are mingled, punishment is +tinged with a veneer of civilization, the culprit is, so to speak, +offered as a sacrifice to the gods. This supernatural view was prolonged +by the Inquisition, at least for a certain class of offences, until +almost modern times. + +When society awakens to the consciousness that its bond of union is +Morality, and that its most important task is to educate its members in +Morality, it introduces the concept of betterment into its penal system. +It wants not only to punish the wrongdoer sharply but also to transform +him inwardly and purify him. He is to feel that the punishment is not +only a requital but a mental benefit. In the Austrian army, until +corporal punishment was abolished, it was a rule that the soldier, after +being flogged, should approach the officer on duty and say, as he +saluted, "I thank you for the kind punishment." That is the attitude +that society, when it gives a moralizing tendency to its penal laws, +wishes the person who has been punished to attain. In this there is much +pleasing self-deception not unmixed with a good deal of hypocrisy. Penal +law offers the wrongdoer but little scope for improvement. + +All misdemeanours and crimes flow from three sources: ignorance, passion +and innate, anti-social self-seeking. Ignorance is the main, almost the +exclusive cause of wrongdoing among young criminals who have been badly +brought up or neglected, who have never had anything but bad examples +before them, and who cannot distinguish between good and evil. Society +may hope to improve these by right treatment; it must not punish, it +must educate them. Men who commit crimes from passion are those who +possess a consciousness of Morality and a conscience, who know quite +well what is right and what wrong, but have not sufficient strength of +character, that is, not an adequately developed power of inhibition, to +resist an opportunity, a temptation, a turmoil of their instincts. To +want to improve them is senseless, for they are not bad; they are weak, +or at any rate not strong enough. What they need is a strengthening of +their character, of their faculty of inhibition, and to achieve this is +beyond the power of society. All it can do is to humiliate the guilty +party by publicly exposing his lapse and by condemning him, and then +grant a delay of the execution of the sentence. In so doing it says to +him: "You have acted basely and ought to be ashamed of yourself, now go +and do not do it again." If the warning is unavailing and he relapses, +then the earlier sentence, as well as the new one, is executed. Fear of +this is added to his motives for acting honestly, and may possibly +strengthen his resistance to the onslaught of his evil instincts. But +his good conduct will always be at stake in the struggle between his +power of inhibition and his instincts, and the stronger of the two will +always carry the day. And finally, upon the man whose organic +disposition makes him anti-social, upon Lombroso's born criminal, +society can have no educative effect whatever. It is a hopeless case. +Society can render him harmless, it cannot alter him. Consideration for +his neighbour will never find a place in his consciousness. He will +never learn to resist his impulses and desires. His spiritual +insensibility makes him indifferent to the sufferings of others. +Incapable of continuous and equable effort, he will always want to prey +on society by begging, deceiving, stealing and robbing. He has no +conscience and does not hear the voice of society in his mind. He knows +nothing of good and evil, which are both empty phrases for him, words +without any meaning, and he is convinced that he acts rightly every time +he seeks to satisfy his appetites. In his case it is love's labour lost +to try and give a moral meaning to the sanctions of the law. Punishment +is not directed against the soul of the born criminal, only against his +body. It overwhelms him, fetters him and makes him either for the time +being, or permanently, harmless; but his organic tendency continues to +sway him, and whenever he recovers his liberty he is the same as before +he was punished. + +The Mystics give to punishment the character of fatherly and chastening +discipline by which the sinner expiates his crime and is purged of the +sin; thus it purifies him and leads him back to the state of innocence; +a kind of anticipatory hell fire which enables him to enter paradise. In +"Gorgias" Plato says explicitly: "He who is punished is liberated from +the evil of his soul." And the Apostle Paul teaches us: "Punishment is +ordained for the betterment of man." Criminal anthropology recognizes +that it is useless to expect this moralizing and redeeming effect from +punishment. Lombroso altogether rejects punishment as a means of +discipline and expiation, and before him Bentham and J. S. Mill, and +simultaneously with him and after him Fouillee, Guyau and Maudsley +adopted the same view. According to them the sanction of criminal law, +which extends and completes it and ensures its efficacy, can have no +other aim than the law itself, and this aim is to defend society against +its active enemies, if possible by converting them, if necessary by +forcible subjugation. + +In a book which is full of interest, but whose value is considerably +diminished by a strong admixture of mysticism, "Esquisse d'une morale +sans obligation ni sanction," M. Guyau goes much farther than the +criminal anthropologists and sociological opponents of punishment, and +expresses the somewhat paradoxical view that "the real sanction seems to +imply complete freedom from punishment for the crime committed, as +punishment for any action that has been accomplished is useless." It