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diff --git a/35958.txt b/35958.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2027c6e --- /dev/null +++ b/35958.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6552 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Review of Edwards's + +Author: Henry Tappan + +Release Date: April 25, 2011 [EBook #35958] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + + + + + +A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S + +"INQUIRY + +INTO THE + +FREEDOM OF THE WILL." + + +CONTAINING + +I. STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM. + +II. THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM. + +III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING WILL. + +BY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN. + +"I am afraid that Edwards's book (however well meant,) has done much +harm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to the same +doctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been generally ranked +among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples."--_Dugald +Stewart_. + + +NEW-YORK: + +JOHN S. TAYLOR, + +THEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER, BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL, + +1839. + + + + +Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by HENRY +PHILIP TAPPAN, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United +States, for the Southern District of New-York. + +G. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street. + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +Discussions respecting the will, have, unhappily, been confounded with +theological opinions, and hence have led to theological controversies, +where predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally +prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental +constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate methods of +psychological investigation, and must abide the result. If we enter the +field of human consciousness in the free, fearless, and honest spirit of +Baconian observation in order to arrive at the laws of the reason or the +imagination, what should prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened +course in reference to the will? + +Is it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are +more immediately connected with the will? This, indeed, throws solemnity +around our investigations, and warns us of caution; but, at the same +time, so far from repressing investigation, it affords the highest +reason why we should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness. +Nothing surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral +obligation, or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency +of religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us the +subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim unbounded liberty +of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at truth. As a believer in +the Bible I always anticipate that the truths to which philosophy leads +me, will harmonize with its facts and doctrines. If in the result there +should appear to be a collision, it imposes upon me the duty of +re-examining both my philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In +this way I may in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but +even gain from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight +into both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be removed, +then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, however, that I must +either renounce the philosophical conclusion, or remove the text. + +If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths were in opposition to +the whole of revelation or its leading truths, we should then evidently +be placed on the alternative of denying one or the other; but as the +denial of philosophy would be the destruction of reason, there would no +longer remain in our being any principle on which a revelation could be +received. Such a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any +system to be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that +with every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne aloft, +and their divine authority and their truth made more manifest, have we +not reason to bless the researches which have enabled us to perceive +more clearly the light from Heaven? A system of truth does not fear, it +courts philosophical scrutiny. Its excellency will be most resplendent +when it has had the most fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken +my faith in the Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its +safety whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And +what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be derived +from it. + +Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves when they argue from +the truths of the Bible to the truths of their philosophy; either under +the view that the last are deducible from the former, or that they serve +to account for and confirm the former. How often is their philosophy +drawn from some other source, or handed down by old authority, and +rendered venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead +of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is perhaps cast +into the mould of the philosophy. + +It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by experience, that in +pursuing our investigations in any particular science we are to confine +ourselves rigorously to its subjects and methods, neither seeking nor +fearing collision with any other science. We may feel confident that +ultimately science will be found to link with science, forming a +universal and harmonious system of truth; but this can by no means form +the principle of our particular investigations. The application of this +maxim is no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds +a relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest that in +the developements of such philosophy or science, it should be found to +harmonize with the revelation; but nevertheless this cannot be received +as the principle on which we shall aim to develope it. If there is a +harmony, it must be discovered; it cannot be invented and made. + +The Cardinals determined upon the authority of Scripture, as they +imagined, what the science of astronomy must be, and compelled the old +man Gallileo to give the lie to his reason; and since then, the science +of geology has been attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be +limited in its researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued +her steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, and +selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own discoveries. +And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The memory of Gallileo and +of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips which name the name of Christ. + +Now we ask the same independence of research in the philosophy of the +human mind, and no less with respect to the Will than with respect to +any other faculty. We wish to make this purely a psychological question. +Let us not ask what philosophy is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to +Pelagianism and Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the +former; let us ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may +present another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the +legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with truths +revealed. + +One thing is certain; the Bible no more professes to be a system of +formal mental philosophy, than it professes to contain the sciences of +astronomy and geology. If mental philosophy is given there, it is given +in facts of history, individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law, +and ethics; and as thus given, must be collected into a system by +observation and philosophical criticism. + +But observations upon these external facts could not possibly be made +independently of observations upon internal facts--the facts of the +consciousness; and the principles of philosophical criticism can be +obtained only in the same way. To him who looks not within himself, +poetry, history, law, ethics, and the distinctions of character and +conduct, would necessarily be unintelligible. No one therefore can +search the Bible for its philosophy, who has not already read philosophy +in his own being. We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole +history of theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every +author of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both +the principles of his philosophy and their influence upon himself. Every +man who reflects and aims to explain, is necessarily a philosopher, and +has his philosophy. Instead therefore of professing to oppose the Bible +to philosophy, or instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy +solely and directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not +discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and that +inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all that we know +and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in a pure, truth-loving +spirit. + +I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will is so intimately +associated with great and venerable names, and has so long worn a +theological complexion, that it is well nigh impossible to disintegrate +it. The authority of great and good men, and theological interests, even +when we are disposed to be candid, impartial, and independent, do often +insensibly influence our reasonings. + +It is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from +the wish to avoid all unnecessary strangeness of manner in handling an +old subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the +weightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open +this discussion with a review of "Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of +the Will." There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the +self-determining power of the will; and none which on this subject has +called forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and +logical subtlety. I believe there is a prevailing impression that +Edwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite +argument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it +may seem, yet honest and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and +more venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great +and venerable sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a +proper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself +alone, neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a +collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is my +interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright; and as +right action is meritorious not when compelled and accidental, but when +free and made under the perception and conviction of right principles; +so also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an +intellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are +something more than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or +Arminius, presents the cup. + +Facts of history or of description are legitimately received on +testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual being can be received +only on the evidence of consciousness, unless the testimony be from God +himself; and even in this case we expect that the testimony, although it +may transcend consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal +evidence of the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this: +that although there be revelations of that which transcends +consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of +consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions of +developed reason and the revelation. + +Now in the application of these principles, if Edwards have given us a +true psychology in relation to the will, we have the means of knowing +it. In the consciousness, and in the consciousness alone, can a doctrine +of the will be ultimately and adequately tested. Nor must we be +intimidated from making this test by the assumption that the theory of +Edwards alone sustains moral responsibility and evangelical religion. +Moral responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and +illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has already on +its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral responsibility +and evangelical religion can derive no support from a philosophy which +they are taken first to prove. + +But although I intend to conduct my argument rigidly on psychological +principles, I shall endeavour in the end to show that moral +responsibility is really sustained by this exposition of the will; and +that I have not, to say the least, weakened one of the supports of +evangelical religion, nor shorn it of one of its glories. + +The plan of my undertaking embraces the following particulars: + +I. A statement of Edwards's system. + +II. The legitimate consequences of this system. + +III. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will. + +IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness. + +V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and +responsibility. + +VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of +the Bible. + +The first three complete the review of Edwards, and make up the present +volume. Another volume is in the course of preparation. + + + + +I. + +A STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM. + +Edwards's System, or, in other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is +contained in part I. of his "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." This +part comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in +his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore use my +best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost clearness and +fairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety is to have Edwards +perfectly understood. My quotations are made from the edition published +by S. Converse, New-York, 1829. + +"Sec. I.--Concerning the Nature of the Will." + +Edwards under this title gives his definition of the will. "_The will +is, that by which the mind chooses anything_. The faculty of the _will_, +is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing: +an act of the _will_ is the same as an act of _choosing_ or _choice_." +(p. 15.) + +He then identifies "choosing" and "refusing:" "In every act of refusal +the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused." (p. 16.) + +The will is thus _the faculty of choice_. Choice manifests itself either +in relation to one object or several objects. Where there is but one +object, its possession or non-possession--its enjoyment or +non-enjoyment--its presence or absence, is chosen. Where there are +several objects, and they are so incompatible that the possession, +enjoyment, or presence of one, involves the refusal of the others, then +choice manifests itself in fixing upon the particular object to be +retained, and the objects to be set aside. + +This definition is given on the ground that any object being regarded as +positive, may be contrasted with its negative: and that therefore the +refusing a negative is equivalent to choosing a positive; and the +choosing a negative, equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa. +Thus if the presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is +negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the absence; and +to choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so that every act of +choosing involves refusing, and every act of refusing involves choosing; +in other words, they are equivalents. + +_Object of Will._ + +The object in respect to which the energy of choice is manifested, +inducing external action, or the action of any other faculty of the +mind, is always an _immediate object_. Although other objects may appear +desirable, that alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of +present action--that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which +I actually think--that alone is chosen as the object of muscular +exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, every act +of choice manifests itself by producing some change or effect in some +other part of our being. "The thing next chosen or preferred, when a man +wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would +be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order +to it." The same principle applies to any mental exertion. + +_Will and Desire._ + +Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only distinction that can +possibly be made is that of genus and species. They are the same in +_kind_. "I do not suppose that _will_ and _desire_ are words of +precisely the same signification: _will_ seems to be a word of a more +general signification, extending to things present and absent. _Desire_ +respects something absent. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely +distinct that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man +never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or +desires anything contrary to his will. The thing which he wills, the +very same he desires; and he does not will a thing and desire the +_contrary_ in any particular." (p. 17.) The immediate object of +will,--that object, in respect of which choice manifests itself by +producing effects,--is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme +desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object which +appears most desirable; and the object which appears most desirable is +always the object chosen. To produce an act of choice, therefore, we +have only to awaken a preponderating desire. Now it is plain, that +desire cannot be distinguished from passion. That which we love, we +desire to be present, to possess, to enjoy: that which we hate, we +desire to be absent, or to be affected in some way. The loving an +object, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical: the hating it, +and desiring its absence or destruction, or any similar affection of it, +are likewise identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished, +at least in _kind_, from the emotions and passions: this will appear +abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly identifies them: +"I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly +distinguishable from the will; as though they were two faculties of +soul." (Revival of Religion in New England, part I.) + +"God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is +capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and +views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The +other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and +view things, but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it +views or considers; either is inclined _to them_, or is disinclined or +averse _from them_. This faculty is called by various names: it is +sometimes called _inclination_; and as it has respect to the actions +that are determined or governed by it, is called will. The _will_ and +the _affections_ of the soul are not two faculties: the affections are +not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere +actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the +liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." (The Nature of the Affections, +part I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the +understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and the +passions, is fully settled by the above quotation. + +"Sec. II.--Concerning the Determination of Will." + +_Meaning of the term._ + +"By _determining_ the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must +be intended, _causing_ that the act of the will or choice should be thus +and not otherwise; and the will is said to be determined, when in +consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and +fixed upon, some particular object. As when we speak of the +determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in +such a direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will +supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined, +there is a determiner." + +Now the causation of choice and the determination of the will are here +intended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and +the determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in +motion, likewise gives it a direction; and where there are several +causes, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the +extent and direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the +will or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its +direction; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also +conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, the +direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is determined. +And where there are several causes acting upon the will, there is here +likewise a composition of the mental forces, and the choice or the +determination of the will takes place accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice +or volition then being an effect must have a cause. What is this cause? + +_Motive._ + +The cause of volition or choice is called motive. A cause setting a body +in motion is properly called the motive of the body; hence, analogously, +a cause exciting the will to choice is called the motive of the will. By +long usage the proper sense of motive is laid aside, and it has come now +to express only the cause or reason of volition. "By _motive_ I mean the +whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, +whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And when I +speak of the _strongest motive_, I have respect to the strength of the +whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that +be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." And "_that +motive which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest, +determines the will_." (p. 19.) This is general, and means nothing more +than--1. the cause of volition is called motive; 2. that where there are +several causes or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3. +the cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the cause, +if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered in their +co-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive "stands in view of the +mind," that is, it is something which the mind knows or is sensible of. + +_What constitutes the strength of Motive?_ + +"Everything that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement, +to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of _tendency_ +or _advantage_ to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to +the act of will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I +call the _strength_ of the motive." When different objects are presented +to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear more or less +"inviting." (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once produced, we +perceive their "tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." It is +a preference or choice anticipated, an instantaneous perception of a +quality in the object which we feel would determine our choice, if we +were called upon to make a choice. The object is felt to be adapted to +the state of the mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are +felt to be reciprocal. + +_What is this quality which makes up the previous tendency?_ + +"Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary +agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or +choice, is considered or viewed _as good_; nor has it any tendency to +engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears +such." Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as +the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the +previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as the +highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the strongest +motive; therefore, it follows that the "_will is always as the greatest +apparent good is_." (p. 20.) + +_The sense in which the term_ "good" _is used._ + +"I use the term _'good'_ as of the same import with _'agreeable.'