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diff --git a/35958-h/35958-h.htm b/35958-h/35958-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c85317 --- /dev/null +++ b/35958-h/35958-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6860 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= +"text/html; charset=utf-8"> +<title>A REVIEW OF EDWARDS’S “INQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE +WILL.”</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + body {font-family:'Bookman Old Style', 'Book Antiqua', 'Garamond'; text-align:justify; margin-left:3em; margin-right:3em} + p.pnn {margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0} + p.pn {text-indent:1.5em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0} + p.pns {text-indent:1.5em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em} + p.p2 {margin-left:7em; text-indent:-2em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0} + p.p2s {margin-left:7em; text-indent:-2em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em} + p.pt1 {text-align:center; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.5em; font-style:italic} + .sc {font-variant:small-caps; font-style:normal} + h1 {text-align:center; margin-top:1.5em; margin-bottom:1em; font-size:133%; font-weight:normal} + ol.ur {list-style-type: upper-roman} +</style> +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Review of Edwards's + +Author: Henry Tappan + +Release Date: April 25, 2011 [EBook #35958] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + + +</pre> + +<p class="pnn"><a href="#Intro">Introduction.</a></p> +<p class="pnn"><a href="#Statement">I. Statement Of Edwards’s +System.</a></p> +<p class="pnn"><a href="#Consequences">II. The Legitimate +Consequences Of This System.</a></p> +<p class="pnn"><a href="#Will">III. An Examination of the Arguments +Against a Self-Determining Will.</a></p> +<p class="pnn"><a href="#End">Conclusion.</a></p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:113%;margin-top:3.0em;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +A REVIEW OF EDWARDS’S</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:146%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +“INQUIRY</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +INTO THE</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:121%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +FREEDOM OF THE WILL.”</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +CONTAINING</p> +<ol class="ur"> +<li>STATEMENT OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</li> +<li>THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.</li> +<li>AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING +WILL.</li> +</ol> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +BY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN.</p> +<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +“I am afraid that Edwards’s book (however well meant,) has done +much harm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to +the same doctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been +generally ranked among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and +his disciples.”—<i>Dugald Stewart</i>.</p> +<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +NEW-YORK:</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +JOHN S. TAYLOR,</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +THEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER,<br> +BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL,</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +1839.</p> +<hr style="margin-top:10em;margin-bottom:5em"> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:63%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839, +by<br> +HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN,<br> +in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States, +for the<br> +Southern District of New-York.</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:63%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +G. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street.</p> +<hr style="margin-top:10em;margin-bottom:5em"> +<h1><a name="Intro" id="Intro">INTRODUCTION.</a></h1> +<p class="pnn">D<span class="sc">iscussions</span> respecting the +will, have, unhappily, been confounded with theological opinions, +and hence have led to theological controversies, where +predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally +prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental +constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate +methods of psychological investigation, and must abide the +result. If we enter the field of human consciousness in the free, +fearless, and honest spirit of Baconian observation in order to +arrive at the laws of the reason or the imagination, what should +prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened course in reference +to the will?</p> +<p class="pn">Is it because responsibility and the duties of +morality and religion are more immediately connected with the +will? This, indeed, throws solemnity around our investigations, +and warns us of caution; but, at the same time, so far from +repressing investigation, it affords the highest reason why we +should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness. Nothing +surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral obligation, +or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency of +religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us +the subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim +unbounded liberty of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at +truth. As a believer in the Bible I always anticipate that the +truths to which philosophy leads me, will harmonize with its +facts and doctrines. If in the result there should appear to be a +collision, it imposes upon me the duty of re-examining both my +philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In this way I may +in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but even gain +from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight into +both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be +removed, then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, +however, that I must either renounce the philosophical +conclusion, or remove the text.</p> +<p class="pn">If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths +were in opposition to the whole of revelation or its leading +truths, we should then evidently be placed on the alternative of +denying one or the other; but as the denial of philosophy would +be the destruction of reason, there would no longer remain in our +being any principle on which a revelation could be received. Such +a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any system to +be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that with +every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne +aloft, and their divine authority and their truth made more +manifest, have we not reason to bless the researches which have +enabled us to perceive more clearly the light from Heaven? A +system of truth does not fear, it courts philosophical scrutiny. +Its excellency will be most resplendent when it has had the most +fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken my faith in the +Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its safety +whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And +what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be +derived from it.</p> +<p class="pn">Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves +when they argue from the truths of the Bible to the truths of +their philosophy; either under the view that the last are +deducible from the former, or that they serve to account for and +confirm the former. How often is their philosophy drawn from some +other source, or handed down by old authority, and rendered +venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead +of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is +perhaps cast into the mould of the philosophy.</p> +<p class="pn">It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by +experience, that in pursuing our investigations in any particular +science we are to confine ourselves rigorously to its subjects +and methods, neither seeking nor fearing collision with any other +science. We may feel confident that ultimately science will be +found to link with science, forming a universal and harmonious +system of truth; but this can by no means form the principle of +our particular investigations. The application of this maxim is +no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds a +relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest +that in the developements of such philosophy or science, it +should be found to harmonize with the revelation; but +nevertheless this cannot be received as the principle on which we +shall aim to develope it. If there is a harmony, it must be +discovered; it cannot be invented and made.</p> +<p class="pn">The Cardinals determined upon the authority of +Scripture, as they imagined, what the science of astronomy must +be, and compelled the old man Gallileo to give the lie to his +reason; and since then, the science of geology has been +attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be limited in its +researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued her +steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, +and selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own +discoveries. And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The +memory of Gallileo and of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips +which name the name of Christ.</p> +<p class="pn">Now we ask the same independence of research in the +philosophy of the human mind, and no less with respect to the +Will than with respect to any other faculty. We wish to make this +purely a psychological question. Let us not ask what philosophy +is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to Pelagianism and +Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the former; let us +ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may present +another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the +legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with +truths revealed.</p> +<p class="pn">One thing is certain; the Bible no more professes +to be a system of formal mental philosophy, than it professes to +contain the sciences of astronomy and geology. If mental +philosophy is given there, it is given in facts of history, +individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law, and ethics; +and as thus given, must be collected into a system by observation +and philosophical criticism.</p> +<p class="pn">But observations upon these external facts could +not possibly be made independently of observations upon internal +facts—the facts of the consciousness; and the principles of +philosophical criticism can be obtained only in the same way. To +him who looks not within himself, poetry, history, law, ethics, +and the distinctions of character and conduct, would necessarily +be unintelligible. No one therefore can search the Bible for its +philosophy, who has not already read philosophy in his own being. +We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole history of +theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every author +of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both +the principles of his philosophy and their influence upon +himself. Every man who reflects and aims to explain, is +necessarily a philosopher, and has his philosophy. Instead +therefore of professing to oppose the Bible to philosophy, or +instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy solely and +directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not +discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and +that inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all +that we know and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in +a pure, truth-loving spirit.</p> +<p class="pn">I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will +is so intimately associated with great and venerable names, and +has so long worn a theological complexion, that it is well nigh +impossible to disintegrate it. The authority of great and good +men, and theological interests, even when we are disposed to be +candid, impartial, and independent, do often insensibly influence +our reasonings.</p> +<p class="pn">It is out of respect to these old associations and +prejudices, and from the wish to avoid all unnecessary +strangeness of manner in handling an old subject, and more than +all, to meet what are regarded by many as the weightiest and most +conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open this +discussion with a review of “Edwards’s Inquiry into the Freedom +of the Will.” There is no work of higher authority among those +who deny the self-determining power of the will; and none which +on this subject has called forth more general admiration for +acuteness of thought and logical subtlety. I believe there is a +prevailing impression that Edwards must be fairly met in order to +make any advance in an opposite argument. I propose no less than +this attempt, presumptuous though it may seem, yet honest and +made for truth’s sake. Truth is greater and more venerable than +the names of great and venerable men, or of great and venerable +sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a proper love +and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself alone, +neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a +collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is +my interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act +aright; and as right action is meritorious not when compelled and +accidental, but when free and made under the perception and +conviction of right principles; so also right thinking and +believing are meritorious, either in an intellectual or moral +point of view, when thinking and believing are something more +than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or Arminius, +presents the cup.</p> +<p class="pn">Facts of history or of description are legitimately +received on testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual +being can be received only on the evidence of consciousness, +unless the testimony be from God himself; and even in this case +we expect that the testimony, although it may transcend +consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal evidence of +the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this: that +although there be revelations of that which transcends +consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of +consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions +of developed reason and the revelation.</p> +<p class="pn">Now in the application of these principles, if +Edwards have given us a true psychology in relation to the will, +we have the means of knowing it. In the consciousness, and in the +consciousness alone, can a doctrine of the will be ultimately and +adequately tested. Nor must we be intimidated from making this +test by the assumption that the theory of Edwards alone sustains +moral responsibility and evangelical religion. Moral +responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and +illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has +already on its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral +responsibility and evangelical religion can derive no support +from a philosophy which they are taken first to prove.</p> +<p class="pn">But although I intend to conduct my argument +rigidly on psychological principles, I shall endeavour in the end +to show that moral responsibility is really sustained by this +exposition of the will; and that I have not, to say the least, +weakened one of the supports of evangelical religion, nor shorn +it of one of its glories.</p> +<p class="pns">The plan of my undertaking embraces the following +particulars:</p> +<p class="pn">I. A statement of Edwards’s system.</p> +<p class="pn">II. The legitimate consequences of this system.</p> +<p class="pn">III. An examination of the arguments against a +self-determining will.</p> +<p class="pn">IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an +appeal to consciousness.</p> +<p class="pn">V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral +agency and responsibility.</p> +<p class="pns">VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the +truths and precepts of the Bible.</p> +<p class="pn">The first three complete the review of Edwards, and +make up the present volume. Another volume is in the course of +preparation.</p> +<h1><a name="Statement" id="Statement">I.</a></h1> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">A +STATEMENT OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</p> +<p class="pns">E<span class="sc">dwards’s</span> System, or, in +other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is contained in part I. +of his “Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.” This part +comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in +his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore +use my best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost +clearness and fairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety +is to have Edwards perfectly understood. My quotations are made +from the edition published by S. Converse, New-York, 1829.</p> +<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. I.—C<span class= +"sc">oncerning the Nature of the Will</span>.”</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards under this title gives his definition of +the will. “<i>The will is, that by which the mind chooses +anything</i>. The faculty of the <i>will</i>, is that power, or +principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing: an act of +the <i>will</i> is the same as an act of <i>choosing</i> or +<i>choice</i>.” (p. 15.)</p> +<p class="pn">He then identifies “choosing” and “refusing:” “In +every act of refusal the mind chooses the absence of the thing +refused.” (p. 16.)</p> +<p class="pn">The will is thus <i>the faculty of choice</i>. +Choice manifests itself either in relation to one object or +several objects. Where there is but one object, its possession or +non-possession—its enjoyment or non-enjoyment—its presence or +absence, is chosen. Where there are several objects, and they are +so incompatible that the possession, enjoyment, or presence of +one, involves the refusal of the others, then choice manifests +itself in fixing upon the particular object to be retained, and +the objects to be set aside.</p> +<p class="pns">This definition is given on the ground that any +object being regarded as positive, may be contrasted with its +negative: and that therefore the refusing a negative is +equivalent to choosing a positive; and the choosing a negative, +equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa. Thus if the +presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is +negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the +absence; and to choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so +that every act of choosing involves refusing, and every act of +refusing involves choosing; in other words, they are +equivalents.</p> +<p class="pt1">Object of Will.</p> +<p class="pns">The object in respect to which the energy of +choice is manifested, inducing external action, or the action of +any other faculty of the mind, is always an <i>immediate +object</i>. Although other objects may appear desirable, that +alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of present +action—that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which I +actually think—that alone is chosen as the object of muscular +exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, +every act of choice manifests itself by producing some change or +effect in some other part of our being. “The thing next chosen or +preferred, when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to +such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion +of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it.” The same principle +applies to any mental exertion.</p> +<p class="pt1">Will and Desire.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only +distinction that can possibly be made is that of genus and +species. They are the same in <i>kind</i>. “I do not suppose that +<i>will</i> and <i>desire</i> are words of precisely the same +signification: <i>will</i> seems to be a word of a more general +signification, extending to things present and absent. +<i>Desire</i> respects something absent. But yet I cannot think +they are so entirely distinct that they can ever be properly said +to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills anything +contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his +will. The thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he +does not will a thing and desire the <i>contrary</i> in any +particular.” (p. 17.) The immediate object of will,—that object, +in respect of which choice manifests itself by producing +effects,—is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme +desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object +which appears most desirable; and the object which appears most +desirable is always the object chosen. To produce an act of +choice, therefore, we have only to awaken a preponderating +desire. Now it is plain, that desire cannot be distinguished from +passion. That which we love, we desire to be present, to possess, +to enjoy: that which we hate, we desire to be absent, or to be +affected in some way. The loving an object, and the desiring its +enjoyment, are identical: the hating it, and desiring its absence +or destruction, or any similar affection of it, are likewise +identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished, at +least in <i>kind</i>, from the emotions and passions: this will +appear abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly +identifies them: “I humbly conceive, that the affections of the +soul are not properly distinguishable from the will; as though +they were two faculties of soul.” (Revival of Religion in New +England, part I.)</p> +<p class="pns">“God has endued the soul with two faculties: one +is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or +by which it discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is +called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the +soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is in some way +inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either +is inclined <i>to them</i>, or is disinclined or averse <i>from +them</i>. This faculty is called by various names: it is +sometimes called <i>inclination</i>; and as it has respect to the +actions that are determined or governed by it, is called will. +The <i>will</i> and the <i>affections</i> of the soul are not two +faculties: the affections are not essentially distinct from the +will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and +inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and +sensibleness of exercise.” (The Nature of the Affections, part +I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the +understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and +the passions, is fully settled by the above quotation.</p> +<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. II.—<span class= +"sc">Concerning the Determination of Will</span>.”</p> +<p class="pt1">Meaning of the term.</p> +<p class="pn">“By <i>determining</i> the will, if the phrase be +used with any meaning, must be intended, <i>causing</i> that the +act of the will or choice should be thus and not otherwise; and +the will is said to be determined, when in consequence of some +action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon, +some particular object. As when we speak of the determination of +motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a +direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will +supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be +determined, there is a determiner.”</p> +<p class="pns">Now the causation of choice and the determination +of the will are here intended to be distinguished, no more than +the causation of motion and the determination of the moving body. +The cause setting a body in motion, likewise gives it a +direction; and where there are several causes, a composition of +the forces takes place, and determines both the extent and +direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the will +or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its +direction; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also +conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, +the direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is +determined. And where there are several causes acting upon the +will, there is here likewise a composition of the mental forces, +and the choice or the determination of the will takes place +accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice or volition then being an effect +must have a cause. What is this cause?</p> +<p class="pt1">Motive.</p> +<p class="pns">The cause of volition or choice is called motive. +A cause setting a body in motion is properly called the motive of +the body; hence, analogously, a cause exciting the will to choice +is called the motive of the will. By long usage the proper sense +of motive is laid aside, and it has come now to express only the +cause or reason of volition. “By <i>motive</i> I mean the whole +of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, +whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And +when I speak of the <i>strongest motive</i>, I have respect to +the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular +act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, +or of many together.” And “<i>that motive which, as it stands in +view of the mind, is the strongest, determines the will</i>.” (p. +19.) This is general, and means nothing more than—1. the cause of +volition is called motive; 2. that where there are several causes +or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3. the +cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the +cause, if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered +in their co-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive “stands +in view of the mind,” that is, it is something which the mind +knows or is sensible of.</p> +<p class="pt1">What constitutes the strength of Motive?</p> +<p class="pns">“Everything that is properly called a motive, +excitement, or inducement, to a perceiving, willing agent, has +some sort and degree of <i>tendency</i> or <i>advantage</i> to +move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of +will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call +the <i>strength</i> of the motive.” When different objects are +presented to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear +more or less “inviting.” (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once +produced, we perceive their “tendency or advantage to move or +excite the will.” It is a preference or choice anticipated, an +instantaneous perception of a quality in the object which we feel +would determine our choice, if we were called upon to make a +choice. The object is felt to be adapted to the state of the +mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are felt to +be reciprocal.</p> +<p class="pt1">What is this quality which makes up the previous +tendency?</p> +<p class="pns">“Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an +intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and +influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or +viewed <i>as good</i>; nor has it any tendency to engage the +election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such.” +Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as +the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the +previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as +the highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the +strongest motive; therefore, it follows that the “<i>will is +always as the greatest apparent good is</i>.” (p. 20.)</p> +<p class="pt1"><i>The sense in which the term</i> “<span class= +"sc">good</span>” <i>is used</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">“I use the term <i>‘good’</i> as of the same import +with <i>‘agreeable.’</i> To appear <i>good</i> to the mind, as I +use the phrase, is the same as to <i>appear agreeable</i>, or +<i>seem pleasing</i> to the mind. If it tends to draw the +inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of +that which <i>suits</i> the mind. And therefore that must have +the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it +stands in the mind’s view, suits it best, and pleases it most; +and in that sense is the greatest apparent good. The word +<i>good</i> in this sense includes the avoiding of evil, or of +that which is disagreeable and uneasy.” (p. 20.)</p> +<p class="pn">It follows then that the will is always determined +by that which <i>seems most pleasing or appears most +agreeable</i> to the mind.</p> +<p class="pn">This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the +position with which Edwards set out: that will is always as the +preponderating desire; indeed, that the will is the same in kind +with desire, or with the affections; and an act of will or +choice, nothing more than the strongest desire in reference to an +immediate object, and a desire producing an effect in our mental +or physical being. The determination of will is the strongest +excitement of passion. That which determines will is the cause of +passion. The strength of the cause lies in its perceived tendency +to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As possessing this +tendency, it is called <i>good</i>, or <i>pleasing</i>, or +<i>agreeable</i>; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the +condition of the affections.</p> +<p class="pns">The <i>“good”</i> which forms the characteristic +of a cause or motive is an immediate good, or a good “in the +present view of the mind.” (p. 21.) Thus a drunkard, before he +drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each other the present +pleasure of drinking and the remote painful consequences; and the +painful consequences may appear to him to be greater than the +present pleasure. But still the question truly in his mind, when +he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only; and +if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. “If he wills +to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his +will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most +agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, +then refraining is the immediate object of his will, and is most +pleasing to him.” The reasoning is, that when the drunkard +drinks, we are not to conclude that he has chosen future misery +over future good, but that the act of drinking, in itself, is the +object of choice; so that, in the view he has taken of it, it is +to him the greatest apparent good. In general we may say, in +accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of choice +takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in +such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the +moment, and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent +good. The man thus never chooses what is disagreeable, but always +what is agreeable to him.</p> +<p class="pt1">Proper use of the term <span class="sc">most +agreeable</span>, in relation to the Will.</p> +<p class="pns">“I have chosen rather to express myself thus, +<i>that the will always is as the greatest apparent good</i>, or +<i>as what appears most agreeable</i>, than to say the will is +<i>determined by</i> the greatest apparent good, or by what seems +most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, +and the mind’s preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict +propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, +that the <i>voluntary action</i>, which is the immediate +<i>consequence</i> of the mind’s choice, is determined by that +which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself.” (p. 21, +22.) Here <i>the perception or sense of the most agreeable</i> is +identified in express terms with <i>volition</i> or +<i>choice</i>. “The will is as the most agreeable,”—that is, +<i>the determination of will</i>, which means <i>its actual +choice</i>, as a fact of the consciousness is embraced in the +<i>sense of the most agreeable;</i> and as the <i>voluntary +action</i>, or the action, or change, or effect, following +volition, in any part of our being,—as to walk, or talk, or read, +or think,—has its cause in the volition, or the “mind’s +choice,”—so it is entirely proper to say, either that this +voluntary action is determined by the volition or that it is +determined by the sense of the most agreeable. Edwards’s meaning +plainly is, that the terms are convertible: volition may be +called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the most +agreeable may be called the cause. This is still a carrying out +of the position, that <i>the will is as the desire</i>. “The +greatest apparent good” being identical with “the most +agreeable,” and this again being identical with <i>the most +desirable</i>, it must follow, that whenever, in relation to any +object, the mind is affected with <i>the sense of the most +agreeable</i>, it presents the phenomenon of “volition” or +“choice;” and still farther, that which is chosen is the most +agreeable object; and is known to be such by the simple fact that +it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more than that +it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,—and the +most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise +than chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more +than that it is the object of the mind’s choice or sense of the +most agreeable. The object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive +or willing power, are correlatives, and choice is the unition of +both: so that if we regard choice as characterizing the object, +then the object is affirmed to be the most agreeable; and if, on +the other side, we regard choice as characterizing the mind, then +the mind is affirmed to be affected with the sense of the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pt1">Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">“Volition itself is always determined by that in or +about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to appear +most agreeable. I say <i>in or about the mind’s view of the +object;</i> because what has influence to render an object in +view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, +but also the manner of the view, and the <i>state and +circumstances</i> of the mind that views.” (p. 22.)</p> +<p class="pn">Choice being the unition of the mind’s sensitivity +and the object,—that is, being an affection of the sensitivity, +by reason of its perfect agreement and correlation with the +object, and of course of the perfect agreement and correlation of +the object with the sensitivity, in determining the cause of +choice, we must necessarily look both to the mind and the object. +Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in relation to +each.</p> +<p class="pn">I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most +agreeable, or choice, will depend upon,—</p> +<p class="pn">1. The beauty of the object, “viewing it as it is +<i>in itself</i>,” independently of circumstances.</p> +<p class="pn">2. “The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble +attending the object, or <i>the consequence</i> of it,” or the +object taken with its “concomitants” and consequences.</p> +<p class="pn">3. “The apparent <i>state</i> of the pleasure or +trouble that appears with respect to <i>distance of time</i>. It +is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure +speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed.” (p. 22.)</p> +<p class="pn">II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness +will depend, first, upon the <i>manner</i> of the mind’s view; +secondly, upon the state of mind. Edwards, under the first, +speaks of the object as connected with future pleasure. Here the +manner of the mind’s view will have influence in two +respects:</p> +<p class="pn">1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind +judges to attach to the pleasure;</p> +<p class="pn">2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the +imagination, which the mind has of it.</p> +<p class="pn">Now these may be in different degrees, compounded +with different degrees of pleasure, considered in itself; and +“the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a +degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the +judgement, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of +that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has +of that good.” (p. 23.)</p> +<p class="pn">Secondly: In reference to objects generally, +whether connected with present or future pleasure, the sense of +agreeableness will depend also upon “the <i>state of the mind</i> +which views a proposed object of choice.” (p. 24.) Here we have +to consider “the particular temper which the mind has by nature, +or that has been introduced or established by education, example, +custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind +is in on a particular occasion.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary +to consider the <i>state of the mind</i> as a ground of +agreeableness distinct from the two already mentioned: viz.—the +<i>nature and circumstances of the object</i>, and the <i>manner +of the view</i>. “Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter,” +he remarks, “the different temper and state of the mind makes no +alteration as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, +than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently; +<i>beautiful</i> or <i>deformed</i>, having apparent pleasure or +pain attending them; and as it occasions the <i>manner</i> of the +view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, +pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.” (ibid.) In +this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind +and object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of +the two, choice is. The <i>state of the mind</i> is manifested +only in relation to <i>the nature and circumstances of the +object;</i> and the sense of agreeableness being in the +correlation of the two, <i>the sense of the most agreeable</i> or +<i>choice</i> is such a perfect unition of the two, that, having +described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation +to <i>the most agreeable</i>, we have comprehended in this the +<i>state of mind</i>. On the other hand, the nature and +circumstances of the object, in relation to the most agreeable, +can be known only by the state of mind produced by the presence +of the object and its circumstances. To give an example,—let a +rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and agreeableness +of this object, I describe the <i>state of mind</i> in relation +to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the +sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in +philosophical language, called the <i>secondary</i> qualities of +the object: and so, on the other hand, if I describe my +sensations and emotions in the presence of the rose, I do in fact +describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind and object are +thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not have this +sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object is +presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they +seem to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of +the most agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. +The only difference between the agreeable simply and the most +agreeable is this: the agreeable refers merely to an emotion +awakened on the immediate presentation of an object, without any +comparison or competition. The most agreeable takes place where +there is comparison and competition. Thus, to prefer or choose a +rose above a violet is a sense of the most agreeable of the two. +In some cases, however, that which is refused is positively +disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these +cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every +instance of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating +the act of choosing itself in the contrast of positive and +negative, the phrase <i>most agreeable</i> or <i>greatest +apparent good</i> is convenient for general use, and sufficiently +precise to express every case which comes up.</p> +<p class="pn">It may be well here to remark, that in the system +we are thus endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word +<i>choice</i> is properly used to express the action of will, +when that action is viewed in relation to its immediate +effects,—as when I say, I choose to walk. <i>The sense of the +most agreeable</i>, is properly used to express the same action, +when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice +and volition are the words in common use, because men at large +only think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But +when the cause of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, +and is supposed to lie in the nature and circumstances of mind +and object, then the <i>sense of the most agreeable</i> becomes +the most appropriate form of expression.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of +the most agreeable, by remarking: “However, I think so much is +certain,—that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, +is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner +which has been explained.” This is the great principle of his +system; and, a few sentences after, he states it as an axiom, or +a generally admitted truth: “There is scarcely a plainer and more +universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than +that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they +do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.” +Indeed, Edwards cannot be considered as having attempted to prove +this; he has only explained it, and therefore it is only the +<i>explanation</i> of a supposed axiom that we have been +following out.</p> +<p class="pn">This supposed axiom is really announced in the +first section: “Will and desire do not run counter at all: the +thing which he wills, the very same he desires;” that is, a man +wills as he desires, and of course wills what is most agreeable +to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the title of part I. runs +as follows: “Wherein are explained and stated various terms and +things, &c.” Receiving it, therefore, as a generally admitted +truth, “that choice or volition is always as the most agreeable,” +and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is the +explanation given?</p> +<p class="pn">1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a +faculty distinct from the affections or passions, or that part of +our being which philosophers sometimes call the sensitivity.</p> +<p class="pn">2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being +at any given moment and under any given circumstances the +strongest inclination, or the strongest affection and desire with +regard to an immediate object, appears in the constitution of our +being as the antecedent of effects in the mind itself, or in the +body; which effects are called voluntary actions,—as acts of +attention, or of talking, or walking.</p> +<p class="pn">3. To say that volition is as the desire, is +equivalent to saying that volition is as the “greatest apparent +good,” which again means only the most agreeable,—so that the +volition becomes again the <i>sense or feeling of the greatest +apparent good</i>. There is in all this only a variety of +expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.</p> +<p class="pn">4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the +production in the mind of volition, or choice, or the strongest +affection, or the sense of the most agreeable, or of the greatest +apparent good. It is therefore an effect, and must have a +determiner or cause.</p> +<p class="pns">5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In +explaining what constitutes the motive, we must take into view +both <i>mind</i> and <i>object</i>. The object must be perceived +by the mind as something existent. This perception, however, is +only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the object to the +mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable, or +choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to +each other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess +qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must +possess a susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the +object. But to say that the object possesses qualities of beauty +and agreeableness to the mind, is in fact to affirm that the mind +has the requisite susceptibility; for these qualities of the +object have a being, and are what they are only in relation to +mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may therefore be +called the unition of the sensitivity and the object. Choice is +thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually appearing +in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and, indeed, +being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be +accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. +But inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in +relation to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for +its manifestations by referring them to the objects and +circumstances in connexion with which they take place, and +without which they would not take place; and thus, as we say, the +cause of passion is the object of passion: so we say also, in +common parlance, the cause of choice is the object of choice; and +assigning the affections of the mind springing up in the presence +of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its qualities, we +say that choice is always as the most beautiful and agreeable; +that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest apparent +good, thus <i>objectively</i> described, is the motive, or +determiner, or cause of volition.</p> +<p class="pt1">In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of +the Understanding.</p> +<p class="pns">“It appears from these things, that in some sense +<i>the will always follows the last dictate of the +understanding</i>. But then the understanding must be taken in a +large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or +apprehension, and not merely what is called <i>reason</i> or +<i>judgement</i>. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant +what reason declares to be best, or most for the person’s +happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true +that the will always follows the last dictate of the +understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different +matter from things appearing now most <i>agreeable</i>, all +things being put together which relates to the mind’s present +perceptions in any respect.” (p. 25.) The “large sense” in which +Edwards takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual +and sensitive being. In the production of choice, or the sense of +the most agreeable, the suggestions of reason may have their +influence, and may work in with other particulars to bring about +the result; but then they are subject to the same condition with +the other particulars,—they must appear, at the moment and in the +immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is not enough +that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must +likewise <i>suit the state of the mind</i>,—for as choice is the +sense of the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to +awaken this sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the +feelings of the subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not +agreeably related, “the act of the will is determined in +opposition to it.” (ibid.)</p> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. III.—<span class="sc">Concerning +the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, +&c. and of Contingence</span>.”</p> +<p class="pn">After having settled his definition of choice or +volition, and explained the cause of the same, Edwards takes up +the nature of the connexion between this cause and effect: viz. +motive and volition. Is this connexion a necessary connexion?</p> +<p class="pn">In order to determine this point, and to explain +his view of it, he proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms +contained in the above title. This section is entirely occupied +with this preliminary discussion.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity +as understood in the common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as +understood in the philosophical or metaphysical use.