is +quite correct that no punishment under the sun can undo what has been +done. But it is not feasible for that reason to dispense with all +punishment for misdeeds and to call this systematic freedom from +punishment a sanction. Guyau overlooks the fact that the punishment is +directed not to the crime but the perpetrator. It certainly alters +nothing in a past transgression of the law, and that is not its object, +but it may possibly have the effect of preventing fresh misdeeds on the +part of the same wrongdoer or of others, and that would justify it. + +If society must renounce the idea of improving the misdemeanant, +especially the man whose organic tendencies make him a criminal and who +is the most dangerous and commits the most numerous and worst crimes, it +nevertheless assumes that it makes an impression on morally doubtful +characters by punishing misdemeanours and crimes, that it warns them and +prevents them from erring. That is the theory of intimidation, which +also has many opponents. It will hardly be denied that psychologically +it is well founded. The conception of the evil consequences for himself +that his action may entail strengthens the impulsive man's power of +inhibition when he is about to do wrong, and perhaps enables him to +overcome his immoral instinct. Only it is difficult to measure the force +which the thought of punishment adds to the effort of inhibition. This +force does not come into question at all with the man who sins +occasionally from passion. The flood of his impulses sweeps away all +barriers which reason may oppose, and their power of resistance is not +materially increased by the fear of consequences, because the mental +horizon is completely darkened at the time of the storm and no prevision +is possible. The criminal from organic causes exercises no inhibition. +He knows that society condemns his actions, but he is convinced of his +personal right to carry them out, and fears no punishment, because he +hopes to escape it, and tries his utmost by means of planning, prudence +and self-control to outwit society. The theory of intimidation is not +applicable to these two classes of criminals, and they constitute a +large proportion of the army of wrongdoers against which society has to +defend itself by force. + +But there remains the great number of mediocre natures whose sympathy +with their fellow men, the emotional foundation of the subjective +impulse to Morality, is only slightly developed, who have a superficial +veneer of Morality, who act honourably out of prudence, but who would +feel no repugnance towards perpetrating profitable misdeeds, if they +were certain that they would incur no risk. These insipid characters +whose emotional temperature oscillates round about freezing point and +who are incapable of great excitement, of passion, would see no reason +to resist any temptation, to disregard any favourable opportunity, if +the penal code, the judge and the policeman did not warn them to be +careful. For this kind of man the penal sanction is really a useful and +perhaps an indispensable means of prevention, and it has been thought +out and developed by the community with a view to such people. + +Not content with theoretical considerations, people have also appealed +to practical experience to test the theory of intimidation. In some +countries capital punishment was either legally abolished or tacitly +suppressed, the judges either refraining from pronouncing the sentence +on the prisoner or the head of the state, when appealed to, commuting it +by an act of pardon to loss of liberty. Statistics seemed to show that +serious crimes meriting the death penalty increased, and capital +punishment was reintroduced or the practice of systematic pardons was +abandoned, with the alleged result that the worst crimes grew less +numerous. I express myself doubtfully, because I do not think that the +statistics were sufficiently conclusive. They embraced too small a +number of cases and too short a period of time. It cannot be +conclusively proved that the abolition of the death penalty resulted in +an increase of capital crimes; but it is certain that crimes were never +more frequent or more horrible than in the times when criminal justice +was most cruel and made use of the most terrible sanctions. Up to the +dawn of modern times legal torture was administered, at every street +corner there were gallows, the poor wretch under sentence of death was +pinched with red-hot pincers, the executioner tore the flesh from his +bones, poured boiling pitch over him, cut out his tongue, hacked off his +hands, broke him on the wheel or burnt him alive; executions were a sort +of public entertainment or popular holiday, and efforts were made to +attract as many spectators as possible; every inhabitant of one of the +larger towns was familiar from childhood with the horrid spectacle of +mutilated human bodies writhing in torture, and there rang in his ears +the echo of the screams of pain and of the shrill death rattle of the +victims. But these impressions were so far from intimidating the gaping +crowd that many hurried from the place of execution to commit the most +execrable crimes, the punishment of which they had just witnessed; +consequently punishments have gradually been made less cruel, and the +public is excluded from executions, which clearly indicates a decisive +rejection of the theory of intimidation. + +The truth is that the severity of the punishment has no effect upon the +frequency or the savagery of crimes. The criminality of a community +depends on the value and emphasis of the moral education which it +bestows upon the rising generation. It can prevent its members, at any +rate the average, normal