_ To +appear _good_ to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to +_appear agreeable_, or _seem pleasing_ to the mind. If it tends to draw +the inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that +which _suits_ the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest +tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's +view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the +greatest apparent good. The word _good_ in this sense includes the +avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy." (p. 20.) + +It follows then that the will is always determined by that which _seems +most pleasing or appears most agreeable_ to the mind. + +This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which +Edwards set out: that will is always as the preponderating desire; +indeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the +affections; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the +strongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire +producing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination +of will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines +will is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its +perceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As +possessing this tendency, it is called _good_, or _pleasing_, or +_agreeable_; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of +the affections. + +The _"good"_ which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an +immediate good, or a good "in the present view of the mind." (p. 21.) +Thus a drunkard, before he drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each +other the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful +consequences; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be +greater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his +mind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only; +and if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. "If he wills to +drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will; and +drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, +and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the +immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him." The +reasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that +he has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of +drinking, in itself, is the object of choice; so that, in the view he +has taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we +may say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of +choice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in +such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the moment, +and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus +never chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him. + +_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._ + +"I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is +as the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_, +than to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or +by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the +mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict +propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that +the _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the +mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than +the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the +most agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or +_choice_. "The will is as the most agreeable,"--that is, _the +determination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of +the consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and +as the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect, +following volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or +read, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the "mind's +choice,"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary +action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the +sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the +terms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary +action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This +is still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the +desire_. "The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most +agreeable," and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it +must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is +affected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the +phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is +chosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the +simple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more +than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and +the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than +chosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is +the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The +object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are +correlatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard +choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be +the most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as +characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with +the sense of the most agreeable. + +_Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._ + +"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's +view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in +or about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to +render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the +object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and +circumstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.) + +Choice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that +is, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect +agreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect +agreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in +determining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the +mind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in +relation to each. + +I. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or +choice, will depend upon,-- + +1. The beauty of the object, "viewing it as it is _in itself_," +independently of circumstances. + +2. "The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or +_the consequence_ of it," or the object taken with its "concomitants" +and consequences. + +3. "The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with +respect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the +mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed." +(p. 22.) + +II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first, +upon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind. +Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future +pleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two +respects: + +1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the +pleasure; + +2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind +has of it. + +Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees +of pleasure, considered in itself; and "the agreeableness of a proposed +object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree +of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or +certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the +mind has of that good." (p. 23.) + +Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with +present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also +upon "the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice." +(p. 24.) Here we have to consider "the particular temper which the mind +has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education, +example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the +mind is in on a particular occasion." (ibid.) + +Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state +of the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already +mentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the +_manner of the view_. "Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter," he +remarks, "the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration +as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes +the objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_, +having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the +_manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or +deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively." (ibid.) +In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and +object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two, +choice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to +_the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of +agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the +most agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that, +having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation +to _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of +mind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in +relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind +produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an +example,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and +agreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation +to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the +sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical +language, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the +other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of +the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind +and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not +have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object +is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem +to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most +agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only +difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this: +the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate +presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The +most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition. +Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most +agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is +positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these +cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance +of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of +choosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase +_most agreeable_ or _greatest apparent good_ is convenient for general +use, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up. + +It may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus +endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word _choice_ is properly +used to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in +relation to its immediate effects,--as when I say, I choose to walk. +_The sense of the most agreeable_, is properly used to express the same +action, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice +and volition are the words in common use, because men at large only +think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause +of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie +in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the _sense of +the most agreeable_ becomes the most appropriate form of expression. + +Edwards concludes his discussion of the cause of the most agreeable, by +remarking: "However, I think so much is certain,--that volition, in no +one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest +apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained." This is the +great principle of his system; and, a few sentences after, he states it +as an axiom, or a generally admitted truth: "There is scarcely a plainer +and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than +that when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what +suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them." Indeed, Edwards +cannot be considered as having attempted to prove this; he has only +explained it, and therefore it is only the _explanation_ of a supposed +axiom that we have been following out. + +This supposed axiom is really announced in the first section: "Will and +desire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very +same he desires;" that is, a man wills as he desires, and of course +wills what is most agreeable to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the +title of part I. runs as follows: "Wherein are explained and stated +various terms and things, &c." Receiving it, therefore, as a generally +admitted truth, "that choice or volition is always as the most +agreeable," and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is +the explanation given? + +1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a faculty distinct from +the affections or passions, or that part of our being which philosophers +sometimes call the sensitivity. + +2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment +and under any given circumstances the strongest inclination, or the +strongest affection and desire with regard to an immediate object, +appears in the constitution of our being as the antecedent of effects in +the mind itself, or in the body; which effects are called voluntary +actions,--as acts of attention, or of talking, or walking. + +3. To say that volition is as the desire, is equivalent to saying that +volition is as the "greatest apparent good," which again means only the +most agreeable,--so that the volition becomes again the _sense or +feeling of the greatest apparent good_. There is in all this only a +variety of expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity. + +4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the production in the mind +of volition, or choice, or the strongest affection, or the sense of the +most agreeable, or of the greatest apparent good. It is therefore an +effect, and must have a determiner or cause. + +5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In explaining what +constitutes the motive, we must take into view both _mind_ and _object_. +The object must be perceived by the mind as something existent. This +perception, however, is only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the +object to the mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable, +or choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to each +other; they must be correlatives. The object must possess qualities of +beauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must possess a +susceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the object. But to say that +the object possesses qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind, +is in fact to affirm that the mind has the requisite susceptibility; for +these qualities of the object have a being, and are what they are only +in relation to mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may +therefore be called the unition of the sensitivity and the object. +Choice is thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually +appearing in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and, +indeed, being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be +accounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. But +inasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in relation +to objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for its +manifestations by referring them to the objects and circumstances in +connexion with which they take place, and without which they would not +take place; and thus, as we say, the cause of passion is the object of +passion: so we say also, in common parlance, the cause of choice is the +object of choice; and assigning the affections of the mind springing up +in the presence of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its +qualities, we say that choice is always as the most beautiful and +agreeable; that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest +apparent good, thus _objectively_ described, is the motive, or +determiner, or cause of volition. + +_In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding._ + +"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always +follows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the +understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole +faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called +_reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant +what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, +taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always +follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason +is quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_, +all things being put together which relates to the mind's present +perceptions in any respect." (p. 25.) The "large sense" in which Edwards +takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive +being. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable, +the suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with +other particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject +to the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at +the moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is +not enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must +likewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of +the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this +sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the +subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, "the +act of the will is determined in opposition to it." (ibid.) + +"Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, +Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence." + +After having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained +the cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion +between this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this +connexion a necessary connexion? + +In order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he +proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above +title. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary +discussion. + +Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the +common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or +metaphysical use. + +1. In common use, _necessity_ "is a relative term, and relates to some +supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition +is overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word +_impossible_ is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to +supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient +for the effect. The word _unable_ is relative, and has relation to +ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word _irresistible_ is +relative, and has reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, +to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to +withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity +and impossibility implies _something that frustrates endeavour or +desire_." + +He then distinguishes this necessity into _general and particular_. +"Things are necessary _in general_, which are or will be, +notwithstanding any supposable opposition, from whatever quarter:" e. g. +that God will judge the world. + +"Things are necessary _to us_ which are or will be, notwithstanding all +opposition supposable in the case _from us_." This is _particular_ +necessity: e. g. any event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions +"about liberty and moral agency," the word is used especially in a +particular sense, because we are concerned in these discussions _as +individuals_. + +According to this _common use_ of necessity in the _particular_ sense, +"When we speak of any thing necessary _to us_, it is with relation to +some supposable opposition _to our wills;_" and "a thing is said to be +necessary" in this sense "when we cannot help it, do what _we will_." So +also a thing is said to be _impossible to us_ when we cannot do it, +although we make the attempt,--that is, put forth the volition; and +_irresistible to us_, which, when we put forth a volition to hinder it, +overcomes the opposition: and we are _unable_ to do a thing "when our +supposable desires and endeavours are insufficient,"--are not followed +by any effect. In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not +considering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are +considering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own effects: +e. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain man can raise a +certain weight,--if it be affirmed that it is _impossible_ for him to +raise it, that he has not the _ability_ to raise it, and that the weight +will _necessarily_ keep its position,--no reference whatever is made to +the production of a volition or choice to raise it, but solely to the +connexion between the _volition_ and the _raising of the weight_. Now +Edwards remarks, that this common use of the term necessity and its +cognates being habitual, is likely to enter into and confound our +reasonings on subjects where it is inadmissible from the nature of the +case. We must therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.) + +2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_, +but an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies "in cases wherein +no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very +nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or +endeavour." (ibid.) Thus it is used "with respect to God's existence +before the creation of the world, when there was no other being." +"_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from +certainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things +in themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or +that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition +which affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than +the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject +and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and +in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when +I endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_." +(p. 27, 28, 29.) + +"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence +of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several +ways." + +"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_. +So God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is +necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four." + +2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence +of something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain. + +3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain +_consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be +"consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_ +with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a +necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity. + +"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which +will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are +necessary only in this last way,"--that is, "by a connexion with +something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already +is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to +controversies about acts of the will." (p. 30.) + +Philosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. "The existence +of a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when +all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its +existence." This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense. + +2. _Particular_ necessity refers to "things that happen to particular +persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern, +at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with +regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard +to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the +will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute +to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether +it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case. + +"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and +_necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms +_impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only +the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.) + +_Inability and Unable._ + +"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use, +have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is +have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these +terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on +controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and +far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will +or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be +supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or +motives. + +_Contingent and Contingency._ + +"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or +accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with +its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of +things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. +But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; +not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot +discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has +absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has +any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.) + +Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use, +contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we +discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical +school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no +cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any +cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper +place. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them. + +Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and +Inability. + +We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and +volition necessary? + +The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this +question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion +between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this +question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its +cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be +necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical +sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to +characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens +with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: "That +necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible +connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a +proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is +distinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity." He then +appropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of +the connexion between motive and volition: "And sometimes by moral +necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which +arises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives, +and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such +certain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the +phrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse." (p. 32.) Natural +_philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to +characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our +being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations, +and the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.) + +In employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate +that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it +distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that "moral necessity may be +as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as +perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect +is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a +thing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and +effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I +call by the name of _moral necessity_." (p. 33.) + +Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that +the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature +of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to +express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which +"does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two +terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many +cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is +plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as +truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having +its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express +the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are +most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of +motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering +the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation. +(p. 34.) + +Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his +reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must +be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name +of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the +original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before, +such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech, +and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to +some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. +But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in +the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and +will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose +and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to +oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite +to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two +contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore +the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or +resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.) + +This passage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the +original use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and +its effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose +or will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour +overcomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the +weight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these +terms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my +volition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the +sense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary +endeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of +as struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition +does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition, +therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be +made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is +supposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their +circumstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two, +as the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its +cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It +comes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary +endeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute +necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone +which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at +given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and +feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought +together. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of +volition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that +necessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure +and perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits, +(p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and +natural necessity is a mere difference in the "two terms connected," and +not a difference "_in the nature of the connexion_." + +_Natural and moral inability._ + +"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain +what is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be +_naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, +because what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or +because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the +will; either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body, +or external objects." (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know +something, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the +understanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the +instrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a +defect of the bodily constitution; or external objects may be regarded +as presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert. +This is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be +remarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or +_philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability; +but only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a +relative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do, +although we will to do. + +What is moral inability? "Moral inability consists not in any of these +things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a +contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to +induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives +to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be +said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or +want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such +a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, +it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an +inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such +circumstances and under the influence of such views." (bid.) + +The inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between +volition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the +volition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition, +cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to +exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The +inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the +motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_, +and in the _nature and circumstances of the object;_ and choice or +volition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense +of the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any +given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not +produced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind +and object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the +deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and +object--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a +state_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not +possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part +of the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a +stronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object, +there is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the +_particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a +different state of mind: and this constitutes "the want of sufficient +motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength +of apparent motives to the contrary." And both these may clearly be +resolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on +the part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards +another object; or, as Edwards expresses it, "the opposition or want of +inclination." For a want of inclination to one object, implying a +stronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the +mind_, and the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not +correlated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and +circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a "want +of sufficient motives;" the second, stronger "motives to the contrary." +Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition, +therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an +effect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has +any existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the +perfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being, +leading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical +inability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain +volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral +ability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and +principles of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_ +ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions +and certain effects. + +Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a +_real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility +of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain +effects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water +freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an +established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of +effects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of +the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the +nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected." + +Edwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability. + +"A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to +prostitute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation +between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object +contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice +cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and +the act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the +principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to +the consequents of the choice. + +"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to +kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding. + +"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and +temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be +unable to forbear gratifying his lust." There is here a correlation +between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and +circumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice +takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral +inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite. + +"A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear +taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last. + +"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an +enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power +of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are +most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_ +is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all +correlated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's +self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the +most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is +absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of +virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love +wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of +habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose +holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy +Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The +love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation +of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is +_utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral +inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this +inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no +power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to +put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition, +and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions. + +Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and +fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has +absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he +would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a +good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good +volitions. + +_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._ + +The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual +and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.) + +The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act, +through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements +presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.) + +An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular +occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular +inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has +become correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it +is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is +correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and +under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is +necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at +present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the +greatest advantage to induce it." + +"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will, +are in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or +_habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be +otherwise than at present it is." (ibid.) + +The passage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be +brought up under the following question: + +Although will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet +can present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the +will, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts? + +"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the +will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a +distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will +at one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and +there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of +the will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered +insufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion +returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such +opposition." (p. 37.) + +Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to +drink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink. +But we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects +likewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife +and children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his +cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing, +these considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most +agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to +form resolutions of amendment; but when the appetite and longing for +drink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these +considerations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are +overcome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, asserts its supremacy. + +"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to +such future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the +occasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be +prevented or avoided." (ibid.) + +In the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual +correlation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and +considerations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being +associated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the +mind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain +the mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation +from strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with +the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed +to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again +into circumstances to give it an adventitious advantage. The repetition +of occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in +the sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. "On this +account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially +obtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and +indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong +habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its +resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also, +when the acts arise from strong habit." (ibid.) + +In every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act +otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment +of his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize +men by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of +moral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no +correlation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if +it be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason +itself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the +most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or +sensitivity is opposed to it. + +_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability +_to act in a certain way._ + +"But it must be observed concerning _moral inability_, in each kind of +it, that the word _inability_ is used in a sense very diverse from its +original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the +proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present +will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said +to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, _according to the +ordinary use of language_, that a malicious man, let him be never so +malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to +show his neighbour a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be +never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. _In the strictest +propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his +choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable +to do a thing, when he can do it if he will_." (ibid.) + +Men, in the common use of language, and in the expression of their +common and generally received sentiments, affirm that an individual has +any thing in his power when it can be controlled by volition. Their +connexion of power does not arise from the connexion of volition with +its cause, but from the conception of volition as itself a cause with +its effects. Thus the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike, +having for its antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking, +having for its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common +usage of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to +strike or not to strike. Now as it is "improperly said that he cannot +perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is +in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the +acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with +respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a +downright contradiction; it is to say he _cannot_ will if he _does_ +will: and, in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man +to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing." (ibid.) + +It is improper, according to this, to say that a man cannot do a thing, +when nothing is wanting but an act of volition; for that is within our +power, as far as it can be within our power, which is within the reach +of our volition. + +It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts +of the will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a +man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to +will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another, +which is absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause +of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has ability to +produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to represent the man +as _unable_, in any particular case, to produce volitions, for this +would imply that in other cases he is able. Nay, the very language is +self-contradictory. If a man produce volitions, he must produce them by +volitions; and if in any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce +volitions; then this inability must arise from a want of connexion +between the volition by which the required volition is aimed to be +produced, and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is +unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will _if he +will_--a proposition which grants the very point it assumes to deny. +"The very willing is the doing," which is required. + +Edwards adopts what he calls the "original" and "proper," meaning of +power, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, "in the +ordinary use of language," as the legitimate and true meaning. In this +use, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition +with its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or +motives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, "to ascribe a +non-performance to the want of power or ability," or to the want of +motives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) "is