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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: A Review of Edwards's
+
+Author: Henry Tappan
+
+Release Date: April 25, 2011 [EBook #35958]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Keith G Richardson
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S
+
+"INQUIRY
+
+INTO THE
+
+FREEDOM OF THE WILL."
+
+
+CONTAINING
+
+I. STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+II. THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.
+
+III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING WILL.
+
+BY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN.
+
+"I am afraid that Edwards's book (however well meant,) has done much
+harm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to the same
+doctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been generally ranked
+among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples."--_Dugald
+Stewart_.
+
+
+NEW-YORK:
+
+JOHN S. TAYLOR,
+
+THEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER, BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL,
+
+1839.
+
+
+
+
+Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by HENRY
+PHILIP TAPPAN, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United
+States, for the Southern District of New-York.
+
+G. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+Discussions respecting the will, have, unhappily, been confounded with
+theological opinions, and hence have led to theological controversies,
+where predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally
+prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental
+constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate methods of
+psychological investigation, and must abide the result. If we enter the
+field of human consciousness in the free, fearless, and honest spirit of
+Baconian observation in order to arrive at the laws of the reason or the
+imagination, what should prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened
+course in reference to the will?
+
+Is it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are
+more immediately connected with the will? This, indeed, throws solemnity
+around our investigations, and warns us of caution; but, at the same
+time, so far from repressing investigation, it affords the highest
+reason why we should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness.
+Nothing surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral
+obligation, or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency
+of religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us the
+subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim unbounded liberty
+of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at truth. As a believer in
+the Bible I always anticipate that the truths to which philosophy leads
+me, will harmonize with its facts and doctrines. If in the result there
+should appear to be a collision, it imposes upon me the duty of
+re-examining both my philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In
+this way I may in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but
+even gain from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight
+into both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be removed,
+then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, however, that I must
+either renounce the philosophical conclusion, or remove the text.
+
+If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths were in opposition to
+the whole of revelation or its leading truths, we should then evidently
+be placed on the alternative of denying one or the other; but as the
+denial of philosophy would be the destruction of reason, there would no
+longer remain in our being any principle on which a revelation could be
+received. Such a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any
+system to be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that
+with every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne aloft,
+and their divine authority and their truth made more manifest, have we
+not reason to bless the researches which have enabled us to perceive
+more clearly the light from Heaven? A system of truth does not fear, it
+courts philosophical scrutiny. Its excellency will be most resplendent
+when it has had the most fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken
+my faith in the Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its
+safety whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And
+what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be derived
+from it.
+
+Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves when they argue from
+the truths of the Bible to the truths of their philosophy; either under
+the view that the last are deducible from the former, or that they serve
+to account for and confirm the former. How often is their philosophy
+drawn from some other source, or handed down by old authority, and
+rendered venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead
+of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is perhaps cast
+into the mould of the philosophy.
+
+It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by experience, that in
+pursuing our investigations in any particular science we are to confine
+ourselves rigorously to its subjects and methods, neither seeking nor
+fearing collision with any other science. We may feel confident that
+ultimately science will be found to link with science, forming a
+universal and harmonious system of truth; but this can by no means form
+the principle of our particular investigations. The application of this
+maxim is no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds
+a relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest that in
+the developements of such philosophy or science, it should be found to
+harmonize with the revelation; but nevertheless this cannot be received
+as the principle on which we shall aim to develope it. If there is a
+harmony, it must be discovered; it cannot be invented and made.
+
+The Cardinals determined upon the authority of Scripture, as they
+imagined, what the science of astronomy must be, and compelled the old
+man Gallileo to give the lie to his reason; and since then, the science
+of geology has been attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be
+limited in its researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued
+her steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, and
+selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own discoveries.
+And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The memory of Gallileo and
+of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips which name the name of Christ.
+
+Now we ask the same independence of research in the philosophy of the
+human mind, and no less with respect to the Will than with respect to
+any other faculty. We wish to make this purely a psychological question.
+Let us not ask what philosophy is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to
+Pelagianism and Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the
+former; let us ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may
+present another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the
+legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with truths
+revealed.
+
+One thing is certain; the Bible no more professes to be a system of
+formal mental philosophy, than it professes to contain the sciences of
+astronomy and geology. If mental philosophy is given there, it is given
+in facts of history, individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law,
+and ethics; and as thus given, must be collected into a system by
+observation and philosophical criticism.
+
+But observations upon these external facts could not possibly be made
+independently of observations upon internal facts--the facts of the
+consciousness; and the principles of philosophical criticism can be
+obtained only in the same way. To him who looks not within himself,
+poetry, history, law, ethics, and the distinctions of character and
+conduct, would necessarily be unintelligible. No one therefore can
+search the Bible for its philosophy, who has not already read philosophy
+in his own being. We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole
+history of theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every
+author of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both
+the principles of his philosophy and their influence upon himself. Every
+man who reflects and aims to explain, is necessarily a philosopher, and
+has his philosophy. Instead therefore of professing to oppose the Bible
+to philosophy, or instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy
+solely and directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not
+discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and that
+inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all that we know
+and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in a pure, truth-loving
+spirit.
+
+I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will is so intimately
+associated with great and venerable names, and has so long worn a
+theological complexion, that it is well nigh impossible to disintegrate
+it. The authority of great and good men, and theological interests, even
+when we are disposed to be candid, impartial, and independent, do often
+insensibly influence our reasonings.
+
+It is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from
+the wish to avoid all unnecessary strangeness of manner in handling an
+old subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the
+weightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open
+this discussion with a review of "Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of
+the Will." There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the
+self-determining power of the will; and none which on this subject has
+called forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and
+logical subtlety. I believe there is a prevailing impression that
+Edwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite
+argument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it
+may seem, yet honest and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and
+more venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great
+and venerable sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a
+proper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself
+alone, neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a
+collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is my
+interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright; and as
+right action is meritorious not when compelled and accidental, but when
+free and made under the perception and conviction of right principles;
+so also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an
+intellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are
+something more than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or
+Arminius, presents the cup.
+
+Facts of history or of description are legitimately received on
+testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual being can be received
+only on the evidence of consciousness, unless the testimony be from God
+himself; and even in this case we expect that the testimony, although it
+may transcend consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal
+evidence of the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this:
+that although there be revelations of that which transcends
+consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of
+consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions of
+developed reason and the revelation.
+
+Now in the application of these principles, if Edwards have given us a
+true psychology in relation to the will, we have the means of knowing
+it. In the consciousness, and in the consciousness alone, can a doctrine
+of the will be ultimately and adequately tested. Nor must we be
+intimidated from making this test by the assumption that the theory of
+Edwards alone sustains moral responsibility and evangelical religion.
+Moral responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and
+illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has already on
+its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral responsibility
+and evangelical religion can derive no support from a philosophy which
+they are taken first to prove.
+
+But although I intend to conduct my argument rigidly on psychological
+principles, I shall endeavour in the end to show that moral
+responsibility is really sustained by this exposition of the will; and
+that I have not, to say the least, weakened one of the supports of
+evangelical religion, nor shorn it of one of its glories.
+
+The plan of my undertaking embraces the following particulars:
+
+I. A statement of Edwards's system.
+
+II. The legitimate consequences of this system.
+
+III. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will.
+
+IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness.
+
+V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and
+responsibility.
+
+VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of
+the Bible.
+
+The first three complete the review of Edwards, and make up the present
+volume. Another volume is in the course of preparation.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+A STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+Edwards's System, or, in other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is
+contained in part I. of his "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." This
+part comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in
+his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore use my
+best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost clearness and
+fairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety is to have Edwards
+perfectly understood. My quotations are made from the edition published
+by S. Converse, New-York, 1829.
+
+"Sec. I.--Concerning the Nature of the Will."
+
+Edwards under this title gives his definition of the will. "_The will
+is, that by which the mind chooses anything_. The faculty of the _will_,
+is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing:
+an act of the _will_ is the same as an act of _choosing_ or _choice_."
+(p. 15.)
+
+He then identifies "choosing" and "refusing:" "In every act of refusal
+the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused." (p. 16.)
+
+The will is thus _the faculty of choice_. Choice manifests itself either
+in relation to one object or several objects. Where there is but one
+object, its possession or non-possession--its enjoyment or
+non-enjoyment--its presence or absence, is chosen. Where there are
+several objects, and they are so incompatible that the possession,
+enjoyment, or presence of one, involves the refusal of the others, then
+choice manifests itself in fixing upon the particular object to be
+retained, and the objects to be set aside.
+
+This definition is given on the ground that any object being regarded as
+positive, may be contrasted with its negative: and that therefore the
+refusing a negative is equivalent to choosing a positive; and the
+choosing a negative, equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa.
+Thus if the presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is
+negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the absence; and
+to choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so that every act of
+choosing involves refusing, and every act of refusing involves choosing;
+in other words, they are equivalents.
+
+_Object of Will._
+
+The object in respect to which the energy of choice is manifested,
+inducing external action, or the action of any other faculty of the
+mind, is always an _immediate object_. Although other objects may appear
+desirable, that alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of
+present action--that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which
+I actually think--that alone is chosen as the object of muscular
+exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, every act
+of choice manifests itself by producing some change or effect in some
+other part of our being. "The thing next chosen or preferred, when a man
+wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would
+be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order
+to it." The same principle applies to any mental exertion.
+
+_Will and Desire._
+
+Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only distinction that can
+possibly be made is that of genus and species. They are the same in
+_kind_. "I do not suppose that _will_ and _desire_ are words of
+precisely the same signification: _will_ seems to be a word of a more
+general signification, extending to things present and absent. _Desire_
+respects something absent. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely
+distinct that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man
+never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or
+desires anything contrary to his will. The thing which he wills, the
+very same he desires; and he does not will a thing and desire the
+_contrary_ in any particular." (p. 17.) The immediate object of
+will,--that object, in respect of which choice manifests itself by
+producing effects,--is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme
+desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object which
+appears most desirable; and the object which appears most desirable is
+always the object chosen. To produce an act of choice, therefore, we
+have only to awaken a preponderating desire. Now it is plain, that
+desire cannot be distinguished from passion. That which we love, we
+desire to be present, to possess, to enjoy: that which we hate, we
+desire to be absent, or to be affected in some way. The loving an
+object, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical: the hating it,
+and desiring its absence or destruction, or any similar affection of it,
+are likewise identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished,
+at least in _kind_, from the emotions and passions: this will appear
+abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly identifies them:
+"I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly
+distinguishable from the will; as though they were two faculties of
+soul." (Revival of Religion in New England, part I.)
+
+"God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is
+capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and
+views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The
+other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and
+view things, but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it
+views or considers; either is inclined _to them_, or is disinclined or
+averse _from them_. This faculty is called by various names: it is
+sometimes called _inclination_; and as it has respect to the actions
+that are determined or governed by it, is called will. The _will_ and
+the _affections_ of the soul are not two faculties: the affections are
+not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere
+actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the
+liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." (The Nature of the Affections,
+part I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the
+understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and the
+passions, is fully settled by the above quotation.
+
+"Sec. II.--Concerning the Determination of Will."
+
+_Meaning of the term._
+
+"By _determining_ the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must
+be intended, _causing_ that the act of the will or choice should be thus
+and not otherwise; and the will is said to be determined, when in
+consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and
+fixed upon, some particular object. As when we speak of the
+determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in
+such a direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will
+supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined,
+there is a determiner."
+
+Now the causation of choice and the determination of the will are here
+intended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and
+the determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in
+motion, likewise gives it a direction; and where there are several
+causes, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the
+extent and direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the
+will or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its
+direction; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also
+conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, the
+direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is determined.
+And where there are several causes acting upon the will, there is here
+likewise a composition of the mental forces, and the choice or the
+determination of the will takes place accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice
+or volition then being an effect must have a cause. What is this cause?
+
+_Motive._
+
+The cause of volition or choice is called motive. A cause setting a body
+in motion is properly called the motive of the body; hence, analogously,
+a cause exciting the will to choice is called the motive of the will. By
+long usage the proper sense of motive is laid aside, and it has come now
+to express only the cause or reason of volition. "By _motive_ I mean the
+whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition,
+whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And when I
+speak of the _strongest motive_, I have respect to the strength of the
+whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that
+be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." And "_that
+motive which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest,
+determines the will_." (p. 19.) This is general, and means nothing more
+than--1. the cause of volition is called motive; 2. that where there are
+several causes or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3.
+the cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the cause,
+if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered in their
+co-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive "stands in view of the
+mind," that is, it is something which the mind knows or is sensible of.
+
+_What constitutes the strength of Motive?_
+
+"Everything that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement,
+to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of _tendency_
+or _advantage_ to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to
+the act of will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I
+call the _strength_ of the motive." When different objects are presented
+to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear more or less
+"inviting." (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once produced, we
+perceive their "tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." It is
+a preference or choice anticipated, an instantaneous perception of a
+quality in the object which we feel would determine our choice, if we
+were called upon to make a choice. The object is felt to be adapted to
+the state of the mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are
+felt to be reciprocal.
+
+_What is this quality which makes up the previous tendency?_
+
+"Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary
+agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or
+choice, is considered or viewed _as good_; nor has it any tendency to
+engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears
+such." Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as
+the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the
+previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as the
+highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the strongest
+motive; therefore, it follows that the "_will is always as the greatest
+apparent good is_." (p. 20.)
+
+_The sense in which the term_ "good" _is used._
+
+"I use the term _'good'_ as of the same import with _'agreeable.'_ To
+appear _good_ to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to
+_appear agreeable_, or _seem pleasing_ to the mind. If it tends to draw
+the inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that
+which _suits_ the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest
+tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's
+view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the
+greatest apparent good. The word _good_ in this sense includes the
+avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy." (p. 20.)
+
+It follows then that the will is always determined by that which _seems
+most pleasing or appears most agreeable_ to the mind.
+
+This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which
+Edwards set out: that will is always as the preponderating desire;
+indeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the
+affections; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the
+strongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire
+producing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination
+of will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines
+will is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its
+perceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As
+possessing this tendency, it is called _good_, or _pleasing_, or
+_agreeable_; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of
+the affections.
+
+The _"good"_ which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an
+immediate good, or a good "in the present view of the mind." (p. 21.)
+Thus a drunkard, before he drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each
+other the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful
+consequences; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be
+greater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his
+mind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only;
+and if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. "If he wills to
+drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will; and
+drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him,
+and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the
+immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him." The
+reasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that
+he has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of
+drinking, in itself, is the object of choice; so that, in the view he
+has taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we
+may say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of
+choice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in
+such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the moment,
+and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus
+never chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him.
+
+_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._
+
+"I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is
+as the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_,
+than to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or
+by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the
+mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict
+propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that
+the _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the
+mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than
+the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the
+most agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or
+_choice_. "The will is as the most agreeable,"--that is, _the
+determination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of
+the consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and
+as the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect,
+following volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or
+read, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the "mind's
+choice,"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary
+action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the
+sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the
+terms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary
+action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This
+is still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the
+desire_. "The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most
+agreeable," and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it
+must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is
+affected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the
+phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is
+chosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the
+simple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more
+than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and
+the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than
+chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is
+the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The
+object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are
+correlatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard
+choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be
+the most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as
+characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with
+the sense of the most agreeable.
+
+_Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._
+
+"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's
+view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in
+or about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to
+render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the
+object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and
+circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.)
+
+Choice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that
+is, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect
+agreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect
+agreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in
+determining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the
+mind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in
+relation to each.
+
+I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or
+choice, will depend upon,--
+
+1. The beauty of the object, "viewing it as it is _in itself_,"
+independently of circumstances.
+
+2. "The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or
+_the consequence_ of it," or the object taken with its "concomitants"
+and consequences.
+
+3. "The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with
+respect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the
+mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed."
+(p. 22.)
+
+II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first,
+upon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind.
+Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future
+pleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two
+respects:
+
+1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the
+pleasure;
+
+2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind
+has of it.
+
+Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees
+of pleasure, considered in itself; and "the agreeableness of a proposed
+object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree
+of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or
+certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the
+mind has of that good." (p. 23.)
+
+Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with
+present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also
+upon "the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice."
+(p. 24.) Here we have to consider "the particular temper which the mind
+has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education,
+example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the
+mind is in on a particular occasion." (ibid.)
+
+Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state
+of the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already
+mentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the
+_manner of the view_. "Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter," he
+remarks, "the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration
+as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes
+the objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_,
+having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the
+_manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or
+deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively." (ibid.)
+In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and
+object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two,
+choice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to
+_the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of
+agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the
+most agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that,
+having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation
+to _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of
+mind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in
+relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind
+produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an
+example,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and
+agreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation
+to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the
+sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical
+language, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the
+other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of
+the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind
+and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not
+have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object
+is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem
+to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most
+agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only
+difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this:
+the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate
+presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The
+most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition.
+Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most
+agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is
+positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these
+cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance
+of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of
+choosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase
+_most agreeable_ or _greatest apparent good_ is convenient for general
+use, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up.
+
+It may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus
+endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word _choice_ is properly
+used to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in
+relation to its immediate effects,--as when I say, I choose to walk.
+_The sense of the most agreeable_, is properly used to express the same
+action, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice
+and volition are the words in common use, because men at large only
+think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause
+of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie
+in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the _sense of
+the most agreeable_ becomes the most appropriate form of expression.
+
+Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of the most agreeable, by
+remarking: "However, I think so much is certain,--that volition, in no
+one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest
+apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained." This is the
+great principle of his system; and, a few sentences after, he states it
+as an axiom, or a generally admitted truth: "There is scarcely a plainer
+and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than
+that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what
+suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them." Indeed, Edwards
+cannot be considered as having attempted to prove this; he has only
+explained it, and therefore it is only the _explanation_ of a supposed
+axiom that we have been following out.
+
+This supposed axiom is really announced in the first section: "Will and
+desire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very
+same he desires;" that is, a man wills as he desires, and of course
+wills what is most agreeable to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the
+title of part I. runs as follows: "Wherein are explained and stated
+various terms and things, &c." Receiving it, therefore, as a generally
+admitted truth, "that choice or volition is always as the most
+agreeable," and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is
+the explanation given?
+
+1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a faculty distinct from
+the affections or passions, or that part of our being which philosophers
+sometimes call the sensitivity.
+
+2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment
+and under any given circumstances the strongest inclination, or the
+strongest affection and desire with regard to an immediate object,
+appears in the constitution of our being as the antecedent of effects in
+the mind itself, or in the body; which effects are called voluntary
+actions,--as acts of attention, or of talking, or walking.
+
+3. To say that volition is as the desire, is equivalent to saying that
+volition is as the "greatest apparent good," which again means only the
+most agreeable,--so that the volition becomes again the _sense or
+feeling of the greatest apparent good_. There is in all this only a
+variety of expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.
+
+4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the production in the mind
+of volition, or choice, or the strongest affection, or the sense of the
+most agreeable, or of the greatest apparent good. It is therefore an
+effect, and must have a determiner or cause.
+
+5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In explaining what
+constitutes the motive, we must take into view both _mind_ and _object_.
+The object must be perceived by the mind as something existent. This
+perception, however, is only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the
+object to the mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable,
+or choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to each
+other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess qualities of
+beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must possess a
+susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the object. But to say that
+the object possesses qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind,
+is in fact to affirm that the mind has the requisite susceptibility; for
+these qualities of the object have a being, and are what they are only
+in relation to mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may
+therefore be called the unition of the sensitivity and the object.
+Choice is thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually
+appearing in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and,
+indeed, being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be
+accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. But
+inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in relation
+to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for its
+manifestations by referring them to the objects and circumstances in
+connexion with which they take place, and without which they would not
+take place; and thus, as we say, the cause of passion is the object of
+passion: so we say also, in common parlance, the cause of choice is the
+object of choice; and assigning the affections of the mind springing up
+in the presence of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its
+qualities, we say that choice is always as the most beautiful and
+agreeable; that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest
+apparent good, thus _objectively_ described, is the motive, or
+determiner, or cause of volition.
+
+_In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding._
+
+"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always
+follows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the
+understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole
+faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called
+_reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant
+what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness,
+taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always
+follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason
+is quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_,
+all things being put together which relates to the mind's present
+perceptions in any respect." (p. 25.) The "large sense" in which Edwards
+takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive
+being. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable,
+the suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with
+other particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject
+to the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at
+the moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is
+not enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must
+likewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of
+the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this
+sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the
+subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, "the
+act of the will is determined in opposition to it." (ibid.)
+
+"Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity,
+Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence."
+
+After having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained
+the cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion
+between this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this
+connexion a necessary connexion?
+
+In order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he
+proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above
+title. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary
+discussion.
+
+Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the
+common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or
+metaphysical use.
+
+1. In common use, _necessity_ "is a relative term, and relates to some
+supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition
+is overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word
+_impossible_ is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to
+supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient
+for the effect. The word _unable_ is relative, and has relation to
+ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word _irresistible_ is
+relative, and has reference to resistance which is made, or may be made,
+to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to
+withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity
+and impossibility implies _something that frustrates endeavour or
+desire_."
+
+He then distinguishes this necessity into _general and particular_.
+"Things are necessary _in general_, which are or will be,
+notwithstanding any supposable opposition, from whatever quarter:" e. g.
+that God will judge the world.
+
+"Things are necessary _to us_ which are or will be, notwithstanding all
+opposition supposable in the case _from us_." This is _particular_
+necessity: e. g. any event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions
+"about liberty and moral agency," the word is used especially in a
+particular sense, because we are concerned in these discussions _as
+individuals_.
+
+According to this _common use_ of necessity in the _particular_ sense,
+"When we speak of any thing necessary _to us_, it is with relation to
+some supposable opposition _to our wills;_" and "a thing is said to be
+necessary" in this sense "when we cannot help it, do what _we will_." So
+also a thing is said to be _impossible to us_ when we cannot do it,
+although we make the attempt,--that is, put forth the volition; and
+_irresistible to us_, which, when we put forth a volition to hinder it,
+overcomes the opposition: and we are _unable_ to do a thing "when our
+supposable desires and endeavours are insufficient,"--are not followed
+by any effect. In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not
+considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are
+considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own effects:
+e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain man can raise a
+certain weight,--if it be affirmed that it is _impossible_ for him to
+raise it, that he has not the _ability_ to raise it, and that the weight
+will _necessarily_ keep its position,--no reference whatever is made to
+the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but solely to the
+connexion between the _volition_ and the _raising of the weight_. Now
+Edwards remarks, that this common use of the term necessity and its
+cognates being habitual, is likely to enter into and confound our
+reasonings on subjects where it is inadmissible from the nature of the
+case. We must therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)
+
+2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_,
+but an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies "in cases wherein
+no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very
+nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or
+endeavour." (ibid.) Thus it is used "with respect to God's existence
+before the creation of the world, when there was no other being."
+"_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from
+certainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things
+in themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or
+that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition
+which affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than
+the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject
+and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and
+in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when
+I endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_."
+(p. 27, 28, 29.)
+
+"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence
+of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several
+ways."
+
+"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_.
+So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is
+necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four."
+
+2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence
+of something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain.
+
+3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain
+_consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be
+"consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_
+with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a
+necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity.
+
+"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which
+will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are
+necessary only in this last way,"--that is, "by a connexion with
+something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already
+is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to
+controversies about acts of the will." (p. 30.)
+
+Philosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. "The existence
+of a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when
+all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its
+existence." This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.
+
+2. _Particular_ necessity refers to "things that happen to particular
+persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern,
+at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with
+regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard
+to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the
+will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute
+to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether
+it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.
+
+"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and
+_necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms
+_impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only
+the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.)
+
+_Inability and Unable._
+
+"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use,
+have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is
+have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these
+terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on
+controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and
+far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will
+or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be
+supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or
+motives.
+
+_Contingent and Contingency._
+
+"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or
+accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with
+its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of
+things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing.
+But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense;
+not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot
+discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has
+absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has
+any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.)
+
+Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use,
+contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we
+discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical
+school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no
+cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any
+cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper
+place. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them.
+
+Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and
+Inability.
+
+We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and
+volition necessary?
+
+The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this
+question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion
+between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this
+question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its
+cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be
+necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical
+sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to
+characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens
+with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: "That
+necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible
+connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a
+proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is
+distinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity." He then
+appropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of
+the connexion between motive and volition: "And sometimes by moral
+necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which
+arises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives,
+and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such
+certain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the
+phrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse." (p. 32.) Natural
+_philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to
+characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our
+being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations,
+and the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)
+
+In employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate
+that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it
+distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that "moral necessity may be
+as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as
+perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect
+is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a
+thing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and
+effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I
+call by the name of _moral necessity_." (p. 33.)
+
+Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that
+the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature
+of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to
+express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which
+"does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two
+terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many
+cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is
+plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as
+truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having
+its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express
+the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are
+most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of
+motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering
+the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation.
+(p. 34.)
+
+Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his
+reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must
+be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name
+of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the
+original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before,
+such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech,
+and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to
+some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient.
+But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in
+the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and
+will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose
+and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to
+oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite
+to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two
+contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore
+the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or
+resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.)
+
+This passage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the
+original use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and
+its effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose
+or will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour
+overcomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the
+weight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these
+terms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my
+volition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the
+sense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary
+endeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of
+as struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition
+does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition,
+therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be
+made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is
+supposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their
+circumstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two,
+as the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its
+cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It
+comes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary
+endeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute
+necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone
+which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at
+given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and
+feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought
+together. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of
+volition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that
+necessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure
+and perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits,
+(p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and
+natural necessity is a mere difference in the "two terms connected," and
+not a difference "_in the nature of the connexion_."
+
+_Natural and moral inability._
+
+"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain
+what is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be
+_naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will,
+because what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or
+because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the
+will; either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body,
+or external objects." (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know
+something, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the
+understanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the
+instrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a
+defect of the bodily constitution; or external objects may be regarded
+as presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert.
+This is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be
+remarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or
+_philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability;
+but only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a
+relative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do,
+although we will to do.
+
+What is moral inability? "Moral inability consists not in any of these
+things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a
+contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to
+induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives
+to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be
+said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or
+want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such
+a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives,
+it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an
+inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
+circumstances and under the influence of such views." (bid.)
+
+The inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between
+volition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the
+volition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition,
+cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to
+exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The
+inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the
+motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_,
+and in the _nature and circumstances of the object;_ and choice or
+volition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense
+of the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any
+given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not
+produced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind
+and object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the
+deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and
+object--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a
+state_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not
+possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part
+of the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a
+stronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object,
+there is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the
+_particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a
+different state of mind: and this constitutes "the want of sufficient
+motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength
+of apparent motives to the contrary." And both these may clearly be
+resolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on
+the part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards
+another object; or, as Edwards expresses it, "the opposition or want of
+inclination." For a want of inclination to one object, implying a
+stronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the
+mind_, and the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not
+correlated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and
+circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a "want
+of sufficient motives;" the second, stronger "motives to the contrary."
+Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition,
+therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an
+effect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has
+any existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the
+perfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being,
+leading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical
+inability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain
+volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral
+ability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and
+principles of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_
+ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions
+and certain effects.
+
+Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a
+_real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility
+of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain
+effects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water
+freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an
+established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of
+effects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of
+the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the
+nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected."
+
+Edwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability.
+
+"A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to
+prostitute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation
+between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object
+contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
+cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and
+the act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the
+principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to
+the consequents of the choice.
+
+"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to
+kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding.
+
+"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and
+temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be
+unable to forbear gratifying his lust." There is here a correlation
+between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and
+circumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
+takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral
+inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite.
+
+"A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear
+taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last.
+
+"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an
+enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power
+of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are
+most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_
+is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all
+correlated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's
+self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the
+most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is
+absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of
+virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love
+wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of
+habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose
+holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy
+Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The
+love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation
+of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is
+_utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral
+inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this
+inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no
+power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to
+put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition,
+and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions.
+
+Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and
+fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has
+absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he
+would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a
+good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good
+volitions.
+
+_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._
+
+The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual
+and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.)
+
+The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act,
+through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements
+presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.)
+
+An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular
+occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular
+inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has
+become correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it
+is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is
+correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and
+under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is
+necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at
+present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the
+greatest advantage to induce it."
+
+"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will,
+are in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or
+_habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be
+otherwise than at present it is." (ibid.)
+
+The passage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be
+brought up under the following question:
+
+Although will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet
+can present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the
+will, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts?
+
+"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the
+will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a
+distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will
+at one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and
+there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of
+the will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered
+insufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion
+returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such
+opposition." (p. 37.)
+
+Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to
+drink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink.
+But we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects
+likewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife
+and children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his
+cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing,
+these considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most
+agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to
+form resolutions of amendment; but when the appetite and longing for
+drink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these
+considerations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are
+overcome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.
+
+"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to
+such future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the
+occasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be
+prevented or avoided." (ibid.)
+
+In the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual
+correlation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and
+considerations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being
+associated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the
+mind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain
+the mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation
+from strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with
+the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed
+to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again
+into circumstances to give it an adventitious advantage. The repetition
+of occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in
+the sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. "On this
+account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially
+obtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and
+indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong
+habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its
+resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also,
+when the acts arise from strong habit." (ibid.)
+
+In every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act
+otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment
+of his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize
+men by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of
+moral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no
+correlation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if
+it be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason
+itself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the
+most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or
+sensitivity is opposed to it.
+
+_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability
+_to act in a certain way._
+
+"But it must be observed concerning _moral inability_, in each kind of
+it, that the word _inability_ is used in a sense very diverse from its
+original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the
+proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present
+will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said
+to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, _according to the
+ordinary use of language_, that a malicious man, let him be never so
+malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to
+show his neighbour a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be
+never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. _In the strictest
+propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his
+choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable
+to do a thing, when he can do it if he will_." (ibid.)
+
+Men, in the common use of language, and in the expression of their
+common and generally received sentiments, affirm that an individual has
+any thing in his power when it can be controlled by volition. Their
+connexion of power does not arise from the connexion of volition with
+its cause, but from the conception of volition as itself a cause with
+its effects. Thus the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike,
+having for its antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking,
+having for its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common
+usage of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to
+strike or not to strike. Now as it is "improperly said that he cannot
+perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is
+in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the
+acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with
+respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a
+downright contradiction; it is to say he _cannot_ will if he _does_
+will: and, in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man
+to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing." (ibid.)
+
+It is improper, according to this, to say that a man cannot do a thing,
+when nothing is wanting but an act of volition; for that is within our
+power, as far as it can be within our power, which is within the reach
+of our volition.
+
+It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts
+of the will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a
+man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to
+will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another,
+which is absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause
+of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has ability to
+produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to represent the man
+as _unable_, in any particular case, to produce volitions, for this
+would imply that in other cases he is able. Nay, the very language is
+self-contradictory. If a man produce volitions, he must produce them by
+volitions; and if in any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce
+volitions; then this inability must arise from a want of connexion
+between the volition by which the required volition is aimed to be
+produced, and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is
+unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will _if he
+will_--a proposition which grants the very point it assumes to deny.
+"The very willing is the doing," which is required.
+
+Edwards adopts what he calls the "original" and "proper," meaning of
+power, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, "in the
+ordinary use of language," as the legitimate and true meaning. In this
+use, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition
+with its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or
+motives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, "to ascribe a
+non-performance to the want of power or ability," or to the want of
+motives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) "is not just," "because the
+thing wanting," that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the
+agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, "is not a
+being _able_," that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral
+ability, "but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the
+act of volition, or the fact of 'being willing,'" there is no facility
+of mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state
+of mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no
+concern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which
+can be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he
+will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability
+to do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the
+volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but
+still if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition
+and the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the
+thing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be
+able to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.
+
+We can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth
+volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those
+motives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not
+_unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of
+the word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the
+volition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done;
+but we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made;
+still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious
+of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our
+actual volitions and their objects.
+
+"Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency."
+
+What is liberty? "The plain and obvious meaning of the words _freedom_
+and _liberty_, in common speech, is _power, opportunity, or advantage
+that any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being
+free from hinderance, or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting
+in any way as he wills. And the _contrary_ to liberty, whatever name we
+call it by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he
+will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise." (p. 38.) Again, "That
+power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according
+to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the
+meaning of the word, anything of the _cause_ of that choice, or at all
+considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was
+caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it
+was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it
+happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with
+something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice
+any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder
+his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free,
+according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (p. 39.)
+
+This is Edwards's definition of liberty, and he has given it with a
+clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an amplification, which
+renders it impossible to mistake his meaning.
+
+Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion between volition and its
+cause or motive. Liberty relates solely to the connexion between the
+volition and its objects. He is free in the only true and proper sense,
+who, when he wills, finds no impediment between the volition and the
+object, who wills and it is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey:
+he wills to talk, and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and
+express sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his
+tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not be
+free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he would not be
+free. If there should be anything preventing the volition from taking
+effect, he would not be free.
+
+_Of what can the attribute of Liberty be affirmed?_
+
+From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, "It will follow, that in
+propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be
+ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty,
+power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no
+_will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its
+will_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be
+restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of
+liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not
+to speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a
+will_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That
+which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the
+power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who
+is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of."
+(p. 38.)
+
+Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the
+spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity
+of choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded
+connexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those
+volitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_
+is the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and
+whose choice reaches effects.
+
+_Moral Agent._
+
+"A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a
+_moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a
+moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty." (p. 39.)
+
+In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality?
+
+"To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and
+evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame,
+reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being
+influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to
+the view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct
+agreeable to moral faculty." (p. 40.)
+
+A moral agent is a being who can perform moral actions, or actions which
+are subject to praise or blame. Now the same action may be committed by
+a man or by a brute--and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man
+guilty? Because he has a moral sense or perception by which he
+distinguishes right and wrong: the brute has no such sense or
+perception. The man having thus the power of perceiving the right and
+wrong of actions--actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated
+to him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, we
+may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of a reason
+and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the capacity of
+having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind as to form motives
+and produce volitions. We might define a man of taste in the fine arts
+in a similar way; thus,--a man of taste is an agent who has the power of
+distinguishing beauty and ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to
+beauty that the sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The
+only difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, the
+sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty perceived;
+while in the former, the right perceived does not always produce this
+sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most agreeable is often
+produced by the wrong, in opposition to the decisions of reason and
+conscience.
+
+I have now completed the statement of Edwards's system, nearly in his
+own words, as contained in part I. of his work. The remarks and
+explanations which have been thrown in, I hope will serve to make him
+more perfectly understood. This end will be still more fully attained by
+presenting on the basis of the foregoing investigation and statement, a
+compend of his psychological system, independently of the order there
+pursued, and without largely introducing quotations, which have already
+been abundantly made.
+
+COMPEND OF EDWARDS'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.
+
+I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. The
+intellectual--called reason or understanding. 2. The active and
+feeling--called will or affections.
+
+II. The relation of these to each other. The first precedes the second
+in the order of exercise. The first perceives and knows objects in their
+qualities, circumstances, and relations. The second experiences emotions
+and passions, or desires and choices, in relation to the objects
+perceived.
+
+III. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are
+brought together, perception takes place according to the constituted
+laws of the intelligence.
+
+IV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty
+of our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice,
+emotions, passions, or desires take place, according to the constituted
+nature and laws of this faculty.
+
+The objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object,
+we may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to
+each other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we
+call pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable,
+affections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in
+relation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces
+accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.
+
+In the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is
+universal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be
+pleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But,
+in the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral
+objects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is,
+suited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to
+be unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that
+pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous
+terms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in
+describing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the
+will.
+
+V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in
+the correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In
+assigning the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of
+the will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in
+the presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects,
+and say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such and
+such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say
+that the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the
+nature and circumstances of the object.
+
+VI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects
+in other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand
+thus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking,
+resisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental
+operations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and
+investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory.
+
+VII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in
+other parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic.
+It is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it
+appears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as
+Edwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect
+contemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense
+sense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most
+pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular
+subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the constitution and law
+of our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception
+must bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately
+follow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception
+again takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as
+objects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth.
+
+VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by
+this system:--_Choice_ is the sense or the affection of the most
+pleasant and agreeable. _Preference_ is its synonyme, with scarcely a
+shade of difference. They both have respect to the _act of selection_.
+_Volition_ is another name for this affection of will, and is used more
+particularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection.
+_Desire_ is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment,
+is choice. _Emotion_ is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to
+the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first
+sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to
+certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to
+them,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object
+which can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the
+object may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that
+is, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most
+agreeable.
+
+_Passion_ is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other
+relations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a
+flower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this
+desire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the passion has
+the characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects
+take place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching
+out the hand, &c.
+
+_The determination of will_ is the production or causation of choice. It
+is used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in
+opposition to all other choices.
+
+_The will itself_ is the capacity of being affected by objects with
+emotion, passion, and desire,--and with that form of passion which we
+call the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected
+with effects or consequents as their stated antecedent.
+
+_The motive_ is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the
+nature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and
+circumstances Of the object chosen.
+
+IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands
+may seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be
+obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of
+the most agreeable.
+
+X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference
+to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul.
+The man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon
+choosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under
+necessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon
+choosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is
+_impossible_ for him to walk,--then he has _no liberty_ to walk,--then
+he is under a _necessity_ of remaining in one place.
+
+Necessity in any other use is _metaphysical_ or _philosophical_
+necessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the
+necessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of
+cause and effect. Hence,
+
+The _connexion_ between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most
+agreeable with the motive or cause, is _necessary_ with a philosophical
+necessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also
+called _moral_ necessity. This term _moral_ is given, not in reference
+to the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the _terms_
+connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus
+distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call _natural_.
+
+XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A _natural_ agent is that
+which produces effects without volition. A _moral_ agent is one
+producing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual
+perception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a
+sense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account
+of the volitions and their effects.
+
+_Brutes_ or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but
+have no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no
+sense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they
+cannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements.
+
+XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason;
+secondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability.
+
+Natural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be
+accomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus
+we say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk,
+he walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first
+refers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The
+second refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting
+forces from between volitions and effects.
+
+Hence a man is _naturally unable_ to do anything when there is no
+established connexion between volition and that thing. A man is
+naturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no _liberty_
+to move his arm when it is bound.
+
+_Moral inability_ is metaphysical or philosophical inability.
+Philosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a
+certain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there
+is a philosophical inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the
+decay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have
+no cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical
+inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine
+lath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate
+cause. _Moral inability_ relates to the connexion between motives and
+volitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the
+connexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the
+term moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the
+_connexion_,--it only expresses the _quality_ of _terms connected_.
+Hence _moral_ inability, as philosophical inability, is the
+impossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive
+or cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical
+inability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive
+or cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral
+philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty
+dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not
+adequate to produce a volition to such an act.
+
+Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us,
+because beyond the sphere of our volition.
+
+XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only
+to volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of
+Edwards's work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be
+found in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of
+his system, we introduce it here.
+
+He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or
+commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature
+of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue
+or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at
+all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not
+in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad
+nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some
+faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is
+our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination,
+--"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean
+the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are
+distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether
+the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or
+viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself.
+It plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the
+above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the
+volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is
+volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing
+or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions
+that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these
+volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are
+right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The
+_metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the
+character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are
+questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our
+personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do
+_we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_
+
+Nor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the
+volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the
+volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character
+of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the
+rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist.
+The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind,
+and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency,
+responsibility, and duty.
+
+And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing
+external actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected
+with volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action
+is one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it,
+if we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this
+very moment there is no such correlation between the action and the
+will, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act
+of willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we
+are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it
+would not be done; although at this very moment there is such a
+correlation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form
+the cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to
+exist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the
+correlation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the
+want of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and
+responsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its
+connexion with its consequents.
+
+This does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions
+are to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect
+volitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation
+to the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in
+themselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force
+or power may have come in between the volition and its object, and
+changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an event
+different from the will or intention; although being in connexion with
+the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act
+which appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an
+extended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is
+evil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must
+know what the man intends, before we pronounce upon him; which is the
+same thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what
+his motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but
+the volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of
+these effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we
+can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really
+intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really
+connected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable.
+
+_Edwards and Locke._
+
+Their systems are one: there is no difference in the principle. Edwards
+represents the will as necessarily determined so does Locke. Edwards
+places liberty in the unimpeded connexion of volition with its stated
+sequents--so does Locke.
+
+They differ only in the mode of developing the necessary determination
+of will. According to Locke, desire is in itself a necessary
+modification of our being produced in its correlation with objects; and
+volition is a necessary consequent of desire when excited at any given
+moment to a degree which gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at
+that moment. "The greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that
+is constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in its
+choice of the next action." (book 2. ch. 21, § 40.) According to
+Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, and the
+strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that moment.
+
+Edwards's analysis is more nice than Locke's, and his whole developement
+more true to the great principle of the system--necessary determination.
+Locke, in distinguishing the will from the desire, seems about to launch
+into a different psychology, and one destructive of the principle.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+These consequences must, I am aware, be deduced with the greatest care
+and clearness. The deduction must be influenced by no passion or
+prejudice. It must be purely and severely logical--and such I shall
+endeavour to make it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has
+himself made.
+
+I. There is no self-determining power of will, and of course no liberty
+consisting in a self-determining power.
+
+A self-determining power of will is a supposed power, which will has to
+determine its own volitions.
+
+Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of desire, emotion, or
+passion.
+
+Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable at
+any given moment.
+
+Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of the will, or
+sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature and circumstances of
+the object.
+
+Now, if the will determined itself, it would determine its own state, in
+relation to objects. But to determine is to act, and therefore, for the
+will to determine is for the will to act; and for the will to determine
+itself, is for the will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the
+will is a volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to
+create a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this
+antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same way.
+We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an indefinite series
+of volitions, without any first volition; consequently we shall have no
+self-determiner after all, because we can arrive at no first determiner,
+and thus the idea of self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again,
+we shall have effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of
+the case never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are
+thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the negative
+of cause.
+
+Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can question. If
+Edwards's psychology be right, and if self-determination implies a will
+to will, or choosing a choice, then a self-determining power is the
+greatest absurdity possible.
+
+II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that God can exercise a
+perfect control over his intelligent creatures, or administer perfectly
+a moral government consisting in the influence of motives.
+
+To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in reference to
+required determinations. And when an individual is removed from the
+motives adapted to his state of mind, the Almighty Providence can so
+order events as to bring him into contiguity with the motives.
+
+If the state of mind should be such that no motives can be made
+available in reference to a particular determination, it is dearly
+supposable that he who made the soul of man, may exert a direct
+influence over this state of mind, and cause it to answer to the motives
+presented. Whether there are motives adapted to every state of mind, in
+reference to every possible determination required by the Almighty
+Lawgiver, so as to render it unnecessary to exert a direct influence
+over the will, is a question which I am not called upon here to answer.
+But in either case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute,
+fore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as well
+as the physical world; and the election of a certain number to eternal
+life, and the making of this election sure, are necessary and plain
+consequences of this system. And as God is a being all-wise and good, we
+may feel assured in connexion with this system, that, in the working out
+of his great plan, whatever evil may appear in the progress of its
+developement, the grand consummation will show that all things have been
+working together for good.
+
+III. It is plainly deducible from this system that moral beings exert an
+influence over each other by the presentation of motives. And thus
+efforts may be made either to the injury or benefit of society.
+
+IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of responsibility, the
+consciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and consequently the expectation
+of punishment or reward, connect themselves simply with the nature of
+the mere fact of volition.--that is, if this is a true and complete
+representation of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon
+the mere fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly
+independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go forth.
+
+Thus we may view the system in relation both to God and to man.
+
+In relation to God. It makes him supreme and absolute--foreseeing and
+fore-determining, and bringing everything to pass according to infinite
+wisdom, and by the energy of an infinite will.
+
+In relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple
+fact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established
+antecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects,
+because he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear,
+because he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common
+judgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness,
+that an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which
+ought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a
+volition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong,
+because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be
+rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition.
+In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea
+of _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends
+the sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has
+all the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but
+a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do
+nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which
+goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his
+effort.
+
+In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground
+of moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_
+necessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne
+to do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been
+wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil,
+anything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under
+any responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to
+be tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of,
+could admit the plea--"I did not the good because I had not the will to
+do it," or "I did the evil because I had the will to do it." "This is
+your guilt," would be the reply of the judge, "that you had no will to
+do the good--that you had a will to do the evil."
+
+We must now take up a different class of deductions. They are such as
+those abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of
+morality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If
+however they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against
+them. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do
+most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for
+himself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_.
+
+I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional
+necessity, particular and general.
+
+1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the
+individual.
+
+It is granted in the system, that the connexion of motive and volition
+is necessary with an absolute necessity, because this precedes and
+therefore is not within the reach of the volition. So also, the state of
+mind, and the nature and circumstances of the object in relation to this
+state, forming a correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent
+upon a cause, beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make
+its motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive,
+and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first cause.
+Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are related by an
+absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the effect of motive,
+being necessary also with an absolute necessity, the only place for
+freedom that remains, if freedom be possible, is the connexion of
+volition and effects, internal and external. And this is the only place
+of freedom which this system claims. But what new characteristic appears
+in this relation? Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and
+sequents? I will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will
+to sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established antecedent
+to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to think on a certain
+subject, I think on that subject. The volition of selecting a subject,
+and the volition of attending to it, are stated antecedents to that
+mental operation which we call thought. We have here only another
+instance of cause and effect; the relation being one as absolute and
+necessary as any other relation of cause and effect. The curious
+organism by which a choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces
+muscular movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual
+man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause beyond
+the sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which connects volition
+with thinking is also pre-established, and beyond the sphere of
+volition. As the volition itself appears by an absolute necessity in
+relation to the individual man, so also do the stated sequents or
+effects of volition appear by an absolute necessity in relation to him.
+
+It is true, indeed, that the connexion between volition and its objects
+may be interrupted by forces coming between, or overcome by superior
+forces, but this is common to cause and effect, and forms no peculiar
+characteristic; it is a lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome
+by a greater. Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force
+does not prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still
+be necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the truth
+in respect of volition, according to this system. The volition could
+have no being without a motive, and when the motive is present it must
+have a being, and no sooner does it appear than its effects follow,
+unless impeded. If impeded, then we have two trains of causes coming
+into collision, and the same necessity which brought them together,
+gives the ascendency to the one or the other.
+
+It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that necessity,
+absolute and unconditional, as far at least as the man himself is
+concerned, reigns in the relation of volition and its effect, if the
+volition itself be a necessary existence. All that precedes volition is
+necessary; volition itself is necessary. All that follows volition is
+necessary: Humanity is but a link of the inevitable chain.
+
+2. General necessity--a necessity absolute, in relation to all being and
+causality, and applicable to all events.
+
+An event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual--is this
+event likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? Let this
+event be a volition of a given individual; it is necessary in relation
+to that individual. Now it must be supposed to have a connexion by a
+chain of sequents and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take
+any particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that antecedent
+and sequent, in its particular place and relations, can be proved
+necessary in the same way that the volition is proved necessary in its
+particular place and relations; that is, the antecedent being given
+under the particular circumstances, the sequent must follow. But the
+antecedent is linked by like necessity to another antecedent, of which
+it is the sequent; and the sequent is linked by like necessity to
+another sequent, of which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole
+chain, from the given necessary volition up to the first cause, is
+necessary. We come therefore at last to consider the connexion between
+the first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is this
+a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded as a
+volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will the first
+sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that sequent should
+appear. But the volition itself cannot really be the first antecedent or
+cause, because volition or choice, from its very nature, must itself
+have a determiner or antecedent. What is this antecedent? The
+motive:--for self-determination, in the sense of the will determining
+itself, would involve the same absurdities on this system in relation to
+God as in relation to man; since it is represented as an absurdity in
+its own nature--it is determining a volition by a volition, in endless
+retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine volition,
+what is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition?
+It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for there is nothing to render
+it otherwise, save the divine will. But the divine will cannot be
+supposed to do this, for the motive is already taken to be the ground
+and cause of the action of the divine will. The necessity which applies
+to volition, in the nature of the case must therefore apply to the
+divine volition. No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the
+divine will, except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom,
+and goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the
+divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This Edwards
+expressly affirms--"If God's will is steadily and surely determined in
+everything by _supreme_ wisdom, then it is in everything _necessarily
+determined_ to that which is _most_ wise." (p. 230.) That the universe
+is governed by infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought,
+and is abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a
+government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most excellent
+government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be contended for. Let
+us not, however, wander from the question, and in representing it as the
+government of wisdom, forget that it is a government of necessity, and
+that absolute. The volition, therefore, with which we started, is at
+last traced up to a necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final
+cause; for here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.
+
+What we have thus proved in relation to one volition, must be equally
+true in reference to every other volition and every other event, for the
+reasoning must apply to every possible case. Every volition, every
+event, must be traced up to a first and final cause, and this must be
+necessary and infinite wisdom.
+
+II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that every volition or
+event is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place
+and relations.
+
+The whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary
+wisdom. All volitions and events have their last and efficient cause in
+infinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that
+can be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great
+source. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for
+any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change
+could make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute
+necessity,--and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has
+made it, and disposed of it.
+
+III. If that which we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be
+both necessary evil and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is
+in vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptation of the
+word; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his.
+These volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried
+back to the one great source of all being and events. Hence,
+
+IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears
+in him, appears by an absolute necessity,--and it cannot be supposed to
+be otherwise than it is. Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only
+the perception of the difference between right and wrong, and the
+conviction that the right ought to be done, but the possession of a
+power to do the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition
+is fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be
+supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all
+things considered, can it be supposed there could have been, at that
+precise moment and in that precise relation, any other volition. The
+volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite and necessary wisdom. We
+cannot escape from this difficulty by perpetually running the changes
+of--"He can if he will,"--"He could if he would,"--"There is nothing
+wanting but a will,"--"He has a natural ability," &c. &c. Let us not
+deceive ourselves, and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by
+these words, "he can if he will"! but he cannot if he don't will. The
+will is wanting,--and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot
+appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? The
+man cannot change one volition for another. By supposition, he has not
+the moral or metaphysical ability,--and yet this is the only ability
+that can produce the new volition. It is passing strange that the power
+upon which volition is absolutely dependent, should be set aside by
+calling it _metaphysical_,--and the man blamed for an act because the
+consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the necessary
+consequent of this power! The man is only in his volition. The volition
+is good or bad in itself. The cause of volition is none of his concern,
+because it transcends volition. He can if he will. That is enough for
+him! But it is not enough to make him blameable, when whether he will or
+not depends not only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the
+antecedent itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.
+
+I am not now disputing the philosophy. The philosophy may be true; it
+may be very good: but then we must take its consequences along with it;
+and this is all that I now insist upon.
+
+V. It is another consequence of this system, that there can be nothing
+evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of
+moral perfection, as indeed their very names imply, then all the
+necessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite
+wisdom and goodness, as principles, can only envelope parts of
+themselves. It would be the destruction of all logic to deny this. It
+would annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be
+said that infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what
+is essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do transgress
+this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation
+of the law was a necessary developement of infinite wisdom; and the
+volition which transgresses it is a developement of the same nature. If
+this seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system,
+and the system alone is responsible for its conclusions.
+
+If it should be replied here, that every system must be subject to the
+same difficulty, because if evil had a beginning, it must have had a
+holy cause, inasmuch as it could not exist before it began to exist,--I
+answer, this would be true if evil is the _necessary_ developement of a
+holy cause. But more of this hereafter.
+
+VI. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. Every volition
+being the sense of the most agreeable, and arising from the correlation
+of the object and the sensitivity; it follows that every motive and
+every action comes under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of
+gratification or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no
+collision between principle and passion, because principle can have no
+power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most agreeable.
+Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain sway only by
+uniting with desire, and thus coming under conditions of yielding the
+highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and benevolence, when obeyed,
+therefore, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable; and
+so also injustice, falsehood, and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but
+simply as the most agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as
+the quality of all motive and the universal principle of the
+determinations of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We
+may indeed _speculate_ respecting these distinctions,--we may say that
+justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in itself; but
+this judgement has practical efficiency only as one of the terms takes
+the form of the most agreeable. But we have seen that the most agreeable
+depends upon the state of the sensitivity in correlation with the
+object,--a state and a correlation antecedent to action; and that
+therefore it is a necessary law of our being, to be determined by the
+greatest apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not
+only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of
+action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can
+act.
+
+VII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an
+effort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course
+cannot resist his passions, or introduce any intellectual or moral
+discipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake
+any enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged,
+or not part or consequent of the same.
+
+If he effect any change directly in the habitual character of his
+volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, he must will different
+from his actual will,--his will must oppose itself in its own act: but
+this is absurd, the system itself being judge. As, therefore, the will
+cannot oppose itself, a new volition can be obtained only by presenting
+a new motive; but this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is
+to call up new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state
+of the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering
+under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself must be
+changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a change must take
+place both of subject and object, for the motive lies in the correlation
+of the two. But the volition to call up new objects and circumstances in
+relation to some principle of the mind that had been slumbering,--for
+example, fear, must itself have a motive; but the motive to call up
+objects of fear must preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then
+of necessity the volition to call up objects of fear will take place;
+and, it will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the
+actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such motive
+pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a new motive, to
+cause the choice of objects of fear; and here would be a recurrence of
+the original difficulty,--and so on, ad infinitum.
+
+If the problem be to effect a change in the state of the mind in
+relation to existing objects, in the first place, this cannot be
+effected by a direct act of will, for the act of will is caused by the
+state of mind, and this would be an effect changing or annihilating its
+cause.
+
+Nor can it be done indirectly. For to do it indirectly, would be to
+bring influences to bear upon the state of mind or the sensitivity; but
+the choice and volition of these influences would require a motive--but
+the motive to change the state of mind must pre-exist in the state of
+mind itself. And thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility
+of finding a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its
+change. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a change,
+but a new developement of the long chain of the necessary causes and
+volitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we must find a motive
+to change the state of mind in order to a change of the state: but this
+motive, if it exist, must pre-exist in the state of mind. If it
+pre-exist, then no change is required; if it do not; then we must seek
+still an antecedent motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the
+problem be to change both subject and object, the same difficulties
+exist in two-fold abundance.
+
+The grand difficulty is to find a _primum mobile_, or first mover, when
+the very act of seeking implies a _primum mobile_, which the conditions
+of the act deny.
+
+Any new discipline, therefore, intellectual or moral, a discipline
+opposite to that which the present state of the mind would naturally and
+necessarily bring about, is impossible.
+
+Of course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to deny or mortify
+one's self. The present volition is as the strongest present
+desire--indeed, is the strongest present desire itself. "Will and desire
+do not run counter at all." "A man never in any instance, wills anything
+contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will." (p.
+17.) Hence to restrain a present passion would be to will against
+will--would be to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may
+be relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome the
+weaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the man; it is
+utterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance, for his whole
+power, activity, and volition, are in the desire itself.
+
+He can do nothing but will; and the nature and direction of his
+volitions are, at least in reference to any effort of his own, immutable
+as necessity itself.
+
+VIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call upon the man to bestir
+himself, to think, to plan, to act, are inconsistent and absurd. In all
+such exhortations and persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth
+volitions, as if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It
+may be replied, 'that the man does will, that the volitions are his
+volitions.' But then he wills only passively, and these volitions are
+his only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort and
+persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his real
+condition according to this system? The exhortations and persuasions do
+themselves contain the motive power: and instead of arousing himself to
+action, he is absolutely and necessarily passive under the motives you
+present. Whether he be moved or not, as truly and absolutely depends
+upon the motives you present, as the removing of any material mass
+depends upon the power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether
+it be wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse itself
+as the man; and the man's volition is his volition in no other sense
+than the motion of the material mass is its motion. In the one case, the
+man perceives; and in the other case, the material mass does not
+perceive--but perception is granted by all parties to be necessary; the
+addition of perception, therefore, only modifies the character of the
+being moved, without altering the nature of his relation to the power
+which moves him. In the material mass, too, we have an analogous
+property, so far as motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine
+the will unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power
+move the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of parts. If I
+have but the wisdom to discover the proper correlation of object and
+sensitivity in the case of individuals or of masses of men, I can
+command them in any direction I please, with a necessity no less
+absolute than that with which a machine is caused to work by the
+application of a steam or water-power.
+
+When I bring motives before the minds of my fellow-beings in the proper
+relation, the volition is necessarily produced; but let me not forget,
+that in bringing these motives I put forth volitions, and that of course
+I am myself moved under the necessity of some antecedent motive. My
+persuasions and exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as
+necessary antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the
+wheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and
+persuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must yield when
+the motives are properly selected.
+
+IX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when obeyed and yielded to,
+are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary force which they possess in
+relation to the state of mind to which they are addressed. When not
+obeyed and yielded to, they fail necessarily, through a moral inability
+on the part of the mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want
+of a proper correlation between them and the state of mind addressed:
+that is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the
+required volitions, and their existence of course is an utter
+impossibility.
+
+Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce volitions of obedience
+and submission, only as they produce the sense of the most agreeable;
+and as the will of the creature can have no part in producing this
+sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition, it is
+produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a
+positive necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that
+no enlargement here is required.
+
+When no obedience and submission take place, it is because the divine
+commands, warnings, and rebukes, do not produce the sense of the most
+agreeable. And as the will of the creature can have no part in producing
+this sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition; and
+as it is produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by
+a positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have no
+part in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition of
+obedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations of the
+antecedent correlations of certain objects with the subject, and are
+necessarily determined by the nature of the correlation.
+
+Now the Divine Being must know the precise relation which his commands
+will necessarily hold to the vast variety of mind to which they are
+addressed, and consequently must know in what cases obedience will be
+produced, and in what cases disobedience. Both results are equally
+necessary. The commands have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a
+two-fold office. When they come into connexion with certain states of
+mind, they necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in
+connexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly produce
+what we call rebellion: and as all volitions are predetermined and fixed
+by a necessary and infinite wisdom, and are therefore in their time and
+place the best, it must follow that rebellion no less than obedience is
+a wise and desirable result.
+
+The consequences I am here deducing seem almost too shocking to utter.
+But show me, he that can, that they are not logical deductions from this
+system? I press the system to its consequences,--not to throw any
+reproach upon those great and good men who unfortunately were led away
+by a false philosophy, but to expose and bring to its close this
+philosophy itself. It has too long been consecrated by its association
+with the good. I know I shall be justified in the honest, though bold
+work, of destroying this unnatural and portentous alliance.
+
+X. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of retribution cannot,
+according to this system, have a real and necessary connexion with any
+volitions, but must be regarded as prejudices or errors of education,
+from which philosophy will serve to relieve us.
+
+Edwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that virtue and vice lie
+essentially in the volitions themselves, and that of course the
+consciousness of evil volitions is the consciousness of guilt. I will,
+or put forth volitions. The volitions are mine, and therefore I am
+guilty. This reasoning is plausible, but not consequential; for,
+according to this system, I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the
+volitions appear necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my
+consciousness, and really are mine only because they are produced in me.
+Connected with this may be the perception that those volitions are
+wrong; but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary,
+and that to suppose them different from what they are, is to suppose
+what could not possibly have been,--since a series of sequents and
+antecedents connect these volitions which now appear, by absolutely
+necessary relations, with a first and necessary cause,--then the sense
+of guilt and shame, and the judgement I ought to be punished, can have
+no place in the human mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will,
+and, according to the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when
+I will wrong,--if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will
+under the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent motive.
+The common judgement of mankind is an error, and philosophy must soon
+dissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and of moral desert, which have
+hitherto annoyed me and made me fearful: and much more must such a
+result ensue, when I take into consideration, likewise, that the
+necessity which determines me, is a necessity which takes its rise in
+infinite and necessary wisdom.
+
+What is true of guilt and retribution is true also of well-doing and
+reward. If I do well, the volitions being determined by an antecedent
+necessity, I could not possibly have done otherwise. It does not answer
+the conditions of the case at all, to say I might have done otherwise,
+if I had willed to do otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am
+doing, is a will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in
+any action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the conviction that
+the choice of this action was a necessary choice, predetermined in a
+long and unbroken chain of necessary antecedents, and the sense of
+praiseworthiness, and the judgement I ought to be rewarded, remain no
+longer.
+
+Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with our volitions, under
+the impression that the good we perform, we perform in opposition to
+temptation, and with the power and possibility of doing evil; and that
+the evil we perform, we perform in opposition to motives of good, and
+with the power and possibility of doing good. But when we are informed
+that all the power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual
+conduct is this,--that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there
+would have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the
+volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been
+otherwise,--we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We perhaps are
+first led to doubt the philosophy,--or if, by acute reasonings, or by
+the authority of great names, we are influenced to yield an implicit
+belief,--the sense of merit and demerit must either die away, or be
+maintained by a hasty retreat from the regions of speculation to those
+of common sense.
+
+XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature and spirit, as causes
+or agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations.
+
+There are three classes of natural causes or agents generally
+acknowledged 1. Inanimate,--as water, wind, steam, magnetism, &c.; 2.
+Animate, but insensible,--as the life and affinities of plants; 3.
+Animate and sensitive, or brute animal power.
+
+These all properly come under the denomination of _natural_, because
+they are alike _necessitated_. "Whatever is comprised in the chain and
+mechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its
+necessity in some other thing antecedent or concurrent,--this is said to
+be _natural_; and the aggregate and system of all such things is
+_nature_." Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this system, comes under
+the same definition: in all its acts it is necessitated. It is in will
+particularly that man is taken as a cause or agent, because it is by
+will that he directly produces phenomena or effects; and by this system
+it is not possible to distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is
+considered, a chain of antecedents and sequents made up of motives,
+volitions, and the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents
+and antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of natural
+agents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and distinguishing
+characteristics; but in the relation of antecedence and sequence,--their
+relation as causes or agents producing effects,--no distinction can be
+perceived. Wind, water, &c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms
+another; brute organization and sensitivity another; intelligent
+volition another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and
+therefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of nature.
+The difference which exists between them is a difference of terms
+merely. There is no difference in the nature of the relation between the
+terms. The nature of the relation between the water-wheel and the
+water,--of the relation between the organic life of plants and their
+developement,--of the relation between passion and volition in
+brutes,--of the relation between their efforts and material
+effects,--and the nature of the relation between motive and
+volition,--are one: it is the relation of cause and effect considered as
+stated antecedent and sequent, and no more and no less necessary in one
+subject than in another.
+
+XII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by external objects,
+and all emotions following perception, and all the acts of the
+intelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or in ratiocination, are as
+really our acts, and acts for which we are as really responsible, if
+responsibility be granted to exist, as acts of volition. Sensations,
+emotions, perceptions, reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in
+our consciousness; they are not created by our volitions, like the
+motions of the hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just
+as volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to all
+is precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of these
+affections of his being; he is simply the subject: the subject of
+sensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning, and of volition; and
+he is the subject of all by the same necessity.
+
+XIII. The system of punishment is only a system accommodated to the
+opinions of society.
+
+There is nothing evil in itself, according to this system of necessity,
+as we have already shown. Every thing which takes place is, in its time,
+place, and relations generally, the necessary result of necessary and
+infinite wisdom. But still it is a fact that society are desirous of
+preventing certain acts,--such as stealing, adultery, murder, &c.; and
+they are necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere
+collection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the emotion
+of fear, which prevent the commission of these acts. Where these acts do
+take place, it is best they should take place; but where they are
+prevented by the fear of punishment, it is best they should be
+prevented. Where the criminal suffers, he has no right to complain,
+because it is best that he should suffer; and yet, if he does complain,
+it is best that he should complain. The system of punishment is good, as
+every thing else is good. The system of divine punishments must be
+considered in the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when
+properly considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in
+the pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events.
+
+XIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there cannot really be any
+calamity. The calamities which we may at any time experience, we ought
+to endure and rejoice in, as flowing from the same perfect and necessary
+source. But as calamity does nevertheless necessarily produce suffering
+and uneasiness, and the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope
+that perfect relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that
+the final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the present
+suffering.
+
+The necessitarian may be an optimist of a high order. It he commits what
+is called crime, and remorse succeeds, and punishment is inflicted under
+law, the crime is good, the remorse is good, the punishment is good, all
+necessary and good, and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure
+happiness. Nothing can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but
+even this will probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all
+afflictions: they must be good in themselves, although disagreeable,
+--and will probably lead the way to the agreeable, just as
+hunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way to the
+enjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity, and of a
+necessary and perfect wisdom.
+
+XV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary and perfect wisdom,
+there really can no more be folly in conduct, or error in reasoning and
+belief, than there can be crime and calamity, considered as evils in
+themselves. Every act that we call folly is a necessary act, in its
+time, place, and relations generally, and is a necessary consequence of
+the infinite wisdom; but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom
+cannot be opposed to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when
+philosophically considered, ceases to be folly.
+
+In any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem necessary, and the
+assent of the mind is necessary. This is granted by all parties. But it
+must be admitted, that when men are said to reason falsely, and to yield
+their assent to false conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them;
+and, according to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem
+otherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary.
+
+The reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning, because it so
+necessarily seems to them; but to the individual to whom it seems
+different, it must really be different, and be good and valid reasoning.
+
+Again: as all these different reasonings and beliefs proceed necessarily
+from the same source, they must all be really true where they seem true,
+and all really false where they seem false. It would follow, from this,
+that no one can really be in a false position except the hypocrite and
+sophist, pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and
+what he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false
+conclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were we not
+compelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite and sophist
+cannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his position is a necessary
+one, predetermined in its necessary connexion with the first necessary
+wisdom.
+
+XVI. Another consequence of this system is fatalism,--or, perhaps, more
+properly speaking, the system is itself a system of fatalism.
+
+This, indeed, has already been made to appear substantially. The word,
+however, has not yet been used. I here, then, charge directly this
+consequence or feature upon the system.
+
+Fatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This system is fatalism,
+because it is the absolute negation of liberty.
+
+No liberty is contended for, in this system, in relation to man, but
+physical liberty: viz. that when he wills, the effect will follow,--that
+when he wills to walk, he walks, &c. "Liberty, as I have explained it,
+is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he
+pleases, or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure,
+without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is." (p. 291.)
+
+In the first place, this is no higher liberty than what brutes possess.
+They have power, opportunity, or advantage, to do as they please.
+Effects follow their volitions by as certain a law as effects follow the
+volitions of men.
+
+In the second place, this is no higher liberty than slaves possess.
+Slaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive be the lash, or the
+fear of the lash, still, in their case as well as in that of brutes
+under similar circumstances, the volition which takes place is the most
+pleasing at the moment. The slave and the animal do what is most
+pleasing to them, or do according to their pleasure, When the one drags
+the plough and the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal,
+rational or irrational, to act without doing what is most pleasing to
+him or it. Volition is always as the greatest apparent good, or as the
+sense of the most pleasant or agreeable.
+
+If any should reply that slaves and animals are _liable_ to be fettered,
+and this distinguishes them from the free, I rejoin that every being is
+liable to various restraints; none of us can do many things which in
+themselves appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there
+were known to be an established connexion between them and our wills. We
+are limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us; we cannot
+overturn mountains, or command the winds. We are limited in the nature
+of our physical being. We are limited by our want of wealth, knowledge,
+and influence. In all these respects, we may, with as much propriety as
+the slave, be regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say
+that, as we never really will what we know to be impossible or
+impracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or a want
+of liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to the fettered
+slave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows it to be
+impossible. But in relation to him as well as to every other being,
+according to this system it holds true, that whether he act or forbear
+to act, his volitions are as the most agreeable.
+
+All creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are to be accounted free,
+and one really as free as another.
+
+In the third place, the liberty here affirmed belongs equally to every
+instance of stated antecedence and sequence.
+
+The liberty which is taken to reside in the connexion between volition
+and effects, is a liberty lying in a connexion of stated antecedence and
+sequence, and is perfect according as this connexion is necessary and
+unimpeded. The highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the
+most absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also
+with power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where power is
+the greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most obstacles and moves
+on irresistibly to its effects, there is the greatest degree of liberty.
+God is the most free of all beings, because nothing can impede his will.
+His volitions are always the antecedents of effects.
+
+But obviously we do not alter the relation, when we change the terms. If
+liberty lie in the stated antecedence of volition to effects, and if
+liberty is measured by the necessity of the relation, then when the
+antecedent is changed, the relation remaining the same, liberty must
+still be present. For example: when a volition to move the arm is
+followed by a motion of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be
+substituted for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place;
+and as freedom is doing as we please, or will, "without considering how
+this pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;" that is, without taking
+its motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be affirmed to be
+doing according to the galvanic impulse, "without considering how" that
+impulse "comes to be as it is."
+
+If we take any other instance of stated antecedence and sequence, the
+reasoning is the same. For example, a water wheel in relation to the
+mill-stone: when the wheel turns, the mill-stone moves. In this case
+freedom may be defined: the mill-stone moving according to the turn of
+the wheel, "without considering how" that turn of the wheel "comes to be
+as it is." In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing
+according to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes
+to be as it is; doing "according to choice, without taking into the
+meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice." (p. 39.)
+
+If it be said that in the case of volition, we have the man of whom to
+affirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel and mill-stone, we have
+nothing of which liberty can properly be affirmed. I reply, that liberty
+must be affirmed, and is properly affirmed, of that to which it really
+belongs; and hence as volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual
+essence, man; and this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because
+volition appears in it, and is attended by consequences:--so, likewise,
+the material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because motion
+belongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every being that has
+volition is free, so likewise every thing that hath motion is free:--in
+every instance of cause and effect, we meet with liberty.
+
+But volition cannot be the characteristic of liberty, if volition itself
+be governed by necessity: and yet this system which affirms liberty,
+wherever there is unimpeded volition, makes volition a necessary
+determination. In the fact of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to
+all creatures that have volition; and then again, in the fact of the
+necessary determination of volition it destroys the possibility of
+liberty. But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new
+feature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between volition
+and its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary and absolute as
+the connexion between the motive and the volition, and between any
+antecedent and sequent whatever. That my arm should move when I make a
+volition to this effect, is just as necessary and just as
+incomprehensible too, as that water should freeze at a given
+temperature: when the volition is impeded, we have only another instance
+of necessity,--a lesser force overcome by a greater.
+
+The liberty therefore which this system affirms in the fact of volition
+and its unimpeded connexion with its consequents, is an assumption--a
+mere name. It is a part of the universal necessity arbitrarily
+distinguished and named, its liberty does not reside in human volition,
+so neither can it reside in the divine volition. The necessary
+dependence of volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of
+effects upon volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind
+than from ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the
+universal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically considered.
+The creation of volition by volition is absurd in itself--it cannot but
+be an absurdity. The determination of will by the strongest motive, if a
+truth is a truth universally; on this system, it contains the whole
+cause and possibility of volition. The whole liberty of God, it is
+affirmed, is contained in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other
+words, that what he wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished:
+what pleases him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His
+liberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from
+necessity.
+
+If the movements of mind are necessary, no argument is required to prove
+that all being and events are necessary. We are thus bound up in a
+universal necessity. Whatever is, is, and cannot be otherwise, and could
+not have been otherwise. As therefore there is no liberty, we are
+reduced to the only remaining alternative of fatalism.
+
+Edwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the charge of fatalism.
+(part iv. § vi.) In relation to the Stoics, he remarks:--"It seems they
+differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of _fate_ as
+maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But
+whatever their doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is
+repugnant to any _liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,_ I
+utterly deny such a fate." He objects to fatalism only when it should
+deny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our sense of the
+most agreeable, that is our volition. But this connexion we have fully
+proved to be as necessary as the connexion between the volition and its
+motive. This reservation therefore does not save him from fatalism.
+
+In the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents the liberty and
+sovereignty of God as consisting in an ability "to do whatever pleases
+him." His idea of the divine liberty, therefore, is the same as that
+attributed to man. That the divine volitions are necessarily determined,
+he repeatedly affirms, and indeed represents as the great excellence of
+the divine nature, because this necessity of determination is laid in
+the infinite wisdom and perfection of his nature.
+
+If necessity govern all being and events, it is cheering to know that it
+is necessity under the forms of infinite wisdom and benevolence. But
+still it remains true that necessity governs. If "it is no disadvantage
+or dishonour to a being, _necessarily_ to act in the most excellent and
+happy manner from the necessary perfection of his own nature," still let
+us remember that under this representation _he does act necessarily_.
+Fate must have some quality or form; it must be what we call good or
+evil: but in determining its quality, we do not destroy its nature. Now
+if we call this fate a nature of goodness and wisdom, eternal and
+infinite, we present it under forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but
+it is nevertheless fate,--and as such it governs the divine volitions;
+and through the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of
+these volitions;--the universe of being and things is determined by
+fate;--and all volitions of angels or men are determined by fate--by
+this fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all things thus
+_proceeding_ from fate were beautiful, benign, and glorious, the theory
+might not alarm us. But that deformity, crime, and calamity should have
+place as developements of this fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of
+this system, however, may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion
+that deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but of
+the limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance in point
+in Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as "a very learned and
+pious disciple of Leibnitz." Says Bonnet--"Thus the same chain embraces
+the physical and moral world, binds the past to the present, the present
+to the future, the future to eternity. That wisdom which has ordained
+the existence of this chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of
+which it is composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is
+of iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of gold.
+_Both_ are necessary parts of one whole, which could not but exist.
+Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? What absurdity!
+God esteems this link at its proper value. He sees it in its cause, and
+he approves this cause, for it is good. God beholds moral monsters as he
+beholds physical monsters. Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy
+if he know that he is _only fortunate_. He has attained the highest
+degree of moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing
+that what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must
+occupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of this
+system; the simile of the potter is its summary." He might have added,
+"Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not guilty, but at
+worst _only unfortunate;_ and really not unfortunate, because holding a
+necessary place in the chain which both as a whole and in its parts, is
+the result of infinite wisdom."
+
+If anything more is required in order to establish this consequence of
+the system we are examining, I would call attention to the inquiry,
+whether after a contingent self-determining will there remains any
+theory of action except fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is
+a will which is the cause of its own volitions or choices--a
+self-conscious power, self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its
+choice, or movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of
+choosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what conception
+have we to oppose to this but that of a will not determining
+itself,--not the cause of its own volitions,--a power not self-moved and
+directed,--and not conscious of ability at the moment of a particular
+choice, to make a contrary choice? And this last conception is a will
+whose volitions are determined by some power antecedent to itself, not
+contingently, but necessarily. As the will is the only power for which
+contingent self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such
+power, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and
+causality will then be expressed as follows:
+
+1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and volitions. 2.
+Absolute and necessary connexion of volitions and effects. 3. Absolute
+and necessary connexion of all sequents and antecedents in nature. 4.
+Absolute and necessary connexion of all things existent with a first and
+necessary principle or cause. 5. The necessary determination of this
+principle or cause.
+
+Denying a contingent self-determining will, this theory is all that
+remains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in the 2d particular of this
+theory, it becomes a mere arbitrary designation, because the _nature_ of
+the relation is granted to be the same; it is not _contingent_, but
+necessary. Nor can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in
+the first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a
+contingent self-determining will, by infinite series of volitions, must
+apply to this great first principle considered as God. And in the second
+place, the doctrine of the necessary determination of motive must apply
+here likewise, since God as will and intelligence requires motives no
+less than we do. Such determination is represented as arising from the
+very nature of mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to
+a self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as opposed
+to necessity. And this is all that can be meant by fatalism. Liberty
+thus becomes a self-contradictory conception, and fatalism alone is
+truth and reality.