type, from developing into criminals. But the +fear of punishment has no deterrent effect upon those whose criminal +impulses have not been subjugated by social discipline. The severity of +the punishment does not contribute anything to the defence of society. +It only proves that the lawgiver and the criminal judges are on the +lowest level of civilization which corresponds to a widespread and +barbarous criminality, and that their modes of thought and feeling are +horribly like those of the criminals whom they sentence to torture, the +gallows, and the wheel. + +Positive law aims at defending society, and tries to attain its end by +punishing transgressions. It provides no reward for conscientious +obedience. The law has no honours to bestow on blamelessness and virtue. +Society felt the want of this and made attempts to encourage honourable +conduct by conferring distinctions, just as it tries to intimidate vice +by punishing crime. These attempts were not particularly happy. The +bestowal of titles and orders is no recognition of virtue, but a means +adopted by governments to ensure devotion to power. An arrangement was +made in some places to honour model citizens in public and crown them +with laurels, but it soon came to grief owing to indifference and +mockery. A private individual wanted to fill this gap in social +institutions. The Count of Montyon, a son of the eighteenth century, +whose philosophy he had imbibed, instituted the prizes for virtue which +are distributed annually by the French Academy. They are bestowed on +modest integrity in humble circumstances which has manifested a sense of +duty, neighbourly love and self-sacrifice. This friend of man has had +few imitators, and that is understandable. Sound common sense realizes +that rewards like the Montyon prizes for virtue do not with the +infallibility of a natural law fall to the lot of merit, but are nearly +always adjudicated to the prizewinner by chance, by recommendation, and +by all sorts of influences that have nothing to do with virtue; and it +seems unjust that among equal claims some should be satisfied while +others, the great majority, are not. It would be vain to contend that +one virtue which goes empty-handed is not unfairly treated when another +gets a benefit on which it has not counted, and that in a moral +character, such as alone would be eligible for a prize for virtue, there +is no room for envy. That would be the moral of the Gospel concerning +the labourers who came at the eleventh hour, which has met with +opposition from others besides the contemporaries of Jesus. + +On the whole, the community has never felt called upon to solve the +moral problem of the reward of virtue. It has always contented itself +with the punishment of vice and has given its law threatening, but not +encouraging, sanctions. This attitude shows that it has always had a +clear conception of its moral task. In its positive law it never +included anything but that minimum of Morality that was absolutely +necessary to its existence, and without which it would dissolve into its +original elements, its order would be replaced by chaos, by the war of +all against all. It must insist on the observance of this minimum; it +must use forcible means to achieve this. But it does not feel justified +in demanding more than this minimum, because more is not claimed by its +instinct of self-preservation. A surplus of virtue over and above the +amount necessary for the life of society is desirable; but it does not +lie within the scope of the natural functions of the community, +determined by its organic necessities, to achieve this by compulsion +and the provision of legal rewards as an encouragement. It is the +business of the individual to work at his own moral improvement, and the +community cannot interfere directly in the matter. It is enough that it +encourage this work indirectly by bestowing care on the culture and +education of the individual, by making it the duty of its public schools +to inculcate good principles, and by creating a public opinion which +surrounds all the activities of higher morality with admiration, respect +and gratitude. The moral education of the individual is not an object +with which laws are concerned; it is the result of the constant, vital +influence of the community, and can have no sanction other than the +increase of well-being of every single person within the social union, +which is a natural consequence of raising the moral level of the +community. + +The penal sanctions of positive law have a gross materialism about them +corresponding to the definite concreteness of the actions with which +positive law deals. The broad field of Morality, however, which is +outside the narrow sphere of the laws, has no room for sanctions of a +material nature. The penalties prescribed by law are directed to actions +which, if they became general, would in a very short space of time +result in the dissolution of society. The community essays by forcible +measures to prevent this kind of action, and these measures more or less +fulfil their aim, whether you interpret their use on the theory of +discipline, of expiation and purification by repentance, of improvement +and moral re-birth, or of intimidation. All these theories were invented +later on, after the community had been convinced by experience that +punishment, if it does not entirely prevent crime, at least limits it +sufficiently to make the continued existence of society possible, and +more or less to guarantee to its members the safety of their life, their +property and their personal dignity. + +Against transgressions of the moral law, the results of which are not +immediately obvious, such as ruthless selfishness, blunted