</p> +<p class="pn">1. In common use, <i>necessity</i> “is a relative +term, and relates to some supposed opposition made to the +existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome or proves +insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word <i>impossible</i> is +manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power +exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient for the +effect. The word <i>unable</i> is relative, and has relation to +ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word +<i>irresistible</i> is relative, and has reference to resistance +which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to +an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder +the effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility +implies <i>something that frustrates endeavour or +desire</i>.”</p> +<p class="pn">He then distinguishes this necessity into +<i>general and particular</i>. “Things are necessary <i>in +general</i>, which are or will be, notwithstanding any supposable +opposition, from whatever quarter:” e. g. that God will judge the +world.</p> +<p class="pn">“Things are necessary <i>to us</i> which are or +will be, notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case +<i>from us</i>.” This is <i>particular</i> necessity: e. g. any +event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions “about liberty +and moral agency,” the word is used especially in a particular +sense, because we are concerned in these discussions <i>as +individuals</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">According to this <i>common use</i> of necessity in +the <i>particular</i> sense, “When we speak of any thing +necessary <i>to us</i>, it is with relation to some supposable +opposition <i>to our wills;</i>” and “a thing is said to be +necessary” in this sense “when we cannot help it, do what <i>we +will</i>.” So also a thing is said to be <i>impossible to us</i> +when we cannot do it, although we make the attempt,—that is, put +forth the volition; and <i>irresistible to us</i>, which, when we +put forth a volition to hinder it, overcomes the opposition: and +we are <i>unable</i> to do a thing “when our supposable desires +and endeavours are insufficient,”—are not followed by any effect. +In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not +considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are +considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own +effects: e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain +man can raise a certain weight,—if it be affirmed that it is +<i>impossible</i> for him to raise it, that he has not the +<i>ability</i> to raise it, and that the weight will +<i>necessarily</i> keep its position,—no reference whatever is +made to the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but +solely to the connexion between the <i>volition</i> and the +<i>raising of the weight</i>. Now Edwards remarks, that this +common use of the term necessity and its cognates being habitual, +is likely to enter into and confound our reasonings on subjects +where it is inadmissible from the nature of the case. We must +therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)</p> +<p class="pn">2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity +is not a <i>relative</i>, but an <i>absolute term</i>. In this +use necessity applies “in cases wherein no insufficient will is +supposed, or can be supposed; but the very nature of the supposed +case itself excludes any opposition, will, or endeavour.” (ibid.) +Thus it is used “with respect to God’s existence before the +creation of the world, when there was no other being.” +“<i>Metaphysical</i> or <i>philosophical</i> necessity is nothing +different from certainty,—not the certainty of knowledge, but the +certainty of things in themselves, which is the foundation of the +certainty of knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the +infallibility of the proposition which affirms them. +Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and +fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject and +predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; +and in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following +discourse, when I endeavour to prove <i>that necessity is not +inconsistent with liberty</i>.” (p. 27, 28, 29.)</p> +<p class="pn">“The subject and predicate of a proposition which +affirms the existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and +certain connexion, in several ways.”</p> +<p class="pn">“1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion +<i>in and of themselves</i>. So God’s infinity and other +attributes are necessary. So it is necessary, <i>in its own +nature</i>, that two and two should be four.”</p> +<p class="pn">2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, +affirming the existence of something which is already come to +pass, are fixed and certain.</p> +<p class="pn">3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may +be fixed and certain <i>consequentially</i>,—and so the existence +of the things affirmed may be “consequentially necessary.” +“Things which are <i>perfectly connected</i> with the things that +are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of +consequence.” This is logical necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">“And here it may be observed, that all things which +are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be +said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way,”—that +is, “by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own +nature, or something that already is or has been. This is the +necessity which especially belongs to controversies about acts of +the will.” (p. 30.)</p> +<p class="pn">Philosophical necessity is <i>general</i> and +<i>particular.</i> 1. “The existence of a thing may be said to be +necessary with a <i>general</i> necessity, when all things +considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its +existence.” This is unconditional necessity in the strictest +sense.</p> +<p class="pn">2. <i>Particular</i> necessity refers to “things +that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which, no +will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, +whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in +general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any +volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the +will about the affair.” (p. 31.) This particular necessity is +absolute to the individual, because his will has nothing to do +with it—whether it be absolute or not in the general sense, does +not affect his case.</p> +<p class="pns">“What has been said to show the meaning of terms +<i>necessary</i> and <i>necessity</i>, may be sufficient for the +explaining of the opposite terms <i>impossible</i> and +<i>impossibility</i>. For there is no difference, but only the +latter are negative and the former positive.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pt1">Inability and Unable.</p> +<p class="pns">“It has been observed that these terms in their +original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as +supposable in the case.” That is have relation to the connexion +of volition with effects. “But as these terms are often used by +philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies +about free will, they are used in a quite different and far more +extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or +endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be +supposed:” e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes +or motives.</p> +<p class="pt1">Contingent and Contingency.</p> +<p class="pn">“Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to +pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such +words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, +according to the established course of things, is not discerned; +and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. But the word, +contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for +that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern +so as to foresee the event, but for something which has +absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence +has any fixed connexion.” (p. 31. 32.)</p> +<p class="pns">Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent +terms. In common use, contingency and chance are relative to our +knowledge—implying that we discern no cause. In another use,—the +use of a certain philosophical school,—he affirms that +contingency is used to express absolutely no cause; or, that some +events are represented as existing without any cause or ground of +their existence. This will be examined in its proper place. I am +now only stating Edwards’s opinions, not discussing them.</p> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +<span class="sc">Sec</span>. IV. <span class="sc">Of the +Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and +Inability</span>.</p> +<p class="pn">We now return to the question:—Is the connexion +between motive and volition necessary?</p> +<p class="pn">The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, +does not relate to this question, for in that use as we have +seen, it refers to the connexion between volition considered as a +cause, and its effects. In this question, we are considering +volition as an effect in relation to its cause or the motive. If +the connexion then of motive and volition be necessary, it must +be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical sense of the +term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to +characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section +opens with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: +“That necessity which has been explained, consisting in an +infallible connexion of the things signified by the subject and +predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the +subjects of it, is distinguished into <i>moral</i> and +<i>natural</i> necessity.” He then appropriates <i>moral +philosophical necessity</i> to express the nature of the +connexion between motive and volition: “And sometimes by moral +necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and +<i>consequence</i> which arises from <i>moral causes</i>, as the +strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which +there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions +and actions. And it is in <i>this</i> sense that I use the phrase +<i>moral necessity</i> in the following discourse.” (p. 32.) +Natural <i>philosophical</i> necessity as distinguished from +this, he employs to characterize the connexion between natural +causes and phenomena of our being, as the connexion of external +objects with our various sensations, and the connexion between +truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)</p> +<p class="pn">In employing the term <i>moral</i>, however, he +does not intend to intimate that it affects at all the +absoluteness of the necessity which it distinguishes; on the +contrary, he affirms that “moral necessity may be as absolute as +natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly +connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is +with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such +a thing as a <i>sure</i> and <i>perfect</i> connexion between +moral causes and effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and +perfect connexion,) is what I call by the name of <i>moral +necessity</i>.” (p. 33.)</p> +<p class="pn">Nor does he intend “that when a moral habit or +motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows, +this is not owing to the <i>nature of things!</i>” But these +terms, moral and natural, are convenient to express a difference +which really exists; a difference, however, which “does not lie +so much in the nature of the <i>connexion</i> as in the two terms +<i>connected</i>.” Indeed, he soon after admits “that choice in +<i>many cases</i> arises from nature, as truly as other events.” +His sentiment is plainly this choice lies in the great system and +chain of nature as truly as any other phenomenon, arising from +its antecedent and having its consequents or effects: but we have +appropriated nature to express the chain of causes and effects, +which lie without us, and which are most obvious to us; and +choice being, “as it were, a new principle of motion and action,” +lying within us, and often interrupting or altering the external +course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation. (p. +34.)</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by +justifying his reduction of motive and volition under +philosophical necessity. “It must be observed, that in what has +been explained, as signified by the name of <i>moral +necessity</i>, the word <i>necessity</i> is not used according to +the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed +before, such terms, <i>necessary, impossible, irresistible,</i> +&c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always +relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary +opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such +opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the +case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination +and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a +will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the +same individual will to oppose itself in its present act; or the +present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice: +as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same +moving body at the same time. And therefore the very case +supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or +resisting will can overcome this necessity.” (p. 35.)</p> +<p class="pns">This passage is clear and full. Common necessity, +or necessity in the original use of the word, refers to the +connexion between volition and its effects; for here an +opposition to will is supposable. I may choose or will to raise a +weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour overcomes it, and +I find it <i>impossible</i> for me to raise it, and the weight +<i>necessarily</i> remains in its place. In this common use of +these terms, the <i>impossibility</i> and the <i>necessity</i> +are <i>relative</i> to my volition; but in the production of +choice itself, or volition, or the sense of the most agreeable, +there is no reference to voluntary endeavour. Choice is not the +cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of as struggling with +itself in its own production. The cause of volition does not lie +within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition, +therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could +not be made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities +and habits, is supposed to be placed within the influence of +objects and their circumstances, and the choice takes place in +the correlation of the two, as the sense of the most agreeable. +Now choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no +choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence, +therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavour; it +comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute necessity of +cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone which +is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at +given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, +and feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense +are brought together. The application of the epithet <i>moral</i> +to the necessity of volition, evidently does not alter in the +least the character of that necessity. It is still philosophical +and absolute necessity, and as sure and perfect as natural +necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits, (p. 33;) +affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and +natural necessity is a mere difference in the “two terms +connected,” and not a difference “<i>in the nature of the +connexion</i>.”</p> +<p class="pt1">Natural and moral inability.</p> +<p class="pn">“What has been said of natural and moral necessity, +may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral +<i>inability</i>. We are said to be <i>naturally</i> unable to do +a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most +commonly called <i>nature</i> does not allow of it, or because of +some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; +either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body, +or external objects.” (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour +to know something, and may find ourselves <i>unable</i>, through +a defect of the understanding. We may make a voluntary effort +<i>to do</i> something by the instrumentality of our hand, and +may find ourselves unable through a defect of the bodily +constitution; or external objects may be regarded as presenting +such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert. This is +natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be remarked +too, that this is <i>inability</i> not <i>metaphysically</i> or +<i>philosophically</i> considered, and therefore not +<i>absolute</i> inability; but only inability in the common and +vulgar acceptation of the term—a relative inability, relative to +volition or choice—an inability to do, although we will to +do.</p> +<p class="pn">What is moral inability? “Moral inability consists +not in any of these things; but either in the want of +inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the +want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act +of will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or +both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said, in one +word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of +inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a +thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary +motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the +want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary +inclination, in such circumstances and under the influence of +such views.” (bid.)</p> +<p class="pn">The inability in this case does not relate to the +connexion between volition and its consequents and effects; +<i>but to the production of the volition itself</i>. Now the +inability to the production of a volition, cannot be affirmed of +the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist, and as an +effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The inability, +therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the +motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the <i>state of the +mind</i>, and in the <i>nature and circumstances of the +object;</i> and choice or volition exists when, in the +correlation of mind and object, the sense of the most agreeable +is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any given case, why +the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not produced? Why +simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind and +object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the +deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and +object—that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not +<i>in a state</i> to be agreeably impressed by the object, and +the object does not possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness +to the mind. On the part of the mind, there is either a want of +inclination to the object, or a stronger inclination towards +another object: on the part of the object, there is a want of +interesting and agreeable qualities to the <i>particular +state</i> of mind in question, or a <i>suitableness</i> to a +different state of mind: and this constitutes “the want of +sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, +or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary.” And both +these may clearly be resolved into one, that above mentioned, +viz, a want of inclination on the part of the mind to the object, +and a stronger inclination towards another object; or, as Edwards +expresses it, “the opposition or want of inclination.” For a want +of inclination to one object, implying a stronger inclination to +another object, expresses that the <i>state of the mind</i>, and +the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not +correlated; but that the <i>state of mind</i>, and the nature and +circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is +a “want of sufficient motives;” the second, stronger “motives to +the contrary.” Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of +volition; volition, therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for +this would suppose an effect to modify its cause, and that too +before the effect itself has any existence. Moral inability is a +<i>metaphysical</i> inability: it is the perfect and fixed +impossibility of certain laws and principles of being, leading to +certain volitions; and is contrasted with <i>physical +inability</i>, which is the established impossibility of a +certain volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that +<i>moral ability</i> is the certain and fixed connexion between +certain laws and principles of being, and volitions; and is +contrasted with <i>natural</i> ability, which is the established +connexion between certain volitions and certain effects.</p> +<p class="pn">Moral inability, although transcending the sphere +of volition, is a <i>real inability</i>. Where it exists, there +is the absolute impossibility of a given volition,—and of course +an absolute impossibility of certain effects coming to pass by +that volition. The impossibility of water freezing above an +established temperature, or of boiling below an established +temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of effects +coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of +the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie +“in the nature of the connexion,” but “in the two terms +connected.”</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards gives several instances in illustration of +moral inability.</p> +<p class="pn">“A woman of great honour and chastity may have a +moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave.” (ibid.) +There is no correlation between <i>the state of her mind</i> and +<i>the act</i> which forms the object contemplated,—of course the +sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot take place; and +while the state of her mind remains the same, and the act and its +circumstances remain the same, there is, on the principle of +Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to the +consequents of the choice.</p> +<p class="pn">“A child of great love and duty to his parents, may +be thus unable to kill his father.” (ibid.) This case is similar +to the preceding.</p> +<p class="pn">“A very lascivious man, in case of certain +opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and +such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust.” +There is here a correlation between <i>the state of mind</i> and +the <i>object</i>, in its <i>nature and circumstances</i>,—and of +course the sense of the most agreeable or choice takes place. +There is a <i>moral ability</i> to the choice, and a <i>moral +inability</i> to forbear, or to choose the opposite.</p> +<p class="pn">“A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may +be unable to forbear taking strong drink.” (ibid.) This is +similar to the last.</p> +<p class="pn">“A very malicious man may be unable to exert +benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, +some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they +may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem +and affection.” (ibid.) The <i>state of mind</i> is such,—that +is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all +correlated to the great duty of loving one’s neighbour as one’s +self,—or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense +of the most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind +it is absolutely impossible that it should be produced. “A strong +habit of virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral +inability to love wickedness in general.” (p. 36.) “On the other +hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under +an inability to love and choose holiness, and render him +<i>utterly unable</i> to love an infinitely Holy Being, or to +choose and cleave to him as the chief good.” (ibid.) The love and +choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation of +the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is +<i>utterly impossible</i> when this correlation does not exist. +Where a moral inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure +and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject +of it has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed +to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this +effect; but this would be an evil volition, and by supposition +the individual has no ability to evil volitions.</p> +<p class="pns">Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing +can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual +who is the subject of it, has absolutely no power to alter it. If +he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a +volition to this effect; but this would be a good volition, and +by supposition the individual has no ability to good +volitions.</p> +<p class="pt1">General and habitual, particular and occasional +Inability.</p> +<p class="pn">The first consists “in a fixed and habitual +inclination, or an habitual and stated defect or want of a +certain kind of inclination.” (p. 36.)</p> +<p class="pn">The second is “an inability of the will or heart to +a particular act, through the strength or defect of present +motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the +understanding, <i>on this occasion</i>.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, +on some <i>particular occasion</i> getting drunk, are instances +of general and particular inability. In the first instance, the +<i>state</i> of the man’s mind has become correlated to the +object; under all times and circumstances <i>it is fixed</i>. In +the second instance, the <i>state</i> of the man’s mind is +correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions +and under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the +choice is necessary,—“it not being possible, in any case, that +the will should at present go against the motive which has now, +all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it.”</p> +<p class="pn">“Will and endeavour against, or diverse from +<i>present</i> acts of the will, are in no case supposable, +whether those acts be <i>occasional</i> or <i>habitual</i>; for +that would be to suppose the will at present to be otherwise than +at present it is.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">The passage which follows deserves particular +attention. It may be brought up under the following question:</p> +<p class="pn">Although will cannot be exerted against present +acts of the will, yet can present acts of the will be exerted to +produce future acts of the will, opposed to present habitual or +present occasional acts?</p> +<p class="pn">“But yet there may be will and endeavour against +<i>future</i> acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to +take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction, to +suppose that the acts of the will at one time may be against the +act of the will at another time; and there may be desires and +endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such +desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered insufficient +and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, +the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition.” +(p. 37.)</p> +<p class="pn">Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The +choice or volition to drink is the fixed correlation of his +disposition and the strong drink. But we may suppose that his +disposition can be affected by other objects likewise: as the +consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife and +children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When +his cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and +loathing, these considerations may awaken at the time the sense +of the most agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of +drunkenness, and to form resolutions of amendment; but when the +appetite and longing for drink returns, and he comes again in the +way of indulgence, then these considerations, brought fairly into +collision with his habits, are overcome, and drinking, as the +most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.</p> +<p class="pn">“But it may be comparatively easy to make an +alteration with respect to such future acts as are only +<i>occasional</i> and <i>transient</i>; because the occasional or +transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or +avoided.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">In the case of occasional drunkenness, for +instance, the habitual correlation is not of mind and strong +drink, but of mind and considerations of honour, prudence, and +virtue. But strong drink being associated on some occasion with +objects which are correlated to the mind, as hospitality, +friendship, or festive celebrations,—may obtain the mastery; and +in this case, the individual being under no temptation from +strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with +the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are +opposed to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not +come again into circumstances to give it an adventitious +advantage. The repetition of occasional drunkenness would of +course by and by produce a change in the sensitivity, and +establish an habitual liking for drink. “On this account, the +moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the +name of <i>inability</i>. And then, as the will may remotely and +indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of +strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and +its resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the +case, also, when the acts arise from strong habit.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pns">In every act of the will, the will at the moment +is unable to act otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, +that a man, at the moment of his acting, must act as he does act; +but as we usually characterize men by the habitual state of their +minds, we more especially speak of moral inability in relation to +acts which are known to have no correlation to this habitual +state. This habitual state of the mind, if it be opposed to +reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason itself, +can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the +most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual +disposition or sensitivity is opposed to it.</p> +<p class="pt1">Common usage with respect to the phrase +<span class="sc">want of power</span> or <span class= +"sc">inability</span> to act in a certain way.</p> +<p class="pn">“But it must be observed concerning <i>moral +inability</i>, in each kind of it, that the word <i>inability</i> +is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The +word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it; +and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or +inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said +to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, +<i>according to the ordinary use of language</i>, that a +malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his +hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour +a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so +strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. <i>In the strictest +propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it +in his choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said +to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will</i>.” +(ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">Men, in the common use of language, and in the +expression of their common and generally received sentiments, +affirm that an individual has any thing in his power when it can +be controlled by volition. Their connexion of power does not +arise from the connexion of volition with its cause, but from the +conception of volition as itself a cause with its effects. Thus +the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike, having for its +antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking, having for +its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common usage +of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to +strike or not to strike. Now as it is “improperly said that he +cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on +the will, it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is +unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is +more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he +will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he +<i>cannot</i> will if he <i>does</i> will: and, in this case, not +only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he +will, but the very willing is the doing.” (ibid.)</p> +<p class="pn">It is improper, according to this, to say that a +man cannot do a thing, when nothing is wanting but an act of +volition; for that is within our power, as far as it can be +within our power, which is within the reach of our volition.</p> +<p class="pn">It is still more improper to say that a man is +unable to exert the acts of the will themselves, or unable to +produce volitions. To say that a man has power to produce +volitions, would imply that he has power to will volitions; but +this would make one volition the cause of another, which is +absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause +of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has +ability to produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to +represent the man as <i>unable</i>, in any particular case, to +produce volitions, for this would imply that in other cases he is +able. Nay, the very language is self-contradictory. If a man +produce volitions, he must produce them by volitions; and if in +any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce volitions; then +this inability must arise from a want of connexion between the +volition by which the required volition is aimed to be produced, +and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is +unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will <i>if +he will</i>—a proposition which grants the very point it assumes +to deny. “The very willing is the doing,” which is required.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards adopts what he calls the “original” and +“proper,” meaning of power, and ability, as applied to human +agents, and appearing, “in the ordinary use of language,” as the +legitimate and true meaning. In this use, power, as we have seen, +relates only to the connexion of volition with its consequents, +and not to its connexion with its antecedents or motives. Hence, +in reference to the human agent, “to ascribe a non-performance to +the want of power or ability,” or to the want of motives, (for +this is plainly his meaning,) “is not just,” “because the thing +wanting,” that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the +agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, “is +not a being <i>able</i>,” that is, a having the requisite +motives, or the moral ability, “but a being <i>willing</i>, or +the act of volition, itself. To the act of volition, or the fact +of ‘being willing,’” there is no facility of mind or capacity of +nature wanting, but only a disposition or state of mind adapted +to the act; but with this, the individual can have no concern in +reference to his action, because he has all the ability which can +be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he +will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral +inability to do a thing—that is the motive may be wanting which +causes the volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the +thing to be done; but still if it is true that there is such a +connexion between the volition and the thing to be done, that the +moment the volition takes place the thing is done; then, +according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be able to do it +with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.</p> +<p class="pns">We can exert power only by exerting will, that is +by putting forth volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert +power over those motives which are themselves the causes of our +volitions. We are not <i>unable</i> to do anything in the proper +and original and legitimate use of the word when, for the want of +motive, we are not the subjects of the volition required as the +immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but we are +<i>unable</i> in this use when, although the volition be made; +still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are +conscious of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion +between our actual volitions and their objects.</p> +<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. V. <span class= +"sc">Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral +Agency</span>.”</p> +<p class="pn">What is liberty? “The plain and obvious meaning of +the words <i>freedom</i> and <i>liberty</i>, in common speech, is +<i>power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he +pleases</i>. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance, +or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any way as he +wills. And the <i>contrary</i> to liberty, whatever name we call +it by, is a person’s being hindered or unable to conduct as he +will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise.” (p. 38.) Again, +“That power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, +or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without +taking into the meaning of the word, anything of the <i>cause</i> +of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have +such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, +or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some +internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a +cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something +foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice +any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to +hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly +free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.” (p. +39.)</p> +<p class="pn">This is Edwards’s definition of liberty, and he has +given it with a clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an +amplification, which renders it impossible to mistake his +meaning.</p> +<p class="pns">Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion +between volition and its cause or motive. Liberty relates solely +to the connexion between the volition and its objects. He is free +in the only true and proper sense, who, when he wills, finds no +impediment between the volition and the object, who wills and it +is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey: he wills to talk, +and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and express +sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his +tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not +be free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he +would not be free. If there should be anything preventing the +volition from taking effect, he would not be free.</p> +<p class="pt1">Of what can the attribute of Liberty be +affirmed?</p> +<p class="pn">From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, “It +will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor +its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but +that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called +will. For that which is possessed of no <i>will</i>, cannot have +any power or opportunity of doing <i>according to its will</i>, +nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be +restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of +liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the <i>very will +itself</i>, is not to speak good sense; for the <i>will +itself</i>, is not an agent that has <i>a will</i>. The power of +choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the +power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of +volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who is +possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed +of.” (p. 38.)</p> +<p class="pns">Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the +agent is the spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the +power or capacity of choice, and his liberty consists as we have +seen in the unimpeded connexion between the volitions produced in +him and the objects of those volitions. Hence, <i>free will</i> +is an objectionable phrase. <i>Free agent</i> is the proper +phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and whose +choice reaches effects.</p> +<p class="pt1">Moral Agent.</p> +<p class="pn">“A <i>moral agent</i> is a being that is capable of +those actions that have a <i>moral</i> quality, and which can +properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous +or vicious, commendable or faulty.” (p. 39.)</p> +<p class="pn">In what lies the capability of actions having a +moral quality?</p> +<p class="pn">“To moral agency belongs a <i>moral faculty</i>, or +sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or +worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a +capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by +moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of the +understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to +moral faculty.” (p. 40.)</p> +<p class="pn">A moral agent is a being who can perform moral +actions, or actions which are subject to praise or blame. Now the +same action may be committed by a man or by a brute—and the man +alone will be guilty: why is the man guilty? Because he has a +moral sense or perception by which he distinguishes right and +wrong: the brute has no such sense or perception. The man having +thus the power of perceiving the right and wrong of +actions—actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated to +him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, +we may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of +a reason and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the +capacity of having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind +as to form motives and produce volitions. We might define a man +of taste in the fine arts in a similar way; thus,—a man of taste +is an agent who has the power of distinguishing beauty and +ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to beauty that the +sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The only +difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, +the sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty +perceived; while in the former, the right perceived does not +always produce this sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most +agreeable is often produced by the wrong, in opposition to the +decisions of reason and conscience.</p> +<p class="pn">I have now completed the statement of Edwards’s +system, nearly in his own words, as contained in part I. of his +work. The remarks and explanations which have been thrown in, I +hope will serve to make him more perfectly understood. This end +will be still more fully attained by presenting on the basis of +the foregoing investigation and statement, a compend of his +psychological system, independently of the order there pursued, +and without largely introducing quotations, which have already +been abundantly made.</p> +<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +<p style= +"text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em;font-size:117%"> +COMPEND OF EDWARDS’S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.</p> +<p class="pn">I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. +The intellectual—called reason or understanding. 2. The active +and feeling—called will or affections.</p> +<p class="pn">II. The relation of these to each other. The first +precedes the second in the order of exercise. The first perceives +and knows objects in their qualities, circumstances, and +relations. The second experiences emotions and passions, or +desires and choices, in relation to the objects perceived.</p> +<p class="pn">III. Perception is necessary. When the +understanding and its objects are brought together, perception +takes place according to the constituted laws of the +intelligence.</p> +<p class="pn">IV. The acts of will or the affections are +necessary. When this faculty of our being and its objects are +brought together, volition or choice, emotions, passions, or +desires take place, according to the constituted nature and laws +of this faculty.</p> +<p class="pn">The objects and this faculty are correlates. In +relation to the object, we may call this faculty subject. When +subject and object are suited to each other, that is, are +agreeable, affections are produced which we call pleasant; when +they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable, affections take +place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in relation +to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces +accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.</p> +<p class="pn">In the perfection and harmony of our being, this +correspondence is universal; that is, what is known to be +agreeable is felt to be pleasant;—what is known to be +disagreeable is felt to be painful. But, in the corruption of our +being, this is reversed in respect of moral objects. Although +what is right is known to be agreeable, that is, suited to us, it +is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to be +unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that +pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as +synonymous terms. The distinction I have here made is at least +convenient in describing the same objects as presented to the +understanding and to the will.</p> +<p class="pn">V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, +are thus produced in the correlation of subject, that is the +will, and the object. In assigning the causes of these +affections, we may refer to the nature of the will, which is +such, as to receive such and such affections when in the presence +of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects, and +say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such +and such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at +once, and say that the affections arise from the state of the +mind, and from the nature and circumstances of the object.</p> +<p class="pn">VI. The affections of the will stand connected with +changes or effects in other parts of our being, as stated +antecedents. First, they stand thus connected with muscular +action,—as walking, talking, striking, resisting, &c. +Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental operations,—as +fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and +investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the +memory.</p> +<p class="pn">VII. The affections of the will, when thus +connected with effects in other parts of our being, have a +peculiar and striking characteristic. It is this: that the effect +contemplated takes place at the moment it appears the most +agreeable,—the greatest apparent good; which, as Edwards uses +these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect contemplated +produces the most pleasant affection,—the most intense sense of +the agreeable,—it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most +pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a +particular subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the +constitution and law of our being. The play of the different +parts is reciprocal. Perception must bring up the objects, and +the affections of will immediately follow. The most agreeable are +dwelt upon by the mind, and perception again takes place +particularly with regard to these; and according as objects +affect the will, do all the activities of our being come +forth.</p> +<p class="pn">VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can +be easily explained by this system:—<i>Choice</i> is the sense or +the affection of the most pleasant and agreeable. +<i>Preference</i> is its synonyme, with scarcely a shade of +difference. They both have respect to the <i>act of +selection</i>. <i>Volition</i> is another name for this affection +of will, and is used more particularly in relation to effects or +changes following the affection. <i>Desire</i> is a nascent +choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment, is choice. +<i>Emotion</i> is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to +the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the +first sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with +respect to certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment +possible in relation to them,—for example, the emotion of +sublimity, produced by an object which can hold no other relation +to us. But then the sublimity of the object may be the motive +which causes the choice of gazing at it; that is, it connects +this act of contemplation with the sense of the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Passion</i> is emotion accompanied by desire in +reference to other relations with the object. Thus the emotion of +beauty awakened by a flower may be accompanied by the desire of +possessing it; and if this desire becomes the strongest desire at +the moment, then the passion has the characteristic which makes +it choice, and some corresponding effects take place in order to +possess it,—as walking towards it, stretching out the hand, +&c.