not just," "because the +thing wanting," that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the +agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, "is not a +being _able_," that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral +ability, "but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the +act of volition, or the fact of 'being willing,'" there is no facility +of mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state +of mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no +concern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which +can be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he +will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability +to do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the +volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but +still if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition +and the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the +thing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be +able to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him. + +We can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth +volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those +motives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not +_unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of +the word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the +volition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; +but we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made; +still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious +of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our +actual volitions and their objects. + +"Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency." + +What is liberty? "The plain and obvious meaning of the words _freedom_ +and _liberty_, in common speech, is _power, opportunity, or advantage +that any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being +free from hinderance, or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting +in any way as he wills. And the _contrary_ to liberty, whatever name we +call it by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he +will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise." (p. 38.) Again, "That +power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according +to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the +meaning of the word, anything of the _cause_ of that choice, or at all +considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was +caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it +was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it +happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with +something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice +any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder +his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, +according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (p. 39.) + +This is Edwards's definition of liberty, and he has given it with a +clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an amplification, which +renders it impossible to mistake his meaning. + +Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion between volition and its +cause or motive. Liberty relates solely to the connexion between the +volition and its objects. He is free in the only true and proper sense, +who, when he wills, finds no impediment between the volition and the +object, who wills and it is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey: +he wills to talk, and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and +express sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his +tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not be +free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he would not be +free. If there should be anything preventing the volition from taking +effect, he would not be free. + +_Of what can the attribute of Liberty be affirmed?_ + +From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, "It will follow, that in +propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be +ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, +power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no +_will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its +will_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be +restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of +liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not +to speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a +will_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That +which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the +power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who +is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of." +(p. 38.) + +Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the +spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity +of choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded +connexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those +volitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_ +is the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and +whose choice reaches effects. + +_Moral Agent._ + +"A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a +_moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a +moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty." (p. 39.) + +In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality? + +"To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and +evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, +reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being +influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to +the view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct +agreeable to moral faculty." (p. 40.) + +A moral agent is a being who can perform moral actions, or actions which +are subject to praise or blame. Now the same action may be committed by +a man or by a brute--and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man +guilty? Because he has a moral sense or perception by which he +distinguishes right and wrong: the brute has no such sense or +perception. The man having thus the power of perceiving the right and +wrong of actions--actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated +to him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, we +may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of a reason +and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the capacity of +having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind as to form motives +and produce volitions. We might define a man of taste in the fine arts +in a similar way; thus,--a man of taste is an agent who has the power of +distinguishing beauty and ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to +beauty that the sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The +only difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, the +sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty perceived; +while in the former, the right perceived does not always produce this +sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most agreeable is often +produced by the wrong, in opposition to the decisions of reason and +conscience. + +I have now completed the statement of Edwards's system, nearly in his +own words, as contained in part I. of his work. The remarks and +explanations which have been thrown in, I hope will serve to make him +more perfectly understood. This end will be still more fully attained by +presenting on the basis of the foregoing investigation and statement, a +compend of his psychological system, independently of the order there +pursued, and without largely introducing quotations, which have already +been abundantly made. + +COMPEND OF EDWARDS'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM. + +I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. The +intellectual--called reason or understanding. 2. The active and +feeling--called will or affections. + +II. The relation of these to each other. The first precedes the second +in the order of exercise. The first perceives and knows objects in their +qualities, circumstances, and relations. The second experiences emotions +and passions, or desires and choices, in relation to the objects +perceived. + +III. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are +brought together, perception takes place according to the constituted +laws of the intelligence. + +IV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty +of our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice, +emotions, passions, or desires take place, according to the constituted +nature and laws of this faculty. + +The objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object, +we may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to +each other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we +call pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable, +affections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in +relation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces +accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful. + +In the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is +universal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be +pleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But, +in the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral +objects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is, +suited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to +be unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that +pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous +terms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in +describing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the +will. + +V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in +the correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In +assigning the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of +the will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in +the presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects, +and say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such and +such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say +that the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the +nature and circumstances of the object. + +VI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects +in other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand +thus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking, +resisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental +operations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and +investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory. + +VII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in +other parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic. +It is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it +appears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as +Edwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect +contemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense +sense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most +pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular +subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the constitution and law +of our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception +must bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately +follow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception +again takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as +objects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth. + +VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by +this system:--_Choice_ is the sense or the affection of the most +pleasant and agreeable. _Preference_ is its synonyme, with scarcely a +shade of difference. They both have respect to the _act of selection_. +_Volition_ is another name for this affection of will, and is used more +particularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection. +_Desire_ is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment, +is choice. _Emotion_ is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to +the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first +sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to +certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to +them,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object +which can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the +object may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that +is, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most +agreeable. + +_Passion_ is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other +relations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a +flower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this +desire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the passion has +the characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects +take place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching +out the hand, &c. + +_The determination of will_ is the production or causation of choice. It +is used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in +opposition to all other choices. + +_The will itself_ is the capacity of being affected by objects with +emotion, passion, and desire,--and with that form of passion which we +call the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected +with effects or consequents as their stated antecedent. + +_The motive_ is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the +nature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and +circumstances Of the object chosen. + +IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands +may seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be +obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of +the most agreeable. + +X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference +to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul. +The man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon +choosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under +necessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon +choosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is +_impossible_ for him to walk,--then he has _no liberty_ to walk,--then +he is under a _necessity_ of remaining in one place. + +Necessity in any other use is _metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ +necessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the +necessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of +cause and effect. Hence, + +The _connexion_ between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most +agreeable with the motive or cause, is _necessary_ with a philosophical +necessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also +called _moral_ necessity. This term _moral_ is given, not in reference +to the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the _terms_ +connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus +distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call _natural_. + +XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A _natural_ agent is that +which produces effects without volition. A _moral_ agent is one +producing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual +perception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a +sense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account +of the volitions and their effects. + +_Brutes_ or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but +have no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no +sense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they +cannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements. + +XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason; +secondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability. + +Natural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be +accomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus +we say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk, +he walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first +refers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The +second refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting +forces from between volitions and effects. + +Hence a man is _naturally unable_ to do anything when there is no +established connexion between volition and that thing. A man is +naturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no _liberty_ +to move his arm when it is bound. + +_Moral inability_ is metaphysical or philosophical inability. +Philosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a +certain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there +is a philosophical inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the +decay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have +no cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical +inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine +lath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate +cause. _Moral inability_ relates to the connexion between motives and +volitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the +connexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the +term moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the +_connexion_,--it only expresses the _quality_ of _terms connected_. +Hence _moral_ inability, as philosophical inability, is the +impossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive +or cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical +inability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive +or cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral +philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty +dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not +adequate to produce a volition to such an act. + +Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us, +because beyond the sphere of our volition. + +XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only +to volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of +Edwards's work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be +found in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of +his system, we introduce it here. + +He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or +commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature +of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue +or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at +all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not +in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad +nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some +faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is +our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination, +--"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean +the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are +distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether +the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or +viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself. +It plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the +above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the +volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is +volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing +or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions +that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these +volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are +right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The +_metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the +character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are +questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our +personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do +_we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_ + +Nor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the +volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the +volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character +of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the +rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist. +The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind, +and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency, +responsibility, and duty. + +And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing +external actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected +with volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action +is one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it, +if we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this +very moment there is no such correlation between the action and the +will, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act +of willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we +are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it +would not be done; although at this very moment there is such a +correlation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form +the cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to +exist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the +correlation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the +want of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and +responsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its +connexion with its consequents. + +This does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions +are to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect +volitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation +to the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in +themselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force +or power may have come in between the volition and its object, and +changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an event +different from the will or intention; although being in connexion with +the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act +which appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an +extended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is +evil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must +know what the man intends, before we pronounce upon him; which is the +same thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what +his motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but +the volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of +these effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we +can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really +intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really +connected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable. + +_Edwards and Locke._ + +Their systems are one: there is no difference in the principle. Edwards +represents the will as necessarily determined so does Locke. Edwards +places liberty in the unimpeded connexion of volition with its stated +sequents--so does Locke. + +They differ only in the mode of developing the necessary determination +of will. According to Locke, desire is in itself a necessary +modification of our being produced in its correlation with objects; and +volition is a necessary consequent of desire when excited at any given +moment to a degree which gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at +that moment. "The greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that +is constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in its +choice of the next action." (book 2. ch. 21, Sec. 40.) According to +Edwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, and the +strongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that moment. + +Edwards's analysis is more nice than Locke's, and his whole developement +more true to the great principle of the system--necessary determination. +Locke, in distinguishing the will from the desire, seems about to launch +into a different psychology, and one destructive of the principle. + + + + +II. + +THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM. + +These consequences must, I am aware, be deduced with the greatest care +and clearness. The deduction must be influenced by no passion or +prejudice. It must be purely and severely logical--and such I shall +endeavour to make it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has +himself