+
+XVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a fair deduction from
+this system.
+
+According to this system, God is the sole and universal doer--the only
+efficient cause. 1. His volition is the creative act, by which all
+beings and things exist. Thus far it is generally conceded that God is
+all in all. "By him we live, and move, and have our being." 2. The
+active powers of the whole system of nature he has constituted and
+regulated. The winds are his messengers. The flaming fire his servant.
+However we may conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting
+under necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy,
+in either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to God.
+These movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are executed directly
+or indirectly by his will. Every effect which we produce in the material
+world, we produce by instrumentality. Our arms, hands, &c. are our first
+instruments. All that we do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute
+to ourselves. Now if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of
+an axe, spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the
+same way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we multiply the
+instruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do the deed directly
+with my hand, or do it by an instrument held in my hand, or by a
+concatenation of machinery, reaching from "the centre to the utmost
+pole,"--if I contemplate the deed, and designedly accomplish it in this
+way, the deed is mine. And not only is the last deed contemplated as the
+end of all this arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements
+produced as the necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the
+last is to be attained, are mine likewise.
+
+I use powers and instruments whose energy and capacity I have learned by
+experience, but in whose constitution I have had no hand. They are
+provided for me, and I merely use them. But God in working by these,
+works by what his own wisdom and power have created; and therefore _a
+fortiori_ must every effect produced by these, according to his design,
+and by his volition as at least the first power of the series, be
+attributed to him,--be called his doing. He causeth the sun to rise and
+set. "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
+service of man." "He watereth the hills from his chambers." This is not
+merely poetry. It is truth.
+
+Now the system we are considering goes one step further; it makes human
+volitions as much the objects of the eternal design, and as really the
+effects of the divine volition, as the rising of the stars, the flight
+of the lightning, the tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth
+itself like a garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is
+God's act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every
+volition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a
+pre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents necessarily
+runs back and connects itself with the infinite wisdom. God's volition
+is his own act; the effect immediately produced by that volition is his
+own deed. Let that effect be the creation of man: the man in all his
+powers and susceptibilities is God's work; the objects around him are
+God's work; the correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man
+is God's work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result
+of this correlation is God's work. The volition of the man is as
+strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common apprehensions,
+the blow which I give with an axe is attributable to me. What is true of
+the first man, must be equally true of the man removed by a thousand
+generations, for the intermediary links are all ordained by God under an
+inevitable necessity. God is really, therefore, the sole doer--the only
+efficient, the only cause. All beings and things, all motion and all
+volition, are absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the
+author of all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the
+author of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all in the
+same way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining will, and
+there is no stopping-place between a human volition and the divine
+volition. The human volition is but the divine, manifested through a
+lengthened it may be, but a connected and necessary chain of antecedents
+and sequents. I see no way of escaping from this, as a necessary and
+legitimate consequence of the necessary determination of will. And what
+is this consequence but pantheism? God is the universal and
+all-pervading intelligence--the universal and only power. Every movement
+of nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because
+necessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There is no
+life but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He is the soul
+of the world.
+
+Spinosa never represented himself as an atheist, and according to the
+following representation appears rather as a pantheist. "He held that
+God is the _cause_ of all things; but that he acts, not from choice, but
+from necessity; and, of consequence, that he is the involuntary author
+of all the good and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human
+life." (Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.)
+
+Cousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather the reproach of
+pantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was fairly deduced from the
+doctrine of necessary determination, which he advocated.
+
+XVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an atheist. "It will
+not be disputed," says Stewart, "by those who comprehend the drift of
+his reasonings, that in point of practical tendency atheism and
+Spinosism are one and the same."
+
+The following is Cousin's view of his system. It apparently differs from
+the preceding in some respects, but really tends to the same
+conclusions.
+
+"Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought to be reproached for
+an error in the other direction. Spinosa starts from the perfect and
+infinite being of Descartes's system, and easily demonstrates that such
+a being is alone a being in itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect,
+and relative, only participates of being, without possessing it, in
+itself: that a being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one
+substance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal existence:
+that to call phenomena, finite substances, is affirming and denying, at
+the same time; whereas, there being, but one substance which possesses
+being in itself, and the finite being that which participates of
+existence without possessing it in itself, a substance finite implies
+two contradictory notions. Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and
+nature are pure phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute
+substance, but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for
+as phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without the
+perfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature suppose
+God; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without phenomena, the
+perfect without the imperfect, the infinite without the finite, and God
+on his part supposes man and nature. The error of his system lies in the
+predominance of the relation of phenomenon to being, of attribute to
+substance, over the relation of effect to cause. When man has been
+represented, not as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and
+uncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought; God, or
+the supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance, and not a
+cause--a being, perfect, infinite, necessary--the immutable substance of
+the universe, and not its producing and creating cause. In Cartesianism,
+the notion of substance figures more conspicuously than that of cause;
+and this notion of substance, altogether predominating, constitutes
+Spinosism." (Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.)
+
+The predominance of the notion of substance and attribute, over that of
+cause and effect, which Cousin here pronounces the vice of Spinosa's
+system, is indeed the vice of every system which contains the dogma of
+the necessary determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism;
+the second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When self
+-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into mere
+desire, necessitated in all its acts from its pre-constituted
+correlation with objects, then will really ceases to be a cause. It
+becomes an instrument of antecedent power, but is no power in itself,
+creative or productive. The reasoning employed in reference to the human
+will, applies in all its force to the divine will, as has been already
+abundantly shown. The divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and
+becomes a mere instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is
+the infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom is
+eternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what tendencies
+or energies it has now, it always had; and therefore, whatever volitions
+it now necessarily produces, it always necessarily produced. If we
+conceive a volition to have been, in one direction, the immediate and
+necessary antecedent of creation; and, in another, the immediate and
+necessary sequent of infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then
+this volition must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as
+the necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The
+eternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because this is
+existence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and creation,
+consisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite, participating only
+of existence, and not being existence in themselves, are not substances,
+but phenomena. But what is the relation of the phenomena to the
+substance? Not that of effect to cause;--this relation slides entirely
+out of view, the moment will ceases to be a cause. It is the relation
+simply of phenomena to being, considered as the necessary and
+inseparable manifestations of being; the relation of attributes to
+substance, considered as the necessary and inseparable properties of
+substance. We cannot conceive of substance without attributes or
+phenomena, nor of attributes or phenomena without substance; they are,
+therefore, co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and
+its attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the universe,
+as made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is Spinosism; this
+is pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate consequence of a
+necessitated will.
+
+The second consequence is atheism. In the denial of will as a cause _per
+se_,--in resolving all its volitions into the necessary phenomena of the
+eternal substance,--we destroy personality: we have nothing remaining
+but the universe. Now we may call the universe God; but with equal
+propriety we call God the universe. This destruction of
+personality,--this merging of God into necessary substance and
+attributes,--is all that we mean by Atheism. The conception is really
+the same, whether we name it fate, pantheism, or atheism.
+
+The following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that he arrived at the
+same result: "Whatever may have been the doctrines of some of the
+ancient atheists about man's free agency, it will not be denied that, in
+the history of modern philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of
+necessity have been hitherto always connected together. Not that I would
+by any means be understood to say, that every necessitarian must _ipso
+facto_ be an atheist, or even that any presumption is afforded, by a
+man's attachment to the former sect, of his having the slightest bias in
+favour of the latter; but only that every modern atheist I have heard of
+has been a necessitarian. I cannot help adding, that the most consistent
+necessitarian who have yet appeared, have been those who followed out
+their principles till they ended in _Spinosism_,--a doctrine which
+differs from atheism more in words than in reality." (Vol. 6, p. 470.)
+
+Cudworth, in his great work entitled "The true Intellectual System of
+the Universe," shows clearly the connexion between fatalism and atheism.
+This work seems to have grown out of another undertaking, which
+contemplated specifically the question of liberty and necessity, and its
+bearing upon morality and religion. The passage in the preface, in which
+he informs us of his original plan, is a very full expression of his
+opinion. "First, therefore, I acknowledge," says he, "that when I
+engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and
+necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of
+all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles
+maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of atheism, and
+undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and
+blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgement
+ridiculous." This opinion of the tendency of the doctrine of a
+necessitated will, is the germ of his work. The connexion established in
+his mind between this doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his
+masterly and elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter.
+
+The arguments of many atheists might be referred to, to illustrate the
+connexion between necessity and atheism. I shall here refer, however, to
+only one individual, remarkable both for his poetic genius and
+metaphysical acumen. I mean the late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly
+and unblushingly professed atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line:
+"There is no God." In a note upon this line, he remarks: "This negation
+must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of
+a pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains unshaken."
+This last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really the negation of a
+creative Deity,--the identity or at least necessary and eternal
+co-existence of God and the universe. Shelley has expressed this clearly
+in another passage:
+
+   "Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,
+   Necessity! thou mother of the world!"
+
+In a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued the doctrine of the
+necessary determination of will by motive, with an acuteness and power
+scarcely inferior to Collins or Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different
+application of the doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and
+Edwards, and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil
+under insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base religion
+upon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a fog of
+subtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly consistent, is
+perfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from necessity to pantheism, and
+thence to atheism and the destruction of all moral distinctions. "We are
+taught," he remarks, "by the doctrine of necessity, that there is
+neither good nor evil in the universe, otherwise than as the events to
+which we apply these epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of
+being. Still less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine
+of necessity accord with the belief of a future state of punishment."
+
+I here close my deductions from this system. If these deductions be
+legitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they are, then, to the largest
+class of readers, the doctrine of necessity is overthrown: it is
+overthrown by its consequences, and my argument has the force of a
+_reductio ad absurdum_. If a self-determined will appear an absurdity,
+still it cannot be as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine
+involve the consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will
+claim that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral
+and responsible nature.
+
+A question will here very naturally arise: How can we account for the
+fact that so many wise and good men have contended for a necessitated
+will, as if they were contending for the great basis of all morality and
+religion? For example, take Edwards himself as a man of great thought
+and of most fervent piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with
+the air and manner of one who is opposing great errors as really
+connected with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the
+following language: "I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a
+_contingent self-determination of the will_, as necessary to the
+morality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably
+pernicious; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important
+truths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary
+to be known." The question is a fair one, and I will endeavour to answer
+it.
+
+1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as being in itself a
+contradictory idea, and as leading to the consequence of affirming the
+existence of effects without causes, takes strong hold of the mind in
+these individuals. This I believe, and hope to prove in the course of
+this treatise, to be a philosophical error;--but it is no new thing for
+great and good men to fall into philosophical errors.
+
+As, therefore, the liberty consisting in a self-determining will, or the
+_liberty of indifference_, as it has been technically called, is
+conceived to be exploded, they endeavour to supply a _liberty of
+spontaneity_, or a liberty lying in the unimpeded connexion between
+volition and sequents.
+
+Hobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in a clearer manner than
+any of its advocates: "I conceive," says he, "liberty to be rightly
+defined,--the absence of all impediments to action, that are not
+contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for
+example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or is said to have
+liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no
+impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments:
+and though water cannot ascend, yet men never say, it wants the
+_liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the
+impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we
+say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment
+is not in him, but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is
+sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself,"--that is, he wants
+the faculty or power of going:--this constitutes natural _inability_.
+Liberty is volition acting upon physical instrumentalities, or upon
+mental faculties, according to a fixed and constituted law of
+antecedents, and meeting with no impediment or overcoming antagonistic
+power. Natural ability is the fixed and constituted antecedence itself.
+Hence there may be natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot
+be affirmed without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute
+responsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated antecedent
+of certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent existing without
+impediment or frustration. Since this is the only possible liberty
+remaining, and as they have no wish to be considered fatalists, they
+enlarge much upon this; not only as the whole of liberty actually
+existing, but as the full and satisfactory notion of liberty.
+
+In basing responsibility and praise and blameworthiness upon this
+liberty, an appeal is made to the common ideas, feelings, and practices
+of men. Every man regards himself as free when he does as he
+pleases,--when, if he pleases to walk, he walks,--when, if he pleases to
+sit down, he sits down, &c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to
+plead in excuse that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed
+to do it, the judge would reply--"this is your guilt, that you pleased
+or willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to commit it
+was the very doing of it." Now all this is just. I readily admit that we
+are free when we do as we please, and that we are guilty when, in doing
+as we please, we commit a crime.
+
+Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty sufficient to constitute
+responsibility? And thus the whole difficulty seems to be got over. The
+reasoning would be very fair, as far as it goes, if employed against
+fatalists, but amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold
+to the self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these
+common ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative of
+freedom, because they raise no question against human freedom. The real
+question at issue is, how are we to account for these facts? The
+advocates of self-determining power account for them by referring them
+to a self-determined will. We say a man is free when he does as he
+pleases or according to his volitions, and has the sense of freedom in
+his volitions, because he determines his own volitions; and that a man
+is guilty for crime, if committed by his volition, because he determined
+this volition, and at the very moment of determining it, was conscious
+of ability to determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that
+a man is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words,
+makes a volition without any impediment between it and its object,--he
+is free, if he make the volition without producing effects by it:
+volition itself is the act of freedom. But how do those who deny a
+self-determining power account for these facts? They say that the
+volition is caused by a motive antecedent to it, but that nevertheless,
+inasmuch as the man feels that he is free and is generally accounted so,
+he must be free; for liberty means nothing more than "power and
+opportunity to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice,
+without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the _cause_ of
+that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a
+volition,"--that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so, when
+he does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by freedom.
+
+But suppose the objection be brought up, that the definition of liberty
+here given is assumed, arbitrary, and unsatisfactory; and that the sense
+or consciousness of freedom in the act of volition, and the common
+sentiments and practices of men in reference to voluntary action, are
+not adequately accounted for,--then the advocates of necessitated
+volition return to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other
+definition,--and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom does
+exist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally correspond to
+it, we must believe that we are free when volition is unimpeded in its
+connexion with sequents, and that we are blame or praiseworthy,
+according to the perceived character of our volitions,--although it
+cannot but be true that the volitions themselves are necessary. On the
+one hand, they are compelled by their philosophy to deny a
+self-determining will. On the other hand, they are compelled, by their
+moral sense and religious convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and
+responsibility. In order to do this, however, a _quasi_ liberty must be
+preserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity, by
+referring the first exclusively to the connexion between volition and
+its sequents, and the second exclusively to the connexion between the
+volition and its antecedents or motives. Liberty is physical; necessity
+is metaphysical. The first belongs to man; the second transcends the
+sphere of his activity, and, is not his concern. In this very difficult
+position, no better or more ingenious solution could be devised; but
+that it is wholly illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from
+absolute and universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved.
+
+2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are speaking, conceive that
+when volitions are supposed to exist out of the necessary determination
+of motives, they exist fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up
+the necessary and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would
+be to place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,--it would
+destroy the great _a posteriori_ argument for the existence of a God. Of
+course it would be the destruction of all morality and religion.
+
+3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in particular, is much
+insisted upon as incompatible with contingent volitions. Divine
+foreknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events certain and necessary.
+Hence volitions are necessary; and, to carry out the reasoning, it must
+be added likewise that the connexion between volitions and their
+sequents is equally necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition
+as well as the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the
+_name_ of liberty, because it fears the designation which properly
+belongs to it.
+
+4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of God and the harmony of
+his government are preserved. His volitions are determined by his
+infinite wisdom. The world, therefore, must be ruled in truth and
+righteousness.
+
+These philosophers and divines thus represent to themselves the theory
+of a self-determining will as an absurdity in itself, and, if granted to
+be true, as involving the most monstrous and disastrous consequences,
+while the theory which they advocate is viewed only in its favourable
+points, and without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If
+these consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be
+evaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and the
+sense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be urged as a
+consequence, of this theory, the ready reply is invariably--"No such
+necessity is maintained as goes to destroy the liberty which consists in
+doing as one pleases;" or if the destruction of responsibility be urged
+as a consequence, the reply is--"A man is always held a just subject of
+praise or blame when he acts voluntarily." The argumentation undoubtedly
+is as sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous.
+They are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No wonder,
+then, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion, they should by
+every possible argument aim to sustain the philosophy which is supposed
+to lie at their basis, and look away from consequences so destructive,
+persuading themselves that these consequences are but the rampant
+sophistries of infidelity.
+
+It is a wonderful fact in the history of philosophy, that the philosophy
+of fate, pantheism, and atheism, should be taken as the philosophy of
+religion. Good men have misapprehended the philosophy, and have
+succeeded in bringing it into fellowship with truth and righteousness.
+Bad men and erring philosophers have embraced it in a clear
+understanding of its principles, and have both logically reasoned out
+and fearlessly owned its consequences.
+
+XIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition of liberty given by
+the theologians above alluded to, is the only possible definition, it
+must follow that the most commonly received modes of preaching the
+truths and urging the duties of religion are inconsistent and
+contradictory.
+
+A class of theologians has been found in the church, who, perhaps
+without intending absolutely to deny human freedom, have denied all
+ability on the part of man to comply with the divine precepts. A generic
+distinction between inability and a want of freedom is not tenable, and
+certainly is of no moment, where, as in this case, the inability
+contended for is radical and absolute.
+
+These theologians clearly perceived, that if volition is necessarily
+determined by motive, and if motive lies in the correlation of desire
+and object, then, in a being totally depraved, or a being of radically
+corrupt desires, there can be no ability to good deeds: the deed is as
+the volition, and the volition is as the strongest desire or the sense
+of the most agreeable.
+
+Hence these theologians refer the conversion of man exclusively to
+divine influence. The man cannot change his own heart, nor employ any
+means to that end; for this would imply a volition for which, according
+to the supposition, he has no ability.
+
+Now, at the same time, that this class represent men as unable to love
+and obey the truths of religion, they engage with great zeal in
+expounding these truths to their minds, and in urging upon them the duty
+of obedience. But what is the aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will
+reply, I know the man cannot determine himself to obedience, but in
+preaching to him, I am presenting motives which may influence him. But
+in denying his ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving
+him by motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by
+supposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more,
+therefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the sense of
+the disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present objects to a
+man's mind which are correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and
+frequently you present them, the more you advance towards the sense of
+the most agreeable or choice. So when you present objects which are not
+correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present
+them, the more you must advance towards the sense of the most
+disagreeable, or positive refusal.
+
+If it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the presentation of truth
+forms the occasion or condition on which the divine influence is exerted
+for the regeneration of the heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man
+to repent, and believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty
+generally, and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly
+unable to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections
+and actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the divine
+influence be exerted, which brings his heart into correlation with
+religion, and makes it possible for him to put forth the volitions of
+piety and duty? It can be regarded in no other light than playing a
+solemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge and persuade, as if the man ought
+to make some exertion when you feel convinced that exertion is
+impossible. It certainly can form no occasion for divine interposition,
+unless it be in pity of human folly. If you say that such a course does
+succeed in the conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe
+that your philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because
+inconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system which
+you know not, or understand not and deny.
+
+A total inability to do good makes man the passive subject of influences
+to be employed for his regeneration, and he can no more be considered
+active in effecting it than he is in the process of digesting food, or
+in the curative action of medicines upon any diseased part of his
+system. If you urge him to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge
+him to put forth volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in
+no sense possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least
+commenced.
+
+I will go one step farther in this reasoning:--on supposition of total
+inability, not only is the individual a passive subject of regenerating
+influences, but he is also incapable of regeneration, or any disposition
+or tendency towards regeneration, from any influences which lie merely
+in motives, produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive,
+according to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards's
+system, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object standing in
+correlation with the state of mind. Now the state of mind, in an
+unregenerate state, is a state represented by this system itself, as
+totally adverse to the objects of religion. Hence, there is no
+conceivable array of religious truth, and no conceivable religious
+exhortation and persuasion that could possibly come into such a relation
+to this state of mind as to form the motive of a religious choice or
+volition. It is perfectly plain, that before such a result could take
+place, the state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the
+array of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must
+fail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state of mind,
+so neither can the state of mind be changed by this array of truth or by
+this exhortation. There is a positive opposition of mind and object, and
+the collision becomes more severe upon every attempt to bring them
+together. It must follow, therefore, that preaching truth and duty to
+the unregenerate, so far from leading to their conversion, can only
+serve to call out more actively the necessary determination, not to
+obey. The very enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer
+perception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the
+disinclination.
+
+Nor can we pause in this consequence, at human instrumentality. It must
+be equally true, that if divine interposition lies in the presentation
+of truth and persuasions to duty, only that these are given with tenfold
+light and power, it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of
+producing any tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no
+correlation with these,--its sense of the disagreeable,--and therefore
+the energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and decided.
+
+If it should be remarked that hope and fear are feelings, which, even in
+a state of unregeneracy, can be operated upon, the state of things is
+equally difficult. No such hope can be operated upon as implies desire
+after religious principles and enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the
+corrupt nature; nor can any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of
+the divine purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate
+to danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security,
+independently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these passions
+might awaken attention, constrain to an outward obedience, and form a
+very prudent conduct, but could effect no purification of the heart.
+
+There is another class of theologians, of whom Edwards is one, who
+endeavour to escape the difficulties which attend a total inability, by
+making the distinction of moral and natural inability:--man, they say,
+is morally unable to do good, and naturally able to do good, and
+therefore he can justly be made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke,
+and exhortation. The futility of this distinction I cannot but think has
+already been made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so
+great stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in
+this particular connexion.
+
+Moral inability, as we have seen, is the impossibility of a given
+volition, because there are no motives or causes to produce it. It is
+simply the impossibility of an effect for the want of a cause: when we
+speak of moral cause and effect, according to Edwards, we speak of
+nothing different from physical cause and effect, except in the quality
+of the terms--the relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility
+of a given volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting,
+is equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a summer's
+noon-tide.[1]
+
+When objects of volition are fairly presented, an inability to choose
+them must lie in the state of the mind, sensitivity, desire, will, or
+affections, for all these have the same meaning according to this
+system. There is no volition of preference where there is no motive to
+this effect; and there is no motive to this effect where the state of
+the mind is not in correlation with the objects presented: on the
+contrary, the volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal.
+
+Natural inability, as defined by this system, lies in the connexion
+between the volition considered as an antecedent, and the effect
+required. Thus I am naturally unable to walk, when, although I make the
+volition, my limbs, through weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect
+in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition,
+or any impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural
+inability.[2] According to this system, I am not held responsible for
+anything which, through natural inability, cannot be accomplished,
+although the volition is made. But now let us suppose that there is no
+defect in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon
+volition, and no impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that
+there need be only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the
+natural ability is complete:--I will to walk, and I walk.
+
+Now it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible for the doing of
+anything, and can be fairly urged to do it when all that is necessary
+for the doing of it is a volition although there may be a moral
+inability to the volition itself.
+
+Nothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this distinction. If
+liberty be essential to responsibility, liberty, as we have clearly
+shown, can no more lie in the connexion between volition and its
+effects, than in the connexion between volition and its motives. One is
+just as necessary as the other. If it be granted to be absurd with the
+first class of theologians to urge men to do right when they are
+conceived to be totally unable to do right, it is equally so when they
+are conceived to have only a natural ability to do right, because this
+natural ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If
+the volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the action;
+nay, "the very willing is the doing of it;" but then the volition as an
+effect cannot take place without a cause; and to acknowledge a moral
+inability, is nothing less than to acknowledge that there is no cause to
+produce the required volition.
+
+The condition of men as represented by the second class of theologians,
+is not really different from their condition as represented by the first
+class. The inability under both representations is a total inability. In
+the utter impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter
+impossibility of any good deed.
+
+When we have denied liberty, in denying a self-determining power, these
+definitions in order to make out a _quasi_ liberty and ability, are
+nothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception.
+
+You tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will; and when he replies to
+you, that on your own principles the required volition is impossible,
+you refer him to the common notions of mankind. According to these, you
+say a man is guilty when he forbears to do right, since nothing is
+wanting to right-doing but a volition,--and guilty when he does wrong,
+because he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions, too, a
+man may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is wanting but a
+will to do right. But do we find this distinction of natural and moral
+ability in the common notions of men? When nothing is required to the
+performance of a deed but a volition, do men conceive of any inability
+whatever? Do they not feel that the volition has a metaphysical
+possibility as well as that the sequent of the volition has a physical
+possibility? Have we not at least some reason to suspect that the
+philosophy of responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion
+lying in the common notions of men, are something widely different from
+the scheme of a necessitated volition?
+
+This last class of theologians, equally with the first, derive all the
+force of their preaching from a philosophy, upon which they are
+compelled to act, but which they stoutly deny. Let them carry out their
+philosophy, and for preaching no place remains.
+
+Preaching can produce good effects only by producing good volitions; and
+good volitions can be produced only by good motives: but good motives
+can exist under preaching only when the subjects of the preaching are
+correlated with the state of mind. But by supposition this is not the
+case, for the heart is totally depraved.
+
+To urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions in reference to his
+regeneration, may consist with a self-determining power of will, but is
+altogether irrelevant on this system. It is urging _him_ to do what _he_
+cannot do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do _in him_ as a
+mere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite easy,
+because nothing is required of him but to will, is equivalent to
+assuring him that the affair is quite easy, because it will be done when
+he has done it. The man may reply, the affair would indeed be quite easy
+if there existed in me a motive to produce the volition; but as there
+does not, the volition is impossible. And as I cannot put forth the
+volition without the motive, so neither can I make the motive which is
+to produce the volition--for then an effect would make its cause. What I
+cannot do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from
+heaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and duties,
+and prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot take the
+character of motives to influence my will, because they are not
+agreeable to my heart.
+
+You indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that on your own
+principles all your zeal and eloquence must necessarily have an opposite
+effect from what you intend? My affections not being in correlation with
+these subjects, the more you urge them, the more intense becomes my
+sense of the most disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my
+good friends, by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable
+and ever-during chain.
+
+It is plainly impossible to escape from this conclusion, and yet
+maintain the philosophy. All efforts of this kind, made by appealing to
+the common sentiments of mankind, we have seen are self-contradictory.
+It will not do to press forward the philosophy until involved in
+difficulty and perplexity, and then to step aside and borrow arguments
+from another system which is assumed to be overthrown. There is no
+necessity more absolute and sovereign, than a logical necessity.[3]
+
+XVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards's system in the sections we
+have been examining, from which the above consequences are deduced, are
+the three following:
+
+1. The will is always determined by the strongest motive.
+
+2. The strongest motive is always "the most agreeable."
+
+3. The will is necessarily determined.
+
+I shall close this part of the present treatise with a brief examination
+of the reasoning by which he endeavours to establish these points.
+
+The reasoning by which the first point is aimed to be established, is
+the general reasoning respecting cause and effect. Volition is an
+effect, and must have a cause. Its cause is the motive lying in the
+correlation of mind and object. When several physical causes conflict
+with each other, we call that the strongest which prevails and produces
+its appropriate effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where
+there are several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other,
+we call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is not
+opposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect; and in
+this case we do not say the _strongest_ cause produces the effect,
+because there is no comparison. So also there are cases in which there
+is but one moral cause or motive present, when there being no
+comparison, we cannot affirm that the volition is determined by the
+_strongest_ motive: the doing of something may be entirely agreeable,
+and the not doing of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the
+motive is only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a
+comparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the effect
+which actually takes place, is produced by the strongest cause or
+motive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a mere postulate,
+as if we should say,--let a cause or motive producing effects be called
+the strongest. It may be represented, also, as a _petitio principii_, or
+reasoning in a circle,--since the proof that the will is determined by
+the strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined. It
+may be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest motive. How
+do you know this? Because it is determined. How does this prove it?
+Because that which determines it must be the strongest.[4]
+
+Edwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of volition. This
+assumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to sustain, when he
+argues against a self-determining will. If the will do not cause its own
+volitions, then it must follow that motive is the cause. The argument
+against a self-determining will we are about to take up.
+
+2. _The strongest motive is always the most agreeable_. Edwards
+maintains that the motive which always prevails to cause volition, has
+this characteristic,--that it is the most agreeable or pleasant at the
+time, and that volition itself is nothing but the sense of the most
+agreeable. If there should be but one motive present to the mind, as in
+that case there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say
+that the will is determined by _the agreeable_.
+
+But how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this
+characteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case
+may be? We can know it only by consulting our consciousness. If,
+whenever we will, we find the sense of the most agreeable identified
+with the volition, and if we are conscious of no power of willing, save
+under this condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then
+certainly there remains no farther question on this point. The
+determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the
+determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.
+
+Does Edwards appeal to consciousness?
+
+He does,--but without formally announcing it. The following passage is
+an appeal to consciousness, and contains Edwards's whole thought on this
+subject: "There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the
+sense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and
+do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most
+_agreeable to them_. To say that they do what _pleases_ them, but yet
+what is not _agreeable_ to them, is the same thing as to say, they do
+what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say,
+that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please." (p.
+25.) Motives differ widely, intrinsically considered. Some are in
+accordance with reason and conscience; some are opposed to reason and
+conscience. Some are wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are
+bad. But whatever may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this
+characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it is by
+this characteristic that their strength is measured. The appeal,
+however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way to beg the very
+point in question. Will not every one admit, that "when men act
+_voluntarily and do what they please_, they do what suits them best, and
+what is most agreeable to them?" Yes. Is it not a palpable
+contradiction, to say that men "do what pleases them," and yet do "what
+is not agreeable to them," according to the ordinary use of these words?
+Certainly.
+
+But the point in question is, whether men, acting voluntarily, always do
+what is pleasing to them: and this point Edwards assumes. He assumes it
+here, and he assumes it throughout his treatise. We have seen that, in
+his psychology, he identifies will and desire or the affections:--hence
+volition is the prevailing desire or affection, and the object which
+moves the _desire_ must of course appear _desirable_, or agreeable, or
+pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men always will what they
+most desire, and desire what they will, then of course when they act
+voluntarily, they do what they please; and when they do what they
+please, they do what suits them best and is most agreeable to them.
+
+Edwards runs the changes of these words with great plausibility, and we
+must say deceives himself as well as others. The great point,--whether
+will and desire are one,--whether the volition is as the most
+agreeable,--he takes up at the beginning as an unquestionable fact, and
+adheres to throughout as such; but he never once attempts an analysis of
+consciousness in relation to it, adequate and satisfactory. His
+psychology is an assumption.
+
+3. The will is necessarily determined.
+
+How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general connexion of causes and
+effects. Causes necessarily produce effects, unless resisted and
+overcome by opposing forces; but where several causes are acting in
+opposition, the strongest will necessarily prevail, and produce its
+appropriate effects.
+
+Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the connexion between motives
+and volitions is the same with that of any other causes and effects. The
+difference is merely in the terms: and when he calls the necessity which
+characterizes the connexion of motive and volition "a moral necessity,"
+he refers not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected.
+In this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between cause
+and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, all causation
+is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, in his system, is
+characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays himself open to all the
+consequences of a universal and absolute necessity.
+
+2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of volition by a method of
+approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, for the sake of the argument,
+that the will may oppose the strongest motive in a given case; but then
+he contends that it is supposable that the strength of the motive may be
+increased beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this
+point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the will
+must be considered necessary. "Whatever power," he remarks, "men may be
+supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not
+infinite." If the power of the man is finite, that of the motive may be
+supposed to be infinite: hence the resistance of the man must at last be
+necessarily overcome. This reasoning seems plausible at first; but a
+little examination, I think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does
+not determine the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic
+qualities, but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But
+agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,--relative to the
+will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would be a motive of
+infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be such only by an
+infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The same of course must hold
+true of any motive less than infinite: and universally, whatever be the
+degree of strength of the motive, there must be in the man an affection
+of corresponding intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in
+the will to any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this
+power of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of
+agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a sense of
+agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall predominate and
+become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain that if the first be
+increased, the second may be supposed to be increased likewise; if the
+first can become infinite, the second can become infinite likewise: and
+hence the power of resistance may be supposed always to meet the motive
+required to be resisted, and a point of necessary determination may
+never be reached.
+
+If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the strength of motives
+intrinsically considered, then the answer is ready. There are motives of
+infinite strength, thus considered, which men are continually resisting:
+for example, the motive which urges them to obey and love God, and seek
+the salvation of their souls.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND
+CONTINGENT WILL.
+
+Edwards's first and great argument against a self-determining will, is
+given in part II. sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows:
+
+The will,--or the soul, or man, by the faculty of willing, effects every
+thing within its power as a cause, by acts of choice. "The will
+determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice;
+and there is no other way of the will's determining, directing, or
+commanding any thing at all." Hence, if the will determines itself, it
+does it by an act of choice; "and if it has itself under its command,
+and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the
+same way that it determines other things which are under its command."
+But if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course we
+have an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice which is
+not determined by a choice,--"which brings us directly to a
+contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first
+act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free
+act of the will before the first free act of the will: or else we must
+come at last to an act of the will determining the consequent acts,
+wherein the will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in
+this notion of freedom." (p. 43.)
+
+This reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt to meet various
+evasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates of a self-determining
+will, depend mainly upon the assumption, that if the will determines
+itself, it must determine itself by an act of choice; that is, inasmuch
+as those acts of the will, or of the soul, considered in its power of
+willing, or in its personal activity, by which effects are produced out
+of the activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for
+example, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down: therefore, if
+the soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions, it must cause them
+by volitions. The causative act by which the soul causes volitions, must
+itself be a volition. This assumption Edwards does not even attempt to
+sustain, but takes for granted that it is of unquestionable validity. If
+the assumption be of unquestionable validity, then his position is
+impregnable; for nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will
+determining volitions by volitions, in an interminable series.
+
+Before directly meeting the assumption, I remark, that if it be valid,
+it is fatal to all causality. Will is simply cause; volition is effect.
+I affirm that the will is the sole and adequate cause of volition.
+Edwards replies: if will is the cause of volition, then, to cause it, it
+must put forth a causative act; but the only act of will is volition
+itself: hence if it cause its own volitions, it must cause them by
+volitions.
+
+Now take any other cause: there must be some effect which according to
+the general views of men stands directly connected with it as its
+effect. The effect is called the phenomenon, or that by which the cause
+manifests itself. But how does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a
+causative act:--but this causative act, according to Edwards's
+reasoning, must itself be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect
+comes between the cause, and what was at first considered the immediate
+effect but the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative
+act; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have another
+causative act before it; and so on, _ad infinitum_. We have here then an
+infinite series of causative acts--an absurdity of the same kind, with
+an infinite series of volitions.
+
+It follows from this, that there can be no cause whatever. An infinite
+series of causative acts, without any first, being, according to this
+reasoning, the consequence of supposing a cause to cause its own acts,
+it must therefore follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but
+that they must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause
+out of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must cause
+these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act of its
+own:--but the same difficulties occur in relation to the second cause as
+in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own acts, and they must
+therefore be caused out of itself by some other cause; and so on, _ad
+infinitum_. We have here again the absurdity of an infinite series of
+causative acts; and also, the absurdity of an infinite series of causes
+without a first cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which
+causes its own acts, without an act of causation; but this is
+impossible, according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there
+cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the denial of
+this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are driven to the
+conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every cause must either
+cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused out of itself. Neither of
+these is possible; therefore, there is no cause.
+
+Take the will itself as an illustration of this last consequence. The
+will is cause; the volition, effect. But the will does not cause its own
+volition; the volition is caused by the motive. But the motive, as a
+cause, must put forth a causative act in the production of a volition.
+If the motive determine the will, then there must be an act of the
+motive to determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to
+act. But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of
+the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its own act,
+then it must do this by a previous act, according to the principle of
+this reasoning; and this again by another previous act; and so on, _ad
+infinitum_.
+
+Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the same.
+
+It may be said in reply to the above, that volition is an effect
+altogether peculiar. It implies selection or determination in one
+direction rather than in another, and therefore that in inquiring after
+its cause, we inquire not merely after the energy which makes it
+existent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in
+one direction rather than in another. "The question is not so much, how
+a spirit endowed with activity comes to _act_, as why it exerts _such_
+an act, and not another; or why it acts with a particular determination?
+If activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for
+instance) acts and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause
+why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined." (p.
+58.)
+
+Every phenomenon or effect is particular and limited. It must
+necessarily be one thing and not another, be in one place and not in
+another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause
+which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise
+all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must,
+in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction.
+
+Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular
+determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every
+volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily
+give it character, and particular direction and determination.
+
+Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular
+determination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect
+cannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause
+cannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection.
+There must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus,
+if fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles,
+and produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular
+determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of
+effect without a particular determination. But in what lies the
+selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain
+objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently
+exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the
+title of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and
+particular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the
+correlation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects;
+and volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by
+will, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the
+selection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or
+direction of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which
+appears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is
+produced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-constitution and
+disposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause.
+
+From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles
+there is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to
+shield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the
+consequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and
+efficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which
+produces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily,
+and often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the
+most agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system
+to make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the
+efficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and
+allurements of passion and desire, and from the laws of reason and
+conscience.
+
+Thus far my argument against Edwards's assumption,--that, to make the
+will the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions
+by an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has
+been fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to
+deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition
+to the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will
+not be deemed superfluous.
+
+Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and
+consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in
+relation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its
+effect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its
+effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and
+effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by
+phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a
+self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we
+do, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable.
+
+The will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by
+volitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms,
+generally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this
+way; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they
+must come under the general law, and be determined by volitions.
+
+The first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does
+not prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable.
+
+In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from
+the first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not
+necessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of
+volitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts
+of the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications
+of the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the
+will can be effected only by that modification of itself called
+volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if
+effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of
+itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in
+external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this
+experience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions.
+The acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are
+volitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the
+will are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the
+will. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have assigned
+the cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the
+will--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I
+do not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the
+production of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The
+connexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and
+inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does
+volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun
+raise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I
+know that such are the facts, it is enough.
+
+Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the
+cause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by
+volitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity.
+
+It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will
+produce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to
+connect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or
+logic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes
+such only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an assumption
+unsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will
+to be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely,
+the motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he
+creates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains
+to motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by
+exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it
+the cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards
+attributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us
+look at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly.
+What is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and
+actual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is
+cause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena,
+and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to cause. But how do
+we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or
+energy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed.
+Is it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not
+observe; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat
+to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion.
+Where then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is
+the _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to
+anticipate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask
+every one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I
+wish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an
+effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the
+volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort
+is simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this
+effort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This
+effort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the
+will itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes
+that know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may
+make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of
+course do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal
+it to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we
+observe in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be
+self-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the
+_nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their
+wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in
+physical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only
+the phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one
+comes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows
+himself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is
+conscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a
+phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a
+phenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the
+sequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible
+world, that he reveals himself to others.
+
+Sometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives
+no external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm
+may be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and
+is not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will
+during a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful
+force; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain.
+
+It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may
+place my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or
+volition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining
+of my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given;
+I am resisted by a greater power than myself.
+
+The most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the
+bosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original
+movement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To
+deny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and
+energy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition,
+admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance
+of the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or
+_nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause
+itself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every
+cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of
+itself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without
+arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all
+cause.
+
+The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own
+volitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported
+alike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the
+absurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten
+upon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it
+assails the opposite system.
+
+_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining
+power of will.
+
+Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There
+is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition
+is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable.
+But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will,
+assuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the
+absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time
+he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in
+correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all
+natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for
+example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these
+natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so
+constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So,
+likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the
+cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will,
+acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the
+most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an
+object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its
+appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most
+agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but
+also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the
+mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the
+mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind
+acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is
+a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are
+acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its
+inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of
+volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat
+may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind,"
+Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It
+follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the
+affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the
+affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any
+other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a
+cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means
+nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a
+cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its
+own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its
+invariable sequents.
+
+Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a
+volition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common
+and necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of
+cause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is
+in fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to
+produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that
+in assigning as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will,
+he really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very
+point he laboured to overthrow.
+
+The point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after
+all, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will
+be self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other
+words, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena.
+
+But the real point in dispute is this: "_Is the will necessarily
+determined, or not?_"
+
+The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted and fixed, that the
+_nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take
+place according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be
+true with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism,
+magnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at
+work in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to
+fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do
+not conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other
+phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which they actually
+produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass of dry gunpowder, an
+explosion must take place.
+
+Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under
+given circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must
+its _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a
+uniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the
+sensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its
+sense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its
+volition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to
+itself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation
+to every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what
+its volition will be at a given time, and under given circumstances.
+Moral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in
+the nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary
+as any physical phenomenon.
+
+Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a
+mere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for
+nothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily
+follow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can
+distinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from
+the sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest
+desire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow,
+because the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a
+necessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of
+consciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our
+undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's
+argument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined.
+This he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word
+contingent; it is important in marking a distinction.
+
+Edwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes
+and begs the question under discussion.
+
+1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if
+identical with chance or no cause. "Any thing is said to be contingent,
+or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of
+such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according
+to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we
+have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be
+contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass
+without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word
+_contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that
+whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to
+foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous
+ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain
+connexion." (p. 31.)
+
+Thus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same
+sense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation
+of these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain
+phenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their
+existence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as
+applied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he
+elaborately discusses the question--"whether any event whatsoever, and
+volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its
+existence;" and in sec. 4,--"whether volition can arise without a cause,
+through the activity of the nature of the soul."
+
+If, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the
+determination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a
+class of phenomena as existing without "any previous ground or reason
+with which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,"--as
+existing without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by
+chance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any
+previous ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate
+argument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That
+"every phenomenon must have a cause," is unquestionably one of those
+primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration,
+because they precede all demonstration, and must be assumed as the basis
+of all demonstration.
+
+By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By
+contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a
+cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated
+will, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By
+contingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free
+will. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be
+supposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not
+necessary I call contingent.
+
+Now an argument against contingency of will on the assumption that we
+intend, under this title, to represent volitions as existing without a
+cause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing.
+
+But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with
+chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered
+that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is
+possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.
+
+The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is
+contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and
+absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency
+is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a
+universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry
+respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and
+rational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine
+whether the will be contingent or necessary.
+
+The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The
+second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to
+follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument
+against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the
+first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is
+brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first
+part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.
+Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss
+contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is
+inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the
+question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring
+whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to
+necessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be
+necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be
+necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for
+inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be
+no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these
+two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause,
+for example, will, which is contingent.
+
+If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a
+contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has
+logically determined nothing in relation to it.
+
+But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether
+contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be
+contradictory and absurd.
+
+Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They
+at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is
+necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether
+contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any
+subject, remains to be determined.
+
+Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with
+necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual
+application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it,
+is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.
+
+What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:--
+
+1. Viewed in relation to will.
+
+2. Viewed irrespective of will.
+
+The first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but
+insufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in
+opposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and
+the progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_.
+
+The second does not take will into consideration at all, and applies to
+subjects where opposition of will is not supposable; for example,
+logical necessity, a is b, and c is a, therefore c is b: mathematical
+necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre of a circle is a point equally distant
+from every point in the circumference: metaphysical necessity, the
+existence of a first cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this
+second kind of necessity under the general designation of metaphysical
+or philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is absolute.
+It is impossible to conceive of these subjects differently from what
+they are. We cannot conceive of no space; no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5,
+and so of the rest.
+
+Necessity under both points of view he distinguishes into particular and
+general.
+
+Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity relative to individual
+will; as general, relative to all will.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a necessity irrespective of
+individual will; as general, irrespective of all will.
+
+Relative necessity is relative to the will in the connexion between
+volition and its sequents. When a volition of individual will takes
+place, without the sequent aimed at, because a greater force is opposed
+to it, then the sequent of this greater force is necessary with a
+particular relative necessity. When the greater force is greater than
+all supposable will, then its sequents take place by a general relative
+necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, the will
+of God cannot be included, as there can be no greater force than a
+divine volition.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes the opposition of
+individual will. Under this Edwards brings the connexion of motive and
+volition. The opposition of will, he contends, is excluded from this
+connexion, because will can act only by volition, and motive is the
+cause of volition. Volition is necessary by a particular metaphysical
+necessity, because the will of the individual cannot be opposed to it;
+but not with a general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may
+be opposed to it.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the opposition of all
+will--even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4--that the centre of a circle
+is a point equally distant from every point in the circumference--the
+existence of time and space--are all true and real, independently of all
+will. Will hath not constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It
+would imply a contradiction to suppose them different from what they
+are. According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary with
+a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these volitions are caused
+by motives, and infinite will, as well as finite will, must act by
+volitions, the opposition of infinite will itself is excluded in the
+production of infinite volitions.
+
+Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points
+of view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is
+and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_.
+
+1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event
+which is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of
+an individual will.
+
+2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which
+cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite
+will. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable.
+
+3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it
+is, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will.
+
+4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it
+is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will.
+
+All this, however, in the last analysis on Edwards's system, becomes
+absolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a
+metaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by
+the infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a
+metaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are
+merely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular
+individual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our
+view. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the
+infinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its
+force absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the
+opposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily
+not only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to
+the infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it.
+
+Having thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on
+Edwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea
+of contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea?
+
+Necessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be
+otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be
+_that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be
+otherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect
+to anything which is independent of will;--time and space;--mathematical
+and metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal,
+that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they
+are seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will,
+nor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not
+conceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of
+contingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to
+causes, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation
+is the effect of divine volition. "God said, let there be light, and
+there was light:" thus did the whole creation come to be.
+
+Now every one will grant, that the creation does not seem necessary as
+time and space; and intuitive truths with their logical deductions, seem
+necessary. We cannot conceive of these as having not been, or as ceasing
+to be; but we can conceive of the creation as not having been, and as
+ceasing to be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or
+void space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may
+be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and
+relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, different
+from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in one word this
+difference between space and body, or in general this difference between
+that which exists independently of will, and that which exists purely as
+the effect of will, we call the first necessary; the second, contingent.
+The first we cannot conceive to be different from what it is. The second
+we can conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the
+creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true
+likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All these
+events are either directly or mediately the effects of will, divine or
+human. Now we can conceive of these as not being at all, or as being
+modified indefinitely, different from what they are;--and under this
+conception we call them contingent.
+
+No one I think will deny that we do as just represented, conceive of the
+possibility of the events and creations of will, either as having no
+being, or as being different from what they are. This conception is
+common to all men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a
+chimera? It must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for
+according to this, there really is no possibility that any event of will
+might have had no being at all, or might have been different from what
+it is. Will is determined by motives antecedent to itself. And this
+applies to the divine will, likewise, which is determined by an infinite
+and necessary wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of
+that which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be
+chimerical. But although the system would force us to this conclusion,
+the conception still reigns in our minds, and does not _seem_ to us
+chimerical;--the deduction from the system strangely conflicts with our
+natural and spontaneous judgements. There are few men who would not be
+startled by the dogma that all things and all events, even the
+constantly occuring volitions of their minds, are absolutely necessary,
+as necessary as a metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,--necessary
+with a necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise
+than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological
+abettors of Edwards's system, who would not also be startled by it. I
+suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the broad
+conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here represented,
+being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not affect the sequents of
+volition; that if a man can do as he pleases, he has a natural liberty
+and ability which relieves him from the chain of metaphysical necessity.
+I have already shown how utterly futile this attempted distinction
+is--how completely the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called
+natural liberty and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted
+to, then we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley,
+"Necessity, thou mother of the world!" But why the reluctance to escape
+from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this system admit that
+there is something opposed to necessity? But what is this something
+opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that choice is opposed to
+necessity? But how opposed--is choice contingent? Do they admit the
+possibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or
+might have been different from what it is?
+
+We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity by merely calling it
+choice, or an act of the will. If will is not necessitated, we wish to
+know under what condition it exists. Volition is plainly under necessity
+on Edwards's system, just as every other event is under necessity. And
+the connexion between volition and its sequents is just as necessary as
+the connexion between volition and its motives. Explain,--why do you
+endeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to
+volition? why do you claim liberty here? Do _you_ likewise have a
+natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It is
+evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the doctrine of
+necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink from its application
+to will. They first establish the doctrine of necessity universally and
+absolutely, and then claim for will an exception from the general
+law,--not by logically and psychologically pointing out the grounds and
+nature of the exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and
+natural judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they
+please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes it
+from necessity;--nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement against
+necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere illusion.
+
+There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this spontaneous
+judgement--and the will comes under the idea opposed to necessity. But
+what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under
+it? Edwards and his followers have not answered these questions--their
+attempt at a solution is self-contradictory and void.
+
+Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than that of contingency,
+viz.--that which is or may be, and possibly might not be, or might be
+otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is a truth which cannot possibly
+not be, or be otherwise than it is. But this book which I hold in my
+hand, I can conceive of as not being at all, or being different from
+what it is, without implying any contradiction, according to this
+spontaneous judgement.
+
+The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot conceive of as not
+existing, or as being altered so as to transpose the terms, making that
+right which now is wrong, and that wrong which now is right. But the
+volition which I now put forth to move this pen over the paper, I can
+conceive of as not existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a
+volition to write words different from those which I am writing. That
+this idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, that
+all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most rational idea.
+Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of necessity, do either adopt
+this idea in relation to will by a self-contradiction, and under a false
+position, as the abettors of the scheme which I am opposing for example,
+or in the ordinary conduct of life, they act upon it. All the
+institutions of society, all government and law, all our feelings of
+remorse and compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself,
+seem based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is
+somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes arising
+from _will_.
+
+That the will actually does come under this idea of contingency, must be
+shown psychologically if shown at all. An investigation to this effect
+must be reserved therefore for another occasion. In this place, I shall
+simply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea
+of contingency?
+
+The contingency of any phenomenon or event must depend upon the nature
+of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or event is one which may be
+conceived of, as one that might not have been at all, or might have been
+different from what it is; but wherein lies the possibility that it
+might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it
+is? This possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine
+nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in anything
+which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing in relation to
+its existence. The cause therefore which actually gives it existence,
+and existence under its particular form, can alone contain the
+possibility of its not having existed at all, or of its having existed
+under a different form. But what is the nature of such a cause? It is a
+cause which in determining a particular event, has at the very moment of
+doing so, the power of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not
+chained to any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of
+objects--as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its
+correlation to a certain class of objects which we thence call
+combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in
+opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to produce an
+effect which it may produce, and of any given number of effects alike
+within its power, it may take any one of them in opposition to all the
+others; and at the very moment it takes one effect, it has the power of
+taking any other. It is a cause contingent and not necessitated. The
+contingency of the event, therefore, arises from the contingency of the
+cause. Now every cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A
+necessary cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to
+act differently from its actual developements--fire must
+burn--gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth's centre. If there
+be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent cause above
+defined, for there is no third conception. We must choose therefore
+between a universal and absolute necessity, and the existence of
+contingent causes. If we take necessity to be universal and absolute,
+then we must take all the consequences, likewise, as deduced in part II.
+There is no possible escape from this. As then all causes must be either
+necessary or contingent, we bring will under the idea of contingency, by
+regarding it as a contingent cause--"a power to do, or not to
+do,"[5]--or a faculty of determining "to do, or not to do something
+which we conceive to be in our power."[6]
+
+We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a
+contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its nature, also. What is this
+nature? It is a nature in fixed correlation with certain objects, so
+that it is inconceivable that its phenomena might be different from
+those which long and established observation have assigned to it. It is
+inconceivable that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it
+is inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing
+temperature. But is this necessity a necessity _per se_, or a determined
+necessity? It is a determined necessity--determined by the creative
+will. If the creative will be under the law of necessity, then of course
+every cause determined by will becomes an absolute necessity.
+
+The only necessity _per se_ is found in that infinite and necessary
+wisdom in which Edwards places the determining motives of the divine
+will. All intuitive truths and their logical deductions are necessary
+_per se_. But the divine will is necessary with a determined necessity
+on Edwards's system,--and so of all other wills and all other causes,
+dependent upon will--the divine will being the first will determined. We
+must recollect, however, that on Edwards's theory of causation, a cause
+is always determined out of itself; and that consequently there can be
+no cause necessary _per se_; and yet at the same time there is by this
+theory, an absolute necessity throughout all causality.
+
+Now let us consider the result of making will a contingent cause. In the
+first place, we have the divine will as the first and supreme contingent
+cause. Then consequently in the second place, all causes ordained by the
+divine will, considered as effects, are contingent. They might not have
+been. They might cease to be. They might be different from what they
+are. But in the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not
+all contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are necessary
+with a determined necessity. They are necessary as fixed by the divine
+will. They are necessary with a relative necessity--relatively to the
+divine will. They put forth their _nisus_, and produce phenomena by a
+fixed and invariable law, established by the divine will. But will is of
+the nature, being made after the image of the divine will. The divine
+will is infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The
+created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its given
+capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its _nisus_ to do, are
+limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may make an effort,
+or volition, or _nisus_, to do anything of which it can conceive--but
+the actual production of phenomena out of itself, must depend upon the
+instrumental and physical connexion which the divine will has
+established between it and the world, external to itself. Of all the
+volitions or _nisus_ within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any
+one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes any one
+_nisus_ or volition, it has the power of making any other.
+
+It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, essential, and first
+cause. Whatever other causes exist, are determined and fixed by will,
+and are therefore properly called secondary or instrumental causes. And
+as we ourselves are will, we must first of all, and most naturally and
+most truly gain our idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate
+these second causes--we observe only their phenomena; but we know
+ourselves in the very first _nisus_ of causation.
+
+To reason therefore from these secondary causes to ourselves, is indeed
+reversing the natural and true order on this subject. Now what is the
+ground of all this clamour against contingency? Do you say it represents
+phenomena as existing without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency
+not to cause, but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the
+phenomena of physical causation,--we reply that you have no right to
+reason from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in
+general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties of
+matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an absurd and
+pernicious doctrine--then turn and look at the doctrine of an absolute
+necessity in all its bearings and consequences, and where lies the
+balance of absurdity and pernicious consequences? But we deny that there
+is anything absurd and pernicious in contingency as above explained.
+That it is not pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of
+moral and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course of
+our inquiries.
+
+After what has already been said in the preceding pages, it perhaps is
+unnecessary to make any further reply to its alleged absurdity.
+
+There is one form under which this allegation comes up, however, which
+is at first sight so plausible, that I shall be pardoned for prolonging
+this discussion in order to dispose of it. It is as follows: That in
+assigning contingency to will, we do not account for a volition being in
+one direction rather than in another. The will, it is urged, under the
+idea of contingency, is indifferent to any particular volition. How then
+can we explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of
+indifferency to a choice or volition?
+
+In answer to this, I remark:--It has already been made clear, that
+selection and particular determination belong to every cause. In
+physical causes, this selection and particular determination lies in the
+correlation of the nature of the cause with certain objects; and this
+selection and particular determination are necessary by a necessity
+determined out of the cause itself--that is, they are determined by the
+creative will, which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes.
+Now Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination of
+will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is correlated to
+certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by the creative will,
+which gave origin to the secondary dependent will, the selection and
+particular determination of will, is necessary with a necessity
+determined out of itself. But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to
+oppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the
+correlation of its nature with certain objects--a will, indeed, which
+has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent;
+for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection
+and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its
+action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of
+itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an absolute
+and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of a will forming
+volitions particular and determinate, or in other words, making a
+_nisus_ towards particular objects, without any correlation of its
+nature with the objects. Is this conception a possible and rational
+conception? It is not a possible conception if will and the sensitivity,
+or the affections are identical--for the very definition of will then
+becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and necessarily
+affected by them.
+
+But now let us conceive of the will as simply and purely an activity or
+cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or affections--a cause capable
+of producing changes or phenomena in relation to a great variety of
+objects, and conscious that it is thus capable, but conscious also that
+it is not drawn by any necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a
+possible and rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause
+different from all other causes; and on this conception there are but
+two _kinds_ of causes. The physical, which are necessarily determined by
+the correlation of their nature with certain objects, and will, which is
+a pure activity not thus determined, and therefore not necessitated, but
+contingent.
+
+Now I may take this as a rational conception, unless its palpable
+absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be proved to involve some
+contradiction.
+
+Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after
+all, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that
+the particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or
+attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular
+determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which
+quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of
+will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of
+the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular
+determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A
+physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will
+is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental
+of a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is
+the first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in
+its energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to
+place, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because
+made in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self
+moved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make
+it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its
+objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any
+particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any
+particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted
+for in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of
+the uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its
+dependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and
+could annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed
+the instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects.
+The man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his
+arm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of
+himself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him,
+but he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than
+himself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created
+will aware of its feebleness and dependence.
+
+But although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent,
+arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with
+sensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason,
+and, the sensitivity or the affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or
+soul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not
+follow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling.
+
+I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a
+scheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent
+will, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal
+necessity.
+
+According to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the
+soul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not
+necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to
+do. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the "source and substance"
+of pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and
+commands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or
+the affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the
+capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the
+sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in
+correlation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation,
+are the emotions and passions awakened.
+
+Next let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality,
+or more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean
+the me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving
+cause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives
+the laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with
+the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at the same
+time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them.
+
+Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention
+to the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain
+objects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other
+objects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain,
+become rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power
+to resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may
+direct itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them,
+and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and
+disgust.
+
+We may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity
+relatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of
+disagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the
+reason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are
+repelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have
+the second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying
+reason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in
+obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa.
+
+Now if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the
+possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it
+were always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of
+resistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system
+of Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition.
+
+The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a
+will as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey
+reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or
+obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the
+indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or
+passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be
+asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause
+of its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and
+self-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys
+the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of
+obedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we
+called upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a
+self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute
+necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to
+explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest
+desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the
+will obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this
+again by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most
+reasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for
+obedience to passion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience
+to reason, by referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in
+the direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then
+the act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may
+find its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and
+is no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is
+most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable?
+because to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable.
+
+Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous to intuitive or first
+truths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they
+form the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first
+movements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of
+antecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis
+of all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of
+no explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of
+power. In God, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man,
+it is finite, primary cause, constituted by God's creative act, but not
+necessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be
+power after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical
+or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents
+and sequents.
+
+God's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains
+all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics
+of creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
+when we inquire _why_ God's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we
+must either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and
+goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute
+necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a
+first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all
+effects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself.
+
+When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition,
+we bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the
+reason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys
+reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; we must
+either represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences
+of a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the
+will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in
+explaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any
+explanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it
+requires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the
+fact of its existence.
+
+Edwards, while he burdens the question of the will's determination with
+monstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down,
+indeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry
+which he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or
+the volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the
+most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or
+capacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and
+volitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The
+question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to
+produce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may
+be the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but
+that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its
+relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is
+at one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another
+foolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will,
+it always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question
+therefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of
+volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most
+agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may
+suppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and
+the different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and
+conditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose
+the arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and
+the different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the
+sensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may
+suppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions
+of the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus
+giving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet
+at an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the
+different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about?
+On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the
+sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in
+both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the
+sensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask
+again, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to
+itself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that
+which is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects
+have the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then
+also we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make
+the right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the
+wrong and foolish.
+
+These last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not
+presume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of
+the volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and
+the nature and circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is
+such as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the
+rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does
+the correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that
+the volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a
+mere repetition of the question; for the question amounts simply to
+this:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather
+than the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most
+agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the
+most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its
+state in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their
+relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable
+in one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of
+the same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent
+will. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the
+direction of passion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the
+power of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by
+merely referring to the will.
+
+According to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives
+the sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the
+reason; and now in the direction of passion--but why?--Why does the
+reason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure
+desire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which
+is equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in
+reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it
+is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the
+most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on
+Edwards's system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular
+direction of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be
+referred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other
+explanation of the different determinations of this cause, except
+referring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible,
+indeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which
+governs the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the
+question must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the
+correlation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at
+another time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself
+as having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do
+or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the
+opposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent
+cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will:
+then the question would be, why the infinite will determines the
+sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at
+another to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that
+it seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to
+him? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable,
+that it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according
+to the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most
+reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards,
+the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say
+that God wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is
+to say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he
+does will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same
+thing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it
+is the most agreeable.
+
+To represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine
+will, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is
+supposed to pertain to contingent self-determination.
+
+Let us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of
+some repetition.
+
+Contingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its
+_nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of
+itself--now obeying reason, and now obeying passion. If it be asked why
+it determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction
+in which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that
+it determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this
+particular direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it
+may be said that it determines in this direction, because it is
+pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of
+reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot
+say that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not passion; because
+the one is all reason, and the other is all passion, and of course they
+cannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be
+compared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the
+gratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it
+is reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the
+will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is
+nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey
+desire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act
+of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any
+other explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the
+other, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the
+other.
+
+To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this
+system? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what
+is the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most
+agreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most
+agreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But
+why does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than
+another; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at
+another time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the
+question,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather
+than of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time,
+and in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine
+itself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the
+sense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards's system. If
+Edwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the
+motive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being
+affected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most
+disagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with
+the one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason
+appears more agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for
+the obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of
+the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey
+reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea
+of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on
+his system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is,
+the reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of
+will being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it
+is obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the
+sense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is
+obeyed.
+
+To refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary
+to the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be
+considered a difficulty, only farther back.
+
+If God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it
+is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the
+reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a
+circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch
+as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows
+that God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only
+because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and
+thus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another,
+or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards,
+unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not
+to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation,
+and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will
+to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in
+an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless
+series, and an absolute necessity.
+
+All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have
+above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the
+sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the
+direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good,
+&c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic
+from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is
+generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind,
+vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?
+Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction
+because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go
+in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause
+_per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that
+direction.
+
+There are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the
+constitution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just,
+the right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same
+constitution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable
+in reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its
+_nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in
+either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes
+its _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good;
+should we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the
+just, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount
+to saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true,
+but only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the
+_nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again
+we might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction
+of the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an
+absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction
+of the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_
+is made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the
+rational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always
+made in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to
+explain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the
+rational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have
+an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the
+direction of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back
+in a circle to our first position.
+
+How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall we adopt the
+psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then
+as the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if
+the sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are
+plunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the
+sensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we
+have to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed
+to be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will
+when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met
+with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as
+more agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one
+time, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations
+are resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go
+up to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question
+it in like manner.
+
+But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary
+cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in
+itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and
+neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their
+particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.
+
+The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered.
+The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will
+as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a
+power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects.
+
+It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or
+belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the
+false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined
+by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and
+the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the
+conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing
+within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of
+modification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every
+_nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its
+self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and
+accountable.
+
+Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or
+rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the
+reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the
+archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to
+be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved
+and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in
+harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a
+triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not
+separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without
+eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and
+isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be
+without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations.
+
+The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but
+then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free
+of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are
+not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the
+will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can
+excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up
+objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and
+yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations.
+
+The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would
+have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities
+would lie dormant without the reason.
+
+So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the
+will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in
+itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and
+sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without
+rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing
+what to do.
+
+It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing
+peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to
+necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_
+feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given
+its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has
+awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is
+as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a
+power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power
+which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.
+
+It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason
+and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason
+or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such
+relation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be
+called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of
+will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing,
+bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however,
+frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention,
+and which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be
+required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting
+one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and
+sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily
+determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection,
+and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general
+motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to
+illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to
+prove that the will can act without a motive.
+
+I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the
+chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a
+selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?
+The illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected,
+and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the
+sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the
+absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at
+illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this
+selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency
+as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the
+reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no
+affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as
+most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.
+
+It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of
+Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_
+a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very
+beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if
+this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in
+a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are
+so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that
+they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the
+other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and
+death." (p. 73.)
+
+Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the
+sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state
+of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of
+indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his
+system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment
+volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in
+indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest
+ceases with motion.
+
+But according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I
+shall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is
+clearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of
+feeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the
+sensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory;
+and a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the
+quality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory
+likewise; it would be confounding that which we had already
+distinguished. From Edwards's very definition of will it cannot be
+indifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise
+than indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and
+sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference
+which it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it
+determines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the
+determination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of
+reason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is
+wakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only
+the _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the
+sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the will
+again knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this
+direction.
+
+In the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting
+together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in
+connexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation
+between physical causes and the masses which they operate upon, may lead
+to the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the
+will and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at
+least, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the
+sensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We
+have already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not
+relieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent
+will, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the
+sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the
+difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the will. In our
+psychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable
+those powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will
+is, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to
+the most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another,
+in opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we
+perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated
+to reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know
+that we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act
+otherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But
+when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its
+direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when
+we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is
+still simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and
+conviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion
+and passion their place in the sensitivity alone.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+FROM
+
+THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
+
+Edwards's argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn
+from the divine prescience, remains to be considered.
+
+The argument is introduced as follows: "That the acts of the wills of
+moral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without
+all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events."
+(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to "the evidence of God's
+certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents." In the
+following section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his
+argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the
+consequences of his position.
+
+God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence
+necessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee
+them; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to
+all events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of
+everything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events
+exist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions,
+and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine
+volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of
+his work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the
+doctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part
+II. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then
+we are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of
+volitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would
+practically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the
+alternative. "If it could be demonstrated," remarks Dugald Stewart,
+(vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) "which in my opinion has not yet been done,
+that the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible
+with the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in
+favour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the
+foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to
+affirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of
+contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not
+extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of
+God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?"
+If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity,
+there is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral
+and theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument
+of Edwards.
+
+This argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order.
+
+I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, "having already
+made sure of existence;" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and
+is therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever
+is, is. He next affirms, that whatever is "indissolubly connected with
+other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;" but events
+infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the
+foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, have an
+indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore
+necessary.
+
+The force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between
+foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be
+"indissoluble;" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with
+the event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine
+foreknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence
+foreknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our
+knowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it
+came to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a
+certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it
+cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his
+walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary
+antecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or
+necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I
+looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the
+knowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the
+man walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the
+mode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a
+contingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of
+prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this
+faculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by
+the faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday.
+The knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a
+knowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the
+object known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in
+relation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and
+present, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in
+relation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge.
+Edwards remarks, (p. 121.) "All certain knowledge, whether it be
+foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the
+thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that
+it is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true."
+
+Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of
+existence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist.
+Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the
+present knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course
+the reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or,
+more strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of
+time, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the
+knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its
+existence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event,
+or if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon
+strict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would
+be affirmed of the event likewise.
+
+That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them,
+they will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive
+affirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, God's
+foreknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend
+them; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God's
+foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or
+determine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the
+contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing
+how wills act in the time present, takes away from them their
+contingency and freedom. God in his prescience, _is the spectator of the
+future, as really as we are the spectators of the present_.
+
+Edwards's reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes
+for exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for
+example, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that
+place, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes
+away, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things,
+that a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then
+it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or
+go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is
+entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or
+contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine
+foreknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are
+subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being,
+"who inhabiteth eternity:" but this necessary condition of their
+existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency
+of their particular causation.
+
+II. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, "No future event
+can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without
+all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It
+is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without
+_evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3.
+Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of
+knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or
+_proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something
+which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the
+object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is
+known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all
+axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed
+evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which
+anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore,
+whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as
+immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God
+otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal
+Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or
+as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So
+much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A
+contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards
+that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising
+from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is
+self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or
+proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be
+self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into
+futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its
+nature."
+
+But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in
+_anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is
+evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed
+that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of
+the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its
+contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He illustrates his
+meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven
+hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine
+Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at
+once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular
+nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of
+God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or
+reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all
+with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no
+evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be
+seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there
+was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in
+something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion
+is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.)
+
+The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent
+event exists "_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the
+matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or
+any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is
+really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right
+in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event
+without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing
+now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is
+connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I
+do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not
+opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being
+by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet
+have sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence
+have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses
+only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign
+choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold
+the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but
+from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view
+to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own
+volitions.
+
+The ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain
+and reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are
+never without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the
+individual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of
+the individual volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible
+existence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and
+constitution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not
+required to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions
+may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual
+existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition;
+he cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough,
+as I have already shown, to assign him prescience, in order to bring
+within his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows
+all the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the
+possible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that class of
+the actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively
+necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring up under
+the characteristic of contingency.
+
+And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine
+prescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the
+contingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far
+otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the
+planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the
+comets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions
+of the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations.
+
+But if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable
+calculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something "that is
+evident" and "now existent, with which the future existence of the
+_contingent_ event is connected."
+
+There are three kinds of certainty. _First_, absolute certainty. This is
+the certainty which lies in necessary and eternal principles e. g. 2 x
+2=4; the existence of space; every body must be in space; every
+phenomenon must have a cause; the being of God.
+
+Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between premises and
+conclusion, is likewise absolute.
+
+_Secondly_. Physical certainty. This is the certainty which lies in the
+connexion between physical causes and their phenomena: e. g.
+gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in general, mechanical forces.
+
+The reason conceives of these causes as inherently active and uniform;
+and hence, wherever a physical cause exists, we expect its proper
+phenomena.
+
+Now we do not call the operation of these causes _absolutely_ certain,
+because they depend ultimately upon will,--the will of God; and we can
+conceive that the same will which ordained them, can change, suspend, or
+even annihilate them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes
+given in time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If
+in any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to recognise
+the presence of that will which ordained them. Such change or suspension
+we call a _miracle_; that is, a surprise,--a wonder, because it is
+unlooked for.
+
+When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically certain, we mean
+that it is certain in the immutability of a cause acting in time and
+space, and under a necessity relatively to the divine will; but still
+not _absolutely_ certain, because there is a possibility of a miracle.
+But when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain, we mean that it
+is certain as comprehended in a principle which is unalterable in its
+very nature, and is therefore independent of will.
+
+_Thirdly_. Moral certainty, is the certainty which lies between the
+connexion of motive and will. By will we mean a self-conscious and
+intelligent cause, or a cause in unity with intelligence. It is also, in
+the fullest sense, a cause _per se_; that is, it contains within itself
+proper efficiency, and determines its own direction. By _motives_ we
+mean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general, all
+activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons; for they have
+the same meaning: but in mere material masses, the rule is not
+contemplated by the acting force,--it is contemplated only by the
+intelligence which ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the
+contrary, the activity which we call will is self-conscious, and is
+connected with a perception of the reasons, or ends, or motives of
+action. These motives or ends of action are of two kinds. _First_, those
+found in the ideas of the practical reason, which decides what is fit
+and right. These are reasons of supreme authority. _Secondly_, those
+found in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately useful
+and expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are right only
+when subordinate to the first.
+
+Now these reasons and motives are a light to the will, and serve to
+direct its activities; and the human conscience, which is but the
+reason, has drawn up for the will explicit rules, suited to all
+circumstances and relations, which are called _ethics_, or _the rules_.
+
+These rules the will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every
+volition it is conscious of a power to do or not to do; but yet, as the
+will forms a unity with the intelligence, we take for granted that it
+will obey them, unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent.
+But the only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a
+state of sinfulness,--a corruption of the sensitivity, or a disposition
+to violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual constitution. Hence
+moral certainty can exist only where the harmony of the spiritual being
+is preserved. For example: God and good angels. In God moral certainty
+is infinite. His dispositions are infinitely pure, and his will freely
+determines to do right; it is not compelled or necessitated, for then
+his infinite meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is _not
+absolute_, because will being a power to do or not to do, there is
+always a possibility, although there may be no probability, nay an
+infinite improbability, that the will may disobey the laws of the
+reason.
+
+In the case of angels and good men, the moral certainty is such as to be
+attended with no apprehension of a dereliction. With respect to such men
+as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a
+very high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they
+will act in any given circumstances involving the influence of motives.
+We know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,--that is, the _first_
+class of motives; and the _second_ only so far as they are authorized by
+the first. If the first class of motives are forsaken, then human
+conduct can be calculated only according to the influence of the second
+class.
+
+Human character, however, is mixed and variously compounded. We might
+make a scale of an indefinite number of degrees, from the highest point
+of moral excellence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then
+our predictions of human conduct would vary with every degree.
+
+In any particular case where we are called upon to reason from the
+connexion of motives with the will, it is evident we must determine the
+character of the individual as accurately as possible, in order to know
+the probable _resultant_ of the opposite moral forces which we are
+likely to find.
+
+We have remarked that moral certainty exists only where the harmony of
+the moral constitution is preserved. Here we know the right will be
+obeyed. It may be remarked in addition to this, however, that moral
+certainty may almost be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral
+degradation, where the right is altogether forsaken. Here the rule is,
+"whatever is most agreeable;" and the volition is indeed merged into the
+sense of the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide
+field of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of human
+nature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of life, is not
+the knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but as it is in its
+vast variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from observation
+and history. What human nature ought to be, we learn from reason.
+
+On a subject of so much importance, and where it is so desirable to have
+clear and definite ideas, the rhetorical ungracefulness of repetition is
+of little moment, when this repetition serves our great end. I shall be
+pardoned, therefore, in calling the attention of the reader to a point
+above suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and
+sensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed to
+derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts which are in
+the direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very trifling
+acts; and therefore acts of this description, although possible, we may
+conclude are very rare. In calculating, then, future acts of will, we
+may, like the mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume
+that all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or sensitivity,
+or of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious of power to
+do, out of the direction of both reason and sensitivity, still, in the
+triunity in which it exists, it submits itself to the general interests
+of the being, and consults the authority of conscience, or the
+enjoyments of passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself
+habits and a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted
+himself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, to the
+laws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has formed for
+himself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many
+occasions, noble, generous, and pure feelings; and hence we conclude
+that his sensitivity harmonizes with conscience. Or he is known to have
+violated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and in a great
+variety of transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for
+himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on many
+occasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we conclude that
+his sensitivity is in collision with conscience.
+
+In both cases supposed, and in like manner in all supposable cases,
+there is plainly a basis on which, in any given circumstances, we may
+foresee and predict volitions. There is something "that is evident and
+now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is
+connected." On the one hand these predictions exert no necessitating
+influence over the events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected
+with the causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events
+need not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of
+probable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations would no
+longer be merely probable:--they would, on the contrary, take the
+precision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses and other
+phenomena based upon necessary laws. But these calculations can aim only
+at _moral_ certainty, because they are made according to the generally
+known and received determinations of will in a unity with reason and
+sensitivity; but still a will which is known also to have the power to
+depart at any moment from the line of determination which it has
+established for itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting
+the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based on his known
+integrity, and the calculations which we make respecting another, based
+on his known dishonesty, may alike disappoint us, through the
+unexpected, though possible dereliction of the first, and the
+unexpected, though possible reformation of the latter. When we reason
+from moral effects to moral causes, or from moral causes to moral
+effects, we cannot regard the operation of causes as positive and
+uniform under the same law of necessity which appertains to physical
+causes, because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and
+last determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a high
+degree of probability, with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely
+and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we cannot reason respecting
+human conduct, as we reason respecting the phenomena of the physical
+world, because it is possible for the human will to disappoint
+calculations based upon the ordinary influence of motives: e. g. the
+motive does not hold the same relation to will which fire holds to
+combustible substance; the fire must burn; the will may or may not
+determine in view of motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance,
+probable evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral
+evidence being generally probable, all probable evidence is called
+moral.