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>The determination of will</i> is the production +or causation of choice. It is used in reference to the immediate +and particular choice, in opposition to all other choices.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>The will itself</i> is the capacity of being +affected by objects with emotion, passion, and desire,—and with +that form of passion which we call the sense of the most +agreeable or choice, and which is connected with effects or +consequents as their stated antecedent.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>The motive</i> is the cause of choice, and is +complex. It lies in the nature and susceptibilities of the will, +and in the nature and circumstances Of the object chosen.</p> +<p class="pn">IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, +what reason commands may seem disagreeable to the will, and of +course reason cannot be obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when +her commands produce the sense of the most agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are +opposed in reference to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute +of the man—the human soul. The man is free when his volitions or +choices are unimpeded,—when, upon choosing to walk, he walks, +&c. The man is not free, or is under necessity, when his +volitions or choices are impeded,—when, upon choosing to walk, he +finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is +<i>impossible</i> for him to walk,—then he has <i>no liberty</i> +to walk,—then he is under a <i>necessity</i> of remaining in one +place.</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity in any other use is <i>metaphysical</i> +or <i>philosophical</i> necessity, and is applied out of the +sphere of the will: as the necessity of truth, the necessity of +being,—the necessary connexion of cause and effect. Hence,</p> +<p class="pn">The <i>connexion</i> between volitions or choices, +or the sense of the most agreeable with the motive or cause, is +<i>necessary</i> with a philosophical necessity. The necessity of +volitions in reference to motives is also called <i>moral</i> +necessity. This term <i>moral</i> is given, not in reference to +the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the <i>terms</i> +connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings +are thus distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly +call <i>natural</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A +<i>natural</i> agent is that which produces effects without +volition. A <i>moral</i> agent is one producing effects by +volitions, accompanied with an intellectual perception of the +volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a sense of +desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account of +the volitions and their effects.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Brutes</i> or irresponsible beings are agents +that have volitions, but have no reason to perceive right and +wrong, and consequently have no sense of desert; and as they +cannot perceive right and wrong, they cannot be made the subjects +of moral appeals and inducements.</p> +<p class="pn">XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the +possession of reason; secondly, from the capacity of choice; +thirdly, from natural ability.</p> +<p class="pn">Natural ability exists when the effect or act +commanded to be accomplished has an established connexion with +volition or choice. Thus we say a man has natural ability to +walk, because if he chooses to walk, he walks. Natural ability +differs from freedom only in this:—The first refers to an +established connexion between volitions and effects. The second +refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting +forces from between volitions and effects.</p> +<p class="pn">Hence a man is <i>naturally unable</i> to do +anything when there is no established connexion between volition +and that thing. A man is naturally unable to push a mountain from +its seat. He has no <i>liberty</i> to move his arm when it is +bound.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Moral inability</i> is metaphysical or +philosophical inability. Philosophical inability in general +refers to the impossibility of a certain effect for the want of a +cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there is a philosophical +inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the decay of old +age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have no +cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a +philosophical inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons +weight with a pine lath, and by the hand of a single man, because +we have not an adequate cause. <i>Moral inability</i> relates to +the connexion between motives and volitions in distinction from +natural ability, which relates to the connexion between volitions +and actions consequent upon them: but the term moral as we have +seen, does not characterize the nature of the +<i>connexion</i>,—it only expresses the <i>quality</i> of +<i>terms connected</i>. Hence <i>moral</i> inability, as +philosophical inability, is the impossibility of a certain +volition or choice for the want of a motive or cause, or an +adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical inability of +Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive or +cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral +philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for +fifty dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive +is not adequate to produce a volition to such an act.</p> +<p class="pn">Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute +in respect of us, because beyond the sphere of our volition.</p> +<p class="pn">XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness +or guilt, apply only to volitions. This indeed is not formally +brought out in the part of Edwards’s work we have been examining. +His discussion of it will be found in part IV. sec. I. But as it +is necessary to a complete view of his system, we introduce it +here.</p> +<p class="pn">He remarks in this part, “If the essence of +virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, +does not lie in the nature of the disposition or acts of the +mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their +cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for +instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the +nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad +nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from +some faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in +us that is our fault, &c.” (page 190.) “Disposition of mind,” +or inclination,—“acts of the mind,” “acts of will,” here +obviously mean the same thing; that is, they mean volition or +choice, and are distinguished from their cause or motive. The +question is not whether the cause or motive be pure or impure, +but whether our virtuousness or viciousness lie in the cause of +our volition, or in the volition itself. It plainly results from +Edwards’s psychology, and he has himself in the above quotation +stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the volition +itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is +volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of +doing or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our +volitions that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for +evil-doing. If these volitions are in accordance with conscience +and the law of God, they are right; if not, they are wrong, and +we are judged accordingly. The <i>metaphysical</i> questions, how +the volition was produced, and what is the character of the +cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are questions +which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our +personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with +this:—Do <i>we</i> do right? do <i>we</i> do wrong? What is the +<i>nature of our volitions?</i></p> +<p class="pn">Nor does the <i>necessary connexion</i> between the +motives and the volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the +praiseworthiness of the volitions. We are blameworthy or +praiseworthy according to the character of the volitions in +themselves, considered and judged according to the rule of right, +without considering how these volitions came to exist. The last +inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind, +and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral +agency, responsibility, and duty.</p> +<p class="pn">And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for +doing or not doing external actions, so far only as these actions +are naturally connected with volitions, as sequents with their +stated antecedents. If the action is one which ought to be done, +we are responsible for the doing of it, if we know that upon our +willing it, it will be done; although at this very moment there +is no such correlation between the action and the will, as to +form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act of +willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, +we are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to +will it, it would not be done; although at this very moment there +is such a correlation between the action, and the state of the +will, as to form the cause or motive by which the act of willing +comes necessarily to exist. The metaphysical or philosophical +inquiry respecting the correlation of the state of the will and +any action, or respecting the want of such a correlation, is +foreign to the question of duty and responsibility. This question +relates only to the volition and its connexion with its +consequents.</p> +<p class="pns">This does not clash at all with the common +sentiment that our actions are to be judged of by our motives; +for this sentiment does not respect volitions in relation to +their cause, but external actions in relation to the volitions +which produce them. These external actions may be in themselves +good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force or +power may have come in between the volition and its object, and +changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an +event different from the will or intention; although being in +connexion with the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: +or the immediate act which appears good, may, in the mind of the +agent be merely part of an extended plan or chain of volitions, +whose last action or result is evil. It is common, therefore, to +say of an external action, we must know what the man intends, +before we pronounce upon him; which is the same thing as to say +we must know what his volition really is, or what his motive +is—that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but the +volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause +of these effects;—which again, is the same thing as to say, that +before we can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what +effects he really intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it +is which is really connected in his mind with the sense of the +most agreeable.</p> +<p class="pt1">Edwards and Locke.</p> +<p class="pn">Their systems are one: there is no difference in +the principle. Edwards represents the will as necessarily +determined so does Locke. Edwards places liberty in the unimpeded +connexion of volition with its stated sequents—so does Locke.</p> +<p class="pn">They differ only in the mode of developing the +necessary determination of will. According to Locke, desire is in +itself a necessary modification of our being produced in its +correlation with objects; and volition is a necessary consequent +of desire when excited at any given moment to a degree which +gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at that moment. “The +greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that is +constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in +its choice of the next action.” (book 2. ch. 21, § 40.) According +to Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, +and the strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that +moment.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards’s analysis is more nice than Locke’s, and +his whole developement more true to the great principle of the +system—necessary determination. Locke, in distinguishing the will +from the desire, seems about to launch into a different +psychology, and one destructive of the principle.</p> +<h1><a name="Consequences" id="Consequences">II.</a></h1> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">THE +LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</p> +<p class="pnn">T<span class="sc">hese</span> consequences must, I +am aware, be deduced with the greatest care and clearness. The +deduction must be influenced by no passion or prejudice. It must +be purely and severely logical—and such I shall endeavour to make +it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has himself +made.</p> +<p class="pn">I. There is no self-determining power of will, and +of course no liberty consisting in a self-determining power.</p> +<p class="pn">A self-determining power of will is a supposed +power, which will has to determine its own volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of +desire, emotion, or passion.</p> +<p class="pn">Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of +the most agreeable at any given moment.</p> +<p class="pn">Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of +the will, or sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature +and circumstances of the object.</p> +<p class="pn">Now, if the will determined itself, it would +determine its own state, in relation to objects. But to determine +is to act, and therefore, for the will to determine is for the +will to act; and for the will to determine itself, is for the +will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the will is a +volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to create +a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this +antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same +way. We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an +indefinite series of volitions, without any first volition; +consequently we shall have no self-determiner after all, because +we can arrive at no first determiner, and thus the idea of +self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again, we shall have +effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of the case +never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are +thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the +negative of cause.</p> +<p class="pn">Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can +question. If Edwards’s psychology be right, and if +self-determination implies a will to will, or choosing a choice, +then a self-determining power is the greatest absurdity +possible.</p> +<p class="pn">II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that +God can exercise a perfect control over his intelligent +creatures, or administer perfectly a moral government consisting +in the influence of motives.</p> +<p class="pn">To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in +reference to required determinations. And when an individual is +removed from the motives adapted to his state of mind, the +Almighty Providence can so order events as to bring him into +contiguity with the motives.</p> +<p class="pn">If the state of mind should be such that no motives +can be made available in reference to a particular determination, +it is dearly supposable that he who made the soul of man, may +exert a direct influence over this state of mind, and cause it to +answer to the motives presented. Whether there are motives +adapted to every state of mind, in reference to every possible +determination required by the Almighty Lawgiver, so as to render +it unnecessary to exert a direct influence over the will, is a +question which I am not called upon here to answer. But in either +case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute, +fore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as +well as the physical world; and the election of a certain number +to eternal life, and the making of this election sure, are +necessary and plain consequences of this system. And as God is a +being all-wise and good, we may feel assured in connexion with +this system, that, in the working out of his great plan, whatever +evil may appear in the progress of its developement, the grand +consummation will show that all things have been working together +for good.</p> +<p class="pn">III. It is plainly deducible from this system that +moral beings exert an influence over each other by the +presentation of motives. And thus efforts may be made either to +the injury or benefit of society.</p> +<p class="pns">IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of +responsibility, the consciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and +consequently the expectation of punishment or reward, connect +themselves simply with the nature of the mere fact of +volition.—that is, if this is a true and complete representation +of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon the mere +fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly +independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go +forth.</p> +<p class="pn">Thus we may view the system in relation both to God +and to man.</p> +<p class="pn">In relation to God. It makes him supreme and +absolute—foreseeing and fore-determining, and bringing everything +to pass according to infinite wisdom, and by the energy of an +infinite will.</p> +<p class="pn">In relation to man. It shuts him up to the +consideration of the simple fact of volition, and its connexion +as a stated or established antecedent with certain effects. He is +free to accomplish these effects, because he can accomplish them +if he will. He is free to forbear, because he can forbear if he +will. It is affirmed to be the common judgement of men, and of +course universally a fact of consciousness, that an individual is +fully responsible for the doing of anything which ought to be +done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a volition: +that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong, +because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and +to be rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by +his volition. In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from +right-doing on the plea of <i>moral inability;</i> this is +<i>metaphysical</i> inability, and transcends the sphere of +volition. He can do it if he will—and therefore he has all the +ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but +a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can +do nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore +that which goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and +impossible to his effort.</p> +<p class="pn">In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for +wrong-doing on the ground of moral <i>necessity</i>. This +<i>moral necessity</i> is <i>metaphysical</i> necessity, and +transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne to do +wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been +wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of +evil, anything with which the agent has any concern, and for +which he is under any responsibility, but the volition. By his +volitions simply is he to be tried. No court of justice, human or +divine, that we can conceive of, could admit the plea—“I did not +the good because I had not the will to do it,” or “I did the evil +because I had the will to do it.” “This is your guilt,” would be +the reply of the judge, “that you had no will to do the good—that +you had a will to do the evil.”</p> +<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +<p class="pn">We must now take up a different class of +deductions. They are such as those abettors of this system who +wish to sustain the great interests of morality and religion do +not make, but strenuously contend against. If however they are +logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against them. I am +conscious of no wish to <i>force</i> them upon the system, and do +most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge +for himself, but let him judge <i>thoughtfully</i> and +<i>candidly</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and +unconditional necessity, particular and general.</p> +<p class="pn">1. A particular necessity—a necessity absolute in +relation to the individual.</p> +<p class="pn">It is granted in the system, that the connexion of +motive and volition is necessary with an absolute necessity, +because this precedes and therefore is not within the reach of +the volition. So also, the state of mind, and the nature and +circumstances of the object in relation to this state, forming a +correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent upon a cause, +beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make its +motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive, +and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first +cause. Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are +related by an absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the +effect of motive, being necessary also with an absolute +necessity, the only place for freedom that remains, if freedom be +possible, is the connexion of volition and effects, internal and +external. And this is the only place of freedom which this system +claims. But what new characteristic appears in this relation? +Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and sequents? I +will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will to +sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established +antecedent to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to +think on a certain subject, I think on that subject. The volition +of selecting a subject, and the volition of attending to it, are +stated antecedents to that mental operation which we call +thought. We have here only another instance of cause and effect; +the relation being one as absolute and necessary as any other +relation of cause and effect. The curious organism by which a +choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces muscular +movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual +man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause +beyond the sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which +connects volition with thinking is also pre-established, and +beyond the sphere of volition. As the volition itself appears by +an absolute necessity in relation to the individual man, so also +do the stated sequents or effects of volition appear by an +absolute necessity in relation to him.</p> +<p class="pn">It is true, indeed, that the connexion between +volition and its objects may be interrupted by forces coming +between, or overcome by superior forces, but this is common to +cause and effect, and forms no peculiar characteristic; it is a +lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome by a greater. +Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force does not +prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still be +necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the +truth in respect of volition, according to this system. The +volition could have no being without a motive, and when the +motive is present it must have a being, and no sooner does it +appear than its effects follow, unless impeded. If impeded, then +we have two trains of causes coming into collision, and the same +necessity which brought them together, gives the ascendency to +the one or the other.</p> +<p class="pn">It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, +that necessity, absolute and unconditional, as far at least as +the man himself is concerned, reigns in the relation of volition +and its effect, if the volition itself be a necessary existence. +All that precedes volition is necessary; volition itself is +necessary. All that follows volition is necessary: Humanity is +but a link of the inevitable chain.</p> +<p class="pn">2. General necessity—a necessity absolute, in +relation to all being and causality, and applicable to all +events.</p> +<p class="pn">An event proved to be necessary in relation to an +individual—is this event likewise necessary in the whole train of +its relations? Let this event be a volition of a given +individual; it is necessary in relation to that individual. Now +it must be supposed to have a connexion by a chain of sequents +and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take any +particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that +antecedent and sequent, in its particular place and relations, +can be proved necessary in the same way that the volition is +proved necessary in its particular place and relations; that is, +the antecedent being given under the particular circumstances, +the sequent must follow. But the antecedent is linked by like +necessity to another antecedent, of which it is the sequent; and +the sequent is linked by like necessity to another sequent, of +which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole chain, from the +given necessary volition up to the first cause, is necessary. We +come therefore at last to consider the connexion between the +first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is +this a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded +as a volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will +the first sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that +sequent should appear. But the volition itself cannot really be +the first antecedent or cause, because volition or choice, from +its very nature, must itself have a determiner or antecedent. +What is this antecedent? The motive:—for self-determination, in +the sense of the will determining itself, would involve the same +absurdities on this system in relation to God as in relation to +man; since it is represented as an absurdity in its own nature—it +is determining a volition by a volition, in endless +retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine +volition, what is the nature of the connexion between the motive +and the volition? It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for +there is nothing to render it otherwise, save the divine will. +But the divine will cannot be supposed to do this, for the motive +is already taken to be the ground and cause of the action of the +divine will. The necessity which applies to volition, in the +nature of the case must therefore apply to the divine volition. +No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the divine will, +except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and +goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the +divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This +Edwards expressly affirms—“If God’s will is steadily and surely +determined in everything by <i>supreme</i> wisdom, then it is in +everything <i>necessarily determined</i> to that which is +<i>most</i> wise.” (p. 230.) That the universe is governed by +infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought, and is +abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a +government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most +excellent government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be +contended for. Let us not, however, wander from the question, and +in representing it as the government of wisdom, forget that it is +a government of necessity, and that absolute. The volition, +therefore, with which we started, is at last traced up to a +necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final cause; for +here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.</p> +<p class="pn">What we have thus proved in relation to one +volition, must be equally true in reference to every other +volition and every other event, for the reasoning must apply to +every possible case. Every volition, every event, must be traced +up to a first and final cause, and this must be necessary and +infinite wisdom.</p> +<p class="pn">II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that +every volition or event is both necessary, and necessarily the +best possible in its place and relations.</p> +<p class="pn">The whole system of things had its origin in +infinite and necessary wisdom. All volitions and events have +their last and efficient cause in infinite and necessary wisdom. +All that has been, all that is, all that can be, are connected by +an absolute necessity with the same great source. It would be the +height of absurdity to suppose it possible for any thing to be +different from what it is, or to suppose that any change could +make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute +necessity,—and all that is, is just what and where infinite +wisdom has made it, and disposed of it.</p> +<p class="pn">III. If that which we call evil, in reality be +evil, then it must be both necessary evil and evil having its +origin in infinite wisdom. It is in vain to say that man is the +agent, in the common acceptation of the word; that he is the +author, because the particular volitions are his. These volitions +are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried back to the +one great source of all being and events. Hence,</p> +<p class="pn">IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every +volition which appears in him, appears by an absolute +necessity,—and it cannot be supposed to be otherwise than it is. +Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only the perception of +the difference between right and wrong, and the conviction that +the right ought to be done, but the possession of a power to do +the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition is +fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual +be supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, +nor, all things considered, can it be supposed there could have +been, at that precise moment and in that precise relation, any +other volition. The volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite +and necessary wisdom. We cannot escape from this difficulty by +perpetually running the changes of—“He can if he will,”—“He could +if he would,”—“There is nothing wanting but a will,”—“He has a +natural ability,” &c. &c. Let us not deceive ourselves, +and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by these words, “he +can if he will”! but he cannot if he don’t will. The will is +wanting,—and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot +appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be +obtained? The man cannot change one volition for another. By +supposition, he has not the moral or metaphysical ability,—and +yet this is the only ability that can produce the new volition. +It is passing strange that the power upon which volition is +absolutely dependent, should be set aside by calling it +<i>metaphysical</i>,—and the man blamed for an act because the +consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the +necessary consequent of this power! The man is only in his +volition. The volition is good or bad in itself. The cause of +volition is none of his concern, because it transcends volition. +He can if he will. That is enough for him! But it is not enough +to make him blameable, when whether he will or not depends not +only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the antecedent +itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.</p> +<p class="pn">I am not now disputing the philosophy. The +philosophy may be true; it may be very good: but then we must +take its consequences along with it; and this is all that I now +insist upon.</p> +<p class="pn">V. It is another consequence of this system, that +there can be nothing evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and +goodness are the highest form of moral perfection, as indeed +their very names imply, then all the necessary consequences of +these must partake of their nature. Infinite wisdom and goodness, +as principles, can only envelope parts of themselves. It would be +the destruction of all logic to deny this. It would annihilate +every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be said that +infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what is +essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do +transgress this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. +The promulgation of the law was a necessary developement of +infinite wisdom; and the volition which transgresses it is a +developement of the same nature. If this seems contradictory, I +cannot help it. It is drawn from the system, and the system alone +is responsible for its conclusions.</p> +<p class="pn">If it should be replied here, that every system +must be subject to the same difficulty, because if evil had a +beginning, it must have had a holy cause, inasmuch as it could +not exist before it began to exist,—I answer, this would be true +if evil is the <i>necessary</i> developement of a holy cause. But +more of this hereafter.</p> +<p class="pn">VI. The system of Edwards is a system of +utilitarianism. Every volition being the sense of the most +agreeable, and arising from the correlation of the object and the +sensitivity; it follows that every motive and every action comes +under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of gratification +or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no collision +between principle and passion, because principle can have no +power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most +agreeable. Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain +sway only by uniting with desire, and thus coming under +conditions of yielding the highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and +benevolence, when obeyed, therefore, are not obeyed as such, but +simply as the most agreeable; and so also injustice, falsehood, +and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most +agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as the quality +of all motive and the universal principle of the determinations +of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We may +indeed <i>speculate</i> respecting these distinctions,—we may say +that justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in +itself; but this judgement has practical efficiency only as one +of the terms takes the form of the most agreeable. But we have +seen that the most agreeable depends upon the state of the +sensitivity in correlation with the object,—a state and a +correlation antecedent to action; and that therefore it is a +necessary law of our being, to be determined by the greatest +apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not +only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of +action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that +we can act.</p> +<p class="pn">VII. It follows from this system, again, that no +individual can make an effort to change the habitual character of +his volitions,—and of course cannot resist his passions, or +introduce any intellectual or moral discipline other than that in +which he is actually placed, or undertake any enterprise that +shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged, or not part +or consequent of the same.</p> +<p class="pn">If he effect any change directly in the habitual +character of his volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, +he must will different from his actual will,—his will must oppose +itself in its own act: but this is absurd, the system itself +being judge. As, therefore, the will cannot oppose itself, a new +volition can be obtained only by presenting a new motive; but +this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is to call up +new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state of +the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering +under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself +must be changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a +change must take place both of subject and object, for the motive +lies in the correlation of the two. But the volition to call up +new objects and circumstances in relation to some principle of +the mind that had been slumbering,—for example, fear, must itself +have a motive; but the motive to call up objects of fear must +preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then of necessity +the volition to call up objects of fear will take place; and, it +will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the +actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such +motive pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a +new motive, to cause the choice of objects of fear; and here +would be a recurrence of the original difficulty,—and so on, ad +infinitum.</p> +<p class="pn">If the problem be to effect a change in the state +of the mind in relation to existing objects, in the first place, +this cannot be effected by a direct act of will, for the act of +will is caused by the state of mind, and this would be an effect +changing or annihilating its cause.</p> +<p class="pn">Nor can it be done indirectly. For to do it +indirectly, would be to bring influences to bear upon the state +of mind or the sensitivity; but the choice and volition of these +influences would require a motive—but the motive to change the +state of mind must pre-exist in the state of mind itself. And +thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility of finding +a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its +change. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a +change, but a new developement of the long chain of the necessary +causes and volitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we +must find a motive to change the state of mind in order to a +change of the state: but this motive, if it exist, must pre-exist +in the state of mind. If it pre-exist, then no change is +required; if it do not; then we must seek still an antecedent +motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the problem be to +change both subject and object, the same difficulties exist in +two-fold abundance.</p> +<p class="pn">The grand difficulty is to find a <i>primum +mobile</i>, or first mover, when the very act of seeking implies +a <i>primum mobile</i>, which the conditions of the act deny.</p> +<p class="pn">Any new discipline, therefore, intellectual or +moral, a discipline opposite to that which the present state of +the mind would naturally and necessarily bring about, is +impossible.</p> +<p class="pn">Of course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to +deny or mortify one’s self. The present volition is as the +strongest present desire—indeed, is the strongest present desire +itself. “Will and desire do not run counter at all.” “A man never +in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or +desires anything contrary to his will.” (p. 17.) Hence to +restrain a present passion would be to will against will—would be +to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may be +relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome +the weaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the +man; it is utterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance, +for his whole power, activity, and volition, are in the desire +itself.</p> +<p class="pn">He can do nothing but will; and the nature and +direction of his volitions are, at least in reference to any +effort of his own, immutable as necessity itself.</p> +<p class="pn">VIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call +upon the man to bestir himself, to think, to plan, to act, are +inconsistent and absurd. In all such exhortations and +persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth volitions, as +if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It may be +replied, ‘that the man does will, that the volitions are his +volitions.’ But then he wills only passively, and these volitions +are his only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort +and persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his +real condition according to this system? The exhortations and +persuasions do themselves contain the motive power: and instead +of arousing himself to action, he is absolutely and necessarily +passive under the motives you present. Whether he be moved or +not, as truly and absolutely depends upon the motives you +present, as the removing of any material mass depends upon the +power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether it be +wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse +itself as the man; and the man’s volition is his volition in no +other sense than the motion of the material mass is its motion. +In the one case, the man perceives; and in the other case, the +material mass does not perceive—but perception is granted by all +parties to be necessary; the addition of perception, therefore, +only modifies the character of the being moved, without altering +the nature of his relation to the power which moves him. In the +material mass, too, we have an analogous property, so far as +motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine the will +unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power +move the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of +parts. If I have but the wisdom to discover the proper +correlation of object and sensitivity in the case of individuals +or of masses of men, I can command them in any direction I +please, with a necessity no less absolute than that with which a +machine is caused to work by the application of a steam or +water-power.</p> +<p class="pn">When I bring motives before the minds of my +fellow-beings in the proper relation, the volition is necessarily +produced; but let me not forget, that in bringing these motives I +put forth volitions, and that of course I am myself moved under +the necessity of some antecedent motive. My persuasions and +exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as necessary +antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the +wheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and +persuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must +yield when the motives are properly selected.</p> +<p class="pn">IX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when +obeyed and yielded to, are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary +force which they possess in relation to the state of mind to +which they are addressed. When not obeyed and yielded to, they +fail necessarily, through a moral inability on the part of the +mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want of a proper +correlation between them and the state of mind addressed: that +is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the +required volitions, and their existence of course is an utter +impossibility.</p> +<p class="pn">Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce +volitions of obedience and submission, only as they produce the +sense of the most agreeable; and as the will of the creature can +have no part in producing this sense, since this would be +producing a volition by a volition, it is produced in a +correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a positive +necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that +no enlargement here is required.</p> +<p class="pn">When no obedience and submission take place, it is +because the divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, do not +produce the sense of the most agreeable. And as the will of the +creature can have no part in producing this sense, since this +would be producing a volition by a volition; and as it is +produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a +positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have +no part in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition +of obedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations +of the antecedent correlations of certain objects with the +subject, and are necessarily determined by the nature of the +correlation.</p> +<p class="pn">Now the Divine Being must know the precise relation +which his commands will necessarily hold to the vast variety of +mind to which they are addressed, and consequently must know in +what cases obedience will be produced, and in what cases +disobedience. Both results are equally necessary. The commands +have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a two-fold office. When +they come into connexion with certain states of mind, they +necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in +connexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly +produce what we call rebellion: and as all volitions are +predetermined and fixed by a necessary and infinite wisdom, and +are therefore in their time and place the best, it must follow +that rebellion no less than obedience is a wise and desirable +result.</p> +<p class="pn">The consequences I am here deducing seem almost too +shocking to utter. But show me, he that can, that they are not +logical deductions from this system? I press the system to its +consequences,—not to throw any reproach upon those great and good +men who unfortunately were led away by a false philosophy, but to +expose and bring to its close this philosophy itself. It has too +long been consecrated by its association with the good. I know I +shall be justified in the honest, though bold work, of destroying +this unnatural and portentous alliance.</p> +<p class="pn">X. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of +retribution cannot, according to this system, have a real and +necessary connexion with any volitions, but must be regarded as +prejudices or errors of education, from which philosophy will +serve to relieve us.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that +virtue and vice lie essentially in the volitions themselves, and +that of course the consciousness of evil volitions is the +consciousness of guilt. I will, or put forth volitions. The +volitions are mine, and therefore I am guilty. This reasoning is +plausible, but not consequential; for, according to this system, +I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the volitions appear +necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my consciousness, and +really are mine only because they are produced in me. Connected +with this may be the perception that those volitions are wrong; +but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary, +and that to suppose them different from what they are, is to +suppose what could not possibly have been,—since a series of +sequents and antecedents connect these volitions which now +appear, by absolutely necessary relations, with a first and +necessary cause,—then the sense of guilt and shame, and the +judgement I ought to be punished, can have no place in the human +mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will, and, according to +the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when I will +wrong,—if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will +under the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent +motive. The common judgement of mankind is an error, and +philosophy must soon dissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and +of moral desert, which have hitherto annoyed me and made me +fearful: and much more must such a result ensue, when I take into +consideration, likewise, that the necessity which determines me, +is a necessity which takes its rise in infinite and necessary +wisdom.</p> +<p class="pn">What is true of guilt and retribution is true also +of well-doing and reward. If I do well, the volitions being +determined by an antecedent necessity, I could not possibly have +done otherwise. It does not answer the conditions of the case at +all, to say I might have done otherwise, if I had willed to do +otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am doing, is a +will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in any +action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the +conviction that the choice of this action was a necessary choice, +predetermined in a long and unbroken chain of necessary +antecedents, and the sense of praiseworthiness, and the judgement +I ought to be rewarded, remain no longer.</p> +<p class="pn">Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with +our volitions, under the impression that the good we perform, we +perform in opposition to temptation, and with the power and +possibility of doing evil; and that the evil we perform, we +perform in opposition to motives of good, and with the power and +possibility of doing good. But when we are informed that all the +power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual conduct +is this,—that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there would +have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the +volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been +otherwise,—we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We +perhaps are first led to doubt the philosophy,—or if, by acute +reasonings, or by the authority of great names, we are influenced +to yield an implicit belief,—the sense of merit and demerit must +either die away, or be maintained by a hasty retreat from the +regions of speculation to those of common sense.</p> +<p class="pn">XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature +and spirit, as causes or agents, cannot be distinguished in their +operations.