made. + +I. There is no self-determining power of will, and of course no liberty +consisting in a self-determining power. + +A self-determining power of will is a supposed power, which will has to +determine its own volitions. + +Will is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of desire, emotion, or +passion. + +Volition is the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable at +any given moment. + +Volition arises from the state of the mind, or of the will, or +sensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature and circumstances of +the object. + +Now, if the will determined itself, it would determine its own state, in +relation to objects. But to determine is to act, and therefore, for the +will to determine is for the will to act; and for the will to determine +itself, is for the will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the +will is a volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to +create a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this +antecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same way. +We shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an indefinite series +of volitions, without any first volition; consequently we shall have no +self-determiner after all, because we can arrive at no first determiner, +and thus the idea of self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again, +we shall have effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of +the case never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are +thus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the negative +of cause. + +Now that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can question. If +Edwards's psychology be right, and if self-determination implies a will +to will, or choosing a choice, then a self-determining power is the +greatest absurdity possible. + +II. It is clearly deducible from this also, that God can exercise a +perfect control over his intelligent creatures, or administer perfectly +a moral government consisting in the influence of motives. + +To any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in reference to +required determinations. And when an individual is removed from the +motives adapted to his state of mind, the Almighty Providence can so +order events as to bring him into contiguity with the motives. + +If the state of mind should be such that no motives can be made +available in reference to a particular determination, it is dearly +supposable that he who made the soul of man, may exert a direct +influence over this state of mind, and cause it to answer to the motives +presented. Whether there are motives adapted to every state of mind, in +reference to every possible determination required by the Almighty +Lawgiver, so as to render it unnecessary to exert a direct influence +over the will, is a question which I am not called upon here to answer. +But in either case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute, +fore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as well +as the physical world; and the election of a certain number to eternal +life, and the making of this election sure, are necessary and plain +consequences of this system. And as God is a being all-wise and good, we +may feel assured in connexion with this system, that, in the working out +of his great plan, whatever evil may appear in the progress of its +developement, the grand consummation will show that all things have been +working together for good. + +III. It is plainly deducible from this system that moral beings exert an +influence over each other by the presentation of motives. And thus +efforts may be made either to the injury or benefit of society. + +IV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of responsibility, the +consciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and consequently the expectation +of punishment or reward, connect themselves simply with the nature of +the mere fact of volition.--that is, if this is a true and complete +representation of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon +the mere fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly +independently of its causes, can the processes of justice go forth. + +Thus we may view the system in relation both to God and to man. + +In relation to God. It makes him supreme and absolute--foreseeing and +fore-determining, and bringing everything to pass according to infinite +wisdom, and by the energy of an infinite will. + +In relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple +fact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established +antecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects, +because he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear, +because he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common +judgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness, +that an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which +ought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a +volition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong, +because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be +rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition. +In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea +of _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends +the sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has +all the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but +a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do +nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which +goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his +effort. + +In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground +of moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_ +necessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne +to do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been +wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil, +anything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under +any responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to +be tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of, +could admit the plea--"I did not the good because I had not the will to +do it," or "I did the evil because I had the will to do it." "This is +your guilt," would be the reply of the judge, "that you had no will to +do the good--that you had a will to do the evil." + +We must now take up a different class of deductions. They are such as +those abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of +morality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If +however they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against +them. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do +most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for +himself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_. + +I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional +necessity, particular and general. + +1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the +individual. + +It is granted in the system, that the connexion of motive and volition +is necessary with an absolute necessity, because this precedes and +therefore is not within the reach of the volition. So also, the state of +mind, and the nature and circumstances of the object in relation to this +state, forming a correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent +upon a cause, beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make +its motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive, +and so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first cause. +Hence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are related by an +absolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the effect of motive, +being necessary also with an absolute necessity, the only place for +freedom that remains, if freedom be possible, is the connexion of +volition and effects, internal and external. And this is the only place +of freedom which this system claims. But what new characteristic appears +in this relation? Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and +sequents? I will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will +to sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established antecedent +to these muscular movements. So also, when I will to think on a certain +subject, I think on that subject. The volition of selecting a subject, +and the volition of attending to it, are stated antecedents to that +mental operation which we call thought. We have here only another +instance of cause and effect; the relation being one as absolute and +necessary as any other relation of cause and effect. The curious +organism by which a choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces +muscular movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual +man. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause beyond +the sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which connects volition +with thinking is also pre-established, and beyond the sphere of +volition. As the volition itself appears by an absolute necessity in +relation to the individual man, so also do the stated sequents or +effects of volition appear by an absolute necessity in relation to him. + +It is true, indeed, that the connexion between volition and its objects +may be interrupted by forces coming between, or overcome by superior +forces, but this is common to cause and effect, and forms no peculiar +characteristic; it is a lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome +by a greater. Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force +does not prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still +be necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the truth +in respect of volition, according to this system. The volition could +have no being without a motive, and when the motive is present it must +have a being, and no sooner does it appear than its effects follow, +unless impeded. If impeded, then we have two trains of causes coming +into collision, and the same necessity which brought them together, +gives the ascendency to the one or the other. + +It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that necessity, +absolute and unconditional, as far at least as the man himself is +concerned, reigns in the relation of volition and its effect, if the +volition itself be a necessary existence. All that precedes volition is +necessary; volition itself is necessary. All that follows volition is +necessary: Humanity is but a link of the inevitable chain. + +2. General necessity--a necessity absolute, in relation to all being and +causality, and applicable to all events. + +An event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual--is this +event likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? Let this +event be a volition of a given individual; it is necessary in relation +to that individual. Now it must be supposed to have a connexion by a +chain of sequents and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take +any particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that antecedent +and sequent, in its particular place and relations, can be proved +necessary in the same way that the volition is proved necessary in its +particular place and relations; that is, the antecedent being given +under the particular circumstances, the sequent must follow. But the +antecedent is linked by like necessity to another antecedent, of which +it is the sequent; and the sequent is linked by like necessity to +another sequent, of which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole +chain, from the given necessary volition up to the first cause, is +necessary. We come therefore at last to consider the connexion between +the first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is this +a necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded as a +volition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will the first +sequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that sequent should +appear. But the volition itself cannot really be the first antecedent or +cause, because volition or choice, from its very nature, must itself +have a determiner or antecedent. What is this antecedent? The +motive:--for self-determination, in the sense of the will determining +itself, would involve the same absurdities on this system in relation to +God as in relation to man; since it is represented as an absurdity in +its own nature--it is determining a volition by a volition, in endless +retrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine volition, +what is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition? +It cannot but be a necessary connexion; for there is nothing to render +it otherwise, save the divine will. But the divine will cannot be +supposed to do this, for the motive is already taken to be the ground +and cause of the action of the divine will. The necessity which applies +to volition, in the nature of the case must therefore apply to the +divine volition. No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the +divine will, except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom, +and goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the +divine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This Edwards +expressly affirms--"If God's will is steadily and surely determined in +everything by _supreme_ wisdom, then it is in everything _necessarily +determined_ to that which is _most_ wise." (p. 230.) That the universe +is governed by infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought, +and is abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a +government of necessity. This may be regarded as the most excellent +government, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be contended for. Let +us not, however, wander from the question, and in representing it as the +government of wisdom, forget that it is a government of necessity, and +that absolute. The volition, therefore, with which we started, is at +last traced up to a necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final +cause; for here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one. + +What we have thus proved in relation to one volition, must be equally +true in reference to every other volition and every other event, for the +reasoning must apply to every possible case. Every volition, every +event, must be traced up to a first and final cause, and this must be +necessary and infinite wisdom. + +II. It follows, therefore, from this system, that every volition or +event is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place +and relations. + +The whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary +wisdom. All volitions and events have their last and efficient cause in +infinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that +can be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great +source. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for +any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change +could make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute +necessity,--and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has +made it, and disposed of it. + +III. If that which we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be +both necessary evil and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is +in vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptation of the +word; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his. +These volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried +back to the one great source of all being and events. Hence, + +IV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears +in him, appears by an absolute necessity,--and it cannot be supposed to +be otherwise than it is. Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only +the perception of the difference between right and wrong, and the +conviction that the right ought to be done, but the possession of a +power to do the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition +is fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be +supposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all +things considered, can it be supposed there could have been, at that +precise moment and in that precise relation, any other volition. The +volition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite and necessary wisdom. We +cannot escape from this difficulty by perpetually running the changes +of--"He can if he will,"--"He could if he would,"--"There is nothing +wanting but a will,"--"He has a natural ability," &c. &c. Let us not +deceive ourselves, and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by +these words, "he can if he will"! but he cannot if he don't will. The +will is wanting,--and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot +appear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? The +man cannot change one volition for another. By supposition, he has not +the moral or metaphysical ability,--and yet this is the only ability +that can produce the new volition. It is passing strange that the power +upon which volition is absolutely dependent, should be set aside by +calling it _metaphysical_,--and the man blamed for an act because the +consequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the necessary +consequent of this power! The man is only in his volition. The volition +is good or bad in itself. The cause of volition is none of his concern, +because it transcends volition. He can if he will. That is enough for +him! But it is not enough to make him blameable, when whether he will or +not depends not only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the +antecedent itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself. + +I am not now disputing the philosophy. The philosophy may be true; it +may be very good: but then we must take its consequences along with it; +and this is all that I now insist upon. + +V. It is another consequence of this system, that there can be nothing +evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of +moral perfection, as indeed their very names imply, then all the +necessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite +wisdom and goodness, as principles, can only envelope parts of +themselves. It would be the destruction of all logic to deny this. It +would annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be +said that infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what +is essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do transgress +this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation +of the law was a necessary developement of infinite wisdom; and the +volition which transgresses it is a developement of the same nature. If +this seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system, +and the system alone is responsible for its conclusions. + +If it should be replied here, that every system must be subject to the +same difficulty, because if evil had a beginning, it must have had a +holy cause, inasmuch as it could not exist before it began to exist,--I +answer, this would be true if evil is the _necessary_ developement of a +holy cause. But more of this hereafter. + +VI. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. Every volition +being the sense of the most agreeable, and arising from the correlation +of the object and the sensitivity; it follows that every motive and +every action comes under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of +gratification or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no +collision between principle and passion, because principle can have no +power to determine the will, except as it becomes the most agreeable. +Universally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain sway only by +uniting with desire, and thus coming under conditions of yielding the +highest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and benevolence, when obeyed, +therefore, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable; and +so also injustice, falsehood, and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but +simply as the most agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as +the quality of all motive and the universal principle of the +determinations of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We +may indeed _speculate_ respecting these distinctions,--we may say that +justice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in itself; but +this judgement has practical efficiency only as one of the terms takes +the form of the most agreeable. But we have seen that the most agreeable +depends upon the state of the sensitivity in correlation with the +object,--a state and a correlation antecedent to action; and that +therefore it is a necessary law of our being, to be determined by the +greatest apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not +only in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of +action. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can +act. + +VII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an +effort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course +cannot resist his passions, or introduce any intellectual or moral +discipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake +any enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged, +or not part or consequent of the same. + +If he effect any change directly in the habitual character of his +volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, he must will different +from his actual will,--his will must oppose itself in its own act: but +this is absurd, the system itself being judge. As, therefore, the will +cannot oppose itself, a new volition can be obtained only by presenting +a new motive; but this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is +to call up new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state +of the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering +under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself must be +changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a change must take +place both of subject and object, for the motive lies in the correlation +of the two. But the volition to call up new objects and circumstances in +relation to some principle of the mind that had been slumbering,--for +example, fear, must itself have a motive; but the motive to call up +objects of fear must preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then +of necessity the volition to call up objects of fear will take place; +and, it will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the +actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such motive +pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a new motive, to +cause the choice of objects of fear; and here would be a recurrence of +the original difficulty,--and so on, ad infinitum. + +If the problem be to effect a change in the state of the mind in +relation to existing objects, in the first place, this cannot be +effected by a direct act of will, for the act of will is caused by the +state of mind, and this would be an effect changing or annihilating its +cause. + +Nor can it be done indirectly. For to do it indirectly, would be to +bring influences to bear upon the state of mind or the sensitivity; but +the choice and volition of these influences would require a motive--but +the motive to change the state of mind must pre-exist in the state of +mind itself. And thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility +of finding a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its +change. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a change, +but a new developement of the long chain of the necessary causes and +volitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we must find a motive +to change the state of mind in order to a change of the state: but this +motive, if it exist, must pre-exist in the state of mind. If it +pre-exist, then no change is required; if it do not; then we must seek +still an antecedent motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the +problem be to change both subject and object, the same difficulties +exist in two-fold abundance. + +The grand difficulty is to find a _primum mobile_, or first mover, when +the very act of seeking implies a _primum mobile_, which the conditions +of the act deny. + +Any new discipline, therefore, intellectual or moral, a discipline +opposite to that which the present state of the mind would naturally and +necessarily bring about, is impossible. + +Of course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to deny or mortify +one's self. The present volition is as the strongest present +desire--indeed, is the strongest present desire itself. "Will and desire +do not run counter at all." "A man never in any instance, wills anything +contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will." (p. +17.) Hence to restrain a present passion would be to will against +will--would be to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may +be relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome the +weaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the man; it is +utterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance, for his whole +power, activity, and volition, are in the desire itself. + +He can do nothing but will; and the nature and direction of his +volitions are, at least in reference to any effort of his own, immutable +as necessity itself. + +VIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call upon the man to bestir +himself, to think, to plan, to act, are inconsistent and absurd. In all +such exhortations and persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth +volitions, as if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It +may be replied, 'that the man does will, that the volitions are his +volitions.' But then he wills only passively, and these volitions are +his only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort and +persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his real +condition according to this system? The exhortations and persuasions do +themselves contain the motive power: and instead of arousing himself to +action, he is absolutely and necessarily passive under the motives you +present. Whether he be moved or not, as truly and absolutely depends +upon the motives you present, as the removing of any material mass +depends upon the power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether +it be wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse itself +as the man; and the man's volition is his volition in no other sense +than the motion of the material mass is its motion. In the one case, the +man perceives; and in the other case, the material mass does not +perceive--but perception is granted by all parties to be necessary; the +addition of perception, therefore, only modifies the character of the +being moved, without altering the nature of his relation to the power +which moves him. In the material mass, too, we have an analogous +property, so far as motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine +the will unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power +move the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of parts. If I +have but the wisdom to discover the proper correlation of object and +sensitivity in the case of individuals or of masses of men, I can +command them in any direction I please, with a necessity no less +absolute than that with which a machine is caused to work by the +application of a steam or water-power. + +When I bring motives before the minds of my fellow-beings in the proper +relation, the volition is necessarily produced; but let me not forget, +that in bringing these motives I put forth volitions, and that of course +I am myself moved under the necessity of some antecedent motive. My +persuasions and exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as +necessary antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the +wheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and +persuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must yield when +the motives are properly selected. + +IX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when obeyed and yielded to, +are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary force which they possess in +relation to the state of mind to which they are addressed. When not +obeyed and yielded to, they fail necessarily, through a moral inability +on the part of the mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want +of a proper correlation between them and the state of mind addressed: +that is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the +required volitions, and their existence of course is an utter +impossibility. + +Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce volitions of obedience +and submission, only as they produce the sense of the most agreeable; +and as the will of the creature can have no part in producing this +sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition, it is +produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a +positive necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that +no enlargement here is required. + +When no obedience and submission take place, it is because the divine +commands, warnings, and rebukes, do not produce the sense of the most +agreeable. And as the will of the creature can have no part in producing +this sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition; and +as it is produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by +a positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have no +part in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition of +obedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations of the +antecedent correlations of certain objects with the subject, and are +necessarily determined by the nature of the correlation. + +Now the Divine Being must know the precise relation which his commands +will necessarily hold to the vast variety of mind to which they are +addressed, and consequently must know in what cases obedience will be +produced, and in what cases disobedience. Both results are equally +necessary. The commands have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a +two-fold office. When they come into connexion with certain states of +mind, they necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in +connexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly produce +what we call rebellion: and as all volitions are predetermined and fixed +by a necessary and infinite wisdom, and are therefore in their time and +place the best, it must follow that rebellion no less than obedience is +a wise and desirable result. + +The consequences I am here deducing seem almost too shocking to utter. +But show me, he that can, that they are not logical deductions from this +system? I press the system to its consequences,--not to throw any +reproach upon those great and good men who unfortunately were led away +by a false philosophy, but to expose and bring to its close this +philosophy itself. It has too long been consecrated by its association +with the good. I know I shall be justified in the honest, though bold +work, of destroying this unnatural and portentous alliance. + +X. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of retribution cannot, +according to this system, have a real and necessary connexion with any +volitions, but must be regarded as prejudices or errors of education, +from which philosophy will serve to relieve us. + +Edwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that virtue and vice lie +essentially in the volitions themselves, and that of course the +consciousness of evil volitions is the consciousness of guilt. I will, +or put forth volitions. The volitions are mine, and therefore I am +guilty. This reasoning is plausible, but not consequential; for, +according to this system, I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the +volitions appear necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my +consciousness, and really are mine only because they are produced in me. +Connected with this may be the perception that those volitions are +wrong; but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary, +and that to suppose them different from what they are, is to suppose +what could not possibly have been,--since a series of sequents and +antecedents connect these volitions which now appear, by absolutely +necessary relations, with a first and necessary cause,--then the sense +of guilt and shame, and the judgement I ought to be punished, can have +no place in the human mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will, +and, according to the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when +I will wrong,--if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will +under the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent motive. +The common judgement of mankind is an error, and philosophy must soon +dissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and of moral desert, which have +hitherto annoyed me and made me fearful: and much more must such a +result ensue, when I take into consideration, likewise, that the +necessity which determines me, is a necessity which takes its rise in +infinite and necessary wisdom. + +What is true of guilt and retribution is true also of well-doing and +reward. If I do well, the volitions being determined by an antecedent +necessity, I could not possibly have done otherwise. It does not answer +the conditions of the case at all, to say I might have done otherwise, +if I had willed to do otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am +doing, is a will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in +any action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the conviction that +the choice of this action was a necessary choice, predetermined in a +long and unbroken chain of necessary antecedents, and the sense of +praiseworthiness, and the judgement I ought to be rewarded, remain no +longer. + +Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with our volitions, under +the impression that the good we perform, we perform in opposition to +temptation, and with the power and possibility of doing evil; and that +the evil we perform, we perform in opposition to motives of good, and +with the power and possibility of doing good. But when we are informed +that all the power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual +conduct is this,--that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there +would have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the +volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been +otherwise,--we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We perhaps are +first led to doubt the philosophy,--or if, by acute reasonings, or by +the authority of great names, we are influenced to yield an implicit +belief,--the sense of merit and demerit must either die away, or be +maintained by a hasty retreat from the regions of speculation to those +of common sense. + +XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature and spirit, as causes +or agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations. + +There are three classes of natural causes or agents generally +acknowledged 1. Inanimate,--as water, wind, steam, magnetism, &c.; 2. +Animate, but insensible,--as the life and affinities of plants; 3. +Animate and sensitive, or brute animal power. + +These all properly come under the denomination of _natural_, because +they are alike _necessitated_. "Whatever is comprised in the chain and +mechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its +necessity in some other thing antecedent or concurrent,--this is said to +be _natural_; and the aggregate and system of all such things is +_nature_." Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this system, comes under +the same definition: in all its acts it is necessitated. It is in will +particularly that man is taken as a cause or agent, because it is by +will that he directly produces phenomena or effects; and by this system +it is not possible to distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is +considered, a chain of antecedents and sequents made up of motives, +volitions, and the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents +and antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of natural +agents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and distinguishing +characteristics; but in the relation of antecedence and sequence,--their +relation as causes or agents producing effects,--no distinction can be +perceived. Wind, water, &c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms +another; brute organization and sensitivity another; intelligent +volition another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and +therefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of nature. +The difference which exists between them is a difference of terms +merely. There is no difference in the nature of the relation between the +terms. The nature of the relation between the water-wheel and the +water,--of the relation between the organic life of plants and their +developement,--of the relation between passion and volition in +brutes,--of the relation between their efforts and material +effects,--and the nature of the relation between motive and +volition,--are one: it is the relation of cause and effect considered as +stated antecedent and sequent, and no more and no less necessary in one +subject than in another. + +XII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by external objects, +and all emotions following perception, and all the acts of the +intelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or in ratiocination, are as +really our acts, and acts for which we are as really responsible, if +responsibility be granted to exist, as acts of volition. Sensations, +emotions, perceptions, reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in +our consciousness; they are not created by our volitions, like the +motions of the hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just +as volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to all +is precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of these +affections of his being; he is simply the subject: the subject of +sensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning, and of volition; and +he is the subject of all by the same necessity. + +XIII. The system of punishment is only a system accommodated to the +opinions of society. + +There is nothing evil in itself, according to this system of necessity, +as we have already shown. Every thing which takes place is, in its time, +place, and relations generally, the necessary result of necessary and +infinite wisdom. But still it is a fact that society are desirous of +preventing certain acts,--such as stealing, adultery, murder, &c.; and +they are necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere +collection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the emotion +of fear, which prevent the commission of these acts. Where these acts do +take place, it is best they should take place; but where they are +prevented by the fear of punishment, it is best they should be +prevented. Where the criminal suffers, he has no right to complain, +because it is best that he should suffer; and yet, if he does complain, +it is best that he should complain. The system of punishment is good, as +every thing else is good. The system of divine punishments must be +considered in the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when +properly considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in +the pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events. + +XIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there cannot really be any +calamity. The calamities which we may at any time experience, we ought +to endure and rejoice in, as flowing from the same perfect and necessary +source. But as calamity does nevertheless necessarily produce suffering +and uneasiness, and the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope +that perfect relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that +the final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the present +suffering. + +The necessitarian may be an optimist of a high order. It he commits what +is called crime, and remorse succeeds, and punishment is inflicted under +law, the crime is good, the remorse is good, the punishment is good, all +necessary and good, and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure +happiness. Nothing can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but +even this will probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all +afflictions: they must be good in themselves, although disagreeable, +--and will probably lead the way to the agreeable, just as +hunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way to the +enjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity, and of a +necessary and perfect wisdom. + +XV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary and perfect wisdom, +there really can no more be folly in conduct, or error in reasoning and +belief, than there can be crime and calamity, considered as evils in +themselves. Every act that we call folly is a necessary act, in its +time, place, and relations generally, and is a necessary consequence of +the infinite wisdom; but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom +cannot be opposed to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when +philosophically considered, ceases to be folly. + +In any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem necessary, and the +assent of the mind is necessary. This is granted by all parties. But it +must be admitted, that when men are said to reason falsely, and to yield +their assent to false conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them; +and, according to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem +otherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary. + +The reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning, because it so +necessarily seems to them; but to the individual to whom it seems +different, it must really be different, and be good and valid reasoning. + +Again: as all these different reasonings and beliefs proceed necessarily +from the same source, they must all be really true where they seem true, +and all really false where they seem false. It would follow, from this, +that no one can really be in a false position except the hypocrite and +sophist, pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and +what he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false +conclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were we not +compelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite and sophist +cannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his position is a necessary +one, predetermined in its necessary connexion with the first necessary +wisdom. + +XVI. Another consequence of this system is fatalism,--or, perhaps, more +properly speaking, the system is itself a system of fatalism. + +This, indeed, has already been made to appear substantially. The word, +however, has not yet been used. I here, then, charge directly this +consequence or feature upon the system. + +Fatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This system is fatalism, +because it is the absolute negation of liberty. + +No liberty is contended for, in this system, in relation to man, but +physical liberty: viz. that when he wills, the effect will follow,--that +when he wills to walk, he walks, &c. "Liberty, as I have explained it, +is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he +pleases, or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure, +without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is." (p. 291.) + +In the first place, this is no higher liberty than what brutes possess. +They have power, opportunity, or advantage, to do as they please. +Effects follow their volitions by as certain a law as effects follow the +volitions of men. + +In the second place, this is no higher liberty than slaves possess. +Slaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive be the lash, or the +fear of the lash, still, in their case as well as in that of brutes +under similar circumstances, the volition which takes place is the most +pleasing at the moment. The slave and the animal do what is most +pleasing to them, or do according to their pleasure, When the one drags +the plough and the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal, +rational or irrational, to act without doing what is most pleasing to +him or it. Volition is always as the greatest apparent good, or as the +sense of the most pleasant or agreeable. + +If any should reply that slaves and animals are _liable_ to be fettered, +and this distinguishes them from the free, I rejoin that every being is +liable to various restraints; none of us can do many things which in +themselves appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there +were known to be an established connexion between them and our wills. We +are limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us; we cannot +overturn mountains, or command the winds. We are limited in the nature +of our physical being. We are limited by our want of wealth, knowledge, +and influence. In all these respects, we may, with as much propriety as +the slave, be regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say +that, as we never really will what we know to be impossible or +impracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or a want +of liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to the fettered +slave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows it to be +impossible. But in relation to him as well as to every other being, +according to this system it holds true, that whether he act or forbear +to act, his volitions are as the most agreeable. + +All creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are to be accounted free, +and one really as free as another. + +In the third place, the liberty here affirmed belongs equally to every +instance of stated antecedence and sequence. + +The liberty which is taken to reside in the connexion between volition +and effects, is a liberty lying in a connexion of stated antecedence and +sequence, and is perfect according as this connexion is necessary and +unimpeded. The highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the +most absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also +with power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where power is +the greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most obstacles and moves +on irresistibly to its effects, there is the greatest degree of liberty. +God is the most free of all beings, because nothing can impede his will. +His volitions are always the antecedents of effects. + +But obviously we do not alter the relation, when we change the terms. If +liberty lie in the stated antecedence of volition to effects, and if +liberty is measured by the necessity of the relation, then when the +antecedent is changed, the relation remaining the same, liberty must +still be present. For example: when a volition to move the arm is +followed by a motion of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be +substituted for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place; +and as freedom is doing as we please, or will, "without considering how +this pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;" that is, without taking +its motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be affirmed to be +doing according to the galvanic impulse, "without considering how" that +impulse "comes to be as it is." + +If we take any other instance of stated antecedence and sequence, the +reasoning is the same. For example, a water wheel in relation to the +mill-stone: when the wheel turns, the mill-stone moves. In this case +freedom may be defined: the mill-stone moving according to the turn of +the wheel, "without considering how" that turn of the wheel "comes to be +as it is." In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing +according to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes +to be as it is; doing "according to choice, without taking into the +meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice." (p. 39.) + +If it be said that in the case of volition, we have the man of whom to +affirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel and mill-stone, we have +nothing of which liberty can properly be affirmed. I reply, that liberty +must be affirmed, and is properly affirmed, of that to which it really +belongs; and hence as volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual +essence, man; and