+
+The will differs from physical causes in being a cause _per se_, but
+although a cause _per se_, it has laws to direct its volitions. It may
+indeed violate these laws and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law
+unto itself; but this violation of law and this arbitrary determination
+do not arise from it necessarily as a cause _per se_, but from an abuse
+of its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the reason, we
+expect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and perfect movements it
+is uniform. Physical causes are uniform because God has determined and
+fixed them according to laws derived from infinite wisdom.
+
+The human will may likewise be uniform by obeying the laws of
+conscience, but the departures may also be indefinitely numerous and
+various.
+
+To sum up these observations in general statements, we remark;--
+
+First: The connexion on which we base predictions of human volitions, is
+the connexion of will with reason and sensitivity in the unity of the
+mind or spirit.
+
+Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be designed to be
+regulated by truth and righteousness, and by feeling subordinated to
+these.
+
+Thirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is thus regulated.
+
+Fourthly: This regulation, however, does not take place by the necessary
+governance which reason and sensitivity have over will, but by a
+self-subjection of will to their rules and inducements;--this
+constitutes meritoriousness,--the opposite conduct constitutes ill
+desert.
+
+Fifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to the degree and
+fixedness of this self-subjection to reason and right feeling; or where
+this does not exist, according to the degree and fixedness of the habits
+of wrong doing, in a self-subjection to certain passions in opposition
+to reason.
+
+Sixthly: Our calculations will be more or less certain according to the
+extent and accuracy of our observations upon human conduct.
+
+Seventhly: Our calculations can never be attended with _absolute_
+certainty, because the will being contingent, has the power of
+disappointing calculations made upon the longest observed uniformity.
+
+Eighthly: Our expectations respecting the determinations of Deity are
+attended with the highest moral certainty. We say _moral_ certainty,
+because it is certainty not arising from necessity, and in that sense
+absolute; but certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely
+pure being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is
+affirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that he has
+not the power to change or to determine contrary to truth; but that
+there is an infinite moral certainty arising from the perfection of his
+nature, that he never will depart from infinite wisdom and rectitude.
+
+To assign God any other immutability would be to deprive him of freedom.
+
+Ninthly: The divine foresight of human volitions need not be supposed to
+necessitate them, any more than human foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing
+them, has no necessary connexion in any case with their causation.
+Again, if it does not appear essential to the divine foresight of
+volitions that they should be necessary. We have seen that future
+contingent volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty
+even by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in the
+same way to calculate them through _media_,--the reach and accuracy of
+his calculations must be in the proportion of his intelligence, and how
+far short of a certain and perfect knowledge of all future contingent
+volitions can infinite intelligence be supposed to fall by such
+calculations?
+
+Tenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite mind is compelled to
+resort to deduction, or to employ _media_ for arriving at any particular
+knowledge. In the attribute of prescience, he is really present to all
+the possible and actual of the future.
+
+III. The third and last point of Edwards's argument is as follows: "To
+suppose the future volitions of moral agents, not to be necessary
+events; or which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible
+but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God
+certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's
+knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God certainly
+and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which
+at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not
+be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one
+thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows."
+(page 117.)
+
+The substance of this reasoning is this. That inasmuch as a contingent
+future event is _uncertain_ from its very nature and definition, it
+cannot be called an object of _certain_ knowledge, to any mind, not even
+to the divine mind, without a manifest contradiction. "It is the same as
+to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth,
+which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth."
+
+We have here again an error arising from not making a proper
+distinction, which I have already pointed out,--the distinction between
+the certainty of a future volition as a mere fact existent, and the
+manner in which that fact came to exist.
+
+The fact of volition comes to exist contingently; that is, by a power
+which in giving it existence, is under no law of necessity, and at the
+moment of causation, is conscious of ability to withhold the causative
+_nibus_. Now all volitions which have already come to exist in this way,
+have both a certain and contingent existence. It is certain that they
+have come to exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their
+existence is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by
+necessity as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and
+free, and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions,
+had the power to withhold them.
+
+Certainty and contingency are not opposed, and exclusive of each other
+in reference to what has already taken place. Are they opposed and
+exclusive of each other in reference to the future? In the first place,
+we may reason on probable grounds. Contingent causes have already
+produced volitions--hence they may produce volitions in the future. They
+have produced volitions in obedience to laws of reason and
+sensitivity--hence they may do so in the future. They have done this
+according to a uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually
+observed--hence this uniformity may be continued in the future.
+
+A future contingent event may therefore have a high degree of
+probability, and even a moral certainty.
+
+But to a being endowed with prescience, what prevents a positive and
+infallible knowledge of a future contingent event? His mind extends to
+the actual in the future, as easily as to the actual in the past; but
+the actual of the future is not only that which comes to pass by his own
+determination and _nibus_, and therefore necessarily in its relation to
+himself as cause, but also that which comes to pass by the _nibus_ of
+constituted wills, contingent and free, as powers to do or not to do.
+There is no opposition, as Edwards supposes, between the infallible
+divine foreknowledge, and the contingency of the event;--the divine
+foreknowledge is infallible from its own inherent perfection; and of
+course there can be no doubt but that the event foreseen will come to
+pass; but then it is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently,
+and not necessarily.
+
+The error we have just noted, appears again in the corollary which
+Edwards immediately deduces from his third position. "From what has been
+observed," he remarks, "it is evident, that the absolute _decrees_ of
+God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the
+necessity of the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute
+foreknowledge of God." (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God are the
+determinations of his will, and comprehend the events to which they
+relate, as the cause comprehends the effect. Foreknowledge, on the
+contrary, has no causality in relation to events foreknown. It is not a
+determination of divine will, but a form of the divine intelligence.
+Hence the decrees of God do actually and truly necessitate events; while
+the foreknowledge of God extends to events which are not necessary but
+contingent,--as well as to those which are pre-determined.
+
+Edwards always confounds contingency with chance or no cause, and thus
+makes it absurd in its very definition. He also always confounds
+certainty with necessity, and thus compels us to take the latter
+universal and absolute, or to plunge into utter uncertainty, doubt, and
+disorder.
+
+Prescience is an essential attribute of Deity. Prescience makes the
+events foreknown, certain; but if certain, they must be necessary. And
+on the other hand, if the events were not certain, they could not be
+foreknown,--for that which is uncertain cannot be the object of positive
+and infallible knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be
+foreknown, then they must be necessary.
+
+Again: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all future events
+supposed to come under it, out of all possible connexion with anything
+preceding and now actually existent, and consequently allows of no basis
+upon which they can be calculated and foreseen. Contingence, also, as
+opposed to necessity, destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility
+even of divine prescience. This is the course of Edwards's reasoning.
+
+Now if we have reconciled contingence with both cause and certainty, and
+have opposed it only to necessity, thus separating cause and certainty
+from the absolute and unvarying dominion of necessity, then this
+reasoning is truly and legitimately set aside.
+
+Necessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the sensitivity connected
+with it:--contingency lies only in will. But the future acts of will can
+be calculated from its known union with, and self-subjection to the
+reason and sensitivity.
+
+These calculations are more or less probable, or are certain according
+to the known character of the person who is the subject of these
+calculations.
+
+Of God we do not affirm merely the power of calculating future
+contingent events upon known data, but a positive prescience of all
+events. He sees from the beginning how contingent causes or wills, will
+act. He sees with absolute infallibility and certainty--and the events
+to him are infallible and certain. But still they are not necessary,
+because the causes which produce them are not determined and
+necessitated by anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free,
+and conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in
+doing.
+
+I am persuaded that inattention to the important distinction of the
+certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge, and the necessity implied
+in the divine predetermination or decree, is the great source of
+fallacious reasonings and conclusions respecting the divine prescience.
+When God pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity
+relative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It cannot be
+otherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains. But when he
+foreknows an event, he presents us merely a form of his infinite
+intelligence, exerting no causative, and consequently no necessitating
+influence whatever. The volitions which I am now conscious of
+exercising, are just what they are, whether they have been foreseen or
+not--and as they now do actually exist, they have certainty; and yet
+they are contingent, because I am conscious that I have power not to
+exercise them. They are, but they might not have been. Now let the
+intelligence of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have
+foreseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain that this
+foresight does not destroy the contingency of the volitions, nor does
+the contingency render the foresight absurd. The supposition is both
+rational and possible.
+
+It is not necessary for us to consider the remaining corollaries of
+Edwards, as the application of the above reasoning to them will be
+obvious.
+
+Before closing this part of the treatise in hand, I deem it expedient to
+lay down something like a scale of certainty. In doing this, I shall
+have to repeat some things. But it is by repetition, and by placing the
+same things in new positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and
+succeed in rendering philosophical ideas familiar.
+
+First: Let us consider minutely the distinction between certainty and
+necessity. Necessity relates to truths and events considered in
+themselves. Certainty relates to our apprehension or conviction of them.
+Hence necessity is not certainty itself, but a ground of certainty.
+_Absolute certainty_ relates only to truths or to being.
+
+First or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions drawn from them, are
+necessary with an absolute necessity. They do not admit of negative
+suppositions, and are irrespective of will. The being of God, and time,
+and space, are necessary with an absolute necessity.
+
+_Relative necessity_ relates to logical conclusions and events or
+phenomena. Logical conclusions are always necessary relatively to the
+premises, but cannot be absolutely necessary unless the premises from
+which they are derived, are absolutely necessary.
+
+All phenomena and events are necessary with only a relative necessity;
+for in depending upon causes, they all ultimately depend upon will.
+Considered therefore in themselves, they are contingent; for the will
+which produced them, either immediately or by second or dependent
+causes, is not necessitated, but free and contingent--and therefore
+their non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to
+will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; when
+therefore the _nibus_ of this will was made, creation was the necessary
+result. The Deity is under no necessity of willing; but when he does
+will, the effect is said necessarily to follow--meaning by this, that
+the _nibus_ of the divine will is essential power, and that there is no
+other power that can prevent its taking effect.
+
+Created will is under no necessity of willing; but when it does will or
+make its _nibus_, effects necessarily follow, according to the connexion
+established by the will of Deity, between the _nibus_ of created will
+and surrounding objects. Where a _nibus_ of created will is made, and
+effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater force of a
+resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so that whatever follows
+the _nibus_ of created will, whether it be a phenomenon without, or the
+mere experience of a greater resisting force, it follows by a necessity
+relative to the divine will.
+
+When we come to consider will in relation to its own volitions, we have
+no more necessity, either absolute er relative; we have contingency and
+absolute freedom.
+
+Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our knowledge or conviction
+of truths and events.
+
+Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute and relative. We
+have a certain knowledge or conviction of that which we perceive to be
+necessary in its own nature, or of which a negative is not supposable;
+and this, as based upon an _absolute necessity_, may be called an
+absolute certainty.
+
+The established connexion between causes and effects, is another ground
+of certainty. Causes are of two kinds; first causes, or causes _per se_,
+or contingent and free causes, or will; and second or physical causes,
+which are necessary with a relative necessity.
+
+First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and the finite.
+
+Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will take place. This may
+likewise be called an absolute certainty, because the connexion between
+divine volitions and effects is absolutely necessary. It is not
+supposable that God should will in vain, for that would contradict his
+admitted infinity.
+
+The connexion between the volitions of created will and effects, and the
+connexion between physical causes and effects, supposing each of course
+to be in its proper relations and circumstances, is a connexion of
+relative necessity; that is, relative to the divine will. Now the
+certainty of our knowledge or conviction that an event will take place,
+depending upon volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different
+from the certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain
+conviction that an event which infinite power wills, will take place.
+The will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend or
+change the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my hand over
+this paper, it will move, supposing of course the continued healthiness
+of the limb; but it is possible for God so to alter the constitution of
+my being, that my will shall have no more connexion with my hands than
+it now has with the circulation of the blood. I believe also that if I
+throw this paper into the fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God
+so to alter the constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper
+will not burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will
+continue to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This
+certainly is not an _absolute certainty_, but a _conditional_ certainty:
+events will thus continue to take place on condition the divine will
+does not change the condition of things. This conditional certainty is
+likewise called a _physical_ certainty, because the events contemplated
+include besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so
+commonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world, or
+nature.
+
+But we must next look at will itself in relation to its volitions: Here
+all is contingency and freedom,--here is no necessity. Is there any
+ground of certain knowledge respecting future volitions?
+
+If will as a cause _per se_, were isolated and in no relation whatever,
+there could not be any ground of any knowledge whatever, respecting
+future volitions. But will is not thus isolated. On the contrary, it
+forms a unity with the sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals _what
+ought to be done_, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The
+sensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the ground
+of personal experience. Now although it is granted that will can act
+without deriving a reason or inducement of action from the reason and
+the sensitivity, still the instances in which it does so act, are so
+rare and trifling, that they may be thrown out of the account. We may
+therefore safely assume as a general law, that the will determines
+according to reasons and inducements drawn from the reason and the
+sensitivity. This law is not by its very definition, and by the very
+nature of the subject to which it relates, a necessary law--but a law
+revealed in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise
+of its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of our
+being, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In obeying the
+one or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to perfect beings,
+therefore, we can calculate with certainty as to their volitions under
+any given circumstances. Whatever is commanded by reason, whatever
+appears attractive to the pure sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed.
+
+But what kind of certainty is this? It is not absolute certainty,
+because it is supposable that the will which obeys may not obey, for it
+has power not to obey. Nor is it _physical_ certainty, for it does not
+relate to a physical cause, nor to the connexion between volition and
+its effects, but to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor
+again can we, strictly speaking, call it a _conditional_ certainty;
+because the will, as a power _per se_, is under no conditions as to the
+production of its volitions. To say that the volitions will be in
+accordance with the reason and pure sensitivity, if the will continue to
+obey the reason and pure sensitivity, is merely saying that the
+volitions will be right if the willing power put forth right volitions.
+What kind of certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty
+altogether peculiar,--a certainty based upon the relative state of the
+reason and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the
+commands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name of
+_moral_[7] laws, simply because they have this relation,--and as the
+sensitivity, when harmonizing with the reason, is thence called morally
+pure, because attracting to the same conduct which the reason
+commands,--this certainty may fitly be called _moral certainty_. The
+name, however, does not mark _degree_. Does this certainty possess
+degrees? It does. With respect to the volitions of God, we have the
+highest degree of moral certainty,--an infinite moral certainty. He,
+indeed, in his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions
+whatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the harmony of
+infinite reason with the divine affections of infinite benevolence,
+truth, and justice, we are certain that his volitions will always be
+right, good, and wise. Besides, he has assured us of his fixed
+determination to maintain justice, truth, and love; and he has given us
+this assurance as perfectly knowing himself in the whole eternity of his
+being. Let no one attempt to confound this perfect moral certainty with
+necessity, for the distinction is plain. If God's will were affirmed to
+be necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness, and
+love, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the
+determination of the divine will: viz.--that the divine determination
+takes place, not in contingency and freedom, not with the power of
+making an opposite determination, but in absolute necessity. But if it
+be affirmed that God's will, will _certainly_ go in the direction of
+truth, righteousness, and love, the affirmation respects our _knowledge_
+and _conviction_ of the character of the divine volitions in the whole
+eternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire after the
+grounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the necessity of the
+divine determinations be the ground of this knowledge and conviction, it
+must be allowed that it is a sufficient ground. But will any man assume
+that necessity is the _only_ ground of certain knowledge and conviction?
+If necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of
+course there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other ground
+of knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at least for the
+sake of the argument, it be granted that there may be other grounds of
+knowledge than necessity, then I would ask whether the infinite
+excellence of the divine reason and sensitivity, in their perfect
+harmony, does afford to us a ground for the most certain and
+satisfactory belief that the divine will will create and mould all being
+and order all events according to infinite wisdom and rectitude. In
+order to have full confidence that God will forever do right, must we
+know that his will is absolutely necessitated by his reason and his
+affections? Can we not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him
+absolute freedom of choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the
+Earth will do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have
+the power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when, in
+his omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his purposes will
+forever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does not the glory and
+excellency of God appear in this,--that while he hath unlimited power,
+he employs that power by his free choice, only to dispense justice,
+mercy, and grace? And does not the excellency and meritoriousness of a
+creature's faith appear in this,--that while God is known to be so
+mighty and so absolute, he is confided in as a being who will never
+violate any moral principle or affection? Suppose God's will to be
+necessitated in its wise and good volitions,--the sun dispensing heat
+and light, and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of
+creation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,--and the
+creature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in him, holds
+no other relation to him than the sunflower to the sun--by a necessity
+of its nature, ever turning its face upwards to receive the influences
+which minister to its life and properties.
+
+The moral certainty attending the volitions of created perfect beings is
+the same in kind with that attending the volitions of the Deity. It is a
+certainty based upon the relative state of the reason and the
+sensitivity, and their unity with the will. Wherever the reason and the
+sensitivity are in harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this,
+that in calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we
+have not to calculate the relative energy of opposing principles:--all
+which is now existent is, in the constituted unity of the soul,
+naturally connected only with good volitions. But the _degree_ of the
+moral certainty in created beings, when compared with that attending the
+volitions of Deity, is only in the proportion of the finite to the
+infinite. The confidence which we repose in the integrity of a good
+being, does not arise from the conviction that his volitions are
+necessitated, but from his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and
+our sense of his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility
+of his doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing
+right while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under
+temptations of doing wrong.
+
+A certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the necessity of the
+volitions, would not differ from a physical certainty. But a moral
+certainty has this plain distinction,--that it is based upon the
+evidently pure dispositions and habits of the individual, without
+implying, however, any necessity of volitions.
+
+Moral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral perfection, and
+predicable in degrees according to the dignity and excellency of the
+being.
+
+But now let us suppose any disorder to take place in the sensitivity;
+that is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to any degree, to grow into
+opposition to the reason, so that while the reason commands in one
+direction, the sensitivity gives the sense of the most agreeable in the
+opposite direction,--and then our calculations respecting future
+volitions must vary accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer,
+because volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing
+principles: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in
+different degrees.
+
+By _the probable_, we mean that which has not attained to certainty, but
+which nevertheless has grounds on which it claims to be believed. We
+call it _probable_ or _proveable_, because it both has proof and is
+still under conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof.
+That which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A
+mathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity, and
+admits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates its truth.
+
+The divine volitions are certain on the ground of the divine
+perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is found in the
+divine perfections.
+
+The volitions of a good created being are certain on the ground of the
+purity of such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what is found
+in this purity.
+
+But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being of reason, and of a
+sensitivity corrupted totally or in different degrees, then we have
+place not for certainty, but for probability. As our knowledge of the
+future volitions of such a being can only be gathered from something now
+existent, this knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present
+relative state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of
+this is in no case supposable,--so that, although our actual knowledge
+of this being may be such as to afford us proof of what his volitions
+may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be increased
+indefinitely by close observation and study, so likewise will the proof
+be increased. According to the definition of probability above given,
+therefore, our knowledge of the future volitions of an imperfect being
+can only amount to probable knowledge.
+
+The direction of the probabilities will be determined by the
+preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed being supposed. If the
+sensitivity be totally corrupted, the probabilities will generally go in
+the direction of the corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed
+general fact in relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments
+of passion are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But
+the state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be in a
+highly developed state, and the convictions of the right consequently
+clear and strong, there may be probabilities of volitions in opposition
+to passion which cannot exist where the reason is undeveloped and
+subject to the errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The
+difference is that which is commonly known under the terms "enlightened
+and unenlightened conscience."
+
+Where the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the direction of the
+probabilities must depend upon the degree of corruption and the degree
+to which the reason is developed or undeveloped.
+
+With a given state of the sensitivity and the reason, the direction of
+the probabilities will depend also very much upon the correlated, or
+upon the opposing objects and circumstances:--where the objects and
+circumstances agree with the state of the sensitivity and the reason, or
+to speak generally and collectively, with "the state of the mind," the
+probabilities will clearly be more easily determined than where they are
+opposed to "the state of the mind."
+
+The law which Edwards lays down as the law of volition universally, viz:
+that "the volition is as the greatest apparent good:" understanding by
+the term "good," as he does, simply, that which strikes us "agreeably,"
+is indeed a general rule, according to which the volitions of characters
+deeply depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as
+governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of
+character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is struggling
+under the light of his reason against passion, and consequently the
+probabilities in this last case must be calculated in a different way.
+But in relation to the former it is a sufficient rule.
+
+Probability, as well as certainty, respects only the kind and degree of
+our knowledge of any events, and not the causes by which those events
+are produced: whether these causes be necessary or contingent is another
+question.
+
+One great error in reasoning respecting the character of causes, in
+connexion with the calculation of probabilities, is the assumption that
+uniformity is the characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning
+may be stated in the following syllogism:
+
+In order to calculate either with certainty or probability any events we
+must suppose a uniform law of causation; but uniformity can exist only
+where there is a necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose
+a necessity of causation.
+
+This is another instance of applying to the will principles which were
+first obtained from the observation of physical causes, and which really
+belong to physical causes only. With respect to physical causes, _it is
+true_ that uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary
+causes, simply because physical causes are relatively necessary
+causes:--but with respect to the will, _it is not true_ that uniformity
+appears to be a characteristic of necessary cause, because the will is
+not a necessary cause. That uniformity therefore, as in the case of
+physical causes, seems to become a characteristic of necessary cause,
+does not arise from the nature of the idea of cause, but from the nature
+of the particular subject, viz., _physical_ cause. Uniformity in logical
+strictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule. Cause
+is simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the direction, aims,
+and modes of power: cause explains the mere existence of phenomena: law
+explains their relations and characteristics: law is the thought and
+design of the reason. Now a cause may be so conditioned as to be
+incapable of acting except in obedience to law, and this is the case of
+all physical causes which act according to the law or design of infinite
+wisdom, and thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to
+these causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they
+necessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned as to
+be incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can oppose itself
+to, and violate law, but still it is a cause in connexion with law, the
+law found in the reason and sensitivity, which law of course has the
+characteristic of uniformity. The law of the reason and pure sensitivity
+is uniform--it is the law of right. The law of a totally corrupted
+sensitivity is likewise a uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law
+to do whatever is most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every
+individual, whatever may be the degree of his corruption, forms for
+himself certain rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces
+uniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity of
+conduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the design of
+the supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature. Uniformity of
+volitions is nothing but the design of reason and pure sensitivity, or
+of corrupted passion developed in human conduct. The uniformity thus not
+being the characteristic of cause as such, cannot be the characteristic
+of necessary cause. The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues
+nothing respecting the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause
+or it may not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity
+in a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform
+rules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but which
+we also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical causes we have
+the uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we have the uniformity of
+a free intelligent cause. We can conceive of perfect freedom and yet of
+perfect order, because the free will can submit itself to the light of
+the reason. Indeed, all the order and harmony of creation, although
+springing from the _idea_ of the reason, has been constituted by the
+power of the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not
+necessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is altogether
+an assumption incapable of being supported that freedom is identified
+with disorder.
+
+_Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience._
+
+These words are metaphorical: _fore_ and _pre_ do not qualify
+_knowledge_ and _science_ in relation to the mind which has the
+knowledge or science; but the time in which the knowledge takes place in
+relation to the time in which the object of knowledge is found. The
+metaphor consists in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge,
+considered relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act
+of knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining
+greater perspicuity, let us say,
+
+First: All acts of knowing are present acts of knowing,--there is no
+_fore_ knowledge and no _after_ knowledge.
+
+Secondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no relation to time and
+space whatever, e. g. pure abstract and necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4;
+and the being of God. Or the objects of knowledge may be in relations of
+time and space, e. g. all physical phenomena.
+
+Now these relations of time and space are various;--the object of
+knowledge may be in time past, or time present, or time future; and it
+may be in a place near, or in a place distant. And the faculty of
+knowledge may be of a capacity to know the object in all these relations
+under certain limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of
+knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under
+certain limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in
+time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near and
+distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events in any of
+these relations, or in any of these relations to their utmost limit.
+
+The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and
+space, under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and
+infinite form. Under this form it comprehends the present perfectly, and
+the past and the future no less than the present--and it reaches through
+all space. God's knowledge is an eternal now--an omnipresent here; that
+is, all that is possible and actual in eternity and space, is now
+perfectly known to him. Indeed God's knowledge ought not to be spoken of
+in relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge,
+from eternity to eternity the same; it is unchangeable, because it is
+perfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished.
+
+We have shown before that the perfection of the knowledge does not
+settle the mode of causation; that which comes to pass by necessity, and
+that which comes to pass contingently, are alike known to God.
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+I here finish my review of Edwards's System, and his arguments against
+the opposite system. I hope I have not thought or written in vain. The
+review I have aimed to conduct fairly and honourably, and in supreme
+reverence of truth. As to style, I have laboured only for perspicuity,
+and where a homely expression has best answered this end, I have not
+hesitated to adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly
+understood, cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a
+flowery surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason,
+is manifestly impossible.
+
+The great man with whose work I have been engaged, I honour and admire
+for his intellectual might, and love and venerate for a purity and
+elevation of spirit, which places him among the most sainted names of
+the Christian church. But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his
+genius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his
+philosophy? I have not done wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he
+leads me to the cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute
+attention--and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to have
+re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, I view him
+in a different character, and here his voice does not sound to me so
+sweet as Plato's.
+
+The first part of my undertaking is accomplished. When I again trouble
+the public with my lucubrations, I shall appear not as a reviewer, but
+in an original work, which in its turn must become the subject of
+philosophical criticism.
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+Footnotes
+
+[1] "It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a
+distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their
+service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say natural or
+physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not: at
+the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly
+physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the
+_invincible_ effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less
+natural, nor less insurmountable, if it is from the laws of spirit than
+it would be if it were from the laws of matter."--(Witherspoon's
+Lectures on Divinity, lect. xiii.)
+
+[2] Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this
+usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the performance of
+an action, and the existence of an impediment or antagonistic force,
+which takes from a faculty supposed to exist, the _liberty_ of action,
+have the same bearing upon responsibility.
+
+[3] It is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and
+natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without intending
+anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By moral inability
+they do not appear to mean anything which really render the actions
+required, impossible; but such an impediment as lies in corrupt
+affections, an impediment which may be removed by a self-determination
+to the use of means and appliances graciously provided or promised. By
+natural ability they mean the possession of all the natural faculties
+necessary to the performance of the actions required. In their
+representations of this natural ability, they proceed according to a
+popular method, rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural
+ability as a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities,
+but they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose upon
+myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to point out
+the connexion between the sensitivity and the will, both in a pure and a
+corrupt state,--and explain what these natural faculties are, which,
+according to the just meaning of these divines, form the ground of
+rebuke and persuasion, and constitute responsibility.
+
+[4] "The great argument that men are determined by the strongest
+motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call _petitio
+principii_. It is impossible even to produce any medium of proof that it
+is the strongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the
+greatest in itself; nor does it seem to be in all respects the strongest
+to the agent; but you say it appears strongest in the meantime. Why?
+Because you are determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was
+determined by the _strongest motive_, and you have only shown that I had
+a _motive_ when I acted. But what has determined you then? Can any
+effect be without a cause? I answer--supposing my self-determining power
+to exist, it is as real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect,
+as your moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and
+is but one and the same thing on one side and on the other."
+--(Witherspoon's Lectures, lect. xiii.)
+
+[5] Cousin.
+
+[6] Dr. Reid.
+
+[7] Lat. _moralis_, from _mos_,--i. e. custom or ordinary conduct.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan
+
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+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN"
+"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content=
+"text/html; charset=utf-8">
+<title>A REVIEW OF EDWARDS’S “INQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE
+WILL.�</title>
+
+<style type="text/css">
+  body   {font-family:'Bookman Old Style', 'Book Antiqua', 'Garamond'; text-align:justify; margin-left:3em; margin-right:3em}
+  p.pnn  {margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0}
+  p.pn  {text-indent:1.5em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0}
+  p.pns  {text-indent:1.5em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em}
+  p.p2  {margin-left:7em; text-indent:-2em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0}
+  p.p2s {margin-left:7em; text-indent:-2em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em}
+  p.pt1 {text-align:center; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.5em; font-style:italic}
+  .sc  {font-variant:small-caps; font-style:normal}
+  h1 {text-align:center; margin-top:1.5em; margin-bottom:1em; font-size:133%; font-weight:normal}
+  ol.ur {list-style-type: upper-roman}
+</style>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+
+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: A Review of Edwards's
+
+Author: Henry Tappan
+
+Release Date: April 25, 2011 [EBook #35958]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Keith G Richardson
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+<p class="pnn"><a href="#Intro">Introduction.</a></p>
+<p class="pnn"><a href="#Statement">I. Statement Of Edwards’s
+System.</a></p>
+<p class="pnn"><a href="#Consequences">II. The Legitimate
+Consequences Of This System.</a></p>
+<p class="pnn"><a href="#Will">III. An Examination of the Arguments
+Against a Self-Determining Will.</a></p>
+<p class="pnn"><a href="#End">Conclusion.</a></p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:113%;margin-top:3.0em;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+A REVIEW OF EDWARDS’S</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:146%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+“INQUIRY</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+INTO THE</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:121%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+FREEDOM OF THE WILL.�</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+CONTAINING</p>
+<ol class="ur">
+<li>STATEMENT OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</li>
+<li>THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.</li>
+<li>AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING
+WILL.</li>
+</ol>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+BY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN.</p>
+<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+“I am afraid that Edwards’s book (however well meant,) has done
+much harm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to
+the same doctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been
+generally ranked among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and
+his disciples.�—<i>Dugald Stewart</i>.</p>
+<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+NEW-YORK:</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:83%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+JOHN S. TAYLOR,</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+THEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER,<br>
+BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL,</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:67%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+1839.</p>
+<hr style="margin-top:10em;margin-bottom:5em">
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:63%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839,
+by<br>
+HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN,<br>
+in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States,
+for the<br>
+Southern District of New-York.</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:63%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+G. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street.</p>
+<hr style="margin-top:10em;margin-bottom:5em">
+<h1><a name="Intro" id="Intro">INTRODUCTION.</a></h1>
+<p class="pnn">D<span class="sc">iscussions</span> respecting the
+will, have, unhappily, been confounded with theological opinions,
+and hence have led to theological controversies, where
+predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally
+prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental
+constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate
+methods of psychological investigation, and must abide the
+result. If we enter the field of human consciousness in the free,
+fearless, and honest spirit of Baconian observation in order to
+arrive at the laws of the reason or the imagination, what should
+prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened course in reference
+to the will?</p>
+<p class="pn">Is it because responsibility and the duties of
+morality and religion are more immediately connected with the
+will? This, indeed, throws solemnity around our investigations,
+and warns us of caution; but, at the same time, so far from
+repressing investigation, it affords the highest reason why we
+should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness. Nothing
+surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral obligation,
+or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency of
+religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us
+the subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim
+unbounded liberty of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at
+truth. As a believer in the Bible I always anticipate that the
+truths to which philosophy leads me, will harmonize with its
+facts and doctrines. If in the result there should appear to be a
+collision, it imposes upon me the duty of re-examining both my
+philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In this way I may
+in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but even gain
+from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight into
+both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be
+removed, then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow,
+however, that I must either renounce the philosophical
+conclusion, or remove the text.</p>
+<p class="pn">If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths
+were in opposition to the whole of revelation or its leading
+truths, we should then evidently be placed on the alternative of
+denying one or the other; but as the denial of philosophy would
+be the destruction of reason, there would no longer remain in our
+being any principle on which a revelation could be received. Such
+a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any system to
+be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that with
+every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne
+aloft, and their divine authority and their truth made more
+manifest, have we not reason to bless the researches which have
+enabled us to perceive more clearly the light from Heaven? A
+system of truth does not fear, it courts philosophical scrutiny.
+Its excellency will be most resplendent when it has had the most
+fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken my faith in the
+Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its safety
+whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And
+what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be
+derived from it.</p>
+<p class="pn">Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves
+when they argue from the truths of the Bible to the truths of
+their philosophy; either under the view that the last are
+deducible from the former, or that they serve to account for and
+confirm the former. How often is their philosophy drawn from some
+other source, or handed down by old authority, and rendered
+venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead
+of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is
+perhaps cast into the mould of the philosophy.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by
+experience, that in pursuing our investigations in any particular
+science we are to confine ourselves rigorously to its subjects
+and methods, neither seeking nor fearing collision with any other
+science. We may feel confident that ultimately science will be
+found to link with science, forming a universal and harmonious
+system of truth; but this can by no means form the principle of
+our particular investigations. The application of this maxim is
+no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds a
+relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest
+that in the developements of such philosophy or science, it
+should be found to harmonize with the revelation; but
+nevertheless this cannot be received as the principle on which we
+shall aim to develope it. If there is a harmony, it must be
+discovered; it cannot be invented and made.</p>
+<p class="pn">The Cardinals determined upon the authority of
+Scripture, as they imagined, what the science of astronomy must
+be, and compelled the old man Gallileo to give the lie to his
+reason; and since then, the science of geology has been
+attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be limited in its
+researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued her
+steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods,
+and selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own
+discoveries. And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The
+memory of Gallileo and of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips
+which name the name of Christ.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now we ask the same independence of research in the
+philosophy of the human mind, and no less with respect to the
+Will than with respect to any other faculty. We wish to make this
+purely a psychological question. Let us not ask what philosophy
+is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to Pelagianism and
+Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the former; let us
+ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may present
+another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the
+legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with
+truths revealed.</p>
+<p class="pn">One thing is certain; the Bible no more professes
+to be a system of formal mental philosophy, than it professes to
+contain the sciences of astronomy and geology. If mental
+philosophy is given there, it is given in facts of history,
+individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law, and ethics;
+and as thus given, must be collected into a system by observation
+and philosophical criticism.</p>
+<p class="pn">But observations upon these external facts could
+not possibly be made independently of observations upon internal
+facts—the facts of the consciousness; and the principles of
+philosophical criticism can be obtained only in the same way. To
+him who looks not within himself, poetry, history, law, ethics,
+and the distinctions of character and conduct, would necessarily
+be unintelligible. No one therefore can search the Bible for its
+philosophy, who has not already read philosophy in his own being.
+We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole history of
+theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every author
+of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both
+the principles of his philosophy and their influence upon
+himself. Every man who reflects and aims to explain, is
+necessarily a philosopher, and has his philosophy. Instead
+therefore of professing to oppose the Bible to philosophy, or
+instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy solely and
+directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not
+discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and
+that inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all
+that we know and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in
+a pure, truth-loving spirit.</p>
+<p class="pn">I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will
+is so intimately associated with great and venerable names, and
+has so long worn a theological complexion, that it is well nigh
+impossible to disintegrate it. The authority of great and good
+men, and theological interests, even when we are disposed to be
+candid, impartial, and independent, do often insensibly influence
+our reasonings.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is out of respect to these old associations and
+prejudices, and from the wish to avoid all unnecessary
+strangeness of manner in handling an old subject, and more than
+all, to meet what are regarded by many as the weightiest and most
+conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open this
+discussion with a review of “Edwards’s Inquiry into the Freedom
+of the Will.� There is no work of higher authority among those
+who deny the self-determining power of the will; and none which
+on this subject has called forth more general admiration for
+acuteness of thought and logical subtlety. I believe there is a
+prevailing impression that Edwards must be fairly met in order to
+make any advance in an opposite argument. I propose no less than
+this attempt, presumptuous though it may seem, yet honest and
+made for truth’s sake. Truth is greater and more venerable than
+the names of great and venerable men, or of great and venerable
+sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a proper love
+and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself alone,
+neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a
+collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is
+my interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act
+aright; and as right action is meritorious not when compelled and
+accidental, but when free and made under the perception and
+conviction of right principles; so also right thinking and
+believing are meritorious, either in an intellectual or moral
+point of view, when thinking and believing are something more
+than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or Arminius,
+presents the cup.</p>
+<p class="pn">Facts of history or of description are legitimately
+received on testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual
+being can be received only on the evidence of consciousness,
+unless the testimony be from God himself; and even in this case
+we expect that the testimony, although it may transcend
+consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal evidence of
+the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this: that
+although there be revelations of that which transcends
+consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of
+consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions
+of developed reason and the revelation.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now in the application of these principles, if
+Edwards have given us a true psychology in relation to the will,
+we have the means of knowing it. In the consciousness, and in the
+consciousness alone, can a doctrine of the will be ultimately and
+adequately tested. Nor must we be intimidated from making this
+test by the assumption that the theory of Edwards alone sustains
+moral responsibility and evangelical religion. Moral
+responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and
+illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has
+already on its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral
+responsibility and evangelical religion can derive no support
+from a philosophy which they are taken first to prove.</p>
+<p class="pn">But although I intend to conduct my argument
+rigidly on psychological principles, I shall endeavour in the end
+to show that moral responsibility is really sustained by this
+exposition of the will; and that I have not, to say the least,
+weakened one of the supports of evangelical religion, nor shorn
+it of one of its glories.</p>
+<p class="pns">The plan of my undertaking embraces the following
+particulars:</p>
+<p class="pn">I. A statement of Edwards’s system.</p>
+<p class="pn">II. The legitimate consequences of this system.</p>
+<p class="pn">III. An examination of the arguments against a
+self-determining will.</p>
+<p class="pn">IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an
+appeal to consciousness.</p>
+<p class="pn">V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral
+agency and responsibility.</p>
+<p class="pns">VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the
+truths and precepts of the Bible.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first three complete the review of Edwards, and
+make up the present volume. Another volume is in the course of
+preparation.</p>
+<h1><a name="Statement" id="Statement">I.</a></h1>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">A
+STATEMENT OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</p>
+<p class="pns">E<span class="sc">dwards’s</span> System, or, in
+other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is contained in part I.
+of his “Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.� This part
+comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in
+his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore
+use my best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost
+clearness and fairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety
+is to have Edwards perfectly understood. My quotations are made
+from the edition published by S. Converse, New-York, 1829.</p>
+<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. I.—C<span class=
+"sc">oncerning the Nature of the Will</span>.�</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards under this title gives his definition of
+the will. “<i>The will is, that by which the mind chooses
+anything</i>. The faculty of the <i>will</i>, is that power, or
+principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing: an act of
+the <i>will</i> is the same as an act of <i>choosing</i> or
+<i>choice</i>.� (p. 15.)</p>
+<p class="pn">He then identifies “choosing� and “refusing:� “In
+every act of refusal the mind chooses the absence of the thing
+refused.� (p. 16.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The will is thus <i>the faculty of choice</i>.
+Choice manifests itself either in relation to one object or
+several objects. Where there is but one object, its possession or
+non-possession—its enjoyment or non-enjoyment—its presence or
+absence, is chosen. Where there are several objects, and they are
+so incompatible that the possession, enjoyment, or presence of
+one, involves the refusal of the others, then choice manifests
+itself in fixing upon the particular object to be retained, and
+the objects to be set aside.</p>
+<p class="pns">This definition is given on the ground that any
+object being regarded as positive, may be contrasted with its
+negative: and that therefore the refusing a negative is
+equivalent to choosing a positive; and the choosing a negative,
+equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa. Thus if the
+presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is
+negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the
+absence; and to choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so
+that every act of choosing involves refusing, and every act of
+refusing involves choosing; in other words, they are
+equivalents.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Object of Will.</p>
+<p class="pns">The object in respect to which the energy of
+choice is manifested, inducing external action, or the action of
+any other faculty of the mind, is always an <i>immediate
+object</i>. Although other objects may appear desirable, that
+alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of present
+action—that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which I
+actually think—that alone is chosen as the object of muscular
+exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is,
+every act of choice manifests itself by producing some change or
+effect in some other part of our being. “The thing next chosen or
+preferred, when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to
+such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion
+of his legs and feet, &amp;c. in order to it.� The same principle
+applies to any mental exertion.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Will and Desire.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only
+distinction that can possibly be made is that of genus and
+species. They are the same in <i>kind</i>. “I do not suppose that
+<i>will</i> and <i>desire</i> are words of precisely the same
+signification: <i>will</i> seems to be a word of a more general
+signification, extending to things present and absent.
+<i>Desire</i> respects something absent. But yet I cannot think
+they are so entirely distinct that they can ever be properly said
+to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills anything
+contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his
+will. The thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he
+does not will a thing and desire the <i>contrary</i> in any
+particular.� (p. 17.) The immediate object of will,—that object,
+in respect of which choice manifests itself by producing
+effects,—is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme
+desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object
+which appears most desirable; and the object which appears most
+desirable is always the object chosen. To produce an act of
+choice, therefore, we have only to awaken a preponderating
+desire. Now it is plain, that desire cannot be distinguished from
+passion. That which we love, we desire to be present, to possess,
+to enjoy: that which we hate, we desire to be absent, or to be
+affected in some way. The loving an object, and the desiring its
+enjoyment, are identical: the hating it, and desiring its absence
+or destruction, or any similar affection of it, are likewise
+identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished, at
+least in <i>kind</i>, from the emotions and passions: this will
+appear abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly
+identifies them: “I humbly conceive, that the affections of the
+soul are not properly distinguishable from the will; as though
+they were two faculties of soul.� (Revival of Religion in New
+England, part I.)</p>
+<p class="pns">“God has endued the soul with two faculties: one
+is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or
+by which it discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is
+called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the
+soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is in some way
+inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either
+is inclined <i>to them</i>, or is disinclined or averse <i>from
+them</i>. This faculty is called by various names: it is
+sometimes called <i>inclination</i>; and as it has respect to the
+actions that are determined or governed by it, is called will.
+The <i>will</i> and the <i>affections</i> of the soul are not two
+faculties: the affections are not essentially distinct from the
+will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and
+inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and
+sensibleness of exercise.� (The Nature of the Affections, part
+I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the
+understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and
+the passions, is fully settled by the above quotation.</p>
+<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. II.—<span class=
+"sc">Concerning the Determination of Will</span>.�</p>
+<p class="pt1">Meaning of the term.</p>
+<p class="pn">“By <i>determining</i> the will, if the phrase be
+used with any meaning, must be intended, <i>causing</i> that the
+act of the will or choice should be thus and not otherwise; and
+the will is said to be determined, when in consequence of some
+action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon,
+some particular object. As when we speak of the determination of
+motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a
+direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will
+supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be
+determined, there is a determiner.�</p>
+<p class="pns">Now the causation of choice and the determination
+of the will are here intended to be distinguished, no more than
+the causation of motion and the determination of the moving body.
+The cause setting a body in motion, likewise gives it a
+direction; and where there are several causes, a composition of
+the forces takes place, and determines both the extent and
+direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the will
+or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its
+direction; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also
+conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen,
+the direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is
+determined. And where there are several causes acting upon the
+will, there is here likewise a composition of the mental forces,
+and the choice or the determination of the will takes place
+accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice or volition then being an effect
+must have a cause. What is this cause?</p>
+<p class="pt1">Motive.</p>
+<p class="pns">The cause of volition or choice is called motive.
+A cause setting a body in motion is properly called the motive of
+the body; hence, analogously, a cause exciting the will to choice
+is called the motive of the will. By long usage the proper sense
+of motive is laid aside, and it has come now to express only the
+cause or reason of volition. “By <i>motive</i> I mean the whole
+of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition,
+whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And
+when I speak of the <i>strongest motive</i>, I have respect to
+the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular
+act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone,
+or of many together.� And “<i>that motive which, as it stands in
+view of the mind, is the strongest, determines the will</i>.� (p.
+19.) This is general, and means nothing more than—1. the cause of
+volition is called motive; 2. that where there are several causes
+or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3. the
+cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the
+cause, if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered
+in their co-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive “stands
+in view of the mind,� that is, it is something which the mind
+knows or is sensible of.</p>
+<p class="pt1">What constitutes the strength of Motive?</p>
+<p class="pns">“Everything that is properly called a motive,
+excitement, or inducement, to a perceiving, willing agent, has
+some sort and degree of <i>tendency</i> or <i>advantage</i> to
+move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of
+will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call
+the <i>strength</i> of the motive.� When different objects are
+presented to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear
+more or less “inviting.� (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once
+produced, we perceive their “tendency or advantage to move or
+excite the will.� It is a preference or choice anticipated, an
+instantaneous perception of a quality in the object which we feel
+would determine our choice, if we were called upon to make a
+choice. The object is felt to be adapted to the state of the
+mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are felt to
+be reciprocal.</p>
+<p class="pt1">What is this quality which makes up the previous
+tendency?</p>
+<p class="pns">“Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an
+intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and
+influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or
+viewed <i>as good</i>; nor has it any tendency to engage the
+election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such.�
+Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as
+the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the
+previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as
+the highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the
+strongest motive; therefore, it follows that the “<i>will is
+always as the greatest apparent good is</i>.� (p. 20.)</p>
+<p class="pt1"><i>The sense in which the term</i> “<span class=
+"sc">good</span>� <i>is used</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">“I use the term <i>‘good’</i> as of the same import
+with <i>‘agreeable.’</i> To appear <i>good</i> to the mind, as I
+use the phrase, is the same as to <i>appear agreeable</i>, or
+<i>seem pleasing</i> to the mind. If it tends to draw the
+inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of
+that which <i>suits</i> the mind. And therefore that must have
+the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it
+stands in the mind’s view, suits it best, and pleases it most;
+and in that sense is the greatest apparent good. The word
+<i>good</i> in this sense includes the avoiding of evil, or of
+that which is disagreeable and uneasy.� (p. 20.)</p>
+<p class="pn">It follows then that the will is always determined
+by that which <i>seems most pleasing or appears most
+agreeable</i> to the mind.</p>
+<p class="pn">This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the
+position with which Edwards set out: that will is always as the
+preponderating desire; indeed, that the will is the same in kind
+with desire, or with the affections; and an act of will or
+choice, nothing more than the strongest desire in reference to an
+immediate object, and a desire producing an effect in our mental
+or physical being. The determination of will is the strongest
+excitement of passion. That which determines will is the cause of
+passion. The strength of the cause lies in its perceived tendency
+to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As possessing this
+tendency, it is called <i>good</i>, or <i>pleasing</i>, or
+<i>agreeable</i>; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the
+condition of the affections.</p>
+<p class="pns">The <i>“good�</i> which forms the characteristic
+of a cause or motive is an immediate good, or a good “in the
+present view of the mind.� (p. 21.) Thus a drunkard, before he
+drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each other the present
+pleasure of drinking and the remote painful consequences; and the
+painful consequences may appear to him to be greater than the
+present pleasure. But still the question truly in his mind, when
+he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only; and
+if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. “If he wills
+to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his
+will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most
+agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain,
+then refraining is the immediate object of his will, and is most
+pleasing to him.� The reasoning is, that when the drunkard
+drinks, we are not to conclude that he has chosen future misery
+over future good, but that the act of drinking, in itself, is the
+object of choice; so that, in the view he has taken of it, it is
+to him the greatest apparent good. In general we may say, in
+accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of choice
+takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in
+such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the
+moment, and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent
+good. The man thus never chooses what is disagreeable, but always
+what is agreeable to him.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Proper use of the term <span class="sc">most
+agreeable</span>, in relation to the Will.</p>
+<p class="pns">“I have chosen rather to express myself thus,
+<i>that the will always is as the greatest apparent good</i>, or
+<i>as what appears most agreeable</i>, than to say the will is
+<i>determined by</i> the greatest apparent good, or by what seems
+most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind,
+and the mind’s preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict
+propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said,
+that the <i>voluntary action</i>, which is the immediate
+<i>consequence</i> of the mind’s choice, is determined by that
+which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself.� (p. 21,
+22.) Here <i>the perception or sense of the most agreeable</i> is
+identified in express terms with <i>volition</i> or
+<i>choice</i>. “The will is as the most agreeable,�—that is,
+<i>the determination of will</i>, which means <i>its actual
+choice</i>, as a fact of the consciousness is embraced in the
+<i>sense of the most agreeable;</i> and as the <i>voluntary
+action</i>, or the action, or change, or effect, following
+volition, in any part of our being,—as to walk, or talk, or read,
+or think,—has its cause in the volition, or the “mind’s
+choice,�—so it is entirely proper to say, either that this
+voluntary action is determined by the volition or that it is
+determined by the sense of the most agreeable. Edwards’s meaning
+plainly is, that the terms are convertible: volition may be
+called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the most
+agreeable may be called the cause. This is still a carrying out
+of the position, that <i>the will is as the desire</i>. “The
+greatest apparent good� being identical with “the most
+agreeable,� and this again being identical with <i>the most
+desirable</i>, it must follow, that whenever, in relation to any
+object, the mind is affected with <i>the sense of the most
+agreeable</i>, it presents the phenomenon of “volition� or
+“choice;� and still farther, that which is chosen is the most
+agreeable object; and is known to be such by the simple fact that
+it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more than that
+it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,—and the
+most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise
+than chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more
+than that it is the object of the mind’s choice or sense of the
+most agreeable. The object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive
+or willing power, are correlatives, and choice is the unition of
+both: so that if we regard choice as characterizing the object,
+then the object is affirmed to be the most agreeable; and if, on
+the other side, we regard choice as characterizing the mind, then
+the mind is affirmed to be affected with the sense of the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">“Volition itself is always determined by that in or
+about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to appear
+most agreeable. I say <i>in or about the mind’s view of the
+object;</i> because what has influence to render an object in
+view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed,
+but also the manner of the view, and the <i>state and
+circumstances</i> of the mind that views.� (p. 22.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Choice being the unition of the mind’s sensitivity
+and the object,—that is, being an affection of the sensitivity,
+by reason of its perfect agreement and correlation with the
+object, and of course of the perfect agreement and correlation of
+the object with the sensitivity, in determining the cause of
+choice, we must necessarily look both to the mind and the object.
+Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in relation to
+each.</p>
+<p class="pn">I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most
+agreeable, or choice, will depend upon,—</p>
+<p class="pn">1. The beauty of the object, “viewing it as it is
+<i>in itself</i>,� independently of circumstances.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. “The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble
+attending the object, or <i>the consequence</i> of it,� or the
+object taken with its “concomitants� and consequences.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. “The apparent <i>state</i> of the pleasure or
+trouble that appears with respect to <i>distance of time</i>. It
+is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure
+speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed.� (p. 22.)</p>
+<p class="pn">II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness
+will depend, first, upon the <i>manner</i> of the mind’s view;
+secondly, upon the state of mind. Edwards, under the first,
+speaks of the object as connected with future pleasure. Here the
+manner of the mind’s view will have influence in two
+respects:</p>
+<p class="pn">1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind
+judges to attach to the pleasure;</p>
+<p class="pn">2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the
+imagination, which the mind has of it.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now these may be in different degrees, compounded
+with different degrees of pleasure, considered in itself; and
+“the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a
+degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the
+judgement, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of
+that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has
+of that good.� (p. 23.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Secondly: In reference to objects generally,
+whether connected with present or future pleasure, the sense of
+agreeableness will depend also upon “the <i>state of the mind</i>
+which views a proposed object of choice.� (p. 24.) Here we have
+to consider “the particular temper which the mind has by nature,
+or that has been introduced or established by education, example,
+custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind
+is in on a particular occasion.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary
+to consider the <i>state of the mind</i> as a ground of
+agreeableness distinct from the two already mentioned: viz.—the
+<i>nature and circumstances of the object</i>, and the <i>manner
+of the view</i>. “Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter,�
+he remarks, “the different temper and state of the mind makes no
+alteration as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way,
+than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently;
+<i>beautiful</i> or <i>deformed</i>, having apparent pleasure or
+pain attending them; and as it occasions the <i>manner</i> of the
+view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity,
+pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.� (ibid.) In
+this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind
+and object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of
+the two, choice is. The <i>state of the mind</i> is manifested
+only in relation to <i>the nature and circumstances of the
+object;</i> and the sense of agreeableness being in the
+correlation of the two, <i>the sense of the most agreeable</i> or
+<i>choice</i> is such a perfect unition of the two, that, having
+described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation
+to <i>the most agreeable</i>, we have comprehended in this the
+<i>state of mind</i>. On the other hand, the nature and
+circumstances of the object, in relation to the most agreeable,
+can be known only by the state of mind produced by the presence
+of the object and its circumstances. To give an example,—let a
+rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and agreeableness
+of this object, I describe the <i>state of mind</i> in relation
+to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the
+sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in
+philosophical language, called the <i>secondary</i> qualities of
+the object: and so, on the other hand, if I describe my
+sensations and emotions in the presence of the rose, I do in fact
+describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind and object are
+thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not have this
+sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object is
+presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they
+seem to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of
+the most agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way.
+The only difference between the agreeable simply and the most
+agreeable is this: the agreeable refers merely to an emotion
+awakened on the immediate presentation of an object, without any
+comparison or competition. The most agreeable takes place where
+there is comparison and competition. Thus, to prefer or choose a
+rose above a violet is a sense of the most agreeable of the two.
+In some cases, however, that which is refused is positively
+disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these
+cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every
+instance of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating
+the act of choosing itself in the contrast of positive and
+negative, the phrase <i>most agreeable</i> or <i>greatest
+apparent good</i> is convenient for general use, and sufficiently
+precise to express every case which comes up.</p>
+<p class="pn">It may be well here to remark, that in the system
+we are thus endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word
+<i>choice</i> is properly used to express the action of will,
+when that action is viewed in relation to its immediate
+effects,—as when I say, I choose to walk. <i>The sense of the
+most agreeable</i>, is properly used to express the same action,
+when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice
+and volition are the words in common use, because men at large
+only think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But
+when the cause of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind,
+and is supposed to lie in the nature and circumstances of mind
+and object, then the <i>sense of the most agreeable</i> becomes
+the most appropriate form of expression.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of
+the most agreeable, by remarking: “However, I think so much is
+certain,—that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned,
+is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner
+which has been explained.� This is the great principle of his
+system; and, a few sentences after, he states it as an axiom, or
+a generally admitted truth: “There is scarcely a plainer and more
+universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than
+that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they
+do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.�
+Indeed, Edwards cannot be considered as having attempted to prove
+this; he has only explained it, and therefore it is only the
+<i>explanation</i> of a supposed axiom that we have been
+following out.</p>
+<p class="pn">This supposed axiom is really announced in the
+first section: “Will and desire do not run counter at all: the
+thing which he wills, the very same he desires;� that is, a man
+wills as he desires, and of course wills what is most agreeable
+to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the title of part I. runs
+as follows: “Wherein are explained and stated various terms and
+things, &amp;c.� Receiving it, therefore, as a generally admitted
+truth, “that choice or volition is always as the most agreeable,�
+and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is the
+explanation given?</p>
+<p class="pn">1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a
+faculty distinct from the affections or passions, or that part of
+our being which philosophers sometimes call the sensitivity.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being
+at any given moment and under any given circumstances the
+strongest inclination, or the strongest affection and desire with
+regard to an immediate object, appears in the constitution of our
+being as the antecedent of effects in the mind itself, or in the
+body; which effects are called voluntary actions,—as acts of
+attention, or of talking, or walking.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. To say that volition is as the desire, is
+equivalent to saying that volition is as the “greatest apparent
+good,� which again means only the most agreeable,—so that the
+volition becomes again the <i>sense or feeling of the greatest
+apparent good</i>. There is in all this only a variety of
+expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.</p>
+<p class="pn">4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the
+production in the mind of volition, or choice, or the strongest
+affection, or the sense of the most agreeable, or of the greatest
+apparent good. It is therefore an effect, and must have a
+determiner or cause.</p>
+<p class="pns">5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In
+explaining what constitutes the motive, we must take into view
+both <i>mind</i> and <i>object</i>. The object must be perceived
+by the mind as something existent. This perception, however, is
+only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the object to the
+mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable, or
+choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to
+each other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess
+qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must
+possess a susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the
+object. But to say that the object possesses qualities of beauty
+and agreeableness to the mind, is in fact to affirm that the mind
+has the requisite susceptibility; for these qualities of the
+object have a being, and are what they are only in relation to
+mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may therefore be
+called the unition of the sensitivity and the object. Choice is
+thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually appearing
+in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and, indeed,
+being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be
+accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being.
+But inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in
+relation to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for
+its manifestations by referring them to the objects and
+circumstances in connexion with which they take place, and
+without which they would not take place; and thus, as we say, the
+cause of passion is the object of passion: so we say also, in
+common parlance, the cause of choice is the object of choice; and
+assigning the affections of the mind springing up in the presence
+of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its qualities, we
+say that choice is always as the most beautiful and agreeable;
+that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest apparent
+good, thus <i>objectively</i> described, is the motive, or
+determiner, or cause of volition.</p>
+<p class="pt1">In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of
+the Understanding.</p>
+<p class="pns">“It appears from these things, that in some sense
+<i>the will always follows the last dictate of the
+understanding</i>. But then the understanding must be taken in a
+large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or
+apprehension, and not merely what is called <i>reason</i> or
+<i>judgement</i>. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant
+what reason declares to be best, or most for the person’s
+happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true
+that the will always follows the last dictate of the
+understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different
+matter from things appearing now most <i>agreeable</i>, all
+things being put together which relates to the mind’s present
+perceptions in any respect.� (p. 25.) The “large sense� in which
+Edwards takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual
+and sensitive being. In the production of choice, or the sense of
+the most agreeable, the suggestions of reason may have their
+influence, and may work in with other particulars to bring about
+the result; but then they are subject to the same condition with
+the other particulars,—they must appear, at the moment and in the
+immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is not enough
+that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must
+likewise <i>suit the state of the mind</i>,—for as choice is the
+sense of the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to
+awaken this sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the
+feelings of the subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not
+agreeably related, “the act of the will is determined in
+opposition to it.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. III.—<span class="sc">Concerning
+the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability,
+&amp;c. and of Contingence</span>.�</p>
+<p class="pn">After having settled his definition of choice or
+volition, and explained the cause of the same, Edwards takes up
+the nature of the connexion between this cause and effect: viz.
+motive and volition. Is this connexion a necessary connexion?</p>
+<p class="pn">In order to determine this point, and to explain
+his view of it, he proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms
+contained in the above title. This section is entirely occupied
+with this preliminary discussion.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity
+as understood in the common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as
+understood in the philosophical or metaphysical use.</p>
+<p class="pn">1. In common use, <i>necessity</i> “is a relative
+term, and relates to some supposed opposition made to the
+existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome or proves
+insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word <i>impossible</i> is
+manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power
+exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient for the
+effect. The word <i>unable</i> is relative, and has relation to
+ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word
+<i>irresistible</i> is relative, and has reference to resistance
+which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to
+an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder
+the effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility
+implies <i>something that frustrates endeavour or
+desire</i>.�</p>
+<p class="pn">He then distinguishes this necessity into
+<i>general and particular</i>. “Things are necessary <i>in
+general</i>, which are or will be, notwithstanding any supposable
+opposition, from whatever quarter:� e. g. that God will judge the
+world.</p>
+<p class="pn">“Things are necessary <i>to us</i> which are or
+will be, notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case
+<i>from us</i>.� This is <i>particular</i> necessity: e. g. any
+event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions “about liberty
+and moral agency,� the word is used especially in a particular
+sense, because we are concerned in these discussions <i>as
+individuals</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">According to this <i>common use</i> of necessity in
+the <i>particular</i> sense, “When we speak of any thing
+necessary <i>to us</i>, it is with relation to some supposable
+opposition <i>to our wills;</i>� and “a thing is said to be
+necessary� in this sense “when we cannot help it, do what <i>we
+will</i>.� So also a thing is said to be <i>impossible to us</i>
+when we cannot do it, although we make the attempt,—that is, put
+forth the volition; and <i>irresistible to us</i>, which, when we
+put forth a volition to hinder it, overcomes the opposition: and
+we are <i>unable</i> to do a thing “when our supposable desires
+and endeavours are insufficient,�—are not followed by any effect.
+In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not
+considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are
+considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own
+effects: e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain
+man can raise a certain weight,—if it be affirmed that it is
+<i>impossible</i> for him to raise it, that he has not the
+<i>ability</i> to raise it, and that the weight will
+<i>necessarily</i> keep its position,—no reference whatever is
+made to the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but
+solely to the connexion between the <i>volition</i> and the
+<i>raising of the weight</i>. Now Edwards remarks, that this
+common use of the term necessity and its cognates being habitual,
+is likely to enter into and confound our reasonings on subjects
+where it is inadmissible from the nature of the case. We must
+therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)</p>
+<p class="pn">2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity
+is not a <i>relative</i>, but an <i>absolute term</i>. In this
+use necessity applies “in cases wherein no insufficient will is
+supposed, or can be supposed; but the very nature of the supposed
+case itself excludes any opposition, will, or endeavour.� (ibid.)
+Thus it is used “with respect to God’s existence before the
+creation of the world, when there was no other being.�
+“<i>Metaphysical</i> or <i>philosophical</i> necessity is nothing
+different from certainty,—not the certainty of knowledge, but the
+certainty of things in themselves, which is the foundation of the
+certainty of knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the
+infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.
+Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and
+fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject and
+predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true;
+and in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following
+discourse, when I endeavour to prove <i>that necessity is not
+inconsistent with liberty</i>.� (p. 27, 28, 29.)</p>
+<p class="pn">“The subject and predicate of a proposition which
+affirms the existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and
+certain connexion, in several ways.�</p>
+<p class="pn">“1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion
+<i>in and of themselves</i>. So God’s infinity and other
+attributes are necessary. So it is necessary, <i>in its own
+nature</i>, that two and two should be four.�</p>
+<p class="pn">2. The subject and predicate of a proposition,
+affirming the existence of something which is already come to
+pass, are fixed and certain.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may
+be fixed and certain <i>consequentially</i>,—and so the existence
+of the things affirmed may be “consequentially necessary.�
+“Things which are <i>perfectly connected</i> with the things that
+are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of
+consequence.� This is logical necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">“And here it may be observed, that all things which
+are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be
+said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way,�—that
+is, “by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own
+nature, or something that already is or has been. This is the
+necessity which especially belongs to controversies about acts of
+the will.� (p. 30.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Philosophical necessity is <i>general</i> and
+<i>particular.</i> 1. “The existence of a thing may be said to be
+necessary with a <i>general</i> necessity, when all things
+considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its
+existence.� This is unconditional necessity in the strictest
+sense.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. <i>Particular</i> necessity refers to “things
+that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which, no
+will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which,
+whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in
+general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any
+volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the
+will about the affair.� (p. 31.) This particular necessity is
+absolute to the individual, because his will has nothing to do
+with it—whether it be absolute or not in the general sense, does
+not affect his case.</p>
+<p class="pns">“What has been said to show the meaning of terms
+<i>necessary</i> and <i>necessity</i>, may be sufficient for the
+explaining of the opposite terms <i>impossible</i> and
+<i>impossibility</i>. For there is no difference, but only the
+latter are negative and the former positive.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pt1">Inability and Unable.</p>
+<p class="pns">“It has been observed that these terms in their
+original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as
+supposable in the case.� That is have relation to the connexion
+of volition with effects. “But as these terms are often used by
+philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies
+about free will, they are used in a quite different and far more
+extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or
+endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be
+supposed:� e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes
+or motives.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Contingent and Contingency.</p>
+<p class="pn">“Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to
+pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such
+words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents,
+according to the established course of things, is not discerned;
+and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. But the word,
+contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for
+that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern
+so as to foresee the event, but for something which has
+absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence
+has any fixed connexion.� (p. 31. 32.)</p>
+<p class="pns">Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent
+terms. In common use, contingency and chance are relative to our
+knowledge—implying that we discern no cause. In another use,—the
+use of a certain philosophical school,—he affirms that
+contingency is used to express absolutely no cause; or, that some
+events are represented as existing without any cause or ground of
+their existence. This will be examined in its proper place. I am
+now only stating Edwards’s opinions, not discussing them.</p>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+<span class="sc">Sec</span>. IV. <span class="sc">Of the
+Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and
+Inability</span>.</p>
+<p class="pn">We now return to the question:—Is the connexion
+between motive and volition necessary?</p>
+<p class="pn">The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use,
+does not relate to this question, for in that use as we have
+seen, it refers to the connexion between volition considered as a
+cause, and its effects. In this question, we are considering
+volition as an effect in relation to its cause or the motive. If
+the connexion then of motive and volition be necessary, it must
+be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical sense of the
+term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to
+characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section
+opens with the following distinction of philosophical necessity:
+“That necessity which has been explained, consisting in an
+infallible connexion of the things signified by the subject and
+predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the
+subjects of it, is distinguished into <i>moral</i> and
+<i>natural</i> necessity.� He then appropriates <i>moral
+philosophical necessity</i> to express the nature of the
+connexion between motive and volition: “And sometimes by moral
+necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and
+<i>consequence</i> which arises from <i>moral causes</i>, as the
+strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which
+there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions
+and actions. And it is in <i>this</i> sense that I use the phrase
+<i>moral necessity</i> in the following discourse.� (p. 32.)
+Natural <i>philosophical</i> necessity as distinguished from
+this, he employs to characterize the connexion between natural
+causes and phenomena of our being, as the connexion of external
+objects with our various sensations, and the connexion between
+truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)</p>
+<p class="pn">In employing the term <i>moral</i>, however, he
+does not intend to intimate that it affects at all the
+absoluteness of the necessity which it distinguishes; on the
+contrary, he affirms that “moral necessity may be as absolute as
+natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly
+connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is
+with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such
+a thing as a <i>sure</i> and <i>perfect</i> connexion between
+moral causes and effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and
+perfect connexion,) is what I call by the name of <i>moral
+necessity</i>.� (p. 33.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Nor does he intend “that when a moral habit or
+motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows,
+this is not owing to the <i>nature of things!</i>� But these
+terms, moral and natural, are convenient to express a difference
+which really exists; a difference, however, which “does not lie
+so much in the nature of the <i>connexion</i> as in the two terms
+<i>connected</i>.� Indeed, he soon after admits “that choice in
+<i>many cases</i> arises from nature, as truly as other events.�
+His sentiment is plainly this choice lies in the great system and
+chain of nature as truly as any other phenomenon, arising from
+its antecedent and having its consequents or effects: but we have
+appropriated nature to express the chain of causes and effects,
+which lie without us, and which are most obvious to us; and
+choice being, “as it were, a new principle of motion and action,�
+lying within us, and often interrupting or altering the external
+course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation. (p.
+34.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by
+justifying his reduction of motive and volition under
+philosophical necessity. “It must be observed, that in what has
+been explained, as signified by the name of <i>moral
+necessity</i>, the word <i>necessity</i> is not used according to
+the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed
+before, such terms, <i>necessary, impossible, irresistible,</i>
+&amp;c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always
+relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary
+opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such
+opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the
+case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination
+and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a
+will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the
+same individual will to oppose itself in its present act; or the
+present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice:
+as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same
+moving body at the same time. And therefore the very case
+supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or
+resisting will can overcome this necessity.� (p. 35.)</p>
+<p class="pns">This passage is clear and full. Common necessity,
+or necessity in the original use of the word, refers to the
+connexion between volition and its effects; for here an
+opposition to will is supposable. I may choose or will to raise a
+weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour overcomes it, and
+I find it <i>impossible</i> for me to raise it, and the weight
+<i>necessarily</i> remains in its place. In this common use of
+these terms, the <i>impossibility</i> and the <i>necessity</i>
+are <i>relative</i> to my volition; but in the production of
+choice itself, or volition, or the sense of the most agreeable,
+there is no reference to voluntary endeavour. Choice is not the
+cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of as struggling with
+itself in its own production. The cause of volition does not lie
+within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition,
+therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could
+not be made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities
+and habits, is supposed to be placed within the influence of
+objects and their circumstances, and the choice takes place in
+the correlation of the two, as the sense of the most agreeable.
+Now choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no
+choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence,
+therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavour; it
+comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute necessity of
+cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone which
+is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at
+given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste,
+and feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense
+are brought together. The application of the epithet <i>moral</i>
+to the necessity of volition, evidently does not alter in the
+least the character of that necessity. It is still philosophical
+and absolute necessity, and as sure and perfect as natural
+necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits, (p. 33;)
+affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and
+natural necessity is a mere difference in the “two terms
+connected,� and not a difference “<i>in the nature of the
+connexion</i>.�</p>
+<p class="pt1">Natural and moral inability.</p>
+<p class="pn">“What has been said of natural and moral necessity,
+may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral
+<i>inability</i>. We are said to be <i>naturally</i> unable to do
+a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most
+commonly called <i>nature</i> does not allow of it, or because of
+some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will;
+either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body,
+or external objects.� (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour
+to know something, and may find ourselves <i>unable</i>, through
+a defect of the understanding. We may make a voluntary effort
+<i>to do</i> something by the instrumentality of our hand, and
+may find ourselves unable through a defect of the bodily
+constitution; or external objects may be regarded as presenting
+such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert. This is
+natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be remarked
+too, that this is <i>inability</i> not <i>metaphysically</i> or
+<i>philosophically</i> considered, and therefore not
+<i>absolute</i> inability; but only inability in the common and
+vulgar acceptation of the term—a relative inability, relative to
+volition or choice—an inability to do, although we will to
+do.</p>
+<p class="pn">What is moral inability? “Moral inability consists
+not in any of these things; but either in the want of
+inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the
+want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act
+of will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or
+both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said, in one
+word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of
+inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a
+thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary
+motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the
+want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary
+inclination, in such circumstances and under the influence of
+such views.� (bid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The inability in this case does not relate to the
+connexion between volition and its consequents and effects;
+<i>but to the production of the volition itself</i>. Now the
+inability to the production of a volition, cannot be affirmed of
+the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist, and as an
+effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The inability,
+therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the
+motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the <i>state of the
+mind</i>, and in the <i>nature and circumstances of the
+object;</i> and choice or volition exists when, in the
+correlation of mind and object, the sense of the most agreeable
+is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any given case, why
+the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not produced? Why
+simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind and
+object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the
+deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and
+object—that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not
+<i>in a state</i> to be agreeably impressed by the object, and
+the object does not possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness
+to the mind. On the part of the mind, there is either a want of
+inclination to the object, or a stronger inclination towards
+another object: on the part of the object, there is a want of
+interesting and agreeable qualities to the <i>particular
+state</i> of mind in question, or a <i>suitableness</i> to a
+different state of mind: and this constitutes “the want of
+sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will,
+or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary.� And both
+these may clearly be resolved into one, that above mentioned,
+viz, a want of inclination on the part of the mind to the object,
+and a stronger inclination towards another object; or, as Edwards
+expresses it, “the opposition or want of inclination.� For a want
+of inclination to one object, implying a stronger inclination to
+another object, expresses that the <i>state of the mind</i>, and
+the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not
+correlated; but that the <i>state of mind</i>, and the nature and
+circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is
+a “want of sufficient motives;� the second, stronger “motives to
+the contrary.� Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of
+volition; volition, therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for
+this would suppose an effect to modify its cause, and that too
+before the effect itself has any existence. Moral inability is a
+<i>metaphysical</i> inability: it is the perfect and fixed
+impossibility of certain laws and principles of being, leading to
+certain volitions; and is contrasted with <i>physical
+inability</i>, which is the established impossibility of a
+certain volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that
+<i>moral ability</i> is the certain and fixed connexion between
+certain laws and principles of being, and volitions; and is
+contrasted with <i>natural</i> ability, which is the established
+connexion between certain volitions and certain effects.</p>
+<p class="pn">Moral inability, although transcending the sphere
+of volition, is a <i>real inability</i>. Where it exists, there
+is the absolute impossibility of a given volition,—and of course
+an absolute impossibility of certain effects coming to pass by
+that volition. The impossibility of water freezing above an
+established temperature, or of boiling below an established
+temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of effects
+coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of
+the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie
+“in the nature of the connexion,� but “in the two terms
+connected.�</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards gives several instances in illustration of
+moral inability.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A woman of great honour and chastity may have a
+moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave.� (ibid.)
+There is no correlation between <i>the state of her mind</i> and
+<i>the act</i> which forms the object contemplated,—of course the
+sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot take place; and
+while the state of her mind remains the same, and the act and its
+circumstances remain the same, there is, on the principle of
+Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to the
+consequents of the choice.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A child of great love and duty to his parents, may
+be thus unable to kill his father.� (ibid.) This case is similar
+to the preceding.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A very lascivious man, in case of certain
+opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and
+such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust.�
+There is here a correlation between <i>the state of mind</i> and
+the <i>object</i>, in its <i>nature and circumstances</i>,—and of
+course the sense of the most agreeable or choice takes place.
+There is a <i>moral ability</i> to the choice, and a <i>moral
+inability</i> to forbear, or to choose the opposite.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may
+be unable to forbear taking strong drink.� (ibid.) This is
+similar to the last.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A very malicious man may be unable to exert
+benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea,
+some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they
+may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem
+and affection.� (ibid.) The <i>state of mind</i> is such,—that
+is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all
+correlated to the great duty of loving one’s neighbour as one’s
+self,—or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense
+of the most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind
+it is absolutely impossible that it should be produced. “A strong
+habit of virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral
+inability to love wickedness in general.� (p. 36.) “On the other
+hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under
+an inability to love and choose holiness, and render him
+<i>utterly unable</i> to love an infinitely Holy Being, or to
+choose and cleave to him as the chief good.� (ibid.) The love and
+choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation of
+the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is
+<i>utterly impossible</i> when this correlation does not exist.