</p> +<p class="pn">There are three classes of natural causes or agents +generally acknowledged 1. Inanimate,—as water, wind, steam, +magnetism, &c.; 2. Animate, but insensible,—as the life and +affinities of plants; 3. Animate and sensitive, or brute animal +power.</p> +<p class="pn">These all properly come under the denomination of +<i>natural</i>, because they are alike <i>necessitated</i>. +“Whatever is comprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and +effect, of course necessitated, and having its necessity in some +other thing antecedent or concurrent,—this is said to be +<i>natural</i>; and the aggregate and system of all such things +is <i>nature</i>.” Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this +system, comes under the same definition: in all its acts it is +necessitated. It is in will particularly that man is taken as a +cause or agent, because it is by will that he directly produces +phenomena or effects; and by this system it is not possible to +distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is considered, a chain +of antecedents and sequents made up of motives, volitions, and +the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents and +antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of +natural agents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and +distinguishing characteristics; but in the relation of +antecedence and sequence,—their relation as causes or agents +producing effects,—no distinction can be perceived. Wind, water, +&c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms another; brute +organization and sensitivity another; intelligent volition +another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and +therefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of +nature. The difference which exists between them is a difference +of terms merely. There is no difference in the nature of the +relation between the terms. The nature of the relation between +the water-wheel and the water,—of the relation between the +organic life of plants and their developement,—of the relation +between passion and volition in brutes,—of the relation between +their efforts and material effects,—and the nature of the +relation between motive and volition,—are one: it is the relation +of cause and effect considered as stated antecedent and sequent, +and no more and no less necessary in one subject than in +another.</p> +<p class="pn">XII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by +external objects, and all emotions following perception, and all +the acts of the intelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or +in ratiocination, are as really our acts, and acts for which we +are as really responsible, if responsibility be granted to exist, +as acts of volition. Sensations, emotions, perceptions, +reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in our consciousness; +they are not created by our volitions, like the motions of the +hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just as +volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to +all is precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of +these affections of his being; he is simply the subject: the +subject of sensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning, +and of volition; and he is the subject of all by the same +necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">XIII. The system of punishment is only a system +accommodated to the opinions of society.</p> +<p class="pn">There is nothing evil in itself, according to this +system of necessity, as we have already shown. Every thing which +takes place is, in its time, place, and relations generally, the +necessary result of necessary and infinite wisdom. But still it +is a fact that society are desirous of preventing certain +acts,—such as stealing, adultery, murder, &c.; and they are +necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere +collection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the +emotion of fear, which prevent the commission of these acts. +Where these acts do take place, it is best they should take +place; but where they are prevented by the fear of punishment, it +is best they should be prevented. Where the criminal suffers, he +has no right to complain, because it is best that he should +suffer; and yet, if he does complain, it is best that he should +complain. The system of punishment is good, as every thing else +is good. The system of divine punishments must be considered in +the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when properly +considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in the +pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events.</p> +<p class="pn">XIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there +cannot really be any calamity. The calamities which we may at any +time experience, we ought to endure and rejoice in, as flowing +from the same perfect and necessary source. But as calamity does +nevertheless necessarily produce suffering and uneasiness, and +the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope that perfect +relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that the +final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the +present suffering.</p> +<p class="pn">The necessitarian may be an optimist of a high +order. It he commits what is called crime, and remorse succeeds, +and punishment is inflicted under law, the crime is good, the +remorse is good, the punishment is good, all necessary and good, +and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure happiness. Nothing +can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but even this will +probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all +afflictions: they must be good in themselves, although +disagreeable,—and will probably lead the way to the agreeable, +just as hunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way +to the enjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity, +and of a necessary and perfect wisdom.</p> +<p class="pn">XV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary +and perfect wisdom, there really can no more be folly in conduct, +or error in reasoning and belief, than there can be crime and +calamity, considered as evils in themselves. Every act that we +call folly is a necessary act, in its time, place, and relations +generally, and is a necessary consequence of the infinite wisdom; +but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom cannot be opposed +to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when +philosophically considered, ceases to be folly.</p> +<p class="pn">In any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem +necessary, and the assent of the mind is necessary. This is +granted by all parties. But it must be admitted, that when men +are said to reason falsely, and to yield their assent to false +conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them; and, according +to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem +otherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary.</p> +<p class="pn">The reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning, +because it so necessarily seems to them; but to the individual to +whom it seems different, it must really be different, and be good +and valid reasoning.</p> +<p class="pn">Again: as all these different reasonings and +beliefs proceed necessarily from the same source, they must all +be really true where they seem true, and all really false where +they seem false. It would follow, from this, that no one can +really be in a false position except the hypocrite and sophist, +pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and what +he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false +conclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were +we not compelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite +and sophist cannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his +position is a necessary one, predetermined in its necessary +connexion with the first necessary wisdom.</p> +<p class="pn">XVI. Another consequence of this system is +fatalism,—or, perhaps, more properly speaking, the system is +itself a system of fatalism.</p> +<p class="pn">This, indeed, has already been made to appear +substantially. The word, however, has not yet been used. I here, +then, charge directly this consequence or feature upon the +system.</p> +<p class="pn">Fatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This +system is fatalism, because it is the absolute negation of +liberty.</p> +<p class="pn">No liberty is contended for, in this system, in +relation to man, but physical liberty: viz. that when he wills, +the effect will follow,—that when he wills to walk, he walks, +&c. “Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power, +opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases, +or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure, +without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is.” (p. +291.)</p> +<p class="pn">In the first place, this is no higher liberty than +what brutes possess. They have power, opportunity, or advantage, +to do as they please. Effects follow their volitions by as +certain a law as effects follow the volitions of men.</p> +<p class="pn">In the second place, this is no higher liberty than +slaves possess. Slaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive +be the lash, or the fear of the lash, still, in their case as +well as in that of brutes under similar circumstances, the +volition which takes place is the most pleasing at the moment. +The slave and the animal do what is most pleasing to them, or do +according to their pleasure, When the one drags the plough and +the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal, +rational or irrational, to act without doing what is most +pleasing to him or it. Volition is always as the greatest +apparent good, or as the sense of the most pleasant or +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">If any should reply that slaves and animals are +<i>liable</i> to be fettered, and this distinguishes them from +the free, I rejoin that every being is liable to various +restraints; none of us can do many things which in themselves +appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there were +known to be an established connexion between them and our wills. +We are limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us; +we cannot overturn mountains, or command the winds. We are +limited in the nature of our physical being. We are limited by +our want of wealth, knowledge, and influence. In all these +respects, we may, with as much propriety as the slave, be +regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say that, +as we never really will what we know to be impossible or +impracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or +a want of liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to +the fettered slave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows +it to be impossible. But in relation to him as well as to every +other being, according to this system it holds true, that whether +he act or forbear to act, his volitions are as the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">All creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are +to be accounted free, and one really as free as another.</p> +<p class="pn">In the third place, the liberty here affirmed +belongs equally to every instance of stated antecedence and +sequence.</p> +<p class="pn">The liberty which is taken to reside in the +connexion between volition and effects, is a liberty lying in a +connexion of stated antecedence and sequence, and is perfect +according as this connexion is necessary and unimpeded. The +highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the most +absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also +with power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where +power is the greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most +obstacles and moves on irresistibly to its effects, there is the +greatest degree of liberty. God is the most free of all beings, +because nothing can impede his will. His volitions are always the +antecedents of effects.</p> +<p class="pn">But obviously we do not alter the relation, when we +change the terms. If liberty lie in the stated antecedence of +volition to effects, and if liberty is measured by the necessity +of the relation, then when the antecedent is changed, the +relation remaining the same, liberty must still be present. For +example: when a volition to move the arm is followed by a motion +of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be substituted +for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place; and as +freedom is doing as we please, or will, “without considering how +this pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;” that is, without +taking its motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be +affirmed to be doing according to the galvanic impulse, “without +considering how” that impulse “comes to be as it is.”</p> +<p class="pn">If we take any other instance of stated antecedence +and sequence, the reasoning is the same. For example, a water +wheel in relation to the mill-stone: when the wheel turns, the +mill-stone moves. In this case freedom may be defined: the +mill-stone moving according to the turn of the wheel, “without +considering how” that turn of the wheel “comes to be as it is.” +In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing according +to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes to +be as it is; doing “according to choice, without taking into the +meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice.” (p. +39.)</p> +<p class="pn">If it be said that in the case of volition, we have +the man of whom to affirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel +and mill-stone, we have nothing of which liberty can properly be +affirmed. I reply, that liberty must be affirmed, and is properly +affirmed, of that to which it really belongs; and hence as +volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual essence, man; and +this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because volition +appears in it, and is attended by consequences:—so, likewise, the +material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because +motion belongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every +being that has volition is free, so likewise every thing that +hath motion is free:—in every instance of cause and effect, we +meet with liberty.</p> +<p class="pn">But volition cannot be the characteristic of +liberty, if volition itself be governed by necessity: and yet +this system which affirms liberty, wherever there is unimpeded +volition, makes volition a necessary determination. In the fact +of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to all creatures that +have volition; and then again, in the fact of the necessary +determination of volition it destroys the possibility of liberty. +But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new +feature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between +volition and its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary +and absolute as the connexion between the motive and the +volition, and between any antecedent and sequent whatever. That +my arm should move when I make a volition to this effect, is just +as necessary and just as incomprehensible too, as that water +should freeze at a given temperature: when the volition is +impeded, we have only another instance of necessity,—a lesser +force overcome by a greater.</p> +<p class="pn">The liberty therefore which this system affirms in +the fact of volition and its unimpeded connexion with its +consequents, is an assumption—a mere name. It is a part of the +universal necessity arbitrarily distinguished and named, its +liberty does not reside in human volition, so neither can it +reside in the divine volition. The necessary dependence of +volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of effects upon +volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind than from +ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the +universal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically +considered. The creation of volition by volition is absurd in +itself—it cannot but be an absurdity. The determination of will +by the strongest motive, if a truth is a truth universally; on +this system, it contains the whole cause and possibility of +volition. The whole liberty of God, it is affirmed, is contained +in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other words, that what he +wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished: what pleases +him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His +liberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from +necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">If the movements of mind are necessary, no argument +is required to prove that all being and events are necessary. We +are thus bound up in a universal necessity. Whatever is, is, and +cannot be otherwise, and could not have been otherwise. As +therefore there is no liberty, we are reduced to the only +remaining alternative of fatalism.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the +charge of fatalism. (part iv. § vi.) In relation to the Stoics, +he remarks:—“It seems they differed among themselves; and +probably the doctrine of <i>fate</i> as maintained by most of +them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their +doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant +to any <i>liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,</i> I +utterly deny such a fate.” He objects to fatalism only when it +should deny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our +sense of the most agreeable, that is our volition. But this +connexion we have fully proved to be as necessary as the +connexion between the volition and its motive. This reservation +therefore does not save him from fatalism.</p> +<p class="pn">In the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents +the liberty and sovereignty of God as consisting in an ability +“to do whatever pleases him.” His idea of the divine liberty, +therefore, is the same as that attributed to man. That the divine +volitions are necessarily determined, he repeatedly affirms, and +indeed represents as the great excellence of the divine nature, +because this necessity of determination is laid in the infinite +wisdom and perfection of his nature.</p> +<p class="pn">If necessity govern all being and events, it is +cheering to know that it is necessity under the forms of infinite +wisdom and benevolence. But still it remains true that necessity +governs. If “it is no disadvantage or dishonour to a being, +<i>necessarily</i> to act in the most excellent and happy manner +from the necessary perfection of his own nature,” still let us +remember that under this representation <i>he does act +necessarily</i>. Fate must have some quality or form; it must be +what we call good or evil: but in determining its quality, we do +not destroy its nature. Now if we call this fate a nature of +goodness and wisdom, eternal and infinite, we present it under +forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but it is nevertheless +fate,—and as such it governs the divine volitions; and through +the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of these +volitions;—the universe of being and things is determined by +fate;—and all volitions of angels or men are determined by +fate—by this fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all +things thus <i>proceeding</i> from fate were beautiful, benign, +and glorious, the theory might not alarm us. But that deformity, +crime, and calamity should have place as developements of this +fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of this system, however, +may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion that +deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but +of the limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance +in point in Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as “a +very learned and pious disciple of Leibnitz.” Says Bonnet—“Thus +the same chain embraces the physical and moral world, binds the +past to the present, the present to the future, the future to +eternity. That wisdom which has ordained the existence of this +chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of which it is +composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is of +iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of +gold. <i>Both</i> are necessary parts of one whole, which could +not but exist. Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron +link? What absurdity! God esteems this link at its proper value. +He sees it in its cause, and he approves this cause, for it is +good. God beholds moral monsters as he beholds physical monsters. +Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy if he know that he is +<i>only fortunate</i>. He has attained the highest degree of +moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing that +what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must +occupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of +this system; the simile of the potter is its summary.” He might +have added, “Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not +guilty, but at worst <i>only unfortunate;</i> and really not +unfortunate, because holding a necessary place in the chain which +both as a whole and in its parts, is the result of infinite +wisdom.”</p> +<p class="pn">If anything more is required in order to establish +this consequence of the system we are examining, I would call +attention to the inquiry, whether after a contingent +self-determining will there remains any theory of action except +fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is a will which is +the cause of its own volitions or choices—a self-conscious power, +self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its choice, or +movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of +choosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what +conception have we to oppose to this but that of a will not +determining itself,—not the cause of its own volitions,—a power +not self-moved and directed,—and not conscious of ability at the +moment of a particular choice, to make a contrary choice? And +this last conception is a will whose volitions are determined by +some power antecedent to itself, not contingently, but +necessarily. As the will is the only power for which contingent +self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such +power, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and +causality will then be expressed as follows:</p> +<p class="pn">1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and +volitions. 2. Absolute and necessary connexion of volitions and +effects. 3. Absolute and necessary connexion of all sequents and +antecedents in nature. 4. Absolute and necessary connexion of all +things existent with a first and necessary principle or cause. 5. +The necessary determination of this principle or cause.</p> +<p class="pn">Denying a contingent self-determining will, this +theory is all that remains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in +the 2d particular of this theory, it becomes a mere arbitrary +designation, because the <i>nature</i> of the relation is granted +to be the same; it is not <i>contingent</i>, but necessary. Nor +can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in the +first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a +contingent self-determining will, by infinite series of +volitions, must apply to this great first principle considered as +God. And in the second place, the doctrine of the necessary +determination of motive must apply here likewise, since God as +will and intelligence requires motives no less than we do. Such +determination is represented as arising from the very nature of +mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to a +self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as +opposed to necessity. And this is all that can be meant by +fatalism. Liberty thus becomes a self-contradictory conception, +and fatalism alone is truth and reality.</p> +<p class="pn">XVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a +fair deduction from this system.</p> +<p class="pn">According to this system, God is the sole and +universal doer—the only efficient cause. 1. His volition is the +creative act, by which all beings and things exist. Thus far it +is generally conceded that God is all in all. “By him we live, +and move, and have our being.” 2. The active powers of the whole +system of nature he has constituted and regulated. The winds are +his messengers. The flaming fire his servant. However we may +conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting under +necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy, +in either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to +God. These movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are +executed directly or indirectly by his will. Every effect which +we produce in the material world, we produce by instrumentality. +Our arms, hands, &c. are our first instruments. All that we +do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute to ourselves. Now +if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of an axe, +spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the +same way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we +multiply the instruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do +the deed directly with my hand, or do it by an instrument held in +my hand, or by a concatenation of machinery, reaching from “the +centre to the utmost pole,”—if I contemplate the deed, and +designedly accomplish it in this way, the deed is mine. And not +only is the last deed contemplated as the end of all this +arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements produced as the +necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the last is +to be attained, are mine likewise.</p> +<p class="pn">I use powers and instruments whose energy and +capacity I have learned by experience, but in whose constitution +I have had no hand. They are provided for me, and I merely use +them. But God in working by these, works by what his own wisdom +and power have created; and therefore <i>a fortiori</i> must +every effect produced by these, according to his design, and by +his volition as at least the first power of the series, be +attributed to him,—be called his doing. He causeth the sun to +rise and set. “He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and +herb for the service of man.” “He watereth the hills from his +chambers.” This is not merely poetry. It is truth.</p> +<p class="pn">Now the system we are considering goes one step +further; it makes human volitions as much the objects of the +eternal design, and as really the effects of the divine volition, +as the rising of the stars, the flight of the lightning, the +tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth itself like a +garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is God’s +act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every +volition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a +pre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents +necessarily runs back and connects itself with the infinite +wisdom. God’s volition is his own act; the effect immediately +produced by that volition is his own deed. Let that effect be the +creation of man: the man in all his powers and susceptibilities +is God’s work; the objects around him are God’s work; the +correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man is God’s +work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result of +this correlation is God’s work. The volition of the man is as +strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common +apprehensions, the blow which I give with an axe is attributable +to me. What is true of the first man, must be equally true of the +man removed by a thousand generations, for the intermediary links +are all ordained by God under an inevitable necessity. God is +really, therefore, the sole doer—the only efficient, the only +cause. All beings and things, all motion and all volition, are +absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the author of +all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the +author of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all +in the same way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining +will, and there is no stopping-place between a human volition and +the divine volition. The human volition is but the divine, +manifested through a lengthened it may be, but a connected and +necessary chain of antecedents and sequents. I see no way of +escaping from this, as a necessary and legitimate consequence of +the necessary determination of will. And what is this consequence +but pantheism? God is the universal and all-pervading +intelligence—the universal and only power. Every movement of +nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because +necessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There +is no life but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He +is the soul of the world.</p> +<p class="pn">Spinosa never represented himself as an atheist, +and according to the following representation appears rather as a +pantheist. “He held that God is the <i>cause</i> of all things; +but that he acts, not from choice, but from necessity; and, of +consequence, that he is the involuntary author of all the good +and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human life.” +(Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.)</p> +<p class="pn">Cousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather +the reproach of pantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was +fairly deduced from the doctrine of necessary determination, +which he advocated.</p> +<p class="pn">XVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an +atheist. “It will not be disputed,” says Stewart, “by those who +comprehend the drift of his reasonings, that in point of +practical tendency atheism and Spinosism are one and the +same.”</p> +<p class="pn">The following is Cousin’s view of his system. It +apparently differs from the preceding in some respects, but +really tends to the same conclusions.</p> +<p class="pn">“Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought +to be reproached for an error in the other direction. Spinosa +starts from the perfect and infinite being of Descartes’s system, +and easily demonstrates that such a being is alone a being in +itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect, and relative, only +participates of being, without possessing it, in itself: that a +being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one +substance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal +existence: that to call phenomena, finite substances, is +affirming and denying, at the same time; whereas, there being, +but one substance which possesses being in itself, and the finite +being that which participates of existence without possessing it +in itself, a substance finite implies two contradictory notions. +Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and nature are pure +phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute substance, +but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for as +phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without +the perfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature +suppose God; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without +phenomena, the perfect without the imperfect, the infinite +without the finite, and God on his part supposes man and nature. +The error of his system lies in the predominance of the relation +of phenomenon to being, of attribute to substance, over the +relation of effect to cause. When man has been represented, not +as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and +uncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought; +God, or the supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance, +and not a cause—a being, perfect, infinite, necessary—the +immutable substance of the universe, and not its producing and +creating cause. In Cartesianism, the notion of substance figures +more conspicuously than that of cause; and this notion of +substance, altogether predominating, constitutes Spinosism.” +(Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.)</p> +<p class="pn">The predominance of the notion of substance and +attribute, over that of cause and effect, which Cousin here +pronounces the vice of Spinosa’s system, is indeed the vice of +every system which contains the dogma of the necessary +determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism; the +second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When +self-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into +mere desire, necessitated in all its acts from its +pre-constituted correlation with objects, then will really ceases +to be a cause. It becomes an instrument of antecedent power, but +is no power in itself, creative or productive. The reasoning +employed in reference to the human will, applies in all its force +to the divine will, as has been already abundantly shown. The +divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and becomes a mere +instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is the +infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom +is eternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what +tendencies or energies it has now, it always had; and therefore, +whatever volitions it now necessarily produces, it always +necessarily produced. If we conceive a volition to have been, in +one direction, the immediate and necessary antecedent of +creation; and, in another, the immediate and necessary sequent of +infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then this volition +must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as the +necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The +eternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because +this is existence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and +creation, consisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite, +participating only of existence, and not being existence in +themselves, are not substances, but phenomena. But what is the +relation of the phenomena to the substance? Not that of effect to +cause;—this relation slides entirely out of view, the moment will +ceases to be a cause. It is the relation simply of phenomena to +being, considered as the necessary and inseparable manifestations +of being; the relation of attributes to substance, considered as +the necessary and inseparable properties of substance. We cannot +conceive of substance without attributes or phenomena, nor of +attributes or phenomena without substance; they are, therefore, +co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and its +attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the +universe, as made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is +Spinosism; this is pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate +consequence of a necessitated will.</p> +<p class="pn">The second consequence is atheism. In the denial of +will as a cause <i>per se</i>,—in resolving all its volitions +into the necessary phenomena of the eternal substance,—we destroy +personality: we have nothing remaining but the universe. Now we +may call the universe God; but with equal propriety we call God +the universe. This destruction of personality,—this merging of +God into necessary substance and attributes,—is all that we mean +by Atheism. The conception is really the same, whether we name it +fate, pantheism, or atheism.</p> +<p class="pn">The following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that +he arrived at the same result: “Whatever may have been the +doctrines of some of the ancient atheists about man’s free +agency, it will not be denied that, in the history of modern +philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of necessity have been +hitherto always connected together. Not that I would by any means +be understood to say, that every necessitarian must <i>ipso +facto</i> be an atheist, or even that any presumption is +afforded, by a man’s attachment to the former sect, of his having +the slightest bias in favour of the latter; but only that every +modern atheist I have heard of has been a necessitarian. I cannot +help adding, that the most consistent necessitarian who have yet +appeared, have been those who followed out their principles till +they ended in <i>Spinosism</i>,—a doctrine which differs from +atheism more in words than in reality.” (Vol. 6, p. 470.)</p> +<p class="pn">Cudworth, in his great work entitled “The true +Intellectual System of the Universe,” shows clearly the connexion +between fatalism and atheism. This work seems to have grown out +of another undertaking, which contemplated specifically the +question of liberty and necessity, and its bearing upon morality +and religion. The passage in the preface, in which he informs us +of his original plan, is a very full expression of his opinion. +“First, therefore, I acknowledge,” says he, “that when I engaged +the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and +necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal +necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever +grounds or principles maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the +design of atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, +as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and +plainly rendering a day of judgement ridiculous.” This opinion of +the tendency of the doctrine of a necessitated will, is the germ +of his work. The connexion established in his mind between this +doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his masterly and +elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter.</p> +<p class="pns">The arguments of many atheists might be referred +to, to illustrate the connexion between necessity and atheism. I +shall here refer, however, to only one individual, remarkable +both for his poetic genius and metaphysical acumen. I mean the +late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly and unblushingly professed +atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line: “There is no God.” +In a note upon this line, he remarks: “This negation must be +understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a +pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains +unshaken.” This last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really +the negation of a creative Deity,—the identity or at least +necessary and eternal co-existence of God and the universe. +Shelley has expressed this clearly in another passage:</p> +<p class="p2">“Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,</p> +<p class="p2s">Necessity! thou mother of the world!”</p> +<p class="pns">In a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued +the doctrine of the necessary determination of will by motive, +with an acuteness and power scarcely inferior to Collins or +Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different application of the +doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and Edwards, +and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil +under insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base +religion upon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a +fog of subtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly +consistent, is perfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from +necessity to pantheism, and thence to atheism and the destruction +of all moral distinctions. “We are taught,” he remarks, “by the +doctrine of necessity, that there is neither good nor evil in the +universe, otherwise than as the events to which we apply these +epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of being. Still +less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine of +necessity accord with the belief of a future state of +punishment.”</p> +<p class="pn">I here close my deductions from this system. If +these deductions be legitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they +are, then, to the largest class of readers, the doctrine of +necessity is overthrown: it is overthrown by its consequences, +and my argument has the force of a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. +If a self-determined will appear an absurdity, still it cannot be +as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine involve the +consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will claim +that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral +and responsible nature.</p> +<p class="pn">A question will here very naturally arise: How can +we account for the fact that so many wise and good men have +contended for a necessitated will, as if they were contending for +the great basis of all morality and religion? For example, take +Edwards himself as a man of great thought and of most fervent +piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with the air and +manner of one who is opposing great errors as really connected +with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the +following language: “I think that the notion of liberty, +consisting in a <i>contingent self-determination of the will</i>, +as necessary to the morality of men’s dispositions and actions, +is almost inconceivably pernicious; and that the contrary truth +is one of the most important truths of moral philosophy that ever +was discussed, and most necessary to be known.” The question is a +fair one, and I will endeavour to answer it.</p> +<p class="pn">1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as +being in itself a contradictory idea, and as leading to the +consequence of affirming the existence of effects without causes, +takes strong hold of the mind in these individuals. This I +believe, and hope to prove in the course of this treatise, to be +a philosophical error;—but it is no new thing for great and good +men to fall into philosophical errors.</p> +<p class="pn">As, therefore, the liberty consisting in a +self-determining will, or the <i>liberty of indifference</i>, as +it has been technically called, is conceived to be exploded, they +endeavour to supply a <i>liberty of spontaneity</i>, or a liberty +lying in the unimpeded connexion between volition and +sequents.</p> +<p class="pn">Hobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in +a clearer manner than any of its advocates: “I conceive,” says +he, “liberty to be rightly defined,—the absence of all +impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature and +intrinsical quality of the agent. As for example, the water is +said to descend <i>freely</i>, or is said to have liberty to +descend by the channel of the river, because there is no +impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are +impediments: and though water cannot ascend, yet men never say, +it wants the <i>liberty</i> to ascend, but the <i>faculty</i> or +<i>power</i>, because the impediment is in the nature of the +water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants +the <i>liberty</i> to go, because the impediment is not in him, +but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is sick or +lame, because the impediment is in himself,”—that is, he wants +the faculty or power of going:—this constitutes natural +<i>inability</i>. Liberty is volition acting upon physical +instrumentalities, or upon mental faculties, according to a fixed +and constituted law of antecedents, and meeting with no +impediment or overcoming antagonistic power. Natural ability is +the fixed and constituted antecedence itself. Hence there may be +natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot be affirmed +without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute +responsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated +antecedent of certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent +existing without impediment or frustration. Since this is the +only possible liberty remaining, and as they have no wish to be +considered fatalists, they enlarge much upon this; not only as +the whole of liberty actually existing, but as the full and +satisfactory notion of liberty.</p> +<p class="pn">In basing responsibility and praise and +blameworthiness upon this liberty, an appeal is made to the +common ideas, feelings, and practices of men. Every man regards +himself as free when he does as he pleases,—when, if he pleases +to walk, he walks,—when, if he pleases to sit down, he sits down, +&c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to plead in excuse +that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed to do +it, the judge would reply—“this is your guilt, that you pleased +or willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to +commit it was the very doing of it.” Now all this is just. I +readily admit that we are free when we do as we please, and that +we are guilty when, in doing as we please, we commit a crime.</p> +<p class="pn">Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty +sufficient to constitute responsibility? And thus the whole +difficulty seems to be got over. The reasoning would be very +fair, as far as it goes, if employed against fatalists, but +amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold to the +self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these +common ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative +of freedom, because they raise no question against human freedom. +The real question at issue is, how are we to account for these +facts? The advocates of self-determining power account for them +by referring them to a self-determined will. We say a man is free +when he does as he pleases or according to his volitions, and has +the sense of freedom in his volitions, because he determines his +own volitions; and that a man is guilty for crime, if committed +by his volition, because he determined this volition, and at the +very moment of determining it, was conscious of ability to +determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that a man +is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words, +makes a volition without any impediment between it and its +object,—he is free, if he make the volition without producing +effects by it: volition itself is the act of freedom. But how do +those who deny a self-determining power account for these facts? +They say that the volition is caused by a motive antecedent to +it, but that nevertheless, inasmuch as the man feels that he is +free and is generally accounted so, he must be free; for liberty +means nothing more than “power and opportunity to do and conduct +as he will, or according to his choice, without taking into the +meaning of the word any thing of the <i>cause</i> of that choice, +or at all considering how the person came to have such a +volition,”—that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so, +when he does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by +freedom.</p> +<p class="pn">But suppose the objection be brought up, that the +definition of liberty here given is assumed, arbitrary, and +unsatisfactory; and that the sense or consciousness of freedom in +the act of volition, and the common sentiments and practices of +men in reference to voluntary action, are not adequately +accounted for,—then the advocates of necessitated volition return +to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other +definition,—and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom +does exist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally +correspond to it, we must believe that we are free when volition +is unimpeded in its connexion with sequents, and that we are +blame or praiseworthy, according to the perceived character of +our volitions,—although it cannot but be true that the volitions +themselves are necessary. On the one hand, they are compelled by +their philosophy to deny a self-determining will. On the other +hand, they are compelled, by their moral sense and religious +convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and responsibility. In +order to do this, however, a <i>quasi</i> liberty must be +preserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity, +by referring the first exclusively to the connexion between +volition and its sequents, and the second exclusively to the +connexion between the volition and its antecedents or motives. +Liberty is physical; necessity is metaphysical. The first belongs +to man; the second transcends the sphere of his activity, and, is +not his concern. In this very difficult position, no better or +more ingenious solution could be devised; but that it is wholly +illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from absolute and +universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved.</p> +<p class="pn">2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are +speaking, conceive that when volitions are supposed to exist out +of the necessary determination of motives, they exist +fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up the necessary +and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would be to +place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,—it would +destroy the great <i>a posteriori</i> argument for the existence +of a God. Of course it would be the destruction of all morality +and religion.