this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because +volition appears in it, and is attended by consequences:--so, likewise, +the material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because motion +belongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every being that has +volition is free, so likewise every thing that hath motion is free:--in +every instance of cause and effect, we meet with liberty. + +But volition cannot be the characteristic of liberty, if volition itself +be governed by necessity: and yet this system which affirms liberty, +wherever there is unimpeded volition, makes volition a necessary +determination. In the fact of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to +all creatures that have volition; and then again, in the fact of the +necessary determination of volition it destroys the possibility of +liberty. But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new +feature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between volition +and its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary and absolute as +the connexion between the motive and the volition, and between any +antecedent and sequent whatever. That my arm should move when I make a +volition to this effect, is just as necessary and just as +incomprehensible too, as that water should freeze at a given +temperature: when the volition is impeded, we have only another instance +of necessity,--a lesser force overcome by a greater. + +The liberty therefore which this system affirms in the fact of volition +and its unimpeded connexion with its consequents, is an assumption--a +mere name. It is a part of the universal necessity arbitrarily +distinguished and named, its liberty does not reside in human volition, +so neither can it reside in the divine volition. The necessary +dependence of volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of +effects upon volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind +than from ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the +universal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically considered. +The creation of volition by volition is absurd in itself--it cannot but +be an absurdity. The determination of will by the strongest motive, if a +truth is a truth universally; on this system, it contains the whole +cause and possibility of volition. The whole liberty of God, it is +affirmed, is contained in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other +words, that what he wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished: +what pleases him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His +liberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from +necessity. + +If the movements of mind are necessary, no argument is required to prove +that all being and events are necessary. We are thus bound up in a +universal necessity. Whatever is, is, and cannot be otherwise, and could +not have been otherwise. As therefore there is no liberty, we are +reduced to the only remaining alternative of fatalism. + +Edwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the charge of fatalism. +(part iv. Sec. vi.) In relation to the Stoics, he remarks:--"It seems they +differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of _fate_ as +maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But +whatever their doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is +repugnant to any _liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,_ I +utterly deny such a fate." He objects to fatalism only when it should +deny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our sense of the +most agreeable, that is our volition. But this connexion we have fully +proved to be as necessary as the connexion between the volition and its +motive. This reservation therefore does not save him from fatalism. + +In the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents the liberty and +sovereignty of God as consisting in an ability "to do whatever pleases +him." His idea of the divine liberty, therefore, is the same as that +attributed to man. That the divine volitions are necessarily determined, +he repeatedly affirms, and indeed represents as the great excellence of +the divine nature, because this necessity of determination is laid in +the infinite wisdom and perfection of his nature. + +If necessity govern all being and events, it is cheering to know that it +is necessity under the forms of infinite wisdom and benevolence. But +still it remains true that necessity governs. If "it is no disadvantage +or dishonour to a being, _necessarily_ to act in the most excellent and +happy manner from the necessary perfection of his own nature," still let +us remember that under this representation _he does act necessarily_. +Fate must have some quality or form; it must be what we call good or +evil: but in determining its quality, we do not destroy its nature. Now +if we call this fate a nature of goodness and wisdom, eternal and +infinite, we present it under forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but +it is nevertheless fate,--and as such it governs the divine volitions; +and through the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of +these volitions;--the universe of being and things is determined by +fate;--and all volitions of angels or men are determined by fate--by +this fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all things thus +_proceeding_ from fate were beautiful, benign, and glorious, the theory +might not alarm us. But that deformity, crime, and calamity should have +place as developements of this fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of +this system, however, may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion +that deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but of +the limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance in point +in Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as "a very learned and +pious disciple of Leibnitz." Says Bonnet--"Thus the same chain embraces +the physical and moral world, binds the past to the present, the present +to the future, the future to eternity. That wisdom which has ordained +the existence of this chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of +which it is composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is +of iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of gold. +_Both_ are necessary parts of one whole, which could not but exist. +Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? What absurdity! +God esteems this link at its proper value. He sees it in its cause, and +he approves this cause, for it is good. God beholds moral monsters as he +beholds physical monsters. Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy +if he know that he is _only fortunate_. He has attained the highest +degree of moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing +that what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must +occupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of this +system; the simile of the potter is its summary." He might have added, +"Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not guilty, but at +worst _only unfortunate;_ and really not unfortunate, because holding a +necessary place in the chain which both as a whole and in its parts, is +the result of infinite wisdom." + +If anything more is required in order to establish this consequence of +the system we are examining, I would call attention to the inquiry, +whether after a contingent self-determining will there remains any +theory of action except fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is +a will which is the cause of its own volitions or choices--a +self-conscious power, self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its +choice, or movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of +choosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what conception +have we to oppose to this but that of a will not determining +itself,--not the cause of its own volitions,--a power not self-moved and +directed,--and not conscious of ability at the moment of a particular +choice, to make a contrary choice? And this last conception is a will +whose volitions are determined by some power antecedent to itself, not +contingently, but necessarily. As the will is the only power for which +contingent self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such +power, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and +causality will then be expressed as follows: + +1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and volitions. 2. +Absolute and necessary connexion of volitions and effects. 3. Absolute +and necessary connexion of all sequents and antecedents in nature. 4. +Absolute and necessary connexion of all things existent with a first and +necessary principle or cause. 5. The necessary determination of this +principle or cause. + +Denying a contingent self-determining will, this theory is all that +remains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in the 2d particular of this +theory, it becomes a mere arbitrary designation, because the _nature_ of +the relation is granted to be the same; it is not _contingent_, but +necessary. Nor can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in +the first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a +contingent self-determining will, by infinite series of volitions, must +apply to this great first principle considered as God. And in the second +place, the doctrine of the necessary determination of motive must apply +here likewise, since God as will and intelligence requires motives no +less than we do. Such determination is represented as arising from the +very nature of mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to +a self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as opposed +to necessity. And this is all that can be meant by fatalism. Liberty +thus becomes a self-contradictory conception, and fatalism alone is +truth and reality. + +XVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a fair deduction from +this system. + +According to this system, God is the sole and universal doer--the only +efficient cause. 1. His volition is the creative act, by which all +beings and things exist. Thus far it is generally conceded that God is +all in all. "By him we live, and move, and have our being." 2. The +active powers of the whole system of nature he has constituted and +regulated. The winds are his messengers. The flaming fire his servant. +However we may conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting +under necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy, +in either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to God. +These movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are executed directly +or indirectly by his will. Every effect which we produce in the material +world, we produce by instrumentality. Our arms, hands, &c. are our first +instruments. All that we do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute +to ourselves. Now if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of +an axe, spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the +same way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we multiply the +instruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do the deed directly +with my hand, or do it by an instrument held in my hand, or by a +concatenation of machinery, reaching from "the centre to the utmost +pole,"--if I contemplate the deed, and designedly accomplish it in this +way, the deed is mine. And not only is the last deed contemplated as the +end of all this arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements +produced as the necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the +last is to be attained, are mine likewise. + +I use powers and instruments whose energy and capacity I have learned by +experience, but in whose constitution I have had no hand. They are +provided for me, and I merely use them. But God in working by these, +works by what his own wisdom and power have created; and therefore _a +fortiori_ must every effect produced by these, according to his design, +and by his volition as at least the first power of the series, be +attributed to him,--be called his doing. He causeth the sun to rise and +set. "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the +service of man." "He watereth the hills from his chambers." This is not +merely poetry. It is truth. + +Now the system we are considering goes one step further; it makes human +volitions as much the objects of the eternal design, and as really the +effects of the divine volition, as the rising of the stars, the flight +of the lightning, the tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth +itself like a garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is +God's act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every +volition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a +pre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents necessarily +runs back and connects itself with the infinite wisdom. God's volition +is his own act; the effect immediately produced by that volition is his +own deed. Let that effect be the creation of man: the man in all his +powers and susceptibilities is God's work; the objects around him are +God's work; the correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man +is God's work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result +of this correlation is God's work. The volition of the man is as +strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common apprehensions, +the blow which I give with an axe is attributable to me. What is true of +the first man, must be equally true of the man removed by a thousand +generations, for the intermediary links are all ordained by God under an +inevitable necessity. God is really, therefore, the sole doer--the only +efficient, the only cause. All beings and things, all motion and all +volition, are absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the +author of all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the +author of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all in the +same way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining will, and +there is no stopping-place between a human volition and the divine +volition. The human volition is but the divine, manifested through a +lengthened it may be, but a connected and necessary chain of antecedents +and sequents. I see no way of escaping from this, as a necessary and +legitimate consequence of the necessary determination of will. And what +is this consequence but pantheism? God is the universal and +all-pervading intelligence--the universal and only power. Every movement +of nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because +necessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There is no +life but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He is the soul +of the world. + +Spinosa never represented himself as an atheist, and according to the +following representation appears rather as a pantheist. "He held that +God is the _cause_ of all things; but that he acts, not from choice, but +from necessity; and, of consequence, that he is the involuntary author +of all the good and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human +life." (Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.) + +Cousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather the reproach of +pantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was fairly deduced from the +doctrine of necessary determination, which he advocated. + +XVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an atheist. "It will +not be disputed," says Stewart, "by those who comprehend the drift of +his reasonings, that in point of practical tendency atheism and +Spinosism are one and the same." + +The following is Cousin's view of his system. It apparently differs from +the preceding in some respects, but really tends to the same +conclusions. + +"Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought to be reproached for +an error in the other direction. Spinosa starts from the perfect and +infinite being of Descartes's system, and easily demonstrates that such +a being is alone a being in itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect, +and relative, only participates of being, without possessing it, in +itself: that a being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one +substance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal existence: +that to call phenomena, finite substances, is affirming and denying, at +the same time; whereas, there being, but one substance which possesses +being in itself, and the finite being that which participates of +existence without possessing it in itself, a substance finite implies +two contradictory notions. Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and +nature are pure phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute +substance, but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for +as phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without the +perfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature suppose +God; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without phenomena, the +perfect without the imperfect, the infinite without the finite, and God +on his part supposes man and nature. The error of his system lies in the +predominance of the relation of phenomenon to being, of attribute to +substance, over the relation of effect to cause. When man has been +represented, not as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and +uncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought; God, or +the supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance, and not a +cause--a being, perfect, infinite, necessary--the immutable substance of +the universe, and not its producing and creating cause. In Cartesianism, +the notion of substance figures more conspicuously than that of cause; +and this notion of substance, altogether predominating, constitutes +Spinosism." (Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.) + +The predominance of the notion of substance and attribute, over that of +cause and effect, which Cousin here pronounces the vice of Spinosa's +system, is indeed the vice of every system which contains the dogma of +the necessary determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism; +the second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When self +-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into mere +desire, necessitated in all its acts from its pre-constituted +correlation with objects, then will really ceases to be a cause. It +becomes an instrument of antecedent power, but is no power in itself, +creative or productive. The reasoning employed in reference to the human +will, applies in all its force to the divine will, as has been already +abundantly shown. The divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and +becomes a mere instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is +the infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom is +eternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what tendencies +or energies it has now, it always had; and therefore, whatever volitions +it now necessarily produces, it always necessarily produced. If we +conceive a volition to have been, in one direction, the immediate and +necessary antecedent of creation; and, in another, the immediate and +necessary sequent of infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then +this volition must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as +the necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The +eternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because this is +existence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and creation, +consisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite, participating only +of existence, and not being existence in themselves, are not substances, +but phenomena. But what is the relation of the phenomena to the +substance? Not that of effect to cause;--this relation slides entirely +out of view, the moment will ceases to be a cause. It is the relation +simply of phenomena to being, considered as the necessary and +inseparable manifestations of being; the relation of attributes to +substance, considered as the necessary and inseparable properties of +substance. We cannot conceive of substance without attributes or +phenomena, nor of attributes or phenomena without substance; they are, +therefore, co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and +its attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the universe, +as made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is Spinosism; this +is pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate consequence of a +necessitated will. + +The second consequence is atheism. In the denial of will as a cause _per +se_,--in resolving all its volitions into the necessary phenomena of the +eternal substance,--we destroy personality: we have nothing remaining +but the universe. Now we may call the universe God; but with equal +propriety we call God the universe. This destruction of +personality,--this merging of God into necessary substance and +attributes,--is all that we mean by Atheism. The conception is really +the same, whether we name it fate, pantheism, or atheism. + +The following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that he arrived at the +same result: "Whatever may have been the doctrines of some of the +ancient atheists about man's free agency, it will not be denied that, in +the history of modern philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of +necessity have been hitherto always connected together. Not that I would +by any means be understood to say, that every necessitarian must _ipso +facto_ be an atheist, or even that any presumption is afforded, by a +man's attachment to the former sect, of his having the slightest bias in +favour of the latter; but only that every modern atheist I have heard of +has been a necessitarian. I cannot help adding, that the most consistent +necessitarian who have yet appeared, have been those who followed out +their principles till they ended in _Spinosism_,--a doctrine which +differs from atheism more in words than in reality." (Vol. 6, p. 470.) + +Cudworth, in his great work entitled "The true Intellectual System of +the Universe," shows clearly the connexion between fatalism and atheism. +This work seems to have grown out of another undertaking, which +contemplated specifically the question of liberty and necessity, and its +bearing upon morality and religion. The passage in the preface, in which +he informs us of his original plan, is a very full expression of his +opinion. "First, therefore, I acknowledge," says he, "that when I +engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and +necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of +all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles +maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of atheism, and +undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and +blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgement +ridiculous." This opinion of the tendency of the doctrine of a +necessitated will, is the germ of his work. The connexion established in +his mind between this doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his +masterly and elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter. + +The arguments of many atheists might be referred to, to illustrate the +connexion between necessity and atheism. I shall here refer, however, to +only one individual, remarkable both for his poetic genius and +metaphysical acumen. I mean the late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly +and unblushingly professed atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line: +"There is no God." In a note upon this line, he remarks: "This negation +must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of +a pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains unshaken." +This last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really the negation of a +creative Deity,--the identity or at least necessary and eternal +co-existence of God and the universe. Shelley has expressed this clearly +in another passage: + + "Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power, + Necessity! thou