+Where a moral inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure
+and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject
+of it has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed
+to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this
+effect; but this would be an evil volition, and by supposition
+the individual has no ability to evil volitions.</p>
+<p class="pns">Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing
+can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual
+who is the subject of it, has absolutely no power to alter it. If
+he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a
+volition to this effect; but this would be a good volition, and
+by supposition the individual has no ability to good
+volitions.</p>
+<p class="pt1">General and habitual, particular and occasional
+Inability.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first consists “in a fixed and habitual
+inclination, or an habitual and stated defect or want of a
+certain kind of inclination.� (p. 36.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The second is “an inability of the will or heart to
+a particular act, through the strength or defect of present
+motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the
+understanding, <i>on this occasion</i>.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober,
+on some <i>particular occasion</i> getting drunk, are instances
+of general and particular inability. In the first instance, the
+<i>state</i> of the man’s mind has become correlated to the
+object; under all times and circumstances <i>it is fixed</i>. In
+the second instance, the <i>state</i> of the man’s mind is
+correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions
+and under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the
+choice is necessary,—“it not being possible, in any case, that
+the will should at present go against the motive which has now,
+all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it.�</p>
+<p class="pn">“Will and endeavour against, or diverse from
+<i>present</i> acts of the will, are in no case supposable,
+whether those acts be <i>occasional</i> or <i>habitual</i>; for
+that would be to suppose the will at present to be otherwise than
+at present it is.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The passage which follows deserves particular
+attention. It may be brought up under the following question:</p>
+<p class="pn">Although will cannot be exerted against present
+acts of the will, yet can present acts of the will be exerted to
+produce future acts of the will, opposed to present habitual or
+present occasional acts?</p>
+<p class="pn">“But yet there may be will and endeavour against
+<i>future</i> acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to
+take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction, to
+suppose that the acts of the will at one time may be against the
+act of the will at another time; and there may be desires and
+endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such
+desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered insufficient
+and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns,
+the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition.�
+(p. 37.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The
+choice or volition to drink is the fixed correlation of his
+disposition and the strong drink. But we may suppose that his
+disposition can be affected by other objects likewise: as the
+consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife and
+children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When
+his cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and
+loathing, these considerations may awaken at the time the sense
+of the most agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of
+drunkenness, and to form resolutions of amendment; but when the
+appetite and longing for drink returns, and he comes again in the
+way of indulgence, then these considerations, brought fairly into
+collision with his habits, are overcome, and drinking, as the
+most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.</p>
+<p class="pn">“But it may be comparatively easy to make an
+alteration with respect to such future acts as are only
+<i>occasional</i> and <i>transient</i>; because the occasional or
+transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or
+avoided.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">In the case of occasional drunkenness, for
+instance, the habitual correlation is not of mind and strong
+drink, but of mind and considerations of honour, prudence, and
+virtue. But strong drink being associated on some occasion with
+objects which are correlated to the mind, as hospitality,
+friendship, or festive celebrations,—may obtain the mastery; and
+in this case, the individual being under no temptation from
+strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with
+the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are
+opposed to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not
+come again into circumstances to give it an adventitious
+advantage. The repetition of occasional drunkenness would of
+course by and by produce a change in the sensitivity, and
+establish an habitual liking for drink. “On this account, the
+moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the
+name of <i>inability</i>. And then, as the will may remotely and
+indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of
+strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and
+its resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the
+case, also, when the acts arise from strong habit.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pns">In every act of the will, the will at the moment
+is unable to act otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true,
+that a man, at the moment of his acting, must act as he does act;
+but as we usually characterize men by the habitual state of their
+minds, we more especially speak of moral inability in relation to
+acts which are known to have no correlation to this habitual
+state. This habitual state of the mind, if it be opposed to
+reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason itself,
+can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the
+most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual
+disposition or sensitivity is opposed to it.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Common usage with respect to the phrase
+<span class="sc">want of power</span> or <span class=
+"sc">inability</span> to act in a certain way.</p>
+<p class="pn">“But it must be observed concerning <i>moral
+inability</i>, in each kind of it, that the word <i>inability</i>
+is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The
+word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it;
+and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or
+inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said
+to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said,
+<i>according to the ordinary use of language</i>, that a
+malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his
+hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour
+a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so
+strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. <i>In the strictest
+propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it
+in his choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said
+to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will</i>.�
+(ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Men, in the common use of language, and in the
+expression of their common and generally received sentiments,
+affirm that an individual has any thing in his power when it can
+be controlled by volition. Their connexion of power does not
+arise from the connexion of volition with its cause, but from the
+conception of volition as itself a cause with its effects. Thus
+the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike, having for its
+antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking, having for
+its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common usage
+of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to
+strike or not to strike. Now as it is “improperly said that he
+cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on
+the will, it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is
+unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is
+more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he
+will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he
+<i>cannot</i> will if he <i>does</i> will: and, in this case, not
+only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he
+will, but the very willing is the doing.� (ibid.)</p>
+<p class="pn">It is improper, according to this, to say that a
+man cannot do a thing, when nothing is wanting but an act of
+volition; for that is within our power, as far as it can be
+within our power, which is within the reach of our volition.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is still more improper to say that a man is
+unable to exert the acts of the will themselves, or unable to
+produce volitions. To say that a man has power to produce
+volitions, would imply that he has power to will volitions; but
+this would make one volition the cause of another, which is
+absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause
+of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has
+ability to produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to
+represent the man as <i>unable</i>, in any particular case, to
+produce volitions, for this would imply that in other cases he is
+able. Nay, the very language is self-contradictory. If a man
+produce volitions, he must produce them by volitions; and if in
+any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce volitions; then
+this inability must arise from a want of connexion between the
+volition by which the required volition is aimed to be produced,
+and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is
+unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will <i>if
+he will</i>—a proposition which grants the very point it assumes
+to deny. “The very willing is the doing,� which is required.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards adopts what he calls the “original� and
+“proper,� meaning of power, and ability, as applied to human
+agents, and appearing, “in the ordinary use of language,� as the
+legitimate and true meaning. In this use, power, as we have seen,
+relates only to the connexion of volition with its consequents,
+and not to its connexion with its antecedents or motives. Hence,
+in reference to the human agent, “to ascribe a non-performance to
+the want of power or ability,� or to the want of motives, (for
+this is plainly his meaning,) “is not just,� “because the thing
+wanting,� that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the
+agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, “is
+not a being <i>able</i>,� that is, a having the requisite
+motives, or the moral ability, “but a being <i>willing</i>, or
+the act of volition, itself. To the act of volition, or the fact
+of ‘being willing,’� there is no facility of mind or capacity of
+nature wanting, but only a disposition or state of mind adapted
+to the act; but with this, the individual can have no concern in
+reference to his action, because he has all the ability which can
+be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he
+will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral
+inability to do a thing—that is the motive may be wanting which
+causes the volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the
+thing to be done; but still if it is true that there is such a
+connexion between the volition and the thing to be done, that the
+moment the volition takes place the thing is done; then,
+according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be able to do it
+with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.</p>
+<p class="pns">We can exert power only by exerting will, that is
+by putting forth volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert
+power over those motives which are themselves the causes of our
+volitions. We are not <i>unable</i> to do anything in the proper
+and original and legitimate use of the word when, for the want of
+motive, we are not the subjects of the volition required as the
+immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but we are
+<i>unable</i> in this use when, although the volition be made;
+still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are
+conscious of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion
+between our actual volitions and their objects.</p>
+<p class="pns">“<span class="sc">Sec</span>. V. <span class=
+"sc">Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral
+Agency</span>.�</p>
+<p class="pn">What is liberty? “The plain and obvious meaning of
+the words <i>freedom</i> and <i>liberty</i>, in common speech, is
+<i>power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he
+pleases</i>. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance,
+or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any way as he
+wills. And the <i>contrary</i> to liberty, whatever name we call
+it by, is a person’s being hindered or unable to conduct as he
+will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise.� (p. 38.) Again,
+“That power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will,
+or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without
+taking into the meaning of the word, anything of the <i>cause</i>
+of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have
+such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive,
+or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some
+internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a
+cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something
+foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice
+any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to
+hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly
+free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.� (p.
+39.)</p>
+<p class="pn">This is Edwards’s definition of liberty, and he has
+given it with a clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an
+amplification, which renders it impossible to mistake his
+meaning.</p>
+<p class="pns">Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion
+between volition and its cause or motive. Liberty relates solely
+to the connexion between the volition and its objects. He is free
+in the only true and proper sense, who, when he wills, finds no
+impediment between the volition and the object, who wills and it
+is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey: he wills to talk,
+and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and express
+sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his
+tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not
+be free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he
+would not be free. If there should be anything preventing the
+volition from taking effect, he would not be free.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Of what can the attribute of Liberty be
+affirmed?</p>
+<p class="pn">From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, “It
+will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor
+its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but
+that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called
+will. For that which is possessed of no <i>will</i>, cannot have
+any power or opportunity of doing <i>according to its will</i>,
+nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be
+restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of
+liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the <i>very will
+itself</i>, is not to speak good sense; for the <i>will
+itself</i>, is not an agent that has <i>a will</i>. The power of
+choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the
+power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of
+volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who is
+possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed
+of.� (p. 38.)</p>
+<p class="pns">Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the
+agent is the spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the
+power or capacity of choice, and his liberty consists as we have
+seen in the unimpeded connexion between the volitions produced in
+him and the objects of those volitions. Hence, <i>free will</i>
+is an objectionable phrase. <i>Free agent</i> is the proper
+phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and whose
+choice reaches effects.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Moral Agent.</p>
+<p class="pn">“A <i>moral agent</i> is a being that is capable of
+those actions that have a <i>moral</i> quality, and which can
+properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous
+or vicious, commendable or faulty.� (p. 39.)</p>
+<p class="pn">In what lies the capability of actions having a
+moral quality?</p>
+<p class="pn">“To moral agency belongs a <i>moral faculty</i>, or
+sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or
+worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a
+capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by
+moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of the
+understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to
+moral faculty.� (p. 40.)</p>
+<p class="pn">A moral agent is a being who can perform moral
+actions, or actions which are subject to praise or blame. Now the
+same action may be committed by a man or by a brute—and the man
+alone will be guilty: why is the man guilty? Because he has a
+moral sense or perception by which he distinguishes right and
+wrong: the brute has no such sense or perception. The man having
+thus the power of perceiving the right and wrong of
+actions—actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated to
+him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or,
+we may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of
+a reason and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the
+capacity of having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind
+as to form motives and produce volitions. We might define a man
+of taste in the fine arts in a similar way; thus,—a man of taste
+is an agent who has the power of distinguishing beauty and
+ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to beauty that the
+sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The only
+difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter,
+the sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty
+perceived; while in the former, the right perceived does not
+always produce this sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most
+agreeable is often produced by the wrong, in opposition to the
+decisions of reason and conscience.</p>
+<p class="pn">I have now completed the statement of Edwards’s
+system, nearly in his own words, as contained in part I. of his
+work. The remarks and explanations which have been thrown in, I
+hope will serve to make him more perfectly understood. This end
+will be still more fully attained by presenting on the basis of
+the foregoing investigation and statement, a compend of his
+psychological system, independently of the order there pursued,
+and without largely introducing quotations, which have already
+been abundantly made.</p>
+<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em;font-size:117%">
+COMPEND OF EDWARDS’S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.</p>
+<p class="pn">I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1.
+The intellectual—called reason or understanding. 2. The active
+and feeling—called will or affections.</p>
+<p class="pn">II. The relation of these to each other. The first
+precedes the second in the order of exercise. The first perceives
+and knows objects in their qualities, circumstances, and
+relations. The second experiences emotions and passions, or
+desires and choices, in relation to the objects perceived.</p>
+<p class="pn">III. Perception is necessary. When the
+understanding and its objects are brought together, perception
+takes place according to the constituted laws of the
+intelligence.</p>
+<p class="pn">IV. The acts of will or the affections are
+necessary. When this faculty of our being and its objects are
+brought together, volition or choice, emotions, passions, or
+desires take place, according to the constituted nature and laws
+of this faculty.</p>
+<p class="pn">The objects and this faculty are correlates. In
+relation to the object, we may call this faculty subject. When
+subject and object are suited to each other, that is, are
+agreeable, affections are produced which we call pleasant; when
+they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable, affections take
+place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in relation
+to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces
+accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the perfection and harmony of our being, this
+correspondence is universal; that is, what is known to be
+agreeable is felt to be pleasant;—what is known to be
+disagreeable is felt to be painful. But, in the corruption of our
+being, this is reversed in respect of moral objects. Although
+what is right is known to be agreeable, that is, suited to us, it
+is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to be
+unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that
+pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as
+synonymous terms. The distinction I have here made is at least
+convenient in describing the same objects as presented to the
+understanding and to the will.</p>
+<p class="pn">V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices,
+are thus produced in the correlation of subject, that is the
+will, and the object. In assigning the causes of these
+affections, we may refer to the nature of the will, which is
+such, as to receive such and such affections when in the presence
+of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects, and
+say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such
+and such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at
+once, and say that the affections arise from the state of the
+mind, and from the nature and circumstances of the object.</p>
+<p class="pn">VI. The affections of the will stand connected with
+changes or effects in other parts of our being, as stated
+antecedents. First, they stand thus connected with muscular
+action,—as walking, talking, striking, resisting, &amp;c.
+Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental operations,—as
+fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and
+investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the
+memory.</p>
+<p class="pn">VII. The affections of the will, when thus
+connected with effects in other parts of our being, have a
+peculiar and striking characteristic. It is this: that the effect
+contemplated takes place at the moment it appears the most
+agreeable,—the greatest apparent good; which, as Edwards uses
+these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect contemplated
+produces the most pleasant affection,—the most intense sense of
+the agreeable,—it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most
+pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a
+particular subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the
+constitution and law of our being. The play of the different
+parts is reciprocal. Perception must bring up the objects, and
+the affections of will immediately follow. The most agreeable are
+dwelt upon by the mind, and perception again takes place
+particularly with regard to these; and according as objects
+affect the will, do all the activities of our being come
+forth.</p>
+<p class="pn">VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can
+be easily explained by this system:—<i>Choice</i> is the sense or
+the affection of the most pleasant and agreeable.
+<i>Preference</i> is its synonyme, with scarcely a shade of
+difference. They both have respect to the <i>act of
+selection</i>. <i>Volition</i> is another name for this affection
+of will, and is used more particularly in relation to effects or
+changes following the affection. <i>Desire</i> is a nascent
+choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment, is choice.
+<i>Emotion</i> is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to
+the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the
+first sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with
+respect to certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment
+possible in relation to them,—for example, the emotion of
+sublimity, produced by an object which can hold no other relation
+to us. But then the sublimity of the object may be the motive
+which causes the choice of gazing at it; that is, it connects
+this act of contemplation with the sense of the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Passion</i> is emotion accompanied by desire in
+reference to other relations with the object. Thus the emotion of
+beauty awakened by a flower may be accompanied by the desire of
+possessing it; and if this desire becomes the strongest desire at
+the moment, then the passion has the characteristic which makes
+it choice, and some corresponding effects take place in order to
+possess it,—as walking towards it, stretching out the hand,
+&amp;c.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>The determination of will</i> is the production
+or causation of choice. It is used in reference to the immediate
+and particular choice, in opposition to all other choices.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>The will itself</i> is the capacity of being
+affected by objects with emotion, passion, and desire,—and with
+that form of passion which we call the sense of the most
+agreeable or choice, and which is connected with effects or
+consequents as their stated antecedent.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>The motive</i> is the cause of choice, and is
+complex. It lies in the nature and susceptibilities of the will,
+and in the nature and circumstances Of the object chosen.</p>
+<p class="pn">IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is,
+what reason commands may seem disagreeable to the will, and of
+course reason cannot be obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when
+her commands produce the sense of the most agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are
+opposed in reference to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute
+of the man—the human soul. The man is free when his volitions or
+choices are unimpeded,—when, upon choosing to walk, he walks,
+&amp;c. The man is not free, or is under necessity, when his
+volitions or choices are impeded,—when, upon choosing to walk, he
+finds his legs bound or paralysed, &amp;c. Then it is
+<i>impossible</i> for him to walk,—then he has <i>no liberty</i>
+to walk,—then he is under a <i>necessity</i> of remaining in one
+place.</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity in any other use is <i>metaphysical</i>
+or <i>philosophical</i> necessity, and is applied out of the
+sphere of the will: as the necessity of truth, the necessity of
+being,—the necessary connexion of cause and effect. Hence,</p>
+<p class="pn">The <i>connexion</i> between volitions or choices,
+or the sense of the most agreeable with the motive or cause, is
+<i>necessary</i> with a philosophical necessity. The necessity of
+volitions in reference to motives is also called <i>moral</i>
+necessity. This term <i>moral</i> is given, not in reference to
+the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the <i>terms</i>
+connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings
+are thus distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly
+call <i>natural</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A
+<i>natural</i> agent is that which produces effects without
+volition. A <i>moral</i> agent is one producing effects by
+volitions, accompanied with an intellectual perception of the
+volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a sense of
+desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account of
+the volitions and their effects.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Brutes</i> or irresponsible beings are agents
+that have volitions, but have no reason to perceive right and
+wrong, and consequently have no sense of desert; and as they
+cannot perceive right and wrong, they cannot be made the subjects
+of moral appeals and inducements.</p>
+<p class="pn">XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the
+possession of reason; secondly, from the capacity of choice;
+thirdly, from natural ability.</p>
+<p class="pn">Natural ability exists when the effect or act
+commanded to be accomplished has an established connexion with
+volition or choice. Thus we say a man has natural ability to
+walk, because if he chooses to walk, he walks. Natural ability
+differs from freedom only in this:—The first refers to an
+established connexion between volitions and effects. The second
+refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting
+forces from between volitions and effects.</p>
+<p class="pn">Hence a man is <i>naturally unable</i> to do
+anything when there is no established connexion between volition
+and that thing. A man is naturally unable to push a mountain from
+its seat. He has no <i>liberty</i> to move his arm when it is
+bound.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Moral inability</i> is metaphysical or
+philosophical inability. Philosophical inability in general
+refers to the impossibility of a certain effect for the want of a
+cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there is a philosophical
+inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the decay of old
+age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have no
+cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a
+philosophical inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons
+weight with a pine lath, and by the hand of a single man, because
+we have not an adequate cause. <i>Moral inability</i> relates to
+the connexion between motives and volitions in distinction from
+natural ability, which relates to the connexion between volitions
+and actions consequent upon them: but the term moral as we have
+seen, does not characterize the nature of the
+<i>connexion</i>,—it only expresses the <i>quality</i> of
+<i>terms connected</i>. Hence <i>moral</i> inability, as
+philosophical inability, is the impossibility of a certain
+volition or choice for the want of a motive or cause, or an
+adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical inability of
+Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive or
+cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral
+philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for
+fifty dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive
+is not adequate to produce a volition to such an act.</p>
+<p class="pn">Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute
+in respect of us, because beyond the sphere of our volition.</p>
+<p class="pn">XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness
+or guilt, apply only to volitions. This indeed is not formally
+brought out in the part of Edwards’s work we have been examining.
+His discussion of it will be found in part IV. sec. I. But as it
+is necessary to a complete view of his system, we introduce it
+here.</p>
+<p class="pn">He remarks in this part, “If the essence of
+virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault,
+does not lie in the nature of the disposition or acts of the
+mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their
+cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for
+instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the
+nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad
+nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from
+some faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in
+us that is our fault, &amp;c.� (page 190.) “Disposition of mind,�
+or inclination,—“acts of the mind,� “acts of will,� here
+obviously mean the same thing; that is, they mean volition or
+choice, and are distinguished from their cause or motive. The
+question is not whether the cause or motive be pure or impure,
+but whether our virtuousness or viciousness lie in the cause of
+our volition, or in the volition itself. It plainly results from
+Edwards’s psychology, and he has himself in the above quotation
+stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the volition
+itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is
+volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of
+doing or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our
+volitions that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for
+evil-doing. If these volitions are in accordance with conscience
+and the law of God, they are right; if not, they are wrong, and
+we are judged accordingly. The <i>metaphysical</i> questions, how
+the volition was produced, and what is the character of the
+cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are questions
+which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our
+personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with
+this:—Do <i>we</i> do right? do <i>we</i> do wrong? What is the
+<i>nature of our volitions?</i></p>
+<p class="pn">Nor does the <i>necessary connexion</i> between the
+motives and the volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the
+praiseworthiness of the volitions. We are blameworthy or
+praiseworthy according to the character of the volitions in
+themselves, considered and judged according to the rule of right,
+without considering how these volitions came to exist. The last
+inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind,
+and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral
+agency, responsibility, and duty.</p>
+<p class="pn">And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for
+doing or not doing external actions, so far only as these actions
+are naturally connected with volitions, as sequents with their
+stated antecedents. If the action is one which ought to be done,
+we are responsible for the doing of it, if we know that upon our
+willing it, it will be done; although at this very moment there
+is no such correlation between the action and the will, as to
+form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act of
+willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done,
+we are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to
+will it, it would not be done; although at this very moment there
+is such a correlation between the action, and the state of the
+will, as to form the cause or motive by which the act of willing
+comes necessarily to exist. The metaphysical or philosophical
+inquiry respecting the correlation of the state of the will and
+any action, or respecting the want of such a correlation, is
+foreign to the question of duty and responsibility. This question
+relates only to the volition and its connexion with its
+consequents.</p>
+<p class="pns">This does not clash at all with the common
+sentiment that our actions are to be judged of by our motives;
+for this sentiment does not respect volitions in relation to
+their cause, but external actions in relation to the volitions
+which produce them. These external actions may be in themselves
+good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force or
+power may have come in between the volition and its object, and
+changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an
+event different from the will or intention; although being in
+connexion with the agent, it may still be attributed to his will:
+or the immediate act which appears good, may, in the mind of the
+agent be merely part of an extended plan or chain of volitions,
+whose last action or result is evil. It is common, therefore, to
+say of an external action, we must know what the man intends,
+before we pronounce upon him; which is the same thing as to say
+we must know what his volition really is, or what his motive
+is—that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but the
+volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause
+of these effects;—which again, is the same thing as to say, that
+before we can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what
+effects he really intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it
+is which is really connected in his mind with the sense of the
+most agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Edwards and Locke.</p>
+<p class="pn">Their systems are one: there is no difference in
+the principle. Edwards represents the will as necessarily
+determined so does Locke. Edwards places liberty in the unimpeded
+connexion of volition with its stated sequents—so does Locke.</p>
+<p class="pn">They differ only in the mode of developing the
+necessary determination of will. According to Locke, desire is in
+itself a necessary modification of our being produced in its
+correlation with objects; and volition is a necessary consequent
+of desire when excited at any given moment to a degree which
+gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at that moment. “The
+greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that is
+constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in
+its choice of the next action.� (book 2. ch. 21, § 40.) According
+to Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty,
+and the strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that
+moment.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards’s analysis is more nice than Locke’s, and
+his whole developement more true to the great principle of the
+system—necessary determination. Locke, in distinguishing the will
+from the desire, seems about to launch into a different
+psychology, and one destructive of the principle.</p>
+<h1><a name="Consequences" id="Consequences">II.</a></h1>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">THE
+LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS’S SYSTEM.</p>
+<p class="pnn">T<span class="sc">hese</span> consequences must, I
+am aware, be deduced with the greatest care and clearness. The
+deduction must be influenced by no passion or prejudice. It must
+be purely and severely logical—and such I shall endeavour to make
+it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has himself
+made.</p>
+<p class="pn">I. There is no self-determining power of will, and
+of course no liberty consisting in a self-determining power.</p>
+<p class="pn">A self-determining power of will is a supposed
+power, which will has to determine its own volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of
+desire, emotion, or passion.</p>
+<p class="pn">Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of
+the most agreeable at any given moment.</p>
+<p class="pn">Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of
+the will, or sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature
+and circumstances of the object.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now, if the will determined itself, it would
+determine its own state, in relation to objects. But to determine
+is to act, and therefore, for the will to determine is for the
+will to act; and for the will to determine itself, is for the
+will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the will is a
+volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to create
+a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this
+antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same
+way. We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an
+indefinite series of volitions, without any first volition;
+consequently we shall have no self-determiner after all, because
+we can arrive at no first determiner, and thus the idea of
+self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again, we shall have
+effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of the case
+never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are
+thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the
+negative of cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can
+question. If Edwards’s psychology be right, and if
+self-determination implies a will to will, or choosing a choice,
+then a self-determining power is the greatest absurdity
+possible.</p>
+<p class="pn">II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that
+God can exercise a perfect control over his intelligent
+creatures, or administer perfectly a moral government consisting
+in the influence of motives.</p>
+<p class="pn">To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in
+reference to required determinations. And when an individual is
+removed from the motives adapted to his state of mind, the
+Almighty Providence can so order events as to bring him into
+contiguity with the motives.</p>
+<p class="pn">If the state of mind should be such that no motives
+can be made available in reference to a particular determination,
+it is dearly supposable that he who made the soul of man, may
+exert a direct influence over this state of mind, and cause it to
+answer to the motives presented. Whether there are motives
+adapted to every state of mind, in reference to every possible
+determination required by the Almighty Lawgiver, so as to render
+it unnecessary to exert a direct influence over the will, is a
+question which I am not called upon here to answer. But in either
+case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute,
+fore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as
+well as the physical world; and the election of a certain number
+to eternal life, and the making of this election sure, are
+necessary and plain consequences of this system. And as God is a
+being all-wise and good, we may feel assured in connexion with
+this system, that, in the working out of his great plan, whatever
+evil may appear in the progress of its developement, the grand
+consummation will show that all things have been working together
+for good.</p>
+<p class="pn">III. It is plainly deducible from this system that
+moral beings exert an influence over each other by the
+presentation of motives. And thus efforts may be made either to
+the injury or benefit of society.</p>
+<p class="pns">IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of
+responsibility, the consciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and
+consequently the expectation of punishment or reward, connect
+themselves simply with the nature of the mere fact of
+volition.—that is, if this is a true and complete representation
+of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon the mere
+fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly
+independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go
+forth.</p>
+<p class="pn">Thus we may view the system in relation both to God
+and to man.</p>
+<p class="pn">In relation to God. It makes him supreme and
+absolute—foreseeing and fore-determining, and bringing everything
+to pass according to infinite wisdom, and by the energy of an
+infinite will.</p>
+<p class="pn">In relation to man. It shuts him up to the
+consideration of the simple fact of volition, and its connexion
+as a stated or established antecedent with certain effects. He is
+free to accomplish these effects, because he can accomplish them
+if he will. He is free to forbear, because he can forbear if he
+will. It is affirmed to be the common judgement of men, and of
+course universally a fact of consciousness, that an individual is
+fully responsible for the doing of anything which ought to be
+done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a volition:
+that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong,
+because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and
+to be rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by
+his volition. In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from
+right-doing on the plea of <i>moral inability;</i> this is
+<i>metaphysical</i> inability, and transcends the sphere of
+volition. He can do it if he will—and therefore he has all the
+ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but
+a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can
+do nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore
+that which goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and
+impossible to his effort.</p>
+<p class="pn">In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for
+wrong-doing on the ground of moral <i>necessity</i>. This
+<i>moral necessity</i> is <i>metaphysical</i> necessity, and
+transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne to do
+wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been
+wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of
+evil, anything with which the agent has any concern, and for
+which he is under any responsibility, but the volition. By his
+volitions simply is he to be tried. No court of justice, human or
+divine, that we can conceive of, could admit the plea—“I did not
+the good because I had not the will to do it,� or “I did the evil
+because I had the will to do it.� “This is your guilt,� would be
+the reply of the judge, “that you had no will to do the good—that
+you had a will to do the evil.�</p>
+<hr style="width:6em;margin-top:1.7em;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+<p class="pn">We must now take up a different class of
+deductions. They are such as those abettors of this system who
+wish to sustain the great interests of morality and religion do
+not make, but strenuously contend against. If however they are
+logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against them. I am
+conscious of no wish to <i>force</i> them upon the system, and do
+most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge
+for himself, but let him judge <i>thoughtfully</i> and
+<i>candidly</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and
+unconditional necessity, particular and general.</p>
+<p class="pn">1. A particular necessity—a necessity absolute in
+relation to the individual.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is granted in the system, that the connexion of
+motive and volition is necessary with an absolute necessity,
+because this precedes and therefore is not within the reach of
+the volition. So also, the state of mind, and the nature and
+circumstances of the object in relation to this state, forming a
+correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent upon a cause,
+beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make its
+motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive,
+and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first
+cause. Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are
+related by an absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the
+effect of motive, being necessary also with an absolute
+necessity, the only place for freedom that remains, if freedom be
+possible, is the connexion of volition and effects, internal and
+external. And this is the only place of freedom which this system
+claims. But what new characteristic appears in this relation?
+Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and sequents? I
+will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will to
+sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established
+antecedent to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to
+think on a certain subject, I think on that subject. The volition
+of selecting a subject, and the volition of attending to it, are
+stated antecedents to that mental operation which we call
+thought. We have here only another instance of cause and effect;
+the relation being one as absolute and necessary as any other
+relation of cause and effect. The curious organism by which a
+choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces muscular
+movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual
+man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause
+beyond the sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which
+connects volition with thinking is also pre-established, and
+beyond the sphere of volition. As the volition itself appears by
+an absolute necessity in relation to the individual man, so also
+do the stated sequents or effects of volition appear by an
+absolute necessity in relation to him.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is true, indeed, that the connexion between
+volition and its objects may be interrupted by forces coming
+between, or overcome by superior forces, but this is common to
+cause and effect, and forms no peculiar characteristic; it is a
+lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome by a greater.
+Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force does not
+prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still be
+necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the
+truth in respect of volition, according to this system. The
+volition could have no being without a motive, and when the
+motive is present it must have a being, and no sooner does it
+appear than its effects follow, unless impeded. If impeded, then
+we have two trains of causes coming into collision, and the same
+necessity which brought them together, gives the ascendency to
+the one or the other.</p>
+<p class="pn">It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion,
+that necessity, absolute and unconditional, as far at least as
+the man himself is concerned, reigns in the relation of volition
+and its effect, if the volition itself be a necessary existence.
+All that precedes volition is necessary; volition itself is
+necessary. All that follows volition is necessary: Humanity is
+but a link of the inevitable chain.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. General necessity—a necessity absolute, in
+relation to all being and causality, and applicable to all
+events.</p>
+<p class="pn">An event proved to be necessary in relation to an
+individual—is this event likewise necessary in the whole train of
+its relations? Let this event be a volition of a given
+individual; it is necessary in relation to that individual. Now
+it must be supposed to have a connexion by a chain of sequents
+and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take any
+particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that
+antecedent and sequent, in its particular place and relations,
+can be proved necessary in the same way that the volition is
+proved necessary in its particular place and relations; that is,
+the antecedent being given under the particular circumstances,
+the sequent must follow. But the antecedent is linked by like
+necessity to another antecedent, of which it is the sequent; and
+the sequent is linked by like necessity to another sequent, of
+which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole chain, from the
+given necessary volition up to the first cause, is necessary. We
+come therefore at last to consider the connexion between the
+first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is
+this a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded
+as a volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will
+the first sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that
+sequent should appear. But the volition itself cannot really be
+the first antecedent or cause, because volition or choice, from
+its very nature, must itself have a determiner or antecedent.
+What is this antecedent? The motive:—for self-determination, in
+the sense of the will determining itself, would involve the same
+absurdities on this system in relation to God as in relation to
+man; since it is represented as an absurdity in its own nature—it
+is determining a volition by a volition, in endless
+retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine
+volition, what is the nature of the connexion between the motive
+and the volition? It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for
+there is nothing to render it otherwise, save the divine will.
+But the divine will cannot be supposed to do this, for the motive
+is already taken to be the ground and cause of the action of the
+divine will. The necessity which applies to volition, in the
+nature of the case must therefore apply to the divine volition.
+No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the divine will,
+except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and
+goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the
+divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This
+Edwards expressly affirms—“If God’s will is steadily and surely
+determined in everything by <i>supreme</i> wisdom, then it is in
+everything <i>necessarily determined</i> to that which is
+<i>most</i> wise.� (p. 230.) That the universe is governed by
+infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought, and is
+abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a
+government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most
+excellent government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be
+contended for. Let us not, however, wander from the question, and
+in representing it as the government of wisdom, forget that it is
+a government of necessity, and that absolute. The volition,
+therefore, with which we started, is at last traced up to a
+necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final cause; for
+here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.</p>
+<p class="pn">What we have thus proved in relation to one
+volition, must be equally true in reference to every other
+volition and every other event, for the reasoning must apply to
+every possible case. Every volition, every event, must be traced
+up to a first and final cause, and this must be necessary and
+infinite wisdom.</p>
+<p class="pn">II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that
+every volition or event is both necessary, and necessarily the
+best possible in its place and relations.</p>
+<p class="pn">The whole system of things had its origin in
+infinite and necessary wisdom. All volitions and events have
+their last and efficient cause in infinite and necessary wisdom.
+All that has been, all that is, all that can be, are connected by
+an absolute necessity with the same great source. It would be the
+height of absurdity to suppose it possible for any thing to be
+different from what it is, or to suppose that any change could
+make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute
+necessity,—and all that is, is just what and where infinite
+wisdom has made it, and disposed of it.</p>
+<p class="pn">III. If that which we call evil, in reality be
+evil, then it must be both necessary evil and evil having its
+origin in infinite wisdom. It is in vain to say that man is the
+agent, in the common acceptation of the word; that he is the
+author, because the particular volitions are his. These volitions
+are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried back to the
+one great source of all being and events. Hence,</p>
+<p class="pn">IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every
+volition which appears in him, appears by an absolute
+necessity,—and it cannot be supposed to be otherwise than it is.
+Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only the perception of
+the difference between right and wrong, and the conviction that
+the right ought to be done, but the possession of a power to do
+the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition is
+fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual
+be supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does,
+nor, all things considered, can it be supposed there could have
+been, at that precise moment and in that precise relation, any
+other volition. The volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite
+and necessary wisdom. We cannot escape from this difficulty by
+perpetually running the changes of—“He can if he will,�—“He could
+if he would,�—“There is nothing wanting but a will,�—“He has a
+natural ability,� &amp;c. &amp;c. Let us not deceive ourselves,
+and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by these words, “he
+can if he will�! but he cannot if he don’t will. The will is
+wanting,—and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot
+appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be
+obtained? The man cannot change one volition for another. By
+supposition, he has not the moral or metaphysical ability,—and
+yet this is the only ability that can produce the new volition.
+It is passing strange that the power upon which volition is
+absolutely dependent, should be set aside by calling it
+<i>metaphysical</i>,—and the man blamed for an act because the
+consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the
+necessary consequent of this power! The man is only in his
+volition. The volition is good or bad in itself. The cause of
+volition is none of his concern, because it transcends volition.
+He can if he will. That is enough for him! But it is not enough
+to make him blameable, when whether he will or not depends not
+only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the antecedent
+itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.</p>
+<p class="pn">I am not now disputing the philosophy. The
+philosophy may be true; it may be very good: but then we must
+take its consequences along with it; and this is all that I now
+insist upon.</p>
+<p class="pn">V. It is another consequence of this system, that
+there can be nothing evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and
+goodness are the highest form of moral perfection, as indeed
+their very names imply, then all the necessary consequences of
+these must partake of their nature. Infinite wisdom and goodness,
+as principles, can only envelope parts of themselves. It would be
+the destruction of all logic to deny this. It would annihilate
+every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be said that
+infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what is
+essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do
+transgress this law, still this cannot affect what is said above.
+The promulgation of the law was a necessary developement of
+infinite wisdom; and the volition which transgresses it is a
+developement of the same nature. If this seems contradictory, I
+cannot help it. It is drawn from the system, and the system alone
+is responsible for its conclusions.</p>
+<p class="pn">If it should be replied here, that every system
+must be subject to the same difficulty, because if evil had a
+beginning, it must have had a holy cause, inasmuch as it could
+not exist before it began to exist,—I answer, this would be true
+if evil is the <i>necessary</i> developement of a holy cause. But
+more of this hereafter.</p>
+<p class="pn">VI. The system of Edwards is a system of
+utilitarianism. Every volition being the sense of the most
+agreeable, and arising from the correlation of the object and the
+sensitivity; it follows that every motive and every action comes
+under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of gratification
+or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no collision
+between principle and passion, because principle can have no
+power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most
+agreeable. Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain
+sway only by uniting with desire, and thus coming under
+conditions of yielding the highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and
+benevolence, when obeyed, therefore, are not obeyed as such, but
+simply as the most agreeable; and so also injustice, falsehood,
+and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most
+agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as the quality
+of all motive and the universal principle of the determinations
+of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We may
+indeed <i>speculate</i> respecting these distinctions,—we may say
+that justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in
+itself; but this judgement has practical efficiency only as one
+of the terms takes the form of the most agreeable. But we have
+seen that the most agreeable depends upon the state of the
+sensitivity in correlation with the object,—a state and a
+correlation antecedent to action; and that therefore it is a
+necessary law of our being, to be determined by the greatest
+apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not
+only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of
+action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that
+we can act.</p>
+<p class="pn">VII. It follows from this system, again, that no
+individual can make an effort to change the habitual character of
+his volitions,—and of course cannot resist his passions, or
+introduce any intellectual or moral discipline other than that in
+which he is actually placed, or undertake any enterprise that
+shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged, or not part
+or consequent of the same.</p>
+<p class="pn">If he effect any change directly in the habitual
+character of his volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is,
+he must will different from his actual will,—his will must oppose
+itself in its own act: but this is absurd, the system itself
+being judge. As, therefore, the will cannot oppose itself, a new
+volition can be obtained only by presenting a new motive; but
+this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is to call up
+new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state of
+the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering
+under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself
+must be changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a
+change must take place both of subject and object, for the motive
+lies in the correlation of the two. But the volition to call up
+new objects and circumstances in relation to some principle of
+the mind that had been slumbering,—for example, fear, must itself
+have a motive; but the motive to call up objects of fear must
+preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then of necessity
+the volition to call up objects of fear will take place; and, it
+will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the
+actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such
+motive pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a
+new motive, to cause the choice of objects of fear; and here
+would be a recurrence of the original difficulty,—and so on, ad
+infinitum.</p>
+<p class="pn">If the problem be to effect a change in the state
+of the mind in relation to existing objects, in the first place,
+this cannot be effected by a direct act of will, for the act of
+will is caused by the state of mind, and this would be an effect
+changing or annihilating its cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">Nor can it be done indirectly. For to do it
+indirectly, would be to bring influences to bear upon the state
+of mind or the sensitivity; but the choice and volition of these
+influences would require a motive—but the motive to change the
+state of mind must pre-exist in the state of mind itself. And
+thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility of finding
+a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its
+change. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a
+change, but a new developement of the long chain of the necessary
+causes and volitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we
+must find a motive to change the state of mind in order to a
+change of the state: but this motive, if it exist, must pre-exist
+in the state of mind. If it pre-exist, then no change is
+required; if it do not; then we must seek still an antecedent
+motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the problem be to
+change both subject and object, the same difficulties exist in
+two-fold abundance.</p>
+<p class="pn">The grand difficulty is to find a <i>primum
+mobile</i>, or first mover, when the very act of seeking implies
+a <i>primum mobile</i>, which the conditions of the act deny.</p>
+<p class="pn">Any new discipline, therefore, intellectual or
+moral, a discipline opposite to that which the present state of
+the mind would naturally and necessarily bring about, is
+impossible.</p>
+<p class="pn">Of course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to
+deny or mortify one’s self. The present volition is as the
+strongest present desire—indeed, is the strongest present desire
+itself. “Will and desire do not run counter at all.� “A man never
+in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or
+desires anything contrary to his will.� (p. 17.) Hence to
+restrain a present passion would be to will against will—would be
+to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may be
+relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome
+the weaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the
+man; it is utterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance,
+for his whole power, activity, and volition, are in the desire
+itself.</p>
+<p class="pn">He can do nothing but will; and the nature and
+direction of his volitions are, at least in reference to any
+effort of his own, immutable as necessity itself.</p>
+<p class="pn">VIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call
+upon the man to bestir himself, to think, to plan, to act, are
+inconsistent and absurd. In all such exhortations and
+persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth volitions, as
+if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It may be
+replied, ‘that the man does will, that the volitions are his
+volitions.’ But then he wills only passively, and these volitions
+are his only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort
+and persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his
+real condition according to this system? The exhortations and
+persuasions do themselves contain the motive power: and instead
+of arousing himself to action, he is absolutely and necessarily
+passive under the motives you present. Whether he be moved or
+not, as truly and absolutely depends upon the motives you
+present, as the removing of any material mass depends upon the
+power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether it be
+wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse
+itself as the man; and the man’s volition is his volition in no
+other sense than the motion of the material mass is its motion.
+In the one case, the man perceives; and in the other case, the
+material mass does not perceive—but perception is granted by all
+parties to be necessary; the addition of perception, therefore,
+only modifies the character of the being moved, without altering
+the nature of his relation to the power which moves him. In the
+material mass, too, we have an analogous property, so far as
+motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine the will
+unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power
+move the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of
+parts. If I have but the wisdom to discover the proper
+correlation of object and sensitivity in the case of individuals
+or of masses of men, I can command them in any direction I
+please, with a necessity no less absolute than that with which a
+machine is caused to work by the application of a steam or
+water-power.</p>
+<p class="pn">When I bring motives before the minds of my
+fellow-beings in the proper relation, the volition is necessarily
+produced; but let me not forget, that in bringing these motives I
+put forth volitions, and that of course I am myself moved under
+the necessity of some antecedent motive. My persuasions and
+exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as necessary
+antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the
+wheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and
+persuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must
+yield when the motives are properly selected.</p>
+<p class="pn">IX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when
+obeyed and yielded to, are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary
+force which they possess in relation to the state of mind to
+which they are addressed. When not obeyed and yielded to, they
+fail necessarily, through a moral inability on the part of the
+mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want of a proper
+correlation between them and the state of mind addressed: that
+is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the
+required volitions, and their existence of course is an utter
+impossibility.</p>
+<p class="pn">Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce
+volitions of obedience and submission, only as they produce the
+sense of the most agreeable; and as the will of the creature can
+have no part in producing this sense, since this would be
+producing a volition by a volition, it is produced in a
+correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a positive
+necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that
+no enlargement here is required.</p>
+<p class="pn">When no obedience and submission take place, it is
+because the divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, do not
+produce the sense of the most agreeable. And as the will of the
+creature can have no part in producing this sense, since this
+would be producing a volition by a volition; and as it is
+produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a
+positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have
+no part in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition
+of obedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations
+of the antecedent correlations of certain objects with the
+subject, and are necessarily determined by the nature of the
+correlation.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now the Divine Being must know the precise relation
+which his commands will necessarily hold to the vast variety of
+mind to which they are addressed, and consequently must know in
+what cases obedience will be produced, and in what cases
+disobedience. Both results are equally necessary. The commands
+have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a two-fold office. When
+they come into connexion with certain states of mind, they
+necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in
+connexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly
+produce what we call rebellion: and as all volitions are
+predetermined and fixed by a necessary and infinite wisdom, and
+are therefore in their time and place the best, it must follow
+that rebellion no less than obedience is a wise and desirable
+result.</p>
+<p class="pn">The consequences I am here deducing seem almost too
+shocking to utter. But show me, he that can, that they are not
+logical deductions from this system? I press the system to its
+consequences,—not to throw any reproach upon those great and good
+men who unfortunately were led away by a false philosophy, but to
+expose and bring to its close this philosophy itself. It has too
+long been consecrated by its association with the good. I know I
+shall be justified in the honest, though bold work, of destroying
+this unnatural and portentous alliance.</p>
+<p class="pn">X. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of
+retribution cannot, according to this system, have a real and
+necessary connexion with any volitions, but must be regarded as
+prejudices or errors of education, from which philosophy will
+serve to relieve us.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that
+virtue and vice lie essentially in the volitions themselves, and
+that of course the consciousness of evil volitions is the
+consciousness of guilt. I will, or put forth volitions. The
+volitions are mine, and therefore I am guilty. This reasoning is
+plausible, but not consequential; for, according to this system,
+I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the volitions appear
+necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my consciousness, and
+really are mine only because they are produced in me. Connected
+with this may be the perception that those volitions are wrong;
+but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary,
+and that to suppose them different from what they are, is to
+suppose what could not possibly have been,—since a series of
+sequents and antecedents connect these volitions which now
+appear, by absolutely necessary relations, with a first and
+necessary cause,—then the sense of guilt and shame, and the
+judgement I ought to be punished, can have no place in the human
+mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will, and, according to
+the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when I will
+wrong,—if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will
+under the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent
+motive. The common judgement of mankind is an error, and
+philosophy must soon dissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and
+of moral desert, which have hitherto annoyed me and made me
+fearful: and much more must such a result ensue, when I take into
+consideration, likewise, that the necessity which determines me,
+is a necessity which takes its rise in infinite and necessary
+wisdom.</p>
+<p class="pn">What is true of guilt and retribution is true also
+of well-doing and reward. If I do well, the volitions being
+determined by an antecedent necessity, I could not possibly have
+done otherwise. It does not answer the conditions of the case at
+all, to say I might have done otherwise, if I had willed to do
+otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am doing, is a
+will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in any
+action called good, great, noble, glorious, &amp;c. the
+conviction that the choice of this action was a necessary choice,
+predetermined in a long and unbroken chain of necessary
+antecedents, and the sense of praiseworthiness, and the judgement
+I ought to be rewarded, remain no longer.</p>
+<p class="pn">Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with
+our volitions, under the impression that the good we perform, we
+perform in opposition to temptation, and with the power and
+possibility of doing evil; and that the evil we perform, we
+perform in opposition to motives of good, and with the power and
+possibility of doing good. But when we are informed that all the
+power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual conduct
+is this,—that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there would
+have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the
+volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been
+otherwise,—we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We
+perhaps are first led to doubt the philosophy,—or if, by acute
+reasonings, or by the authority of great names, we are influenced
+to yield an implicit belief,—the sense of merit and demerit must
+either die away, or be maintained by a hasty retreat from the
+regions of speculation to those of common sense.</p>
+<p class="pn">XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature
+and spirit, as causes or agents, cannot be distinguished in their
+operations.</p>
+<p class="pn">There are three classes of natural causes or agents
+generally acknowledged 1. Inanimate,—as water, wind, steam,
+magnetism, &amp;c.; 2. Animate, but insensible,—as the life and
+affinities of plants; 3. Animate and sensitive, or brute animal
+power.</p>
+<p class="pn">These all properly come under the denomination of
+<i>natural</i>, because they are alike <i>necessitated</i>.
+“Whatever is comprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and
+effect, of course necessitated, and having its necessity in some
+other thing antecedent or concurrent,—this is said to be
+<i>natural</i>; and the aggregate and system of all such things
+is <i>nature</i>.� Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this
+system, comes under the same definition: in all its acts it is
+necessitated. It is in will particularly that man is taken as a
+cause or agent, because it is by will that he directly produces
+phenomena or effects; and by this system it is not possible to
+distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is considered, a chain
+of antecedents and sequents made up of motives, volitions, and
+the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents and
+antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of
+natural agents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and
+distinguishing characteristics; but in the relation of
+antecedence and sequence,—their relation as causes or agents
+producing effects,—no distinction can be perceived. Wind, water,
+&amp;c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms another; brute
+organization and sensitivity another; intelligent volition
+another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and
+therefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of
+nature. The difference which exists between them is a difference
+of terms merely. There is no difference in the nature of the
+relation between the terms. The nature of the relation between
+the water-wheel and the water,—of the relation between the
+organic life of plants and their developement,—of the relation
+between passion and volition in brutes,—of the relation between
+their efforts and material effects,—and the nature of the
+relation between motive and volition,—are one: it is the relation
+of cause and effect considered as stated antecedent and sequent,
+and no more and no less necessary in one subject than in
+another.</p>
+<p class="pn">XII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by
+external objects, and all emotions following perception, and all
+the acts of the intelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or
+in ratiocination, are as really our acts, and acts for which we
+are as really responsible, if responsibility be granted to exist,
+as acts of volition. Sensations, emotions, perceptions,
+reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in our consciousness;
+they are not created by our volitions, like the motions of the
+hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just as
+volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to
+all is precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of
+these affections of his being; he is simply the subject: the
+subject of sensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning,
+and of volition; and he is the subject of all by the same
+necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">XIII. The system of punishment is only a system
+accommodated to the opinions of society.</p>
+<p class="pn">There is nothing evil in itself, according to this
+system of necessity, as we have already shown. Every thing which
+takes place is, in its time, place, and relations generally, the
+necessary result of necessary and infinite wisdom. But still it
+is a fact that society are desirous of preventing certain
+acts,—such as stealing, adultery, murder, &amp;c.; and they are
+necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere
+collection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the
+emotion of fear, which prevent the commission of these acts.
+Where these acts do take place, it is best they should take
+place; but where they are prevented by the fear of punishment, it
+is best they should be prevented. Where the criminal suffers, he
+has no right to complain, because it is best that he should
+suffer; and yet, if he does complain, it is best that he should
+complain. The system of punishment is good, as every thing else
+is good. The system of divine punishments must be considered in
+the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when properly
+considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in the
+pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events.</p>
+<p class="pn">XIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there
+cannot really be any calamity. The calamities which we may at any
+time experience, we ought to endure and rejoice in, as flowing
+from the same perfect and necessary source. But as calamity does
+nevertheless necessarily produce suffering and uneasiness, and
+the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope that perfect
+relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that the
+final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the
+present suffering.</p>
+<p class="pn">The necessitarian may be an optimist of a high
+order. It he commits what is called crime, and remorse succeeds,
+and punishment is inflicted under law, the crime is good, the
+remorse is good, the punishment is good, all necessary and good,
+and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure happiness. Nothing
+can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but even this will
+probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all
+afflictions: they must be good in themselves, although
+disagreeable,—and will probably lead the way to the agreeable,
+just as hunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way
+to the enjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity,
+and of a necessary and perfect wisdom.</p>
+<p class="pn">XV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary
+and perfect wisdom, there really can no more be folly in conduct,
+or error in reasoning and belief, than there can be crime and
+calamity, considered as evils in themselves. Every act that we
+call folly is a necessary act, in its time, place, and relations
+generally, and is a necessary consequence of the infinite wisdom;
+but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom cannot be opposed
+to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when
+philosophically considered, ceases to be folly.</p>
+<p class="pn">In any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem
+necessary, and the assent of the mind is necessary. This is
+granted by all parties. But it must be admitted, that when men
+are said to reason falsely, and to yield their assent to false
+conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them; and, according
+to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem
+otherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary.</p>
+<p class="pn">The reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning,
+because it so necessarily seems to them; but to the individual to
+whom it seems different, it must really be different, and be good
+and valid reasoning.</p>
+<p class="pn">Again: as all these different reasonings and
+beliefs proceed necessarily from the same source, they must all
+be really true where they seem true, and all really false where
+they seem false. It would follow, from this, that no one can
+really be in a false position except the hypocrite and sophist,
+pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and what
+he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false
+conclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were
+we not compelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite
+and sophist cannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his
+position is a necessary one, predetermined in its necessary
+connexion with the first necessary wisdom.</p>
+<p class="pn">XVI. Another consequence of this system is
+fatalism,—or, perhaps, more properly speaking, the system is
+itself a system of fatalism.</p>
+<p class="pn">This, indeed, has already been made to appear
+substantially. The word, however, has not yet been used. I here,
+then, charge directly this consequence or feature upon the
+system.</p>
+<p class="pn">Fatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This
+system is fatalism, because it is the absolute negation of
+liberty.</p>
+<p class="pn">No liberty is contended for, in this system, in
+relation to man, but physical liberty: viz. that when he wills,
+the effect will follow,—that when he wills to walk, he walks,
+&amp;c. “Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power,
+opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases,
+or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure,
+without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is.� (p.
+291.)</p>
+<p class="pn">In the first place, this is no higher liberty than
+what brutes possess. They have power, opportunity, or advantage,
+to do as they please. Effects follow their volitions by as
+certain a law as effects follow the volitions of men.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the second place, this is no higher liberty than
+slaves possess. Slaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive
+be the lash, or the fear of the lash, still, in their case as
+well as in that of brutes under similar circumstances, the
+volition which takes place is the most pleasing at the moment.
+The slave and the animal do what is most pleasing to them, or do
+according to their pleasure, When the one drags the plough and
+the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal,
+rational or irrational, to act without doing what is most
+pleasing to him or it. Volition is always as the greatest
+apparent good, or as the sense of the most pleasant or
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">If any should reply that slaves and animals are
+<i>liable</i> to be fettered, and this distinguishes them from
+the free, I rejoin that every being is liable to various
+restraints; none of us can do many things which in themselves
+appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there were
+known to be an established connexion between them and our wills.
+We are limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us;
+we cannot overturn mountains, or command the winds. We are
+limited in the nature of our physical being. We are limited by
+our want of wealth, knowledge, and influence. In all these
+respects, we may, with as much propriety as the slave, be
+regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say that,
+as we never really will what we know to be impossible or
+impracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or
+a want of liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to
+the fettered slave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows
+it to be impossible. But in relation to him as well as to every
+other being, according to this system it holds true, that whether
+he act or forbear to act, his volitions are as the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">All creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are
+to be accounted free, and one really as free as another.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the third place, the liberty here affirmed
+belongs equally to every instance of stated antecedence and
+sequence.</p>
+<p class="pn">The liberty which is taken to reside in the
+connexion between volition and effects, is a liberty lying in a
+connexion of stated antecedence and sequence, and is perfect
+according as this connexion is necessary and unimpeded. The
+highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the most
+absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also
+with power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where
+power is the greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most
+obstacles and moves on irresistibly to its effects, there is the
+greatest degree of liberty. God is the most free of all beings,
+because nothing can impede his will. His volitions are always the
+antecedents of effects.</p>
+<p class="pn">But obviously we do not alter the relation, when we
+change the terms. If liberty lie in the stated antecedence of
+volition to effects, and if liberty is measured by the necessity
+of the relation, then when the antecedent is changed, the
+relation remaining the same, liberty must still be present. For
+example: when a volition to move the arm is followed by a motion
+of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be substituted
+for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place; and as
+freedom is doing as we please, or will, “without considering how
+this pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;� that is, without
+taking its motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be
+affirmed to be doing according to the galvanic impulse, “without
+considering how� that impulse “comes to be as it is.�</p>
+<p class="pn">If we take any other instance of stated antecedence
+and sequence, the reasoning is the same. For example, a water
+wheel in relation to the mill-stone: when the wheel turns, the
+mill-stone moves. In this case freedom may be defined: the
+mill-stone moving according to the turn of the wheel, “without
+considering how� that turn of the wheel “comes to be as it is.�
+In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing according
+to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes to
+be as it is; doing “according to choice, without taking into the
+meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice.� (p.
+39.)</p>
+<p class="pn">If it be said that in the case of volition, we have
+the man of whom to affirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel
+and mill-stone, we have nothing of which liberty can properly be
+affirmed. I reply, that liberty must be affirmed, and is properly
+affirmed, of that to which it really belongs; and hence as
+volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual essence, man; and
+this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because volition
+appears in it, and is attended by consequences:—so, likewise, the
+material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because
+motion belongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every
+being that has volition is free, so likewise every thing that
+hath motion is free:—in every instance of cause and effect, we
+meet with liberty.</p>
+<p class="pn">But volition cannot be the characteristic of
+liberty, if volition itself be governed by necessity: and yet
+this system which affirms liberty, wherever there is unimpeded
+volition, makes volition a necessary determination. In the fact
+of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to all creatures that
+have volition; and then again, in the fact of the necessary
+determination of volition it destroys the possibility of liberty.
+But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new
+feature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between
+volition and its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary
+and absolute as the connexion between the motive and the
+volition, and between any antecedent and sequent whatever. That
+my arm should move when I make a volition to this effect, is just
+as necessary and just as incomprehensible too, as that water
+should freeze at a given temperature: when the volition is
+impeded, we have only another instance of necessity,—a lesser
+force overcome by a greater.</p>
+<p class="pn">The liberty therefore which this system affirms in
+the fact of volition and its unimpeded connexion with its
+consequents, is an assumption—a mere name. It is a part of the
+universal necessity arbitrarily distinguished and named, its
+liberty does not reside in human volition, so neither can it
+reside in the divine volition. The necessary dependence of
+volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of effects upon
+volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind than from
+ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the
+universal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically
+considered. The creation of volition by volition is absurd in
+itself—it cannot but be an absurdity. The determination of will
+by the strongest motive, if a truth is a truth universally; on
+this system, it contains the whole cause and possibility of
+volition. The whole liberty of God, it is affirmed, is contained
+in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other words, that what he
+wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished: what pleases
+him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His
+liberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from
+necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">If the movements of mind are necessary, no argument
+is required to prove that all being and events are necessary. We
+are thus bound up in a universal necessity. Whatever is, is, and
+cannot be otherwise, and could not have been otherwise. As
+therefore there is no liberty, we are reduced to the only
+remaining alternative of fatalism.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the
+charge of fatalism. (part iv. § vi.) In relation to the Stoics,
+he remarks:—“It seems they differed among themselves; and
+probably the doctrine of <i>fate</i> as maintained by most of
+them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their
+doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant
+to any <i>liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,</i> I
+utterly deny such a fate.� He objects to fatalism only when it
+should deny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our
+sense of the most agreeable, that is our volition. But this
+connexion we have fully proved to be as necessary as the
+connexion between the volition and its motive. This reservation
+therefore does not save him from fatalism.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents
+the liberty and sovereignty of God as consisting in an ability
+“to do whatever pleases him.� His idea of the divine liberty,
+therefore, is the same as that attributed to man. That the divine
+volitions are necessarily determined, he repeatedly affirms, and
+indeed represents as the great excellence of the divine nature,
+because this necessity of determination is laid in the infinite
+wisdom and perfection of his nature.</p>
+<p class="pn">If necessity govern all being and events, it is
+cheering to know that it is necessity under the forms of infinite
+wisdom and benevolence. But still it remains true that necessity
+governs. If “it is no disadvantage or dishonour to a being,
+<i>necessarily</i> to act in the most excellent and happy manner
+from the necessary perfection of his own nature,� still let us
+remember that under this representation <i>he does act
+necessarily</i>. Fate must have some quality or form; it must be
+what we call good or evil: but in determining its quality, we do
+not destroy its nature. Now if we call this fate a nature of
+goodness and wisdom, eternal and infinite, we present it under
+forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but it is nevertheless
+fate,—and as such it governs the divine volitions; and through
+the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of these
+volitions;—the universe of being and things is determined by
+fate;—and all volitions of angels or men are determined by
+fate—by this fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all
+things thus <i>proceeding</i> from fate were beautiful, benign,
+and glorious, the theory might not alarm us. But that deformity,
+crime, and calamity should have place as developements of this
+fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of this system, however,
+may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion that
+deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but
+of the limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance
+in point in Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as “a
+very learned and pious disciple of Leibnitz.� Says Bonnet—“Thus
+the same chain embraces the physical and moral world, binds the
+past to the present, the present to the future, the future to
+eternity. That wisdom which has ordained the existence of this
+chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of which it is
+composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is of
+iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of
+gold. <i>Both</i> are necessary parts of one whole, which could
+not but exist. Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron
+link? What absurdity! God esteems this link at its proper value.
+He sees it in its cause, and he approves this cause, for it is
+good. God beholds moral monsters as he beholds physical monsters.
+Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy if he know that he is
+<i>only fortunate</i>. He has attained the highest degree of
+moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing that
+what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must
+occupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of
+this system; the simile of the potter is its summary.� He might
+have added, “Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not
+guilty, but at worst <i>only unfortunate;</i> and really not
+unfortunate, because holding a necessary place in the chain which
+both as a whole and in its parts, is the result of infinite
+wisdom.�</p>
+<p class="pn">If anything more is required in order to establish
+this consequence of the system we are examining, I would call
+attention to the inquiry, whether after a contingent
+self-determining will there remains any theory of action except
+fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is a will which is
+the cause of its own volitions or choices—a self-conscious power,
+self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its choice, or
+movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of
+choosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what
+conception have we to oppose to this but that of a will not
+determining itself,—not the cause of its own volitions,—a power
+not self-moved and directed,—and not conscious of ability at the
+moment of a particular choice, to make a contrary choice? And
+this last conception is a will whose volitions are determined by
+some power antecedent to itself, not contingently, but
+necessarily. As the will is the only power for which contingent
+self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such
+power, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and
+causality will then be expressed as follows:</p>
+<p class="pn">1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and
+volitions. 2. Absolute and necessary connexion of volitions and
+effects. 3. Absolute and necessary connexion of all sequents and
+antecedents in nature. 4. Absolute and necessary connexion of all
+things existent with a first and necessary principle or cause. 5.
+The necessary determination of this principle or cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">Denying a contingent self-determining will, this
+theory is all that remains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in
+the 2d particular of this theory, it becomes a mere arbitrary
+designation, because the <i>nature</i> of the relation is granted
+to be the same; it is not <i>contingent</i>, but necessary. Nor
+can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in the
+first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a
+contingent self-determining will, by infinite series of
+volitions, must apply to this great first principle considered as
+God. And in the second place, the doctrine of the necessary
+determination of motive must apply here likewise, since God as
+will and intelligence requires motives no less than we do. Such
+determination is represented as arising from the very nature of
+mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to a
+self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as
+opposed to necessity. And this is all that can be meant by
+fatalism. Liberty thus becomes a self-contradictory conception,
+and fatalism alone is truth and reality.</p>
+<p class="pn">XVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a
+fair deduction from this system.</p>
+<p class="pn">According to this system, God is the sole and
+universal doer—the only efficient cause. 1. His volition is the
+creative act, by which all beings and things exist. Thus far it
+is generally conceded that God is all in all. “By him we live,
+and move, and have our being.� 2. The active powers of the whole
+system of nature he has constituted and regulated. The winds are
+his messengers. The flaming fire his servant. However we may
+conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting under
+necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy,
+in either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to
+God. These movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are
+executed directly or indirectly by his will. Every effect which
+we produce in the material world, we produce by instrumentality.
+Our arms, hands, &amp;c. are our first instruments. All that we
+do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute to ourselves. Now
+if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of an axe,
+spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the
+same way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we
+multiply the instruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do
+the deed directly with my hand, or do it by an instrument held in
+my hand, or by a concatenation of machinery, reaching from “the
+centre to the utmost pole,�—if I contemplate the deed, and
+designedly accomplish it in this way, the deed is mine. And not
+only is the last deed contemplated as the end of all this
+arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements produced as the
+necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the last is
+to be attained, are mine likewise.</p>
+<p class="pn">I use powers and instruments whose energy and
+capacity I have learned by experience, but in whose constitution
+I have had no hand. They are provided for me, and I merely use
+them. But God in working by these, works by what his own wisdom
+and power have created; and therefore <i>a fortiori</i> must
+every effect produced by these, according to his design, and by
+his volition as at least the first power of the series, be
+attributed to him,—be called his doing. He causeth the sun to
+rise and set. “He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and
+herb for the service of man.� “He watereth the hills from his
+chambers.� This is not merely poetry. It is truth.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now the system we are considering goes one step
+further; it makes human volitions as much the objects of the
+eternal design, and as really the effects of the divine volition,
+as the rising of the stars, the flight of the lightning, the
+tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth itself like a
+garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is God’s
+act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every
+volition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a
+pre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents
+necessarily runs back and connects itself with the infinite
+wisdom. God’s volition is his own act; the effect immediately
+produced by that volition is his own deed. Let that effect be the
+creation of man: the man in all his powers and susceptibilities
+is God’s work; the objects around him are God’s work; the
+correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man is God’s
+work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result of
+this correlation is God’s work. The volition of the man is as
+strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common
+apprehensions, the blow which I give with an axe is attributable
+to me. What is true of the first man, must be equally true of the
+man removed by a thousand generations, for the intermediary links
+are all ordained by God under an inevitable necessity. God is
+really, therefore, the sole doer—the only efficient, the only
+cause. All beings and things, all motion and all volition, are
+absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the author of
+all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the
+author of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all
+in the same way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining
+will, and there is no stopping-place between a human volition and
+the divine volition. The human volition is but the divine,
+manifested through a lengthened it may be, but a connected and
+necessary chain of antecedents and sequents. I see no way of
+escaping from this, as a necessary and legitimate consequence of
+the necessary determination of will. And what is this consequence
+but pantheism? God is the universal and all-pervading
+intelligence—the universal and only power. Every movement of
+nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because
+necessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There
+is no life but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He
+is the soul of the world.</p>
+<p class="pn">Spinosa never represented himself as an atheist,
+and according to the following representation appears rather as a
+pantheist. “He held that God is the <i>cause</i> of all things;
+but that he acts, not from choice, but from necessity; and, of
+consequence, that he is the involuntary author of all the good
+and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human life.�
+(Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Cousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather
+the reproach of pantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was
+fairly deduced from the doctrine of necessary determination,
+which he advocated.</p>
+<p class="pn">XVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an
+atheist. “It will not be disputed,� says Stewart, “by those who
+comprehend the drift of his reasonings, that in point of
+practical tendency atheism and Spinosism are one and the
+same.�</p>
+<p class="pn">The following is Cousin’s view of his system. It
+apparently differs from the preceding in some respects, but
+really tends to the same conclusions.</p>
+<p class="pn">“Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought
+to be reproached for an error in the other direction. Spinosa
+starts from the perfect and infinite being of Descartes’s system,
+and easily demonstrates that such a being is alone a being in
+itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect, and relative, only
+participates of being, without possessing it, in itself: that a
+being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one
+substance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal
+existence: that to call phenomena, finite substances, is
+affirming and denying, at the same time; whereas, there being,
+but one substance which possesses being in itself, and the finite
+being that which participates of existence without possessing it
+in itself, a substance finite implies two contradictory notions.
+Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and nature are pure
+phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute substance,
+but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for as
+phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without
+the perfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature
+suppose God; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without
+phenomena, the perfect without the imperfect, the infinite
+without the finite, and God on his part supposes man and nature.
+The error of his system lies in the predominance of the relation
+of phenomenon to being, of attribute to substance, over the
+relation of effect to cause. When man has been represented, not
+as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and
+uncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought;
+God, or the supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance,
+and not a cause—a being, perfect, infinite, necessary—the
+immutable substance of the universe, and not its producing and
+creating cause. In Cartesianism, the notion of substance figures
+more conspicuously than that of cause; and this notion of
+substance, altogether predominating, constitutes Spinosism.�
+(Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The predominance of the notion of substance and
+attribute, over that of cause and effect, which Cousin here
+pronounces the vice of Spinosa’s system, is indeed the vice of
+every system which contains the dogma of the necessary
+determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism; the
+second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When
+self-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into
+mere desire, necessitated in all its acts from its
+pre-constituted correlation with objects, then will really ceases
+to be a cause. It becomes an instrument of antecedent power, but
+is no power in itself, creative or productive. The reasoning
+employed in reference to the human will, applies in all its force
+to the divine will, as has been already abundantly shown. The
+divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and becomes a mere
+instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is the
+infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom
+is eternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what
+tendencies or energies it has now, it always had; and therefore,
+whatever volitions it now necessarily produces, it always
+necessarily produced. If we conceive a volition to have been, in
+one direction, the immediate and necessary antecedent of
+creation; and, in another, the immediate and necessary sequent of
+infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then this volition
+must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as the
+necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The
+eternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because
+this is existence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and
+creation, consisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite,
+participating only of existence, and not being existence in
+themselves, are not substances, but phenomena. But what is the
+relation of the phenomena to the substance? Not that of effect to
+cause;—this relation slides entirely out of view, the moment will
+ceases to be a cause. It is the relation simply of phenomena to
+being, considered as the necessary and inseparable manifestations
+of being; the relation of attributes to substance, considered as
+the necessary and inseparable properties of substance. We cannot
+conceive of substance without attributes or phenomena, nor of
+attributes or phenomena without substance; they are, therefore,
+co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and its
+attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the
+universe, as made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is
+Spinosism; this is pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate
+consequence of a necessitated will.</p>
+<p class="pn">The second consequence is atheism. In the denial of
+will as a cause <i>per se</i>,—in resolving all its volitions
+into the necessary phenomena of the eternal substance,—we destroy
+personality: we have nothing remaining but the universe. Now we
+may call the universe God; but with equal propriety we call God
+the universe. This destruction of personality,—this merging of
+God into necessary substance and attributes,—is all that we mean
+by Atheism. The conception is really the same, whether we name it
+fate, pantheism, or atheism.</p>
+<p class="pn">The following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that
+he arrived at the same result: “Whatever may have been the
+doctrines of some of the ancient atheists about man’s free
+agency, it will not be denied that, in the history of modern
+philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of necessity have been
+hitherto always connected together. Not that I would by any means
+be understood to say, that every necessitarian must <i>ipso
+facto</i> be an atheist, or even that any presumption is
+afforded, by a man’s attachment to the former sect, of his having
+the slightest bias in favour of the latter; but only that every
+modern atheist I have heard of has been a necessitarian. I cannot
+help adding, that the most consistent necessitarian who have yet
+appeared, have been those who followed out their principles till
+they ended in <i>Spinosism</i>,—a doctrine which differs from
+atheism more in words than in reality.� (Vol. 6, p. 470.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Cudworth, in his great work entitled “The true
+Intellectual System of the Universe,� shows clearly the connexion
+between fatalism and atheism. This work seems to have grown out
+of another undertaking, which contemplated specifically the
+question of liberty and necessity, and its bearing upon morality
+and religion. The passage in the preface, in which he informs us
+of his original plan, is a very full expression of his opinion.
+“First, therefore, I acknowledge,� says he, “that when I engaged
+the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and
+necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal
+necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever
+grounds or principles maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the
+design of atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion,
+as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and
+plainly rendering a day of judgement ridiculous.� This opinion of
+the tendency of the doctrine of a necessitated will, is the germ
+of his work. The connexion established in his mind between this
+doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his masterly and
+elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter.</p>
+<p class="pns">The arguments of many atheists might be referred
+to, to illustrate the connexion between necessity and atheism. I
+shall here refer, however, to only one individual, remarkable
+both for his poetic genius and metaphysical acumen. I mean the
+late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly and unblushingly professed
+atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line: “There is no God.�
+In a note upon this line, he remarks: “This negation must be
+understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a
+pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains
+unshaken.� This last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really
+the negation of a creative Deity,—the identity or at least
+necessary and eternal co-existence of God and the universe.
+Shelley has expressed this clearly in another passage:</p>
+<p class="p2">“Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,</p>
+<p class="p2s">Necessity! thou mother of the world!�</p>
+<p class="pns">In a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued
+the doctrine of the necessary determination of will by motive,
+with an acuteness and power scarcely inferior to Collins or
+Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different application of the
+doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and Edwards,
+and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil
+under insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base
+religion upon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a
+fog of subtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly
+consistent, is perfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from
+necessity to pantheism, and thence to atheism and the destruction
+of all moral distinctions. “We are taught,� he remarks, “by the
+doctrine of necessity, that there is neither good nor evil in the
+universe, otherwise than as the events to which we apply these
+epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of being. Still
+less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine of
+necessity accord with the belief of a future state of
+punishment.�</p>
+<p class="pn">I here close my deductions from this system. If
+these deductions be legitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they
+are, then, to the largest class of readers, the doctrine of
+necessity is overthrown: it is overthrown by its consequences,
+and my argument has the force of a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>.
+If a self-determined will appear an absurdity, still it cannot be
+as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine involve the
+consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will claim
+that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral
+and responsible nature.</p>
+<p class="pn">A question will here very naturally arise: How can
+we account for the fact that so many wise and good men have
+contended for a necessitated will, as if they were contending for
+the great basis of all morality and religion? For example, take
+Edwards himself as a man of great thought and of most fervent
+piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with the air and
+manner of one who is opposing great errors as really connected
+with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the
+following language: “I think that the notion of liberty,
+consisting in a <i>contingent self-determination of the will</i>,
+as necessary to the morality of men’s dispositions and actions,
+is almost inconceivably pernicious; and that the contrary truth
+is one of the most important truths of moral philosophy that ever
+was discussed, and most necessary to be known.� The question is a
+fair one, and I will endeavour to answer it.</p>
+<p class="pn">1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as
+being in itself a contradictory idea, and as leading to the
+consequence of affirming the existence of effects without causes,
+takes strong hold of the mind in these individuals. This I
+believe, and hope to prove in the course of this treatise, to be
+a philosophical error;—but it is no new thing for great and good
+men to fall into philosophical errors.</p>
+<p class="pn">As, therefore, the liberty consisting in a
+self-determining will, or the <i>liberty of indifference</i>, as
+it has been technically called, is conceived to be exploded, they
+endeavour to supply a <i>liberty of spontaneity</i>, or a liberty
+lying in the unimpeded connexion between volition and
+sequents.</p>
+<p class="pn">Hobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in
+a clearer manner than any of its advocates: “I conceive,� says
+he, “liberty to be rightly defined,—the absence of all
+impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature and
+intrinsical quality of the agent. As for example, the water is
+said to descend <i>freely</i>, or is said to have liberty to
+descend by the channel of the river, because there is no
+impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are
+impediments: and though water cannot ascend, yet men never say,
+it wants the <i>liberty</i> to ascend, but the <i>faculty</i> or
+<i>power</i>, because the impediment is in the nature of the
+water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants
+the <i>liberty</i> to go, because the impediment is not in him,
+but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is sick or
+lame, because the impediment is in himself,�—that is, he wants
+the faculty or power of going:—this constitutes natural
+<i>inability</i>. Liberty is volition acting upon physical
+instrumentalities, or upon mental faculties, according to a fixed
+and constituted law of antecedents, and meeting with no
+impediment or overcoming antagonistic power. Natural ability is
+the fixed and constituted antecedence itself. Hence there may be
+natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot be affirmed
+without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute
+responsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated
+antecedent of certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent
+existing without impediment or frustration. Since this is the
+only possible liberty remaining, and as they have no wish to be
+considered fatalists, they enlarge much upon this; not only as
+the whole of liberty actually existing, but as the full and
+satisfactory notion of liberty.</p>
+<p class="pn">In basing responsibility and praise and
+blameworthiness upon this liberty, an appeal is made to the
+common ideas, feelings, and practices of men. Every man regards
+himself as free when he does as he pleases,—when, if he pleases
+to walk, he walks,—when, if he pleases to sit down, he sits down,
+&amp;c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to plead in excuse
+that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed to do
+it, the judge would reply—“this is your guilt, that you pleased
+or willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to
+commit it was the very doing of it.� Now all this is just. I
+readily admit that we are free when we do as we please, and that
+we are guilty when, in doing as we please, we commit a crime.</p>
+<p class="pn">Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty
+sufficient to constitute responsibility? And thus the whole
+difficulty seems to be got over. The reasoning would be very
+fair, as far as it goes, if employed against fatalists, but
+amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold to the
+self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these
+common ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative
+of freedom, because they raise no question against human freedom.
+The real question at issue is, how are we to account for these
+facts? The advocates of self-determining power account for them
+by referring them to a self-determined will. We say a man is free
+when he does as he pleases or according to his volitions, and has
+the sense of freedom in his volitions, because he determines his
+own volitions; and that a man is guilty for crime, if committed
+by his volition, because he determined this volition, and at the
+very moment of determining it, was conscious of ability to
+determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that a man
+is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words,
+makes a volition without any impediment between it and its
+object,—he is free, if he make the volition without producing
+effects by it: volition itself is the act of freedom. But how do
+those who deny a self-determining power account for these facts?
+They say that the volition is caused by a motive antecedent to
+it, but that nevertheless, inasmuch as the man feels that he is
+free and is generally accounted so, he must be free; for liberty
+means nothing more than “power and opportunity to do and conduct
+as he will, or according to his choice, without taking into the
+meaning of the word any thing of the <i>cause</i> of that choice,
+or at all considering how the person came to have such a
+volition,�—that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so,
+when he does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by
+freedom.</p>
+<p class="pn">But suppose the objection be brought up, that the
+definition of liberty here given is assumed, arbitrary, and
+unsatisfactory; and that the sense or consciousness of freedom in
+the act of volition, and the common sentiments and practices of
+men in reference to voluntary action, are not adequately
+accounted for,—then the advocates of necessitated volition return
+to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other
+definition,—and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom
+does exist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally
+correspond to it, we must believe that we are free when volition
+is unimpeded in its connexion with sequents, and that we are
+blame or praiseworthy, according to the perceived character of
+our volitions,—although it cannot but be true that the volitions
+themselves are necessary. On the one hand, they are compelled by
+their philosophy to deny a self-determining will. On the other
+hand, they are compelled, by their moral sense and religious
+convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and responsibility. In
+order to do this, however, a <i>quasi</i> liberty must be
+preserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity,
+by referring the first exclusively to the connexion between
+volition and its sequents, and the second exclusively to the
+connexion between the volition and its antecedents or motives.
+Liberty is physical; necessity is metaphysical. The first belongs
+to man; the second transcends the sphere of his activity, and, is
+not his concern. In this very difficult position, no better or
+more ingenious solution could be devised; but that it is wholly
+illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from absolute and
+universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are
+speaking, conceive that when volitions are supposed to exist out
+of the necessary determination of motives, they exist
+fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up the necessary
+and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would be to
+place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,—it would
+destroy the great <i>a posteriori</i> argument for the existence
+of a God. Of course it would be the destruction of all morality
+and religion.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in
+particular, is much insisted upon as incompatible with contingent
+volitions. Divine foreknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events
+certain and necessary. Hence volitions are necessary; and, to
+carry out the reasoning, it must be added likewise that the
+connexion between volitions and their sequents is equally
+necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition as well as
+the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the
+<i>name</i> of liberty, because it fears the designation which
+properly belongs to it.</p>
+<p class="pn">4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of
+God and the harmony of his government are preserved. His
+volitions are determined by his infinite wisdom. The world,
+therefore, must be ruled in truth and righteousness.</p>
+<p class="pn">These philosophers and divines thus represent to
+themselves the theory of a self-determining will as an absurdity
+in itself, and, if granted to be true, as involving the most
+monstrous and disastrous consequences, while the theory which
+they advocate is viewed only in its favourable points, and
+without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If these
+consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be
+evaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and
+the sense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be
+urged as a consequence, of this theory, the ready reply is
+invariably—“No such necessity is maintained as goes to destroy
+the liberty which consists in doing as one pleases;� or if the
+destruction of responsibility be urged as a consequence, the
+reply is—“A man is always held a just subject of praise or blame
+when he acts voluntarily.� The argumentation undoubtedly is as
+sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous.