</p> +<p class="pn">3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in +particular, is much insisted upon as incompatible with contingent +volitions. Divine foreknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events +certain and necessary. Hence volitions are necessary; and, to +carry out the reasoning, it must be added likewise that the +connexion between volitions and their sequents is equally +necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition as well as +the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the +<i>name</i> of liberty, because it fears the designation which +properly belongs to it.</p> +<p class="pn">4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of +God and the harmony of his government are preserved. His +volitions are determined by his infinite wisdom. The world, +therefore, must be ruled in truth and righteousness.</p> +<p class="pn">These philosophers and divines thus represent to +themselves the theory of a self-determining will as an absurdity +in itself, and, if granted to be true, as involving the most +monstrous and disastrous consequences, while the theory which +they advocate is viewed only in its favourable points, and +without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If these +consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be +evaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and +the sense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be +urged as a consequence, of this theory, the ready reply is +invariably—“No such necessity is maintained as goes to destroy +the liberty which consists in doing as one pleases;” or if the +destruction of responsibility be urged as a consequence, the +reply is—“A man is always held a just subject of praise or blame +when he acts voluntarily.” The argumentation undoubtedly is as +sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous. +They are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No +wonder, then, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion, +they should by every possible argument aim to sustain the +philosophy which is supposed to lie at their basis, and look away +from consequences so destructive, persuading themselves that +these consequences are but the rampant sophistries of +infidelity.</p> +<p class="pn">It is a wonderful fact in the history of +philosophy, that the philosophy of fate, pantheism, and atheism, +should be taken as the philosophy of religion. Good men have +misapprehended the philosophy, and have succeeded in bringing it +into fellowship with truth and righteousness. Bad men and erring +philosophers have embraced it in a clear understanding of its +principles, and have both logically reasoned out and fearlessly +owned its consequences.</p> +<p class="pn">XIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition +of liberty given by the theologians above alluded to, is the only +possible definition, it must follow that the most commonly +received modes of preaching the truths and urging the duties of +religion are inconsistent and contradictory.</p> +<p class="pn">A class of theologians has been found in the +church, who, perhaps without intending absolutely to deny human +freedom, have denied all ability on the part of man to comply +with the divine precepts. A generic distinction between inability +and a want of freedom is not tenable, and certainly is of no +moment, where, as in this case, the inability contended for is +radical and absolute.</p> +<p class="pn">These theologians clearly perceived, that if +volition is necessarily determined by motive, and if motive lies +in the correlation of desire and object, then, in a being totally +depraved, or a being of radically corrupt desires, there can be +no ability to good deeds: the deed is as the volition, and the +volition is as the strongest desire or the sense of the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">Hence these theologians refer the conversion of man +exclusively to divine influence. The man cannot change his own +heart, nor employ any means to that end; for this would imply a +volition for which, according to the supposition, he has no +ability.</p> +<p class="pn">Now, at the same time, that this class represent +men as unable to love and obey the truths of religion, they +engage with great zeal in expounding these truths to their minds, +and in urging upon them the duty of obedience. But what is the +aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will reply, I know the man +cannot determine himself to obedience, but in preaching to him, I +am presenting motives which may influence him. But in denying his +ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving him by +motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by +supposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more, +therefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the +sense of the disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present +objects to a man’s mind which are correlated to his feelings, the +more clearly and frequently you present them, the more you +advance towards the sense of the most agreeable or choice. So +when you present objects which are not correlated to his +feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present them, the +more you must advance towards the sense of the most disagreeable, +or positive refusal.</p> +<p class="pn">If it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the +presentation of truth forms the occasion or condition on which +the divine influence is exerted for the regeneration of the +heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man to repent, and +believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty generally, +and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly unable +to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections +and actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the +divine influence be exerted, which brings his heart into +correlation with religion, and makes it possible for him to put +forth the volitions of piety and duty? It can be regarded in no +other light than playing a solemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge +and persuade, as if the man ought to make some exertion when you +feel convinced that exertion is impossible. It certainly can form +no occasion for divine interposition, unless it be in pity of +human folly. If you say that such a course does succeed in the +conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe that your +philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because +inconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system +which you know not, or understand not and deny.</p> +<p class="pn">A total inability to do good makes man the passive +subject of influences to be employed for his regeneration, and he +can no more be considered active in effecting it than he is in +the process of digesting food, or in the curative action of +medicines upon any diseased part of his system. If you urge him +to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge him to put forth +volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in no sense +possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least +commenced.</p> +<p class="pn">I will go one step farther in this reasoning:—on +supposition of total inability, not only is the individual a +passive subject of regenerating influences, but he is also +incapable of regeneration, or any disposition or tendency towards +regeneration, from any influences which lie merely in motives, +produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive, according +to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards’s +system, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object +standing in correlation with the state of mind. Now the state of +mind, in an unregenerate state, is a state represented by this +system itself, as totally adverse to the objects of religion. +Hence, there is no conceivable array of religious truth, and no +conceivable religious exhortation and persuasion that could +possibly come into such a relation to this state of mind as to +form the motive of a religious choice or volition. It is +perfectly plain, that before such a result could take place, the +state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the array +of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must +fail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state +of mind, so neither can the state of mind be changed by this +array of truth or by this exhortation. There is a positive +opposition of mind and object, and the collision becomes more +severe upon every attempt to bring them together. It must follow, +therefore, that preaching truth and duty to the unregenerate, so +far from leading to their conversion, can only serve to call out +more actively the necessary determination, not to obey. The very +enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer +perception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the +disinclination.</p> +<p class="pn">Nor can we pause in this consequence, at human +instrumentality. It must be equally true, that if divine +interposition lies in the presentation of truth and persuasions +to duty, only that these are given with tenfold light and power, +it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of producing any +tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no correlation +with these,—its sense of the disagreeable,—and therefore the +energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and +decided.</p> +<p class="pn">If it should be remarked that hope and fear are +feelings, which, even in a state of unregeneracy, can be operated +upon, the state of things is equally difficult. No such hope can +be operated upon as implies desire after religious principles and +enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the corrupt nature; nor can +any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of the divine +purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate to +danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security, +independently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these +passions might awaken attention, constrain to an outward +obedience, and form a very prudent conduct, but could effect no +purification of the heart.</p> +<p class="pn">There is another class of theologians, of whom +Edwards is one, who endeavour to escape the difficulties which +attend a total inability, by making the distinction of moral and +natural inability:—man, they say, is morally unable to do good, +and naturally able to do good, and therefore he can justly be +made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke, and exhortation. The +futility of this distinction I cannot but think has already been +made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so great +stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in +this particular connexion.</p> +<p class="pn">Moral inability, as we have seen, is the +impossibility of a given volition, because there are no motives +or causes to produce it. It is simply the impossibility of an +effect for the want of a cause: when we speak of moral cause and +effect, according to Edwards, we speak of nothing different from +physical cause and effect, except in the quality of the terms—the +relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility of a given +volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting, is +equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a +summer’s noon-tide.<sup><a href="#n1" id="f1" title= +"see footnote" name="f1">1</a></sup></p> +<p class="pn">When objects of volition are fairly presented, an +inability to choose them must lie in the state of the mind, +sensitivity, desire, will, or affections, for all these have the +same meaning according to this system. There is no volition of +preference where there is no motive to this effect; and there is +no motive to this effect where the state of the mind is not in +correlation with the objects presented: on the contrary, the +volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal.</p> +<p class="pn">Natural inability, as defined by this system, lies +in the connexion between the volition considered as an +antecedent, and the effect required. Thus I am naturally unable +to walk, when, although I make the volition, my limbs, through +weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect in the powers or +instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition, or any +impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural +inability.<sup><a href="#n2" id="f2" title="see footnote" name= +"f2">2</a></sup> According to this system, I am not held +responsible for anything which, through natural inability, cannot +be accomplished, although the volition is made. But now let us +suppose that there is no defect in the powers or +instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition, and no +impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that there need be +only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the natural +ability is complete:—I will to walk, and I walk.</p> +<p class="pn">Now it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible +for the doing of anything, and can be fairly urged to do it when +all that is necessary for the doing of it is a volition although +there may be a moral inability to the volition itself.</p> +<p class="pn">Nothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this +distinction. If liberty be essential to responsibility, liberty, +as we have clearly shown, can no more lie in the connexion +between volition and its effects, than in the connexion between +volition and its motives. One is just as necessary as the other. +If it be granted to be absurd with the first class of theologians +to urge men to do right when they are conceived to be totally +unable to do right, it is equally so when they are conceived to +have only a natural ability to do right, because this natural +ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If +the volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the +action; nay, “the very willing is the doing of it;” but then the +volition as an effect cannot take place without a cause; and to +acknowledge a moral inability, is nothing less than to +acknowledge that there is no cause to produce the required +volition.</p> +<p class="pn">The condition of men as represented by the second +class of theologians, is not really different from their +condition as represented by the first class. The inability under +both representations is a total inability. In the utter +impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter +impossibility of any good deed.</p> +<p class="pn">When we have denied liberty, in denying a +self-determining power, these definitions in order to make out a +<i>quasi</i> liberty and ability, are nothing but ingenious folly +and plausible deception.</p> +<p class="pn">You tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will; +and when he replies to you, that on your own principles the +required volition is impossible, you refer him to the common +notions of mankind. According to these, you say a man is guilty +when he forbears to do right, since nothing is wanting to +right-doing but a volition,—and guilty when he does wrong, +because he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions, +too, a man may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is +wanting but a will to do right. But do we find this distinction +of natural and moral ability in the common notions of men? When +nothing is required to the performance of a deed but a volition, +do men conceive of any inability whatever? Do they not feel that +the volition has a metaphysical possibility as well as that the +sequent of the volition has a physical possibility? Have we not +at least some reason to suspect that the philosophy of +responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion lying in +the common notions of men, are something widely different from +the scheme of a necessitated volition?</p> +<p class="pn">This last class of theologians, equally with the +first, derive all the force of their preaching from a philosophy, +upon which they are compelled to act, but which they stoutly +deny. Let them carry out their philosophy, and for preaching no +place remains.</p> +<p class="pn">Preaching can produce good effects only by +producing good volitions; and good volitions can be produced only +by good motives: but good motives can exist under preaching only +when the subjects of the preaching are correlated with the state +of mind. But by supposition this is not the case, for the heart +is totally depraved.</p> +<p class="pn">To urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions +in reference to his regeneration, may consist with a +self-determining power of will, but is altogether irrelevant on +this system. It is urging <i>him</i> to do what <i>he</i> cannot +do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do <i>in him</i> +as a mere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite +easy, because nothing is required of him but to will, is +equivalent to assuring him that the affair is quite easy, because +it will be done when he has done it. The man may reply, the +affair would indeed be quite easy if there existed in me a motive +to produce the volition; but as there does not, the volition is +impossible. And as I cannot put forth the volition without the +motive, so neither can I make the motive which is to produce the +volition—for then an effect would make its cause. What I cannot +do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from +heaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and +duties, and prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot +take the character of motives to influence my will, because they +are not agreeable to my heart.</p> +<p class="pn">You indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that +on your own principles all your zeal and eloquence must +necessarily have an opposite effect from what you intend? My +affections not being in correlation with these subjects, the more +you urge them, the more intense becomes my sense of the most +disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my good friends, +by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable and +ever-during chain.</p> +<p class="pn">It is plainly impossible to escape from this +conclusion, and yet maintain the philosophy. All efforts of this +kind, made by appealing to the common sentiments of mankind, we +have seen are self-contradictory. It will not do to press forward +the philosophy until involved in difficulty and perplexity, and +then to step aside and borrow arguments from another system which +is assumed to be overthrown. There is no necessity more absolute +and sovereign, than a logical necessity.<sup><a href="#n3" id= +"f3" title="see footnote" name="f3">3</a></sup></p> +<p class="pn">XVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards’s system +in the sections we have been examining, from which the above +consequences are deduced, are the three following:</p> +<p class="pn">1. The will is always determined by the strongest +motive.</p> +<p class="pn">2. The strongest motive is always “the most +agreeable.”</p> +<p class="pns">3. The will is necessarily determined.</p> +<p class="pn">I shall close this part of the present treatise +with a brief examination of the reasoning by which he endeavours +to establish these points.</p> +<p class="pn">The reasoning by which the first point is aimed to +be established, is the general reasoning respecting cause and +effect. Volition is an effect, and must have a cause. Its cause +is the motive lying in the correlation of mind and object. When +several physical causes conflict with each other, we call that +the strongest which prevails and produces its appropriate +effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where there are +several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other, we +call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is +not opposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect; +and in this case we do not say the <i>strongest</i> cause +produces the effect, because there is no comparison. So also +there are cases in which there is but one moral cause or motive +present, when there being no comparison, we cannot affirm that +the volition is determined by the <i>strongest</i> motive: the +doing of something may be entirely agreeable, and the not doing +of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the motive is +only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a +comparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the +effect which actually takes place, is produced by the strongest +cause or motive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a +mere postulate, as if we should say,—let a cause or motive +producing effects be called the strongest. It may be represented, +also, as a <i>petitio principii</i>, or reasoning in a +circle,—since the proof that the will is determined by the +strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined. +It may be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest +motive. How do you know this? Because it is determined. How does +this prove it? Because that which determines it must be the +strongest.<sup><a href="#n4" id="f4" title="see footnote" name= +"f4">4</a></sup></p> +<p class="pn">Edwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of +volition. This assumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to +sustain, when he argues against a self-determining will. If the +will do not cause its own volitions, then it must follow that +motive is the cause. The argument against a self-determining will +we are about to take up.</p> +<p class="pn">2. <i>The strongest motive is always the most +agreeable</i>. Edwards maintains that the motive which always +prevails to cause volition, has this characteristic,—that it is +the most agreeable or pleasant at the time, and that volition +itself is nothing but the sense of the most agreeable. If there +should be but one motive present to the mind, as in that case +there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say that +the will is determined by <i>the agreeable</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">But how are we to know whether the motive of every +volition has this characteristic of agreeableness, or of most +agreeableness, as the case may be? We can know it only by +consulting our consciousness. If, whenever we will, we find the +sense of the most agreeable identified with the volition, and if +we are conscious of no power of willing, save under this +condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then certainly +there remains no farther question on this point. The +determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the +determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.</p> +<p class="pn">Does Edwards appeal to consciousness?</p> +<p class="pn">He does,—but without formally announcing it. The +following passage is an appeal to consciousness, and contains +Edwards’s whole thought on this subject: “There is scarcely a +plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of +mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and do what they +please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most +<i>agreeable to them</i>. To say that they do what <i>pleases</i> +them, but yet what is not <i>agreeable</i> to them, is the same +thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their +pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and +yet do not what they please.” (p. 25.) Motives differ widely, +intrinsically considered. Some are in accordance with reason and +conscience; some are opposed to reason and conscience. Some are +wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are bad. But whatever +may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this +characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it +is by this characteristic that their strength is measured. The +appeal, however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way +to beg the very point in question. Will not every one admit, that +“when men act <i>voluntarily and do what they please</i>, they do +what suits them best, and what is most agreeable to them?” Yes. +Is it not a palpable contradiction, to say that men “do what +pleases them,” and yet do “what is not agreeable to them,” +according to the ordinary use of these words? Certainly.</p> +<p class="pn">But the point in question is, whether men, acting +voluntarily, always do what is pleasing to them: and this point +Edwards assumes. He assumes it here, and he assumes it throughout +his treatise. We have seen that, in his psychology, he identifies +will and desire or the affections:—hence volition is the +prevailing desire or affection, and the object which moves the +<i>desire</i> must of course appear <i>desirable</i>, or +agreeable, or pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men +always will what they most desire, and desire what they will, +then of course when they act voluntarily, they do what they +please; and when they do what they please, they do what suits +them best and is most agreeable to them.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards runs the changes of these words with great +plausibility, and we must say deceives himself as well as others. +The great point,—whether will and desire are one,—whether the +volition is as the most agreeable,—he takes up at the beginning +as an unquestionable fact, and adheres to throughout as such; but +he never once attempts an analysis of consciousness in relation +to it, adequate and satisfactory. His psychology is an +assumption.</p> +<p class="pn">3. The will is necessarily determined.</p> +<p class="pn">How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general +connexion of causes and effects. Causes necessarily produce +effects, unless resisted and overcome by opposing forces; but +where several causes are acting in opposition, the strongest will +necessarily prevail, and produce its appropriate effects.</p> +<p class="pn">Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the +connexion between motives and volitions is the same with that of +any other causes and effects. The difference is merely in the +terms: and when he calls the necessity which characterizes the +connexion of motive and volition “a moral necessity,” he refers +not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected. In +this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between +cause and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, +all causation is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, +in his system, is characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays +himself open to all the consequences of a universal and absolute +necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of +volition by a method of approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, +for the sake of the argument, that the will may oppose the +strongest motive in a given case; but then he contends that it is +supposable that the strength of the motive may be increased +beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this +point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the +will must be considered necessary. “Whatever power,” he remarks, +“men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that +power is not infinite.” If the power of the man is finite, that +of the motive may be supposed to be infinite: hence the +resistance of the man must at last be necessarily overcome. This +reasoning seems plausible at first; but a little examination, I +think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does not determine +the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic qualities, +but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But +agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,—relative +to the will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would +be a motive of infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be +such only by an infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The +same of course must hold true of any motive less than infinite: +and universally, whatever be the degree of strength of the +motive, there must be in the man an affection of corresponding +intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in the will to +any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this power +of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of +agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a +sense of agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall +predominate and become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain +that if the first be increased, the second may be supposed to be +increased likewise; if the first can become infinite, the second +can become infinite likewise: and hence the power of resistance +may be supposed always to meet the motive required to be +resisted, and a point of necessary determination may never be +reached.</p> +<p class="pn">If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the +strength of motives intrinsically considered, then the answer is +ready. There are motives of infinite strength, thus considered, +which men are continually resisting: for example, the motive +which urges them to obey and love God, and seek the salvation of +their souls.</p> +<h1><a name="Will" id="Will">III.</a></h1> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">AN +EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND +CONTINGENT WILL.</p> +<p class="pnn">E<span class="sc">dwards’s</span> first and great +argument against a self-determining will, is given in part II. +sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows:</p> +<p class="pn">The will,—or the soul, or man, by the faculty of +willing, effects every thing within its power as a cause, by acts +of choice. “The will determines which way the hands and feet +shall move, by an act of choice; and there is no other way of the +will’s determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all.” +Hence, if the will determines itself, it does it by an act of +choice; “and if it has itself under its command, and determines +itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the same way +that it determines other things which are under its command.” But +if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course +we have an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice +which is not determined by a choice,—“which brings us directly to +a contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the +first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; +or a free act of the will before the first free act of the will: +or else we must come at last to an act of the will determining +the consequent acts, wherein the will is not self-determined, and +so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom.” (p. 43.)</p> +<p class="pn">This reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt +to meet various evasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates +of a self-determining will, depend mainly upon the assumption, +that if the will determines itself, it must determine itself by +an act of choice; that is, inasmuch as those acts of the will, or +of the soul, considered in its power of willing, or in its +personal activity, by which effects are produced out of the +activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for +example, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down: +therefore, if the soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions, +it must cause them by volitions. The causative act by which the +soul causes volitions, must itself be a volition. This assumption +Edwards does not even attempt to sustain, but takes for granted +that it is of unquestionable validity. If the assumption be of +unquestionable validity, then his position is impregnable; for +nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will determining +volitions by volitions, in an interminable series.</p> +<p class="pn">Before directly meeting the assumption, I remark, +that if it be valid, it is fatal to all causality. Will is simply +cause; volition is effect. I affirm that the will is the sole and +adequate cause of volition. Edwards replies: if will is the cause +of volition, then, to cause it, it must put forth a causative +act; but the only act of will is volition itself: hence if it +cause its own volitions, it must cause them by volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">Now take any other cause: there must be some effect +which according to the general views of men stands directly +connected with it as its effect. The effect is called the +phenomenon, or that by which the cause manifests itself. But how +does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a causative act:—but +this causative act, according to Edwards’s reasoning, must itself +be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect comes between the +cause, and what was at first considered the immediate effect but +the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative +act; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have +another causative act before it; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>. +We have here then an infinite series of causative acts—an +absurdity of the same kind, with an infinite series of +volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">It follows from this, that there can be no cause +whatever. An infinite series of causative acts, without any +first, being, according to this reasoning, the consequence of +supposing a cause to cause its own acts, it must therefore +follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but that they +must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause out +of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must +cause these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act +of its own:—but the same difficulties occur in relation to the +second cause as in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own +acts, and they must therefore be caused out of itself by some +other cause; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>. We have here again +the absurdity of an infinite series of causative acts; and also, +the absurdity of an infinite series of causes without a first +cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which causes its +own acts, without an act of causation; but this is impossible, +according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there +cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the +denial of this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are +driven to the conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every +cause must either cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused +out of itself. Neither of these is possible; therefore, there is +no cause.</p> +<p class="pn">Take the will itself as an illustration of this +last consequence. The will is cause; the volition, effect. But +the will does not cause its own volition; the volition is caused +by the motive. But the motive, as a cause, must put forth a +causative act in the production of a volition. If the motive +determine the will, then there must be an act of the motive to +determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to act. +But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of +the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its +own act, then it must do this by a previous act, according to the +principle of this reasoning; and this again by another previous +act; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the +same.</p> +<p class="pn">It may be said in reply to the above, that volition +is an effect altogether peculiar. It implies selection or +determination in one direction rather than in another, and +therefore that in inquiring after its cause, we inquire not +merely after the energy which makes it existent, but also after +the cause of its particular determination in one direction rather +than in another. “The question is not so much, how a spirit +endowed with activity comes to <i>act</i>, as why it exerts +<i>such</i> an act, and not another; or why it acts with a +particular determination? If activity of nature be the cause why +a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts and does not lie +still; yet that alone is not the cause why its action is thus and +thus limited, directed and determined.” (p. 58.)</p> +<p class="pn">Every phenomenon or effect is particular and +limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, be in +one place and not in another, have certain characteristics and +not others; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be +supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a +particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion, +give it likewise a particular direction.</p> +<p class="pn">Volition must have an object; something is willed +or chosen; particular determination and direction are therefore +inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives +it a being, must necessarily give it character, and particular +direction and determination.</p> +<p class="pn">Selection is the attribute of the cause, and +answers to particular determination and direction in the effect. +As a phenomenon or effect cannot come to exist without a +particular determination, so a cause cannot give existence to a +phenomenon, or effect, without selection. There must necessarily +be one object selected rather than another. Thus, if fire be +thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles, and +produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular +determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor +of effect without a particular determination. But in what lies +the selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with +certain objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and +consequently exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In +chemistry, under the title of affinities, we have wonderful +exhibitions of selection and particular determination. Now +motive, according to Edwards, lies in the correlation of the +nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects; and volition +is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by will, +arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like +the selection made by any other cause; and the particular +determination or direction of the volition, in consequence of +this, is like that which appears in every other effect. In the +case of will, whatever effect is produced, is produced of +necessity, by a pre-constitution and disposition of will and +objects, just as in the case of any other cause.</p> +<p class="pn">From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on +Edwards’s principles there is no such difference between volition +and any other effect, as to shield his reasonings respecting a +self-determining will, against the consequences above deduced +from them. The distinction of final and efficient causes does not +lie in his system. The motive is that which produces the sense of +the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily, and often in +opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the most +agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite +system to make this distinction in all its clearness and +force—where the efficient will is distinguished, both from the +persuasions and allurements of passion and desire, and from the +laws of reason and conscience.</p> +<p class="pn">Thus far my argument against Edwards’s +assumption,—that, to make the will the cause of its own +volitions, is to make it cause its volitions by an act of +volition,—has been indirect. If this indirect argument has been +fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed +to deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In +addition to the above, however, on a subject so important, a +direct argument will not be deemed superfluous.</p> +<p class="pn">Self-determining will means simply a will causing +its own volitions; and consequently, particularly determining and +directing them. Will, in relation to volition, is just what any +cause is in relation to its effect. Will causing volitions, +causes them just as any cause causes its effects. There is no +intervention of anything between the cause and effect; between +will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena, +is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a self-determiner, we +do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we do, and he +assumes it as if it were unquestionable.</p> +<p class="pn">The will, he first remarks, determines all our +external actions by volitions, as the motions of the hands and +feet. He next affirms, generally, that all which the will +determines, it determines in this way; and then concludes, that +if it determines its own volitions, they must come under the +general law, and be determined by volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">The first position is admitted. The second, +involving the last, he does not prove, and I deny that it is +unquestionable.</p> +<p class="pn">In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken +as following from the first. The relation of will to the sequents +of its volitions, is not necessarily the same as its relation to +its volitions. The sequents of volitions are changes or +modifications, in external nature, or in parts of the being +external to the will; but the volitions are modifications of the +will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the +will can be effected only by that modification of itself called +volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if +effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification +of itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents +in external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; +but this experience teaches us nothing respecting the production +of volitions. The acts of the will are volitions, and all the +acts of wills are volitions; but this means nothing more than +that all the acts of the will are acts of the will, for volition +means only this—an act of the will. But has not the act of the +will a cause? Yes, you have assigned the cause, in the very +language just employed. It is the act of the will—the will is the +cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I do not know, +nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the production of +its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The connexion +between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and +inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. +How does volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire +burn, or the sun raise the tides? And how does will cause +volitions? I know not; but if I know that such are the facts, it +is enough.</p> +<p class="pn">Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, +will cannot be the cause, since this would lead to the absurdity +of causing volitions by volitions. But we cannot perceive that it +leads to any such absurdity.</p> +<p class="pn">It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause +acts. If the will produce effects in external nature by its acts, +it is impossible to connect with this as a sequence, established +either by experience or logic, that in being received as the +cause of its own acts, it becomes such only by willing its own +acts. It is clearly an assumption unsupported, and incapable of +being supported. Besides, in denying will to be the cause of its +own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely, the motive, +Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he creates; for +I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains to +motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects +by exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To +suppose it the cause of its own acts, involves all the +absurdities which Edwards attributes to self-determination. But, +<i>In the second place</i>,—let us look at the connexion of cause +and phenomena a little more particularly. What is cause? It is +that which is the ground of the possible, and actual existence of +phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is cause +visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe +phenomena, and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to +cause. But how do we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By +a <i>nisus</i>, an effort, or energy. Is this <i>nisus</i> itself +a phenomenon? It is when it is observed. Is it always observed? +It is not. The <i>nisus</i> of gravitation we do not observe; we +observe merely the facts of gravitation. The <i>nisus</i> of heat +to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of +combustion. Where then do we observe this <i>nisus?</i> Only in +will. Really, volition is the <i>nisus</i> or effort of that +cause which we call will. I do not wish to anticipate subsequent +investigations, but I am constrained here to ask every one to +examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I wish +to do anything I make an effort—a <i>nisus</i> to do it; I make +an effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply +the volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my +hand,—this effort is simply the volition to lift it,—and +immediately antecedent to this effort, I recognise only my will, +or really only myself. This effort—this <i>nisus</i>—this +volition—whatever we call it,—is in the will itself, and it +becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes that know +ourselves. Every <i>nisus</i>, or effort, or volition, which we +may make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not +self-conscious, of course do not reveal this <i>nisus</i> to +themselves, and they cannot reveal it to us because it is in the +very bosom of the cause itself. What we observe in relation to +all causes—not ourselves, whether they be self-conscious or not, +is not the <i>nisus</i>, but the sequents of the <i>nisus</i>. +Thus in men we do not observe the volition or <i>nisus</i> in +their wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the +<i>nisus</i>. And in physical causes, we do not observe the +<i>nisus</i> of these causes, but only the phenomena which form +the sequents of this <i>nisus</i>. But when each one comes to +himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself—knows +himself. He is himself the cause—he, himself, makes the +<i>nisus</i>, and is conscious of it; and this <i>nisus</i> to +him becomes an effect—a phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which +he reveals himself, but a phenomenon by which he reveals himself +only to himself. It is by the sequents of this <i>nisus</i>,—the +effects produced in the external visible world, that he reveals +himself to others.</p> +<p class="pn">Sometimes the <i>nisus</i> or volition expends +itself in the will, and gives no external phenomena. I may make +an effort to raise my arm, but my arm may be bound or paralyzed, +and consequently the effort is in vain, and is not known without. +How energetic are the efforts made by the will during a fit of +the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful force; we +strive to run away from danger but all in vain.</p> +<p class="pn">It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a +mountain: I may place my hand against its side, and tug, and +strive: the <i>nisus</i> or volition is the most energetic that I +can make, but, save the straining of my muscles, no external +expression of the energy of my will is given; I am resisted by a +greater power than myself.</p> +<p class="pn">The most original movement of every cause is, then, +this <i>nisus</i> in the bosom of the cause itself, and in man, +as a cause, the most original movement is this <i>nisus</i> +likewise, which in him we call volition. To deny such a +<i>nisus</i> would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and +energy of cause. This <i>nisus</i>, by its very conception and +definition, admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it +is in the substance of the cause; its first going forth to +effects. A first movement or <i>nisus</i> of cause is just as +necessary a conception as first cause itself. There is no +conception to oppose to this, but that of every cause having its +first movement determined by some other cause out of itself—a +conception which runs back in endless retrogression without +arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of +all cause.</p> +<p class="pn">The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will +determine its own volitions, it must determine them by an act of +volition, is unsupported alike by the facts of consciousness and +a sound logic,—while all the absurdities of an infinite series of +causation of acts really fasten upon his own theory, and destroy +it by the very weapons with which it assails the opposite +system.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>In the third place</i>,—Edwards virtually allows +the self-determining power of will.