sympathy and +lack of active neighbourly kindness, the community does not proceed with +forcible measures; firstly, because it cannot establish their existence +convincingly and hence cannot try them in a court of justice, and +secondly, because it does not recognize them as constituting an +immediate danger to its existence. Now, as the sanctions set up by +society are not applicable to these transgressions, an individual whose +mind does not penetrate very far into matters is disquieted, for +accustomed as he is to the spectacle of the steady justice of the state, +he seeks the counterpart in the forms of this justice in the world of +Morality, and does not discover it at the first glance. He asks +anxiously where are the police, the public prosecutor, the examining +magistrate, the criminal court, the prison for sins against Morality, +and invents them, since he cannot find them. He transfers to the +hereafter the sanctions of Morality, which are not visible on earth. He +cannot make up his mind to renounce them, because the fact that sins +against the moral law go unpunished would seem to him to indicate +intolerable anarchy, comparable with the state of a community where +everyone could murder, rob and mutilate to his heart's content without +incurring the risk of the least personal unpleasantness. + +In the sphere of the moral law punishment certainly does not follow hot +foot upon crime, but it nevertheless does not fail to appear, and +becomes visible when the eye is capable of embracing long periods of +time and of tracing intricate connexions. The sanctions of the moral law +differ from those of criminal law, but they are not wanting. They are of +a subjective and of an objective character. The subjective punishment +for a sin against the laws of Morality is remorse. It is inflicted by +the inner judge who rules in the consciousness of the individual, by +conscience, and penetrates to the very deepest depths of a person's mind +which no outward punishment imposed by the community ever reaches. It is +not only religious and political martyrs who endure torture and death +with proud serenity, conscious that they are morally immeasurably +superior to their executioners; even common criminals remain perfectly +unmoved by their punishment and regret only that they are weaker than +their captors. Prisons are full of convicts who look upon their +condition as that of prisoners of war. They have been worsted in their +battle with law. That seems to them a misfortune but not a disgrace. +They are neither humble nor contrite, but revengeful. They are +determined and ready to take up the duel with society as soon as an +opportunity offers and they may hope to do so with some prospect of +success. + +But remorse is an unresisting submission to the verdict of conscience +and the consciousness of one's own unworthiness. It is the recognition +of the justice of the sentence which brands one, and the constant, +anguished realization that one's personality has been deservedly +humiliated, dishonoured and deprived of its rights. As a spiritual +process, remorse causes the sinner continually to relive the misdeed he +committed, while at the same time he is fully conscious of its atrocity. +The ego becomes dual, one part active, the other watching and judging. +The one again and again perpetrates its misdeed, the other looks on +horrified and suffers agonies. It is one long torture and disgrace of +self. Remorse condemns the sinner perpetually to repeat in his mind the +deed which fills him with horror of himself. This state of mind is the +nearest approach to eternal damnation in hell. There is only one means +of temporary escape: to extinguish memory by narcotics. That is why +remorse not seldom leads to drunkenness. Shakespeare, with a poet's +infallible insight into the soul, has grasped and depicted the nature of +remorse, the uninterrupted, torturing presence of the misdeed in man's +consciousness. Lady Macbeth sees her hands ever stained with the blood +of the innocent royal victim whom she herself did not even murder, and +she complains that "all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this +little hand." Leontes, in the "Winter's Tale," on hearing of Hermione's +alleged death, of which he believes himself guilty, mourns: + + "Once a day I'll visit + The chapel where they lie; and tears shed there + Shall be my recreation: so long as nature + Will bear up with this exercise, so long + I daily vow to use it." + +Remorse is the most effective of the subjective sanctions of Morality; +it is almost too effective, for owing to its duration and severity the +punishment easily grows disproportionate to the crime. But it has one +great disadvantage, it affects only better natures who have an active +conscience and spiritual delicacy, while it spares the wicked who have +no conscience, who perpetrate their misdeeds contentedly, without a +qualm, and regret them only when they are discovered and lead to +unpleasantness. + +Nevertheless, the actions of these hardened sinners do not go quite +unpunished. Moral law always takes vengeance for transgressions, but not +directly on the evildoer. In addition to the subjective, it also has an +objective sanction; when it is violated retribution falls on the +community. The masses have a dim idea that every evil deed meets with +requital and express it in the proverb that "Though the mills of God +grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small." They have noticed that +the curse of an evil deed never fails to come, and is consummated with +crushing force, only that it does not happen at once. It seems +objectionably unjust that the culprit should not feel the effect of his +crime, whilst others do who were