+They are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No
+wonder, then, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion,
+they should by every possible argument aim to sustain the
+philosophy which is supposed to lie at their basis, and look away
+from consequences so destructive, persuading themselves that
+these consequences are but the rampant sophistries of
+infidelity.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is a wonderful fact in the history of
+philosophy, that the philosophy of fate, pantheism, and atheism,
+should be taken as the philosophy of religion. Good men have
+misapprehended the philosophy, and have succeeded in bringing it
+into fellowship with truth and righteousness. Bad men and erring
+philosophers have embraced it in a clear understanding of its
+principles, and have both logically reasoned out and fearlessly
+owned its consequences.</p>
+<p class="pn">XIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition
+of liberty given by the theologians above alluded to, is the only
+possible definition, it must follow that the most commonly
+received modes of preaching the truths and urging the duties of
+religion are inconsistent and contradictory.</p>
+<p class="pn">A class of theologians has been found in the
+church, who, perhaps without intending absolutely to deny human
+freedom, have denied all ability on the part of man to comply
+with the divine precepts. A generic distinction between inability
+and a want of freedom is not tenable, and certainly is of no
+moment, where, as in this case, the inability contended for is
+radical and absolute.</p>
+<p class="pn">These theologians clearly perceived, that if
+volition is necessarily determined by motive, and if motive lies
+in the correlation of desire and object, then, in a being totally
+depraved, or a being of radically corrupt desires, there can be
+no ability to good deeds: the deed is as the volition, and the
+volition is as the strongest desire or the sense of the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">Hence these theologians refer the conversion of man
+exclusively to divine influence. The man cannot change his own
+heart, nor employ any means to that end; for this would imply a
+volition for which, according to the supposition, he has no
+ability.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now, at the same time, that this class represent
+men as unable to love and obey the truths of religion, they
+engage with great zeal in expounding these truths to their minds,
+and in urging upon them the duty of obedience. But what is the
+aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will reply, I know the man
+cannot determine himself to obedience, but in preaching to him, I
+am presenting motives which may influence him. But in denying his
+ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving him by
+motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by
+supposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more,
+therefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the
+sense of the disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present
+objects to a man’s mind which are correlated to his feelings, the
+more clearly and frequently you present them, the more you
+advance towards the sense of the most agreeable or choice. So
+when you present objects which are not correlated to his
+feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present them, the
+more you must advance towards the sense of the most disagreeable,
+or positive refusal.</p>
+<p class="pn">If it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the
+presentation of truth forms the occasion or condition on which
+the divine influence is exerted for the regeneration of the
+heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man to repent, and
+believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty generally,
+and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly unable
+to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections
+and actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the
+divine influence be exerted, which brings his heart into
+correlation with religion, and makes it possible for him to put
+forth the volitions of piety and duty? It can be regarded in no
+other light than playing a solemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge
+and persuade, as if the man ought to make some exertion when you
+feel convinced that exertion is impossible. It certainly can form
+no occasion for divine interposition, unless it be in pity of
+human folly. If you say that such a course does succeed in the
+conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe that your
+philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because
+inconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system
+which you know not, or understand not and deny.</p>
+<p class="pn">A total inability to do good makes man the passive
+subject of influences to be employed for his regeneration, and he
+can no more be considered active in effecting it than he is in
+the process of digesting food, or in the curative action of
+medicines upon any diseased part of his system. If you urge him
+to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge him to put forth
+volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in no sense
+possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least
+commenced.</p>
+<p class="pn">I will go one step farther in this reasoning:—on
+supposition of total inability, not only is the individual a
+passive subject of regenerating influences, but he is also
+incapable of regeneration, or any disposition or tendency towards
+regeneration, from any influences which lie merely in motives,
+produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive, according
+to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards’s
+system, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object
+standing in correlation with the state of mind. Now the state of
+mind, in an unregenerate state, is a state represented by this
+system itself, as totally adverse to the objects of religion.
+Hence, there is no conceivable array of religious truth, and no
+conceivable religious exhortation and persuasion that could
+possibly come into such a relation to this state of mind as to
+form the motive of a religious choice or volition. It is
+perfectly plain, that before such a result could take place, the
+state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the array
+of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must
+fail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state
+of mind, so neither can the state of mind be changed by this
+array of truth or by this exhortation. There is a positive
+opposition of mind and object, and the collision becomes more
+severe upon every attempt to bring them together. It must follow,
+therefore, that preaching truth and duty to the unregenerate, so
+far from leading to their conversion, can only serve to call out
+more actively the necessary determination, not to obey. The very
+enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer
+perception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the
+disinclination.</p>
+<p class="pn">Nor can we pause in this consequence, at human
+instrumentality. It must be equally true, that if divine
+interposition lies in the presentation of truth and persuasions
+to duty, only that these are given with tenfold light and power,
+it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of producing any
+tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no correlation
+with these,—its sense of the disagreeable,—and therefore the
+energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and
+decided.</p>
+<p class="pn">If it should be remarked that hope and fear are
+feelings, which, even in a state of unregeneracy, can be operated
+upon, the state of things is equally difficult. No such hope can
+be operated upon as implies desire after religious principles and
+enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the corrupt nature; nor can
+any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of the divine
+purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate to
+danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security,
+independently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these
+passions might awaken attention, constrain to an outward
+obedience, and form a very prudent conduct, but could effect no
+purification of the heart.</p>
+<p class="pn">There is another class of theologians, of whom
+Edwards is one, who endeavour to escape the difficulties which
+attend a total inability, by making the distinction of moral and
+natural inability:—man, they say, is morally unable to do good,
+and naturally able to do good, and therefore he can justly be
+made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke, and exhortation. The
+futility of this distinction I cannot but think has already been
+made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so great
+stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in
+this particular connexion.</p>
+<p class="pn">Moral inability, as we have seen, is the
+impossibility of a given volition, because there are no motives
+or causes to produce it. It is simply the impossibility of an
+effect for the want of a cause: when we speak of moral cause and
+effect, according to Edwards, we speak of nothing different from
+physical cause and effect, except in the quality of the terms—the
+relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility of a given
+volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting, is
+equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a
+summer’s noon-tide.<sup><a href="#n1" id="f1" title=
+"see footnote" name="f1">1</a></sup></p>
+<p class="pn">When objects of volition are fairly presented, an
+inability to choose them must lie in the state of the mind,
+sensitivity, desire, will, or affections, for all these have the
+same meaning according to this system. There is no volition of
+preference where there is no motive to this effect; and there is
+no motive to this effect where the state of the mind is not in
+correlation with the objects presented: on the contrary, the
+volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal.</p>
+<p class="pn">Natural inability, as defined by this system, lies
+in the connexion between the volition considered as an
+antecedent, and the effect required. Thus I am naturally unable
+to walk, when, although I make the volition, my limbs, through
+weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect in the powers or
+instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition, or any
+impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural
+inability.<sup><a href="#n2" id="f2" title="see footnote" name=
+"f2">2</a></sup> According to this system, I am not held
+responsible for anything which, through natural inability, cannot
+be accomplished, although the volition is made. But now let us
+suppose that there is no defect in the powers or
+instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition, and no
+impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that there need be
+only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the natural
+ability is complete:—I will to walk, and I walk.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible
+for the doing of anything, and can be fairly urged to do it when
+all that is necessary for the doing of it is a volition although
+there may be a moral inability to the volition itself.</p>
+<p class="pn">Nothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this
+distinction. If liberty be essential to responsibility, liberty,
+as we have clearly shown, can no more lie in the connexion
+between volition and its effects, than in the connexion between
+volition and its motives. One is just as necessary as the other.
+If it be granted to be absurd with the first class of theologians
+to urge men to do right when they are conceived to be totally
+unable to do right, it is equally so when they are conceived to
+have only a natural ability to do right, because this natural
+ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If
+the volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the
+action; nay, “the very willing is the doing of it;� but then the
+volition as an effect cannot take place without a cause; and to
+acknowledge a moral inability, is nothing less than to
+acknowledge that there is no cause to produce the required
+volition.</p>
+<p class="pn">The condition of men as represented by the second
+class of theologians, is not really different from their
+condition as represented by the first class. The inability under
+both representations is a total inability. In the utter
+impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter
+impossibility of any good deed.</p>
+<p class="pn">When we have denied liberty, in denying a
+self-determining power, these definitions in order to make out a
+<i>quasi</i> liberty and ability, are nothing but ingenious folly
+and plausible deception.</p>
+<p class="pn">You tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will;
+and when he replies to you, that on your own principles the
+required volition is impossible, you refer him to the common
+notions of mankind. According to these, you say a man is guilty
+when he forbears to do right, since nothing is wanting to
+right-doing but a volition,—and guilty when he does wrong,
+because he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions,
+too, a man may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is
+wanting but a will to do right. But do we find this distinction
+of natural and moral ability in the common notions of men? When
+nothing is required to the performance of a deed but a volition,
+do men conceive of any inability whatever? Do they not feel that
+the volition has a metaphysical possibility as well as that the
+sequent of the volition has a physical possibility? Have we not
+at least some reason to suspect that the philosophy of
+responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion lying in
+the common notions of men, are something widely different from
+the scheme of a necessitated volition?</p>
+<p class="pn">This last class of theologians, equally with the
+first, derive all the force of their preaching from a philosophy,
+upon which they are compelled to act, but which they stoutly
+deny. Let them carry out their philosophy, and for preaching no
+place remains.</p>
+<p class="pn">Preaching can produce good effects only by
+producing good volitions; and good volitions can be produced only
+by good motives: but good motives can exist under preaching only
+when the subjects of the preaching are correlated with the state
+of mind. But by supposition this is not the case, for the heart
+is totally depraved.</p>
+<p class="pn">To urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions
+in reference to his regeneration, may consist with a
+self-determining power of will, but is altogether irrelevant on
+this system. It is urging <i>him</i> to do what <i>he</i> cannot
+do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do <i>in him</i>
+as a mere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite
+easy, because nothing is required of him but to will, is
+equivalent to assuring him that the affair is quite easy, because
+it will be done when he has done it. The man may reply, the
+affair would indeed be quite easy if there existed in me a motive
+to produce the volition; but as there does not, the volition is
+impossible. And as I cannot put forth the volition without the
+motive, so neither can I make the motive which is to produce the
+volition—for then an effect would make its cause. What I cannot
+do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from
+heaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and
+duties, and prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot
+take the character of motives to influence my will, because they
+are not agreeable to my heart.</p>
+<p class="pn">You indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that
+on your own principles all your zeal and eloquence must
+necessarily have an opposite effect from what you intend? My
+affections not being in correlation with these subjects, the more
+you urge them, the more intense becomes my sense of the most
+disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my good friends,
+by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable and
+ever-during chain.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is plainly impossible to escape from this
+conclusion, and yet maintain the philosophy. All efforts of this
+kind, made by appealing to the common sentiments of mankind, we
+have seen are self-contradictory. It will not do to press forward
+the philosophy until involved in difficulty and perplexity, and
+then to step aside and borrow arguments from another system which
+is assumed to be overthrown. There is no necessity more absolute
+and sovereign, than a logical necessity.<sup><a href="#n3" id=
+"f3" title="see footnote" name="f3">3</a></sup></p>
+<p class="pn">XVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards’s system
+in the sections we have been examining, from which the above
+consequences are deduced, are the three following:</p>
+<p class="pn">1. The will is always determined by the strongest
+motive.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. The strongest motive is always “the most
+agreeable.�</p>
+<p class="pns">3. The will is necessarily determined.</p>
+<p class="pn">I shall close this part of the present treatise
+with a brief examination of the reasoning by which he endeavours
+to establish these points.</p>
+<p class="pn">The reasoning by which the first point is aimed to
+be established, is the general reasoning respecting cause and
+effect. Volition is an effect, and must have a cause. Its cause
+is the motive lying in the correlation of mind and object. When
+several physical causes conflict with each other, we call that
+the strongest which prevails and produces its appropriate
+effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where there are
+several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other, we
+call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is
+not opposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect;
+and in this case we do not say the <i>strongest</i> cause
+produces the effect, because there is no comparison. So also
+there are cases in which there is but one moral cause or motive
+present, when there being no comparison, we cannot affirm that
+the volition is determined by the <i>strongest</i> motive: the
+doing of something may be entirely agreeable, and the not doing
+of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the motive is
+only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a
+comparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the
+effect which actually takes place, is produced by the strongest
+cause or motive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a
+mere postulate, as if we should say,—let a cause or motive
+producing effects be called the strongest. It may be represented,
+also, as a <i>petitio principii</i>, or reasoning in a
+circle,—since the proof that the will is determined by the
+strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined.
+It may be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest
+motive. How do you know this? Because it is determined. How does
+this prove it? Because that which determines it must be the
+strongest.<sup><a href="#n4" id="f4" title="see footnote" name=
+"f4">4</a></sup></p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of
+volition. This assumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to
+sustain, when he argues against a self-determining will. If the
+will do not cause its own volitions, then it must follow that
+motive is the cause. The argument against a self-determining will
+we are about to take up.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. <i>The strongest motive is always the most
+agreeable</i>. Edwards maintains that the motive which always
+prevails to cause volition, has this characteristic,—that it is
+the most agreeable or pleasant at the time, and that volition
+itself is nothing but the sense of the most agreeable. If there
+should be but one motive present to the mind, as in that case
+there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say that
+the will is determined by <i>the agreeable</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">But how are we to know whether the motive of every
+volition has this characteristic of agreeableness, or of most
+agreeableness, as the case may be? We can know it only by
+consulting our consciousness. If, whenever we will, we find the
+sense of the most agreeable identified with the volition, and if
+we are conscious of no power of willing, save under this
+condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then certainly
+there remains no farther question on this point. The
+determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the
+determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.</p>
+<p class="pn">Does Edwards appeal to consciousness?</p>
+<p class="pn">He does,—but without formally announcing it. The
+following passage is an appeal to consciousness, and contains
+Edwards’s whole thought on this subject: “There is scarcely a
+plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of
+mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and do what they
+please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most
+<i>agreeable to them</i>. To say that they do what <i>pleases</i>
+them, but yet what is not <i>agreeable</i> to them, is the same
+thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their
+pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and
+yet do not what they please.� (p. 25.) Motives differ widely,
+intrinsically considered. Some are in accordance with reason and
+conscience; some are opposed to reason and conscience. Some are
+wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are bad. But whatever
+may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this
+characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it
+is by this characteristic that their strength is measured. The
+appeal, however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way
+to beg the very point in question. Will not every one admit, that
+“when men act <i>voluntarily and do what they please</i>, they do
+what suits them best, and what is most agreeable to them?� Yes.
+Is it not a palpable contradiction, to say that men “do what
+pleases them,� and yet do “what is not agreeable to them,�
+according to the ordinary use of these words? Certainly.</p>
+<p class="pn">But the point in question is, whether men, acting
+voluntarily, always do what is pleasing to them: and this point
+Edwards assumes. He assumes it here, and he assumes it throughout
+his treatise. We have seen that, in his psychology, he identifies
+will and desire or the affections:—hence volition is the
+prevailing desire or affection, and the object which moves the
+<i>desire</i> must of course appear <i>desirable</i>, or
+agreeable, or pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men
+always will what they most desire, and desire what they will,
+then of course when they act voluntarily, they do what they
+please; and when they do what they please, they do what suits
+them best and is most agreeable to them.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards runs the changes of these words with great
+plausibility, and we must say deceives himself as well as others.
+The great point,—whether will and desire are one,—whether the
+volition is as the most agreeable,—he takes up at the beginning
+as an unquestionable fact, and adheres to throughout as such; but
+he never once attempts an analysis of consciousness in relation
+to it, adequate and satisfactory. His psychology is an
+assumption.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. The will is necessarily determined.</p>
+<p class="pn">How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general
+connexion of causes and effects. Causes necessarily produce
+effects, unless resisted and overcome by opposing forces; but
+where several causes are acting in opposition, the strongest will
+necessarily prevail, and produce its appropriate effects.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the
+connexion between motives and volitions is the same with that of
+any other causes and effects. The difference is merely in the
+terms: and when he calls the necessity which characterizes the
+connexion of motive and volition “a moral necessity,� he refers
+not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected. In
+this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between
+cause and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is,
+all causation is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause,
+in his system, is characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays
+himself open to all the consequences of a universal and absolute
+necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of
+volition by a method of approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants,
+for the sake of the argument, that the will may oppose the
+strongest motive in a given case; but then he contends that it is
+supposable that the strength of the motive may be increased
+beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this
+point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the
+will must be considered necessary. “Whatever power,� he remarks,
+“men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that
+power is not infinite.� If the power of the man is finite, that
+of the motive may be supposed to be infinite: hence the
+resistance of the man must at last be necessarily overcome. This
+reasoning seems plausible at first; but a little examination, I
+think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does not determine
+the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic qualities,
+but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But
+agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,—relative
+to the will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would
+be a motive of infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be
+such only by an infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The
+same of course must hold true of any motive less than infinite:
+and universally, whatever be the degree of strength of the
+motive, there must be in the man an affection of corresponding
+intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in the will to
+any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this power
+of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of
+agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a
+sense of agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall
+predominate and become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain
+that if the first be increased, the second may be supposed to be
+increased likewise; if the first can become infinite, the second
+can become infinite likewise: and hence the power of resistance
+may be supposed always to meet the motive required to be
+resisted, and a point of necessary determination may never be
+reached.</p>
+<p class="pn">If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the
+strength of motives intrinsically considered, then the answer is
+ready. There are motives of infinite strength, thus considered,
+which men are continually resisting: for example, the motive
+which urges them to obey and love God, and seek the salvation of
+their souls.</p>
+<h1><a name="Will" id="Will">III.</a></h1>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:2.0em">AN
+EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND
+CONTINGENT WILL.</p>
+<p class="pnn">E<span class="sc">dwards’s</span> first and great
+argument against a self-determining will, is given in part II.
+sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows:</p>
+<p class="pn">The will,—or the soul, or man, by the faculty of
+willing, effects every thing within its power as a cause, by acts
+of choice. “The will determines which way the hands and feet
+shall move, by an act of choice; and there is no other way of the
+will’s determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all.�
+Hence, if the will determines itself, it does it by an act of
+choice; “and if it has itself under its command, and determines
+itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the same way
+that it determines other things which are under its command.� But
+if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course
+we have an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice
+which is not determined by a choice,—“which brings us directly to
+a contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the
+first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest;
+or a free act of the will before the first free act of the will:
+or else we must come at last to an act of the will determining
+the consequent acts, wherein the will is not self-determined, and
+so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom.� (p. 43.)</p>
+<p class="pn">This reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt
+to meet various evasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates
+of a self-determining will, depend mainly upon the assumption,
+that if the will determines itself, it must determine itself by
+an act of choice; that is, inasmuch as those acts of the will, or
+of the soul, considered in its power of willing, or in its
+personal activity, by which effects are produced out of the
+activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for
+example, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down:
+therefore, if the soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions,
+it must cause them by volitions. The causative act by which the
+soul causes volitions, must itself be a volition. This assumption
+Edwards does not even attempt to sustain, but takes for granted
+that it is of unquestionable validity. If the assumption be of
+unquestionable validity, then his position is impregnable; for
+nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will determining
+volitions by volitions, in an interminable series.</p>
+<p class="pn">Before directly meeting the assumption, I remark,
+that if it be valid, it is fatal to all causality. Will is simply
+cause; volition is effect. I affirm that the will is the sole and
+adequate cause of volition. Edwards replies: if will is the cause
+of volition, then, to cause it, it must put forth a causative
+act; but the only act of will is volition itself: hence if it
+cause its own volitions, it must cause them by volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now take any other cause: there must be some effect
+which according to the general views of men stands directly
+connected with it as its effect. The effect is called the
+phenomenon, or that by which the cause manifests itself. But how
+does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a causative act:—but
+this causative act, according to Edwards’s reasoning, must itself
+be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect comes between the
+cause, and what was at first considered the immediate effect but
+the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative
+act; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have
+another causative act before it; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>.
+We have here then an infinite series of causative acts—an
+absurdity of the same kind, with an infinite series of
+volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">It follows from this, that there can be no cause
+whatever. An infinite series of causative acts, without any
+first, being, according to this reasoning, the consequence of
+supposing a cause to cause its own acts, it must therefore
+follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but that they
+must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause out
+of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must
+cause these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act
+of its own:—but the same difficulties occur in relation to the
+second cause as in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own
+acts, and they must therefore be caused out of itself by some
+other cause; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>. We have here again
+the absurdity of an infinite series of causative acts; and also,
+the absurdity of an infinite series of causes without a first
+cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which causes its
+own acts, without an act of causation; but this is impossible,
+according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there
+cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the
+denial of this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are
+driven to the conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every
+cause must either cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused
+out of itself. Neither of these is possible; therefore, there is
+no cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">Take the will itself as an illustration of this
+last consequence. The will is cause; the volition, effect. But
+the will does not cause its own volition; the volition is caused
+by the motive. But the motive, as a cause, must put forth a
+causative act in the production of a volition. If the motive
+determine the will, then there must be an act of the motive to
+determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to act.
+But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of
+the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its
+own act, then it must do this by a previous act, according to the
+principle of this reasoning; and this again by another previous
+act; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the
+same.</p>
+<p class="pn">It may be said in reply to the above, that volition
+is an effect altogether peculiar. It implies selection or
+determination in one direction rather than in another, and
+therefore that in inquiring after its cause, we inquire not
+merely after the energy which makes it existent, but also after
+the cause of its particular determination in one direction rather
+than in another. “The question is not so much, how a spirit
+endowed with activity comes to <i>act</i>, as why it exerts
+<i>such</i> an act, and not another; or why it acts with a
+particular determination? If activity of nature be the cause why
+a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts and does not lie
+still; yet that alone is not the cause why its action is thus and
+thus limited, directed and determined.� (p. 58.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Every phenomenon or effect is particular and
+limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, be in
+one place and not in another, have certain characteristics and
+not others; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be
+supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a
+particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion,
+give it likewise a particular direction.</p>
+<p class="pn">Volition must have an object; something is willed
+or chosen; particular determination and direction are therefore
+inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives
+it a being, must necessarily give it character, and particular
+direction and determination.</p>
+<p class="pn">Selection is the attribute of the cause, and
+answers to particular determination and direction in the effect.
+As a phenomenon or effect cannot come to exist without a
+particular determination, so a cause cannot give existence to a
+phenomenon, or effect, without selection. There must necessarily
+be one object selected rather than another. Thus, if fire be
+thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles, and
+produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular
+determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor
+of effect without a particular determination. But in what lies
+the selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with
+certain objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and
+consequently exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In
+chemistry, under the title of affinities, we have wonderful
+exhibitions of selection and particular determination. Now
+motive, according to Edwards, lies in the correlation of the
+nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects; and volition
+is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by will,
+arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like
+the selection made by any other cause; and the particular
+determination or direction of the volition, in consequence of
+this, is like that which appears in every other effect. In the
+case of will, whatever effect is produced, is produced of
+necessity, by a pre-constitution and disposition of will and
+objects, just as in the case of any other cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on
+Edwards’s principles there is no such difference between volition
+and any other effect, as to shield his reasonings respecting a
+self-determining will, against the consequences above deduced
+from them. The distinction of final and efficient causes does not
+lie in his system. The motive is that which produces the sense of
+the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily, and often in
+opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the most
+agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite
+system to make this distinction in all its clearness and
+force—where the efficient will is distinguished, both from the
+persuasions and allurements of passion and desire, and from the
+laws of reason and conscience.</p>
+<p class="pn">Thus far my argument against Edwards’s
+assumption,—that, to make the will the cause of its own
+volitions, is to make it cause its volitions by an act of
+volition,—has been indirect. If this indirect argument has been
+fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed
+to deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In
+addition to the above, however, on a subject so important, a
+direct argument will not be deemed superfluous.</p>
+<p class="pn">Self-determining will means simply a will causing
+its own volitions; and consequently, particularly determining and
+directing them. Will, in relation to volition, is just what any
+cause is in relation to its effect. Will causing volitions,
+causes them just as any cause causes its effects. There is no
+intervention of anything between the cause and effect; between
+will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena,
+is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a self-determiner, we
+do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we do, and he
+assumes it as if it were unquestionable.</p>
+<p class="pn">The will, he first remarks, determines all our
+external actions by volitions, as the motions of the hands and
+feet. He next affirms, generally, that all which the will
+determines, it determines in this way; and then concludes, that
+if it determines its own volitions, they must come under the
+general law, and be determined by volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first position is admitted. The second,
+involving the last, he does not prove, and I deny that it is
+unquestionable.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken
+as following from the first. The relation of will to the sequents
+of its volitions, is not necessarily the same as its relation to
+its volitions. The sequents of volitions are changes or
+modifications, in external nature, or in parts of the being
+external to the will; but the volitions are modifications of the
+will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the
+will can be effected only by that modification of itself called
+volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if
+effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification
+of itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents
+in external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will;
+but this experience teaches us nothing respecting the production
+of volitions. The acts of the will are volitions, and all the
+acts of wills are volitions; but this means nothing more than
+that all the acts of the will are acts of the will, for volition
+means only this—an act of the will. But has not the act of the
+will a cause? Yes, you have assigned the cause, in the very
+language just employed. It is the act of the will—the will is the
+cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I do not know,
+nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the production of
+its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The connexion
+between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and
+inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions.
+How does volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire
+burn, or the sun raise the tides? And how does will cause
+volitions? I know not; but if I know that such are the facts, it
+is enough.</p>
+<p class="pn">Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards,
+will cannot be the cause, since this would lead to the absurdity
+of causing volitions by volitions. But we cannot perceive that it
+leads to any such absurdity.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause
+acts. If the will produce effects in external nature by its acts,
+it is impossible to connect with this as a sequence, established
+either by experience or logic, that in being received as the
+cause of its own acts, it becomes such only by willing its own
+acts. It is clearly an assumption unsupported, and incapable of
+being supported. Besides, in denying will to be the cause of its
+own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely, the motive,
+Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he creates; for
+I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains to
+motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects
+by exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To
+suppose it the cause of its own acts, involves all the
+absurdities which Edwards attributes to self-determination. But,
+<i>In the second place</i>,—let us look at the connexion of cause
+and phenomena a little more particularly. What is cause? It is
+that which is the ground of the possible, and actual existence of
+phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is cause
+visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe
+phenomena, and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to
+cause. But how do we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By
+a <i>nisus</i>, an effort, or energy. Is this <i>nisus</i> itself
+a phenomenon? It is when it is observed. Is it always observed?
+It is not. The <i>nisus</i> of gravitation we do not observe; we
+observe merely the facts of gravitation. The <i>nisus</i> of heat
+to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of
+combustion. Where then do we observe this <i>nisus?</i> Only in
+will. Really, volition is the <i>nisus</i> or effort of that
+cause which we call will. I do not wish to anticipate subsequent
+investigations, but I am constrained here to ask every one to
+examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I wish
+to do anything I make an effort—a <i>nisus</i> to do it; I make
+an effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply
+the volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my
+hand,—this effort is simply the volition to lift it,—and
+immediately antecedent to this effort, I recognise only my will,
+or really only myself. This effort—this <i>nisus</i>—this
+volition—whatever we call it,—is in the will itself, and it
+becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes that know
+ourselves. Every <i>nisus</i>, or effort, or volition, which we
+may make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not
+self-conscious, of course do not reveal this <i>nisus</i> to
+themselves, and they cannot reveal it to us because it is in the
+very bosom of the cause itself. What we observe in relation to
+all causes—not ourselves, whether they be self-conscious or not,
+is not the <i>nisus</i>, but the sequents of the <i>nisus</i>.
+Thus in men we do not observe the volition or <i>nisus</i> in
+their wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the
+<i>nisus</i>. And in physical causes, we do not observe the
+<i>nisus</i> of these causes, but only the phenomena which form
+the sequents of this <i>nisus</i>. But when each one comes to
+himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself—knows
+himself. He is himself the cause—he, himself, makes the
+<i>nisus</i>, and is conscious of it; and this <i>nisus</i> to
+him becomes an effect—a phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which
+he reveals himself, but a phenomenon by which he reveals himself
+only to himself. It is by the sequents of this <i>nisus</i>,—the
+effects produced in the external visible world, that he reveals
+himself to others.</p>
+<p class="pn">Sometimes the <i>nisus</i> or volition expends
+itself in the will, and gives no external phenomena. I may make
+an effort to raise my arm, but my arm may be bound or paralyzed,
+and consequently the effort is in vain, and is not known without.
+How energetic are the efforts made by the will during a fit of
+the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful force; we
+strive to run away from danger but all in vain.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a
+mountain: I may place my hand against its side, and tug, and
+strive: the <i>nisus</i> or volition is the most energetic that I
+can make, but, save the straining of my muscles, no external
+expression of the energy of my will is given; I am resisted by a
+greater power than myself.</p>
+<p class="pn">The most original movement of every cause is, then,
+this <i>nisus</i> in the bosom of the cause itself, and in man,
+as a cause, the most original movement is this <i>nisus</i>
+likewise, which in him we call volition. To deny such a
+<i>nisus</i> would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and
+energy of cause. This <i>nisus</i>, by its very conception and
+definition, admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it
+is in the substance of the cause; its first going forth to
+effects. A first movement or <i>nisus</i> of cause is just as
+necessary a conception as first cause itself. There is no
+conception to oppose to this, but that of every cause having its
+first movement determined by some other cause out of itself—a
+conception which runs back in endless retrogression without
+arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of
+all cause.</p>
+<p class="pn">The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will
+determine its own volitions, it must determine them by an act of
+volition, is unsupported alike by the facts of consciousness and
+a sound logic,—while all the absurdities of an infinite series of
+causation of acts really fasten upon his own theory, and destroy
+it by the very weapons with which it assails the opposite
+system.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>In the third place</i>,—Edwards virtually allows
+the self-determining power of will.</p>
+<p class="pn">Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or
+the sensibility. There is no personal activity out of the
+affections or sensitivity. Volition is as the most agreeable, and
+is itself the sense of the most agreeable. But what is the cause
+of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will, assuming that to
+make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the absurdity
+of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time he
+affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in
+correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all
+natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,—as, for
+example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these
+natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with
+objects so constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon
+by them. So, likewise, according to Edwards’s representation, we
+may say that the cause of volition is the nature and state of the
+affections or the will, acting under the condition of objects
+correlated to it. The sense of the most agreeable or choice
+cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an object presented
+which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its appearing
+most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most
+agreeable, depends not only upon “what appears in the object
+viewed, but also in the manner of the view, and <i>the state and
+circumstances</i> of the mind that views.� (p. 22.) Now “the
+<i>state</i> and <i>circumstances</i> of the mind that views, and
+the <i>manner</i> of its view,� is simply the mind acting from
+its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is a
+representation which answers to every natural cause with which we
+are acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of
+course its inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken
+as the cause of volition, on Edwards’s own principles, as the
+nature and state of heat may be taken as the cause of combustion:
+but by “the state, of mind,� Edwards means, evidently, the state
+of the will or the affections. It follows, therefore, that he
+makes the state of the will or the affections the cause of
+volition; but as the state of the will or the affections means
+nothing more in reference to will than the state of any other
+cause means in reference to that cause,—and as the state of a
+cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution,
+means nothing more than its character and qualities considered as
+a cause,—therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause
+of its own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause
+of its invariable sequents.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity
+of determining a volition by a volition, overlooked that,
+according to our most common and necessary conceptions of cause,
+the first movement or action of cause must be determined by the
+cause itself, and that to deny this, is in fact to deny cause. If
+cause have not within itself a <i>nisus</i> to produce phenomena,
+then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that in assigning
+as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will, he
+really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the
+very point he laboured to overthrow.</p>
+<p class="pn">The point in dispute, therefore, between us and
+Edwards, is not, after all, the self-determining power of the
+will. If will be a cause, it will be self-determining; for all
+cause is self-determining, or, in other words, is in its inherent
+nature active, and the ground of phenomena.</p>
+<p class="pn">But the real point in dispute is this: “<i>Is the
+will necessarily determined, or not?</i>�</p>
+<p class="pn">The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted
+and fixed, that the <i>nisus</i> by which it determines itself to
+produce phenomena, shall take place according to invariable and
+necessary laws. This we believe to be true with respect to all
+physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism,
+gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at work
+in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to
+fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary
+laws. We do not conceive it possible for these powers to produce
+any other phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which
+they actually produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass
+of dry gunpowder, an explosion must take place.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we
+call will, must, under given circumstances, necessarily produce
+such and such phenomena? Must its <i>nisus</i>, its
+self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a uniform and
+inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the sensitivity,
+and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its sense
+of the most agreeable, which is its most original <i>nisus</i> or
+its volition, follows certain necessary laws,—necessary in
+relation to itself. If we know the state of any particular will,
+and its correlation to every variety of object, we may know, with
+the utmost certainty, what its volition will be at a given time,
+and under given circumstances. Moral necessity and physical
+necessity differ only in the terms,—not in the nature of the
+connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary as any
+physical phenomenon.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity
+are one, then, as a mere psychological fact, we must grant that
+volition is necessary; for nothing can be plainer than that the
+desires and affections necessarily follow the correlation of the
+sensitivity and its objects. But if we can distinguish in the
+consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from the
+sensitivity,—if we can distinguish volition from the strongest
+desire or the sense of the most agreeable,—then it will not
+follow, because the one is necessary, the other is necessary
+likewise, unless a necessary connexion between the two be also an
+observed fact of consciousness. This will be inquired into in
+another part of our undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned
+with, is Edwards’s argument against the conception of a will not
+necessarily determined. This he calls a contingent determination
+of will. We adopt the word contingent; it is important in marking
+a distinction.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards, in his argument against a contingent
+determination, mistakes and begs the question under
+discussion.</p>
+<p class="pn">1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated
+of throughout as if identical with chance or no cause. “Any thing
+is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or
+accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its
+connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the
+established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we
+have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to
+be contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to
+pass without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope.
+But the word <i>contingent</i> is used abundantly in a very
+different sense; not for that whose connexion with the series of
+things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for
+something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason with
+which its existence has any fixed and certain connexion.� (p.
+31.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Thus, according to Edwards, not only is
+<i>contingent</i> used in the same sense as chance and accident,
+in the ordinary and familiar acceptation of these words, but it
+is also gravely employed to represent certain phenomena, as
+without any ground, or reason, or cause of their existence; and
+it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as applied
+to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he
+elaborately discusses the question—“whether any event whatsoever,
+and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of
+its existence;� and in sec. 4,—“whether volition can arise
+without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the
+soul.�</p>
+<p class="pn">If, in calling volitions contingent,—if, in
+representing the determination of the will as contingent, we
+intended to represent a class of phenomena as existing without
+“any previous ground or reason with which their existence has a
+fixed and certain connexion,�—as existing without any cause
+whatever, and therefore as existing by chance, or as really
+self-existent, and therefore not demanding any previous ground
+for their existence,—it seems to me that no elaborate argument
+would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That
+“every phenomenon must have a cause,� is unquestionably one of
+those primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a
+demonstration, because they precede all demonstration, and must
+be assumed as the basis of all demonstration.</p>
+<p class="pn">By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is
+not a cause. By contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions
+which exist without a cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will
+which is not a necessitated will, but what I conceive only and
+truly to be a <i>free will</i>. By contingent volitions, I mean
+volitions belonging to a contingent or free will. I do not oppose
+contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be supposed that
+we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not necessary
+I call contingent.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now an argument against contingency of will on the
+assumption that we intend, under this title, to represent
+volitions as existing without a cause, is irrelevant, since we
+mean no such thing.</p>
+<p class="pn">But an argument attempting to prove that
+contingency is identical with chance, or no cause, is a fair
+argument; but then it must be remembered that such an argument
+really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is possible, for
+we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">The argument must therefore turn upon these two
+points: First, is contingency a possible conception, or is it in
+itself contradictory and absurd? This is the main question; for
+if it be decided that contingency is a contradictory and absurd
+conception, then we are shut up to a universal and an absolute
+necessity, and no place remains for inquiry respecting a
+contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and
+rational conception, then the <i>second</i> point will be, to
+determine whether the will be contingent or necessary.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first point is the only one which I shall
+discuss in this place. The second properly belongs to the
+psychological investigations which are to follow. But I proceed
+to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument against a contingent
+will, really begs the question in dispute. In the first place, he
+represents the will as necessarily determined. This is brought
+out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first part
+of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.
+Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss
+contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that
+necessity is inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is
+plainly a begging of the question, as well as a mistaking of it;
+for when we are inquiring whether there be any thing contingent,
+that is, any thing opposed to necessity, he <i>begins</i> his
+argument by affirming all cause to be necessary, and contingency
+as implying no cause. If all cause be necessary, and contingency
+imply no cause, there is no occasion for inquiry after
+contingency; for it is already settled that there can be no
+contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are
+these two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be
+any cause, for example, will, which is contingent.</p>
+<p class="pn">If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the
+question respecting a contingent will, as I think clearly
+appears, then of course he has logically determined nothing in
+relation to it.</p>
+<p class="pn">But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now
+to inquire whether contingency be a possible and rational
+conception, or whether it be contradictory and absurd.</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity and contingency are then two ideas
+opposed to each other. They at least cannot co-exist in relation
+to the same subject. That which is necessary cannot be contingent
+at the same time, and vice versa. Whether contingency is a
+possible conception and has place in relation to any subject,
+remains to be determined.</p>
+<p class="pn">Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas:
+we will begin with necessity, because that this idea is rational
+and admits of actual application is not questioned. The only
+point in question respecting it, is, whether it be universal,
+embracing all beings, causes, and events.</p>
+<p class="pn">What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under
+two points of view:—</p>
+<p class="pn">1. Viewed in relation to will.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. Viewed irrespective of will.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first, supposes that opposition of will is
+possible, but insufficient;—for example: it is possible for me to
+place myself in opposition to a rushing torrent, but my
+opposition is insufficient, and the progress of the torrent
+relatively to me is <i>necessary</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">The second does not take will into consideration at
+all, and applies to subjects where opposition of will is not
+supposable; for example, logical necessity, a is b, and c is a,
+therefore c is b: mathematical necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre
+of a circle is a point equally distant from every point in the
+circumference: metaphysical necessity, the existence of a first
+cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this second kind of
+necessity under the general designation of metaphysical or
+philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is
+absolute. It is impossible to conceive of these subjects
+differently from what they are. We cannot conceive of no space;
+no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5, and so of the rest.</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity under both points of view he
+distinguishes into particular and general.</p>
+<p class="pn">Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity
+relative to individual will; as general, relative to all
+will.</p>
+<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a
+necessity irrespective of individual will; as general,
+irrespective of all will.</p>
+<p class="pn">Relative necessity is relative to the will in the
+connexion between volition and its sequents. When a volition of
+individual will takes place, without the sequent aimed at,
+because a greater force is opposed to it, then the sequent of
+this greater force is necessary with a particular relative
+necessity. When the greater force is greater than all supposable
+will, then its sequents take place by a general relative
+necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will,
+the will of God cannot be included, as there can be no greater
+force than a divine volition.</p>
+<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes
+the opposition of individual will. Under this Edwards brings the
+connexion of motive and volition. The opposition of will, he
+contends, is excluded from this connexion, because will can act
+only by volition, and motive is the cause of volition. Volition
+is necessary by a particular metaphysical necessity, because the
+will of the individual cannot be opposed to it; but not with a
+general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may be
+opposed to it.</p>
+<p class="pn">Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the
+opposition of all will—even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4—that
+the centre of a circle is a point equally distant from every
+point in the circumference—the existence of time and space—are
+all true and real, independently of all will. Will hath not
+constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It would imply a
+contradiction to suppose them different from what they are.
+According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary
+with a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these
+volitions are caused by motives, and infinite will, as well as
+finite will, must act by volitions, the opposition of infinite
+will itself is excluded in the production of infinite
+volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained
+in these two points of view, with their two-fold distinction?
+<i>Necessity is that which is and which cannot possibly not be,
+or be otherwise than it is</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">1. An event necessary by a relative particular
+necessity, is an event which is and cannot possibly not be or be
+otherwise by the opposition of an individual will.</p>
+<p class="pn">2. An event necessary by a relative general
+necessity, is an event which cannot possibly not be, or be
+otherwise by the opposition of all finite will. In these cases,
+opposition of will of course is supposable.</p>
+<p class="pn">3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical
+particular necessity, when it is, and admits of no possible
+opposition from the individual will.</p>
+<p class="pn">4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general
+necessity, when it is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition
+even from infinite will.</p>
+<p class="pn">All this, however, in the last analysis on
+Edwards’s system, becomes absolute necessity. The infinite will
+is necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity.
+All events are necessarily determined by the infinite will.
+Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a metaphysical
+general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are merely
+the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular
+individual and relation:—the terms characterize only the manner
+of our view. The opposition of the particular will being
+predetermined by the infinite will, which comprehends all, is to
+the precise limit of its force absolutely necessary; and the
+opposite force which overcomes the opposition of the particular
+will, produces its phenomena necessarily not only in reference to
+the particular will, but also in reference to the infinite will
+which necessarily pre-determines it.</p>
+<p class="pn">Having thus settled the definition of necessity,
+and that too, on Edwards’s own grounds, we are next to inquire,
+what is the opposite idea of contingency, and whether it has
+place as a rational idea?</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity is that which is, and which cannot
+possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as
+the opposite idea, must be <i>that which is, or may be, and which
+possibly might not be, or might be otherwise than it is</i>. Now,
+contingency cannot have place with respect to anything which is
+independent of will;—time and space;—mathematical and
+metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are
+equal, that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be
+contingent, for they are seen to be real and true in themselves.
+They do not arise from will, nor is it conceivable that will can
+alter them, for it is not conceivable that they admit of change
+from any source. If the idea of contingency have place as a
+rational idea, it must be with respect to causes, being, and
+phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation is the
+effect of divine volition. “God said, let there be light, and
+there was light:� thus did the whole creation come to be.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now every one will grant, that the creation does
+not seem necessary as time and space; and intuitive truths with
+their logical deductions, seem necessary. We cannot conceive of
+these as having not been, or as ceasing to be; but we can
+conceive of the creation as not having been, and as ceasing to
+be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or void
+space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may
+be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and
+relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely,
+different from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in
+one word this difference between space and body, or in general
+this difference between that which exists independently of will,
+and that which exists purely as the effect of will, we call the
+first necessary; the second, contingent. The first we cannot
+conceive to be different from what it is. The second we can
+conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the
+creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true
+likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All
+these events are either directly or mediately the effects of
+will, divine or human. Now we can conceive of these as not being
+at all, or as being modified indefinitely, different from what
+they are;—and under this conception we call them contingent.</p>
+<p class="pn">No one I think will deny that we do as just
+represented, conceive of the possibility of the events and
+creations of will, either as having no being, or as being
+different from what they are. This conception is common to all
+men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a chimera? It
+must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for
+according to this, there really is no possibility that any event
+of will might have had no being at all, or might have been
+different from what it is. Will is determined by motives
+antecedent to itself. And this applies to the divine will,
+likewise, which is determined by an infinite and necessary
+wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of that
+which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be
+chimerical. But although the system would force us to this
+conclusion, the conception still reigns in our minds, and does
+not <i>seem</i> to us chimerical;—the deduction from the system
+strangely conflicts with our natural and spontaneous judgements.
+There are few men who would not be startled by the dogma that all
+things and all events, even the constantly occuring volitions of
+their minds, are absolutely necessary, as necessary as a
+metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,—necessary with a
+necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise
+than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological
+abettors of Edwards’s system, who would not also be startled by
+it. I suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the
+broad conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here
+represented, being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not
+affect the sequents of volition; that if a man can do as he
+pleases, he has a natural liberty and ability which relieves him
+from the chain of metaphysical necessity. I have already shown
+how utterly futile this attempted distinction is—how completely
+the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called natural liberty
+and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted to, then
+we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley,
+“Necessity, thou mother of the world!� But why the reluctance to
+escape from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this
+system admit that there is something opposed to necessity? But
+what is this something opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that
+choice is opposed to necessity? But how opposed—is choice
+contingent? Do they admit the possibility that any choice which
+is, might not have been at all, or might have been different from
+what it is?</p>
+<p class="pn">We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity
+by merely calling it choice, or an act of the will. If will is
+not necessitated, we wish to know under what condition it exists.
+Volition is plainly under necessity on Edwards’s system, just as
+every other event is under necessity. And the connexion between
+volition and its sequents is just as necessary as the connexion
+between volition and its motives. Explain,—why do you endeavour
+to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to volition?
+why do you claim liberty here? Do <i>you</i> likewise have a
+natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It
+is evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the
+doctrine of necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink
+from its application to will. They first establish the doctrine
+of necessity universally and absolutely, and then claim for will
+an exception from the general law,—not by logically and
+psychologically pointing out the grounds and nature of the
+exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and natural
+judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they
+please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes
+it from necessity;—nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement
+against necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere
+illusion.</p>
+<p class="pn">There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this
+spontaneous judgement—and the will comes under the idea opposed
+to necessity. But what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how
+does the will come under it? Edwards and his followers have not
+answered these questions—their attempt at a solution is
+self-contradictory and void.</p>
+<p class="pn">Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than
+that of contingency, viz.—that which is or may be, and possibly
+might not be, or might be otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is
+a truth which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is.
+But this book which I hold in my hand, I can conceive of as not
+being at all, or being different from what it is, without
+implying any contradiction, according to this spontaneous
+judgement.</p>
+<p class="pn">The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot
+conceive of as not existing, or as being altered so as to
+transpose the terms, making that right which now is wrong, and
+that wrong which now is right. But the volition which I now put
+forth to move this pen over the paper, I can conceive of as not
+existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a volition to
+write words different from those which I am writing. That this
+idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this,
+that all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most
+rational idea. Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of
+necessity, do either adopt this idea in relation to will by a
+self-contradiction, and under a false position, as the abettors
+of the scheme which I am opposing for example, or in the ordinary
+conduct of life, they act upon it. All the institutions of
+society, all government and law, all our feelings of remorse and
+compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself, seem
+based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is
+somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes
+arising from <i>will</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">That the will actually does come under this idea of
+contingency, must be shown psychologically if shown at all. An
+investigation to this effect must be reserved therefore for
+another occasion. In this place, I shall simply inquire, how the
+will may be conceived as coming under the idea of
+contingency?</p>
+<p class="pn">The contingency of any phenomenon or event must
+depend upon the nature of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or
+event is one which may be conceived of, as one that might not
+have been at all, or might have been different from what it is;
+but wherein lies the possibility that it might not have been at
+all, or might have been different from what it is? This
+possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine
+nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in
+anything which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing
+in relation to its existence. The cause therefore which actually
+gives it existence, and existence under its particular form, can
+alone contain the possibility of its not having existed at all,
+or of its having existed under a different form. But what is the
+nature of such a cause? It is a cause which in determining a
+particular event, has at the very moment of doing so, the power
+of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not chained to
+any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of
+objects—as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its
+correlation to a certain class of objects which we thence call
+combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in
+opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to
+produce an effect which it may produce, and of any given number
+of effects alike within its power, it may take any one of them in
+opposition to all the others; and at the very moment it takes one
+effect, it has the power of taking any other. It is a cause
+contingent and not necessitated. The contingency of the event,
+therefore, arises from the contingency of the cause. Now every
+cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A necessary
+cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to act
+differently from its actual developements—fire must
+burn—gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth’s centre. If
+there be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent
+cause above defined, for there is no third conception. We must
+choose therefore between a universal and absolute necessity, and
+the existence of contingent causes. If we take necessity to be
+universal and absolute, then we must take all the consequences,
+likewise, as deduced in part II. There is no possible escape from
+this. As then all causes must be either necessary or contingent,
+we bring will under the idea of contingency, by regarding it as a
+contingent cause—“a power to do, or not to do,�<sup><a href="#n5"
+id="f5" title="see footnote" name="f5">5</a></sup>—or a faculty
+of determining “to do, or not to do something which we conceive
+to be in our power.�<sup><a href="#n6" id="f6" title=
+"see footnote" name="f6">6</a></sup></p>
+<p class="pn">We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a
+cause opposed to a contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its
+nature, also. What is this nature? It is a nature in fixed
+correlation with certain objects, so that it is inconceivable
+that its phenomena might be different from those which long and
+established observation have assigned to it. It is inconceivable
+that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it is
+inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing
+temperature. But is this necessity a necessity <i>per se</i>, or
+a determined necessity? It is a determined necessity—determined
+by the creative will. If the creative will be under the law of
+necessity, then of course every cause determined by will becomes
+an absolute necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">The only necessity <i>per se</i> is found in that
+infinite and necessary wisdom in which Edwards places the
+determining motives of the divine will. All intuitive truths and
+their logical deductions are necessary <i>per se</i>. But the
+divine will is necessary with a determined necessity on Edwards’s
+system,—and so of all other wills and all other causes, dependent
+upon will—the divine will being the first will determined. We
+must recollect, however, that on Edwards’s theory of causation, a
+cause is always determined out of itself; and that consequently
+there can be no cause necessary <i>per se</i>; and yet at the
+same time there is by this theory, an absolute necessity
+throughout all causality.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now let us consider the result of making will a
+contingent cause. In the first place, we have the divine will as
+the first and supreme contingent cause. Then consequently in the
+second place, all causes ordained by the divine will, considered
+as effects, are contingent. They might not have been. They might
+cease to be. They might be different from what they are. But in
+the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not all
+contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are
+necessary with a determined necessity. They are necessary as
+fixed by the divine will. They are necessary with a relative
+necessity—relatively to the divine will. They put forth their
+<i>nisus</i>, and produce phenomena by a fixed and invariable
+law, established by the divine will. But will is of the nature,
+being made after the image of the divine will. The divine will is
+infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The
+created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its
+given capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its <i>nisus</i>
+to do, are limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may
+make an effort, or volition, or <i>nisus</i>, to do anything of
+which it can conceive—but the actual production of phenomena out
+of itself, must depend upon the instrumental and physical
+connexion which the divine will has established between it and
+the world, external to itself. Of all the volitions or
+<i>nisus</i> within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any
+one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes
+any one <i>nisus</i> or volition, it has the power of making any
+other.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient,
+essential, and first cause. Whatever other causes exist, are
+determined and fixed by will, and are therefore properly called
+secondary or instrumental causes. And as we ourselves are will,
+we must first of all, and most naturally and most truly gain our
+idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate these second
+causes—we observe only their phenomena; but we know ourselves in
+the very first <i>nisus</i> of causation.</p>
+<p class="pn">To reason therefore from these secondary causes to
+ourselves, is indeed reversing the natural and true order on this
+subject. Now what is the ground of all this clamour against
+contingency? Do you say it represents phenomena as existing
+without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency not to cause,
+but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the phenomena of
+physical causation,—we reply that you have no right to reason
+from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in
+general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties
+of matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an
+absurd and pernicious doctrine—then turn and look at the doctrine
+of an absolute necessity in all its bearings and consequences,
+and where lies the balance of absurdity and pernicious
+consequences? But we deny that there is anything absurd and
+pernicious in contingency as above explained. That it is not
+pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of moral
+and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course
+of our inquiries.</p>
+<p class="pn">After what has already been said in the preceding
+pages, it perhaps is unnecessary to make any further reply to its
+alleged absurdity.</p>
+<p class="pn">There is one form under which this allegation comes
+up, however, which is at first sight so plausible, that I shall
+be pardoned for prolonging this discussion in order to dispose of
+it. It is as follows: That in assigning contingency to will, we
+do not account for a volition being in one direction rather than
+in another. The will, it is urged, under the idea of contingency,
+is indifferent to any particular volition. How then can we
+explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of
+indifferency to a choice or volition?</p>
+<p class="pn">In answer to this, I remark:—It has already been
+made clear, that selection and particular determination belong to
+every cause. In physical causes, this selection and particular
+determination lies in the correlation of the nature of the cause
+with certain objects; and this selection and particular
+determination are necessary by a necessity determined out of the
+cause itself—that is, they are determined by the creative will,
+which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes. Now
+Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination
+of will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is
+correlated to certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by
+the creative will, which gave origin to the secondary dependent
+will, the selection and particular determination of will, is
+necessary with a necessity determined out of itself. But to a
+necessitated will, we have nothing to oppose except a will whose
+volitions are not determined by the correlation of its nature
+with certain objects—a will, indeed, which has not its nature
+correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent; for if its
+nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and
+determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its
+action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of
+itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an
+absolute and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of
+a will forming volitions particular and determinate, or in other
+words, making a <i>nisus</i> towards particular objects, without
+any correlation of its nature with the objects. Is this
+conception a possible and rational conception? It is not a
+possible conception if will and the sensitivity, or the
+affections are identical—for the very definition of will then
+becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and
+necessarily affected by them.</p>
+<p class="pn">But now let us conceive of the will as simply and
+purely an activity or cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or
+affections—a cause capable of producing changes or phenomena in
+relation to a great variety of objects, and conscious that it is
+thus capable, but conscious also that it is not drawn by any
+necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a possible and
+rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause
+different from all other causes; and on this conception there are
+but two <i>kinds</i> of causes. The physical, which are
+necessarily determined by the correlation of their nature with
+certain objects, and will, which is a pure activity not thus
+determined, and therefore not necessitated, but contingent.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now I may take this as a rational conception,
+unless its palpable absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be
+proved to involve some contradiction.</p>
+<p class="pn">Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity,
+that there is, after all, nothing to account for the particular
+determination? I answer that the particular determination is
+accounted for in the very quality or attribute of the cause. In
+the case of a physical cause, the particular determination is
+accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to be
+necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of will, the
+particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the
+cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular
+determination without being necessarily correlated to the object.
+A physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated.
+The will is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a
+cause instrumental of a first cause:—the will is first cause
+itself. The infinite will is the first cause inhabiting eternity,
+filling immensity, and unlimited in its energy. The human will is
+first cause appearing in time, confined to place, and finite in
+its energy; but it is the same in kind, because made in the
+likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self moved,
+it makes its <i>nisus</i> of itself, and of itself it forbears to
+make it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation
+to its objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary
+act, any particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as
+well as any particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a
+cause, are accounted for in itself alone. This does not make the
+created will independent of the uncreated. The very fact of its
+being a created will, settles its dependence. The power which
+created it, has likewise limited it, and could annihilate it. The
+power which created it, has ordained and fixed the
+instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of
+effects. The man may make the volition or <i>nisus</i>, to remove
+a mountain, but his arm fails to carry out the <i>nisus</i>. His
+volitions are produced freely of himself; they are unrestrained
+within the capacity of will given him, but he meets on every side
+those physical causes which are mightier than himself, and which,
+instrumental of the divine will, make the created will aware of
+its feebleness and dependence.</p>
+<p class="pn">But although the will is an activity or cause thus
+contingent, arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity
+or cause united with sensitivity and reason; and forming the
+unity of the soul. Will, reason, and, the sensitivity or the
+affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or soul. Although the
+will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not follow that it
+<i>must</i> act without regard to reason or feeling.</p>
+<p class="pn">I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am
+now only giving a scheme of psychology in order to prove the
+possibility of a contingent will, that we have nothing else to
+oppose to an absolute and universal necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">According to this scheme, we take the will as the
+<i>executive</i> of the soul or the <i>doer</i>. It is a doer
+having life and power in itself, not necessarily determined in
+any of its acts, but a power to do or not to do. <i>Reason</i> we
+take as the <i>lawgiver</i>. It is the “source and substance� of
+pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and
+commands the executive will what ought to be done. The
+sensitivity or the affections, or the desire, is the seat of
+enjoyment: it is the capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in
+general, hold to the sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or
+the disagreeable, are in correlation with it; and, according to
+the degree of this correlation, are the emotions and passions
+awakened.</p>
+<p class="pn">Next let the will be taken as the chief
+characteristic of personality, or more strictly, as the
+personality itself. By the personality, I mean the me, or myself.
+The personality—the me—the will, a self-moving cause, directs
+itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives the
+laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with
+the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at
+the same time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to
+disobey them.</p>
+<p class="pn">Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in
+an act of attention to the pleasurable emotions connected with
+the presence of certain objects; and the painful emotions
+connected with the presence of other objects; and then the desire
+of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain, become rules of action.
+There is here again the consciousness of power to resist or to
+comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may direct
+itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them,
+and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and
+disgust.</p>
+<p class="pn">We may suppose again two conditions of the reason
+and sensitivity relatively to each other; a condition of
+agreement, and a condition of disagreement. If the affections
+incline to those objects which the reason approves, then we have
+the first condition. If the affections are repelled in dislike by
+those objects which reason approves, then we have the second
+condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying reason,
+gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in
+obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice
+versa.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now if the will were always governed by the highest
+reason, without the possibility of resistance, it would be a
+necessitated will; and if it were always governed by the
+strongest desire, without the possibility of resistance, it would
+be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system of Edwards,
+where the strongest desire is identified with volition.</p>
+<p class="pn">The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in
+the conception of a will as above defined—a conscious,
+self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to
+passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in
+their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the
+indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to
+reason or passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the
+reason, shall it be asked, what is the cause of the act of
+obedience? The will is the cause of its own act; a cause <i>per
+se</i>, a cause self-conscious and self-moving; it obeys the
+reason by its own <i>nisus</i>. When the will obeys the strongest
+desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of obedience?
+Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we called
+upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a
+self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an
+absolute necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason,
+we attempt to explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason
+awakens the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable;
+we may then ask, why the will obeys the strongest desire? and
+then we may attempt to explain this again by saying, that to obey
+the strongest desire seems most reasonable. We may evidently,
+with as much propriety, account for obedience to passion, by
+referring to reason; as account for obedience to reason, by
+referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in the
+direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then
+the act of the will which goes in the direction of the
+sensitivity, may find its cause in the reason. But this is only
+moving in a circle, and is no advance whatever. Why does the will
+obey the reason? because it is most agreeable: but why does the
+will obey because it is most agreeable? because to obey the most
+agreeable seems most reasonable.</p>
+<p class="pn">Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous
+to intuitive or first truths. First truths require no
+demonstration; they admit of none; they form the basis of all
+demonstration. Acts of the will are first movements of primary
+causes, and as such neither require nor admit of antecedent
+causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis of
+all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself
+admits of no explanation. It presents the primary and
+all-comprehending <i>fact</i> of power. In God, will is infinite,
+primary cause, and untreated: in man, it is finite, primary
+cause, constituted by God’s creative act, but not necessitated,
+for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be power
+after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical
+or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural
+antecedents and sequents.</p>
+<p class="pn">God’s will explains creation as an existent fact;
+man’s will explains all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire
+after the characteristics of creation, we bring in the idea of
+infinite wisdom and goodness. But when we inquire <i>why</i>
+God’s will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we must either
+represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and
+goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute
+necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself
+as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which,
+explaining all effects, neither requires nor admits of any
+explanation itself.</p>
+<p class="pn">When we proceed to inquire after the
+characteristics of human volition, we bring in the idea of right
+and wrong; we look at the relations of the reason and the
+sensitivity. But when we inquire <i>why</i> the will now obeys
+reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion;
+we must either represent the will as necessitated, and take all
+the consequences of a necessitated will, or we must stop short
+here likewise, with the will itself as a first cause, not
+necessary, but contingent, which, in explaining its own
+volitions, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself,
+other than as a finite and dependent will it requires to be
+referred to the infinite will in order to account for the fact of
+its existence.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards, while he burdens the question of the
+will’s determination with monstrous consequences, relieves it of
+no one difficulty. He lays down, indeed, a uniform law of
+determination; but there is a last inquiry which he does not
+presume to answer. The determination of the will, or the
+volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of
+the most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one
+simple power or capacity, there arise from it an indefinite
+variety of volitions; and volitions at one time directly opposed
+to volitions at another time. The question now arises, how this
+one simple capacity of volition comes to produce such various
+volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may be the
+volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but
+that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only
+its relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically
+considered, is at one time right, at another wrong; at one time
+rational, at another foolish. The volition really varies,
+although, relatively to the will, it always puts on the
+characteristic of the most agreeable. The question therefore
+returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of
+volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most
+agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. <i>First</i>,
+we may suppose the <i>state</i> of the will or sensitivity to
+remain unchanged, and the different volitions to be effected by
+the different arrangements and conditions of the objects
+relatively to it. <i>Secondly</i>, we may suppose the
+arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged,
+and the different volitions to be effected by changes in the
+<i>state</i> of the sensitivity, or will, relatively to the
+objects. Or, <i>thirdly</i>, we may suppose both the state of the
+will, and the arrangements and conditions of the objects to be
+subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus giving rise to
+the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet at an
+end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the
+different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought
+about? On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of
+the sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the
+changes in both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could
+be said, that the sensitivity changes itself relatively to the
+objects, then we should ask again, why the sensitivity chooses at
+one time, as most agreeable to itself, that which is right and
+rational, and at another time, that which is wrong and foolish?
+Or, if it could be said, that the objects have the power of
+changing their own arrangements and conditions, then also we must
+ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make the
+right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time,
+the wrong and foolish.</p>
+<p class="pn">These last questions are the very questions which
+Edwards does not presume to answer. The motive by which he
+accounts for the existence of the volition, is formed of the
+correlation of the state of the will, and the nature and
+circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is such as
+to give the volition in the direction of the right and the
+rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,—we ask
+<i>why</i> does the correlation give the volition in this
+direction. If it be said that the volition in this direction
+appears most agreeable, the answer is a mere repetition of the
+question; for the question amounts simply to this:—why the
+correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather than the
+other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most
+agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as
+the most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind
+changes its state in relation to the objects; or why the objects
+change their relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense
+of the most agreeable in one direction rather than in another?
+The difficulty is precisely of the same nature which is supposed
+to exist in the case of a contingent will. The will now goes in
+the direction of reason, and now in the direction of passion,—but
+why? We say, because as will, it has the power of thus varying
+its movement. The change is accounted for by merely referring to
+the will.</p>
+<p class="pn">According to Edwards, the correlation of will and
+its objects, now gives the sense of the most agreeable, or
+volition, in the direction of the reason; and now in the
+direction of passion—but why?—Why does the reason <i>now</i>
+appear most agreeable,—and now the indulgences of impure desire?
+I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which
+is equivalent to saying,—I have the sense of the most agreeable
+in reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do
+you know it is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have
+the sense of the most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain,
+therefore, that on Edwards’s system, as well as on that opposed
+to it, the particular direction of volition, and the constant
+changes of volition, must be referred simply to the cause of
+volition, without giving any other explanation of the different
+determinations of this cause, except referring them to the nature
+of the cause itself. It is possible, indeed, to refer the changes
+in the correlation to some cause which governs the correlation of
+the will and its objects; but then the question must arise in
+relation to this cause, why it determines the correlation in one
+direction at one time, and in another direction at another time?
+And this could be answered only by referring it to itself as
+having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to
+do or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction,
+or in the opposite direction; or by referring it to still another
+antecedent cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be
+the infinite will: then the question would be, why the infinite
+will determines the sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one
+time to wisdom, and at another to folly? And what answer could be
+given? Shall it be said that it seems most agreeable to him? But
+why does it seem most agreeable to him? Is it because the
+particular determination is the most reasonable, that it seems
+most agreeable? But why does he determine always according to the
+most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most
+reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to
+Edwards, the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the
+same; to say that God wills as he does will, because it is most
+agreeable to him, is to say that he wills because he wills; and
+to say that he wills as he does will, because it seems most
+reasonable to him, amounts to the same thing, because he wills
+according to the most reasonable only because it is the most
+agreeable.</p>
+<p class="pn">To represent the volitions, or choices, either in
+the human or divine will, as determined by motives, removes
+therefore no difficulty which is supposed to pertain to
+contingent self-determination.</p>
+<p class="pn">Let us compare the two theories particularly,
+although at the hazard of some repetition.</p>
+<p class="pn">Contingent self-determination represents the will
+as a cause making its <i>nisus</i> or volitions of itself, and
+determining their direction of itself—now obeying reason, and now
+obeying passion. If it be asked why it determines in a particular
+direction?—if this particular direction in which it determines be
+that of the reason?—then it may be said, that it determines in
+this direction because it is reasonable;—if this particular
+direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it may
+be said that it determines in this direction, because it is
+pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction
+of reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to
+reason?—we cannot say that it is most reasonable to obey reason
+and not passion; because the one is all reason, and the other is
+all passion, and of course they cannot be compared under the
+reasonable; and no more can they be compared under the
+pleasing,—when, by the pleasing, we understand, the gratification
+of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it is
+reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that
+the will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is
+desirable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that
+the will does obey desire. The will goes in one direction rather
+than in another by an act of self-determination, which neither
+admits of, nor indeed requires any other explanation than this,
+that the will has power to do one or the other, and in the
+exercise of this power, it does one rather than the other.</p>
+<p class="pn">To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards;
+and what is this system? That the will is determined by the
+strongest motive;—and what is the strongest motive? The greatest
+apparent good, or the most agreeable:—what constitutes the
+greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable? The correlation of
+will or sensitivity and the object. But why does the correlation
+make one object appear more agreeable than another; or make the
+same object at one time appear agreeable, at another time
+disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the
+question,—why does the will go in the direction of one object
+rather than of another; or go in the direction of a given object
+at one time, and in opposition to it at another time? For the
+will to determine itself toward an object in one system, answers
+to the will having the sense of the most agreeable towards an
+object in Edwards’s system. If Edwards should attempt to give an
+answer without going beyond the motive, he could only say that
+the sensitivity has the power of being affected with the sense of
+the most agreeable or of the most disagreeable; and that in the
+exercise of this power it is affected with the one rather than
+with the other. He could not say that to obey reason appears more
+agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for the
+obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense
+of the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to
+obey reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite,
+under the idea of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to
+no more than this, on his system, that it is most agreeable to
+obey the reasonable;—that is, the reasonable is obeyed only as
+the most agreeable: but obedience of will being nothing more than
+the sense of the most agreeable, to say it is obeyed because most
+agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the sense of the most
+agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is obeyed.</p>
+<p class="pn">To refer the motive to the divine determination
+makes volition necessary to the man, and throws the difficulty in
+question, if it is to be considered a difficulty, only farther
+back.</p>
+<p class="pn">If God’s will determines in the direction of the
+reasonable because it is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it
+the most agreeable? If the reply be, because it is most
+reasonable, then we are only moving in a circle; but if the
+agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch as to will
+is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows that
+God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only
+because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in
+him; and thus the question why God wills in one direction rather
+than in another, or what is the cause of his determination, is
+not answered by Edwards, unless he says with us that the will in
+itself as a power to do or not to do, or to do one thing, or its
+opposite, is a sufficient explanation, and the only possible
+explanation;—or unless he refers the divine will to an antecedent
+cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in an endless
+series—and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless
+series, and an absolute necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">All possible volitions, according to the scheme of
+psychology I have above given, must be either in the direction of
+the reason or of the sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both.
+If the volition be in the direction of the reason, it takes the
+characteristics of rational, good, &amp;c. If in the direction of
+the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic from the nature of
+the particular desire which it obeys:—it is generous, benevolent,
+kind, &amp;c.—or it is malicious, envious, unkind, vicious,
+&amp;c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?
+Nothing moves it; it is a cause <i>per se</i>; it goes in that
+direction because it has power to go in that direction. What
+moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing
+moves it; it is a cause <i>per se</i>; it goes in that direction
+because it has power to go in that direction.</p>
+<p class="pn">There are in the intelligence or reason, as united
+with the will in the constitution of the mind, necessary
+convictions of the true, the just, the right. There are in the
+sensitivity, as united in the same constitution, necessary
+affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable in reference to
+various objects. The will as the power which by its <i>nisus</i>
+produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in
+either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it
+makes its <i>nisus</i> or volition in reference to the true, the
+just, the good; should we attempt to explain this <i>nisus</i> by
+saying that the true, the just, the good, affect the sensitivity
+agreeably, this would only amount to saying that the <i>nisus</i>
+is made towards the true, not as the true, but only as the
+agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the
+<i>nisus</i> is always made in the direction of the agreeable.
+But then again we might seek to explain why the <i>nisus</i> is
+always made in the direction of the agreeable. Is it of an
+antecedent necessity? Then we have an absolute and universal
+necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the agreeable
+seems most rational? Then it follows that the <i>nisus</i> is
+made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the
+rational; and then we would introduce the law that the
+<i>nisus</i> is always made in the direction of the rational. But
+then again we might seek to explain why this <i>nisus</i> is
+always made in the direction of the rational. Is it of an
+antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have an absolute and
+universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the
+rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back in a
+circle to our first position.</p>
+<p class="pn">How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall
+we adopt the psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the
+sensitivity one? Then as the volition is always the strongest
+affection of the agreeable, if the sensitivity be necessary,
+volitions are necessary, and we are plunged headlong again into
+an absolute and universal necessity. If the sensitivity be not
+necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we have to
+account for its various determinations just as we are supposed to
+be called upon to account for the various determinations of the
+will when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:—we
+are met with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent
+this object as more agreeable than that object?—or the same
+object as agreeable at one time, and disagreeable at another? Or
+if these various determinations are resolved into an antecedent
+necessity comprehending them, then we go up to the antecedent
+cause in which this necessity resides, and question it in like
+manner.</p>
+<p class="pn">But one thing remains, and that is to consider the
+will as primary cause, contingent in opposition to being
+necessitated—a cause having in itself the power of making these
+various volitions or <i>nisus</i>, and neither asking nor
+allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their particular
+direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.</p>
+<p class="pn">The question respecting the indifferency of will
+must now be considered. The term <i>indifferency</i> comes up in
+consequence of considering the will as distinct from the
+sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling—it is a power
+indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of
+objects.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is
+not conviction or belief—it is a power indifferent to the true
+and the right, to the false and the wrong, in the sense that it
+is not necessarily determined by conviction and belief, by the
+true and the right, or by the false and the wrong. The conception
+of will in its utmost simplicity is the conception of pure power,
+self-moving, and self-conscious—containing within itself the
+ground and the possibility of creation and of modification. In
+God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every
+<i>nisus</i> in his will is really creative or modifying,
+according to its self-directed aim. In man it is constituted,
+dependent, limited, and accountable.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now in direct connexion with power, we have the
+conception of law or rule, or what power <i>ought</i> to do. This
+law or rule is revealed in the reason. In man as pure, and we
+conclude in God likewise, as the archetype of all spirit, there
+is given a sensitivity or a capacity to be affected agreeably by,
+and to be drawn towards the objects approved and commanded by the
+reason. If this sensitivity does not move in harmony with the
+reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a triunity with
+these two other powers. We can distinguish but not separate it
+from them. A will without reason would be a power without eyes,
+or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and
+isolated;—just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be
+without efficiency, or capacity of giving real
+manifestations.</p>
+<p class="pn">The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a
+union with all; but then each in its proper movements is in some
+sense independent and free of the others. The convictions,
+beliefs, or perceptions of reason are not made, nor can they be
+unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the will any direct
+command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can excite and
+direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up objects
+and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and
+yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its
+manifestations.</p>
+<p class="pn">The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet
+the latter would have no definite perception, and of course its
+highest sensibilities would lie dormant without the reason.</p>
+<p class="pn">So also the reason and the sensitivity do not
+determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or
+creative and modifying power in itself—self-moved, self-directed.
+But then without reason and sensitivity, the will would be
+without objects, without designs, without rules,—a solitary
+power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing what to
+do.</p>
+<p class="pn">It addition to the above, the will has this high
+and distinguishing peculiarity. That it alone is free—that it
+alone is opposed to necessity. Reason <i>must</i> perceive,
+<i>must</i> believe. Sensitivity <i>must</i> feel when its
+objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given its
+light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has
+awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey.
+It is as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may
+be called a power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only
+that it is a power which absolutely puts forth its own
+<i>nisus</i>, and is free.</p>
+<p class="pn">It follows from this, that the will can act
+irrespective of both reason and sensitivity, if an object of
+action, bearing no relation to reason or sensitivity, be
+possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such relation,
+must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be
+called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency
+of will;—it would only prove that all objects of action actually
+existing, bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is
+a case, however, frequently called up, and much disputed, which
+deserves some attention, and which it appears to me, offers the
+illustration required. Let it be required to select one of the
+squares of the chess-board. In selecting one of the squares, does
+the will act irrespective of reason and sensitivity, or not?
+Those who hold that the will is necessarily determined, must make
+out some connexion between the act of selection, and the reason
+and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general motive
+which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to
+illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is,
+to prove that the will can act without a motive.</p>
+<p class="pn">I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the
+motive of bringing the chess-board before the eye, and in making
+all the preparations for a selection;—but now the last question
+is, which square shall I select? The illustration will have the
+same force whichever square is selected, and there is no motive
+that can be drawn either from the reason or the sensitivity for
+taking one square in preference to the other: under the absence
+of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at
+illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in
+making this selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an
+entire indifferency as to which particular square is
+selected;—there is no command of the reason directing to one
+square rather than another;—there is no affection of the
+sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as most
+agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.</p>
+<p class="pn">It will be proper, in this place, to consider the
+following argument of Edwards against indifferency of will:
+“Choice may be immediately <i>after</i> a state of indifference,
+but cannot co-exist with it: even the very beginning of it is not
+in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if this be liberty,
+no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state
+of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are
+so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to
+another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes
+and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and
+darkness, or life and death.� (p. 73.)</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If
+the will and the sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be
+conceived of as in a state of indifference, and if it could be
+conceived of as in a state of indifference before it exercises
+volition, inasmuch as, according to his system again, volition is
+the sense of the most agreeable, the moment volition begins,
+indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in
+indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just
+as rest ceases with motion.</p>
+<p class="pn">But according to the system of psychology, which we
+adopt, and which I shall verify hereafter, the will is not one
+with the sensitivity, but is clearly distinguishable from it:—the
+sensitivity is the capacity of feeling; the will is the causality
+of the soul:—a movement of the sensitivity, under the quality of
+indifference, is self-contradictory; and a movement of the will
+being a mere <i>nisus</i> of cause, under the quality of any
+sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory likewise;
+it would be confounding that which we had already distinguished.