</p> +<p class="pn">Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or +the sensibility. There is no personal activity out of the +affections or sensitivity. Volition is as the most agreeable, and +is itself the sense of the most agreeable. But what is the cause +of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will, assuming that to +make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the absurdity +of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time he +affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in +correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all +natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,—as, for +example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these +natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with +objects so constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon +by them. So, likewise, according to Edwards’s representation, we +may say that the cause of volition is the nature and state of the +affections or the will, acting under the condition of objects +correlated to it. The sense of the most agreeable or choice +cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an object presented +which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its appearing +most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most +agreeable, depends not only upon “what appears in the object +viewed, but also in the manner of the view, and <i>the state and +circumstances</i> of the mind that views.” (p. 22.) Now “the +<i>state</i> and <i>circumstances</i> of the mind that views, and +the <i>manner</i> of its view,” is simply the mind acting from +its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is a +representation which answers to every natural cause with which we +are acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of +course its inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken +as the cause of volition, on Edwards’s own principles, as the +nature and state of heat may be taken as the cause of combustion: +but by “the state, of mind,” Edwards means, evidently, the state +of the will or the affections. It follows, therefore, that he +makes the state of the will or the affections the cause of +volition; but as the state of the will or the affections means +nothing more in reference to will than the state of any other +cause means in reference to that cause,—and as the state of a +cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, +means nothing more than its character and qualities considered as +a cause,—therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause +of its own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause +of its invariable sequents.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity +of determining a volition by a volition, overlooked that, +according to our most common and necessary conceptions of cause, +the first movement or action of cause must be determined by the +cause itself, and that to deny this, is in fact to deny cause. If +cause have not within itself a <i>nisus</i> to produce phenomena, +then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that in assigning +as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will, he +really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the +very point he laboured to overthrow.</p> +<p class="pn">The point in dispute, therefore, between us and +Edwards, is not, after all, the self-determining power of the +will. If will be a cause, it will be self-determining; for all +cause is self-determining, or, in other words, is in its inherent +nature active, and the ground of phenomena.</p> +<p class="pn">But the real point in dispute is this: “<i>Is the +will necessarily determined, or not?</i>”</p> +<p class="pn">The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted +and fixed, that the <i>nisus</i> by which it determines itself to +produce phenomena, shall take place according to invariable and +necessary laws. This we believe to be true with respect to all +physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, +gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at work +in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to +fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary +laws. We do not conceive it possible for these powers to produce +any other phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which +they actually produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass +of dry gunpowder, an explosion must take place.</p> +<p class="pn">Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we +call will, must, under given circumstances, necessarily produce +such and such phenomena? Must its <i>nisus</i>, its +self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a uniform and +inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the sensitivity, +and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its sense +of the most agreeable, which is its most original <i>nisus</i> or +its volition, follows certain necessary laws,—necessary in +relation to itself. If we know the state of any particular will, +and its correlation to every variety of object, we may know, with +the utmost certainty, what its volition will be at a given time, +and under given circumstances. Moral necessity and physical +necessity differ only in the terms,—not in the nature of the +connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary as any +physical phenomenon.</p> +<p class="pn">Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity +are one, then, as a mere psychological fact, we must grant that +volition is necessary; for nothing can be plainer than that the +desires and affections necessarily follow the correlation of the +sensitivity and its objects. But if we can distinguish in the +consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from the +sensitivity,—if we can distinguish volition from the strongest +desire or the sense of the most agreeable,—then it will not +follow, because the one is necessary, the other is necessary +likewise, unless a necessary connexion between the two be also an +observed fact of consciousness. This will be inquired into in +another part of our undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned +with, is Edwards’s argument against the conception of a will not +necessarily determined. This he calls a contingent determination +of will. We adopt the word contingent; it is important in marking +a distinction.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards, in his argument against a contingent +determination, mistakes and begs the question under +discussion.</p> +<p class="pn">1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated +of throughout as if identical with chance or no cause. “Any thing +is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or +accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its +connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the +established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we +have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to +be contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to +pass without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. +But the word <i>contingent</i> is used abundantly in a very +different sense; not for that whose connexion with the series of +things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for +something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason with +which its existence has any fixed and certain connexion.” (p. +31.)</p> +<p class="pn">Thus, according to Edwards, not only is +<i>contingent</i> used in the same sense as chance and accident, +in the ordinary and familiar acceptation of these words, but it +is also gravely employed to represent certain phenomena, as +without any ground, or reason, or cause of their existence; and +it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as applied +to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he +elaborately discusses the question—“whether any event whatsoever, +and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of +its existence;” and in sec. 4,—“whether volition can arise +without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the +soul.”</p> +<p class="pn">If, in calling volitions contingent,—if, in +representing the determination of the will as contingent, we +intended to represent a class of phenomena as existing without +“any previous ground or reason with which their existence has a +fixed and certain connexion,”—as existing without any cause +whatever, and therefore as existing by chance, or as really +self-existent, and therefore not demanding any previous ground +for their existence,—it seems to me that no elaborate argument +would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That +“every phenomenon must have a cause,” is unquestionably one of +those primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a +demonstration, because they precede all demonstration, and must +be assumed as the basis of all demonstration.</p> +<p class="pn">By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is +not a cause. By contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions +which exist without a cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will +which is not a necessitated will, but what I conceive only and +truly to be a <i>free will</i>. By contingent volitions, I mean +volitions belonging to a contingent or free will. I do not oppose +contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be supposed that +we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not necessary +I call contingent.</p> +<p class="pn">Now an argument against contingency of will on the +assumption that we intend, under this title, to represent +volitions as existing without a cause, is irrelevant, since we +mean no such thing.</p> +<p class="pn">But an argument attempting to prove that +contingency is identical with chance, or no cause, is a fair +argument; but then it must be remembered that such an argument +really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is possible, for +we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">The argument must therefore turn upon these two +points: First, is contingency a possible conception, or is it in +itself contradictory and absurd? This is the main question; for +if it be decided that contingency is a contradictory and absurd +conception, then we are shut up to a universal and an absolute +necessity, and no place remains for inquiry respecting a +contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and +rational conception, then the <i>second</i> point will be, to +determine whether the will be contingent or necessary.</p> +<p class="pn">The first point is the only one which I shall +discuss in this place. The second properly belongs to the +psychological investigations which are to follow. But I proceed +to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument against a contingent +will, really begs the question in dispute. In the first place, he +represents the will as necessarily determined. This is brought +out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first part +of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute. +Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss +contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that +necessity is inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is +plainly a begging of the question, as well as a mistaking of it; +for when we are inquiring whether there be any thing contingent, +that is, any thing opposed to necessity, he <i>begins</i> his +argument by affirming all cause to be necessary, and contingency +as implying no cause. If all cause be necessary, and contingency +imply no cause, there is no occasion for inquiry after +contingency; for it is already settled that there can be no +contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are +these two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be +any cause, for example, will, which is contingent.</p> +<p class="pn">If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the +question respecting a contingent will, as I think clearly +appears, then of course he has logically determined nothing in +relation to it.</p> +<p class="pn">But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now +to inquire whether contingency be a possible and rational +conception, or whether it be contradictory and absurd.</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity and contingency are then two ideas +opposed to each other. They at least cannot co-exist in relation +to the same subject. That which is necessary cannot be contingent +at the same time, and vice versa. Whether contingency is a +possible conception and has place in relation to any subject, +remains to be determined.</p> +<p class="pn">Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: +we will begin with necessity, because that this idea is rational +and admits of actual application is not questioned. The only +point in question respecting it, is, whether it be universal, +embracing all beings, causes, and events.</p> +<p class="pn">What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under +two points of view:—</p> +<p class="pn">1. Viewed in relation to will.</p> +<p class="pn">2. Viewed irrespective of will.</p> +<p class="pn">The first, supposes that opposition of will is +possible, but insufficient;—for example: it is possible for me to +place myself in opposition to a rushing torrent, but my +opposition is insufficient, and the progress of the torrent +relatively to me is <i>necessary</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">The second does not take will into consideration at +all, and applies to subjects where opposition of will is not +supposable; for example, logical necessity, a is b, and c is a, +therefore c is b: mathematical necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre +of a circle is a point equally distant from every point in the +circumference: metaphysical necessity, the existence of a first +cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this second kind of +necessity under the general designation of metaphysical or +philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is +absolute. It is impossible to conceive of these subjects +differently from what they are. We cannot conceive of no space; +no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5, and so of the rest.</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity under both points of view he +distinguishes into particular and general.</p> +<p class="pn">Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity +relative to individual will; as general, relative to all +will.</p> +<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a +necessity irrespective of individual will; as general, +irrespective of all will.</p> +<p class="pn">Relative necessity is relative to the will in the +connexion between volition and its sequents. When a volition of +individual will takes place, without the sequent aimed at, +because a greater force is opposed to it, then the sequent of +this greater force is necessary with a particular relative +necessity. When the greater force is greater than all supposable +will, then its sequents take place by a general relative +necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, +the will of God cannot be included, as there can be no greater +force than a divine volition.</p> +<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes +the opposition of individual will. Under this Edwards brings the +connexion of motive and volition. The opposition of will, he +contends, is excluded from this connexion, because will can act +only by volition, and motive is the cause of volition. Volition +is necessary by a particular metaphysical necessity, because the +will of the individual cannot be opposed to it; but not with a +general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may be +opposed to it.</p> +<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the +opposition of all will—even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4—that +the centre of a circle is a point equally distant from every +point in the circumference—the existence of time and space—are +all true and real, independently of all will. Will hath not +constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It would imply a +contradiction to suppose them different from what they are. +According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary +with a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these +volitions are caused by motives, and infinite will, as well as +finite will, must act by volitions, the opposition of infinite +will itself is excluded in the production of infinite +volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained +in these two points of view, with their two-fold distinction? +<i>Necessity is that which is and which cannot possibly not be, +or be otherwise than it is</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">1. An event necessary by a relative particular +necessity, is an event which is and cannot possibly not be or be +otherwise by the opposition of an individual will.</p> +<p class="pn">2. An event necessary by a relative general +necessity, is an event which cannot possibly not be, or be +otherwise by the opposition of all finite will. In these cases, +opposition of will of course is supposable.</p> +<p class="pn">3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical +particular necessity, when it is, and admits of no possible +opposition from the individual will.</p> +<p class="pn">4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general +necessity, when it is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition +even from infinite will.</p> +<p class="pn">All this, however, in the last analysis on +Edwards’s system, becomes absolute necessity. The infinite will +is necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity. +All events are necessarily determined by the infinite will. +Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a metaphysical +general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are merely +the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular +individual and relation:—the terms characterize only the manner +of our view. The opposition of the particular will being +predetermined by the infinite will, which comprehends all, is to +the precise limit of its force absolutely necessary; and the +opposite force which overcomes the opposition of the particular +will, produces its phenomena necessarily not only in reference to +the particular will, but also in reference to the infinite will +which necessarily pre-determines it.</p> +<p class="pn">Having thus settled the definition of necessity, +and that too, on Edwards’s own grounds, we are next to inquire, +what is the opposite idea of contingency, and whether it has +place as a rational idea?</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity is that which is, and which cannot +possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as +the opposite idea, must be <i>that which is, or may be, and which +possibly might not be, or might be otherwise than it is</i>. Now, +contingency cannot have place with respect to anything which is +independent of will;—time and space;—mathematical and +metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are +equal, that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be +contingent, for they are seen to be real and true in themselves. +They do not arise from will, nor is it conceivable that will can +alter them, for it is not conceivable that they admit of change +from any source. If the idea of contingency have place as a +rational idea, it must be with respect to causes, being, and +phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation is the +effect of divine volition. “God said, let there be light, and +there was light:” thus did the whole creation come to be.</p> +<p class="pn">Now every one will grant, that the creation does +not seem necessary as time and space; and intuitive truths with +their logical deductions, seem necessary. We cannot conceive of +these as having not been, or as ceasing to be; but we can +conceive of the creation as not having been, and as ceasing to +be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or void +space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may +be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and +relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, +different from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in +one word this difference between space and body, or in general +this difference between that which exists independently of will, +and that which exists purely as the effect of will, we call the +first necessary; the second, contingent. The first we cannot +conceive to be different from what it is. The second we can +conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the +creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true +likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All +these events are either directly or mediately the effects of +will, divine or human. Now we can conceive of these as not being +at all, or as being modified indefinitely, different from what +they are;—and under this conception we call them contingent.</p> +<p class="pn">No one I think will deny that we do as just +represented, conceive of the possibility of the events and +creations of will, either as having no being, or as being +different from what they are. This conception is common to all +men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a chimera? It +must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for +according to this, there really is no possibility that any event +of will might have had no being at all, or might have been +different from what it is. Will is determined by motives +antecedent to itself. And this applies to the divine will, +likewise, which is determined by an infinite and necessary +wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of that +which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be +chimerical. But although the system would force us to this +conclusion, the conception still reigns in our minds, and does +not <i>seem</i> to us chimerical;—the deduction from the system +strangely conflicts with our natural and spontaneous judgements. +There are few men who would not be startled by the dogma that all +things and all events, even the constantly occuring volitions of +their minds, are absolutely necessary, as necessary as a +metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,—necessary with a +necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise +than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological +abettors of Edwards’s system, who would not also be startled by +it. I suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the +broad conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here +represented, being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not +affect the sequents of volition; that if a man can do as he +pleases, he has a natural liberty and ability which relieves him +from the chain of metaphysical necessity. I have already shown +how utterly futile this attempted distinction is—how completely +the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called natural liberty +and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted to, then +we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley, +“Necessity, thou mother of the world!” But why the reluctance to +escape from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this +system admit that there is something opposed to necessity? But +what is this something opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that +choice is opposed to necessity? But how opposed—is choice +contingent? Do they admit the possibility that any choice which +is, might not have been at all, or might have been different from +what it is?</p> +<p class="pn">We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity +by merely calling it choice, or an act of the will. If will is +not necessitated, we wish to know under what condition it exists. +Volition is plainly under necessity on Edwards’s system, just as +every other event is under necessity. And the connexion between +volition and its sequents is just as necessary as the connexion +between volition and its motives. Explain,—why do you endeavour +to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to volition? +why do you claim liberty here? Do <i>you</i> likewise have a +natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It +is evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the +doctrine of necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink +from its application to will. They first establish the doctrine +of necessity universally and absolutely, and then claim for will +an exception from the general law,—not by logically and +psychologically pointing out the grounds and nature of the +exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and natural +judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they +please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes +it from necessity;—nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement +against necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere +illusion.</p> +<p class="pn">There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this +spontaneous judgement—and the will comes under the idea opposed +to necessity. But what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how +does the will come under it? Edwards and his followers have not +answered these questions—their attempt at a solution is +self-contradictory and void.</p> +<p class="pn">Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than +that of contingency, viz.—that which is or may be, and possibly +might not be, or might be otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is +a truth which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. +But this book which I hold in my hand, I can conceive of as not +being at all, or being different from what it is, without +implying any contradiction, according to this spontaneous +judgement.</p> +<p class="pn">The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot +conceive of as not existing, or as being altered so as to +transpose the terms, making that right which now is wrong, and +that wrong which now is right. But the volition which I now put +forth to move this pen over the paper, I can conceive of as not +existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a volition to +write words different from those which I am writing. That this +idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, +that all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most +rational idea. Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of +necessity, do either adopt this idea in relation to will by a +self-contradiction, and under a false position, as the abettors +of the scheme which I am opposing for example, or in the ordinary +conduct of life, they act upon it. All the institutions of +society, all government and law, all our feelings of remorse and +compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself, seem +based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is +somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes +arising from <i>will</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">That the will actually does come under this idea of +contingency, must be shown psychologically if shown at all. An +investigation to this effect must be reserved therefore for +another occasion. In this place, I shall simply inquire, how the +will may be conceived as coming under the idea of +contingency?</p> +<p class="pn">The contingency of any phenomenon or event must +depend upon the nature of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or +event is one which may be conceived of, as one that might not +have been at all, or might have been different from what it is; +but wherein lies the possibility that it might not have been at +all, or might have been different from what it is? This +possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine +nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in +anything which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing +in relation to its existence. The cause therefore which actually +gives it existence, and existence under its particular form, can +alone contain the possibility of its not having existed at all, +or of its having existed under a different form. But what is the +nature of such a cause? It is a cause which in determining a +particular event, has at the very moment of doing so, the power +of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not chained to +any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of +objects—as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its +correlation to a certain class of objects which we thence call +combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in +opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to +produce an effect which it may produce, and of any given number +of effects alike within its power, it may take any one of them in +opposition to all the others; and at the very moment it takes one +effect, it has the power of taking any other. It is a cause +contingent and not necessitated. The contingency of the event, +therefore, arises from the contingency of the cause. Now every +cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A necessary +cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to act +differently from its actual developements—fire must +burn—gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth’s centre. If +there be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent +cause above defined, for there is no third conception. We must +choose therefore between a universal and absolute necessity, and +the existence of contingent causes. If we take necessity to be +universal and absolute, then we must take all the consequences, +likewise, as deduced in part II. There is no possible escape from +this. As then all causes must be either necessary or contingent, +we bring will under the idea of contingency, by regarding it as a +contingent cause—“a power to do, or not to do,”<sup><a href="#n5" +id="f5" title="see footnote" name="f5">5</a></sup>—or a faculty +of determining “to do, or not to do something which we conceive +to be in our power.”<sup><a href="#n6" id="f6" title= +"see footnote" name="f6">6</a></sup></p> +<p class="pn">We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a +cause opposed to a contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its +nature, also. What is this nature? It is a nature in fixed +correlation with certain objects, so that it is inconceivable +that its phenomena might be different from those which long and +established observation have assigned to it. It is inconceivable +that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it is +inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing +temperature. But is this necessity a necessity <i>per se</i>, or +a determined necessity? It is a determined necessity—determined +by the creative will. If the creative will be under the law of +necessity, then of course every cause determined by will becomes +an absolute necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">The only necessity <i>per se</i> is found in that +infinite and necessary wisdom in which Edwards places the +determining motives of the divine will. All intuitive truths and +their logical deductions are necessary <i>per se</i>. But the +divine will is necessary with a determined necessity on Edwards’s +system,—and so of all other wills and all other causes, dependent +upon will—the divine will being the first will determined. We +must recollect, however, that on Edwards’s theory of causation, a +cause is always determined out of itself; and that consequently +there can be no cause necessary <i>per se</i>; and yet at the +same time there is by this theory, an absolute necessity +throughout all causality.</p> +<p class="pn">Now let us consider the result of making will a +contingent cause. In the first place, we have the divine will as +the first and supreme contingent cause. Then consequently in the +second place, all causes ordained by the divine will, considered +as effects, are contingent. They might not have been. They might +cease to be. They might be different from what they are. But in +the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not all +contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are +necessary with a determined necessity. They are necessary as +fixed by the divine will. They are necessary with a relative +necessity—relatively to the divine will. They put forth their +<i>nisus</i>, and produce phenomena by a fixed and invariable +law, established by the divine will. But will is of the nature, +being made after the image of the divine will. The divine will is +infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The +created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its +given capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its <i>nisus</i> +to do, are limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may +make an effort, or volition, or <i>nisus</i>, to do anything of +which it can conceive—but the actual production of phenomena out +of itself, must depend upon the instrumental and physical +connexion which the divine will has established between it and +the world, external to itself. Of all the volitions or +<i>nisus</i> within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any +one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes +any one <i>nisus</i> or volition, it has the power of making any +other.</p> +<p class="pn">It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, +essential, and first cause. Whatever other causes exist, are +determined and fixed by will, and are therefore properly called +secondary or instrumental causes. And as we ourselves are will, +we must first of all, and most naturally and most truly gain our +idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate these second +causes—we observe only their phenomena; but we know ourselves in +the very first <i>nisus</i> of causation.</p> +<p class="pn">To reason therefore from these secondary causes to +ourselves, is indeed reversing the natural and true order on this +subject. Now what is the ground of all this clamour against +contingency? Do you say it represents phenomena as existing +without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency not to cause, +but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the phenomena of +physical causation,—we reply that you have no right to reason +from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in +general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties +of matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an +absurd and pernicious doctrine—then turn and look at the doctrine +of an absolute necessity in all its bearings and consequences, +and where lies the balance of absurdity and pernicious +consequences? But we deny that there is anything absurd and +pernicious in contingency as above explained. That it is not +pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of moral +and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course +of our inquiries.</p> +<p class="pn">After what has already been said in the preceding +pages, it perhaps is unnecessary to make any further reply to its +alleged absurdity.</p> +<p class="pn">There is one form under which this allegation comes +up, however, which is at first sight so plausible, that I shall +be pardoned for prolonging this discussion in order to dispose of +it. It is as follows: That in assigning contingency to will, we +do not account for a volition being in one direction rather than +in another. The will, it is urged, under the idea of contingency, +is indifferent to any particular volition. How then can we +explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of +indifferency to a choice or volition?</p> +<p class="pn">In answer to this, I remark:—It has already been +made clear, that selection and particular determination belong to +every cause. In physical causes, this selection and particular +determination lies in the correlation of the nature of the cause +with certain objects; and this selection and particular +determination are necessary by a necessity determined out of the +cause itself—that is, they are determined by the creative will, +which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes. Now +Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination +of will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is +correlated to certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by +the creative will, which gave origin to the secondary dependent +will, the selection and particular determination of will, is +necessary with a necessity determined out of itself. But to a +necessitated will, we have nothing to oppose except a will whose +volitions are not determined by the correlation of its nature +with certain objects—a will, indeed, which has not its nature +correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent; for if its +nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and +determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its +action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of +itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an +absolute and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of +a will forming volitions particular and determinate, or in other +words, making a <i>nisus</i> towards particular objects, without +any correlation of its nature with the objects. Is this +conception a possible and rational conception? It is not a +possible conception if will and the sensitivity, or the +affections are identical—for the very definition of will then +becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and +necessarily affected by them.</p> +<p class="pn">But now let us conceive of the will as simply and +purely an activity or cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or +affections—a cause capable of producing changes or phenomena in +relation to a great variety of objects, and conscious that it is +thus capable, but conscious also that it is not drawn by any +necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a possible and +rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause +different from all other causes; and on this conception there are +but two <i>kinds</i> of causes. The physical, which are +necessarily determined by the correlation of their nature with +certain objects, and will, which is a pure activity not thus +determined, and therefore not necessitated, but contingent.</p> +<p class="pn">Now I may take this as a rational conception, +unless its palpable absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be +proved to involve some contradiction.</p> +<p class="pn">Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, +that there is, after all, nothing to account for the particular +determination? I answer that the particular determination is +accounted for in the very quality or attribute of the cause. In +the case of a physical cause, the particular determination is +accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to be +necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of will, the +particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the +cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular +determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. +A physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. +The will is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a +cause instrumental of a first cause:—the will is first cause +itself. The infinite will is the first cause inhabiting eternity, +filling immensity, and unlimited in its energy. The human will is +first cause appearing in time, confined to place, and finite in +its energy; but it is the same in kind, because made in the +likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self moved, +it makes its <i>nisus</i> of itself, and of itself it forbears to +make it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation +to its objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary +act, any particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as +well as any particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a +cause, are accounted for in itself alone. This does not make the +created will independent of the uncreated. The very fact of its +being a created will, settles its dependence. The power which +created it, has likewise limited it, and could annihilate it. The +power which created it, has ordained and fixed the +instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of +effects. The man may make the volition or <i>nisus</i>, to remove +a mountain, but his arm fails to carry out the <i>nisus</i>. His +volitions are produced freely of himself; they are unrestrained +within the capacity of will given him, but he meets on every side +those physical causes which are mightier than himself, and which, +instrumental of the divine will, make the created will aware of +its feebleness and dependence.</p> +<p class="pn">But although the will is an activity or cause thus +contingent, arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity +or cause united with sensitivity and reason; and forming the +unity of the soul. Will, reason, and, the sensitivity or the +affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or soul. Although the +will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not follow that it +<i>must</i> act without regard to reason or feeling.</p> +<p class="pn">I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am +now only giving a scheme of psychology in order to prove the +possibility of a contingent will, that we have nothing else to +oppose to an absolute and universal necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">According to this scheme, we take the will as the +<i>executive</i> of the soul or the <i>doer</i>. It is a doer +having life and power in itself, not necessarily determined in +any of its acts, but a power to do or not to do. <i>Reason</i> we +take as the <i>lawgiver</i>. It is the “source and substance” of +pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and +commands the executive will what ought to be done. The +sensitivity or the affections, or the desire, is the seat of +enjoyment: it is the capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in +general, hold to the sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or +the disagreeable, are in correlation with it; and, according to +the degree of this correlation, are the emotions and passions +awakened.</p> +<p class="pn">Next let the will be taken as the chief +characteristic of personality, or more strictly, as the +personality itself. By the personality, I mean the me, or myself. +The personality—the me—the will, a self-moving cause, directs +itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives the +laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with +the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at +the same time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to +disobey them.</p> +<p class="pn">Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in +an act of attention to the pleasurable emotions connected with +the presence of certain objects; and the painful emotions +connected with the presence of other objects; and then the desire +of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain, become rules of action. +There is here again the consciousness of power to resist or to +comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may direct +itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them, +and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and +disgust.</p> +<p class="pn">We may suppose again two conditions of the reason +and sensitivity relatively to each other; a condition of +agreement, and a condition of disagreement. If the affections +incline to those objects which the reason approves, then we have +the first condition. If the affections are repelled in dislike by +those objects which reason approves, then we have the second +condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying reason, +gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in +obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice +versa.</p> +<p class="pn">Now if the will were always governed by the highest +reason, without the possibility of resistance, it would be a +necessitated will; and if it were always governed by the +strongest desire, without the possibility of resistance, it would +be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system of Edwards, +where the strongest desire is identified with volition.</p> +<p class="pn">The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in +the conception of a will as above defined—a conscious, +self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to +passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in +their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the +indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to +reason or passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the +reason, shall it be asked, what is the cause of the act of +obedience? The will is the cause of its own act; a cause <i>per +se</i>, a cause self-conscious and self-moving; it obeys the +reason by its own <i>nisus</i>. When the will obeys the strongest +desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of obedience? +Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we called +upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a +self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an +absolute necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, +we attempt to explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason +awakens the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; +we may then ask, why the will obeys the strongest desire? and +then we may attempt to explain this again by saying, that to obey +the strongest desire seems most reasonable. We may evidently, +with as much propriety, account for obedience to passion, by +referring to reason; as account for obedience to reason, by +referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in the +direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then +the act of the will which goes in the direction of the +sensitivity, may find its cause in the reason. But this is only +moving in a circle, and is no advance whatever. Why does the will +obey the reason? because it is most agreeable: but why does the +will obey because it is most agreeable? because to obey the most +agreeable seems most reasonable.</p> +<p class="pn">Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous +to intuitive or first truths. First truths require no +demonstration; they admit of none; they form the basis of all +demonstration. Acts of the will are first movements of primary +causes, and as such neither require nor admit of antecedent +causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis of +all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself +admits of no explanation. It presents the primary and +all-comprehending <i>fact</i> of power. In God, will is infinite, +primary cause, and untreated: in man, it is finite, primary +cause, constituted by God’s creative act, but not necessitated, +for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be power +after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical +or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural +antecedents and sequents.</p> +<p class="pn">God’s will explains creation as an existent fact; +man’s will explains all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire +after the characteristics of creation, we bring in the idea of +infinite wisdom and goodness. But when we inquire <i>why</i> +God’s will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we must either +represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and +goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute +necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself +as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, +explaining all effects, neither requires nor admits of any +explanation itself.</p> +<p class="pn">When we proceed to inquire after the +characteristics of human volition, we bring in the idea of right +and wrong; we look at the relations of the reason and the +sensitivity. But when we inquire <i>why</i> the will now obeys +reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; +we must either represent the will as necessitated, and take all +the consequences of a necessitated will, or we must stop short +here likewise, with the will itself as a first cause, not +necessary, but contingent, which, in explaining its own +volitions, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself, +other than as a finite and dependent will it requires to be +referred to the infinite will in order to account for the fact of +its existence.