not born when it was perpetrated. But +the concept of retributory justice is as little applicable to the +far-reaching relations in the life of humanity as to the actions of the +laws of Nature, for instance gravity or electricity. Morality is, as I +have shown, an adaptation of the species to the natural conditions in +which it is forced to live. Morality, therefore, has an aim, which is to +make social life in common possible for the individual, this life alone +enabling him to maintain his existence amid the conditions obtaining on +this earth. The discipline which Morality imposes on the individual +leaves him a certain amount of free play. If he escapes from this +discipline to a certain small extent which does not threaten the +existence of society, this revolt has no ill effect upon the life of the +species, the latter has no grounds for punishing him, and the only, yet +sufficient, sanction of the loose Morality of an undisciplined +individual lies in the fact that he is more or less inferior to the most +perfect type of the species, and visibly bears the stamp of his +worthlessness in his character, his bearing and his mode of thought. But +if in his disregard of Morality the individual goes so far as to +frustrate its aim and endanger the existence of society, then the latter +must either find ways and means of rendering the culprit harmless or +else it overlooks his misdeed and thereby becomes an accessory and +justly suffers the evils consequent upon a deterioration of Morals which +is universally tolerated. + +The means by which a society must defend the Morality necessary to its +existence can only be spiritual, for it is not a question of breaches of +the positive law which result in the intervention of justice and of +material penalties, but of a disregard of the commands of Morality, +which are not drawn up in paragraphs. Public opinion suffices to rouse +the individual who despises the Moral law to an uncomfortable sense of +his unworthiness; if he finds himself treated with contempt and sees +disapproval and dislike in everyone's face, either he will be spurred +to an effort to overcome his immoral instincts or his self-respect will +suffer from the universal contempt with which he meets; and this +suffering is his punishment, therefore it is the sanction of a breach of +the Moral law. + +If public opinion does not keep careful and severe watch, such as may be +termed the function of a higher moral police, then inevitably the moral +tone of the whole society will sink to a lower level, and this will +result in making life harder and more difficult, and in certain +circumstances may lead to dissolution. This is not a theoretical +assumption, but an observed fact, a lesson taught by history. It tells +us of epochs in which the licentiousness of individuals, favoured by a +society too dull, weak and indifferent to stand up against bad examples, +succeeded in corrupting all classes. Such a period is exemplified by the +fall of Rome. Common natures indulged and wallowed in every vice, the +better ones felt such disgust for a life without nobility and virtue +that they discarded it, and the community lost all excuse of joint +responsibility and became so loosely knit together that it was incapable +of common effort or sacrifice, and collapsed miserably at the first +onslaught of a foreign aggressor tempted by its depravity. + +The disintegration of a society, the sanction of its sins against +Morality, is a slow process. It does not often take place +catastrophically, with theatrical effect, so that even a dull observer +can grasp the connexion between cause and effect. But whoever +investigates closely will realize that all evils from which society +suffers, which make life more bitter and harder for its members, are +ultimately due to defective Morality. What are class struggles with +their consequent hostilities between groups of the same nation, their +coercion and damage, but manifestations of self-seeking, lack of +consideration and injustice, that is, of Immorality? Would they be +possible if members of all classes, capitalists and workers, +agriculturists and townsmen, rulers and subjects were inspired by +neighbourly kindness, understanding and appreciation of the needs, +pretensions and feelings of their opponents, and by a spirit of +self-sacrifice? Would the decay of character, the arbitrariness and +arrogance of the mighty, the cowardly slavishness of the masses, with +the resultant rottenness of public affairs, be conceivable if +individuals were conscious of their dignity and their duty to themselves +and the community, and if they had the strength and the determination to +overcome their fear of men? Could wars of aggression bring ruin upon +mankind if leading personalities did not give way to the desire for +outward honours, to the hunger for power, to avarice, to the itch of +vanity, that is to the lowest forms of selfishness, and if the masses +out of stupidity or fear of a mental effort, and out of dread for their +personal responsibility did not allow themselves to be misused for base +purposes? + +Thus we find insufficient Morality in individuals, or the complete lack +of it, to be at the root of all evils with which the community is +afflicted, and we are justified in conceiving war, party quarrels, +collisions between groups representing different interests, revolutions, +in fact, all tragedies of life in societies with the suffering and +destruction they entail, as the penal sanction of sins against Morality. +Morality, which was created to facilitate life for the individual or to +make it at all possible for him, is no longer able to fulfil its aim, +and the society finds itself by its own fault back in the condition of +misery and fear, owing to which its instinct of self-preservation +originally forced it to make the effort of setting up the Moral law. +Even the most merciless zealot cannot wish for a more efficacious and +painful punishment of Immorality. + +But Morality does not possess the sanction of punishment alone, it has +also the more amiable one of reward. We have seen that by strengthening +the faculty of inhibition it raises the individual to a higher level of +organic development, that by the inculcation of consideration and +neighbourly kindness it affords the community the possibility of working +together peacefully and profitably. But it does more than that. It gives +life an incomparably higher value than when it is dull and uniform, by +enriching and beautifying it with heroism and with ideals. + +Ideals and heroism are direct creations of Morality and inconceivable +without it. The ideal is a conception of perfection; the thought of +attaining it is accompanied by the most pleasurable emotions, and the +individual regards it as his life's task to strive for it. The struggle +for the ideal implies effort at all times, renunciation of the ease of a +thoughtless and care-free existence, an endless series of difficult +victories over appetites clamouring for immediate satisfaction, that is, +constant work in the service of Morality. He who has an ideal is never +troubled by the problem of the meaning of life. His life has an aim and +significance. He knows whither he goes, why he lives, for what he works. +He knows nothing of the doubts of the aimless wanderer, of the +discouraging consciousness of one's own uselessness, and his assurance, +his conviction that his efforts are useful and worthy come very near to +happiness. Heroism is the noblest victory of a thinking and volitional +personality over selfishness; it is altruism which rises to +self-sacrifice, the proud subjugation by Reason of the most primitive +and powerful of all instincts, that of self-preservation. It is the +highest achievement of which Morality is capable. It is never developed +for the profit of an individual, but always for that of a community, for +a thought, for an ideal. His heroic conduct raises the hero out of the +rut of his existence, liberates him from the trammels of his +individuality and enlarges this to represent a community, its longings, +its resolutions, its determination. At the moment of his heroic action +the hero lives innumerable lives, the lives of all for whom he risks his +own, and if death reaches him, it can destroy only his single person, +but cannot put an end to the dynamic activity of the community which is +included in the hero, while he is magnificently elevated far above +himself. The faculty of forming an ideal of existence and activity, and +of rising to the heights of heroism, is the royal reward of Morality +which the perfect subjection of animal instincts to the rule of human +Reason has achieved. Its punishment for those retrograde individuals who +never learn to control their instinctive reflex actions is that they are +denied the sight of the glory of the ideal, that heroism is unknown and +incomprehensible to them, that they lead their lives fettered and +imprisoned, unconscious of any task, without prospect or exaltation, as +if they dwelt in a cellar or in a dark dungeon. These are the sanctions +of Morality. It has no others, nor does it need them. + +In one passage of the book cited above Guyau makes the doubting remark: +"Who can tell us whether Morality is not ... at one and the same time a +beautiful and useful art? Perhaps it bewitches us and deceives us." Let +us assume that it is an illusion. That would not detract from its value +for mankind. Is not all our knowledge of the world, is not our whole +view of Nature an illusion? We are made conscious of the universe by its +qualities, and these qualities are conferred on it by our senses. But +all knowledge that we derive from our senses is an illusion. For the +senses do not convey reality to us, but the modifications which the +influence of reality produces in our sense organs. The universe has +neither sound nor colour nor scent. But we perceive it as sounding, +coloured and scented. These qualities we attribute to reality are +illusions of our senses, but these illusions make up all the beauty of +the world which without them would be dumb, blind and without charm for +us. + +Life for us is an unspeakably oppressive riddle. Has it an aim, and, if +so, what? We do not know. All thought only leads to the conclusion: life +is its own aim and end, we live for life's sake. And this conclusion is +no solution of the problem. Then Morality appears, and not only makes +life easier and possible, but even shows us an aim, if not for +universal, at least for individual life. That aim is the humanization of +the animal, the spiritualization of man, the exaltation and enrichment +of the individual by means of sympathy, neighbourly kindness, a sense of +joint responsibility, and the subjection of Instinct to Reason which, as +far as we know, is the noblest product of Nature. It is possible that +Morality, which hides the eerie unintelligibility of life from us, is an +illusion. Blessed be the illusion which makes life worth living. + + + Printed in England by Cassell & Company, Limited, London, E.C.4. + F17.122 + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Morals and the Evolution of Man, by +Max Simon Nordau + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN *** + +***** This file should be named 37998.txt or 37998.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/9/9/37998/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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