+From Edwards’s very definition of will it cannot be indifferent;
+from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise than
+indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and
+sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the
+indifference which it possessed before the action; but this is no
+less true when it determines in the direction either of reason or
+sensitivity. When the determination is in the direction of the
+reason, there is an exercise of reason in connexion with the act,
+and all the interest of the reason is wakened up, but the will
+considered in its entire simplicity, knows only the <i>nisus</i>
+of power. When the determination is in the direction of the
+sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the
+will again knows only the <i>nisus</i> of power which carries it
+in this direction.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the unity of the soul these powers are generally
+found acting together. It may be difficult to distinguish them,
+and this, in connexion with the constantly observed fact of the
+fixed correlation between physical causes and the masses which
+they operate upon, may lead to the conclusion that there is a
+fixed correlation likewise between the will and its objects,
+regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at least, that there is
+a fixed connexion between the will and the sensitivity, so that
+the former is invariably governed by the latter. We have already
+shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not relieve us
+from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent will,
+unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the
+sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the
+sensitivity the difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the
+will. In our psychological investigations it will appear how
+clearly distinguishable those powers are, and also how clearly
+independent and sovereign will is, inasmuch as it does actually
+determine at one time, in opposition to the most agreeable; at
+another, in opposition to reason; and at another, in opposition
+to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we
+perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as
+subordinated to reason, to move within the delights of the
+sensitivity; and we know that we are acting <i>unreasonably</i>
+and <i>senselessly</i> when we act otherwise; but yet
+<i>unreasonably</i> and <i>senselessly</i> do we often act. But
+when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its
+direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason;
+and when we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become
+sensitivity—will is still simply cause, and its act the
+<i>nisus</i> of power: thought, and conviction, and design, hold
+their place in the reason alone: emotion and passion their place
+in the sensitivity alone.</p>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+ARGUMENT</p>
+<p style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:84%;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">
+FROM</p>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:0;margin-bottom:1.5em">THE
+DIVINE PRESCIENCE.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards’s argument against a contingent,
+self-determining will, drawn from the divine prescience, remains
+to be considered.</p>
+<p class="pn">The argument is introduced as follows: “That the
+acts of the wills of moral agents are not contingent events, in
+such a sense as to be without all necessity, appears by God’s
+certain foreknowledge of such events.� (sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards
+devotes this section to “the evidence of God’s certain
+foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.� In the following
+section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his
+argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the
+consequences of his position.</p>
+<p class="pn">God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them
+makes their existence necessary. If their existence were not
+necessary, he could not foresee them; or, to express it still
+more generally, foreknowledge extends to all events, and
+foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of everything to
+which it extends. It follows from this, that all events exist
+with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all
+volitions, and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all
+the divine volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own
+volitions. In no part of his work, does Edwards lay down more
+summarily and decidedly, the doctrine of absolute and universal
+necessity. We have already, in part II. of this treatise, deduced
+the consequences of this doctrine. If then we are placed upon the
+alternative of denying the divine prescience of volitions, or of
+acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would practically be
+most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the
+alternative. “If it could be demonstrated,� remarks Dugald
+Stewart, (vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) “which in my opinion has not
+yet been done, that the prescience of the volitions of moral
+agents is incompatible with the free agency of man, the logical
+inference would be, <i>not</i> in favour of the scheme of
+necessity, but that there are some events, the foreknowledge of
+which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to affirm, that
+it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of contingent
+events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not extend
+to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of
+God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his
+omniscience?� If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the
+doctrine of necessity, there is nothing left that it is worth
+while to contend for; all moral and theological interests vanish
+away. But let us examine the argument of Edwards.</p>
+<p class="pn">This argument consists of three parts; we shall
+consider them in order.</p>
+<p class="pn">I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is
+necessary, “having already made sure of existence;� but divine
+foreknowledge is such an event, and is therefore necessary. This
+is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever is, is. He next
+affirms, that whatever is “indissolubly connected with other
+things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;� but events
+infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the
+foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God,
+have an indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are
+therefore necessary.</p>
+<p class="pn">The force of this reasoning turns upon the
+connexion between foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This
+connexion is affirmed to be “indissoluble;� that is, the
+foreknowledge is certainly connected with the event. But this
+only amounts to the certainty of divine foreknowledge, and proves
+nothing as to the nature of the existence foreknown. We may
+certainly know a past or present event, but our knowledge of its
+existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it came to
+exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a
+certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and
+it cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge
+of his walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or
+necessary antecedent; and the question whether his walking be
+contingent or necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the
+cause of walking. I looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a
+man walking; and the knowledge of that event I now retain, so
+that it cannot but be that the man walked yesterday: but this
+again leaves the question respecting the mode of existence
+untouched:—Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a contingent
+event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of
+prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by
+this faculty I may see a man walking in the time called
+to-morrow, just as by the faculty of memory I see a man walking
+in the time called yesterday. The knowledge, whether it relate to
+past, present, or future, as a knowledge in relation to myself,
+is always a present knowledge; but the object known may stand in
+various relations of time, place, &amp;c. Now in relation to the
+future, no more than in relation to the past and present, does
+the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in relation to
+the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge. Edwards
+remarks, (p. 121.) “All certain knowledge, whether it be
+foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge,
+proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or
+other; or proves that it is impossible that it should now be
+otherwise than true.�</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty
+of the mere <i>fact</i> of existence, and the necessity by which
+anything comes to exist. Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and
+concomitant knowledge,—that is, the present knowledge of events,
+future, past, or present,—proves of course the reality of the
+events; that they will be, have been, or are: or, more strictly
+speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of time, is
+the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the
+knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity
+of its existence. If the knowledge of the event were the
+<i>cause</i> of the event, or if it <i>generically</i>
+comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon strict logical
+principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would be
+affirmed of the event likewise.</p>
+<p class="pn">That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that
+as he foreknows them, they will be, is also granted; his
+foreknowledge of them is the positive affirmation of their
+reality in time future; but by supposition, God’s foreknowledge
+is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend them;
+they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God’s
+foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put
+forth or determine their volitions, does not take away from these
+wills the contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more
+than our witnessing how wills act in the time present, takes away
+from them their contingency and freedom. God in his prescience,
+<i>is the spectator of the future, as really as we are the
+spectators of the present</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards’s reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that
+employed sometimes for exercising the student of logic in the
+detection of fallacies: for example, a man in a given place, must
+<i>necessarily</i> either stay in that place, or go away from
+that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes away, he acts
+necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things, that a
+man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then
+it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to
+stay or go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition
+as a body, is entirely distinct from the question respecting the
+necessity or contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect
+of the divine foreknowledge: all human volitions as events
+occurring in time, are subject to the necessary condition of
+being foreknown by that Being, “who inhabiteth eternity:� but
+this necessary condition of their existence neither proves nor
+disproves the necessity or the contingency of their particular
+causation.</p>
+<p class="pn">II. The second proposition in Edwards’s argument
+is, “No future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence
+is contingent, and without all necessity.� His reasoning in
+support of this is as follows: 1. “It is impossible for a thing
+to be certainly known to any intellect without <i>evidence</i>.�
+2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3. Therefore, a
+contingent future event is not a possible object of knowledge. I
+dispute both premises: That which is known by <i>evidence</i> or
+<i>proof</i> is <i>mediate</i> knowledge,—that is, we know it
+through something which is immediate, standing between the
+faculty of knowledge and the object of knowledge in question.
+That which is known <i>intuitively</i> is known without proof,
+and this is <i>immediate</i> knowledge. In this way all axioms or
+first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed
+evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by
+which anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a
+Being, therefore, whose knowledge fills duration, future and past
+events may be as immediately known as present events. Indeed, can
+we conceive of God otherwise than immediately knowing all things?
+An Infinite and Eternal Intelligence cannot be thought of under
+relations of time and space, or as arriving at knowledge through
+<i>media</i> of proof or demonstration. So much for the first
+premise. The second is equally untenable: “<i>A contingent future
+event is without evidence</i>.� We grant with Edwards that it is
+not <i>self-evident</i>; implying by that the evidence arising
+from “the necessity of its nature,� as for example, 2 x 2 = 4.
+What is self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require
+any evidence or proof, but is known immediately; and a future
+contingent event may be self-evident as a fact lying before the
+divine mind, reaching into futurity, although it cannot be
+self-evident from “the necessity of its nature.�</p>
+<p class="pn">But Edwards affirms, that “neither is there any
+<i>proof</i> or evidence in <i>anything else</i>, or evidence of
+connexion with something else that is evident; for this is also
+contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now
+nothing existent with which the future existence of the
+<i>contingent</i> event is connected. For such a connexion
+destroys its contingency and supposes necessity.� (p. 116.) He
+illustrates his meaning by the following example: “Suppose that
+five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no
+other being but the Divine Being,—and then this world, or some
+particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into
+being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form—all in
+<i>absolute contingence</i>,—without any concern of God, or any
+other cause in the matter,—without any manner of ground or reason
+of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all
+with anything foregoing;—I say that if this be supposed, there
+was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence
+of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet
+was not; and there was no evidence of it to be seen in <i>any
+thing else;</i> for <i>evidence</i> in something else; is
+<i>connexion</i> with something else; but such connexion is
+contrary to the supposition.� (p. 116.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch
+as a contingent event exists “<i>without any concern of God, or
+any other cause in the matter,—without any manner of ground or
+reason of its existence,—or any dependence upon or connexion with
+anything foregoing</i>,�—there is really nothing by which it can
+be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right in this definition of a
+contingent event, viz.: that it is an event without any cause or
+ground of its existence, and “that there is nothing now existent
+with which the future existence of the contingent event is
+connected,� then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive.
+But I do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat
+again, is not opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may
+have sprung into being by <i>absolute contingence</i> more than
+five thousand years ago, and yet have sprung into being at the
+command of God himself, and its existence have been foreseen by
+him from all eternity. The contingence expresses only the freedom
+of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign choice, and
+at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold the
+creative <i>nibus</i>,—creating in the light of his infinite
+wisdom, but from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein
+found. Under this view to foresee creation was nothing different
+from foreseeing his own volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">The ground on which human volitions can be
+foreseen, is no less plain and reasonable. In the first place,
+future contingent volitions are never without a cause and
+sufficient ground of their existence, the individual will being
+always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of the individual
+volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible existence
+of volitions other than his own, in the creation and constitution
+of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not required
+to conceive of <i>media</i> by which all the particular volitions
+may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual
+existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite
+intuition; he cannot be dependent upon any media for his
+knowledge. It is enough, as I have already shown, to assign him
+prescience, in order to bring within his positive knowledge all
+future contingent volitions. He knows all the variety and the
+full extent of the possible, and amid the possible he foresees
+the actual; and he foresees not only that class of the actual
+which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively
+necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring
+up under the characteristic of contingency.</p>
+<p class="pn">And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of
+the divine prescience over human forecast,—in that the former
+penetrates the contingent as accurately as the necessary. With
+the latter it is far otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can
+foresee the motions of the planets, eclipses of the sun and moon,
+and even the flight of the comets, because they are governed by
+necessary laws; but the volitions of the human will form the
+subject of only <i>probable</i> calculations.</p>
+<p class="pn">But if human volitions, as contingent, form the
+subject of probable calculations, there must be in opposition to
+Edwards something “that is evident� and “now existent, with which
+the future existence of the <i>contingent</i> event is
+connected.�</p>
+<p class="pn">There are three kinds of certainty. <i>First</i>,
+absolute certainty. This is the certainty which lies in necessary
+and eternal principles e. g. 2 x 2=4; the existence of space;
+every body must be in space; every phenomenon must have a cause;
+the being of God.</p>
+<p class="pn">Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between
+premises and conclusion, is likewise absolute.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Secondly</i>. Physical certainty. This is the
+certainty which lies in the connexion between physical causes and
+their phenomena: e. g. gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in
+general, mechanical forces.</p>
+<p class="pn">The reason conceives of these causes as inherently
+active and uniform; and hence, wherever a physical cause exists,
+we expect its proper phenomena.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now we do not call the operation of these causes
+<i>absolutely</i> certain, because they depend ultimately upon
+will,—the will of God; and we can conceive that the same will
+which ordained them, can change, suspend, or even annihilate
+them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes given in
+time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If in
+any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to
+recognise the presence of that will which ordained them. Such
+change or suspension we call a <i>miracle</i>; that is, a
+surprise,—a wonder, because it is unlooked for.</p>
+<p class="pn">When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be
+physically certain, we mean that it is certain in the
+immutability of a cause acting in time and space, and under a
+necessity relatively to the divine will; but still not
+<i>absolutely</i> certain, because there is a possibility of a
+miracle. But when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain,
+we mean that it is certain as comprehended in a principle which
+is unalterable in its very nature, and is therefore independent
+of will.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Thirdly</i>. Moral certainty, is the certainty
+which lies between the connexion of motive and will. By will we
+mean a self-conscious and intelligent cause, or a cause in unity
+with intelligence. It is also, in the fullest sense, a cause
+<i>per se</i>; that is, it contains within itself proper
+efficiency, and determines its own direction. By <i>motives</i>
+we mean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general,
+all activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons;
+for they have the same meaning: but in mere material masses, the
+rule is not contemplated by the acting force,—it is contemplated
+only by the intelligence which ordained and conditioned the
+force. In spirit, on the contrary, the activity which we call
+will is self-conscious, and is connected with a perception of the
+reasons, or ends, or motives of action. These motives or ends of
+action are of two kinds. <i>First</i>, those found in the ideas
+of the practical reason, which decides what is fit and right.
+These are reasons of supreme authority. <i>Secondly</i>, those
+found in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately
+useful and expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are
+right only when subordinate to the first.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now these reasons and motives are a light to the
+will, and serve to direct its activities; and the human
+conscience, which is but the reason, has drawn up for the will
+explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations, which
+are called <i>ethics</i>, or <i>the rules</i>.</p>
+<p class="pn">These rules the will is not compelled or
+necessitated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a
+power to do or not to do; but yet, as the will forms a unity with
+the intelligence, we take for granted that it will obey them,
+unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent. But the
+only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a
+state of sinfulness,—a corruption of the sensitivity, or a
+disposition to violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual
+constitution. Hence moral certainty can exist only where the
+harmony of the spiritual being is preserved. For example: God and
+good angels. In God moral certainty is infinite. His dispositions
+are infinitely pure, and his will freely determines to do right;
+it is not compelled or necessitated, for then his infinite
+meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is <i>not
+absolute</i>, because will being a power to do or not to do,
+there is always a possibility, although there may be no
+probability, nay an infinite improbability, that the will may
+disobey the laws of the reason.</p>
+<p class="pn">In the case of angels and good men, the moral
+certainty is such as to be attended with no apprehension of a
+dereliction. With respect to such men as Joseph, Daniel, Paul,
+Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a very high and
+satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they will
+act in any given circumstances involving the influence of
+motives. We know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,—that
+is, the <i>first</i> class of motives; and the <i>second</i> only
+so far as they are authorized by the first. If the first class of
+motives are forsaken, then human conduct can be calculated only
+according to the influence of the second class.</p>
+<p class="pn">Human character, however, is mixed and variously
+compounded. We might make a scale of an indefinite number of
+degrees, from the highest point of moral excellence to the lowest
+point of moral degradation, and then our predictions of human
+conduct would vary with every degree.</p>
+<p class="pn">In any particular case where we are called upon to
+reason from the connexion of motives with the will, it is evident
+we must determine the character of the individual as accurately
+as possible, in order to know the probable <i>resultant</i> of
+the opposite moral forces which we are likely to find.</p>
+<p class="pn">We have remarked that moral certainty exists only
+where the harmony of the moral constitution is preserved. Here we
+know the right will be obeyed. It may be remarked in addition to
+this, however, that moral certainty may almost be said to exist
+in the case of the lowest moral degradation, where the right is
+altogether forsaken. Here the rule is, “whatever is most
+agreeable;� and the volition is indeed merged into the sense of
+the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide
+field of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of
+human nature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of
+life, is not the knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but
+as it is in its vast variety of good and evil. We gain this
+knowledge from observation and history. What human nature ought
+to be, we learn from reason.</p>
+<p class="pn">On a subject of so much importance, and where it is
+so desirable to have clear and definite ideas, the rhetorical
+ungracefulness of repetition is of little moment, when this
+repetition serves our great end. I shall be pardoned, therefore,
+in calling the attention of the reader to a point above
+suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and
+sensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed
+to derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts
+which are in the direction of neither reason nor sensitivity,
+must be very trifling acts; and therefore acts of this
+description, although possible, we may conclude are very rare. In
+calculating, then, future acts of will, we may, like the
+mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume that
+all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or
+sensitivity, or of both in their harmony. Although the will is
+conscious of power to do, out of the direction of both reason and
+sensitivity, still, in the triunity in which it exists, it
+submits itself to the general interests of the being, and
+consults the authority of conscience, or the enjoyments of
+passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself habits and
+a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted
+himself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions,
+to the laws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has
+formed for himself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has
+exhibited, too, on many occasions, noble, generous, and pure
+feelings; and hence we conclude that his sensitivity harmonizes
+with conscience. Or he is known to have violated the laws of the
+conscience from day to day, and in a great variety of
+transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for
+himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on
+many occasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we
+conclude that his sensitivity is in collision with
+conscience.</p>
+<p class="pn">In both cases supposed, and in like manner in all
+supposable cases, there is plainly a basis on which, in any given
+circumstances, we may foresee and predict volitions. There is
+something “that is evident and now existent with which the future
+existence of the contingent event is connected.� On the one hand
+these predictions exert no necessitating influence over the
+events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected with the
+causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events need
+not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of
+probable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations
+would no longer be merely probable:—they would, on the contrary,
+take the precision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses
+and other phenomena based upon necessary laws. But these
+calculations can aim only at <i>moral</i> certainty, because they
+are made according to the generally known and received
+determinations of will in a unity with reason and sensitivity;
+but still a will which is known also to have the power to depart
+at any moment from the line of determination which it has
+established for itself. Thus the calculations which we make
+respecting the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based
+on his known integrity, and the calculations which we make
+respecting another, based on his known dishonesty, may alike
+disappoint us, through the unexpected, though possible
+dereliction of the first, and the unexpected, though possible
+reformation of the latter. When we reason from moral effects to
+moral causes, or from moral causes to moral effects, we cannot
+regard the operation of causes as positive and uniform under the
+same law of necessity which appertains to physical causes,
+because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and
+last determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a
+high degree of probability, with a probability sufficient to
+regulate wisely and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we
+cannot reason respecting human conduct, as we reason respecting
+the phenomena of the physical world, because it is possible for
+the human will to disappoint calculations based upon the ordinary
+influence of motives: e. g. the motive does not hold the same
+relation to will which fire holds to combustible substance; the
+fire must burn; the will may or may not determine in view of
+motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance, probable
+evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral evidence
+being generally probable, all probable evidence is called
+moral.</p>
+<p class="pn">The will differs from physical causes in being a
+cause <i>per se</i>, but although a cause <i>per se</i>, it has
+laws to direct its volitions. It may indeed violate these laws
+and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law unto itself; but
+this violation of law and this arbitrary determination do not
+arise from it necessarily as a cause <i>per se</i>, but from an
+abuse of its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the
+reason, we expect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and
+perfect movements it is uniform. Physical causes are uniform
+because God has determined and fixed them according to laws
+derived from infinite wisdom.</p>
+<p class="pn">The human will may likewise be uniform by obeying
+the laws of conscience, but the departures may also be
+indefinitely numerous and various.</p>
+<p class="pn">To sum up these observations in general statements,
+we remark;—</p>
+<p class="pn">First: The connexion on which we base predictions
+of human volitions, is the connexion of will with reason and
+sensitivity in the unity of the mind or spirit.</p>
+<p class="pn">Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be
+designed to be regulated by truth and righteousness, and by
+feeling subordinated to these.</p>
+<p class="pn">Thirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is
+thus regulated.</p>
+<p class="pn">Fourthly: This regulation, however, does not take
+place by the necessary governance which reason and sensitivity
+have over will, but by a self-subjection of will to their rules
+and inducements;—this constitutes meritoriousness,—the opposite
+conduct constitutes ill desert.</p>
+<p class="pn">Fifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to
+the degree and fixedness of this self-subjection to reason and
+right feeling; or where this does not exist, according to the
+degree and fixedness of the habits of wrong doing, in a
+self-subjection to certain passions in opposition to reason.</p>
+<p class="pn">Sixthly: Our calculations will be more or less
+certain according to the extent and accuracy of our observations
+upon human conduct.</p>
+<p class="pn">Seventhly: Our calculations can never be attended
+with <i>absolute</i> certainty, because the will being
+contingent, has the power of disappointing calculations made upon
+the longest observed uniformity.</p>
+<p class="pn">Eighthly: Our expectations respecting the
+determinations of Deity are attended with the highest moral
+certainty. We say <i>moral</i> certainty, because it is certainty
+not arising from necessity, and in that sense absolute; but
+certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely pure
+being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is
+affirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that
+he has not the power to change or to determine contrary to truth;
+but that there is an infinite moral certainty arising from the
+perfection of his nature, that he never will depart from infinite
+wisdom and rectitude.</p>
+<p class="pn">To assign God any other immutability would be to
+deprive him of freedom.</p>
+<p class="pn">Ninthly: The divine foresight of human volitions
+need not be supposed to necessitate them, any more than human
+foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing them, has no necessary
+connexion in any case with their causation. Again, if it does not
+appear essential to the divine foresight of volitions that they
+should be necessary. We have seen that future contingent
+volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty even
+by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in
+the same way to calculate them through <i>media</i>,—the reach
+and accuracy of his calculations must be in the proportion of his
+intelligence, and how far short of a certain and perfect
+knowledge of all future contingent volitions can infinite
+intelligence be supposed to fall by such calculations?</p>
+<p class="pn">Tenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite
+mind is compelled to resort to deduction, or to employ
+<i>media</i> for arriving at any particular knowledge. In the
+attribute of prescience, he is really present to all the possible
+and actual of the future.</p>
+<p class="pn">III. The third and last point of Edwards’s argument
+is as follows: “To suppose the future volitions of moral agents,
+not to be necessary events; or which is the same thing, events
+which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass;
+and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows
+all things, is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with
+itself. For to say that God certainly and without all conjecture,
+knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he
+knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to
+suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing
+he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows.�
+(page 117.)</p>
+<p class="pn">The substance of this reasoning is this. That
+inasmuch as a contingent future event is <i>uncertain</i> from
+its very nature and definition, it cannot be called an object of
+<i>certain</i> knowledge, to any mind, not even to the divine
+mind, without a manifest contradiction. “It is the same as to
+say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible
+truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth.�</p>
+<p class="pn">We have here again an error arising from not making
+a proper distinction, which I have already pointed out,—the
+distinction between the certainty of a future volition as a mere
+fact existent, and the manner in which that fact came to
+exist.</p>
+<p class="pn">The fact of volition comes to exist contingently;
+that is, by a power which in giving it existence, is under no law
+of necessity, and at the moment of causation, is conscious of
+ability to withhold the causative <i>nibus</i>. Now all volitions
+which have already come to exist in this way, have both a certain
+and contingent existence. It is certain that they have come to
+exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their existence
+is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by necessity
+as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and free,
+and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions,
+had the power to withhold them.</p>
+<p class="pn">Certainty and contingency are not opposed, and
+exclusive of each other in reference to what has already taken
+place. Are they opposed and exclusive of each other in reference
+to the future? In the first place, we may reason on probable
+grounds. Contingent causes have already produced volitions—hence
+they may produce volitions in the future. They have produced
+volitions in obedience to laws of reason and sensitivity—hence
+they may do so in the future. They have done this according to a
+uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually observed—hence
+this uniformity may be continued in the future.</p>
+<p class="pn">A future contingent event may therefore have a high
+degree of probability, and even a moral certainty.</p>
+<p class="pn">But to a being endowed with prescience, what
+prevents a positive and infallible knowledge of a future
+contingent event? His mind extends to the actual in the future,
+as easily as to the actual in the past; but the actual of the
+future is not only that which comes to pass by his own
+determination and <i>nibus</i>, and therefore necessarily in its
+relation to himself as cause, but also that which comes to pass
+by the <i>nibus</i> of constituted wills, contingent and free, as
+powers to do or not to do. There is no opposition, as Edwards
+supposes, between the infallible divine foreknowledge, and the
+contingency of the event;—the divine foreknowledge is infallible
+from its own inherent perfection; and of course there can be no
+doubt but that the event foreseen will come to pass; but then it
+is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently, and not
+necessarily.</p>
+<p class="pn">The error we have just noted, appears again in the
+corollary which Edwards immediately deduces from his third
+position. “From what has been observed,� he remarks, “it is
+evident, that the absolute <i>decrees</i> of God are no more
+inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the necessity of
+the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute
+foreknowledge of God.� (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God
+are the determinations of his will, and comprehend the events to
+which they relate, as the cause comprehends the effect.
+Foreknowledge, on the contrary, has no causality in relation to
+events foreknown. It is not a determination of divine will, but a
+form of the divine intelligence. Hence the decrees of God do
+actually and truly necessitate events; while the foreknowledge of
+God extends to events which are not necessary but contingent,—as
+well as to those which are pre-determined.</p>
+<p class="pn">Edwards always confounds contingency with chance or
+no cause, and thus makes it absurd in its very definition. He
+also always confounds certainty with necessity, and thus compels
+us to take the latter universal and absolute, or to plunge into
+utter uncertainty, doubt, and disorder.</p>
+<p class="pn">Prescience is an essential attribute of Deity.
+Prescience makes the events foreknown, certain; but if certain,
+they must be necessary. And on the other hand, if the events were
+not certain, they could not be foreknown,—for that which is
+uncertain cannot be the object of positive and infallible
+knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be foreknown, then
+they must be necessary.</p>
+<p class="pn">Again: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all
+future events supposed to come under it, out of all possible
+connexion with anything preceding and now actually existent, and
+consequently allows of no basis upon which they can be calculated
+and foreseen. Contingence, also, as opposed to necessity,
+destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility even of divine
+prescience. This is the course of Edwards’s reasoning.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now if we have reconciled contingence with both
+cause and certainty, and have opposed it only to necessity, thus
+separating cause and certainty from the absolute and unvarying
+dominion of necessity, then this reasoning is truly and
+legitimately set aside.</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the
+sensitivity connected with it:—contingency lies only in will. But
+the future acts of will can be calculated from its known union
+with, and self-subjection to the reason and sensitivity.</p>
+<p class="pn">These calculations are more or less probable, or
+are certain according to the known character of the person who is
+the subject of these calculations.</p>
+<p class="pn">Of God we do not affirm merely the power of
+calculating future contingent events upon known data, but a
+positive prescience of all events. He sees from the beginning how
+contingent causes or wills, will act. He sees with absolute
+infallibility and certainty—and the events to him are infallible
+and certain. But still they are not necessary, because the causes
+which produce them are not determined and necessitated by
+anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free, and
+conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in
+doing.</p>
+<p class="pn">I am persuaded that inattention to the important
+distinction of the certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge,
+and the necessity implied in the divine predetermination or
+decree, is the great source of fallacious reasonings and
+conclusions respecting the divine prescience. When God
+pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity
+relative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It
+cannot be otherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains.
+But when he foreknows an event, he presents us merely a form of
+his infinite intelligence, exerting no causative, and
+consequently no necessitating influence whatever. The volitions
+which I am now conscious of exercising, are just what they are,
+whether they have been foreseen or not—and as they now do
+actually exist, they have certainty; and yet they are contingent,
+because I am conscious that I have power not to exercise them.
+They are, but they might not have been. Now let the intelligence
+of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have
+foreseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain
+that this foresight does not destroy the contingency of the
+volitions, nor does the contingency render the foresight absurd.
+The supposition is both rational and possible.</p>
+<p class="pn">It is not necessary for us to consider the
+remaining corollaries of Edwards, as the application of the above
+reasoning to them will be obvious.</p>
+<p class="pn">Before closing this part of the treatise in hand, I
+deem it expedient to lay down something like a scale of
+certainty. In doing this, I shall have to repeat some things. But
+it is by repetition, and by placing the same things in new
+positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and succeed in
+rendering philosophical ideas familiar.</p>
+<p class="pn">First: Let us consider minutely the distinction
+between certainty and necessity. Necessity relates to truths and
+events considered in themselves. Certainty relates to our
+apprehension or conviction of them. Hence necessity is not
+certainty itself, but a ground of certainty. <i>Absolute
+certainty</i> relates only to truths or to being.</p>
+<p class="pn">First or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions
+drawn from them, are necessary with an absolute necessity. They
+do not admit of negative suppositions, and are irrespective of
+will. The being of God, and time, and space, are necessary with
+an absolute necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn"><i>Relative necessity</i> relates to logical
+conclusions and events or phenomena. Logical conclusions are
+always necessary relatively to the premises, but cannot be
+absolutely necessary unless the premises from which they are
+derived, are absolutely necessary.</p>
+<p class="pn">All phenomena and events are necessary with only a
+relative necessity; for in depending upon causes, they all
+ultimately depend upon will. Considered therefore in themselves,
+they are contingent; for the will which produced them, either
+immediately or by second or dependent causes, is not
+necessitated, but free and contingent—and therefore their
+non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to
+will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite;
+when therefore the <i>nibus</i> of this will was made, creation
+was the necessary result. The Deity is under no necessity of
+willing; but when he does will, the effect is said necessarily to
+follow—meaning by this, that the <i>nibus</i> of the divine will
+is essential power, and that there is no other power that can
+prevent its taking effect.</p>
+<p class="pn">Created will is under no necessity of willing; but
+when it does will or make its <i>nibus</i>, effects necessarily
+follow, according to the connexion established by the will of
+Deity, between the <i>nibus</i> of created will and surrounding
+objects. Where a <i>nibus</i> of created will is made, and
+effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater
+force of a resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so
+that whatever follows the <i>nibus</i> of created will, whether
+it be a phenomenon without, or the mere experience of a greater
+resisting force, it follows by a necessity relative to the divine
+will.</p>
+<p class="pn">When we come to consider will in relation to its
+own volitions, we have no more necessity, either absolute er
+relative; we have contingency and absolute freedom.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our
+knowledge or conviction of truths and events.</p>
+<p class="pn">Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute
+and relative. We have a certain knowledge or conviction of that
+which we perceive to be necessary in its own nature, or of which
+a negative is not supposable; and this, as based upon an
+<i>absolute necessity</i>, may be called an absolute
+certainty.</p>
+<p class="pn">The established connexion between causes and
+effects, is another ground of certainty. Causes are of two kinds;
+first causes, or causes <i>per se</i>, or contingent and free
+causes, or will; and second or physical causes, which are
+necessary with a relative necessity.</p>
+<p class="pn">First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and
+the finite.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will
+take place. This may likewise be called an absolute certainty,
+because the connexion between divine volitions and effects is
+absolutely necessary. It is not supposable that God should will
+in vain, for that would contradict his admitted infinity.</p>
+<p class="pn">The connexion between the volitions of created will
+and effects, and the connexion between physical causes and
+effects, supposing each of course to be in its proper relations
+and circumstances, is a connexion of relative necessity; that is,
+relative to the divine will. Now the certainty of our knowledge
+or conviction that an event will take place, depending upon
+volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different from the
+certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain conviction
+that an event which infinite power wills, will take place. The
+will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend
+or change the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my
+hand over this paper, it will move, supposing of course the
+continued healthiness of the limb; but it is possible for God so
+to alter the constitution of my being, that my will shall have no
+more connexion with my hands than it now has with the circulation
+of the blood. I believe also that if I throw this paper into the
+fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God so to alter the
+constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper will not
+burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will continue
+to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This
+certainly is not an <i>absolute certainty</i>, but a
+<i>conditional</i> certainty: events will thus continue to take
+place on condition the divine will does not change the condition
+of things. This conditional certainty is likewise called a
+<i>physical</i> certainty, because the events contemplated
+include besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so
+commonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world,
+or nature.</p>
+<p class="pn">But we must next look at will itself in relation to
+its volitions: Here all is contingency and freedom,—here is no
+necessity. Is there any ground of certain knowledge respecting
+future volitions?</p>
+<p class="pn">If will as a cause <i>per se</i>, were isolated and
+in no relation whatever, there could not be any ground of any
+knowledge whatever, respecting future volitions. But will is not
+thus isolated. On the contrary, it forms a unity with the
+sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals <i>what ought to be
+done</i>, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The
+sensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the
+ground of personal experience. Now although it is granted that
+will can act without deriving a reason or inducement of action
+from the reason and the sensitivity, still the instances in which
+it does so act, are so rare and trifling, that they may be thrown
+out of the account. We may therefore safely assume as a general
+law, that the will determines according to reasons and
+inducements drawn from the reason and the sensitivity. This law
+is not by its very definition, and by the very nature of the
+subject to which it relates, a necessary law—but a law revealed
+in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise of
+its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of
+our being, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In
+obeying the one or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to
+perfect beings, therefore, we can calculate with certainty as to
+their volitions under any given circumstances. Whatever is
+commanded by reason, whatever appears attractive to the pure
+sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed.</p>
+<p class="pn">But what kind of certainty is this? It is not
+absolute certainty, because it is supposable that the will which
+obeys may not obey, for it has power not to obey. Nor is it
+<i>physical</i> certainty, for it does not relate to a physical
+cause, nor to the connexion between volition and its effects, but
+to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor again can
+we, strictly speaking, call it a <i>conditional</i> certainty;
+because the will, as a power <i>per se</i>, is under no
+conditions as to the production of its volitions. To say that the
+volitions will be in accordance with the reason and pure
+sensitivity, if the will continue to obey the reason and pure
+sensitivity, is merely saying that the volitions will be right if
+the willing power put forth right volitions. What kind of
+certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty altogether
+peculiar,—a certainty based upon the relative state of the reason
+and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the
+commands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name
+of <i>moral</i><sup><a href="#n7" id="f7" title="see footnote"
+name="f7">7</a></sup> laws, simply because they have this
+relation,—and as the sensitivity, when harmonizing with the
+reason, is thence called morally pure, because attracting to the
+same conduct which the reason commands,—this certainty may fitly
+be called <i>moral certainty</i>. The name, however, does not
+mark <i>degree</i>. Does this certainty possess degrees? It does.
+With respect to the volitions of God, we have the highest degree
+of moral certainty,—an infinite moral certainty. He, indeed, in
+his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions
+whatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the
+harmony of infinite reason with the divine affections of infinite
+benevolence, truth, and justice, we are certain that his
+volitions will always be right, good, and wise. Besides, he has
+assured us of his fixed determination to maintain justice, truth,
+and love; and he has given us this assurance as perfectly knowing
+himself in the whole eternity of his being. Let no one attempt to
+confound this perfect moral certainty with necessity, for the
+distinction is plain. If God’s will were affirmed to be
+necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness,
+and love, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the
+determination of the divine will: viz.—that the divine
+determination takes place, not in contingency and freedom, not
+with the power of making an opposite determination, but in
+absolute necessity. But if it be affirmed that God’s will, will
+<i>certainly</i> go in the direction of truth, righteousness, and
+love, the affirmation respects our <i>knowledge</i> and
+<i>conviction</i> of the character of the divine volitions in the
+whole eternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire
+after the grounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the
+necessity of the divine determinations be the ground of this
+knowledge and conviction, it must be allowed that it is a
+sufficient ground. But will any man assume that necessity is the
+<i>only</i> ground of certain knowledge and conviction? If
+necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of
+course there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other
+ground of knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at
+least for the sake of the argument, it be granted that there may
+be other grounds of knowledge than necessity, then I would ask
+whether the infinite excellence of the divine reason and
+sensitivity, in their perfect harmony, does afford to us a ground
+for the most certain and satisfactory belief that the divine will
+will create and mould all being and order all events according to
+infinite wisdom and rectitude. In order to have full confidence
+that God will forever do right, must we know that his will is
+absolutely necessitated by his reason and his affections? Can we
+not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him absolute freedom of
+choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the Earth will
+do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have the
+power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when,
+in his omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his
+purposes will forever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does
+not the glory and excellency of God appear in this,—that while he
+hath unlimited power, he employs that power by his free choice,
+only to dispense justice, mercy, and grace? And does not the
+excellency and meritoriousness of a creature’s faith appear in
+this,—that while God is known to be so mighty and so absolute, he
+is confided in as a being who will never violate any moral
+principle or affection? Suppose God’s will to be necessitated in
+its wise and good volitions,—the sun dispensing heat and light,
+and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of
+creation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,—and
+the creature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in
+him, holds no other relation to him than the sunflower to the
+sun—by a necessity of its nature, ever turning its face upwards
+to receive the influences which minister to its life and
+properties.</p>
+<p class="pn">The moral certainty attending the volitions of
+created perfect beings is the same in kind with that attending
+the volitions of the Deity. It is a certainty based upon the
+relative state of the reason and the sensitivity, and their unity
+with the will. Wherever the reason and the sensitivity are in
+harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this, that in
+calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we
+have not to calculate the relative energy of opposing
+principles:—all which is now existent is, in the constituted
+unity of the soul, naturally connected only with good volitions.
+But the <i>degree</i> of the moral certainty in created beings,
+when compared with that attending the volitions of Deity, is only
+in the proportion of the finite to the infinite. The confidence
+which we repose in the integrity of a good being, does not arise
+from the conviction that his volitions are necessitated, but from
+his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and our sense of
+his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility of his
+doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing
+right while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under
+temptations of doing wrong.</p>
+<p class="pn">A certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the
+necessity of the volitions, would not differ from a physical
+certainty. But a moral certainty has this plain distinction,—that
+it is based upon the evidently pure dispositions and habits of
+the individual, without implying, however, any necessity of
+volitions.</p>
+<p class="pn">Moral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral
+perfection, and predicable in degrees according to the dignity
+and excellency of the being.</p>
+<p class="pn">But now let us suppose any disorder to take place
+in the sensitivity; that is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to
+any degree, to grow into opposition to the reason, so that while
+the reason commands in one direction, the sensitivity gives the
+sense of the most agreeable in the opposite direction,—and then
+our calculations respecting future volitions must vary
+accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer, because
+volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing
+principles: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in
+different degrees.</p>
+<p class="pn">By <i>the probable</i>, we mean that which has not
+attained to certainty, but which nevertheless has grounds on
+which it claims to be believed. We call it <i>probable</i> or
+<i>proveable</i>, because it both has proof and is still under
+conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof. That
+which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A
+mathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity,
+and admits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates
+its truth.</p>
+<p class="pn">The divine volitions are certain on the ground of
+the divine perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is
+found in the divine perfections.</p>
+<p class="pn">The volitions of a good created being are certain
+on the ground of the purity of such a being, and admit of no
+higher proof than what is found in this purity.</p>
+<p class="pn">But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being
+of reason, and of a sensitivity corrupted totally or in different
+degrees, then we have place not for certainty, but for
+probability. As our knowledge of the future volitions of such a
+being can only be gathered from something now existent, this
+knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present relative
+state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of
+this is in no case supposable,—so that, although our actual
+knowledge of this being may be such as to afford us proof of what
+his volitions may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may
+be increased indefinitely by close observation and study, so
+likewise will the proof be increased. According to the definition
+of probability above given, therefore, our knowledge of the
+future volitions of an imperfect being can only amount to
+probable knowledge.</p>
+<p class="pn">The direction of the probabilities will be
+determined by the preponderance of the good or the bad in the
+mixed being supposed. If the sensitivity be totally corrupted,
+the probabilities will generally go in the direction of the
+corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed general fact in
+relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments of passion
+are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But the
+state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be
+in a highly developed state, and the convictions of the right
+consequently clear and strong, there may be probabilities of
+volitions in opposition to passion which cannot exist where the
+reason is undeveloped and subject to the errors and prejudices of
+custom and superstition. The difference is that which is commonly
+known under the terms “enlightened and unenlightened
+conscience.�</p>
+<p class="pn">Where the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the
+direction of the probabilities must depend upon the degree of
+corruption and the degree to which the reason is developed or
+undeveloped.</p>
+<p class="pn">With a given state of the sensitivity and the
+reason, the direction of the probabilities will depend also very
+much upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects and
+circumstances:—where the objects and circumstances agree with the
+state of the sensitivity and the reason, or to speak generally
+and collectively, with “the state of the mind,� the probabilities
+will clearly be more easily determined than where they are
+opposed to “the state of the mind.�</p>
+<p class="pn">The law which Edwards lays down as the law of
+volition universally, viz: that “the volition is as the greatest
+apparent good:� understanding by the term “good,� as he does,
+simply, that which strikes us “agreeably,� is indeed a general
+rule, according to which the volitions of characters deeply
+depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as
+governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of
+character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is
+struggling under the light of his reason against passion, and
+consequently the probabilities in this last case must be
+calculated in a different way. But in relation to the former it
+is a sufficient rule.</p>
+<p class="pn">Probability, as well as certainty, respects only
+the kind and degree of our knowledge of any events, and not the
+causes by which those events are produced: whether these causes
+be necessary or contingent is another question.</p>
+<p class="pn">One great error in reasoning respecting the
+character of causes, in connexion with the calculation of
+probabilities, is the assumption that uniformity is the
+characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning may be
+stated in the following syllogism:</p>
+<p class="pn">In order to calculate either with certainty or
+probability any events we must suppose a uniform law of
+causation; but uniformity can exist only where there is a
+necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose a
+necessity of causation.</p>
+<p class="pns">This is another instance of applying to the will
+principles which were first obtained from the observation of
+physical causes, and which really belong to physical causes only.
+With respect to physical causes, <i>it is true</i> that
+uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary causes,
+simply because physical causes are relatively necessary
+causes:—but with respect to the will, <i>it is not true</i> that
+uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary cause,
+because the will is not a necessary cause. That uniformity
+therefore, as in the case of physical causes, seems to become a
+characteristic of necessary cause, does not arise from the nature
+of the idea of cause, but from the nature of the particular
+subject, viz., <i>physical</i> cause. Uniformity in logical
+strictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule.
+Cause is simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the
+direction, aims, and modes of power: cause explains the mere
+existence of phenomena: law explains their relations and
+characteristics: law is the thought and design of the reason. Now
+a cause may be so conditioned as to be incapable of acting except
+in obedience to law, and this is the case of all physical causes
+which act according to the law or design of infinite wisdom, and
+thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to these
+causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they
+necessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned
+as to be incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can
+oppose itself to, and violate law, but still it is a cause in
+connexion with law, the law found in the reason and sensitivity,
+which law of course has the characteristic of uniformity. The law
+of the reason and pure sensitivity is uniform—it is the law of
+right. The law of a totally corrupted sensitivity is likewise a
+uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law to do whatever is
+most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every individual, whatever
+may be the degree of his corruption, forms for himself certain
+rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces
+uniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity
+of conduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the
+design of the supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature.
+Uniformity of volitions is nothing but the design of reason and
+pure sensitivity, or of corrupted passion developed in human
+conduct. The uniformity thus not being the characteristic of
+cause as such, cannot be the characteristic of necessary cause.
+The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues nothing respecting
+the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause or it may
+not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity in
+a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform
+rules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but
+which we also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical
+causes we have the uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we
+have the uniformity of a free intelligent cause. We can conceive
+of perfect freedom and yet of perfect order, because the free
+will can submit itself to the light of the reason. Indeed, all
+the order and harmony of creation, although springing from the
+<i>idea</i> of the reason, has been constituted by the power of
+the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not
+necessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is
+altogether an assumption incapable of being supported that
+freedom is identified with disorder.</p>
+<p class="pt1">Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience.</p>
+<p class="pn">These words are metaphorical: <i>fore</i> and
+<i>pre</i> do not qualify <i>knowledge</i> and <i>science</i> in
+relation to the mind which has the knowledge or science; but the
+time in which the knowledge takes place in relation to the time
+in which the object of knowledge is found. The metaphor consists
+in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge, considered
+relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act of
+knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining
+greater perspicuity, let us say,</p>
+<p class="pn">First: All acts of knowing are present acts of
+knowing,—there is no <i>fore</i> knowledge and no <i>after</i>
+knowledge.</p>
+<p class="pn">Secondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no
+relation to time and space whatever, e. g. pure abstract and
+necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4; and the being of God. Or the
+objects of knowledge may be in relations of time and space, e. g.
+all physical phenomena.</p>
+<p class="pn">Now these relations of time and space are
+various;—the object of knowledge may be in time past, or time
+present, or time future; and it may be in a place near, or in a
+place distant. And the faculty of knowledge may be of a capacity
+to know the object in all these relations under certain
+limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of knowledge as
+knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under certain
+limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in
+time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near
+and distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events
+in any of these relations, or in any of these relations to their
+utmost limit.</p>
+<p class="pn">The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all
+relations of time and space, under no limitations, is the faculty
+under its divine and infinite form. Under this form it
+comprehends the present perfectly, and the past and the future no
+less than the present—and it reaches through all space. God’s
+knowledge is an <span class="sc">eternal now</span>—an
+<span class="sc">omnipresent here</span>; that is, all that is
+possible and actual in eternity and space, is now perfectly known
+to him. Indeed God’s knowledge ought not to be spoken of in
+relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute
+knowledge, from eternity to eternity the same; it is
+unchangeable, because it is perfect; it can neither be increased
+nor diminished.</p>
+<p class="pn">We have shown before that the perfection of the
+knowledge does not settle the mode of causation; that which comes
+to pass by necessity, and that which comes to pass contingently,
+are alike known to God.</p>
+<h1><a name="End" id="End">CONCLUSION.</a></h1>
+<p class="pn">I here finish my review of Edwards’s System, and
+his arguments against the opposite system. I hope I have not
+thought or written in vain. The review I have aimed to conduct
+fairly and honourably, and in supreme reverence of truth. As to
+style, I have laboured only for perspicuity, and where a homely
+expression has best answered this end, I have not hesitated to
+adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly understood,
+cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a flowery
+surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason,
+is manifestly impossible.</p>
+<p class="pn">The great man with whose work I have been engaged,
+I honour and admire for his intellectual might, and love and
+venerate for a purity and elevation of spirit, which places him
+among the most sainted names of the Christian church. But have I
+done wrong not to be seduced by his genius, nor won and commanded
+by his piety to the belief of his philosophy? I have not done
+wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he leads me to the
+cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute
+attention—and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to
+have re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove,
+I view him in a different character, and here his voice does not
+sound to me so sweet as Plato’s.</p>
+<p class="pn">The first part of my undertaking is accomplished.
+When I again trouble the public with my lucubrations, I shall
+appear not as a reviewer, but in an original work, which in its
+turn must become the subject of philosophical criticism.</p>
+<p style="text-align:center;margin-top:5.0em;margin-bottom:7.0em">
+THE END.</p>
+<h1 style=
+"text-align:center;font-size:112%;margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2em;">
+<a name="Footnotes" id="Footnotes">Footnotes</a></h1>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f1" id="n1" name="n1">1</a></sup>
+“It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a
+distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into
+their service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say
+natural or physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral
+necessity does not: at the same time they explain moral necessity
+so as to make it truly physical or natural. That is physical
+necessity which is the <i>invincible</i> effect of the law of
+nature, and it is neither less natural, nor less insurmountable,
+if it is from the laws of spirit than it would be if it were from
+the laws of matter.�—(Witherspoon’s Lectures on Divinity, lect.
+xiii.)</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f2" id="n2" name="n2">2</a></sup>
+Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this
+usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the
+performance of an action, and the existence of an impediment or
+antagonistic force, which takes from a faculty supposed to exist,
+the <i>liberty</i> of action, have the same bearing upon
+responsibility.</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f3" id="n3" name="n3">3</a></sup> It
+is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and
+natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without
+intending anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By
+moral inability they do not appear to mean anything which really
+render the actions required, impossible; but such an impediment
+as lies in corrupt affections, an impediment which may be removed
+by a self-determination to the use of means and appliances
+graciously provided or promised. By natural ability they mean the
+possession of all the natural faculties necessary to the
+performance of the actions required. In their representations of
+this natural ability, they proceed according to a popular method,
+rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural ability as
+a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities, but
+they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose
+upon myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to
+point out the connexion between the sensitivity and the will,
+both in a pure and a corrupt state,—and explain what these
+natural faculties are, which, according to the just meaning of
+these divines, form the ground of rebuke and persuasion, and
+constitute responsibility.</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f4" id="n4" name="n4">4</a></sup>
+“The great argument that men are determined by the strongest
+motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call
+<i>petitio principii</i>. It is impossible even to produce any
+medium of proof that it is the strongest motive, except that it
+has prevailed. It is not the greatest in itself; nor does it seem
+to be in all respects the strongest to the agent; but you say it
+appears strongest in the meantime. Why? Because you are
+determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was
+determined by the <i>strongest motive</i>, and you have only
+shown that I had a <i>motive</i> when I acted. But what has
+determined you then? Can any effect be without a cause? I
+answer—supposing my self-determining power to exist, it is as
+real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect, as your
+moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and is
+but one and the same thing on one side and on the
+other.�—(Witherspoon’s Lectures, lect. xiii.)</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f5" id="n5" name="n5">5</a></sup>
+Cousin.</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f6" id="n6" name="n6">6</a></sup>
+Dr. Reid.</p>
+<p class="pn"><sup><a href="#f7" id="n7" name="n7">7</a></sup>
+Lat. <i>moralis</i>, from <i>mos</i>,—i. e. custom or ordinary
+conduct.</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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diff --git a/35958.txt b/35958.txt
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: A Review of Edwards's
+
+Author: Henry Tappan
+
+Release Date: April 25, 2011 [EBook #35958]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Keith G Richardson
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S
+
+"INQUIRY
+
+INTO THE
+
+FREEDOM OF THE WILL."
+
+
+CONTAINING
+
+I. STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+II. THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.
+
+III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING WILL.
+
+BY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN.
+
+"I am afraid that Edwards's book (however well meant,) has done much
+harm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to the same
+doctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been generally ranked
+among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples."--_Dugald
+Stewart_.
+
+
+NEW-YORK:
+
+JOHN S. TAYLOR,
+
+THEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER, BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL,
+
+1839.
+
+
+
+
+Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by HENRY
+PHILIP TAPPAN, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United
+States, for the Southern District of New-York.
+
+G. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+Discussions respecting the will, have, unhappily, been confounded with
+theological opinions, and hence have led to theological controversies,
+where predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally
+prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental
+constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate methods of
+psychological investigation, and must abide the result. If we enter the
+field of human consciousness in the free, fearless, and honest spirit of
+Baconian observation in order to arrive at the laws of the reason or the
+imagination, what should prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened
+course in reference to the will?
+
+Is it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are
+more immediately connected with the will? This, indeed, throws solemnity
+around our investigations, and warns us of caution; but, at the same
+time, so far from repressing investigation, it affords the highest
+reason why we should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness.
+Nothing surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral
+obligation, or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency
+of religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us the
+subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim unbounded liberty
+of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at truth. As a believer in
+the Bible I always anticipate that the truths to which philosophy leads
+me, will harmonize with its facts and doctrines. If in the result there
+should appear to be a collision, it imposes upon me the duty of
+re-examining both my philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In
+this way I may in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but
+even gain from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight
+into both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be removed,
+then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, however, that I must
+either renounce the philosophical conclusion, or remove the text.
+
+If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths were in opposition to
+the whole of revelation or its leading truths, we should then evidently
+be placed on the alternative of denying one or the other; but as the
+denial of philosophy would be the destruction of reason, there would no
+longer remain in our being any principle on which a revelation could be
+received. Such a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any
+system to be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that
+with every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne aloft,
+and their divine authority and their truth made more manifest, have we
+not reason to bless the researches which have enabled us to perceive
+more clearly the light from Heaven? A system of truth does not fear, it
+courts philosophical scrutiny. Its excellency will be most resplendent
+when it has had the most fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken
+my faith in the Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its
+safety whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And
+what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be derived
+from it.
+
+Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves when they argue from
+the truths of the Bible to the truths of their philosophy; either under
+the view that the last are deducible from the former, or that they serve
+to account for and confirm the former. How often is their philosophy
+drawn from some other source, or handed down by old authority, and
+rendered venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead
+of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is perhaps cast
+into the mould of the philosophy.
+
+It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by experience, that in
+pursuing our investigations in any particular science we are to confine
+ourselves rigorously to its subjects and methods, neither seeking nor
+fearing collision with any other science. We may feel confident that
+ultimately science will be found to link with science, forming a
+universal and harmonious system of truth; but this can by no means form
+the principle of our particular investigations. The application of this
+maxim is no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds
+a relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest that in
+the developements of such philosophy or science, it should be found to
+harmonize with the revelation; but nevertheless this cannot be received
+as the principle on which we shall aim to develope it. If there is a
+harmony, it must be discovered; it cannot be invented and made.
+
+The Cardinals determined upon the authority of Scripture, as they
+imagined, what the science of astronomy must be, and compelled the old
+man Gallileo to give the lie to his reason; and since then, the science
+of geology has been attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be
+limited in its researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued
+her steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, and
+selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own discoveries.
+And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The memory of Gallileo and
+of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips which name the name of Christ.
+
+Now we ask the same independence of research in the philosophy of the
+human mind, and no less with respect to the Will than with respect to
+any other faculty. We wish to make this purely a psychological question.
+Let us not ask what philosophy is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to
+Pelagianism and Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the
+former; let us ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may
+present another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the
+legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with truths
+revealed.
+
+One thing is certain; the Bible no more professes to be a system of
+formal mental philosophy, than it professes to contain the sciences of
+astronomy and geology. If mental philosophy is given there, it is given
+in facts of history, individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law,
+and ethics; and as thus given, must be collected into a system by
+observation and philosophical criticism.
+
+But observations upon these external facts could not possibly be made
+independently of observations upon internal facts--the facts of the
+consciousness; and the principles of philosophical criticism can be
+obtained only in the same way. To him who looks not within himself,
+poetry, history, law, ethics, and the distinctions of character and
+conduct, would necessarily be unintelligible. No one therefore can
+search the Bible for its philosophy, who has not already read philosophy
+in his own being. We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole
+history of theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every
+author of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both
+the principles of his philosophy and their influence upon himself. Every
+man who reflects and aims to explain, is necessarily a philosopher, and
+has his philosophy. Instead therefore of professing to oppose the Bible
+to philosophy, or instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy
+solely and directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not
+discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and that
+inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all that we know
+and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in a pure, truth-loving
+spirit.
+
+I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will is so intimately
+associated with great and venerable names, and has so long worn a
+theological complexion, that it is well nigh impossible to disintegrate
+it. The authority of great and good men, and theological interests, even
+when we are disposed to be candid, impartial, and independent, do often
+insensibly influence our reasonings.
+
+It is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from
+the wish to avoid all unnecessary strangeness of manner in handling an
+old subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the
+weightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open
+this discussion with a review of "Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of
+the Will." There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the
+self-determining power of the will; and none which on this subject has
+called forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and
+logical subtlety. I believe there is a prevailing impression that
+Edwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite
+argument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it
+may seem, yet honest and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and
+more venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great
+and venerable sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a
+proper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself
+alone, neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a
+collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is my
+interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright; and as
+right action is meritorious not when compelled and accidental, but when
+free and made under the perception and conviction of right principles;
+so also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an
+intellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are
+something more than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or
+Arminius, presents the cup.
+
+Facts of history or of description are legitimately received on
+testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual being can be received
+only on the evidence of consciousness, unless the testimony be from God
+himself; and even in this case we expect that the testimony, although it
+may transcend consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal
+evidence of the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this:
+that although there be revelations of that which transcends
+consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of
+consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions of
+developed reason and the revelation.
+
+Now in the application of these principles, if Edwards have given us a
+true psychology in relation to the will, we have the means of knowing
+it. In the consciousness, and in the consciousness alone, can a doctrine
+of the will be ultimately and adequately tested. Nor must we be
+intimidated from making this test by the assumption that the theory of
+Edwards alone sustains moral responsibility and evangelical religion.
+Moral responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and
+illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has already on
+its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral responsibility
+and evangelical religion can derive no support from a philosophy which
+they are taken first to prove.
+
+But although I intend to conduct my argument rigidly on psychological
+principles, I shall endeavour in the end to show that moral
+responsibility is really sustained by this exposition of the will; and
+that I have not, to say the least, weakened one of the supports of
+evangelical religion, nor shorn it of one of its glories.
+
+The plan of my undertaking embraces the following particulars:
+
+I. A statement of Edwards's system.
+
+II. The legitimate consequences of this system.
+
+III. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will.
+
+IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness.
+
+V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and
+responsibility.
+
+VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of
+the Bible.
+
+The first three complete the review of Edwards, and make up the present
+volume. Another volume is in the course of preparation.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+A STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+Edwards's System, or, in other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is
+contained in part I. of his "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." This
+part comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in
+his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore use my
+best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost clearness and
+fairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety is to have Edwards
+perfectly understood. My quotations are made from the edition published
+by S. Converse, New-York, 1829.
+
+"Sec. I.--Concerning the Nature of the Will."
+
+Edwards under this title gives his definition of the will. "_The will
+is, that by which the mind chooses anything_. The faculty of the _will_,
+is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing:
+an act of the _will_ is the same as an act of _choosing_ or _choice_."
+(p. 15.)
+
+He then identifies "choosing" and "refusing:" "In every act of refusal
+the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused." (p. 16.)
+
+The will is thus _the faculty of choice_. Choice manifests itself either
+in relation to one object or several objects. Where there is but one
+object, its possession or non-possession--its enjoyment or
+non-enjoyment--its presence or absence, is chosen. Where there are
+several objects, and they are so incompatible that the possession,
+enjoyment, or presence of one, involves the refusal of the others, then
+choice manifests itself in fixing upon the particular object to be
+retained, and the objects to be set aside.
+
+This definition is given on the ground that any object being regarded as
+positive, may be contrasted with its negative: and that therefore the
+refusing a negative is equivalent to choosing a positive; and the
+choosing a negative, equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa.
+Thus if the presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is
+negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the absence; and
+to choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so that every act of
+choosing involves refusing, and every act of refusing involves choosing;
+in other words, they are equivalents.
+
+_Object of Will._
+
+The object in respect to which the energy of choice is manifested,
+inducing external action, or the action of any other faculty of the
+mind, is always an _immediate object_. Although other objects may appear
+desirable, that alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of
+present action--that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which
+I actually think--that alone is chosen as the object of muscular
+exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, every act
+of choice manifests itself by producing some change or effect in some
+other part of our being. "The thing next chosen or preferred, when a man
+wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would
+be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order
+to it." The same principle applies to any mental exertion.
+
+_Will and Desire._
+
+Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only distinction that can
+possibly be made is that of genus and species. They are the same in
+_kind_. "I do not suppose that _will_ and _desire_ are words of
+precisely the same signification: _will_ seems to be a word of a more
+general signification, extending to things present and absent. _Desire_
+respects something absent. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely
+distinct that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man
+never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or
+desires anything contrary to his will. The thing which he wills, the
+very same he desires; and he does not will a thing and desire the
+_contrary_ in any particular." (p. 17.) The immediate object of
+will,--that object, in respect of which choice manifests itself by
+producing effects,--is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme
+desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object which
+appears most desirable; and the object which appears most desirable is
+always the object chosen. To produce an act of choice, therefore, we
+have only to awaken a preponderating desire. Now it is plain, that
+desire cannot be distinguished from passion. That which we love, we
+desire to be present, to possess, to enjoy: that which we hate, we
+desire to be absent, or to be affected in some way. The loving an
+object, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical: the hating it,
+and desiring its absence or destruction, or any similar affection of it,
+are likewise identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished,
+at least in _kind_, from the emotions and passions: this will appear
+abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly identifies them:
+"I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly
+distinguishable from the will; as though they were two faculties of
+soul." (Revival of Religion in New England, part I.)
+
+"God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is
+capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and
+views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The
+other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and
+view things, but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it
+views or considers; either is inclined _to them_, or is disinclined or
+averse _from them_. This faculty is called by various names: it is
+sometimes called _inclination_; and as it has respect to the actions
+that are determined or governed by it, is called will. The _will_ and
+the _affections_ of the soul are not two faculties: the affections are
+not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere
+actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the
+liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." (The Nature of the Affections,
+part I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the
+understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and the
+passions, is fully settled by the above quotation.
+
+"Sec. II.--Concerning the Determination of Will."
+
+_Meaning of the term._
+
+"By _determining_ the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must
+be intended, _causing_ that the act of the will or choice should be thus
+and not otherwise; and the will is said to be determined, when in
+consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and
+fixed upon, some particular object. As when we speak of the
+determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in
+such a direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will
+supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined,
+there is a determiner."
+
+Now the causation of choice and the determination of the will are here
+intended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and
+the determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in
+motion, likewise gives it a direction; and where there are several
+causes, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the
+extent and direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the
+will or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its
+direction; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also
+conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, the
+direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is determined.
+And where there are several causes acting upon the will, there is here
+likewise a composition of the mental forces, and the choice or the
+determination of the will takes place accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice
+or volition then being an effect must have a cause. What is this cause?
+
+_Motive._
+
+The cause of volition or choice is called motive. A cause setting a body
+in motion is properly called the motive of the body; hence, analogously,
+a cause exciting the will to choice is called the motive of the will. By
+long usage the proper sense of motive is laid aside, and it has come now
+to express only the cause or reason of volition. "By _motive_ I mean the
+whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition,
+whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And when I
+speak of the _strongest motive_, I have respect to the strength of the
+whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that
+be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." And "_that
+motive which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest,
+determines the will_." (p. 19.) This is general, and means nothing more
+than--1. the cause of volition is called motive; 2. that where there are
+several causes or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3.
+the cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the cause,
+if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered in their
+co-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive "stands in view of the
+mind," that is, it is something which the mind knows or is sensible of.
+
+_What constitutes the strength of Motive?_
+
+"Everything that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement,
+to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of _tendency_
+or _advantage_ to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to
+the act of will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I
+call the _strength_ of the motive." When different objects are presented
+to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear more or less
+"inviting." (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once produced, we
+perceive their "tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." It is
+a preference or choice anticipated, an instantaneous perception of a
+quality in the object which we feel would determine our choice, if we
+were called upon to make a choice. The object is felt to be adapted to
+the state of the mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are
+felt to be reciprocal.
+
+_What is this quality which makes up the previous tendency?_
+
+"Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary
+agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or
+choice, is considered or viewed _as good_; nor has it any tendency to
+engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears
+such." Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as
+the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the
+previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as the
+highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the strongest
+motive; therefore, it follows that the "_will is always as the greatest
+apparent good is_." (p. 20.)
+
+_The sense in which the term_ "good" _is used._
+
+"I use the term _'good'_ as of the same import with _'agreeable.'_ To
+appear _good_ to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to
+_appear agreeable_, or _seem pleasing_ to the mind. If it tends to draw
+the inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that
+which _suits_ the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest
+tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's
+view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the
+greatest apparent good. The word _good_ in this sense includes the
+avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy." (p. 20.)
+
+It follows then that the will is always determined by that which _seems
+most pleasing or appears most agreeable_ to the mind.
+
+This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which
+Edwards set out: that will is always as the preponderating desire;
+indeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the
+affections; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the
+strongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire
+producing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination
+of will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines
+will is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its
+perceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As
+possessing this tendency, it is called _good_, or _pleasing_, or
+_agreeable_; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of
+the affections.
+
+The _"good"_ which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an
+immediate good, or a good "in the present view of the mind." (p. 21.)
+Thus a drunkard, before he drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each
+other the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful
+consequences; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be
+greater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his
+mind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only;
+and if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. "If he wills to
+drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will; and
+drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him,
+and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the
+immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him." The
+reasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that
+he has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of
+drinking, in itself, is the object of choice; so that, in the view he
+has taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we
+may say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of
+choice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in
+such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the moment,
+and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus
+never chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him.
+
+_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._
+
+"I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is
+as the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_,
+than to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or
+by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the
+mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict
+propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that
+the _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the
+mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than
+the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the
+most agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or
+_choice_. "The will is as the most agreeable,"--that is, _the
+determination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of
+the consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and
+as the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect,
+following volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or
+read, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the "mind's
+choice,"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary
+action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the
+sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the
+terms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary
+action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This
+is still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the
+desire_. "The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most
+agreeable," and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it
+must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is
+affected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the
+phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is
+chosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the
+simple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more
+than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and
+the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than
+chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is
+the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The
+object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are
+correlatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard
+choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be
+the most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as
+characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with
+the sense of the most agreeable.
+
+_Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._
+
+"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's
+view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in
+or about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to
+render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the
+object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and
+circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.)
+
+Choice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that
+is, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect
+agreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect
+agreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in
+determining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the
+mind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in
+relation to each.
+
+I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or
+choice, will depend upon,--
+
+1. The beauty of the object, "viewing it as it is _in itself_,"
+independently of circumstances.
+
+2. "The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or
+_the consequence_ of it," or the object taken with its "concomitants"
+and consequences.
+
+3. "The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with
+respect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the
+mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed."
+(p. 22.)
+
+II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first,
+upon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind.
+Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future
+pleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two
+respects:
+
+1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the
+pleasure;
+
+2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind
+has of it.
+
+Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees
+of pleasure, considered in itself; and "the agreeableness of a proposed
+object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree
+of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or
+certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the
+mind has of that good." (p. 23.)
+
+Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with
+present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also
+upon "the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice."
+(p. 24.) Here we have to consider "the particular temper which the mind
+has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education,
+example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the
+mind is in on a particular occasion." (ibid.)
+
+Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state
+of the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already
+mentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the
+_manner of the view_. "Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter," he
+remarks, "the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration
+as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes
+the objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_,
+having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the
+_manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or
+deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively." (ibid.)
+In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and
+object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two,
+choice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to
+_the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of
+agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the
+most agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that,
+having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation
+to _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of
+mind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in
+relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind
+produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an
+example,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and
+agreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation
+to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the
+sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical
+language, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the
+other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of
+the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind
+and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not
+have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object
+is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem
+to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most
+agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only
+difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this:
+the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate
+presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The
+most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition.
+Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most
+agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is
+positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these
+cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance
+of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of
+choosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase
+_most agreeable_ or _greatest apparent good_ is convenient for general
+use, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up.
+
+It may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus
+endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word _choice_ is properly
+used to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in
+relation to its immediate effects,--as when I say, I choose to walk.
+_The sense of the most agreeable_, is properly used to express the same
+action, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice
+and volition are the words in common use, because men at large only
+think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause
+of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie
+in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the _sense of
+the most agreeable_ becomes the most appropriate form of expression.
+
+Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of the most agreeable, by
+remarking: "However, I think so much is certain,--that volition, in no
+one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest
+apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained." This is the
+great principle of his system; and, a few sentences after, he states it
+as an axiom, or a generally admitted truth: "There is scarcely a plainer
+and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than
+that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what
+suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them." Indeed, Edwards
+cannot be considered as having attempted to prove this; he has only
+explained it, and therefore it is only the _explanation_ of a supposed
+axiom that we have been following out.
+
+This supposed axiom is really announced in the first section: "Will and
+desire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very
+same he desires;" that is, a man wills as he desires, and of course
+wills what is most agreeable to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the
+title of part I. runs as follows: "Wherein are explained and stated
+various terms and things, &c." Receiving it, therefore, as a generally
+admitted truth, "that choice or volition is always as the most
+agreeable," and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is
+the explanation given?
+
+1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a faculty distinct from
+the affections or passions, or that part of our being which philosophers
+sometimes call the sensitivity.
+
+2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment
+and under any given circumstances the strongest inclination, or the
+strongest affection and desire with regard to an immediate object,
+appears in the constitution of our being as the antecedent of effects in
+the mind itself, or in the body; which effects are called voluntary
+actions,--as acts of attention, or of talking, or walking.
+
+3. To say that volition is as the desire, is equivalent to saying that
+volition is as the "greatest apparent good," which again means only the
+most agreeable,--so that the volition becomes again the _sense or
+feeling of the greatest apparent good_. There is in all this only a
+variety of expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.
+
+4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the production in the mind
+of volition, or choice, or the strongest affection, or the sense of the
+most agreeable, or of the greatest apparent good. It is therefore an
+effect, and must have a determiner or cause.
+
+5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In explaining what
+constitutes the motive, we must take into view both _mind_ and _object_.
+The object must be perceived by the mind as something existent. This
+perception, however, is only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the
+object to the mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable,
+or choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to each
+other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess qualities of
+beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must possess a
+susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the object. But to say that
+the object possesses qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind,
+is in fact to affirm that the mind has the requisite susceptibility; for
+these qualities of the object have a being, and are what they are only
+in relation to mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may
+therefore be called the unition of the sensitivity and the object.
+Choice is thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually
+appearing in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and,
+indeed, being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be
+accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. But
+inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in relation
+to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for its
+manifestations by referring them to the objects and circumstances in
+connexion with which they take place, and without which they would not
+take place; and thus, as we say, the cause of passion is the object of
+passion: so we say also, in common parlance, the cause of choice is the
+object of choice; and assigning the affections of the mind springing up
+in the presence of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its
+qualities, we say that choice is always as the most beautiful and
+agreeable; that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest
+apparent good, thus _objectively_ described, is the motive, or
+determiner, or cause of volition.
+
+_In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding._
+
+"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always
+follows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the
+understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole
+faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called
+_reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant
+what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness,
+taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always
+follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason
+is quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_,
+all things being put together which relates to the mind's present
+perceptions in any respect." (p. 25.) The "large sense" in which Edwards
+takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive
+being. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable,
+the suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with
+other particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject
+to the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at
+the moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is
+not enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must
+likewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of
+the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this
+sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the
+subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, "the
+act of the will is determined in opposition to it." (ibid.)
+
+"Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity,
+Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence."
+
+After having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained
+the cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion
+between this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this
+connexion a necessary connexion?
+
+In order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he
+proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above
+title. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary
+discussion.
+
+Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the
+common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or
+metaphysical use.
+
+1. In common use, _necessity_ "is a relative term, and relates to some
+supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition
+is overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word
+_impossible_ is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to
+supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient
+for the effect. The word _unable_ is relative, and has relation to
+ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word _irresistible_ is
+relative, and has reference to resistance which is made, or may be made,
+to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to
+withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity
+and impossibility implies _something that frustrates endeavour or
+desire_."
+
+He then distinguishes this necessity into _general and particular_.
+"Things are necessary _in general_, which are or will be,
+notwithstanding any supposable opposition, from whatever quarter:" e. g.
+that God will judge the world.
+
+"Things are necessary _to us_ which are or will be, notwithstanding all
+opposition supposable in the case _from us_." This is _particular_
+necessity: e. g. any event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions
+"about liberty and moral agency," the word is used especially in a
+particular sense, because we are concerned in these discussions _as
+individuals_.
+
+According to this _common use_ of necessity in the _particular_ sense,
+"When we speak of any thing necessary _to us_, it is with relation to
+some supposable opposition _to our wills;_" and "a thing is said to be
+necessary" in this sense "when we cannot help it, do what _we will_." So
+also a thing is said to be _impossible to us_ when we cannot do it,
+although we make the attempt,--that is, put forth the volition; and
+_irresistible to us_, which, when we put forth a volition to hinder it,
+overcomes the opposition: and we are _unable_ to do a thing "when our
+supposable desires and endeavours are insufficient,"--are not followed
+by any effect. In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not
+considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are
+considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own effects:
+e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain man can raise a
+certain weight,--if it be affirmed that it is _impossible_ for him to
+raise it, that he has not the _ability_ to raise it, and that the weight
+will _necessarily_ keep its position,--no reference whatever is made to
+the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but solely to the
+connexion between the _volition_ and the _raising of the weight_. Now
+Edwards remarks, that this common use of the term necessity and its
+cognates being habitual, is likely to enter into and confound our
+reasonings on subjects where it is inadmissible from the nature of the
+case. We must therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)
+
+2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_,
+but an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies "in cases wherein
+no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very
+nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or
+endeavour." (ibid.) Thus it is used "with respect to God's existence
+before the creation of the world, when there was no other being."
+"_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from
+certainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things
+in themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or
+that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition
+which affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than
+the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject
+and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and
+in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when
+I endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_."
+(p. 27, 28, 29.)
+
+"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence
+of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several
+ways."
+
+"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_.
+So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is
+necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four."
+
+2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence
+of something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain.
+
+3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain
+_consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be
+"consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_
+with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a
+necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity.
+
+"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which
+will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are
+necessary only in this last way,"--that is, "by a connexion with
+something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already
+is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to
+controversies about acts of the will." (p. 30.)
+
+Philosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. "The existence
+of a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when
+all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its
+existence." This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.
+
+2. _Particular_ necessity refers to "things that happen to particular
+persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern,
+at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with
+regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard
+to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the
+will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute
+to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether
+it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.
+
+"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and
+_necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms
+_impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only
+the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.)
+
+_Inability and Unable._
+
+"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use,
+have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is
+have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these
+terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on
+controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and
+far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will
+or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be
+supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or
+motives.
+
+_Contingent and Contingency._
+
+"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or
+accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with
+its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of
+things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing.
+But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense;
+not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot
+discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has
+absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has
+any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.)
+
+Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use,
+contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we
+discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical
+school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no
+cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any
+cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper
+place. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them.
+
+Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and
+Inability.
+
+We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and
+volition necessary?
+
+The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this
+question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion
+between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this
+question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its
+cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be
+necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical
+sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to
+characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens
+with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: "That
+necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible
+connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a
+proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is
+distinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity." He then
+appropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of
+the connexion between motive and volition: "And sometimes by moral
+necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which
+arises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives,
+and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such
+certain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the
+phrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse." (p. 32.) Natural
+_philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to
+characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our
+being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations,
+and the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)
+
+In employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate
+that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it
+distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that "moral necessity may be
+as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as
+perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect
+is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a
+thing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and
+effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I
+call by the name of _moral necessity_." (p. 33.)
+
+Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that
+the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature
+of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to
+express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which
+"does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two
+terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many
+cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is
+plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as
+truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having
+its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express
+the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are
+most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of
+motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering
+the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation.
+(p. 34.)
+
+Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his
+reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must
+be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name
+of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the
+original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before,
+such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech,
+and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to
+some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient.
+But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in
+the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and
+will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose
+and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to
+oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite
+to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two
+contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore
+the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or
+resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.)
+
+This passage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the
+original use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and
+its effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose
+or will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour
+overcomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the
+weight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these
+terms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my
+volition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the
+sense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary
+endeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of
+as struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition
+does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition,
+therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be
+made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is
+supposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their
+circumstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two,
+as the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its
+cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It
+comes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary
+endeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute
+necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone
+which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at
+given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and
+feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought
+together. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of
+volition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that
+necessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure
+and perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits,
+(p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and
+natural necessity is a mere difference in the "two terms connected," and
+not a difference "_in the nature of the connexion_."
+
+_Natural and moral inability._
+
+"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain
+what is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be
+_naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will,
+because what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or
+because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the
+will; either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body,
+or external objects." (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know
+something, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the
+understanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the
+instrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a
+defect of the bodily constitution; or external objects may be regarded
+as presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert.
+This is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be
+remarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or
+_philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability;
+but only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a
+relative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do,
+although we will to do.
+
+What is moral inability? "Moral inability consists not in any of these
+things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a
+contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to
+induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives
+to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be
+said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or
+want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such
+a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives,
+it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an
+inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
+circumstances and under the influence of such views." (bid.)
+
+The inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between
+volition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the
+volition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition,
+cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to
+exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The
+inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the
+motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_,
+and in the _nature and circumstances of the object;_ and choice or
+volition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense
+of the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any
+given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not
+produced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind
+and object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the
+deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and
+object--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a
+state_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not
+possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part
+of the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a
+stronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object,
+there is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the
+_particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a
+different state of mind: and this constitutes "the want of sufficient
+motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength
+of apparent motives to the contrary." And both these may clearly be
+resolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on
+the part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards
+another object; or, as Edwards expresses it, "the opposition or want of
+inclination." For a want of inclination to one object, implying a
+stronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the
+mind_, and the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not
+correlated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and
+circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a "want
+of sufficient motives;" the second, stronger "motives to the contrary."
+Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition,
+therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an
+effect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has
+any existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the
+perfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being,
+leading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical
+inability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain
+volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral
+ability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and
+principles of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_
+ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions
+and certain effects.
+
+Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a
+_real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility
+of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain
+effects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water
+freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an
+established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of
+effects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of
+the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the
+nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected."
+
+Edwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability.
+
+"A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to
+prostitute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation
+between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object
+contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
+cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and
+the act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the
+principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to
+the consequents of the choice.
+
+"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to
+kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding.
+
+"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and
+temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be
+unable to forbear gratifying his lust." There is here a correlation
+between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and
+circumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
+takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral
+inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite.
+
+"A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear
+taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last.
+
+"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an
+enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power
+of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are
+most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_
+is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all
+correlated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's
+self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the
+most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is
+absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of
+virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love
+wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of
+habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose
+holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy
+Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The
+love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation
+of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is
+_utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral
+inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this
+inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no
+power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to
+put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition,
+and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions.
+
+Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and
+fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has
+absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he
+would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a
+good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good
+volitions.
+
+_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._
+
+The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual
+and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.)
+
+The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act,
+through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements
+presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.)
+
+An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular
+occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular
+inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has
+become correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it
+is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is
+correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and
+under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is
+necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at
+present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the
+greatest advantage to induce it."
+
+"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will,
+are in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or
+_habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be
+otherwise than at present it is." (ibid.)
+
+The passage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be
+brought up under the following question:
+
+Although will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet
+can present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the
+will, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts?
+
+"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the
+will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a
+distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will
+at one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and
+there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of
+the will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered
+insufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion
+returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such
+opposition." (p. 37.)
+
+Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to
+drink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink.
+But we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects
+likewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife
+and children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his
+cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing,
+these considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most
+agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to
+form resolutions of amendment; but when the appetite and longing for
+drink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these
+considerations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are
+overcome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.
+
+"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to
+such future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the
+occasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be
+prevented or avoided." (ibid.)
+
+In the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual
+correlation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and
+considerations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being
+associated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the
+mind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain
+the mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation
+from strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with
+the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed
+to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again
+into circumstances to give it an adventitious advantage. The repetition
+of occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in
+the sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. "On this
+account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially
+obtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and
+indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong
+habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its
+resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also,
+when the acts arise from strong habit." (ibid.)
+
+In every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act
+otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment
+of his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize
+men by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of
+moral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no
+correlation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if
+it be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason
+itself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the
+most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or
+sensitivity is opposed to it.
+
+_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability
+_to act in a certain way._
+
+"But it must be observed concerning _moral inability_, in each kind of
+it, that the word _inability_ is used in a sense very diverse from its
+original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the
+proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present
+will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said
+to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, _according to the
+ordinary use of language_, that a malicious man, let him be never so
+malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to
+show his neighbour a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be
+never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. _In the strictest
+propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his
+choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable
+to do a thing, when he can do it if he will_." (ibid.)
+
+Men, in the common use of language, and in the expression of their
+common and generally received sentiments, affirm that an individual has
+any thing in his power when it can be controlled by volition. Their
+connexion of power does not arise from the connexion of volition with
+its cause, but from the conception of volition as itself a cause with
+its effects. Thus the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike,
+having for its antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking,
+having for its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common
+usage of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to
+strike or not to strike. Now as it is "improperly said that he cannot
+perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is
+in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the
+acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with
+respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a
+downright contradiction; it is to say he _cannot_ will if he _does_
+will: and, in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man
+to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing." (ibid.)
+
+It is improper, according to this, to say that a man cannot do a thing,
+when nothing is wanting but an act of volition; for that is within our
+power, as far as it can be within our power, which is within the reach
+of our volition.
+
+It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts
+of the will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a
+man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to
+will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another,
+which is absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause
+of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has ability to
+produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to represent the man
+as _unable_, in any particular case, to produce volitions, for this
+would imply that in other cases he is able. Nay, the very language is
+self-contradictory. If a man produce volitions, he must produce them by
+volitions; and if in any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce
+volitions; then this inability must arise from a want of connexion
+between the volition by which the required volition is aimed to be
+produced, and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is
+unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will _if he
+will_--a proposition which grants the very point it assumes to deny.
+"The very willing is the doing," which is required.
+
+Edwards adopts what he calls the "original" and "proper," meaning of
+power, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, "in the
+ordinary use of language," as the legitimate and true meaning. In this
+use, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition
+with its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or
+motives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, "to ascribe a
+non-performance to the want of power or ability," or to the want of
+motives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) "is not just," "because the
+thing wanting," that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the
+agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, "is not a
+being _able_," that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral
+ability, "but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the
+act of volition, or the fact of 'being willing,'" there is no facility
+of mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state
+of mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no
+concern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which
+can be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he
+will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability
+to do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the
+volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but
+still if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition
+and the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the
+thing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be
+able to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.
+
+We can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth
+volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those
+motives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not
+_unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of
+the word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the
+volition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done;
+but we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made;
+still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious
+of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our
+actual volitions and their objects.
+
+"Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency."
+
+What is liberty? "The plain and obvious meaning of the words _freedom_
+and _liberty_, in common speech, is _power, opportunity, or advantage
+that any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being
+free from hinderance, or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting
+in any way as he wills. And the _contrary_ to liberty, whatever name we
+call it by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he
+will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise." (p. 38.) Again, "That
+power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according
+to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the
+meaning of the word, anything of the _cause_ of that choice, or at all
+considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was
+caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it
+was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it
+happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with
+something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice
+any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder
+his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free,
+according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (p. 39.)
+
+This is Edwards's definition of liberty, and he has given it with a
+clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an amplification, which
+renders it impossible to mistake his meaning.
+
+Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion between volition and its
+cause or motive. Liberty relates solely to the connexion between the
+volition and its objects. He is free in the only true and proper sense,
+who, when he wills, finds no impediment between the volition and the
+object, who wills and it is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey:
+he wills to talk, and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and
+express sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his
+tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not be
+free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he would not be
+free. If there should be anything preventing the volition from taking
+effect, he would not be free.
+
+_Of what can the attribute of Liberty be affirmed?_
+
+From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, "It will follow, that in
+propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be
+ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty,
+power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no
+_will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its
+will_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be
+restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of
+liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not
+to speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a
+will_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That
+which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the
+power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who
+is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of."
+(p. 38.)
+
+Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the
+spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity
+of choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded
+connexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those
+volitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_
+is the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and
+whose choice reaches effects.
+
+_Moral Agent._
+
+"A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a
+_moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a
+moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty." (p. 39.)
+
+In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality?
+
+"To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and
+evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame,
+reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being
+influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to
+the view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct
+agreeable to moral faculty." (p. 40.)
+
+A moral agent is a being who can perform moral actions, or actions which
+are subject to praise or blame. Now the same action may be committed by
+a man or by a brute--and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man
+guilty? Because he has a moral sense or perception by which he
+distinguishes right and wrong: the brute has no such sense or
+perception. The man having thus the power of perceiving the right and
+wrong of actions--actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated
+to him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, we
+may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of a reason
+and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the capacity of
+having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind as to form motives
+and produce volitions. We might define a man of taste in the fine arts
+in a similar way; thus,--a man of taste is an agent who has the power of
+distinguishing beauty and ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to
+beauty that the sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The
+only difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, the
+sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty perceived;
+while in the former, the right perceived does not always produce this
+sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most agreeable is often
+produced by the wrong, in opposition to the decisions of reason and
+conscience.
+
+I have now completed the statement of Edwards's system, nearly in his
+own words, as contained in part I. of his work. The remarks and
+explanations which have been thrown in, I hope will serve to make him
+more perfectly understood. This end will be still more fully attained by
+presenting on the basis of the foregoing investigation and statement, a
+compend of his psychological system, independently of the order there
+pursued, and without largely introducing quotations, which have already
+been abundantly made.
+
+COMPEND OF EDWARDS'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.
+
+I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. The
+intellectual--called reason or understanding. 2. The active and
+feeling--called will or affections.
+
+II. The relation of these to each other. The first precedes the second
+in the order of exercise. The first perceives and knows objects in their
+qualities, circumstances, and relations. The second experiences emotions
+and passions, or desires and choices, in relation to the objects
+perceived.
+
+III. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are
+brought together, perception takes place according to the constituted
+laws of the intelligence.
+
+IV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty
+of our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice,
+emotions, passions, or desires take place, according to the constituted
+nature and laws of this faculty.
+
+The objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object,
+we may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to
+each other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we
+call pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable,
+affections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in
+relation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces
+accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.
+
+In the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is
+universal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be
+pleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But,
+in the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral
+objects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is,
+suited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to
+be unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that
+pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous
+terms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in
+describing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the
+will.
+
+V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in
+the correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In
+assigning the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of
+the will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in
+the presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects,
+and say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such and
+such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say
+that the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the
+nature and circumstances of the object.
+
+VI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects
+in other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand
+thus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking,
+resisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental
+operations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and
+investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory.
+
+VII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in
+other parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic.
+It is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it
+appears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as
+Edwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect
+contemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense
+sense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most
+pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular
+subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the constitution and law
+of our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception
+must bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately
+follow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception
+again takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as
+objects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth.
+
+VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by
+this system:--_Choice_ is the sense or the affection of the most
+pleasant and agreeable. _Preference_ is its synonyme, with scarcely a
+shade of difference. They both have respect to the _act of selection_.
+_Volition_ is another name for this affection of will, and is used more
+particularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection.
+_Desire_ is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment,
+is choice. _Emotion_ is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to
+the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first
+sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to
+certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to
+them,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object
+which can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the
+object may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that
+is, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most
+agreeable.
+
+_Passion_ is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other
+relations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a
+flower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this
+desire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the passion has
+the characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects
+take place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching
+out the hand, &c.
+
+_The determination of will_ is the production or causation of choice. It
+is used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in
+opposition to all other choices.
+
+_The will itself_ is the capacity of being affected by objects with
+emotion, passion, and desire,--and with that form of passion which we
+call the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected
+with effects or consequents as their stated antecedent.
+
+_The motive_ is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the
+nature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and
+circumstances Of the object chosen.
+
+IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands
+may seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be
+obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of
+the most agreeable.
+
+X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference
+to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul.
+The man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon
+choosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under
+necessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon
+choosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is
+_impossible_ for him to walk,--then he has _no liberty_ to walk,--then
+he is under a _necessity_ of remaining in one place.
+
+Necessity in any other use is _metaphysical_ or _philosophical_
+necessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the
+necessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of
+cause and effect. Hence,
+
+The _connexion_ between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most
+agreeable with the motive or cause, is _necessary_ with a philosophical
+necessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also
+called _moral_ necessity. This term _moral_ is given, not in reference
+to the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the _terms_
+connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus
+distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call _natural_.
+
+XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A _natural_ agent is that
+which produces effects without volition. A _moral_ agent is one
+producing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual
+perception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a
+sense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account
+of the volitions and their effects.
+
+_Brutes_ or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but
+have no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no
+sense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they
+cannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements.
+
+XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason;
+secondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability.
+
+Natural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be
+accomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus
+we say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk,
+he walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first
+refers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The
+second refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting
+forces from between volitions and effects.
+
+Hence a man is _naturally unable_ to do anything when there is no
+established connexion between volition and that thing. A man is
+naturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no _liberty_
+to move his arm when it is bound.
+
+_Moral inability_ is metaphysical or philosophical inability.
+Philosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a
+certain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there
+is a philosophical inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the
+decay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have
+no cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical
+inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine
+lath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate
+cause. _Moral inability_ relates to the connexion between motives and
+volitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the
+connexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the
+term moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the
+_connexion_,--it only expresses the _quality_ of _terms connected_.
+Hence _moral_ inability, as philosophical inability, is the
+impossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive
+or cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical
+inability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive
+or cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral
+philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty
+dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not
+adequate to produce a volition to such an act.
+
+Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us,
+because beyond the sphere of our volition.
+
+XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only
+to volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of
+Edwards's work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be
+found in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of
+his system, we introduce it here.
+
+He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or
+commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature
+of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue
+or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at
+all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not
+in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad
+nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some
+faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is
+our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination,
+--"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean
+the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are
+distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether
+the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or
+viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself.
+It plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the
+above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the
+volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is
+volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing
+or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions
+that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these
+volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are
+right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The
+_metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the
+character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are
+questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our
+personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do
+_we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_
+
+Nor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the
+volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the
+volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character
+of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the
+rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist.
+The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind,
+and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency,
+responsibility, and duty.
+
+And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing
+external actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected
+with volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action
+is one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it,
+if we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this
+very moment there is no such correlation between the action and the
+will, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act
+of willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we
+are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it
+would not be done; although at this very moment there is such a
+correlation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form
+the cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to
+exist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the
+correlation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the
+want of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and
+responsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its
+connexion with its consequents.
+
+This does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions
+are to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect
+volitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation
+to the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in
+themselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force
+or power may have come in between the volition and its object, and
+changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an event
+different from the will or intention; although being in connexion with
+the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act
+which appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an
+extended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is
+evil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must
+know what the man intends, before we pronounce upon him; which is the
+same thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what
+his motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but
+the volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of
+these effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we
+can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really
+intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really
+connected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable.
+
+_Edwards and Locke._
+
+Their systems are one: there is no difference in the principle. Edwards
+represents the will as necessarily determined so does Locke. Edwards
+places liberty in the unimpeded connexion of volition with its stated
+sequents--so does Locke.
+
+They differ only in the mode of developing the necessary determination
+of will. According to Locke, desire is in itself a necessary
+modification of our being produced in its correlation with objects; and
+volition is a necessary consequent of desire when excited at any given
+moment to a degree which gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at
+that moment. "The greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that
+is constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in its
+choice of the next action." (book 2. ch. 21, Sec. 40.) According to
+Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, and the
+strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that moment.
+
+Edwards's analysis is more nice than Locke's, and his whole developement
+more true to the great principle of the system--necessary determination.
+Locke, in distinguishing the will from the desire, seems about to launch
+into a different psychology, and one destructive of the principle.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.
+
+These consequences must, I am aware, be deduced with the greatest care
+and clearness. The deduction must be influenced by no passion or
+prejudice. It must be purely and severely logical--and such I shall
+endeavour to make it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has
+himself made.
+
+I. There is no self-determining power of will, and of course no liberty
+consisting in a self-determining power.
+
+A self-determining power of will is a supposed power, which will has to
+determine its own volitions.
+
+Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of desire, emotion, or
+passion.
+
+Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable at
+any given moment.
+
+Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of the will, or
+sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature and circumstances of
+the object.
+
+Now, if the will determined itself, it would determine its own state, in
+relation to objects. But to determine is to act, and therefore, for the
+will to determine is for the will to act; and for the will to determine
+itself, is for the will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the
+will is a volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to
+create a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this
+antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same way.
+We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an indefinite series
+of volitions, without any first volition; consequently we shall have no
+self-determiner after all, because we can arrive at no first determiner,
+and thus the idea of self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again,
+we shall have effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of
+the case never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are
+thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the negative
+of cause.
+
+Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can question. If
+Edwards's psychology be right, and if self-determination implies a will
+to will, or choosing a choice, then a self-determining power is the
+greatest absurdity possible.
+
+II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that God can exercise a
+perfect control over his intelligent creatures, or administer perfectly
+a moral government consisting in the influence of motives.
+
+To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in reference to
+required determinations. And when an individual is removed from the
+motives adapted to his state of mind, the Almighty Providence can so
+order events as to bring him into contiguity with the motives.
+
+If the state of mind should be such that no motives can be made
+available in reference to a particular determination, it is dearly
+supposable that he who made the soul of man, may exert a direct
+influence over this state of mind, and cause it to answer to the motives
+presented. Whether there are motives adapted to every state of mind, in
+reference to every possible determination required by the Almighty
+Lawgiver, so as to render it unnecessary to exert a direct influence
+over the will, is a question which I am not called upon here to answer.
+But in either case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute,
+fore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as well
+as the physical world; and the election of a certain number to eternal
+life, and the making of this election sure, are necessary and plain
+consequences of this system. And as God is a being all-wise and good, we
+may feel assured in connexion with this system, that, in the working out
+of his great plan, whatever evil may appear in the progress of its
+developement, the grand consummation will show that all things have been
+working together for good.
+
+III. It is plainly deducible from this system that moral beings exert an
+influence over each other by the presentation of motives. And thus
+efforts may be made either to the injury or benefit of society.
+
+IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of responsibility, the
+consciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and consequently the expectation
+of punishment or reward, connect themselves simply with the nature of
+the mere fact of volition.--that is, if this is a true and complete
+representation of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon
+the mere fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly
+independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go forth.
+
+Thus we may view the system in relation both to God and to man.
+
+In relation to God. It makes him supreme and absolute--foreseeing and
+fore-determining, and bringing everything to pass according to infinite
+wisdom, and by the energy of an infinite will.
+
+In relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple
+fact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established
+antecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects,
+because he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear,
+because he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common
+judgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness,
+that an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which
+ought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a
+volition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong,
+because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be
+rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition.
+In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea
+of _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends
+the sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has
+all the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but
+a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do
+nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which
+goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his
+effort.
+
+In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground
+of moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_
+necessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne
+to do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been
+wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil,
+anything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under
+any responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to
+be tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of,
+could admit the plea--"I did not the good because I had not the will to
+do it," or "I did the evil because I had the will to do it." "This is
+your guilt," would be the reply of the judge, "that you had no will to
+do the good--that you had a will to do the evil."
+
+We must now take up a different class of deductions. They are such as
+those abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of
+morality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If
+however they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against
+them. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do
+most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for
+himself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_.
+
+I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional
+necessity, particular and general.
+
+1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the
+individual.
+
+It is granted in the system, that the connexion of motive and volition
+is necessary with an absolute necessity, because this precedes and
+therefore is not within the reach of the volition. So also, the state of
+mind, and the nature and circumstances of the object in relation to this
+state, forming a correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent
+upon a cause, beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make
+its motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive,
+and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first cause.
+Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are related by an
+absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the effect of motive,
+being necessary also with an absolute necessity, the only place for
+freedom that remains, if freedom be possible, is the connexion of
+volition and effects, internal and external. And this is the only place
+of freedom which this system claims. But what new characteristic appears
+in this relation? Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and
+sequents? I will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will
+to sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established antecedent
+to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to think on a certain
+subject, I think on that subject. The volition of selecting a subject,
+and the volition of attending to it, are stated antecedents to that
+mental operation which we call thought. We have here only another
+instance of cause and effect; the relation being one as absolute and
+necessary as any other relation of cause and effect. The curious
+organism by which a choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces
+muscular movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual
+man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause beyond
+the sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which connects volition
+with thinking is also pre-established, and beyond the sphere of
+volition. As the volition itself appears by an absolute necessity in
+relation to the individual man, so also do the stated sequents or
+effects of volition appear by an absolute necessity in relation to him.
+
+It is true, indeed, that the connexion between volition and its objects
+may be interrupted by forces coming between, or overcome by superior
+forces, but this is common to cause and effect, and forms no peculiar
+characteristic; it is a lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome
+by a greater. Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force
+does not prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still
+be necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the truth
+in respect of volition, according to this system. The volition could
+have no being without a motive, and when the motive is present it must
+have a being, and no sooner does it appear than its effects follow,
+unless impeded. If impeded, then we have two trains of causes coming
+into collision, and the same necessity which brought them together,
+gives the ascendency to the one or the other.
+
+It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that necessity,
+absolute and unconditional, as far at least as the man himself is
+concerned, reigns in the relation of volition and its effect, if the
+volition itself be a necessary existence. All that precedes volition is
+necessary; volition itself is necessary. All that follows volition is
+necessary: Humanity is but a link of the inevitable chain.
+
+2. General necessity--a necessity absolute, in relation to all being and
+causality, and applicable to all events.
+
+An event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual--is this
+event likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? Let this
+event be a volition of a given individual; it is necessary in relation
+to that individual. Now it must be supposed to have a connexion by a
+chain of sequents and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take
+any particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that antecedent
+and sequent, in its particular place and relations, can be proved
+necessary in the same way that the volition is proved necessary in its
+particular place and relations; that is, the antecedent being given
+under the particular circumstances, the sequent must follow. But the
+antecedent is linked by like necessity to another antecedent, of which
+it is the sequent; and the sequent is linked by like necessity to
+another sequent, of which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole
+chain, from the given necessary volition up to the first cause, is
+necessary. We come therefore at last to consider the connexion between
+the first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is this
+a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded as a
+volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will the first
+sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that sequent should
+appear. But the volition itself cannot really be the first antecedent or
+cause, because volition or choice, from its very nature, must itself
+have a determiner or antecedent. What is this antecedent? The
+motive:--for self-determination, in the sense of the will determining
+itself, would involve the same absurdities on this system in relation to
+God as in relation to man; since it is represented as an absurdity in
+its own nature--it is determining a volition by a volition, in endless
+retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine volition,
+what is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition?
+It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for there is nothing to render
+it otherwise, save the divine will. But the divine will cannot be
+supposed to do this, for the motive is already taken to be the ground
+and cause of the action of the divine will. The necessity which applies
+to volition, in the nature of the case must therefore apply to the
+divine volition. No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the
+divine will, except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom,
+and goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the
+divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This Edwards
+expressly affirms--"If God's will is steadily and surely determined in
+everything by _supreme_ wisdom, then it is in everything _necessarily
+determined_ to that which is _most_ wise." (p. 230.) That the universe
+is governed by infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought,
+and is abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a
+government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most excellent
+government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be contended for. Let
+us not, however, wander from the question, and in representing it as the
+government of wisdom, forget that it is a government of necessity, and
+that absolute. The volition, therefore, with which we started, is at
+last traced up to a necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final
+cause; for here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.
+
+What we have thus proved in relation to one volition, must be equally
+true in reference to every other volition and every other event, for the
+reasoning must apply to every possible case. Every volition, every
+event, must be traced up to a first and final cause, and this must be
+necessary and infinite wisdom.
+
+II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that every volition or
+event is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place
+and relations.
+
+The whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary
+wisdom. All volitions and events have their last and efficient cause in
+infinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that
+can be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great
+source. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for
+any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change
+could make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute
+necessity,--and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has
+made it, and disposed of it.
+
+III. If that which we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be
+both necessary evil and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is
+in vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptation of the
+word; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his.
+These volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried
+back to the one great source of all being and events. Hence,
+
+IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears
+in him, appears by an absolute necessity,--and it cannot be supposed to
+be otherwise than it is. Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only
+the perception of the difference between right and wrong, and the
+conviction that the right ought to be done, but the possession of a
+power to do the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition
+is fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be
+supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all
+things considered, can it be supposed there could have been, at that
+precise moment and in that precise relation, any other volition. The
+volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite and necessary wisdom. We
+cannot escape from this difficulty by perpetually running the changes
+of--"He can if he will,"--"He could if he would,"--"There is nothing
+wanting but a will,"--"He has a natural ability," &c. &c. Let us not
+deceive ourselves, and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by
+these words, "he can if he will"! but he cannot if he don't will. The
+will is wanting,--and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot
+appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? The
+man cannot change one volition for another. By supposition, he has not
+the moral or metaphysical ability,--and yet this is the only ability
+that can produce the new volition. It is passing strange that the power
+upon which volition is absolutely dependent, should be set aside by
+calling it _metaphysical_,--and the man blamed for an act because the
+consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the necessary
+consequent of this power! The man is only in his volition. The volition
+is good or bad in itself. The cause of volition is none of his concern,
+because it transcends volition. He can if he will. That is enough for
+him! But it is not enough to make him blameable, when whether he will or
+not depends not only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the
+antecedent itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.
+
+I am not now disputing the philosophy. The philosophy may be true; it
+may be very good: but then we must take its consequences along with it;
+and this is all that I now insist upon.
+
+V. It is another consequence of this system, that there can be nothing
+evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of
+moral perfection, as indeed their very names imply, then all the
+necessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite
+wisdom and goodness, as principles, can only envelope parts of
+themselves. It would be the destruction of all logic to deny this. It
+would annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be
+said that infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what
+is essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do transgress
+this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation
+of the law was a necessary developement of infinite wisdom; and the
+volition which transgresses it is a developement of the same nature. If
+this seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system,
+and the system alone is responsible for its conclusions.
+
+If it should be replied here, that every system must be subject to the
+same difficulty, because if evil had a beginning, it must have had a
+holy cause, inasmuch as it could not exist before it began to exist,--I
+answer, this would be true if evil is the _necessary_ developement of a
+holy cause. But more of this hereafter.
+
+VI. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. Every volition
+being the sense of the most agreeable, and arising from the correlation
+of the object and the sensitivity; it follows that every motive and
+every action comes under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of
+gratification or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no
+collision between principle and passion, because principle can have no
+power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most agreeable.
+Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain sway only by
+uniting with desire, and thus coming under conditions of yielding the
+highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and benevolence, when obeyed,
+therefore, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable; and
+so also injustice, falsehood, and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but
+simply as the most agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as
+the quality of all motive and the universal principle of the
+determinations of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We
+may indeed _speculate_ respecting these distinctions,--we may say that
+justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in itself; but
+this judgement has practical efficiency only as one of the terms takes
+the form of the most agreeable. But we have seen that the most agreeable
+depends upon the state of the sensitivity in correlation with the
+object,--a state and a correlation antecedent to action; and that
+therefore it is a necessary law of our being, to be determined by the
+greatest apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not
+only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of
+action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can
+act.
+
+VII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an
+effort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course
+cannot resist his passions, or introduce any intellectual or moral
+discipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake
+any enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged,
+or not part or consequent of the same.
+
+If he effect any change directly in the habitual character of his
+volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, he must will different
+from his actual will,--his will must oppose itself in its own act: but
+this is absurd, the system itself being judge. As, therefore, the will
+cannot oppose itself, a new volition can be obtained only by presenting
+a new motive; but this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is
+to call up new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state
+of the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering
+under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself must be
+changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a change must take
+place both of subject and object, for the motive lies in the correlation
+of the two. But the volition to call up new objects and circumstances in
+relation to some principle of the mind that had been slumbering,--for
+example, fear, must itself have a motive; but the motive to call up
+objects of fear must preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then
+of necessity the volition to call up objects of fear will take place;
+and, it will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the
+actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such motive
+pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a new motive, to
+cause the choice of objects of fear; and here would be a recurrence of
+the original difficulty,--and so on, ad infinitum.
+
+If the problem be to effect a change in the state of the mind in
+relation to existing objects, in the first place, this cannot be
+effected by a direct act of will, for the act of will is caused by the
+state of mind, and this would be an effect changing or annihilating its
+cause.
+
+Nor can it be done indirectly. For to do it indirectly, would be to
+bring influences to bear upon the state of mind or the sensitivity; but
+the choice and volition of these influences would require a motive--but
+the motive to change the state of mind must pre-exist in the state of
+mind itself. And thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility
+of finding a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its
+change. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a change,
+but a new developement of the long chain of the necessary causes and
+volitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we must find a motive
+to change the state of mind in order to a change of the state: but this
+motive, if it exist, must pre-exist in the state of mind. If it
+pre-exist, then no change is required; if it do not; then we must seek
+still an antecedent motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the
+problem be to change both subject and object, the same difficulties
+exist in two-fold abundance.
+
+The grand difficulty is to find a _primum mobile_, or first mover, when
+the very act of seeking implies a _primum mobile_, which the conditions
+of the act deny.
+
+Any new discipline, therefore, intellectual or moral, a discipline
+opposite to that which the present state of the mind would naturally and
+necessarily bring about, is impossible.
+
+Of course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to deny or mortify
+one's self. The present volition is as the strongest present
+desire--indeed, is the strongest present desire itself. "Will and desire
+do not run counter at all." "A man never in any instance, wills anything
+contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will." (p.
+17.) Hence to restrain a present passion would be to will against
+will--would be to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may
+be relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome the
+weaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the man; it is
+utterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance, for his whole
+power, activity, and volition, are in the desire itself.
+
+He can do nothing but will; and the nature and direction of his
+volitions are, at least in reference to any effort of his own, immutable
+as necessity itself.
+
+VIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call upon the man to bestir
+himself, to think, to plan, to act, are inconsistent and absurd. In all
+such exhortations and persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth
+volitions, as if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It
+may be replied, 'that the man does will, that the volitions are his
+volitions.' But then he wills only passively, and these volitions are
+his only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort and
+persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his real
+condition according to this system? The exhortations and persuasions do
+themselves contain the motive power: and instead of arousing himself to
+action, he is absolutely and necessarily passive under the motives you
+present. Whether he be moved or not, as truly and absolutely depends
+upon the motives you present, as the removing of any material mass
+depends upon the power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether
+it be wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse itself
+as the man; and the man's volition is his volition in no other sense
+than the motion of the material mass is its motion. In the one case, the
+man perceives; and in the other case, the material mass does not
+perceive--but perception is granted by all parties to be necessary; the
+addition of perception, therefore, only modifies the character of the
+being moved, without altering the nature of his relation to the power
+which moves him. In the material mass, too, we have an analogous
+property, so far as motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine
+the will unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power
+move the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of parts. If I
+have but the wisdom to discover the proper correlation of object and
+sensitivity in the case of individuals or of masses of men, I can
+command them in any direction I please, with a necessity no less
+absolute than that with which a machine is caused to work by the
+application of a steam or water-power.
+
+When I bring motives before the minds of my fellow-beings in the proper
+relation, the volition is necessarily produced; but let me not forget,
+that in bringing these motives I put forth volitions, and that of course
+I am myself moved under the necessity of some antecedent motive. My
+persuasions and exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as
+necessary antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the
+wheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and
+persuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must yield when
+the motives are properly selected.
+
+IX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when obeyed and yielded to,
+are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary force which they possess in
+relation to the state of mind to which they are addressed. When not
+obeyed and yielded to, they fail necessarily, through a moral inability
+on the part of the mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want
+of a proper correlation between them and the state of mind addressed:
+that is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the
+required volitions, and their existence of course is an utter
+impossibility.
+
+Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce volitions of obedience
+and submission, only as they produce the sense of the most agreeable;
+and as the will of the creature can have no part in producing this
+sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition, it is
+produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a
+positive necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that
+no enlargement here is required.
+
+When no obedience and submission take place, it is because the divine
+commands, warnings, and rebukes, do not produce the sense of the most
+agreeable. And as the will of the creature can have no part in producing
+this sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition; and
+as it is produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by
+a positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have no
+part in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition of
+obedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations of the
+antecedent correlations of certain objects with the subject, and are
+necessarily determined by the nature of the correlation.
+
+Now the Divine Being must know the precise relation which his commands
+will necessarily hold to the vast variety of mind to which they are
+addressed, and consequently must know in what cases obedience will be
+produced, and in what cases disobedience. Both results are equally
+necessary. The commands have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a
+two-fold office. When they come into connexion with certain states of
+mind, they necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in
+connexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly produce
+what we call rebellion: and as all volitions are predetermined and fixed
+by a necessary and infinite wisdom, and are therefore in their time and
+place the best, it must follow that rebellion no less than obedience is
+a wise and desirable result.
+
+The consequences I am here deducing seem almost too shocking to utter.
+But show me, he that can, that they are not logical deductions from this
+system? I press the system to its consequences,--not to throw any
+reproach upon those great and good men who unfortunately were led away
+by a false philosophy, but to expose and bring to its close this
+philosophy itself. It has too long been consecrated by its association
+with the good. I know I shall be justified in the honest, though bold
+work, of destroying this unnatural and portentous alliance.
+
+X. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of retribution cannot,
+according to this system, have a real and necessary connexion with any
+volitions, but must be regarded as prejudices or errors of education,
+from which philosophy will serve to relieve us.
+
+Edwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that virtue and vice lie
+essentially in the volitions themselves, and that of course the
+consciousness of evil volitions is the consciousness of guilt. I will,
+or put forth volitions. The volitions are mine, and therefore I am
+guilty. This reasoning is plausible, but not consequential; for,
+according to this system, I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the
+volitions appear necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my
+consciousness, and really are mine only because they are produced in me.
+Connected with this may be the perception that those volitions are
+wrong; but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary,
+and that to suppose them different from what they are, is to suppose
+what could not possibly have been,--since a series of sequents and
+antecedents connect these volitions which now appear, by absolutely
+necessary relations, with a first and necessary cause,--then the sense
+of guilt and shame, and the judgement I ought to be punished, can have
+no place in the human mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will,
+and, according to the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when
+I will wrong,--if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will
+under the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent motive.
+The common judgement of mankind is an error, and philosophy must soon
+dissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and of moral desert, which have
+hitherto annoyed me and made me fearful: and much more must such a
+result ensue, when I take into consideration, likewise, that the
+necessity which determines me, is a necessity which takes its rise in
+infinite and necessary wisdom.
+
+What is true of guilt and retribution is true also of well-doing and
+reward. If I do well, the volitions being determined by an antecedent
+necessity, I could not possibly have done otherwise. It does not answer
+the conditions of the case at all, to say I might have done otherwise,
+if I had willed to do otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am
+doing, is a will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in
+any action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the conviction that
+the choice of this action was a necessary choice, predetermined in a
+long and unbroken chain of necessary antecedents, and the sense of
+praiseworthiness, and the judgement I ought to be rewarded, remain no
+longer.
+
+Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with our volitions, under
+the impression that the good we perform, we perform in opposition to
+temptation, and with the power and possibility of doing evil; and that
+the evil we perform, we perform in opposition to motives of good, and
+with the power and possibility of doing good. But when we are informed
+that all the power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual
+conduct is this,--that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there
+would have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the
+volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been
+otherwise,--we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We perhaps are
+first led to doubt the philosophy,--or if, by acute reasonings, or by
+the authority of great names, we are influenced to yield an implicit
+belief,--the sense of merit and demerit must either die away, or be
+maintained by a hasty retreat from the regions of speculation to those
+of common sense.
+
+XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature and spirit, as causes
+or agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations.
+
+There are three classes of natural causes or agents generally
+acknowledged 1. Inanimate,--as water, wind, steam, magnetism, &c.; 2.
+Animate, but insensible,--as the life and affinities of plants; 3.
+Animate and sensitive, or brute animal power.
+
+These all properly come under the denomination of _natural_, because
+they are alike _necessitated_. "Whatever is comprised in the chain and
+mechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its
+necessity in some other thing antecedent or concurrent,--this is said to
+be _natural_; and the aggregate and system of all such things is
+_nature_." Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this system, comes under
+the same definition: in all its acts it is necessitated. It is in will
+particularly that man is taken as a cause or agent, because it is by
+will that he directly produces phenomena or effects; and by this system
+it is not possible to distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is
+considered, a chain of antecedents and sequents made up of motives,
+volitions, and the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents
+and antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of natural
+agents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and distinguishing
+characteristics; but in the relation of antecedence and sequence,--their
+relation as causes or agents producing effects,--no distinction can be
+perceived. Wind, water, &c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms
+another; brute organization and sensitivity another; intelligent
+volition another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and
+therefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of nature.
+The difference which exists between them is a difference of terms
+merely. There is no difference in the nature of the relation between the
+terms. The nature of the relation between the water-wheel and the
+water,--of the relation between the organic life of plants and their
+developement,--of the relation between passion and volition in
+brutes,--of the relation between their efforts and material
+effects,--and the nature of the relation between motive and
+volition,--are one: it is the relation of cause and effect considered as
+stated antecedent and sequent, and no more and no less necessary in one
+subject than in another.
+
+XII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by external objects,
+and all emotions following perception, and all the acts of the
+intelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or in ratiocination, are as
+really our acts, and acts for which we are as really responsible, if
+responsibility be granted to exist, as acts of volition. Sensations,
+emotions, perceptions, reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in
+our consciousness; they are not created by our volitions, like the
+motions of the hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just
+as volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to all
+is precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of these
+affections of his being; he is simply the subject: the subject of
+sensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning, and of volition; and
+he is the subject of all by the same necessity.
+
+XIII. The system of punishment is only a system accommodated to the
+opinions of society.
+
+There is nothing evil in itself, according to this system of necessity,
+as we have already shown. Every thing which takes place is, in its time,
+place, and relations generally, the necessary result of necessary and
+infinite wisdom. But still it is a fact that society are desirous of
+preventing certain acts,--such as stealing, adultery, murder, &c.; and
+they are necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere
+collection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the emotion
+of fear, which prevent the commission of these acts. Where these acts do
+take place, it is best they should take place; but where they are
+prevented by the fear of punishment, it is best they should be
+prevented. Where the criminal suffers, he has no right to complain,
+because it is best that he should suffer; and yet, if he does complain,
+it is best that he should complain. The system of punishment is good, as
+every thing else is good. The system of divine punishments must be
+considered in the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when
+properly considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in
+the pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events.
+
+XIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there cannot really be any
+calamity. The calamities which we may at any time experience, we ought
+to endure and rejoice in, as flowing from the same perfect and necessary
+source. But as calamity does nevertheless necessarily produce suffering
+and uneasiness, and the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope
+that perfect relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that
+the final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the present
+suffering.
+
+The necessitarian may be an optimist of a high order. It he commits what
+is called crime, and remorse succeeds, and punishment is inflicted under
+law, the crime is good, the remorse is good, the punishment is good, all
+necessary and good, and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure
+happiness. Nothing can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but
+even this will probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all
+afflictions: they must be good in themselves, although disagreeable,
+--and will probably lead the way to the agreeable, just as
+hunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way to the
+enjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity, and of a
+necessary and perfect wisdom.
+
+XV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary and perfect wisdom,
+there really can no more be folly in conduct, or error in reasoning and
+belief, than there can be crime and calamity, considered as evils in
+themselves. Every act that we call folly is a necessary act, in its
+time, place, and relations generally, and is a necessary consequence of
+the infinite wisdom; but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom
+cannot be opposed to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when
+philosophically considered, ceases to be folly.
+
+In any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem necessary, and the
+assent of the mind is necessary. This is granted by all parties. But it
+must be admitted, that when men are said to reason falsely, and to yield
+their assent to false conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them;
+and, according to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem
+otherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary.
+
+The reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning, because it so
+necessarily seems to them; but to the individual to whom it seems
+different, it must really be different, and be good and valid reasoning.
+
+Again: as all these different reasonings and beliefs proceed necessarily
+from the same source, they must all be really true where they seem true,
+and all really false where they seem false. It would follow, from this,
+that no one can really be in a false position except the hypocrite and
+sophist, pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and
+what he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false
+conclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were we not
+compelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite and sophist
+cannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his position is a necessary
+one, predetermined in its necessary connexion with the first necessary
+wisdom.
+
+XVI. Another consequence of this system is fatalism,--or, perhaps, more
+properly speaking, the system is itself a system of fatalism.
+
+This, indeed, has already been made to appear substantially. The word,
+however, has not yet been used. I here, then, charge directly this
+consequence or feature upon the system.
+
+Fatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This system is fatalism,
+because it is the absolute negation of liberty.
+
+No liberty is contended for, in this system, in relation to man, but
+physical liberty: viz. that when he wills, the effect will follow,--that
+when he wills to walk, he walks, &c. "Liberty, as I have explained it,
+is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he
+pleases, or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure,
+without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is." (p. 291.)
+
+In the first place, this is no higher liberty than what brutes possess.
+They have power, opportunity, or advantage, to do as they please.
+Effects follow their volitions by as certain a law as effects follow the
+volitions of men.
+
+In the second place, this is no higher liberty than slaves possess.
+Slaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive be the lash, or the
+fear of the lash, still, in their case as well as in that of brutes
+under similar circumstances, the volition which takes place is the most
+pleasing at the moment. The slave and the animal do what is most
+pleasing to them, or do according to their pleasure, When the one drags
+the plough and the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal,
+rational or irrational, to act without doing what is most pleasing to
+him or it. Volition is always as the greatest apparent good, or as the
+sense of the most pleasant or agreeable.
+
+If any should reply that slaves and animals are _liable_ to be fettered,
+and this distinguishes them from the free, I rejoin that every being is
+liable to various restraints; none of us can do many things which in
+themselves appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there
+were known to be an established connexion between them and our wills. We
+are limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us; we cannot
+overturn mountains, or command the winds. We are limited in the nature
+of our physical being. We are limited by our want of wealth, knowledge,
+and influence. In all these respects, we may, with as much propriety as
+the slave, be regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say
+that, as we never really will what we know to be impossible or
+impracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or a want
+of liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to the fettered
+slave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows it to be
+impossible. But in relation to him as well as to every other being,
+according to this system it holds true, that whether he act or forbear
+to act, his volitions are as the most agreeable.
+
+All creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are to be accounted free,
+and one really as free as another.
+
+In the third place, the liberty here affirmed belongs equally to every
+instance of stated antecedence and sequence.
+
+The liberty which is taken to reside in the connexion between volition
+and effects, is a liberty lying in a connexion of stated antecedence and
+sequence, and is perfect according as this connexion is necessary and
+unimpeded. The highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the
+most absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also
+with power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where power is
+the greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most obstacles and moves
+on irresistibly to its effects, there is the greatest degree of liberty.
+God is the most free of all beings, because nothing can impede his will.
+His volitions are always the antecedents of effects.
+
+But obviously we do not alter the relation, when we change the terms. If
+liberty lie in the stated antecedence of volition to effects, and if
+liberty is measured by the necessity of the relation, then when the
+antecedent is changed, the relation remaining the same, liberty must
+still be present. For example: when a volition to move the arm is
+followed by a motion of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be
+substituted for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place;
+and as freedom is doing as we please, or will, "without considering how
+this pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;" that is, without taking
+its motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be affirmed to be
+doing according to the galvanic impulse, "without considering how" that
+impulse "comes to be as it is."
+
+If we take any other instance of stated antecedence and sequence, the
+reasoning is the same. For example, a water wheel in relation to the
+mill-stone: when the wheel turns, the mill-stone moves. In this case
+freedom may be defined: the mill-stone moving according to the turn of
+the wheel, "without considering how" that turn of the wheel "comes to be
+as it is." In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing
+according to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes
+to be as it is; doing "according to choice, without taking into the
+meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice." (p. 39.)
+
+If it be said that in the case of volition, we have the man of whom to
+affirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel and mill-stone, we have
+nothing of which liberty can properly be affirmed. I reply, that liberty
+must be affirmed, and is properly affirmed, of that to which it really
+belongs; and hence as volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual
+essence, man; and this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because
+volition appears in it, and is attended by consequences:--so, likewise,
+the material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because motion
+belongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every being that has
+volition is free, so likewise every thing that hath motion is free:--in
+every instance of cause and effect, we meet with liberty.
+
+But volition cannot be the characteristic of liberty, if volition itself
+be governed by necessity: and yet this system which affirms liberty,
+wherever there is unimpeded volition, makes volition a necessary
+determination. In the fact of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to
+all creatures that have volition; and then again, in the fact of the
+necessary determination of volition it destroys the possibility of
+liberty. But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new
+feature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between volition
+and its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary and absolute as
+the connexion between the motive and the volition, and between any
+antecedent and sequent whatever. That my arm should move when I make a
+volition to this effect, is just as necessary and just as
+incomprehensible too, as that water should freeze at a given
+temperature: when the volition is impeded, we have only another instance
+of necessity,--a lesser force overcome by a greater.
+
+The liberty therefore which this system affirms in the fact of volition
+and its unimpeded connexion with its consequents, is an assumption--a
+mere name. It is a part of the universal necessity arbitrarily
+distinguished and named, its liberty does not reside in human volition,
+so neither can it reside in the divine volition. The necessary
+dependence of volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of
+effects upon volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind
+than from ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the
+universal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically considered.
+The creation of volition by volition is absurd in itself--it cannot but
+be an absurdity. The determination of will by the strongest motive, if a
+truth is a truth universally; on this system, it contains the whole
+cause and possibility of volition. The whole liberty of God, it is
+affirmed, is contained in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other
+words, that what he wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished:
+what pleases him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His
+liberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from
+necessity.
+
+If the movements of mind are necessary, no argument is required to prove
+that all being and events are necessary. We are thus bound up in a
+universal necessity. Whatever is, is, and cannot be otherwise, and could
+not have been otherwise. As therefore there is no liberty, we are
+reduced to the only remaining alternative of fatalism.
+
+Edwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the charge of fatalism.
+(part iv. Sec. vi.) In relation to the Stoics, he remarks:--"It seems they
+differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of _fate_ as
+maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But
+whatever their doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is
+repugnant to any _liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,_ I
+utterly deny such a fate." He objects to fatalism only when it should
+deny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our sense of the
+most agreeable, that is our volition. But this connexion we have fully
+proved to be as necessary as the connexion between the volition and its
+motive. This reservation therefore does not save him from fatalism.
+
+In the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents the liberty and
+sovereignty of God as consisting in an ability "to do whatever pleases
+him." His idea of the divine liberty, therefore, is the same as that
+attributed to man. That the divine volitions are necessarily determined,
+he repeatedly affirms, and indeed represents as the great excellence of
+the divine nature, because this necessity of determination is laid in
+the infinite wisdom and perfection of his nature.
+
+If necessity govern all being and events, it is cheering to know that it
+is necessity under the forms of infinite wisdom and benevolence. But
+still it remains true that necessity governs. If "it is no disadvantage
+or dishonour to a being, _necessarily_ to act in the most excellent and
+happy manner from the necessary perfection of his own nature," still let
+us remember that under this representation _he does act necessarily_.
+Fate must have some quality or form; it must be what we call good or
+evil: but in determining its quality, we do not destroy its nature. Now
+if we call this fate a nature of goodness and wisdom, eternal and
+infinite, we present it under forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but
+it is nevertheless fate,--and as such it governs the divine volitions;
+and through the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of
+these volitions;--the universe of being and things is determined by
+fate;--and all volitions of angels or men are determined by fate--by
+this fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all things thus
+_proceeding_ from fate were beautiful, benign, and glorious, the theory
+might not alarm us. But that deformity, crime, and calamity should have
+place as developements of this fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of
+this system, however, may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion
+that deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but of
+the limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance in point
+in Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as "a very learned and
+pious disciple of Leibnitz." Says Bonnet--"Thus the same chain embraces
+the physical and moral world, binds the past to the present, the present
+to the future, the future to eternity. That wisdom which has ordained
+the existence of this chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of
+which it is composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is
+of iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of gold.
+_Both_ are necessary parts of one whole, which could not but exist.
+Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? What absurdity!
+God esteems this link at its proper value. He sees it in its cause, and
+he approves this cause, for it is good. God beholds moral monsters as he
+beholds physical monsters. Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy
+if he know that he is _only fortunate_. He has attained the highest
+degree of moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing
+that what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must
+occupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of this
+system; the simile of the potter is its summary." He might have added,
+"Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not guilty, but at
+worst _only unfortunate;_ and really not unfortunate, because holding a
+necessary place in the chain which both as a whole and in its parts, is
+the result of infinite wisdom."
+
+If anything more is required in order to establish this consequence of
+the system we are examining, I would call attention to the inquiry,
+whether after a contingent self-determining will there remains any
+theory of action except fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is
+a will which is the cause of its own volitions or choices--a
+self-conscious power, self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its
+choice, or movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of
+choosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what conception
+have we to oppose to this but that of a will not determining
+itself,--not the cause of its own volitions,--a power not self-moved and
+directed,--and not conscious of ability at the moment of a particular
+choice, to make a contrary choice? And this last conception is a will
+whose volitions are determined by some power antecedent to itself, not
+contingently, but necessarily. As the will is the only power for which
+contingent self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such
+power, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and
+causality will then be expressed as follows:
+
+1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and volitions. 2.
+Absolute and necessary connexion of volitions and effects. 3. Absolute
+and necessary connexion of all sequents and antecedents in nature. 4.
+Absolute and necessary connexion of all things existent with a first and
+necessary principle or cause. 5. The necessary determination of this
+principle or cause.
+
+Denying a contingent self-determining will, this theory is all that
+remains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in the 2d particular of this
+theory, it becomes a mere arbitrary designation, because the _nature_ of
+the relation is granted to be the same; it is not _contingent_, but
+necessary. Nor can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in
+the first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a
+contingent self-determining will, by infinite series of volitions, must
+apply to this great first principle considered as God. And in the second
+place, the doctrine of the necessary determination of motive must apply
+here likewise, since God as will and intelligence requires motives no
+less than we do. Such determination is represented as arising from the
+very nature of mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to
+a self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as opposed
+to necessity. And this is all that can be meant by fatalism. Liberty
+thus becomes a self-contradictory conception, and fatalism alone is
+truth and reality.
+
+XVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a fair deduction from
+this system.
+
+According to this system, God is the sole and universal doer--the only
+efficient cause. 1. His volition is the creative act, by which all
+beings and things exist. Thus far it is generally conceded that God is
+all in all. "By him we live, and move, and have our being." 2. The
+active powers of the whole system of nature he has constituted and
+regulated. The winds are his messengers. The flaming fire his servant.
+However we may conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting
+under necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy,
+in either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to God.
+These movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are executed directly
+or indirectly by his will. Every effect which we produce in the material
+world, we produce by instrumentality. Our arms, hands, &c. are our first
+instruments. All that we do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute
+to ourselves. Now if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of
+an axe, spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the
+same way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we multiply the
+instruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do the deed directly
+with my hand, or do it by an instrument held in my hand, or by a
+concatenation of machinery, reaching from "the centre to the utmost
+pole,"--if I contemplate the deed, and designedly accomplish it in this
+way, the deed is mine. And not only is the last deed contemplated as the
+end of all this arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements
+produced as the necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the
+last is to be attained, are mine likewise.
+
+I use powers and instruments whose energy and capacity I have learned by
+experience, but in whose constitution I have had no hand. They are
+provided for me, and I merely use them. But God in working by these,
+works by what his own wisdom and power have created; and therefore _a
+fortiori_ must every effect produced by these, according to his design,
+and by his volition as at least the first power of the series, be
+attributed to him,--be called his doing. He causeth the sun to rise and
+set. "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
+service of man." "He watereth the hills from his chambers." This is not
+merely poetry. It is truth.
+
+Now the system we are considering goes one step further; it makes human
+volitions as much the objects of the eternal design, and as really the
+effects of the divine volition, as the rising of the stars, the flight
+of the lightning, the tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth
+itself like a garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is
+God's act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every
+volition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a
+pre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents necessarily
+runs back and connects itself with the infinite wisdom. God's volition
+is his own act; the effect immediately produced by that volition is his
+own deed. Let that effect be the creation of man: the man in all his
+powers and susceptibilities is God's work; the objects around him are
+God's work; the correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man
+is God's work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result
+of this correlation is God's work. The volition of the man is as
+strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common apprehensions,
+the blow which I give with an axe is attributable to me. What is true of
+the first man, must be equally true of the man removed by a thousand
+generations, for the intermediary links are all ordained by God under an
+inevitable necessity. God is really, therefore, the sole doer--the only
+efficient, the only cause. All beings and things, all motion and all
+volition, are absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the
+author of all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the
+author of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all in the
+same way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining will, and
+there is no stopping-place between a human volition and the divine
+volition. The human volition is but the divine, manifested through a
+lengthened it may be, but a connected and necessary chain of antecedents
+and sequents. I see no way of escaping from this, as a necessary and
+legitimate consequence of the necessary determination of will. And what
+is this consequence but pantheism? God is the universal and
+all-pervading intelligence--the universal and only power. Every movement
+of nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because
+necessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There is no
+life but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He is the soul
+of the world.
+
+Spinosa never represented himself as an atheist, and according to the
+following representation appears rather as a pantheist. "He held that
+God is the _cause_ of all things; but that he acts, not from choice, but
+from necessity; and, of consequence, that he is the involuntary author
+of all the good and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human
+life." (Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.)
+
+Cousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather the reproach of
+pantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was fairly deduced from the
+doctrine of necessary determination, which he advocated.
+
+XVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an atheist. "It will
+not be disputed," says Stewart, "by those who comprehend the drift of
+his reasonings, that in point of practical tendency atheism and
+Spinosism are one and the same."
+
+The following is Cousin's view of his system. It apparently differs from
+the preceding in some respects, but really tends to the same
+conclusions.
+
+"Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought to be reproached for
+an error in the other direction. Spinosa starts from the perfect and
+infinite being of Descartes's system, and easily demonstrates that such
+a being is alone a being in itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect,
+and relative, only participates of being, without possessing it, in
+itself: that a being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one
+substance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal existence:
+that to call phenomena, finite substances, is affirming and denying, at
+the same time; whereas, there being, but one substance which possesses
+being in itself, and the finite being that which participates of
+existence without possessing it in itself, a substance finite implies
+two contradictory notions. Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and
+nature are pure phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute
+substance, but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for
+as phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without the
+perfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature suppose
+God; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without phenomena, the
+perfect without the imperfect, the infinite without the finite, and God
+on his part supposes man and nature. The error of his system lies in the
+predominance of the relation of phenomenon to being, of attribute to
+substance, over the relation of effect to cause. When man has been
+represented, not as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and
+uncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought; God, or
+the supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance, and not a
+cause--a being, perfect, infinite, necessary--the immutable substance of
+the universe, and not its producing and creating cause. In Cartesianism,
+the notion of substance figures more conspicuously than that of cause;
+and this notion of substance, altogether predominating, constitutes
+Spinosism." (Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.)
+
+The predominance of the notion of substance and attribute, over that of
+cause and effect, which Cousin here pronounces the vice of Spinosa's
+system, is indeed the vice of every system which contains the dogma of
+the necessary determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism;
+the second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When self
+-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into mere
+desire, necessitated in all its acts from its pre-constituted
+correlation with objects, then will really ceases to be a cause. It
+becomes an instrument of antecedent power, but is no power in itself,
+creative or productive. The reasoning employed in reference to the human
+will, applies in all its force to the divine will, as has been already
+abundantly shown. The divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and
+becomes a mere instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is
+the infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom is
+eternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what tendencies
+or energies it has now, it always had; and therefore, whatever volitions
+it now necessarily produces, it always necessarily produced. If we
+conceive a volition to have been, in one direction, the immediate and
+necessary antecedent of creation; and, in another, the immediate and
+necessary sequent of infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then
+this volition must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as
+the necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The
+eternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because this is
+existence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and creation,
+consisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite, participating only
+of existence, and not being existence in themselves, are not substances,
+but phenomena. But what is the relation of the phenomena to the
+substance? Not that of effect to cause;--this relation slides entirely
+out of view, the moment will ceases to be a cause. It is the relation
+simply of phenomena to being, considered as the necessary and
+inseparable manifestations of being; the relation of attributes to
+substance, considered as the necessary and inseparable properties of
+substance. We cannot conceive of substance without attributes or
+phenomena, nor of attributes or phenomena without substance; they are,
+therefore, co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and
+its attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the universe,
+as made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is Spinosism; this
+is pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate consequence of a
+necessitated will.
+
+The second consequence is atheism. In the denial of will as a cause _per
+se_,--in resolving all its volitions into the necessary phenomena of the
+eternal substance,--we destroy personality: we have nothing remaining
+but the universe. Now we may call the universe God; but with equal
+propriety we call God the universe. This destruction of
+personality,--this merging of God into necessary substance and
+attributes,--is all that we mean by Atheism. The conception is really
+the same, whether we name it fate, pantheism, or atheism.
+
+The following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that he arrived at the
+same result: "Whatever may have been the doctrines of some of the
+ancient atheists about man's free agency, it will not be denied that, in
+the history of modern philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of
+necessity have been hitherto always connected together. Not that I would
+by any means be understood to say, that every necessitarian must _ipso
+facto_ be an atheist, or even that any presumption is afforded, by a
+man's attachment to the former sect, of his having the slightest bias in
+favour of the latter; but only that every modern atheist I have heard of
+has been a necessitarian. I cannot help adding, that the most consistent
+necessitarian who have yet appeared, have been those who followed out
+their principles till they ended in _Spinosism_,--a doctrine which
+differs from atheism more in words than in reality." (Vol. 6, p. 470.)
+
+Cudworth, in his great work entitled "The true Intellectual System of
+the Universe," shows clearly the connexion between fatalism and atheism.
+This work seems to have grown out of another undertaking, which
+contemplated specifically the question of liberty and necessity, and its
+bearing upon morality and religion. The passage in the preface, in which
+he informs us of his original plan, is a very full expression of his
+opinion. "First, therefore, I acknowledge," says he, "that when I
+engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and
+necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of
+all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles
+maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of atheism, and
+undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and
+blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgement
+ridiculous." This opinion of the tendency of the doctrine of a
+necessitated will, is the germ of his work. The connexion established in
+his mind between this doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his
+masterly and elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter.
+
+The arguments of many atheists might be referred to, to illustrate the
+connexion between necessity and atheism. I shall here refer, however, to
+only one individual, remarkable both for his poetic genius and
+metaphysical acumen. I mean the late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly
+and unblushingly professed atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line:
+"There is no God." In a note upon this line, he remarks: "This negation
+must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of
+a pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains unshaken."
+This last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really the negation of a
+creative Deity,--the identity or at least necessary and eternal
+co-existence of God and the universe. Shelley has expressed this clearly
+in another passage:
+
+   "Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,
+   Necessity! thou mother of the world!"
+
+In a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued the doctrine of the
+necessary determination of will by motive, with an acuteness and power
+scarcely inferior to Collins or Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different
+application of the doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and
+Edwards, and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil
+under insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base religion
+upon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a fog of
+subtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly consistent, is
+perfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from necessity to pantheism, and
+thence to atheism and the destruction of all moral distinctions. "We are
+taught," he remarks, "by the doctrine of necessity, that there is
+neither good nor evil in the universe, otherwise than as the events to
+which we apply these epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of
+being. Still less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine
+of necessity accord with the belief of a future state of punishment."
+
+I here close my deductions from this system. If these deductions be
+legitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they are, then, to the largest
+class of readers, the doctrine of necessity is overthrown: it is
+overthrown by its consequences, and my argument has the force of a
+_reductio ad absurdum_. If a self-determined will appear an absurdity,
+still it cannot be as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine
+involve the consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will
+claim that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral
+and responsible nature.
+
+A question will here very naturally arise: How can we account for the
+fact that so many wise and good men have contended for a necessitated
+will, as if they were contending for the great basis of all morality and
+religion? For example, take Edwards himself as a man of great thought
+and of most fervent piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with
+the air and manner of one who is opposing great errors as really
+connected with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the
+following language: "I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a
+_contingent self-determination of the will_, as necessary to the
+morality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably
+pernicious; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important
+truths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary
+to be known." The question is a fair one, and I will endeavour to answer
+it.
+
+1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as being in itself a
+contradictory idea, and as leading to the consequence of affirming the
+existence of effects without causes, takes strong hold of the mind in
+these individuals. This I believe, and hope to prove in the course of
+this treatise, to be a philosophical error;--but it is no new thing for
+great and good men to fall into philosophical errors.
+
+As, therefore, the liberty consisting in a self-determining will, or the
+_liberty of indifference_, as it has been technically called, is
+conceived to be exploded, they endeavour to supply a _liberty of
+spontaneity_, or a liberty lying in the unimpeded connexion between
+volition and sequents.
+
+Hobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in a clearer manner than
+any of its advocates: "I conceive," says he, "liberty to be rightly
+defined,--the absence of all impediments to action, that are not
+contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for
+example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or is said to have
+liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no
+impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments:
+and though water cannot ascend, yet men never say, it wants the
+_liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the
+impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we
+say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment
+is not in him, but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is
+sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself,"--that is, he wants
+the faculty or power of going:--this constitutes natural _inability_.
+Liberty is volition acting upon physical instrumentalities, or upon
+mental faculties, according to a fixed and constituted law of
+antecedents, and meeting with no impediment or overcoming antagonistic
+power. Natural ability is the fixed and constituted antecedence itself.
+Hence there may be natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot
+be affirmed without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute
+responsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated antecedent
+of certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent existing without
+impediment or frustration. Since this is the only possible liberty
+remaining, and as they have no wish to be considered fatalists, they
+enlarge much upon this; not only as the whole of liberty actually
+existing, but as the full and satisfactory notion of liberty.
+
+In basing responsibility and praise and blameworthiness upon this
+liberty, an appeal is made to the common ideas, feelings, and practices
+of men. Every man regards himself as free when he does as he
+pleases,--when, if he pleases to walk, he walks,--when, if he pleases to
+sit down, he sits down, &c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to
+plead in excuse that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed
+to do it, the judge would reply--"this is your guilt, that you pleased
+or willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to commit it
+was the very doing of it." Now all this is just. I readily admit that we
+are free when we do as we please, and that we are guilty when, in doing
+as we please, we commit a crime.
+
+Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty sufficient to constitute
+responsibility? And thus the whole difficulty seems to be got over. The
+reasoning would be very fair, as far as it goes, if employed against
+fatalists, but amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold
+to the self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these
+common ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative of
+freedom, because they raise no question against human freedom. The real
+question at issue is, how are we to account for these facts? The
+advocates of self-determining power account for them by referring them
+to a self-determined will. We say a man is free when he does as he
+pleases or according to his volitions, and has the sense of freedom in
+his volitions, because he determines his own volitions; and that a man
+is guilty for crime, if committed by his volition, because he determined
+this volition, and at the very moment of determining it, was conscious
+of ability to determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that
+a man is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words,
+makes a volition without any impediment between it and its object,--he
+is free, if he make the volition without producing effects by it:
+volition itself is the act of freedom. But how do those who deny a
+self-determining power account for these facts? They say that the
+volition is caused by a motive antecedent to it, but that nevertheless,
+inasmuch as the man feels that he is free and is generally accounted so,
+he must be free; for liberty means nothing more than "power and
+opportunity to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice,
+without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the _cause_ of
+that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a
+volition,"--that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so, when
+he does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by freedom.
+
+But suppose the objection be brought up, that the definition of liberty
+here given is assumed, arbitrary, and unsatisfactory; and that the sense
+or consciousness of freedom in the act of volition, and the common
+sentiments and practices of men in reference to voluntary action, are
+not adequately accounted for,--then the advocates of necessitated
+volition return to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other
+definition,--and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom does
+exist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally correspond to
+it, we must believe that we are free when volition is unimpeded in its
+connexion with sequents, and that we are blame or praiseworthy,
+according to the perceived character of our volitions,--although it
+cannot but be true that the volitions themselves are necessary. On the
+one hand, they are compelled by their philosophy to deny a
+self-determining will. On the other hand, they are compelled, by their
+moral sense and religious convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and
+responsibility. In order to do this, however, a _quasi_ liberty must be
+preserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity, by
+referring the first exclusively to the connexion between volition and
+its sequents, and the second exclusively to the connexion between the
+volition and its antecedents or motives. Liberty is physical; necessity
+is metaphysical. The first belongs to man; the second transcends the
+sphere of his activity, and, is not his concern. In this very difficult
+position, no better or more ingenious solution could be devised; but
+that it is wholly illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from
+absolute and universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved.
+
+2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are speaking, conceive that
+when volitions are supposed to exist out of the necessary determination
+of motives, they exist fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up
+the necessary and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would
+be to place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,--it would
+destroy the great _a posteriori_ argument for the existence of a God. Of
+course it would be the destruction of all morality and religion.
+
+3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in particular, is much
+insisted upon as incompatible with contingent volitions. Divine
+foreknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events certain and necessary.
+Hence volitions are necessary; and, to carry out the reasoning, it must
+be added likewise that the connexion between volitions and their
+sequents is equally necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition
+as well as the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the
+_name_ of liberty, because it fears the designation which properly
+belongs to it.
+
+4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of God and the harmony of
+his government are preserved. His volitions are determined by his
+infinite wisdom. The world, therefore, must be ruled in truth and
+righteousness.
+
+These philosophers and divines thus represent to themselves the theory
+of a self-determining will as an absurdity in itself, and, if granted to
+be true, as involving the most monstrous and disastrous consequences,
+while the theory which they advocate is viewed only in its favourable
+points, and without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If
+these consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be
+evaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and the
+sense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be urged as a
+consequence, of this theory, the ready reply is invariably--"No such
+necessity is maintained as goes to destroy the liberty which consists in
+doing as one pleases;" or if the destruction of responsibility be urged
+as a consequence, the reply is--"A man is always held a just subject of
+praise or blame when he acts voluntarily." The argumentation undoubtedly
+is as sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous.
+They are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No wonder,
+then, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion, they should by
+every possible argument aim to sustain the philosophy which is supposed
+to lie at their basis, and look away from consequences so destructive,
+persuading themselves that these consequences are but the rampant
+sophistries of infidelity.
+
+It is a wonderful fact in the history of philosophy, that the philosophy
+of fate, pantheism, and atheism, should be taken as the philosophy of
+religion. Good men have misapprehended the philosophy, and have
+succeeded in bringing it into fellowship with truth and righteousness.
+Bad men and erring philosophers have embraced it in a clear
+understanding of its principles, and have both logically reasoned out
+and fearlessly owned its consequences.
+
+XIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition of liberty given by
+the theologians above alluded to, is the only possible definition, it
+must follow that the most commonly received modes of preaching the
+truths and urging the duties of religion are inconsistent and
+contradictory.
+
+A class of theologians has been found in the church, who, perhaps
+without intending absolutely to deny human freedom, have denied all
+ability on the part of man to comply with the divine precepts. A generic
+distinction between inability and a want of freedom is not tenable, and
+certainly is of no moment, where, as in this case, the inability
+contended for is radical and absolute.
+
+These theologians clearly perceived, that if volition is necessarily
+determined by motive, and if motive lies in the correlation of desire
+and object, then, in a being totally depraved, or a being of radically
+corrupt desires, there can be no ability to good deeds: the deed is as
+the volition, and the volition is as the strongest desire or the sense
+of the most agreeable.
+
+Hence these theologians refer the conversion of man exclusively to
+divine influence. The man cannot change his own heart, nor employ any
+means to that end; for this would imply a volition for which, according
+to the supposition, he has no ability.
+
+Now, at the same time, that this class represent men as unable to love
+and obey the truths of religion, they engage with great zeal in
+expounding these truths to their minds, and in urging upon them the duty
+of obedience. But what is the aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will
+reply, I know the man cannot determine himself to obedience, but in
+preaching to him, I am presenting motives which may influence him. But
+in denying his ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving
+him by motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by
+supposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more,
+therefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the sense of
+the disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present objects to a
+man's mind which are correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and
+frequently you present them, the more you advance towards the sense of
+the most agreeable or choice. So when you present objects which are not
+correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present
+them, the more you must advance towards the sense of the most
+disagreeable, or positive refusal.
+
+If it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the presentation of truth
+forms the occasion or condition on which the divine influence is exerted
+for the regeneration of the heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man
+to repent, and believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty
+generally, and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly
+unable to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections
+and actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the divine
+influence be exerted, which brings his heart into correlation with
+religion, and makes it possible for him to put forth the volitions of
+piety and duty? It can be regarded in no other light than playing a
+solemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge and persuade, as if the man ought
+to make some exertion when you feel convinced that exertion is
+impossible. It certainly can form no occasion for divine interposition,
+unless it be in pity of human folly. If you say that such a course does
+succeed in the conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe
+that your philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because
+inconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system which
+you know not, or understand not and deny.
+
+A total inability to do good makes man the passive subject of influences
+to be employed for his regeneration, and he can no more be considered
+active in effecting it than he is in the process of digesting food, or
+in the curative action of medicines upon any diseased part of his
+system. If you urge him to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge
+him to put forth volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in
+no sense possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least
+commenced.
+
+I will go one step farther in this reasoning:--on supposition of total
+inability, not only is the individual a passive subject of regenerating
+influences, but he is also incapable of regeneration, or any disposition
+or tendency towards regeneration, from any influences which lie merely
+in motives, produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive,
+according to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards's
+system, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object standing in
+correlation with the state of mind. Now the state of mind, in an
+unregenerate state, is a state represented by this system itself, as
+totally adverse to the objects of religion. Hence, there is no
+conceivable array of religious truth, and no conceivable religious
+exhortation and persuasion that could possibly come into such a relation
+to this state of mind as to form the motive of a religious choice or
+volition. It is perfectly plain, that before such a result could take
+place, the state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the
+array of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must
+fail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state of mind,
+so neither can the state of mind be changed by this array of truth or by
+this exhortation. There is a positive opposition of mind and object, and
+the collision becomes more severe upon every attempt to bring them
+together. It must follow, therefore, that preaching truth and duty to
+the unregenerate, so far from leading to their conversion, can only
+serve to call out more actively the necessary determination, not to
+obey. The very enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer
+perception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the
+disinclination.
+
+Nor can we pause in this consequence, at human instrumentality. It must
+be equally true, that if divine interposition lies in the presentation
+of truth and persuasions to duty, only that these are given with tenfold
+light and power, it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of
+producing any tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no
+correlation with these,--its sense of the disagreeable,--and therefore
+the energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and decided.
+
+If it should be remarked that hope and fear are feelings, which, even in
+a state of unregeneracy, can be operated upon, the state of things is
+equally difficult. No such hope can be operated upon as implies desire
+after religious principles and enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the
+corrupt nature; nor can any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of
+the divine purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate
+to danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security,
+independently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these passions
+might awaken attention, constrain to an outward obedience, and form a
+very prudent conduct, but could effect no purification of the heart.
+
+There is another class of theologians, of whom Edwards is one, who
+endeavour to escape the difficulties which attend a total inability, by
+making the distinction of moral and natural inability:--man, they say,
+is morally unable to do good, and naturally able to do good, and
+therefore he can justly be made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke,
+and exhortation. The futility of this distinction I cannot but think has
+already been made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so
+great stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in
+this particular connexion.
+
+Moral inability, as we have seen, is the impossibility of a given
+volition, because there are no motives or causes to produce it. It is
+simply the impossibility of an effect for the want of a cause: when we
+speak of moral cause and effect, according to Edwards, we speak of
+nothing different from physical cause and effect, except in the quality
+of the terms--the relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility
+of a given volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting,
+is equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a summer's
+noon-tide.[1]
+
+When objects of volition are fairly presented, an inability to choose
+them must lie in the state of the mind, sensitivity, desire, will, or
+affections, for all these have the same meaning according to this
+system. There is no volition of preference where there is no motive to
+this effect; and there is no motive to this effect where the state of
+the mind is not in correlation with the objects presented: on the
+contrary, the volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal.
+
+Natural inability, as defined by this system, lies in the connexion
+between the volition considered as an antecedent, and the effect
+required. Thus I am naturally unable to walk, when, although I make the
+volition, my limbs, through weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect
+in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition,
+or any impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural
+inability.[2] According to this system, I am not held responsible for
+anything which, through natural inability, cannot be accomplished,
+although the volition is made. But now let us suppose that there is no
+defect in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon
+volition, and no impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that
+there need be only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the
+natural ability is complete:--I will to walk, and I walk.
+
+Now it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible for the doing of
+anything, and can be fairly urged to do it when all that is necessary
+for the doing of it is a volition although there may be a moral
+inability to the volition itself.
+
+Nothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this distinction. If
+liberty be essential to responsibility, liberty, as we have clearly
+shown, can no more lie in the connexion between volition and its
+effects, than in the connexion between volition and its motives. One is
+just as necessary as the other. If it be granted to be absurd with the
+first class of theologians to urge men to do right when they are
+conceived to be totally unable to do right, it is equally so when they
+are conceived to have only a natural ability to do right, because this
+natural ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If
+the volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the action;
+nay, "the very willing is the doing of it;" but then the volition as an
+effect cannot take place without a cause; and to acknowledge a moral
+inability, is nothing less than to acknowledge that there is no cause to
+produce the required volition.
+
+The condition of men as represented by the second class of theologians,
+is not really different from their condition as represented by the first
+class. The inability under both representations is a total inability. In
+the utter impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter
+impossibility of any good deed.
+
+When we have denied liberty, in denying a self-determining power, these
+definitions in order to make out a _quasi_ liberty and ability, are
+nothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception.
+
+You tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will; and when he replies to
+you, that on your own principles the required volition is impossible,
+you refer him to the common notions of mankind. According to these, you
+say a man is guilty when he forbears to do right, since nothing is
+wanting to right-doing but a volition,--and guilty when he does wrong,
+because he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions, too, a
+man may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is wanting but a
+will to do right. But do we find this distinction of natural and moral
+ability in the common notions of men? When nothing is required to the
+performance of a deed but a volition, do men conceive of any inability
+whatever? Do they not feel that the volition has a metaphysical
+possibility as well as that the sequent of the volition has a physical
+possibility? Have we not at least some reason to suspect that the
+philosophy of responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion
+lying in the common notions of men, are something widely different from
+the scheme of a necessitated volition?
+
+This last class of theologians, equally with the first, derive all the
+force of their preaching from a philosophy, upon which they are
+compelled to act, but which they stoutly deny. Let them carry out their
+philosophy, and for preaching no place remains.
+
+Preaching can produce good effects only by producing good volitions; and
+good volitions can be produced only by good motives: but good motives
+can exist under preaching only when the subjects of the preaching are
+correlated with the state of mind. But by supposition this is not the
+case, for the heart is totally depraved.
+
+To urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions in reference to his
+regeneration, may consist with a self-determining power of will, but is
+altogether irrelevant on this system. It is urging _him_ to do what _he_
+cannot do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do _in him_ as a
+mere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite easy,
+because nothing is required of him but to will, is equivalent to
+assuring him that the affair is quite easy, because it will be done when
+he has done it. The man may reply, the affair would indeed be quite easy
+if there existed in me a motive to produce the volition; but as there
+does not, the volition is impossible. And as I cannot put forth the
+volition without the motive, so neither can I make the motive which is
+to produce the volition--for then an effect would make its cause. What I
+cannot do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from
+heaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and duties,
+and prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot take the
+character of motives to influence my will, because they are not
+agreeable to my heart.
+
+You indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that on your own
+principles all your zeal and eloquence must necessarily have an opposite
+effect from what you intend? My affections not being in correlation with
+these subjects, the more you urge them, the more intense becomes my
+sense of the most disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my
+good friends, by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable
+and ever-during chain.
+
+It is plainly impossible to escape from this conclusion, and yet
+maintain the philosophy. All efforts of this kind, made by appealing to
+the common sentiments of mankind, we have seen are self-contradictory.
+It will not do to press forward the philosophy until involved in
+difficulty and perplexity, and then to step aside and borrow arguments
+from another system which is assumed to be overthrown. There is no
+necessity more absolute and sovereign, than a logical necessity.[3]
+
+XVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards's system in the sections we
+have been examining, from which the above consequences are deduced, are
+the three following:
+
+1. The will is always determined by the strongest motive.
+
+2. The strongest motive is always "the most agreeable."
+
+3. The will is necessarily determined.
+
+I shall close this part of the present treatise with a brief examination
+of the reasoning by which he endeavours to establish these points.