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards, while he burdens the question of the +will’s determination with monstrous consequences, relieves it of +no one difficulty. He lays down, indeed, a uniform law of +determination; but there is a last inquiry which he does not +presume to answer. The determination of the will, or the +volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of +the most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one +simple power or capacity, there arise from it an indefinite +variety of volitions; and volitions at one time directly opposed +to volitions at another time. The question now arises, how this +one simple capacity of volition comes to produce such various +volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may be the +volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but +that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only +its relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically +considered, is at one time right, at another wrong; at one time +rational, at another foolish. The volition really varies, +although, relatively to the will, it always puts on the +characteristic of the most agreeable. The question therefore +returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of +volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most +agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. <i>First</i>, +we may suppose the <i>state</i> of the will or sensitivity to +remain unchanged, and the different volitions to be effected by +the different arrangements and conditions of the objects +relatively to it. <i>Secondly</i>, we may suppose the +arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, +and the different volitions to be effected by changes in the +<i>state</i> of the sensitivity, or will, relatively to the +objects. Or, <i>thirdly</i>, we may suppose both the state of the +will, and the arrangements and conditions of the objects to be +subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus giving rise to +the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet at an +end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the +different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought +about? On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of +the sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the +changes in both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could +be said, that the sensitivity changes itself relatively to the +objects, then we should ask again, why the sensitivity chooses at +one time, as most agreeable to itself, that which is right and +rational, and at another time, that which is wrong and foolish? +Or, if it could be said, that the objects have the power of +changing their own arrangements and conditions, then also we must +ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make the +right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, +the wrong and foolish.</p> +<p class="pn">These last questions are the very questions which +Edwards does not presume to answer. The motive by which he +accounts for the existence of the volition, is formed of the +correlation of the state of the will, and the nature and +circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is such as +to give the volition in the direction of the right and the +rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,—we ask +<i>why</i> does the correlation give the volition in this +direction. If it be said that the volition in this direction +appears most agreeable, the answer is a mere repetition of the +question; for the question amounts simply to this:—why the +correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather than the +other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most +agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as +the most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind +changes its state in relation to the objects; or why the objects +change their relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense +of the most agreeable in one direction rather than in another? +The difficulty is precisely of the same nature which is supposed +to exist in the case of a contingent will. The will now goes in +the direction of reason, and now in the direction of passion,—but +why? We say, because as will, it has the power of thus varying +its movement. The change is accounted for by merely referring to +the will.</p> +<p class="pn">According to Edwards, the correlation of will and +its objects, now gives the sense of the most agreeable, or +volition, in the direction of the reason; and now in the +direction of passion—but why?—Why does the reason <i>now</i> +appear most agreeable,—and now the indulgences of impure desire? +I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which +is equivalent to saying,—I have the sense of the most agreeable +in reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do +you know it is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have +the sense of the most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, +therefore, that on Edwards’s system, as well as on that opposed +to it, the particular direction of volition, and the constant +changes of volition, must be referred simply to the cause of +volition, without giving any other explanation of the different +determinations of this cause, except referring them to the nature +of the cause itself. It is possible, indeed, to refer the changes +in the correlation to some cause which governs the correlation of +the will and its objects; but then the question must arise in +relation to this cause, why it determines the correlation in one +direction at one time, and in another direction at another time? +And this could be answered only by referring it to itself as +having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to +do or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, +or in the opposite direction; or by referring it to still another +antecedent cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be +the infinite will: then the question would be, why the infinite +will determines the sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one +time to wisdom, and at another to folly? And what answer could be +given? Shall it be said that it seems most agreeable to him? But +why does it seem most agreeable to him? Is it because the +particular determination is the most reasonable, that it seems +most agreeable? But why does he determine always according to the +most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most +reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to +Edwards, the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the +same; to say that God wills as he does will, because it is most +agreeable to him, is to say that he wills because he wills; and +to say that he wills as he does will, because it seems most +reasonable to him, amounts to the same thing, because he wills +according to the most reasonable only because it is the most +agreeable.</p> +<p class="pn">To represent the volitions, or choices, either in +the human or divine will, as determined by motives, removes +therefore no difficulty which is supposed to pertain to +contingent self-determination.</p> +<p class="pn">Let us compare the two theories particularly, +although at the hazard of some repetition.</p> +<p class="pn">Contingent self-determination represents the will +as a cause making its <i>nisus</i> or volitions of itself, and +determining their direction of itself—now obeying reason, and now +obeying passion. If it be asked why it determines in a particular +direction?—if this particular direction in which it determines be +that of the reason?—then it may be said, that it determines in +this direction because it is reasonable;—if this particular +direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it may +be said that it determines in this direction, because it is +pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction +of reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to +reason?—we cannot say that it is most reasonable to obey reason +and not passion; because the one is all reason, and the other is +all passion, and of course they cannot be compared under the +reasonable; and no more can they be compared under the +pleasing,—when, by the pleasing, we understand, the gratification +of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it is +reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that +the will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is +desirable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that +the will does obey desire. The will goes in one direction rather +than in another by an act of self-determination, which neither +admits of, nor indeed requires any other explanation than this, +that the will has power to do one or the other, and in the +exercise of this power, it does one rather than the other.</p> +<p class="pn">To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; +and what is this system? That the will is determined by the +strongest motive;—and what is the strongest motive? The greatest +apparent good, or the most agreeable:—what constitutes the +greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable? The correlation of +will or sensitivity and the object. But why does the correlation +make one object appear more agreeable than another; or make the +same object at one time appear agreeable, at another time +disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the +question,—why does the will go in the direction of one object +rather than of another; or go in the direction of a given object +at one time, and in opposition to it at another time? For the +will to determine itself toward an object in one system, answers +to the will having the sense of the most agreeable towards an +object in Edwards’s system. If Edwards should attempt to give an +answer without going beyond the motive, he could only say that +the sensitivity has the power of being affected with the sense of +the most agreeable or of the most disagreeable; and that in the +exercise of this power it is affected with the one rather than +with the other. He could not say that to obey reason appears more +agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for the +obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense +of the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to +obey reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, +under the idea of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to +no more than this, on his system, that it is most agreeable to +obey the reasonable;—that is, the reasonable is obeyed only as +the most agreeable: but obedience of will being nothing more than +the sense of the most agreeable, to say it is obeyed because most +agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the sense of the most +agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is obeyed.</p> +<p class="pn">To refer the motive to the divine determination +makes volition necessary to the man, and throws the difficulty in +question, if it is to be considered a difficulty, only farther +back.</p> +<p class="pn">If God’s will determines in the direction of the +reasonable because it is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it +the most agreeable? If the reply be, because it is most +reasonable, then we are only moving in a circle; but if the +agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch as to will +is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows that +God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only +because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in +him; and thus the question why God wills in one direction rather +than in another, or what is the cause of his determination, is +not answered by Edwards, unless he says with us that the will in +itself as a power to do or not to do, or to do one thing, or its +opposite, is a sufficient explanation, and the only possible +explanation;—or unless he refers the divine will to an antecedent +cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in an endless +series—and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless +series, and an absolute necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">All possible volitions, according to the scheme of +psychology I have above given, must be either in the direction of +the reason or of the sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. +If the volition be in the direction of the reason, it takes the +characteristics of rational, good, &c. If in the direction of +the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic from the nature of +the particular desire which it obeys:—it is generous, benevolent, +kind, &c.—or it is malicious, envious, unkind, vicious, +&c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason? +Nothing moves it; it is a cause <i>per se</i>; it goes in that +direction because it has power to go in that direction. What +moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing +moves it; it is a cause <i>per se</i>; it goes in that direction +because it has power to go in that direction.</p> +<p class="pn">There are in the intelligence or reason, as united +with the will in the constitution of the mind, necessary +convictions of the true, the just, the right. There are in the +sensitivity, as united in the same constitution, necessary +affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable in reference to +various objects. The will as the power which by its <i>nisus</i> +produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in +either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it +makes its <i>nisus</i> or volition in reference to the true, the +just, the good; should we attempt to explain this <i>nisus</i> by +saying that the true, the just, the good, affect the sensitivity +agreeably, this would only amount to saying that the <i>nisus</i> +is made towards the true, not as the true, but only as the +agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the +<i>nisus</i> is always made in the direction of the agreeable. +But then again we might seek to explain why the <i>nisus</i> is +always made in the direction of the agreeable. Is it of an +antecedent necessity? Then we have an absolute and universal +necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the agreeable +seems most rational? Then it follows that the <i>nisus</i> is +made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the +rational; and then we would introduce the law that the +<i>nisus</i> is always made in the direction of the rational. But +then again we might seek to explain why this <i>nisus</i> is +always made in the direction of the rational. Is it of an +antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have an absolute and +universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the +rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back in a +circle to our first position.</p> +<p class="pn">How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall +we adopt the psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the +sensitivity one? Then as the volition is always the strongest +affection of the agreeable, if the sensitivity be necessary, +volitions are necessary, and we are plunged headlong again into +an absolute and universal necessity. If the sensitivity be not +necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we have to +account for its various determinations just as we are supposed to +be called upon to account for the various determinations of the +will when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:—we +are met with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent +this object as more agreeable than that object?—or the same +object as agreeable at one time, and disagreeable at another? Or +if these various determinations are resolved into an antecedent +necessity comprehending them, then we go up to the antecedent +cause in which this necessity resides, and question it in like +manner.</p> +<p class="pn">But one thing remains, and that is to consider the +will as primary cause, contingent in opposition to being +necessitated—a cause having in itself the power of making these +various volitions or <i>nisus</i>, and neither asking nor +allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their particular +direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.</p> +<p class="pn">The question respecting the indifferency of will +must now be considered. The term <i>indifferency</i> comes up in +consequence of considering the will as distinct from the +sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling—it is a power +indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of +objects.</p> +<p class="pn">It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is +not conviction or belief—it is a power indifferent to the true +and the right, to the false and the wrong, in the sense that it +is not necessarily determined by conviction and belief, by the +true and the right, or by the false and the wrong. The conception +of will in its utmost simplicity is the conception of pure power, +self-moving, and self-conscious—containing within itself the +ground and the possibility of creation and of modification. In +God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every +<i>nisus</i> in his will is really creative or modifying, +according to its self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, +dependent, limited, and accountable.</p> +<p class="pn">Now in direct connexion with power, we have the +conception of law or rule, or what power <i>ought</i> to do. This +law or rule is revealed in the reason. In man as pure, and we +conclude in God likewise, as the archetype of all spirit, there +is given a sensitivity or a capacity to be affected agreeably by, +and to be drawn towards the objects approved and commanded by the +reason. If this sensitivity does not move in harmony with the +reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a triunity with +these two other powers. We can distinguish but not separate it +from them. A will without reason would be a power without eyes, +or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and +isolated;—just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be +without efficiency, or capacity of giving real +manifestations.</p> +<p class="pn">The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a +union with all; but then each in its proper movements is in some +sense independent and free of the others. The convictions, +beliefs, or perceptions of reason are not made, nor can they be +unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the will any direct +command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can excite and +direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up objects +and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and +yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its +manifestations.</p> +<p class="pn">The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet +the latter would have no definite perception, and of course its +highest sensibilities would lie dormant without the reason.</p> +<p class="pn">So also the reason and the sensitivity do not +determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or +creative and modifying power in itself—self-moved, self-directed. +But then without reason and sensitivity, the will would be +without objects, without designs, without rules,—a solitary +power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing what to +do.</p> +<p class="pn">It addition to the above, the will has this high +and distinguishing peculiarity. That it alone is free—that it +alone is opposed to necessity. Reason <i>must</i> perceive, +<i>must</i> believe. Sensitivity <i>must</i> feel when its +objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given its +light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has +awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. +It is as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may +be called a power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only +that it is a power which absolutely puts forth its own +<i>nisus</i>, and is free.</p> +<p class="pn">It follows from this, that the will can act +irrespective of both reason and sensitivity, if an object of +action, bearing no relation to reason or sensitivity, be +possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such relation, +must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be +called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency +of will;—it would only prove that all objects of action actually +existing, bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is +a case, however, frequently called up, and much disputed, which +deserves some attention, and which it appears to me, offers the +illustration required. Let it be required to select one of the +squares of the chess-board. In selecting one of the squares, does +the will act irrespective of reason and sensitivity, or not? +Those who hold that the will is necessarily determined, must make +out some connexion between the act of selection, and the reason +and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general motive +which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to +illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, +to prove that the will can act without a motive.</p> +<p class="pn">I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the +motive of bringing the chess-board before the eye, and in making +all the preparations for a selection;—but now the last question +is, which square shall I select? The illustration will have the +same force whichever square is selected, and there is no motive +that can be drawn either from the reason or the sensitivity for +taking one square in preference to the other: under the absence +of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at +illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in +making this selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an +entire indifferency as to which particular square is +selected;—there is no command of the reason directing to one +square rather than another;—there is no affection of the +sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as most +agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.</p> +<p class="pn">It will be proper, in this place, to consider the +following argument of Edwards against indifferency of will: +“Choice may be immediately <i>after</i> a state of indifference, +but cannot co-exist with it: even the very beginning of it is not +in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if this be liberty, +no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state +of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are +so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to +another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes +and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and +darkness, or life and death.” (p. 73.)</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If +the will and the sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be +conceived of as in a state of indifference, and if it could be +conceived of as in a state of indifference before it exercises +volition, inasmuch as, according to his system again, volition is +the sense of the most agreeable, the moment volition begins, +indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in +indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just +as rest ceases with motion.</p> +<p class="pn">But according to the system of psychology, which we +adopt, and which I shall verify hereafter, the will is not one +with the sensitivity, but is clearly distinguishable from it:—the +sensitivity is the capacity of feeling; the will is the causality +of the soul:—a movement of the sensitivity, under the quality of +indifference, is self-contradictory; and a movement of the will +being a mere <i>nisus</i> of cause, under the quality of any +sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory likewise; +it would be confounding that which we had already distinguished. +From Edwards’s very definition of will it cannot be indifferent; +from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise than +indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and +sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the +indifference which it possessed before the action; but this is no +less true when it determines in the direction either of reason or +sensitivity. When the determination is in the direction of the +reason, there is an exercise of reason in connexion with the act, +and all the interest of the reason is wakened up, but the will +considered in its entire simplicity, knows only the <i>nisus</i> +of power. When the determination is in the direction of the +sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the +will again knows only the <i>nisus</i> of power which carries it +in this direction.</p> +<p class="pn">In the unity of the soul these powers are generally +found acting together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, +and this, in connexion with the constantly observed fact of the +fixed correlation between physical causes and the masses which +they operate upon, may lead to the conclusion that there is a +fixed correlation likewise between the will and its objects, +regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at least, that there is +a fixed connexion between the will and the sensitivity, so that +the former is invariably governed by the latter. We have already +shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not relieve us +from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent will, +unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the +sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the +sensitivity the difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the +will. In our psychological investigations it will appear how +clearly distinguishable those powers are, and also how clearly +independent and sovereign will is, inasmuch as it does actually +determine at one time, in opposition to the most agreeable; at +another, in opposition to reason; and at another, in opposition +to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we +perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as +subordinated to reason, to move within the delights of the +sensitivity; and we know that we are acting <i>unreasonably</i> +and <i>senselessly</i> when we act otherwise; but yet +<i>unreasonably</i> and <i>senselessly</i> do we often act. But +when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its +direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; +and when we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become +sensitivity—will is still simply cause, and its act the +<i>nisus</i> of power: thought, and conviction, and design, hold +their place in the reason alone: emotion and passion their place +in the sensitivity alone.</p> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +ARGUMENT</p> +<p style= +"text-align:center;font-size:84%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em"> +FROM</p> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">THE +DIVINE PRESCIENCE.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards’s argument against a contingent, +self-determining will, drawn from the divine prescience, remains +to be considered.</p> +<p class="pn">The argument is introduced as follows: “That the +acts of the wills of moral agents are not contingent events, in +such a sense as to be without all necessity, appears by God’s +certain foreknowledge of such events.” (sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards +devotes this section to “the evidence of God’s certain +foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.” In the following +section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his +argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the +consequences of his position.</p> +<p class="pn">God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them +makes their existence necessary. If their existence were not +necessary, he could not foresee them; or, to express it still +more generally, foreknowledge extends to all events, and +foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of everything to +which it extends. It follows from this, that all events exist +with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all +volitions, and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all +the divine volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own +volitions. In no part of his work, does Edwards lay down more +summarily and decidedly, the doctrine of absolute and universal +necessity. We have already, in part II. of this treatise, deduced +the consequences of this doctrine. If then we are placed upon the +alternative of denying the divine prescience of volitions, or of +acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would practically be +most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the +alternative. “If it could be demonstrated,” remarks Dugald +Stewart, (vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) “which in my opinion has not +yet been done, that the prescience of the volitions of moral +agents is incompatible with the free agency of man, the logical +inference would be, <i>not</i> in favour of the scheme of +necessity, but that there are some events, the foreknowledge of +which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to affirm, that +it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of contingent +events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not extend +to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of +God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his +omniscience?” If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the +doctrine of necessity, there is nothing left that it is worth +while to contend for; all moral and theological interests vanish +away. But let us examine the argument of Edwards.</p> +<p class="pn">This argument consists of three parts; we shall +consider them in order.</p> +<p class="pn">I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is +necessary, “having already made sure of existence;” but divine +foreknowledge is such an event, and is therefore necessary. This +is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever is, is. He next +affirms, that whatever is “indissolubly connected with other +things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;” but events +infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the +foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, +have an indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are +therefore necessary.</p> +<p class="pn">The force of this reasoning turns upon the +connexion between foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This +connexion is affirmed to be “indissoluble;” that is, the +foreknowledge is certainly connected with the event. But this +only amounts to the certainty of divine foreknowledge, and proves +nothing as to the nature of the existence foreknown. We may +certainly know a past or present event, but our knowledge of its +existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it came to +exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a +certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and +it cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge +of his walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or +necessary antecedent; and the question whether his walking be +contingent or necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the +cause of walking. I looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a +man walking; and the knowledge of that event I now retain, so +that it cannot but be that the man walked yesterday: but this +again leaves the question respecting the mode of existence +untouched:—Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a contingent +event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of +prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by +this faculty I may see a man walking in the time called +to-morrow, just as by the faculty of memory I see a man walking +in the time called yesterday. The knowledge, whether it relate to +past, present, or future, as a knowledge in relation to myself, +is always a present knowledge; but the object known may stand in +various relations of time, place, &c. Now in relation to the +future, no more than in relation to the past and present, does +the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in relation to +the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge. Edwards +remarks, (p. 121.) “All certain knowledge, whether it be +foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, +proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or +other; or proves that it is impossible that it should now be +otherwise than true.”</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty +of the mere <i>fact</i> of existence, and the necessity by which +anything comes to exist. Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and +concomitant knowledge,—that is, the present knowledge of events, +future, past, or present,—proves of course the reality of the +events; that they will be, have been, or are: or, more strictly +speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of time, is +the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the +knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity +of its existence. If the knowledge of the event were the +<i>cause</i> of the event, or if it <i>generically</i> +comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon strict logical +principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would be +affirmed of the event likewise.</p> +<p class="pn">That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that +as he foreknows them, they will be, is also granted; his +foreknowledge of them is the positive affirmation of their +reality in time future; but by supposition, God’s foreknowledge +is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend them; +they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God’s +foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put +forth or determine their volitions, does not take away from these +wills the contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more +than our witnessing how wills act in the time present, takes away +from them their contingency and freedom. God in his prescience, +<i>is the spectator of the future, as really as we are the +spectators of the present</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards’s reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that +employed sometimes for exercising the student of logic in the +detection of fallacies: for example, a man in a given place, must +<i>necessarily</i> either stay in that place, or go away from +that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes away, he acts +necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things, that a +man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then +it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to +stay or go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition +as a body, is entirely distinct from the question respecting the +necessity or contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect +of the divine foreknowledge: all human volitions as events +occurring in time, are subject to the necessary condition of +being foreknown by that Being, “who inhabiteth eternity:” but +this necessary condition of their existence neither proves nor +disproves the necessity or the contingency of their particular +causation.</p> +<p class="pn">II. The second proposition in Edwards’s argument +is, “No future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence +is contingent, and without all necessity.” His reasoning in +support of this is as follows: 1. “It is impossible for a thing +to be certainly known to any intellect without <i>evidence</i>.” +2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3. Therefore, a +contingent future event is not a possible object of knowledge. I +dispute both premises: That which is known by <i>evidence</i> or +<i>proof</i> is <i>mediate</i> knowledge,—that is, we know it +through something which is immediate, standing between the +faculty of knowledge and the object of knowledge in question. +That which is known <i>intuitively</i> is known without proof, +and this is <i>immediate</i> knowledge. In this way all axioms or +first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed +evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by +which anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a +Being, therefore, whose knowledge fills duration, future and past +events may be as immediately known as present events. Indeed, can +we conceive of God otherwise than immediately knowing all things? +An Infinite and Eternal Intelligence cannot be thought of under +relations of time and space, or as arriving at knowledge through +<i>media</i> of proof or demonstration. So much for the first +premise. The second is equally untenable: “<i>A contingent future +event is without evidence</i>.” We grant with Edwards that it is +not <i>self-evident</i>; implying by that the evidence arising +from “the necessity of its nature,” as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. +What is self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require +any evidence or proof, but is known immediately; and a future +contingent event may be self-evident as a fact lying before the +divine mind, reaching into futurity, although it cannot be +self-evident from “the necessity of its nature.”</p> +<p class="pn">But Edwards affirms, that “neither is there any +<i>proof</i> or evidence in <i>anything else</i>, or evidence of +connexion with something else that is evident; for this is also +contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now +nothing existent with which the future existence of the +<i>contingent</i> event is connected. For such a connexion +destroys its contingency and supposes necessity.” (p. 116.) He +illustrates his meaning by the following example: “Suppose that +five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no +other being but the Divine Being,—and then this world, or some +particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into +being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form—all in +<i>absolute contingence</i>,—without any concern of God, or any +other cause in the matter,—without any manner of ground or reason +of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all +with anything foregoing;—I say that if this be supposed, there +was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence +of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet +was not; and there was no evidence of it to be seen in <i>any +thing else;</i> for <i>evidence</i> in something else; is +<i>connexion</i> with something else; but such connexion is +contrary to the supposition.” (p. 116.)</p> +<p class="pn">The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch +as a contingent event exists “<i>without any concern of God, or +any other cause in the matter,—without any manner of ground or +reason of its existence,—or any dependence upon or connexion with +anything foregoing</i>,”—there is really nothing by which it can +be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right in this definition of a +contingent event, viz.: that it is an event without any cause or +ground of its existence, and “that there is nothing now existent +with which the future existence of the contingent event is +connected,” then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. +But I do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat +again, is not opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may +have sprung into being by <i>absolute contingence</i> more than +five thousand years ago, and yet have sprung into being at the +command of God himself, and its existence have been foreseen by +him from all eternity. The contingence expresses only the freedom +of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign choice, and +at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold the +creative <i>nibus</i>,—creating in the light of his infinite +wisdom, but from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein +found. Under this view to foresee creation was nothing different +from foreseeing his own volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">The ground on which human volitions can be +foreseen, is no less plain and reasonable. In the first place, +future contingent volitions are never without a cause and +sufficient ground of their existence, the individual will being +always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of the individual +volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible existence +of volitions other than his own, in the creation and constitution +of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not required +to conceive of <i>media</i> by which all the particular volitions +may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual +existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite +intuition; he cannot be dependent upon any media for his +knowledge. It is enough, as I have already shown, to assign him +prescience, in order to bring within his positive knowledge all +future contingent volitions. He knows all the variety and the +full extent of the possible, and amid the possible he foresees +the actual; and he foresees not only that class of the actual +which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively +necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring +up under the characteristic of contingency.</p> +<p class="pn">And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of +the divine prescience over human forecast,—in that the former +penetrates the contingent as accurately as the necessary. With +the latter it is far otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can +foresee the motions of the planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, +and even the flight of the comets, because they are governed by +necessary laws; but the volitions of the human will form the +subject of only <i>probable</i> calculations.</p> +<p class="pn">But if human volitions, as contingent, form the +subject of probable calculations, there must be in opposition to +Edwards something “that is evident” and “now existent, with which +the future existence of the <i>contingent</i> event is +connected.”</p> +<p class="pn">There are three kinds of certainty. <i>First</i>, +absolute certainty. This is the certainty which lies in necessary +and eternal principles e. g. 2 x 2=4; the existence of space; +every body must be in space; every phenomenon must have a cause; +the being of God.</p> +<p class="pn">Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between +premises and conclusion, is likewise absolute.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Secondly</i>. Physical certainty. This is the +certainty which lies in the connexion between physical causes and +their phenomena: e. g. gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in +general, mechanical forces.</p> +<p class="pn">The reason conceives of these causes as inherently +active and uniform; and hence, wherever a physical cause exists, +we expect its proper phenomena.</p> +<p class="pn">Now we do not call the operation of these causes +<i>absolutely</i> certain, because they depend ultimately upon +will,—the will of God; and we can conceive that the same will +which ordained them, can change, suspend, or even annihilate +them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes given in +time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If in +any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to +recognise the presence of that will which ordained them. Such +change or suspension we call a <i>miracle</i>; that is, a +surprise,—a wonder, because it is unlooked for.</p> +<p class="pn">When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be +physically certain, we mean that it is certain in the +immutability of a cause acting in time and space, and under a +necessity relatively to the divine will; but still not +<i>absolutely</i> certain, because there is a possibility of a +miracle. But when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain, +we mean that it is certain as comprehended in a principle which +is unalterable in its very nature, and is therefore independent +of will.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Thirdly</i>. Moral certainty, is the certainty +which lies between the connexion of motive and will. By will we +mean a self-conscious and intelligent cause, or a cause in unity +with intelligence. It is also, in the fullest sense, a cause +<i>per se</i>; that is, it contains within itself proper +efficiency, and determines its own direction. By <i>motives</i> +we mean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general, +all activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons; +for they have the same meaning: but in mere material masses, the +rule is not contemplated by the acting force,—it is contemplated +only by the intelligence which ordained and conditioned the +force. In spirit, on the contrary, the activity which we call +will is self-conscious, and is connected with a perception of the +reasons, or ends, or motives of action. These motives or ends of +action are of two kinds. <i>First</i>, those found in the ideas +of the practical reason, which decides what is fit and right. +These are reasons of supreme authority. <i>Secondly</i>, those +found in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately +useful and expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are +right only when subordinate to the first.</p> +<p class="pn">Now these reasons and motives are a light to the +will, and serve to direct its activities; and the human +conscience, which is but the reason, has drawn up for the will +explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations, which +are called <i>ethics</i>, or <i>the rules</i>.</p> +<p class="pn">These rules the will is not compelled or +necessitated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a +power to do or not to do; but yet, as the will forms a unity with +the intelligence, we take for granted that it will obey them, +unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent. But the +only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a +state of sinfulness,—a corruption of the sensitivity, or a +disposition to violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual +constitution. Hence moral certainty can exist only where the +harmony of the spiritual being is preserved. For example: God and +good angels. In God moral certainty is infinite. His dispositions +are infinitely pure, and his will freely determines to do right; +it is not compelled or necessitated, for then his infinite +meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is <i>not +absolute</i>, because will being a power to do or not to do, +there is always a possibility, although there may be no +probability, nay an infinite improbability, that the will may +disobey the laws of the reason.</p> +<p class="pn">In the case of angels and good men, the moral +certainty is such as to be attended with no apprehension of a +dereliction. With respect to such men as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, +Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a very high and +satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they will +act in any given circumstances involving the influence of +motives. We know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,—that +is, the <i>first</i> class of motives; and the <i>second</i> only +so far as they are authorized by the first. If the first class of +motives are forsaken, then human conduct can be calculated only +according to the influence of the second class.</p> +<p class="pn">Human character, however, is mixed and variously +compounded. We might make a scale of an indefinite number of +degrees, from the highest point of moral excellence to the lowest +point of moral degradation, and then our predictions of human +conduct would vary with every degree.</p> +<p class="pn">In any particular case where we are called upon to +reason from the connexion of motives with the will, it is evident +we must determine the character of the individual as accurately +as possible, in order to know the probable <i>resultant</i> of +the opposite moral forces which we are likely to find.</p> +<p class="pn">We have remarked that moral certainty exists only +where the harmony of the moral constitution is preserved. Here we +know the right will be obeyed. It may be remarked in addition to +this, however, that moral certainty may almost be said to exist +in the case of the lowest moral degradation, where the right is +altogether forsaken. Here the rule is, “whatever is most +agreeable;” and the volition is indeed merged into the sense of +the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide +field of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of +human nature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of +life, is not the knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but +as it is in its vast variety of good and evil. We gain this +knowledge from observation and history. What human nature ought +to be, we learn from reason.</p> +<p class="pn">On a subject of so much importance, and where it is +so desirable to have clear and definite ideas, the rhetorical +ungracefulness of repetition is of little moment, when this +repetition serves our great end. I shall be pardoned, therefore, +in calling the attention of the reader to a point above +suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and +sensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed +to derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts +which are in the direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, +must be very trifling acts; and therefore acts of this +description, although possible, we may conclude are very rare. In +calculating, then, future acts of will, we may, like the +mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume that +all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or +sensitivity, or of both in their harmony. Although the will is +conscious of power to do, out of the direction of both reason and +sensitivity, still, in the triunity in which it exists, it +submits itself to the general interests of the being, and +consults the authority of conscience, or the enjoyments of +passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself habits and +a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted +himself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, +to the laws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has +formed for himself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has +exhibited, too, on many occasions, noble, generous, and pure +feelings; and hence we conclude that his sensitivity harmonizes +with conscience. Or he is known to have violated the laws of the +conscience from day to day, and in a great variety of +transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for +himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on +many occasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we +conclude that his sensitivity is in collision with +conscience.</p> +<p class="pn">In both cases supposed, and in like manner in all +supposable cases, there is plainly a basis on which, in any given +circumstances, we may foresee and predict volitions. There is +something “that is evident and now existent with which the future +existence of the contingent event is connected.” On the one hand +these predictions exert no necessitating influence over the +events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected with the +causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events need +not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of +probable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations +would no longer be merely probable:—they would, on the contrary, +take the precision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses +and other phenomena based upon necessary laws. But these +calculations can aim only at <i>moral</i> certainty, because they +are made according to the generally known and received +determinations of will in a unity with reason and sensitivity; +but still a will which is known also to have the power to depart +at any moment from the line of determination which it has +established for itself. Thus the calculations which we make +respecting the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based +on his known integrity, and the calculations which we make +respecting another, based on his known dishonesty, may alike +disappoint us, through the unexpected, though possible +dereliction of the first, and the unexpected, though possible +reformation of the latter. When we reason from moral effects to +moral causes, or from moral causes to moral effects, we cannot +regard the operation of causes as positive and uniform under the +same law of necessity which appertains to physical causes, +because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and +last determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a +high degree of probability, with a probability sufficient to +regulate wisely and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we +cannot reason respecting human conduct, as we reason respecting +the phenomena of the physical world, because it is possible for +the human will to disappoint calculations based upon the ordinary +influence of motives: e. g. the motive does not hold the same +relation to will which fire holds to combustible substance; the +fire must burn; the will may or may not determine in view of +motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance, probable +evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral evidence +being generally probable, all probable evidence is called +moral.</p> +<p class="pn">The will differs from physical causes in being a +cause <i>per se</i>, but although a cause <i>per se</i>, it has +laws to direct its volitions. It may indeed violate these laws +and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law unto itself; but +this violation of law and this arbitrary determination do not +arise from it necessarily as a cause <i>per se</i>, but from an +abuse of its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the +reason, we expect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and +perfect movements it is uniform. Physical causes are uniform +because God has determined and fixed them according to laws +derived from infinite wisdom.</p> +<p class="pn">The human will may likewise be uniform by obeying +the laws of conscience, but the departures may also be +indefinitely numerous and various.</p> +<p class="pn">To sum up these observations in general statements, +we remark;—</p> +<p class="pn">First: The connexion on which we base predictions +of human volitions, is the connexion of will with reason and +sensitivity in the unity of the mind or spirit.</p> +<p class="pn">Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be +designed to be regulated by truth and righteousness, and by +feeling subordinated to these.</p> +<p class="pn">Thirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is +thus regulated.</p> +<p class="pn">Fourthly: This regulation, however, does not take +place by the necessary governance which reason and sensitivity +have over will, but by a self-subjection of will to their rules +and inducements;—this constitutes meritoriousness,—the opposite +conduct constitutes ill desert.</p> +<p class="pn">Fifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to +the degree and fixedness of this self-subjection to reason and +right feeling; or where this does not exist, according to the +degree and fixedness of the habits of wrong doing, in a +self-subjection to certain passions in opposition to reason.</p> +<p class="pn">Sixthly: Our calculations will be more or less +certain according to the extent and accuracy of our observations +upon human conduct.</p> +<p class="pn">Seventhly: Our calculations can never be attended +with <i>absolute</i> certainty, because the will being +contingent, has the power of disappointing calculations made upon +the longest observed uniformity.</p> +<p class="pn">Eighthly: Our expectations respecting the +determinations of Deity are attended with the highest moral +certainty. We say <i>moral</i> certainty, because it is certainty +not arising from necessity, and in that sense absolute; but +certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely pure +being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is +affirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that +he has not the power to change or to determine contrary to truth; +but that there is an infinite moral certainty arising from the +perfection of his nature, that he never will depart from infinite +wisdom and rectitude.</p> +<p class="pn">To assign God any other immutability would be to +deprive him of freedom.</p> +<p class="pn">Ninthly: The divine foresight of human volitions +need not be supposed to necessitate them, any more than human +foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing them, has no necessary +connexion in any case with their causation. Again, if it does not +appear essential to the divine foresight of volitions that they +should be necessary. We have seen that future contingent +volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty even +by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in +the same way to calculate them through <i>media</i>,—the reach +and accuracy of his calculations must be in the proportion of his +intelligence, and how far short of a certain and perfect +knowledge of all future contingent volitions can infinite +intelligence be supposed to fall by such calculations?</p> +<p class="pn">Tenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite +mind is compelled to resort to deduction, or to employ +<i>media</i> for arriving at any particular knowledge. In the +attribute of prescience, he is really present to all the possible +and actual of the future.</p> +<p class="pn">III. The third and last point of Edwards’s argument +is as follows: “To suppose the future volitions of moral agents, +not to be necessary events; or which is the same thing, events +which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; +and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows +all things, is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with +itself. For to say that God certainly and without all conjecture, +knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he +knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to +suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing +he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows.” +(page 117.)</p> +<p class="pn">The substance of this reasoning is this. That +inasmuch as a contingent future event is <i>uncertain</i> from +its very nature and definition, it cannot be called an object of +<i>certain</i> knowledge, to any mind, not even to the divine +mind, without a manifest contradiction. “It is the same as to +say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible +truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth.”</p> +<p class="pn">We have here again an error arising from not making +a proper distinction, which I have already pointed out,—the +distinction between the certainty of a future volition as a mere +fact existent, and the manner in which that fact came to +exist.</p> +<p class="pn">The fact of volition comes to exist contingently; +that is, by a power which in giving it existence, is under no law +of necessity, and at the moment of causation, is conscious of +ability to withhold the causative <i>nibus</i>. Now all volitions +which have already come to exist in this way, have both a certain +and contingent existence. It is certain that they have come to +exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their existence +is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by necessity +as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and free, +and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions, +had the power to withhold them.</p> +<p class="pn">Certainty and contingency are not opposed, and +exclusive of each other in reference to what has already taken +place. Are they opposed and exclusive of each other in reference +to the future? In the first place, we may reason on probable +grounds. Contingent causes have already produced volitions—hence +they may produce volitions in the future. They have produced +volitions in obedience to laws of reason and sensitivity—hence +they may do so in the future. They have done this according to a +uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually observed—hence +this uniformity may be continued in the future.</p> +<p class="pn">A future contingent event may therefore have a high +degree of probability, and even a moral certainty.</p> +<p class="pn">But to a being endowed with prescience, what +prevents a positive and infallible knowledge of a future +contingent event? His mind extends to the actual in the future, +as easily as to the actual in the past; but the actual of the +future is not only that which comes to pass by his own +determination and <i>nibus</i>, and therefore necessarily in its +relation to himself as cause, but also that which comes to pass +by the <i>nibus</i> of constituted wills, contingent and free, as +powers to do or not to do. There is no opposition, as Edwards +supposes, between the infallible divine foreknowledge, and the +contingency of the event;—the divine foreknowledge is infallible +from its own inherent perfection; and of course there can be no +doubt but that the event foreseen will come to pass; but then it +is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently, and not +necessarily.</p> +<p class="pn">The error we have just noted, appears again in the +corollary which Edwards immediately deduces from his third +position. “From what has been observed,” he remarks, “it is +evident, that the absolute <i>decrees</i> of God are no more +inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the necessity of +the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute +foreknowledge of God.” (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God +are the determinations of his will, and comprehend the events to +which they relate, as the cause comprehends the effect. +Foreknowledge, on the contrary, has no causality in relation to +events foreknown. It is not a determination of divine will, but a +form of the divine intelligence. Hence the decrees of God do +actually and truly necessitate events; while the foreknowledge of +God extends to events which are not necessary but contingent,—as +well as to those which are pre-determined.</p> +<p class="pn">Edwards always confounds contingency with chance or +no cause, and thus makes it absurd in its very definition. He +also always confounds certainty with necessity, and thus compels +us to take the latter universal and absolute, or to plunge into +utter uncertainty, doubt, and disorder.</p> +<p class="pn">Prescience is an essential attribute of Deity. +Prescience makes the events foreknown, certain; but if certain, +they must be necessary. And on the other hand, if the events were +not certain, they could not be foreknown,—for that which is +uncertain cannot be the object of positive and infallible +knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be foreknown, then +they must be necessary.</p> +<p class="pn">Again: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all +future events supposed to come under it, out of all possible +connexion with anything preceding and now actually existent, and +consequently allows of no basis upon which they can be calculated +and foreseen. Contingence, also, as opposed to necessity, +destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility even of divine +prescience. This is the course of Edwards’s reasoning.</p> +<p class="pn">Now if we have reconciled contingence with both +cause and certainty, and have opposed it only to necessity, thus +separating cause and certainty from the absolute and unvarying +dominion of necessity, then this reasoning is truly and +legitimately set aside.</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the +sensitivity connected with it:—contingency lies only in will. But +the future acts of will can be calculated from its known union +with, and self-subjection to the reason and sensitivity.</p> +<p class="pn">These calculations are more or less probable, or +are certain according to the known character of the person who is +the subject of these calculations.</p> +<p class="pn">Of God we do not affirm merely the power of +calculating future contingent events upon known data, but a +positive prescience of all events. He sees from the beginning how +contingent causes or wills, will act. He sees with absolute +infallibility and certainty—and the events to him are infallible +and certain. But still they are not necessary, because the causes +which produce them are not determined and necessitated by +anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free, and +conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in +doing.</p> +<p class="pn">I am persuaded that inattention to the important +distinction of the certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge, +and the necessity implied in the divine predetermination or +decree, is the great source of fallacious reasonings and +conclusions respecting the divine prescience. When God +pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity +relative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It +cannot be otherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains. +But when he foreknows an event, he presents us merely a form of +his infinite intelligence, exerting no causative, and +consequently no necessitating influence whatever. The volitions +which I am now conscious of exercising, are just what they are, +whether they have been foreseen or not—and as they now do +actually exist, they have certainty; and yet they are contingent, +because I am conscious that I have power not to exercise them. +They are, but they might not have been. Now let the intelligence +of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have +foreseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain +that this foresight does not destroy the contingency of the +volitions, nor does the contingency render the foresight absurd. +The supposition is both rational and possible.</p> +<p class="pn">It is not necessary for us to consider the +remaining corollaries of Edwards, as the application of the above +reasoning to them will be obvious.</p> +<p class="pn">Before closing this part of the treatise in hand, I +deem it expedient to lay down something like a scale of +certainty. In doing this, I shall have to repeat some things. But +it is by repetition, and by placing the same things in new +positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and succeed in +rendering philosophical ideas familiar.</p> +<p class="pn">First: Let us consider minutely the distinction +between certainty and necessity. Necessity relates to truths and +events considered in themselves. Certainty relates to our +apprehension or conviction of them. Hence necessity is not +certainty itself, but a ground of certainty. <i>Absolute +certainty</i> relates only to truths or to being.</p> +<p class="pn">First or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions +drawn from them, are necessary with an absolute necessity. They +do not admit of negative suppositions, and are irrespective of +will. The being of God, and time, and space, are necessary with +an absolute necessity.</p> +<p class="pn"><i>Relative necessity</i> relates to logical +conclusions and events or phenomena. Logical conclusions are +always necessary relatively to the premises, but cannot be +absolutely necessary unless the premises from which they are +derived, are absolutely necessary.</p> +<p class="pn">All phenomena and events are necessary with only a +relative necessity; for in depending upon causes, they all +ultimately depend upon will. Considered therefore in themselves, +they are contingent; for the will which produced them, either +immediately or by second or dependent causes, is not +necessitated, but free and contingent—and therefore their +non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to +will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; +when therefore the <i>nibus</i> of this will was made, creation +was the necessary result. The Deity is under no necessity of +willing; but when he does will, the effect is said necessarily to +follow—meaning by this, that the <i>nibus</i> of the divine will +is essential power, and that there is no other power that can +prevent its taking effect.</p> +<p class="pn">Created will is under no necessity of willing; but +when it does will or make its <i>nibus</i>, effects necessarily +follow, according to the connexion established by the will of +Deity, between the <i>nibus</i> of created will and surrounding +objects. Where a <i>nibus</i> of created will is made, and +effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater +force of a resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so +that whatever follows the <i>nibus</i> of created will, whether +it be a phenomenon without, or the mere experience of a greater +resisting force, it follows by a necessity relative to the divine +will.</p> +<p class="pn">When we come to consider will in relation to its +own volitions, we have no more necessity, either absolute er +relative; we have contingency and absolute freedom.</p> +<p class="pn">Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our +knowledge or conviction of truths and events.</p> +<p class="pn">Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute +and relative. We have a certain knowledge or conviction of that +which we perceive to be necessary in its own nature, or of which +a negative is not supposable; and this, as based upon an +<i>absolute necessity</i>, may be called an absolute +certainty.</p> +<p class="pn">The established connexion between causes and +effects, is another ground of certainty. Causes are of two kinds; +first causes, or causes <i>per se</i>, or contingent and free +causes, or will; and second or physical causes, which are +necessary with a relative necessity.</p> +<p class="pn">First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and +the finite.</p> +<p class="pn">Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will +take place. This may likewise be called an absolute certainty, +because the connexion between divine volitions and effects is +absolutely necessary. It is not supposable that God should will +in vain, for that would contradict his admitted infinity.</p> +<p class="pn">The connexion between the volitions of created will +and effects, and the connexion between physical causes and +effects, supposing each of course to be in its proper relations +and circumstances, is a connexion of relative necessity; that is, +relative to the divine will. Now the certainty of our knowledge +or conviction that an event will take place, depending upon +volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different from the +certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain conviction +that an event which infinite power wills, will take place. The +will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend +or change the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my +hand over this paper, it will move, supposing of course the +continued healthiness of the limb; but it is possible for God so +to alter the constitution of my being, that my will shall have no +more connexion with my hands than it now has with the circulation +of the blood. I believe also that if I throw this paper into the +fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God so to alter the +constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper will not +burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will continue +to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This +certainly is not an <i>absolute certainty</i>, but a +<i>conditional</i> certainty: events will thus continue to take +place on condition the divine will does not change the condition +of things. This conditional certainty is likewise called a +<i>physical</i> certainty, because the events contemplated +include besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so +commonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world, +or nature.</p> +<p class="pn">But we must next look at will itself in relation to +its volitions: Here all is contingency and freedom,—here is no +necessity. Is there any ground of certain knowledge respecting +future volitions?</p> +<p class="pn">If will as a cause <i>per se</i>, were isolated and +in no relation whatever, there could not be any ground of any +knowledge whatever, respecting future volitions. But will is not +thus isolated. On the contrary, it forms a unity with the +sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals <i>what ought to be +done</i>, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The +sensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the +ground of personal experience. Now although it is granted that +will can act without deriving a reason or inducement of action +from the reason and the sensitivity, still the instances in which +it does so act, are so rare and trifling, that they may be thrown +out of the account. We may therefore safely assume as a general +law, that the will determines according to reasons and +inducements drawn from the reason and the sensitivity. This law +is not by its very definition, and by the very nature of the +subject to which it relates, a necessary law—but a law revealed +in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise of +its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of +our being, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In +obeying the one or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to +perfect beings, therefore, we can calculate with certainty as to +their volitions under any given circumstances. Whatever is +commanded by reason, whatever appears attractive to the pure +sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed.</p> +<p class="pn">But what kind of certainty is this? It is not +absolute certainty, because it is supposable that the will which +obeys may not obey, for it has power not to obey. Nor is it +<i>physical</i> certainty, for it does not relate to a physical +cause, nor to the connexion between volition and its effects, but +to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor again can +we, strictly speaking, call it a <i>conditional</i> certainty; +because the will, as a power <i>per se</i>, is under no +conditions as to the production of its volitions. To say that the +volitions will be in accordance with the reason and pure +sensitivity, if the will continue to obey the reason and pure +sensitivity, is merely saying that the volitions will be right if +the willing power put forth right volitions. What kind of +certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty altogether +peculiar,—a certainty based upon the relative state of the reason +and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the +commands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name +of <i>moral</i><sup><a href="#n7" id="f7" title="see footnote" +name="f7">7</a></sup> laws, simply because they have this +relation,—and as the sensitivity, when harmonizing with the +reason, is thence called morally pure, because attracting to the +same conduct which the reason commands,—this certainty may fitly +be called <i>moral certainty</i>. The name, however, does not +mark <i>degree</i>. Does this certainty possess degrees? It does. +With respect to the volitions of God, we have the highest degree +of moral certainty,—an infinite moral certainty. He, indeed, in +his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions +whatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the +harmony of infinite reason with the divine affections of infinite +benevolence, truth, and justice, we are certain that his +volitions will always be right, good, and wise. Besides, he has +assured us of his fixed determination to maintain justice, truth, +and love; and he has given us this assurance as perfectly knowing +himself in the whole eternity of his being. Let no one attempt to +confound this perfect moral certainty with necessity, for the +distinction is plain. If God’s will were affirmed to be +necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness, +and love, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the +determination of the divine will: viz.—that the divine +determination takes place, not in contingency and freedom, not +with the power of making an opposite determination, but in +absolute necessity. But if it be affirmed that God’s will, will +<i>certainly</i> go in the direction of truth, righteousness, and +love, the affirmation respects our <i>knowledge</i> and +<i>conviction</i> of the character of the divine volitions in the +whole eternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire +after the grounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the +necessity of the divine determinations be the ground of this +knowledge and conviction, it must be allowed that it is a +sufficient ground. But will any man assume that necessity is the +<i>only</i> ground of certain knowledge and conviction? If +necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of +course there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other +ground of knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at +least for the sake of the argument, it be granted that there may +be other grounds of knowledge than necessity, then I would ask +whether the infinite excellence of the divine reason and +sensitivity, in their perfect harmony, does afford to us a ground +for the most certain and satisfactory belief that the divine will +will create and mould all being and order all events according to +infinite wisdom and rectitude. In order to have full confidence +that God will forever do right, must we know that his will is +absolutely necessitated by his reason and his affections? Can we +not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him absolute freedom of +choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the Earth will +do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have the +power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when, +in his omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his +purposes will forever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does +not the glory and excellency of God appear in this,—that while he +hath unlimited power, he employs that power by his free choice, +only to dispense justice, mercy, and grace? And does not the +excellency and meritoriousness of a creature’s faith appear in +this,—that while God is known to be so mighty and so absolute, he +is confided in as a being who will never violate any moral +principle or affection? Suppose God’s will to be necessitated in +its wise and good volitions,—the sun dispensing heat and light, +and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of +creation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,—and +the creature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in +him, holds no other relation to him than the sunflower to the +sun—by a necessity of its nature, ever turning its face upwards +to receive the influences which minister to its life and +properties.</p> +<p class="pn">The moral certainty attending the volitions of +created perfect beings is the same in kind with that attending +the volitions of the Deity. It is a certainty based upon the +relative state of the reason and the sensitivity, and their unity +with the will. Wherever the reason and the sensitivity are in +harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this, that in +calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we +have not to calculate the relative energy of opposing +principles:—all which is now existent is, in the constituted +unity of the soul, naturally connected only with good volitions. +But the <i>degree</i> of the moral certainty in created beings, +when compared with that attending the volitions of Deity, is only +in the proportion of the finite to the infinite. The confidence +which we repose in the integrity of a good being, does not arise +from the conviction that his volitions are necessitated, but from +his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and our sense of +his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility of his +doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing +right while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under +temptations of doing wrong.</p> +<p class="pn">A certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the +necessity of the volitions, would not differ from a physical +certainty. But a moral certainty has this plain distinction,—that +it is based upon the evidently pure dispositions and habits of +the individual, without implying, however, any necessity of +volitions.</p> +<p class="pn">Moral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral +perfection, and predicable in degrees according to the dignity +and excellency of the being.</p> +<p class="pn">But now let us suppose any disorder to take place +in the sensitivity; that is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to +any degree, to grow into opposition to the reason, so that while +the reason commands in one direction, the sensitivity gives the +sense of the most agreeable in the opposite direction,—and then +our calculations respecting future volitions must vary +accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer, because +volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing +principles: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in +different degrees.</p> +<p class="pn">By <i>the probable</i>, we mean that which has not +attained to certainty, but which nevertheless has grounds on +which it claims to be believed. We call it <i>probable</i> or +<i>proveable</i>, because it both has proof and is still under +conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof. That +which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A +mathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity, +and admits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates +its truth.</p> +<p class="pn">The divine volitions are certain on the ground of +the divine perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is +found in the divine perfections.</p> +<p class="pn">The volitions of a good created being are certain +on the ground of the purity of such a being, and admit of no +higher proof than what is found in this purity.</p> +<p class="pn">But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being +of reason, and of a sensitivity corrupted totally or in different +degrees, then we have place not for certainty, but for +probability. As our knowledge of the future volitions of such a +being can only be gathered from something now existent, this +knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present relative +state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of +this is in no case supposable,—so that, although our actual +knowledge of this being may be such as to afford us proof of what +his volitions may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may +be increased indefinitely by close observation and study, so +likewise will the proof be increased. According to the definition +of probability above given, therefore, our knowledge of the +future volitions of an imperfect being can only amount to +probable knowledge.</p> +<p class="pn">The direction of the probabilities will be +determined by the preponderance of the good or the bad in the +mixed being supposed. If the sensitivity be totally corrupted, +the probabilities will generally go in the direction of the +corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed general fact in +relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments of passion +are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But the +state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be +in a highly developed state, and the convictions of the right +consequently clear and strong, there may be probabilities of +volitions in opposition to passion which cannot exist where the +reason is undeveloped and subject to the errors and prejudices of +custom and superstition. The difference is that which is commonly +known under the terms “enlightened and unenlightened +conscience.”</p> +<p class="pn">Where the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the +direction of the probabilities must depend upon the degree of +corruption and the degree to which the reason is developed or +undeveloped.</p> +<p class="pn">With a given state of the sensitivity and the +reason, the direction of the probabilities will depend also very +much upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects and +circumstances:—where the objects and circumstances agree with the +state of the sensitivity and the reason, or to speak generally +and collectively, with “the state of the mind,” the probabilities +will clearly be more easily determined than where they are +opposed to “the state of the mind.”</p> +<p class="pn">The law which Edwards lays down as the law of +volition universally, viz: that “the volition is as the greatest +apparent good:” understanding by the term “good,” as he does, +simply, that which strikes us “agreeably,” is indeed a general +rule, according to which the volitions of characters deeply +depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as +governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of +character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is +struggling under the light of his reason against passion, and +consequently the probabilities in this last case must be +calculated in a different way. But in relation to the former it +is a sufficient rule.</p> +<p class="pn">Probability, as well as certainty, respects only +the kind and degree of our knowledge of any events, and not the +causes by which those events are produced: whether these causes +be necessary or contingent is another question.</p> +<p class="pn">One great error in reasoning respecting the +character of causes, in connexion with the calculation of +probabilities, is the assumption that uniformity is the +characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning may be +stated in the following syllogism:</p> +<p class="pn">In order to calculate either with certainty or +probability any events we must suppose a uniform law of +causation; but uniformity can exist only where there is a +necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose a +necessity of causation.</p> +<p class="pns">This is another instance of applying to the will +principles which were first obtained from the observation of +physical causes, and which really belong to physical causes only. +With respect to physical causes, <i>it is true</i> that +uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary causes, +simply because physical causes are relatively necessary +causes:—but with respect to the will, <i>it is not true</i> that +uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary cause, +because the will is not a necessary cause. That uniformity +therefore, as in the case of physical causes, seems to become a +characteristic of necessary cause, does not arise from the nature +of the idea of cause, but from the nature of the particular +subject, viz., <i>physical</i> cause. Uniformity in logical +strictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule. +Cause is simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the +direction, aims, and modes of power: cause explains the mere +existence of phenomena: law explains their relations and +characteristics: law is the thought and design of the reason. Now +a cause may be so conditioned as to be incapable of acting except +in obedience to law, and this is the case of all physical causes +which act according to the law or design of infinite wisdom, and +thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to these +causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they +necessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned +as to be incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can +oppose itself to, and violate law, but still it is a cause in +connexion with law, the law found in the reason and sensitivity, +which law of course has the characteristic of uniformity. The law +of the reason and pure sensitivity is uniform—it is the law of +right. The law of a totally corrupted sensitivity is likewise a +uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law to do whatever is +most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every individual, whatever +may be the degree of his corruption, forms for himself certain +rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces +uniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity +of conduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the +design of the supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature. +Uniformity of volitions is nothing but the design of reason and +pure sensitivity, or of corrupted passion developed in human +conduct. The uniformity thus not being the characteristic of +cause as such, cannot be the characteristic of necessary cause. +The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues nothing respecting +the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause or it may +not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity in +a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform +rules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but +which we also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical +causes we have the uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we +have the uniformity of a free intelligent cause. We can conceive +of perfect freedom and yet of perfect order, because the free +will can submit itself to the light of the reason. Indeed, all +the order and harmony of creation, although springing from the +<i>idea</i> of the reason, has been constituted by the power of +the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not +necessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is +altogether an assumption incapable of being supported that +freedom is identified with disorder.</p> +<p class="pt1">Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience.</p> +<p class="pn">These words are metaphorical: <i>fore</i> and +<i>pre</i> do not qualify <i>knowledge</i> and <i>science</i> in +relation to the mind which has the knowledge or science; but the +time in which the knowledge takes place in relation to the time +in which the object of knowledge is found. The metaphor consists +in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge, considered +relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act of +knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining +greater perspicuity, let us say,</p> +<p class="pn">First: All acts of knowing are present acts of +knowing,—there is no <i>fore</i> knowledge and no <i>after</i> +knowledge.</p> +<p class="pn">Secondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no +relation to time and space whatever, e. g. pure abstract and +necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4; and the being of God. Or the +objects of knowledge may be in relations of time and space, e. g. +all physical phenomena.</p> +<p class="pn">Now these relations of time and space are +various;—the object of knowledge may be in time past, or time +present, or time future; and it may be in a place near, or in a +place distant. And the faculty of knowledge may be of a capacity +to know the object in all these relations under certain +limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of knowledge as +knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under certain +limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in +time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near +and distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events +in any of these relations, or in any of these relations to their +utmost limit.</p> +<p class="pn">The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all +relations of time and space, under no limitations, is the faculty +under its divine and infinite form. Under this form it +comprehends the present perfectly, and the past and the future no +less than the present—and it reaches through all space. God’s +knowledge is an <span class="sc">eternal now</span>—an +<span class="sc">omnipresent here</span>; that is, all that is +possible and actual in eternity and space, is now perfectly known +to him. Indeed God’s knowledge ought not to be spoken of in +relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute +knowledge, from eternity to eternity the same; it is +unchangeable, because it is perfect; it can neither be increased +nor diminished.</p> +<p class="pn">We have shown before that the perfection of the +knowledge does not settle the mode of causation; that which comes +to pass by necessity, and that which comes to pass contingently, +are alike known to God.</p> +<h1><a name="End" id="End">CONCLUSION.</a></h1> +<p class="pn">I here finish my review of Edwards’s System, and +his arguments against the opposite system. I hope I have not +thought or written in vain. The review I have aimed to conduct +fairly and honourably, and in supreme reverence of truth. As to +style, I have laboured only for perspicuity, and where a homely +expression has best answered this end, I have not hesitated to +adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly understood, +cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a flowery +surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason, +is manifestly impossible.</p> +<p class="pn">The great man with whose work I have been engaged, +I honour and admire for his intellectual might, and love and +venerate for a purity and elevation of spirit, which places him +among the most sainted names of the Christian church. But have I +done wrong not to be seduced by his genius, nor won and commanded +by his piety to the belief of his philosophy? I have not done +wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he leads me to the +cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute +attention—and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to +have re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, +I view him in a different character, and here his voice does not +sound to me so sweet as Plato’s.</p> +<p class="pn">The first part of my undertaking is accomplished. +When I again trouble the public with my lucubrations, I shall +appear not as a reviewer, but in an original work, which in its +turn must become the subject of philosophical criticism.</p> +<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:5.0em;margin-bottom:7.0em"> +THE END.</p> +<h1 style= +"text-align:center;font-size:112%;margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2em;"> +<a name="Footnotes" id="Footnotes">Footnotes</a></h1> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f1" id="n1" name="n1">1</a></sup> +“It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a +distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into +their service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say +natural or physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral +necessity does not: at the same time they explain moral necessity +so as to make it truly physical or natural. That is physical +necessity which is the <i>invincible</i> effect of the law of +nature, and it is neither less natural, nor less insurmountable, +if it is from the laws of spirit than it would be if it were from +the laws of matter.”—(Witherspoon’s Lectures on Divinity, lect. +xiii.)</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f2" id="n2" name="n2">2</a></sup> +Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this +usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the +performance of an action, and the existence of an impediment or +antagonistic force, which takes from a faculty supposed to exist, +the <i>liberty</i> of action, have the same bearing upon +responsibility.</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f3" id="n3" name="n3">3</a></sup> It +is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and +natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without +intending anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By +moral inability they do not appear to mean anything which really +render the actions required, impossible; but such an impediment +as lies in corrupt affections, an impediment which may be removed +by a self-determination to the use of means and appliances +graciously provided or promised. By natural ability they mean the +possession of all the natural faculties necessary to the +performance of the actions required. In their representations of +this natural ability, they proceed according to a popular method, +rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural ability as +a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities, but +they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose +upon myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to +point out the connexion between the sensitivity and the will, +both in a pure and a corrupt state,—and explain what these +natural faculties are, which, according to the just meaning of +these divines, form the ground of rebuke and persuasion, and +constitute responsibility.</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f4" id="n4" name="n4">4</a></sup> +“The great argument that men are determined by the strongest +motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call +<i>petitio principii</i>. It is impossible even to produce any +medium of proof that it is the strongest motive, except that it +has prevailed. It is not the greatest in itself; nor does it seem +to be in all respects the strongest to the agent; but you say it +appears strongest in the meantime. Why? Because you are +determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was +determined by the <i>strongest motive</i>, and you have only +shown that I had a <i>motive</i> when I acted. But what has +determined you then? Can any effect be without a cause? I +answer—supposing my self-determining power to exist, it is as +real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect, as your +moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and is +but one and the same thing on one side and on the +other.”—(Witherspoon’s Lectures, lect. xiii.)</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f5" id="n5" name="n5">5</a></sup> +Cousin.</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f6" id="n6" name="n6">6</a></sup> +Dr. Reid.</p> +<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f7" id="n7" name="n7">7</a></sup> +Lat. <i>moralis</i>, from <i>mos</i>,—i. e. custom or ordinary +conduct.</p> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S *** + +***** This file should be named 35958-h.htm or 35958-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/9/5/35958/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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