+
+The reasoning by which the first point is aimed to be established, is
+the general reasoning respecting cause and effect. Volition is an
+effect, and must have a cause. Its cause is the motive lying in the
+correlation of mind and object. When several physical causes conflict
+with each other, we call that the strongest which prevails and produces
+its appropriate effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where
+there are several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other,
+we call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is not
+opposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect; and in
+this case we do not say the _strongest_ cause produces the effect,
+because there is no comparison. So also there are cases in which there
+is but one moral cause or motive present, when there being no
+comparison, we cannot affirm that the volition is determined by the
+_strongest_ motive: the doing of something may be entirely agreeable,
+and the not doing of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the
+motive is only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a
+comparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the effect
+which actually takes place, is produced by the strongest cause or
+motive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a mere postulate,
+as if we should say,--let a cause or motive producing effects be called
+the strongest. It may be represented, also, as a _petitio principii_, or
+reasoning in a circle,--since the proof that the will is determined by
+the strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined. It
+may be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest motive. How
+do you know this? Because it is determined. How does this prove it?
+Because that which determines it must be the strongest.[4]
+
+Edwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of volition. This
+assumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to sustain, when he
+argues against a self-determining will. If the will do not cause its own
+volitions, then it must follow that motive is the cause. The argument
+against a self-determining will we are about to take up.
+
+2. _The strongest motive is always the most agreeable_. Edwards
+maintains that the motive which always prevails to cause volition, has
+this characteristic,--that it is the most agreeable or pleasant at the
+time, and that volition itself is nothing but the sense of the most
+agreeable. If there should be but one motive present to the mind, as in
+that case there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say
+that the will is determined by _the agreeable_.
+
+But how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this
+characteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case
+may be? We can know it only by consulting our consciousness. If,
+whenever we will, we find the sense of the most agreeable identified
+with the volition, and if we are conscious of no power of willing, save
+under this condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then
+certainly there remains no farther question on this point. The
+determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the
+determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.
+
+Does Edwards appeal to consciousness?
+
+He does,--but without formally announcing it. The following passage is
+an appeal to consciousness, and contains Edwards's whole thought on this
+subject: "There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the
+sense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and
+do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most
+_agreeable to them_. To say that they do what _pleases_ them, but yet
+what is not _agreeable_ to them, is the same thing as to say, they do
+what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say,
+that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please." (p.
+25.) Motives differ widely, intrinsically considered. Some are in
+accordance with reason and conscience; some are opposed to reason and
+conscience. Some are wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are
+bad. But whatever may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this
+characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it is by
+this characteristic that their strength is measured. The appeal,
+however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way to beg the very
+point in question. Will not every one admit, that "when men act
+_voluntarily and do what they please_, they do what suits them best, and
+what is most agreeable to them?" Yes. Is it not a palpable
+contradiction, to say that men "do what pleases them," and yet do "what
+is not agreeable to them," according to the ordinary use of these words?
+Certainly.
+
+But the point in question is, whether men, acting voluntarily, always do
+what is pleasing to them: and this point Edwards assumes. He assumes it
+here, and he assumes it throughout his treatise. We have seen that, in
+his psychology, he identifies will and desire or the affections:--hence
+volition is the prevailing desire or affection, and the object which
+moves the _desire_ must of course appear _desirable_, or agreeable, or
+pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men always will what they
+most desire, and desire what they will, then of course when they act
+voluntarily, they do what they please; and when they do what they
+please, they do what suits them best and is most agreeable to them.
+
+Edwards runs the changes of these words with great plausibility, and we
+must say deceives himself as well as others. The great point,--whether
+will and desire are one,--whether the volition is as the most
+agreeable,--he takes up at the beginning as an unquestionable fact, and
+adheres to throughout as such; but he never once attempts an analysis of
+consciousness in relation to it, adequate and satisfactory. His
+psychology is an assumption.
+
+3. The will is necessarily determined.
+
+How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general connexion of causes and
+effects. Causes necessarily produce effects, unless resisted and
+overcome by opposing forces; but where several causes are acting in
+opposition, the strongest will necessarily prevail, and produce its
+appropriate effects.
+
+Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the connexion between motives
+and volitions is the same with that of any other causes and effects. The
+difference is merely in the terms: and when he calls the necessity which
+characterizes the connexion of motive and volition "a moral necessity,"
+he refers not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected.
+In this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between cause
+and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, all causation
+is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, in his system, is
+characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays himself open to all the
+consequences of a universal and absolute necessity.
+
+2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of volition by a method of
+approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, for the sake of the argument,
+that the will may oppose the strongest motive in a given case; but then
+he contends that it is supposable that the strength of the motive may be
+increased beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this
+point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the will
+must be considered necessary. "Whatever power," he remarks, "men may be
+supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not
+infinite." If the power of the man is finite, that of the motive may be
+supposed to be infinite: hence the resistance of the man must at last be
+necessarily overcome. This reasoning seems plausible at first; but a
+little examination, I think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does
+not determine the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic
+qualities, but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But
+agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,--relative to the
+will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would be a motive of
+infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be such only by an
+infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The same of course must hold
+true of any motive less than infinite: and universally, whatever be the
+degree of strength of the motive, there must be in the man an affection
+of corresponding intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in
+the will to any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this
+power of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of
+agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a sense of
+agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall predominate and
+become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain that if the first be
+increased, the second may be supposed to be increased likewise; if the
+first can become infinite, the second can become infinite likewise: and
+hence the power of resistance may be supposed always to meet the motive
+required to be resisted, and a point of necessary determination may
+never be reached.
+
+If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the strength of motives
+intrinsically considered, then the answer is ready. There are motives of
+infinite strength, thus considered, which men are continually resisting:
+for example, the motive which urges them to obey and love God, and seek
+the salvation of their souls.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND
+CONTINGENT WILL.
+
+Edwards's first and great argument against a self-determining will, is
+given in part II. sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows:
+
+The will,--or the soul, or man, by the faculty of willing, effects every
+thing within its power as a cause, by acts of choice. "The will
+determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice;
+and there is no other way of the will's determining, directing, or
+commanding any thing at all." Hence, if the will determines itself, it
+does it by an act of choice; "and if it has itself under its command,
+and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the
+same way that it determines other things which are under its command."
+But if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course we
+have an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice which is
+not determined by a choice,--"which brings us directly to a
+contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first
+act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free
+act of the will before the first free act of the will: or else we must
+come at last to an act of the will determining the consequent acts,
+wherein the will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in
+this notion of freedom." (p. 43.)
+
+This reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt to meet various
+evasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates of a self-determining
+will, depend mainly upon the assumption, that if the will determines
+itself, it must determine itself by an act of choice; that is, inasmuch
+as those acts of the will, or of the soul, considered in its power of
+willing, or in its personal activity, by which effects are produced out
+of the activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for
+example, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down: therefore, if
+the soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions, it must cause them
+by volitions. The causative act by which the soul causes volitions, must
+itself be a volition. This assumption Edwards does not even attempt to
+sustain, but takes for granted that it is of unquestionable validity. If
+the assumption be of unquestionable validity, then his position is
+impregnable; for nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will
+determining volitions by volitions, in an interminable series.
+
+Before directly meeting the assumption, I remark, that if it be valid,
+it is fatal to all causality. Will is simply cause; volition is effect.
+I affirm that the will is the sole and adequate cause of volition.
+Edwards replies: if will is the cause of volition, then, to cause it, it
+must put forth a causative act; but the only act of will is volition
+itself: hence if it cause its own volitions, it must cause them by
+volitions.
+
+Now take any other cause: there must be some effect which according to
+the general views of men stands directly connected with it as its
+effect. The effect is called the phenomenon, or that by which the cause
+manifests itself. But how does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a
+causative act:--but this causative act, according to Edwards's
+reasoning, must itself be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect
+comes between the cause, and what was at first considered the immediate
+effect but the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative
+act; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have another
+causative act before it; and so on, _ad infinitum_. We have here then an
+infinite series of causative acts--an absurdity of the same kind, with
+an infinite series of volitions.
+
+It follows from this, that there can be no cause whatever. An infinite
+series of causative acts, without any first, being, according to this
+reasoning, the consequence of supposing a cause to cause its own acts,
+it must therefore follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but
+that they must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause
+out of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must cause
+these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act of its
+own:--but the same difficulties occur in relation to the second cause as
+in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own acts, and they must
+therefore be caused out of itself by some other cause; and so on, _ad
+infinitum_. We have here again the absurdity of an infinite series of
+causative acts; and also, the absurdity of an infinite series of causes
+without a first cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which
+causes its own acts, without an act of causation; but this is
+impossible, according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there
+cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the denial of
+this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are driven to the
+conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every cause must either
+cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused out of itself. Neither of
+these is possible; therefore, there is no cause.
+
+Take the will itself as an illustration of this last consequence. The
+will is cause; the volition, effect. But the will does not cause its own
+volition; the volition is caused by the motive. But the motive, as a
+cause, must put forth a causative act in the production of a volition.
+If the motive determine the will, then there must be an act of the
+motive to determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to
+act. But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of
+the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its own act,
+then it must do this by a previous act, according to the principle of
+this reasoning; and this again by another previous act; and so on, _ad
+infinitum_.
+
+Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the same.
+
+It may be said in reply to the above, that volition is an effect
+altogether peculiar. It implies selection or determination in one
+direction rather than in another, and therefore that in inquiring after
+its cause, we inquire not merely after the energy which makes it
+existent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in
+one direction rather than in another. "The question is not so much, how
+a spirit endowed with activity comes to _act_, as why it exerts _such_
+an act, and not another; or why it acts with a particular determination?
+If activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for
+instance) acts and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause
+why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined." (p.
+58.)
+
+Every phenomenon or effect is particular and limited. It must
+necessarily be one thing and not another, be in one place and not in
+another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause
+which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise
+all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must,
+in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction.
+
+Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular
+determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every
+volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily
+give it character, and particular direction and determination.
+
+Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular
+determination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect
+cannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause
+cannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection.
+There must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus,
+if fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles,
+and produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular
+determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of
+effect without a particular determination. But in what lies the
+selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain
+objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently
+exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the
+title of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and
+particular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the
+correlation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects;
+and volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by
+will, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the
+selection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or
+direction of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which
+appears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is
+produced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-constitution and
+disposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause.
+
+From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles
+there is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to
+shield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the
+consequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and
+efficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which
+produces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily,
+and often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the
+most agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system
+to make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the
+efficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and
+allurements of passion and desire, and from the laws of reason and
+conscience.
+
+Thus far my argument against Edwards's assumption,--that, to make the
+will the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions
+by an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has
+been fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to
+deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition
+to the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will
+not be deemed superfluous.
+
+Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and
+consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in
+relation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its
+effect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its
+effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and
+effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by
+phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a
+self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we
+do, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable.
+
+The will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by
+volitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms,
+generally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this
+way; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they
+must come under the general law, and be determined by volitions.
+
+The first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does
+not prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable.
+
+In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from
+the first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not
+necessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of
+volitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts
+of the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications
+of the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the
+will can be effected only by that modification of itself called
+volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if
+effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of
+itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in
+external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this
+experience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions.
+The acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are
+volitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the
+will are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the
+will. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have assigned
+the cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the
+will--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I
+do not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the
+production of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The
+connexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and
+inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does
+volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun
+raise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I
+know that such are the facts, it is enough.
+
+Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the
+cause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by
+volitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity.
+
+It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will
+produce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to
+connect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or
+logic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes
+such only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an assumption
+unsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will
+to be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely,
+the motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he
+creates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains
+to motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by
+exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it
+the cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards
+attributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us
+look at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly.
+What is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and
+actual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is
+cause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena,
+and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to cause. But how do
+we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or
+energy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed.
+Is it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not
+observe; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat
+to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion.
+Where then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is
+the _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to
+anticipate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask
+every one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I
+wish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an
+effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the
+volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort
+is simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this
+effort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This
+effort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the
+will itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes
+that know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may
+make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of
+course do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal
+it to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we
+observe in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be
+self-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the
+_nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their
+wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in
+physical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only
+the phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one
+comes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows
+himself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is
+conscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a
+phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a
+phenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the
+sequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible
+world, that he reveals himself to others.
+
+Sometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives
+no external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm
+may be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and
+is not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will
+during a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful
+force; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain.
+
+It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may
+place my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or
+volition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining
+of my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given;
+I am resisted by a greater power than myself.
+
+The most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the
+bosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original
+movement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To
+deny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and
+energy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition,
+admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance
+of the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or
+_nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause
+itself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every
+cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of
+itself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without
+arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all
+cause.
+
+The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own
+volitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported
+alike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the
+absurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten
+upon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it
+assails the opposite system.
+
+_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining
+power of will.
+
+Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There
+is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition
+is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable.
+But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will,
+assuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the
+absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time
+he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in
+correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all
+natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for
+example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these
+natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so
+constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So,
+likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the
+cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will,
+acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the
+most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an
+object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its
+appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most
+agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but
+also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the
+mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the
+mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind
+acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is
+a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are
+acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its
+inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of
+volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat
+may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind,"
+Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It
+follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the
+affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the
+affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any
+other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a
+cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means
+nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a
+cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its
+own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its
+invariable sequents.
+
+Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a
+volition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common
+and necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of
+cause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is
+in fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to
+produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that
+in assigning as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will,
+he really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very
+point he laboured to overthrow.
+
+The point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after
+all, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will
+be self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other
+words, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena.
+
+But the real point in dispute is this: "_Is the will necessarily
+determined, or not?_"
+
+The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted and fixed, that the
+_nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take
+place according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be
+true with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism,
+magnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at
+work in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to
+fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do
+not conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other
+phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which they actually
+produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass of dry gunpowder, an
+explosion must take place.
+
+Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under
+given circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must
+its _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a
+uniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the
+sensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its
+sense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its
+volition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to
+itself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation
+to every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what
+its volition will be at a given time, and under given circumstances.
+Moral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in
+the nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary
+as any physical phenomenon.
+
+Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a
+mere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for
+nothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily
+follow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can
+distinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from
+the sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest
+desire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow,
+because the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a
+necessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of
+consciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our
+undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's
+argument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined.
+This he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word
+contingent; it is important in marking a distinction.
+
+Edwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes
+and begs the question under discussion.
+
+1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if
+identical with chance or no cause. "Any thing is said to be contingent,
+or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of
+such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according
+to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we
+have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be
+contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass
+without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word
+_contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that
+whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to
+foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous
+ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain
+connexion." (p. 31.)
+
+Thus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same
+sense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation
+of these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain
+phenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their
+existence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as
+applied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he
+elaborately discusses the question--"whether any event whatsoever, and
+volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its
+existence;" and in sec. 4,--"whether volition can arise without a cause,
+through the activity of the nature of the soul."
+
+If, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the
+determination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a
+class of phenomena as existing without "any previous ground or reason
+with which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,"--as
+existing without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by
+chance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any
+previous ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate
+argument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That
+"every phenomenon must have a cause," is unquestionably one of those
+primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration,
+because they precede all demonstration, and must be assumed as the basis
+of all demonstration.
+
+By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By
+contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a
+cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated
+will, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By
+contingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free
+will. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be
+supposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not
+necessary I call contingent.
+
+Now an argument against contingency of will on the assumption that we
+intend, under this title, to represent volitions as existing without a
+cause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing.
+
+But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with
+chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered
+that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is
+possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.
+
+The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is
+contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and
+absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency
+is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a
+universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry
+respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and
+rational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine
+whether the will be contingent or necessary.
+
+The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The
+second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to
+follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument
+against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the
+first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is
+brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first
+part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.
+Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss
+contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is
+inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the
+question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring
+whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to
+necessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be
+necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be
+necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for
+inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be
+no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these
+two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause,
+for example, will, which is contingent.
+
+If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a
+contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has
+logically determined nothing in relation to it.
+
+But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether
+contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be
+contradictory and absurd.
+
+Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They
+at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is
+necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether
+contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any
+subject, remains to be determined.
+
+Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with
+necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual
+application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it,
+is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.
+
+What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:--
+
+1. Viewed in relation to will.
+
+2. Viewed irrespective of will.
+
+The first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but
+insufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in
+opposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and
+the progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_.
+
+The second does not take will into consideration at all, and applies to
+subjects where opposition of will is not supposable; for example,
+logical necessity, a is b, and c is a, therefore c is b: mathematical
+necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre of a circle is a point equally distant
+from every point in the circumference: metaphysical necessity, the
+existence of a first cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this
+second kind of necessity under the general designation of metaphysical
+or philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is absolute.
+It is impossible to conceive of these subjects differently from what
+they are. We cannot conceive of no space; no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5,
+and so of the rest.
+
+Necessity under both points of view he distinguishes into particular and
+general.
+
+Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity relative to individual
+will; as general, relative to all will.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a necessity irrespective of
+individual will; as general, irrespective of all will.
+
+Relative necessity is relative to the will in the connexion between
+volition and its sequents. When a volition of individual will takes
+place, without the sequent aimed at, because a greater force is opposed
+to it, then the sequent of this greater force is necessary with a
+particular relative necessity. When the greater force is greater than
+all supposable will, then its sequents take place by a general relative
+necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, the will
+of God cannot be included, as there can be no greater force than a
+divine volition.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes the opposition of
+individual will. Under this Edwards brings the connexion of motive and
+volition. The opposition of will, he contends, is excluded from this
+connexion, because will can act only by volition, and motive is the
+cause of volition. Volition is necessary by a particular metaphysical
+necessity, because the will of the individual cannot be opposed to it;
+but not with a general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may
+be opposed to it.
+
+Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the opposition of all
+will--even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4--that the centre of a circle
+is a point equally distant from every point in the circumference--the
+existence of time and space--are all true and real, independently of all
+will. Will hath not constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It
+would imply a contradiction to suppose them different from what they
+are. According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary with
+a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these volitions are caused
+by motives, and infinite will, as well as finite will, must act by
+volitions, the opposition of infinite will itself is excluded in the
+production of infinite volitions.
+
+Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points
+of view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is
+and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_.
+
+1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event
+which is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of
+an individual will.
+
+2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which
+cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite
+will. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable.
+
+3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it
+is, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will.
+
+4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it
+is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will.
+
+All this, however, in the last analysis on Edwards's system, becomes
+absolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a
+metaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by
+the infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a
+metaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are
+merely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular
+individual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our
+view. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the
+infinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its
+force absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the
+opposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily
+not only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to
+the infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it.
+
+Having thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on
+Edwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea
+of contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea?
+
+Necessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be
+otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be
+_that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be
+otherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect
+to anything which is independent of will;--time and space;--mathematical
+and metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal,
+that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they
+are seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will,
+nor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not
+conceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of
+contingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to
+causes, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation
+is the effect of divine volition. "God said, let there be light, and
+there was light:" thus did the whole creation come to be.
+
+Now every one will grant, that the creation does not seem necessary as
+time and space; and intuitive truths with their logical deductions, seem
+necessary. We cannot conceive of these as having not been, or as ceasing
+to be; but we can conceive of the creation as not having been, and as
+ceasing to be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or
+void space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may
+be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and
+relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, different
+from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in one word this
+difference between space and body, or in general this difference between
+that which exists independently of will, and that which exists purely as
+the effect of will, we call the first necessary; the second, contingent.
+The first we cannot conceive to be different from what it is. The second
+we can conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the
+creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true
+likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All these
+events are either directly or mediately the effects of will, divine or
+human. Now we can conceive of these as not being at all, or as being
+modified indefinitely, different from what they are;--and under this
+conception we call them contingent.
+
+No one I think will deny that we do as just represented, conceive of the
+possibility of the events and creations of will, either as having no
+being, or as being different from what they are. This conception is
+common to all men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a
+chimera? It must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for
+according to this, there really is no possibility that any event of will
+might have had no being at all, or might have been different from what
+it is. Will is determined by motives antecedent to itself. And this
+applies to the divine will, likewise, which is determined by an infinite
+and necessary wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of
+that which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be
+chimerical. But although the system would force us to this conclusion,
+the conception still reigns in our minds, and does not _seem_ to us
+chimerical;--the deduction from the system strangely conflicts with our
+natural and spontaneous judgements. There are few men who would not be
+startled by the dogma that all things and all events, even the
+constantly occuring volitions of their minds, are absolutely necessary,
+as necessary as a metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,--necessary
+with a necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise
+than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological
+abettors of Edwards's system, who would not also be startled by it. I
+suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the broad
+conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here represented,
+being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not affect the sequents of
+volition; that if a man can do as he pleases, he has a natural liberty
+and ability which relieves him from the chain of metaphysical necessity.
+I have already shown how utterly futile this attempted distinction
+is--how completely the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called
+natural liberty and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted
+to, then we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley,
+"Necessity, thou mother of the world!" But why the reluctance to escape
+from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this system admit that
+there is something opposed to necessity? But what is this something
+opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that choice is opposed to
+necessity? But how opposed--is choice contingent? Do they admit the
+possibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or
+might have been different from what it is?
+
+We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity by merely calling it
+choice, or an act of the will. If will is not necessitated, we wish to
+know under what condition it exists. Volition is plainly under necessity
+on Edwards's system, just as every other event is under necessity. And
+the connexion between volition and its sequents is just as necessary as
+the connexion between volition and its motives. Explain,--why do you
+endeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to
+volition? why do you claim liberty here? Do _you_ likewise have a
+natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It is
+evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the doctrine of
+necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink from its application
+to will. They first establish the doctrine of necessity universally and
+absolutely, and then claim for will an exception from the general
+law,--not by logically and psychologically pointing out the grounds and
+nature of the exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and
+natural judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they
+please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes it
+from necessity;--nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement against
+necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere illusion.
+
+There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this spontaneous
+judgement--and the will comes under the idea opposed to necessity. But
+what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under
+it? Edwards and his followers have not answered these questions--their
+attempt at a solution is self-contradictory and void.
+
+Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than that of contingency,
+viz.--that which is or may be, and possibly might not be, or might be
+otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is a truth which cannot possibly
+not be, or be otherwise than it is. But this book which I hold in my
+hand, I can conceive of as not being at all, or being different from
+what it is, without implying any contradiction, according to this
+spontaneous judgement.
+
+The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot conceive of as not
+existing, or as being altered so as to transpose the terms, making that
+right which now is wrong, and that wrong which now is right. But the
+volition which I now put forth to move this pen over the paper, I can
+conceive of as not existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a
+volition to write words different from those which I am writing. That
+this idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, that
+all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most rational idea.
+Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of necessity, do either adopt
+this idea in relation to will by a self-contradiction, and under a false
+position, as the abettors of the scheme which I am opposing for example,
+or in the ordinary conduct of life, they act upon it. All the
+institutions of society, all government and law, all our feelings of
+remorse and compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself,
+seem based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is
+somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes arising
+from _will_.
+
+That the will actually does come under this idea of contingency, must be
+shown psychologically if shown at all. An investigation to this effect
+must be reserved therefore for another occasion. In this place, I shall
+simply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea
+of contingency?
+
+The contingency of any phenomenon or event must depend upon the nature
+of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or event is one which may be
+conceived of, as one that might not have been at all, or might have been
+different from what it is; but wherein lies the possibility that it
+might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it
+is? This possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine
+nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in anything
+which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing in relation to
+its existence. The cause therefore which actually gives it existence,
+and existence under its particular form, can alone contain the
+possibility of its not having existed at all, or of its having existed
+under a different form. But what is the nature of such a cause? It is a
+cause which in determining a particular event, has at the very moment of
+doing so, the power of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not
+chained to any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of
+objects--as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its
+correlation to a certain class of objects which we thence call
+combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in
+opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to produce an
+effect which it may produce, and of any given number of effects alike
+within its power, it may take any one of them in opposition to all the
+others; and at the very moment it takes one effect, it has the power of
+taking any other. It is a cause contingent and not necessitated. The
+contingency of the event, therefore, arises from the contingency of the
+cause. Now every cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A
+necessary cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to
+act differently from its actual developements--fire must
+burn--gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth's centre. If there
+be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent cause above
+defined, for there is no third conception. We must choose therefore
+between a universal and absolute necessity, and the existence of
+contingent causes. If we take necessity to be universal and absolute,
+then we must take all the consequences, likewise, as deduced in part II.
+There is no possible escape from this. As then all causes must be either
+necessary or contingent, we bring will under the idea of contingency, by
+regarding it as a contingent cause--"a power to do, or not to
+do,"[5]--or a faculty of determining "to do, or not to do something
+which we conceive to be in our power."[6]
+
+We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a
+contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its nature, also. What is this
+nature? It is a nature in fixed correlation with certain objects, so
+that it is inconceivable that its phenomena might be different from
+those which long and established observation have assigned to it. It is
+inconceivable that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it
+is inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing
+temperature. But is this necessity a necessity _per se_, or a determined
+necessity? It is a determined necessity--determined by the creative
+will. If the creative will be under the law of necessity, then of course
+every cause determined by will becomes an absolute necessity.
+
+The only necessity _per se_ is found in that infinite and necessary
+wisdom in which Edwards places the determining motives of the divine
+will. All intuitive truths and their logical deductions are necessary
+_per se_. But the divine will is necessary with a determined necessity
+on Edwards's system,--and so of all other wills and all other causes,
+dependent upon will--the divine will being the first will determined. We
+must recollect, however, that on Edwards's theory of causation, a cause
+is always determined out of itself; and that consequently there can be
+no cause necessary _per se_; and yet at the same time there is by this
+theory, an absolute necessity throughout all causality.
+
+Now let us consider the result of making will a contingent cause. In the
+first place, we have the divine will as the first and supreme contingent
+cause. Then consequently in the second place, all causes ordained by the
+divine will, considered as effects, are contingent. They might not have
+been. They might cease to be. They might be different from what they
+are. But in the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not
+all contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are necessary
+with a determined necessity. They are necessary as fixed by the divine
+will. They are necessary with a relative necessity--relatively to the
+divine will. They put forth their _nisus_, and produce phenomena by a
+fixed and invariable law, established by the divine will. But will is of
+the nature, being made after the image of the divine will. The divine
+will is infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The
+created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its given
+capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its _nisus_ to do, are
+limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may make an effort,
+or volition, or _nisus_, to do anything of which it can conceive--but
+the actual production of phenomena out of itself, must depend upon the
+instrumental and physical connexion which the divine will has
+established between it and the world, external to itself. Of all the
+volitions or _nisus_ within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any
+one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes any one
+_nisus_ or volition, it has the power of making any other.
+
+It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, essential, and first
+cause. Whatever other causes exist, are determined and fixed by will,
+and are therefore properly called secondary or instrumental causes. And
+as we ourselves are will, we must first of all, and most naturally and
+most truly gain our idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate
+these second causes--we observe only their phenomena; but we know
+ourselves in the very first _nisus_ of causation.
+
+To reason therefore from these secondary causes to ourselves, is indeed
+reversing the natural and true order on this subject. Now what is the
+ground of all this clamour against contingency? Do you say it represents
+phenomena as existing without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency
+not to cause, but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the
+phenomena of physical causation,--we reply that you have no right to
+reason from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in
+general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties of
+matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an absurd and
+pernicious doctrine--then turn and look at the doctrine of an absolute
+necessity in all its bearings and consequences, and where lies the
+balance of absurdity and pernicious consequences? But we deny that there
+is anything absurd and pernicious in contingency as above explained.
+That it is not pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of
+moral and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course of
+our inquiries.
+
+After what has already been said in the preceding pages, it perhaps is
+unnecessary to make any further reply to its alleged absurdity.
+
+There is one form under which this allegation comes up, however, which
+is at first sight so plausible, that I shall be pardoned for prolonging
+this discussion in order to dispose of it. It is as follows: That in
+assigning contingency to will, we do not account for a volition being in
+one direction rather than in another. The will, it is urged, under the
+idea of contingency, is indifferent to any particular volition. How then
+can we explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of
+indifferency to a choice or volition?
+
+In answer to this, I remark:--It has already been made clear, that
+selection and particular determination belong to every cause. In
+physical causes, this selection and particular determination lies in the
+correlation of the nature of the cause with certain objects; and this
+selection and particular determination are necessary by a necessity
+determined out of the cause itself--that is, they are determined by the
+creative will, which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes.
+Now Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination of
+will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is correlated to
+certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by the creative will,
+which gave origin to the secondary dependent will, the selection and
+particular determination of will, is necessary with a necessity
+determined out of itself. But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to
+oppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the
+correlation of its nature with certain objects--a will, indeed, which
+has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent;
+for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection
+and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its
+action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of
+itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an absolute
+and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of a will forming
+volitions particular and determinate, or in other words, making a
+_nisus_ towards particular objects, without any correlation of its
+nature with the objects. Is this conception a possible and rational
+conception? It is not a possible conception if will and the sensitivity,
+or the affections are identical--for the very definition of will then
+becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and necessarily
+affected by them.
+
+But now let us conceive of the will as simply and purely an activity or
+cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or affections--a cause capable
+of producing changes or phenomena in relation to a great variety of
+objects, and conscious that it is thus capable, but conscious also that
+it is not drawn by any necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a
+possible and rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause
+different from all other causes; and on this conception there are but
+two _kinds_ of causes. The physical, which are necessarily determined by
+the correlation of their nature with certain objects, and will, which is
+a pure activity not thus determined, and therefore not necessitated, but
+contingent.
+
+Now I may take this as a rational conception, unless its palpable
+absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be proved to involve some
+contradiction.
+
+Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after
+all, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that
+the particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or
+attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular
+determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which
+quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of
+will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of
+the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular
+determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A
+physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will
+is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental
+of a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is
+the first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in
+its energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to
+place, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because
+made in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self
+moved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make
+it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its
+objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any
+particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any
+particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted
+for in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of
+the uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its
+dependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and
+could annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed
+the instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects.
+The man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his
+arm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of
+himself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him,
+but he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than
+himself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created
+will aware of its feebleness and dependence.
+
+But although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent,
+arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with
+sensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason,
+and, the sensitivity or the affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or
+soul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not
+follow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling.
+
+I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a
+scheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent
+will, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal
+necessity.
+
+According to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the
+soul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not
+necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to
+do. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the "source and substance"
+of pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and
+commands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or
+the affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the
+capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the
+sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in
+correlation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation,
+are the emotions and passions awakened.
+
+Next let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality,
+or more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean
+the me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving
+cause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives
+the laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with
+the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at the same
+time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them.
+
+Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention
+to the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain
+objects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other
+objects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain,
+become rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power
+to resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may
+direct itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them,
+and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and
+disgust.
+
+We may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity
+relatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of
+disagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the
+reason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are
+repelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have
+the second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying
+reason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in
+obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa.
+
+Now if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the
+possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it
+were always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of
+resistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system
+of Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition.
+
+The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a
+will as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey
+reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or
+obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the
+indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or
+passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be
+asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause
+of its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and
+self-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys
+the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of
+obedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we
+called upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a
+self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute
+necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to
+explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest
+desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the
+will obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this
+again by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most
+reasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for
+obedience to passion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience
+to reason, by referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in
+the direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then
+the act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may
+find its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and
+is no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is
+most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable?
+because to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable.
+
+Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous to intuitive or first
+truths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they
+form the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first
+movements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of
+antecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis
+of all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of
+no explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of
+power. In God, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man,
+it is finite, primary cause, constituted by God's creative act, but not
+necessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be
+power after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical
+or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents
+and sequents.
+
+God's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains
+all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics
+of creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
+when we inquire _why_ God's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we
+must either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and
+goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute
+necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a
+first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all
+effects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself.
+
+When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition,
+we bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the
+reason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys
+reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; we must
+either represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences
+of a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the
+will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in
+explaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any
+explanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it
+requires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the
+fact of its existence.
+
+Edwards, while he burdens the question of the will's determination with
+monstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down,
+indeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry
+which he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or
+the volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the
+most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or
+capacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and
+volitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The
+question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to
+produce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may
+be the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but
+that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its
+relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is
+at one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another
+foolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will,
+it always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question
+therefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of
+volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most
+agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may
+suppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and
+the different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and
+conditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose
+the arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and
+the different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the
+sensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may
+suppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions
+of the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus
+giving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet
+at an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the
+different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about?
+On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the
+sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in
+both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the
+sensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask
+again, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to
+itself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that
+which is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects
+have the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then
+also we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make
+the right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the
+wrong and foolish.
+
+These last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not
+presume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of
+the volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and
+the nature and circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is
+such as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the
+rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does
+the correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that
+the volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a
+mere repetition of the question; for the question amounts simply to
+this:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather
+than the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most
+agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the
+most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its
+state in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their
+relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable
+in one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of
+the same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent
+will. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the
+direction of passion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the
+power of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by
+merely referring to the will.
+
+According to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives
+the sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the
+reason; and now in the direction of passion--but why?--Why does the
+reason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure
+desire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which
+is equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in
+reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it
+is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the
+most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on
+Edwards's system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular
+direction of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be
+referred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other
+explanation of the different determinations of this cause, except
+referring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible,
+indeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which
+governs the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the
+question must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the
+correlation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at
+another time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself
+as having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do
+or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the
+opposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent
+cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will:
+then the question would be, why the infinite will determines the
+sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at
+another to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that
+it seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to
+him? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable,
+that it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according
+to the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most
+reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards,
+the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say
+that God wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is
+to say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he
+does will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same
+thing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it
+is the most agreeable.
+
+To represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine
+will, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is
+supposed to pertain to contingent self-determination.
+
+Let us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of
+some repetition.
+
+Contingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its
+_nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of
+itself--now obeying reason, and now obeying passion. If it be asked why
+it determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction
+in which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that
+it determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this
+particular direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it
+may be said that it determines in this direction, because it is
+pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of
+reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot
+say that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not passion; because
+the one is all reason, and the other is all passion, and of course they
+cannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be
+compared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the
+gratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it
+is reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the
+will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is
+nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey
+desire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act
+of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any
+other explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the
+other, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the
+other.
+
+To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this
+system? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what
+is the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most
+agreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most
+agreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But
+why does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than
+another; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at
+another time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the
+question,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather
+than of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time,
+and in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine
+itself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the
+sense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards's system. If
+Edwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the
+motive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being
+affected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most
+disagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with
+the one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason
+appears more agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for
+the obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of
+the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey
+reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea
+of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on
+his system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is,
+the reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of
+will being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it
+is obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the
+sense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is
+obeyed.
+
+To refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary
+to the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be
+considered a difficulty, only farther back.
+
+If God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it
+is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the
+reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a
+circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch
+as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows
+that God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only
+because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and
+thus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another,
+or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards,
+unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not
+to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation,
+and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will
+to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in
+an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless
+series, and an absolute necessity.
+
+All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have
+above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the
+sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the
+direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good,
+&c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic
+from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is
+generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind,
+vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?
+Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction
+because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go
+in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause
+_per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that
+direction.
+
+There are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the
+constitution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just,
+the right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same
+constitution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable
+in reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its
+_nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in
+either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes
+its _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good;
+should we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the
+just, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount
+to saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true,
+but only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the
+_nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again
+we might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction
+of the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an
+absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction
+of the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_
+is made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the
+rational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always
+made in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to
+explain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the
+rational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have
+an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the
+direction of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back
+in a circle to our first position.
+
+How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall we adopt the
+psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then
+as the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if
+the sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are
+plunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the
+sensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we
+have to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed
+to be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will
+when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met
+with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as
+more agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one
+time, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations
+are resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go
+up to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question
+it in like manner.
+
+But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary
+cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in
+itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and
+neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their
+particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.
+
+The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered.
+The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will
+as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a
+power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects.
+
+It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or
+belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the
+false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined
+by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and
+the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the
+conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing
+within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of
+modification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every
+_nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its
+self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and
+accountable.
+
+Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or
+rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the
+reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the
+archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to
+be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved
+and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in
+harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a
+triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not
+separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without
+eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and
+isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be
+without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations.
+
+The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but
+then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free
+of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are
+not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the
+will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can
+excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up
+objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and
+yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations.
+
+The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would
+have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities
+would lie dormant without the reason.
+
+So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the
+will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in
+itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and
+sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without
+rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing
+what to do.
+
+It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing
+peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to
+necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_
+feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given
+its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has
+awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is
+as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a
+power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power
+which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.
+
+It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason
+and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason
+or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such
+relation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be
+called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of
+will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing,
+bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however,
+frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention,
+and which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be
+required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting
+one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and
+sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily
+determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection,
+and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general
+motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to
+illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to
+prove that the will can act without a motive.
+
+I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the
+chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a
+selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?
+The illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected,
+and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the
+sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the
+absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at
+illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this
+selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency
+as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the
+reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no
+affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as
+most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.
+
+It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of
+Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_
+a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very
+beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if
+this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in
+a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are
+so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that
+they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the
+other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and
+death." (p. 73.)
+
+Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the
+sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state
+of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of
+indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his
+system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment
+volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in
+indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest
+ceases with motion.
+
+But according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I
+shall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is
+clearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of
+feeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the
+sensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory;
+and a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the
+quality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory
+likewise; it would be confounding that which we had already
+distinguished. From Edwards's very definition of will it cannot be
+indifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise
+than indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and
+sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference
+which it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it
+determines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the
+determination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of
+reason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is
+wakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only
+the _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the
+sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the will
+again knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this
+direction.
+
+In the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting
+together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in
+connexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation
+between physical causes and the masses which they operate upon, may lead
+to the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the
+will and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at
+least, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the
+sensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We
+have already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not
+relieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent
+will, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the
+sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the
+difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the will. In our
+psychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable
+those powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will
+is, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to
+the most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another,
+in opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we
+perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated
+to reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know
+that we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act
+otherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But
+when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its
+direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when
+we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is
+still simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and
+conviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion
+and passion their place in the sensitivity alone.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+FROM
+
+THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
+
+Edwards's argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn
+from the divine prescience, remains to be considered.
+
+The argument is introduced as follows: "That the acts of the wills of
+moral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without
+all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events."
+(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to "the evidence of God's
+certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents." In the
+following section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his
+argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the
+consequences of his position.
+
+God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence
+necessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee
+them; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to
+all events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of
+everything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events
+exist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions,
+and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine
+volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of
+his work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the
+doctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part
+II. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then
+we are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of
+volitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would
+practically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the
+alternative. "If it could be demonstrated," remarks Dugald Stewart,
+(vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) "which in my opinion has not yet been done,
+that the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible
+with the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in
+favour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the
+foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to
+affirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of
+contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not
+extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of
+God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?"
+If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity,
+there is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral
+and theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument
+of Edwards.
+
+This argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order.
+
+I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, "having already
+made sure of existence;" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and
+is therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever
+is, is. He next affirms, that whatever is "indissolubly connected with
+other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;" but events
+infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the
+foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, have an
+indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore
+necessary.
+
+The force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between
+foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be
+"indissoluble;" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with
+the event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine
+foreknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence
+foreknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our
+knowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it
+came to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a
+certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it
+cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his
+walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary
+antecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or
+necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I
+looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the
+knowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the
+man walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the
+mode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a
+contingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of
+prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this
+faculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by
+the faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday.
+The knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a
+knowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the
+object known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in
+relation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and
+present, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in
+relation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge.
+Edwards remarks, (p. 121.) "All certain knowledge, whether it be
+foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the
+thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that
+it is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true."
+
+Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of
+existence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist.
+Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the
+present knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course
+the reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or,
+more strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of
+time, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the
+knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its
+existence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event,
+or if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon
+strict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would
+be affirmed of the event likewise.
+
+That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them,
+they will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive
+affirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, God's
+foreknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend
+them; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God's
+foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or
+determine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the
+contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing
+how wills act in the time present, takes away from them their
+contingency and freedom. God in his prescience, _is the spectator of the
+future, as really as we are the spectators of the present_.
+
+Edwards's reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes
+for exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for
+example, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that
+place, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes
+away, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things,
+that a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then
+it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or
+go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is
+entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or
+contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine
+foreknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are
+subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being,
+"who inhabiteth eternity:" but this necessary condition of their
+existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency
+of their particular causation.
+
+II. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, "No future event
+can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without
+all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It
+is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without
+_evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3.
+Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of
+knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or
+_proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something
+which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the
+object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is
+known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all
+axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed
+evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which
+anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore,
+whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as
+immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God
+otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal
+Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or
+as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So
+much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A
+contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards
+that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising
+from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is
+self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or
+proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be
+self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into
+futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its
+nature."
+
+But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in
+_anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is
+evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed
+that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of
+the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its
+contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He illustrates his
+meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven
+hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine
+Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at
+once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular
+nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of
+God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or
+reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all
+with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no
+evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be
+seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there
+was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in
+something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion
+is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.)
+
+The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent
+event exists "_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the
+matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or
+any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is
+really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right
+in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event
+without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing
+now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is
+connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I
+do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not
+opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being
+by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet
+have sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence
+have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses
+only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign
+choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold
+the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but
+from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view
+to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own
+volitions.
+
+The ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain
+and reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are
+never without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the
+individual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of
+the individual volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible
+existence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and
+constitution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not
+required to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions
+may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual
+existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition;
+he cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough,
+as I have already shown, to assign him prescience, in order to bring
+within his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows
+all the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the
+possible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that class of
+the actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively
+necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring up under
+the characteristic of contingency.
+
+And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine
+prescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the
+contingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far
+otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the
+planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the
+comets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions
+of the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations.
+
+But if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable
+calculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something "that is
+evident" and "now existent, with which the future existence of the
+_contingent_ event is connected."
+
+There are three kinds of certainty. _First_, absolute certainty. This is
+the certainty which lies in necessary and eternal principles e. g. 2 x
+2=4; the existence of space; every body must be in space; every
+phenomenon must have a cause; the being of God.
+
+Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between premises and
+conclusion, is likewise absolute.
+
+_Secondly_. Physical certainty. This is the certainty which lies in the
+connexion between physical causes and their phenomena: e. g.
+gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in general, mechanical forces.
+
+The reason conceives of these causes as inherently active and uniform;
+and hence, wherever a physical cause exists, we expect its proper
+phenomena.
+
+Now we do not call the operation of these causes _absolutely_ certain,
+because they depend ultimately upon will,--the will of God; and we can
+conceive that the same will which ordained them, can change, suspend, or
+even annihilate them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes
+given in time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If
+in any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to recognise
+the presence of that will which ordained them. Such change or suspension
+we call a _miracle_; that is, a surprise,--a wonder, because it is
+unlooked for.
+
+When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically certain, we mean
+that it is certain in the immutability of a cause acting in time and
+space, and under a necessity relatively to the divine will; but still
+not _absolutely_ certain, because there is a possibility of a miracle.
+But when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain, we mean that it
+is certain as comprehended in a principle which is unalterable in its
+very nature, and is therefore independent of will.
+
+_Thirdly_. Moral certainty, is the certainty which lies between the
+connexion of motive and will. By will we mean a self-conscious and
+intelligent cause, or a cause in unity with intelligence. It is also, in
+the fullest sense, a cause _per se_; that is, it contains within itself
+proper efficiency, and determines its own direction. By _motives_ we
+mean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general, all
+activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons; for they have
+the same meaning: but in mere material masses, the rule is not
+contemplated by the acting force,--it is contemplated only by the
+intelligence which ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the
+contrary, the activity which we call will is self-conscious, and is
+connected with a perception of the reasons, or ends, or motives of
+action. These motives or ends of action are of two kinds. _First_, those
+found in the ideas of the practical reason, which decides what is fit
+and right. These are reasons of supreme authority. _Secondly_, those
+found in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately useful
+and expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are right only
+when subordinate to the first.
+
+Now these reasons and motives are a light to the will, and serve to
+direct its activities; and the human conscience, which is but the
+reason, has drawn up for the will explicit rules, suited to all
+circumstances and relations, which are called _ethics_, or _the rules_.
+
+These rules the will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every
+volition it is conscious of a power to do or not to do; but yet, as the
+will forms a unity with the intelligence, we take for granted that it
+will obey them, unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent.
+But the only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a
+state of sinfulness,--a corruption of the sensitivity, or a disposition
+to violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual constitution. Hence
+moral certainty can exist only where the harmony of the spiritual being
+is preserved. For example: God and good angels. In God moral certainty
+is infinite. His dispositions are infinitely pure, and his will freely
+determines to do right; it is not compelled or necessitated, for then
+his infinite meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is _not
+absolute_, because will being a power to do or not to do, there is
+always a possibility, although there may be no probability, nay an
+infinite improbability, that the will may disobey the laws of the
+reason.
+
+In the case of angels and good men, the moral certainty is such as to be
+attended with no apprehension of a dereliction. With respect to such men
+as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a
+very high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they
+will act in any given circumstances involving the influence of motives.
+We know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,--that is, the _first_
+class of motives; and the _second_ only so far as they are authorized by
+the first. If the first class of motives are forsaken, then human
+conduct can be calculated only according to the influence of the second
+class.
+
+Human character, however, is mixed and variously compounded. We might
+make a scale of an indefinite number of degrees, from the highest point
+of moral excellence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then
+our predictions of human conduct would vary with every degree.
+
+In any particular case where we are called upon to reason from the
+connexion of motives with the will, it is evident we must determine the
+character of the individual as accurately as possible, in order to know
+the probable _resultant_ of the opposite moral forces which we are
+likely to find.
+
+We have remarked that moral certainty exists only where the harmony of
+the moral constitution is preserved. Here we know the right will be
+obeyed. It may be remarked in addition to this, however, that moral
+certainty may almost be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral
+degradation, where the right is altogether forsaken. Here the rule is,
+"whatever is most agreeable;" and the volition is indeed merged into the
+sense of the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide
+field of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of human
+nature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of life, is not
+the knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but as it is in its
+vast variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from observation
+and history. What human nature ought to be, we learn from reason.
+
+On a subject of so much importance, and where it is so desirable to have
+clear and definite ideas, the rhetorical ungracefulness of repetition is
+of little moment, when this repetition serves our great end. I shall be
+pardoned, therefore, in calling the attention of the reader to a point
+above suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and
+sensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed to
+derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts which are in
+the direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very trifling
+acts; and therefore acts of this description, although possible, we may
+conclude are very rare. In calculating, then, future acts of will, we
+may, like the mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume
+that all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or sensitivity,
+or of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious of power to
+do, out of the direction of both reason and sensitivity, still, in the
+triunity in which it exists, it submits itself to the general interests
+of the being, and consults the authority of conscience, or the
+enjoyments of passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself
+habits and a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted
+himself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, to the
+laws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has formed for
+himself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many
+occasions, noble, generous, and pure feelings; and hence we conclude
+that his sensitivity harmonizes with conscience. Or he is known to have
+violated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and in a great
+variety of transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for
+himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on many
+occasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we conclude that
+his sensitivity is in collision with conscience.
+
+In both cases supposed, and in like manner in all supposable cases,
+there is plainly a basis on which, in any given circumstances, we may
+foresee and predict volitions. There is something "that is evident and
+now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is
+connected." On the one hand these predictions exert no necessitating
+influence over the events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected
+with the causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events
+need not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of
+probable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations would no
+longer be merely probable:--they would, on the contrary, take the
+precision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses and other
+phenomena based upon necessary laws. But these calculations can aim only
+at _moral_ certainty, because they are made according to the generally
+known and received determinations of will in a unity with reason and
+sensitivity; but still a will which is known also to have the power to
+depart at any moment from the line of determination which it has
+established for itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting
+the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based on his known
+integrity, and the calculations which we make respecting another, based
+on his known dishonesty, may alike disappoint us, through the
+unexpected, though possible dereliction of the first, and the
+unexpected, though possible reformation of the latter. When we reason
+from moral effects to moral causes, or from moral causes to moral
+effects, we cannot regard the operation of causes as positive and
+uniform under the same law of necessity which appertains to physical
+causes, because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and
+last determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a high
+degree of probability, with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely
+and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we cannot reason respecting
+human conduct, as we reason respecting the phenomena of the physical
+world, because it is possible for the human will to disappoint
+calculations based upon the ordinary influence of motives: e. g. the
+motive does not hold the same relation to will which fire holds to
+combustible substance; the fire must burn; the will may or may not
+determine in view of motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance,
+probable evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral
+evidence being generally probable, all probable evidence is called
+moral.
+
+The will differs from physical causes in being a cause _per se_, but
+although a cause _per se_, it has laws to direct its volitions. It may
+indeed violate these laws and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law
+unto itself; but this violation of law and this arbitrary determination
+do not arise from it necessarily as a cause _per se_, but from an abuse
+of its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the reason, we
+expect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and perfect movements it
+is uniform. Physical causes are uniform because God has determined and
+fixed them according to laws derived from infinite wisdom.
+
+The human will may likewise be uniform by obeying the laws of
+conscience, but the departures may also be indefinitely numerous and
+various.
+
+To sum up these observations in general statements, we remark;--
+
+First: The connexion on which we base predictions of human volitions, is
+the connexion of will with reason and sensitivity in the unity of the
+mind or spirit.
+
+Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be designed to be
+regulated by truth and righteousness, and by feeling subordinated to
+these.
+
+Thirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is thus regulated.
+
+Fourthly: This regulation, however, does not take place by the necessary
+governance which reason and sensitivity have over will, but by a
+self-subjection of will to their rules and inducements;--this
+constitutes meritoriousness,--the opposite conduct constitutes ill
+desert.
+
+Fifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to the degree and
+fixedness of this self-subjection to reason and right feeling; or where
+this does not exist, according to the degree and fixedness of the habits
+of wrong doing, in a self-subjection to certain passions in opposition
+to reason.
+
+Sixthly: Our calculations will be more or less certain according to the
+extent and accuracy of our observations upon human conduct.
+
+Seventhly: Our calculations can never be attended with _absolute_
+certainty, because the will being contingent, has the power of
+disappointing calculations made upon the longest observed uniformity.
+
+Eighthly: Our expectations respecting the determinations of Deity are
+attended with the highest moral certainty. We say _moral_ certainty,
+because it is certainty not arising from necessity, and in that sense
+absolute; but certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely
+pure being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is
+affirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that he has
+not the power to change or to determine contrary to truth; but that
+there is an infinite moral certainty arising from the perfection of his
+nature, that he never will depart from infinite wisdom and rectitude.
+
+To assign God any other immutability would be to deprive him of freedom.
+
+Ninthly: The divine foresight of human volitions need not be supposed to
+necessitate them, any more than human foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing
+them, has no necessary connexion in any case with their causation.
+Again, if it does not appear essential to the divine foresight of
+volitions that they should be necessary. We have seen that future
+contingent volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty
+even by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in the
+same way to calculate them through _media_,--the reach and accuracy of
+his calculations must be in the proportion of his intelligence, and how
+far short of a certain and perfect knowledge of all future contingent
+volitions can infinite intelligence be supposed to fall by such
+calculations?
+
+Tenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite mind is compelled to
+resort to deduction, or to employ _media_ for arriving at any particular
+knowledge. In the attribute of prescience, he is really present to all
+the possible and actual of the future.
+
+III. The third and last point of Edwards's argument is as follows: "To
+suppose the future volitions of moral agents, not to be necessary
+events; or which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible
+but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God
+certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's
+knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God certainly
+and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which
+at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not
+be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one
+thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows."
+(page 117.)
+
+The substance of this reasoning is this. That inasmuch as a contingent
+future event is _uncertain_ from its very nature and definition, it
+cannot be called an object of _certain_ knowledge, to any mind, not even
+to the divine mind, without a manifest contradiction. "It is the same as
+to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth,
+which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth."
+
+We have here again an error arising from not making a proper
+distinction, which I have already pointed out,--the distinction between
+the certainty of a future volition as a mere fact existent, and the
+manner in which that fact came to exist.
+
+The fact of volition comes to exist contingently; that is, by a power
+which in giving it existence, is under no law of necessity, and at the
+moment of causation, is conscious of ability to withhold the causative
+_nibus_. Now all volitions which have already come to exist in this way,
+have both a certain and contingent existence. It is certain that they
+have come to exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their
+existence is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by
+necessity as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and
+free, and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions,
+had the power to withhold them.
+
+Certainty and contingency are not opposed, and exclusive of each other
+in reference to what has already taken place. Are they opposed and
+exclusive of each other in reference to the future? In the first place,
+we may reason on probable grounds. Contingent causes have already
+produced volitions--hence they may produce volitions in the future. They
+have produced volitions in obedience to laws of reason and
+sensitivity--hence they may do so in the future. They have done this
+according to a uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually
+observed--hence this uniformity may be continued in the future.
+
+A future contingent event may therefore have a high degree of
+probability, and even a moral certainty.
+
+But to a being endowed with prescience, what prevents a positive and
+infallible knowledge of a future contingent event? His mind extends to
+the actual in the future, as easily as to the actual in the past; but
+the actual of the future is not only that which comes to pass by his own
+determination and _nibus_, and therefore necessarily in its relation to
+himself as cause, but also that which comes to pass by the _nibus_ of
+constituted wills, contingent and free, as powers to do or not to do.
+There is no opposition, as Edwards supposes, between the infallible
+divine foreknowledge, and the contingency of the event;--the divine
+foreknowledge is infallible from its own inherent perfection; and of
+course there can be no doubt but that the event foreseen will come to
+pass; but then it is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently,
+and not necessarily.
+
+The error we have just noted, appears again in the corollary which
+Edwards immediately deduces from his third position. "From what has been
+observed," he remarks, "it is evident, that the absolute _decrees_ of
+God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the
+necessity of the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute
+foreknowledge of God." (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God are the
+determinations of his will, and comprehend the events to which they
+relate, as the cause comprehends the effect. Foreknowledge, on the
+contrary, has no causality in relation to events foreknown. It is not a
+determination of divine will, but a form of the divine intelligence.
+Hence the decrees of God do actually and truly necessitate events; while
+the foreknowledge of God extends to events which are not necessary but
+contingent,--as well as to those which are pre-determined.
+
+Edwards always confounds contingency with chance or no cause, and thus
+makes it absurd in its very definition. He also always confounds
+certainty with necessity, and thus compels us to take the latter
+universal and absolute, or to plunge into utter uncertainty, doubt, and
+disorder.
+
+Prescience is an essential attribute of Deity. Prescience makes the
+events foreknown, certain; but if certain, they must be necessary. And
+on the other hand, if the events were not certain, they could not be
+foreknown,--for that which is uncertain cannot be the object of positive
+and infallible knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be
+foreknown, then they must be necessary.
+
+Again: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all future events
+supposed to come under it, out of all possible connexion with anything
+preceding and now actually existent, and consequently allows of no basis
+upon which they can be calculated and foreseen. Contingence, also, as
+opposed to necessity, destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility
+even of divine prescience. This is the course of Edwards's reasoning.
+
+Now if we have reconciled contingence with both cause and certainty, and
+have opposed it only to necessity, thus separating cause and certainty
+from the absolute and unvarying dominion of necessity, then this
+reasoning is truly and legitimately set aside.
+
+Necessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the sensitivity connected
+with it:--contingency lies only in will. But the future acts of will can
+be calculated from its known union with, and self-subjection to the
+reason and sensitivity.
+
+These calculations are more or less probable, or are certain according
+to the known character of the person who is the subject of these
+calculations.
+
+Of God we do not affirm merely the power of calculating future
+contingent events upon known data, but a positive prescience of all
+events. He sees from the beginning how contingent causes or wills, will
+act. He sees with absolute infallibility and certainty--and the events
+to him are infallible and certain. But still they are not necessary,
+because the causes which produce them are not determined and
+necessitated by anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free,
+and conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in
+doing.
+
+I am persuaded that inattention to the important distinction of the
+certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge, and the necessity implied
+in the divine predetermination or decree, is the great source of
+fallacious reasonings and conclusions respecting the divine prescience.
+When God pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity
+relative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It cannot be
+otherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains. But when he
+foreknows an event, he presents us merely a form of his infinite
+intelligence, exerting no causative, and consequently no necessitating
+influence whatever. The volitions which I am now conscious of
+exercising, are just what they are, whether they have been foreseen or
+not--and as they now do actually exist, they have certainty; and yet
+they are contingent, because I am conscious that I have power not to
+exercise them. They are, but they might not have been. Now let the
+intelligence of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have
+foreseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain that this
+foresight does not destroy the contingency of the volitions, nor does
+the contingency render the foresight absurd. The supposition is both
+rational and possible.
+
+It is not necessary for us to consider the remaining corollaries of
+Edwards, as the application of the above reasoning to them will be
+obvious.
+
+Before closing this part of the treatise in hand, I deem it expedient to
+lay down something like a scale of certainty. In doing this, I shall
+have to repeat some things. But it is by repetition, and by placing the
+same things in new positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and
+succeed in rendering philosophical ideas familiar.
+
+First: Let us consider minutely the distinction between certainty and
+necessity. Necessity relates to truths and events considered in
+themselves. Certainty relates to our apprehension or conviction of them.
+Hence necessity is not certainty itself, but a ground of certainty.
+_Absolute certainty_ relates only to truths or to being.
+
+First or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions drawn from them, are
+necessary with an absolute necessity. They do not admit of negative
+suppositions, and are irrespective of will. The being of God, and time,
+and space, are necessary with an absolute necessity.
+
+_Relative necessity_ relates to logical conclusions and events or
+phenomena. Logical conclusions are always necessary relatively to the
+premises, but cannot be absolutely necessary unless the premises from
+which they are derived, are absolutely necessary.
+
+All phenomena and events are necessary with only a relative necessity;
+for in depending upon causes, they all ultimately depend upon will.
+Considered therefore in themselves, they are contingent; for the will
+which produced them, either immediately or by second or dependent
+causes, is not necessitated, but free and contingent--and therefore
+their non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to
+will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; when
+therefore the _nibus_ of this will was made, creation was the necessary
+result. The Deity is under no necessity of willing; but when he does
+will, the effect is said necessarily to follow--meaning by this, that
+the _nibus_ of the divine will is essential power, and that there is no
+other power that can prevent its taking effect.
+
+Created will is under no necessity of willing; but when it does will or
+make its _nibus_, effects necessarily follow, according to the connexion
+established by the will of Deity, between the _nibus_ of created will
+and surrounding objects. Where a _nibus_ of created will is made, and
+effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater force of a
+resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so that whatever follows
+the _nibus_ of created will, whether it be a phenomenon without, or the
+mere experience of a greater resisting force, it follows by a necessity
+relative to the divine will.
+
+When we come to consider will in relation to its own volitions, we have
+no more necessity, either absolute er relative; we have contingency and
+absolute freedom.
+
+Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our knowledge or conviction
+of truths and events.
+
+Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute and relative. We
+have a certain knowledge or conviction of that which we perceive to be
+necessary in its own nature, or of which a negative is not supposable;
+and this, as based upon an _absolute necessity_, may be called an
+absolute certainty.
+
+The established connexion between causes and effects, is another ground
+of certainty. Causes are of two kinds; first causes, or causes _per se_,
+or contingent and free causes, or will; and second or physical causes,
+which are necessary with a relative necessity.
+
+First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and the finite.
+
+Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will take place. This may
+likewise be called an absolute certainty, because the connexion between
+divine volitions and effects is absolutely necessary. It is not
+supposable that God should will in vain, for that would contradict his
+admitted infinity.
+
+The connexion between the volitions of created will and effects, and the
+connexion between physical causes and effects, supposing each of course
+to be in its proper relations and circumstances, is a connexion of
+relative necessity; that is, relative to the divine will. Now the
+certainty of our knowledge or conviction that an event will take place,
+depending upon volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different
+from the certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain
+conviction that an event which infinite power wills, will take place.
+The will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend or
+change the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my hand over
+this paper, it will move, supposing of course the continued healthiness
+of the limb; but it is possible for God so to alter the constitution of
+my being, that my will shall have no more connexion with my hands than
+it now has with the circulation of the blood. I believe also that if I
+throw this paper into the fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God
+so to alter the constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper
+will not burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will
+continue to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This
+certainly is not an _absolute certainty_, but a _conditional_ certainty:
+events will thus continue to take place on condition the divine will
+does not change the condition of things. This conditional certainty is
+likewise called a _physical_ certainty, because the events contemplated
+include besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so
+commonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world, or
+nature.
+
+But we must next look at will itself in relation to its volitions: Here
+all is contingency and freedom,--here is no necessity. Is there any
+ground of certain knowledge respecting future volitions?
+
+If will as a cause _per se_, were isolated and in no relation whatever,
+there could not be any ground of any knowledge whatever, respecting
+future volitions. But will is not thus isolated. On the contrary, it
+forms a unity with the sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals _what
+ought to be done_, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The
+sensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the ground
+of personal experience. Now although it is granted that will can act
+without deriving a reason or inducement of action from the reason and
+the sensitivity, still the instances in which it does so act, are so
+rare and trifling, that they may be thrown out of the account. We may
+therefore safely assume as a general law, that the will determines
+according to reasons and inducements drawn from the reason and the
+sensitivity. This law is not by its very definition, and by the very
+nature of the subject to which it relates, a necessary law--but a law
+revealed in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise
+of its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of our
+being, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In obeying the
+one or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to perfect beings,
+therefore, we can calculate with certainty as to their volitions under
+any given circumstances. Whatever is commanded by reason, whatever
+appears attractive to the pure sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed.
+
+But what kind of certainty is this? It is not absolute certainty,
+because it is supposable that the will which obeys may not obey, for it
+has power not to obey. Nor is it _physical_ certainty, for it does not
+relate to a physical cause, nor to the connexion between volition and
+its effects, but to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor
+again can we, strictly speaking, call it a _conditional_ certainty;
+because the will, as a power _per se_, is under no conditions as to the
+production of its volitions. To say that the volitions will be in
+accordance with the reason and pure sensitivity, if the will continue to
+obey the reason and pure sensitivity, is merely saying that the
+volitions will be right if the willing power put forth right volitions.
+What kind of certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty
+altogether peculiar,--a certainty based upon the relative state of the
+reason and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the
+commands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name of
+_moral_[7] laws, simply because they have this relation,--and as the
+sensitivity, when harmonizing with the reason, is thence called morally
+pure, because attracting to the same conduct which the reason
+commands,--this certainty may fitly be called _moral certainty_. The
+name, however, does not mark _degree_. Does this certainty possess
+degrees? It does. With respect to the volitions of God, we have the
+highest degree of moral certainty,--an infinite moral certainty. He,
+indeed, in his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions
+whatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the harmony of
+infinite reason with the divine affections of infinite benevolence,
+truth, and justice, we are certain that his volitions will always be
+right, good, and wise. Besides, he has assured us of his fixed
+determination to maintain justice, truth, and love; and he has given us
+this assurance as perfectly knowing himself in the whole eternity of his
+being. Let no one attempt to confound this perfect moral certainty with
+necessity, for the distinction is plain. If God's will were affirmed to
+be necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness, and
+love, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the
+determination of the divine will: viz.--that the divine determination
+takes place, not in contingency and freedom, not with the power of
+making an opposite determination, but in absolute necessity. But if it
+be affirmed that God's will, will _certainly_ go in the direction of
+truth, righteousness, and love, the affirmation respects our _knowledge_
+and _conviction_ of the character of the divine volitions in the whole
+eternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire after the
+grounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the necessity of the
+divine determinations be the ground of this knowledge and conviction, it
+must be allowed that it is a sufficient ground. But will any man assume
+that necessity is the _only_ ground of certain knowledge and conviction?
+If necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of
+course there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other ground
+of knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at least for the
+sake of the argument, it be granted that there may be other grounds of
+knowledge than necessity, then I would ask whether the infinite
+excellence of the divine reason and sensitivity, in their perfect
+harmony, does afford to us a ground for the most certain and
+satisfactory belief that the divine will will create and mould all being
+and order all events according to infinite wisdom and rectitude. In
+order to have full confidence that God will forever do right, must we
+know that his will is absolutely necessitated by his reason and his
+affections? Can we not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him
+absolute freedom of choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the
+Earth will do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have
+the power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when, in
+his omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his purposes will
+forever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does not the glory and
+excellency of God appear in this,--that while he hath unlimited power,
+he employs that power by his free choice, only to dispense justice,
+mercy, and grace? And does not the excellency and meritoriousness of a
+creature's faith appear in this,--that while God is known to be so
+mighty and so absolute, he is confided in as a being who will never
+violate any moral principle or affection? Suppose God's will to be
+necessitated in its wise and good volitions,--the sun dispensing heat
+and light, and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of
+creation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,--and the
+creature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in him, holds
+no other relation to him than the sunflower to the sun--by a necessity
+of its nature, ever turning its face upwards to receive the influences
+which minister to its life and properties.
+
+The moral certainty attending the volitions of created perfect beings is
+the same in kind with that attending the volitions of the Deity. It is a
+certainty based upon the relative state of the reason and the
+sensitivity, and their unity with the will. Wherever the reason and the
+sensitivity are in harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this,
+that in calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we
+have not to calculate the relative energy of opposing principles:--all
+which is now existent is, in the constituted unity of the soul,
+naturally connected only with good volitions. But the _degree_ of the
+moral certainty in created beings, when compared with that attending the
+volitions of Deity, is only in the proportion of the finite to the
+infinite. The confidence which we repose in the integrity of a good
+being, does not arise from the conviction that his volitions are
+necessitated, but from his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and
+our sense of his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility
+of his doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing
+right while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under
+temptations of doing wrong.
+
+A certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the necessity of the
+volitions, would not differ from a physical certainty. But a moral
+certainty has this plain distinction,--that it is based upon the
+evidently pure dispositions and habits of the individual, without
+implying, however, any necessity of volitions.
+
+Moral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral perfection, and
+predicable in degrees according to the dignity and excellency of the
+being.
+
+But now let us suppose any disorder to take place in the sensitivity;
+that is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to any degree, to grow into
+opposition to the reason, so that while the reason commands in one
+direction, the sensitivity gives the sense of the most agreeable in the
+opposite direction,--and then our calculations respecting future
+volitions must vary accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer,
+because volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing
+principles: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in
+different degrees.
+
+By _the probable_, we mean that which has not attained to certainty, but
+which nevertheless has grounds on which it claims to be believed. We
+call it _probable_ or _proveable_, because it both has proof and is
+still under conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof.
+That which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A
+mathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity, and
+admits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates its truth.
+
+The divine volitions are certain on the ground of the divine
+perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is found in the
+divine perfections.
+
+The volitions of a good created being are certain on the ground of the
+purity of such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what is found
+in this purity.
+
+But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being of reason, and of a
+sensitivity corrupted totally or in different degrees, then we have
+place not for certainty, but for probability. As our knowledge of the
+future volitions of such a being can only be gathered from something now
+existent, this knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present
+relative state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of
+this is in no case supposable,--so that, although our actual knowledge
+of this being may be such as to afford us proof of what his volitions
+may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be increased
+indefinitely by close observation and study, so likewise will the proof
+be increased. According to the definition of probability above given,
+therefore, our knowledge of the future volitions of an imperfect being
+can only amount to probable knowledge.
+
+The direction of the probabilities will be determined by the
+preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed being supposed. If the
+sensitivity be totally corrupted, the probabilities will generally go in
+the direction of the corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed
+general fact in relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments
+of passion are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But
+the state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be in a
+highly developed state, and the convictions of the right consequently
+clear and strong, there may be probabilities of volitions in opposition
+to passion which cannot exist where the reason is undeveloped and
+subject to the errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The
+difference is that which is commonly known under the terms "enlightened
+and unenlightened conscience."
+
+Where the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the direction of the
+probabilities must depend upon the degree of corruption and the degree
+to which the reason is developed or undeveloped.
+
+With a given state of the sensitivity and the reason, the direction of
+the probabilities will depend also very much upon the correlated, or
+upon the opposing objects and circumstances:--where the objects and
+circumstances agree with the state of the sensitivity and the reason, or
+to speak generally and collectively, with "the state of the mind," the
+probabilities will clearly be more easily determined than where they are
+opposed to "the state of the mind."
+
+The law which Edwards lays down as the law of volition universally, viz:
+that "the volition is as the greatest apparent good:" understanding by
+the term "good," as he does, simply, that which strikes us "agreeably,"
+is indeed a general rule, according to which the volitions of characters
+deeply depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as
+governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of
+character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is struggling
+under the light of his reason against passion, and consequently the
+probabilities in this last case must be calculated in a different way.
+But in relation to the former it is a sufficient rule.
+
+Probability, as well as certainty, respects only the kind and degree of
+our knowledge of any events, and not the causes by which those events
+are produced: whether these causes be necessary or contingent is another
+question.
+
+One great error in reasoning respecting the character of causes, in
+connexion with the calculation of probabilities, is the assumption that
+uniformity is the characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning
+may be stated in the following syllogism:
+
+In order to calculate either with certainty or probability any events we
+must suppose a uniform law of causation; but uniformity can exist only
+where there is a necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose
+a necessity of causation.
+
+This is another instance of applying to the will principles which were
+first obtained from the observation of physical causes, and which really
+belong to physical causes only. With respect to physical causes, _it is
+true_ that uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary
+causes, simply because physical causes are relatively necessary
+causes:--but with respect to the will, _it is not true_ that uniformity
+appears to be a characteristic of necessary cause, because the will is
+not a necessary cause. That uniformity therefore, as in the case of
+physical causes, seems to become a characteristic of necessary cause,
+does not arise from the nature of the idea of cause, but from the nature
+of the particular subject, viz., _physical_ cause. Uniformity in logical
+strictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule. Cause
+is simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the direction, aims,
+and modes of power: cause explains the mere existence of phenomena: law
+explains their relations and characteristics: law is the thought and
+design of the reason. Now a cause may be so conditioned as to be
+incapable of acting except in obedience to law, and this is the case of
+all physical causes which act according to the law or design of infinite
+wisdom, and thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to
+these causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they
+necessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned as to
+be incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can oppose itself
+to, and violate law, but still it is a cause in connexion with law, the
+law found in the reason and sensitivity, which law of course has the
+characteristic of uniformity. The law of the reason and pure sensitivity
+is uniform--it is the law of right. The law of a totally corrupted
+sensitivity is likewise a uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law
+to do whatever is most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every
+individual, whatever may be the degree of his corruption, forms for
+himself certain rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces
+uniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity of
+conduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the design of
+the supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature. Uniformity of
+volitions is nothing but the design of reason and pure sensitivity, or
+of corrupted passion developed in human conduct. The uniformity thus not
+being the characteristic of cause as such, cannot be the characteristic
+of necessary cause. The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues
+nothing respecting the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause
+or it may not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity
+in a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform
+rules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but which
+we also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical causes we have
+the uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we have the uniformity of
+a free intelligent cause. We can conceive of perfect freedom and yet of
+perfect order, because the free will can submit itself to the light of
+the reason. Indeed, all the order and harmony of creation, although
+springing from the _idea_ of the reason, has been constituted by the
+power of the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not
+necessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is altogether
+an assumption incapable of being supported that freedom is identified
+with disorder.
+
+_Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience._
+
+These words are metaphorical: _fore_ and _pre_ do not qualify
+_knowledge_ and _science_ in relation to the mind which has the
+knowledge or science; but the time in which the knowledge takes place in
+relation to the time in which the object of knowledge is found. The
+metaphor consists in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge,
+considered relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act
+of knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining
+greater perspicuity, let us say,
+
+First: All acts of knowing are present acts of knowing,--there is no
+_fore_ knowledge and no _after_ knowledge.
+
+Secondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no relation to time and
+space whatever, e. g. pure abstract and necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4;
+and the being of God. Or the objects of knowledge may be in relations of
+time and space, e. g. all physical phenomena.
+
+Now these relations of time and space are various;--the object of
+knowledge may be in time past, or time present, or time future; and it
+may be in a place near, or in a place distant. And the faculty of
+knowledge may be of a capacity to know the object in all these relations
+under certain limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of
+knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under
+certain limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in
+time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near and
+distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events in any of
+these relations, or in any of these relations to their utmost limit.
+
+The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and
+space, under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and
+infinite form. Under this form it comprehends the present perfectly, and
+the past and the future no less than the present--and it reaches through
+all space. God's knowledge is an eternal now--an omnipresent here; that
+is, all that is possible and actual in eternity and space, is now
+perfectly known to him. Indeed God's knowledge ought not to be spoken of
+in relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge,
+from eternity to eternity the same; it is unchangeable, because it is
+perfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished.
+
+We have shown before that the perfection of the knowledge does not
+settle the mode of causation; that which comes to pass by necessity, and
+that which comes to pass contingently, are alike known to God.
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+I here finish my review of Edwards's System, and his arguments against
+the opposite system. I hope I have not thought or written in vain. The
+review I have aimed to conduct fairly and honourably, and in supreme
+reverence of truth. As to style, I have laboured only for perspicuity,
+and where a homely expression has best answered this end, I have not
+hesitated to adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly
+understood, cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a
+flowery surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason,
+is manifestly impossible.
+
+The great man with whose work I have been engaged, I honour and admire
+for his intellectual might, and love and venerate for a purity and
+elevation of spirit, which places him among the most sainted names of
+the Christian church. But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his
+genius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his
+philosophy? I have not done wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he
+leads me to the cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute
+attention--and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to have
+re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, I view him
+in a different character, and here his voice does not sound to me so
+sweet as Plato's.
+
+The first part of my undertaking is accomplished. When I again trouble
+the public with my lucubrations, I shall appear not as a reviewer, but
+in an original work, which in its turn must become the subject of
+philosophical criticism.
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+Footnotes
+
+[1] "It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a
+distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their
+service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say natural or
+physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not: at
+the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly
+physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the
+_invincible_ effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less
+natural, nor less insurmountable, if it is from the laws of spirit than
+it would be if it were from the laws of matter."--(Witherspoon's
+Lectures on Divinity, lect. xiii.)
+
+[2] Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this
+usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the performance of
+an action, and the existence of an impediment or antagonistic force,
+which takes from a faculty supposed to exist, the _liberty_ of action,
+have the same bearing upon responsibility.
+
+[3] It is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and
+natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without intending
+anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By moral inability
+they do not appear to mean anything which really render the actions
+required, impossible; but such an impediment as lies in corrupt
+affections, an impediment which may be removed by a self-determination
+to the use of means and appliances graciously provided or promised. By
+natural ability they mean the possession of all the natural faculties
+necessary to the performance of the actions required. In their
+representations of this natural ability, they proceed according to a
+popular method, rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural
+ability as a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities,
+but they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose upon
+myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to point out
+the connexion between the sensitivity and the will, both in a pure and a
+corrupt state,--and explain what these natural faculties are, which,
+according to the just meaning of these divines, form the ground of
+rebuke and persuasion, and constitute responsibility.
+
+[4] "The great argument that men are determined by the strongest
+motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call _petitio
+principii_. It is impossible even to produce any medium of proof that it
+is the strongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the
+greatest in itself; nor does it seem to be in all respects the strongest
+to the agent; but you say it appears strongest in the meantime. Why?
+Because you are determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was
+determined by the _strongest motive_, and you have only shown that I had
+a _motive_ when I acted. But what has determined you then? Can any
+effect be without a cause? I answer--supposing my self-determining power
+to exist, it is as real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect,
+as your moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and
+is but one and the same thing on one side and on the other."
+--(Witherspoon's Lectures, lect. xiii.)
+
+[5] Cousin.
+
+[6] Dr. Reid.
+
+[7] Lat. _moralis_, from _mos_,--i. e. custom or ordinary conduct.
+
+
+
+
+
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