mother of the world!" + +In a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued the doctrine of the +necessary determination of will by motive, with an acuteness and power +scarcely inferior to Collins or Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different +application of the doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and +Edwards, and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil +under insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base religion +upon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a fog of +subtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly consistent, is +perfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from necessity to pantheism, and +thence to atheism and the destruction of all moral distinctions. "We are +taught," he remarks, "by the doctrine of necessity, that there is +neither good nor evil in the universe, otherwise than as the events to +which we apply these epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of +being. Still less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine +of necessity accord with the belief of a future state of punishment." + +I here close my deductions from this system. If these deductions be +legitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they are, then, to the largest +class of readers, the doctrine of necessity is overthrown: it is +overthrown by its consequences, and my argument has the force of a +_reductio ad absurdum_. If a self-determined will appear an absurdity, +still it cannot be as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine +involve the consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will +claim that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral +and responsible nature. + +A question will here very naturally arise: How can we account for the +fact that so many wise and good men have contended for a necessitated +will, as if they were contending for the great basis of all morality and +religion? For example, take Edwards himself as a man of great thought +and of most fervent piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with +the air and manner of one who is opposing great errors as really +connected with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the +following language: "I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a +_contingent self-determination of the will_, as necessary to the +morality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably +pernicious; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important +truths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary +to be known." The question is a fair one, and I will endeavour to answer +it. + +1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as being in itself a +contradictory idea, and as leading to the consequence of affirming the +existence of effects without causes, takes strong hold of the mind in +these individuals. This I believe, and hope to prove in the course of +this treatise, to be a philosophical error;--but it is no new thing for +great and good men to fall into philosophical errors. + +As, therefore, the liberty consisting in a self-determining will, or the +_liberty of indifference_, as it has been technically called, is +conceived to be exploded, they endeavour to supply a _liberty of +spontaneity_, or a liberty lying in the unimpeded connexion between +volition and sequents. + +Hobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in a clearer manner than +any of its advocates: "I conceive," says he, "liberty to be rightly +defined,--the absence of all impediments to action, that are not +contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for +example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or is said to have +liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no +impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments: +and though water cannot ascend, yet men never say, it wants the +_liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the +impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we +say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment +is not in him, but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is +sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself,"--that is, he wants +the faculty or power of going:--this constitutes natural _inability_. +Liberty is volition acting upon physical instrumentalities, or upon +mental faculties, according to a fixed and constituted law of +antecedents, and meeting with no impediment or overcoming antagonistic +power. Natural ability is the fixed and constituted antecedence itself. +Hence there may be natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot +be affirmed without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute +responsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated antecedent +of certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent existing without +impediment or frustration. Since this is the only possible liberty +remaining, and as they have no wish to be considered fatalists, they +enlarge much upon this; not only as the whole of liberty actually +existing, but as the full and satisfactory notion of liberty. + +In basing responsibility and praise and blameworthiness upon this +liberty, an appeal is made to the common ideas, feelings, and practices +of men. Every man regards himself as free when he does as he +pleases,--when, if he pleases to walk, he walks,--when, if he pleases to +sit down, he sits down, &c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to +plead in excuse that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed +to do it, the judge would reply--"this is your guilt, that you pleased +or willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to commit it +was the very doing of it." Now all this is just. I readily admit that we +are free when we do as we please, and that we are guilty when, in doing +as we please, we commit a crime. + +Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty sufficient to constitute +responsibility? And thus the whole difficulty seems to be got over. The +reasoning would be very fair, as far as it goes, if employed against +fatalists, but amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold +to the self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these +common ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative of +freedom, because they raise no question against human freedom. The real +question at issue is, how are we to account for these facts? The +advocates of self-determining power account for them by referring them +to a self-determined will. We say a man is free when he does as he +pleases or according to his volitions, and has the sense of freedom in +his volitions, because he determines his own volitions; and that a man +is guilty for crime, if committed by his volition, because he determined +this volition, and at the very moment of determining it, was conscious +of ability to determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that +a man is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words, +makes a volition without any impediment between it and its object,--he +is free, if he make the volition without producing effects by it: +volition itself is the act of freedom. But how do those who deny a +self-determining power account for these facts? They say that the +volition is caused by a motive antecedent to it, but that nevertheless, +inasmuch as the man feels that he is free and is generally accounted so, +he must be free; for liberty means nothing more than "power and +opportunity to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, +without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the _cause_ of +that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a +volition,"--that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so, when +he does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by freedom. + +But suppose the objection be brought up, that the definition of liberty +here given is assumed, arbitrary, and unsatisfactory; and that the sense +or consciousness of freedom in the act of volition, and the common +sentiments and practices of men in reference to voluntary action, are +not adequately accounted for,--then the advocates of necessitated +volition return to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other +definition,--and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom does +exist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally correspond to +it, we must believe that we are free when volition is unimpeded in its +connexion with sequents, and that we are blame or praiseworthy, +according to the perceived character of our volitions,--although it +cannot but be true that the volitions themselves are necessary. On the +one hand, they are compelled by their philosophy to deny a +self-determining will. On the other hand, they are compelled, by their +moral sense and religious convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and +responsibility. In order to do this, however, a _quasi_ liberty must be +preserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity, by +referring the first exclusively to the connexion between volition and +its sequents, and the second exclusively to the connexion between the +volition and its antecedents or motives. Liberty is physical; necessity +is metaphysical. The first belongs to man; the second transcends the +sphere of his activity, and, is not his concern. In this very difficult +position, no better or more ingenious solution could be devised; but +that it is wholly illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from +absolute and universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved. + +2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are speaking, conceive that +when volitions are supposed to exist out of the necessary determination +of motives, they exist fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up +the necessary and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would +be to place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,--it would +destroy the great _a posteriori_ argument for the existence of a God. Of +course it would be the destruction of all morality and religion. + +3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in particular, is much +insisted upon as incompatible with contingent volitions. Divine +foreknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events certain and necessary. +Hence volitions are necessary; and, to carry out the reasoning, it must +be added likewise that the connexion between volitions and their +sequents is equally necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition +as well as the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the +_name_ of liberty, because it fears the designation which properly +belongs to it. + +4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of God and the harmony of +his government are preserved. His volitions are determined by his +infinite wisdom. The world, therefore, must be ruled in truth and +righteousness. + +These philosophers and divines thus represent to themselves the theory +of a self-determining will as an absurdity in itself, and, if granted to +be true, as involving the most monstrous and disastrous consequences, +while the theory which they advocate is viewed only in its favourable +points, and without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If +these consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be +evaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and the +sense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be urged as a +consequence, of this theory, the ready reply is invariably--"No such +necessity is maintained as goes to destroy the liberty which consists in +doing as one pleases;" or if the destruction of responsibility be urged +as a consequence, the reply is--"A man is always held a just subject of +praise or blame when he acts voluntarily." The argumentation undoubtedly +is as sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous. +They are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No wonder, +then, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion, they should by +every possible argument aim to sustain the philosophy which is supposed +to lie at their basis, and look away from consequences so destructive, +persuading themselves that these consequences are but the rampant +sophistries of infidelity. + +It is a wonderful fact in the history of philosophy, that the philosophy +of fate, pantheism, and atheism, should be taken as the philosophy of +religion. Good men have misapprehended the philosophy, and have +succeeded in bringing it into fellowship with truth and righteousness. +Bad men and erring philosophers have embraced it in a clear +understanding of its principles, and have both logically reasoned out +and fearlessly owned its consequences. + +XIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition of liberty given by +the theologians above alluded to, is the only possible definition, it +must follow that the most commonly received modes of preaching the +truths and urging the duties of religion are inconsistent and +contradictory. + +A class of theologians has been found in the church, who, perhaps +without intending absolutely to deny human freedom, have denied all +ability on the part of man to comply with the divine precepts. A generic +distinction between inability and a want of freedom is not tenable, and +certainly is of no moment, where, as in this case, the inability +contended for is radical and absolute. + +These theologians clearly perceived, that if volition is necessarily +determined by motive, and if motive lies in the correlation of desire +and object, then, in a being totally depraved, or a being of radically +corrupt desires, there can be no ability to good deeds: the deed is as +the volition, and the volition is as the strongest desire or the sense +of the most agreeable. + +Hence these theologians refer the conversion of man exclusively to +divine influence. The man cannot change his own heart, nor employ any +means to that end; for this would imply a volition for which, according +to the supposition, he has no ability. + +Now, at the same time, that this class represent men as unable to love +and obey the truths of religion, they engage with great zeal in +expounding these truths to their minds, and in urging upon them the duty +of obedience. But what is the aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will +reply, I know the man cannot determine himself to obedience, but in +preaching to him, I am presenting motives which may influence him. But +in denying his ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving +him by motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by +supposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more, +therefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the sense of +the disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present objects to a +man's mind which are correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and +frequently you present them, the more you advance towards the sense of +the most agreeable or choice. So when you present objects which are not +correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present +them, the more you must advance towards the sense of the most +disagreeable, or positive refusal. + +If it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the presentation of truth +forms the occasion or condition on which the divine influence is exerted +for the regeneration of the heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man +to repent, and believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty +generally, and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly +unable to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections +and actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the divine +influence be exerted, which brings his heart into correlation with +religion, and makes it possible for him to put forth the volitions of +piety and duty? It can be regarded in no other light than playing a +solemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge and persuade, as if the man ought +to make some exertion when you feel convinced that exertion is +impossible. It certainly can form no occasion for divine interposition, +unless it be in pity of human folly. If you say that such a course does +succeed in the conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe +that your philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because +inconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system which +you know not, or understand not and deny. + +A total inability to do good makes man the passive subject of influences +to be employed for his regeneration, and he can no more be considered +active in effecting it than he is in the process of digesting food, or +in the curative action of medicines upon any diseased part of his +system. If you urge him to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge +him to put forth volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in +no sense possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least +commenced. + +I will go one step farther in this reasoning:--on supposition of total +inability, not only is the individual a passive subject of regenerating +influences, but he is also incapable of regeneration, or any disposition +or tendency towards regeneration, from any influences which lie merely +in motives, produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive, +according to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards's +system, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object standing in +correlation with the state of mind. Now the state of mind, in an +unregenerate state, is a state represented by this system itself, as +totally adverse to the objects of religion. Hence, there is no +conceivable array of religious truth, and no conceivable religious +exhortation and persuasion that could possibly come into such a relation +to this state of mind as to form the motive of a religious choice or +volition. It is perfectly plain, that before such a result could take +place, the state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the +array of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must +fail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state of mind, +so neither can the state of mind be changed by this array of truth or by +this exhortation. There is a positive opposition of mind and object, and +the collision becomes more severe upon every attempt to bring them +together. It must follow, therefore, that preaching truth and duty to +the unregenerate, so far from leading to their conversion, can only +serve to call out more actively the necessary determination, not to +obey. The very enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer +perception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the +disinclination. + +Nor can we pause in this consequence, at human instrumentality. It must +be equally true, that if divine interposition lies in the presentation +of truth and persuasions to duty, only that these are given with tenfold +light and power, it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of +producing any tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no +correlation with these,--its sense of the disagreeable,--and therefore +the energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and decided. + +If it should be remarked that hope and fear are feelings, which, even in +a state of unregeneracy, can be operated upon, the state of things is +equally difficult. No such hope can be operated upon as implies desire +after religious principles and enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the +corrupt nature; nor can any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of +the divine purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate +to danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security, +independently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these passions +might awaken attention, constrain to an outward obedience, and form a +very prudent conduct, but could effect no purification of the heart. + +There is another class of theologians, of whom Edwards is one, who +endeavour to escape the difficulties which attend a total inability, by +making the distinction of moral and natural inability:--man, they say, +is morally unable to do good, and naturally able to do good, and +therefore he can justly be made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke, +and exhortation. The futility of this distinction I cannot but think has +already been made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so +great stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in +this particular connexion. + +Moral inability, as we have seen, is the impossibility of a given +volition, because there are no motives or causes to produce it. It is +simply the impossibility of an effect for the want of a cause: when we +speak of moral cause and effect, according to Edwards, we speak of +nothing different from physical cause and effect, except in the quality +of the terms--the relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility +of a given volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting, +is equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a summer's +noon-tide.[1] + +When objects of volition are fairly presented, an inability to choose +them must lie in the state of the mind, sensitivity, desire, will, or +affections, for all these have the same meaning according to this +system. There is no volition of preference where there is no motive to +this effect; and there is no motive to this effect where the state of +the mind is not in correlation with the objects presented: on the +contrary, the volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal. + +Natural inability, as defined by this system, lies in the connexion +between the volition considered as an antecedent, and the effect +required. Thus I am naturally unable to walk, when, although I make the +volition, my limbs, through weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect +in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition, +or any impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural +inability.[2] According to this system, I am not held responsible for +anything which, through natural inability, cannot be accomplished, +although the volition is made. But now let us suppose that there is no +defect in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon +volition, and no impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that +there need be only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the +natural ability is complete:--I will to walk, and I walk. + +Now it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible for the doing of +anything, and can be fairly urged to do it when all that is necessary +for the doing of it is a volition although there may be a moral +inability to the volition itself. + +Nothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this distinction. If +liberty be essential to responsibility, liberty, as we have clearly +shown, can no more lie in the connexion between volition and its +effects, than in the connexion between volition and its motives. One is +just as necessary as the other. If it be granted to be absurd with the +first class of theologians to urge men to do right when they are +conceived to be totally unable to do right, it is equally so when they +are conceived to have only a natural ability to do right, because this +natural ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If +the volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the action; +nay, "the very willing is the doing of it;" but then the volition as an +effect cannot take place without a cause; and to acknowledge a moral +inability, is nothing less than to acknowledge that there is no cause to +produce the required volition. + +The condition of men as represented by the second class of theologians, +is not really different from their condition as represented by the first +class. The inability under both representations is a total inability. In +the utter impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter +impossibility of any good deed. + +When we have denied liberty, in denying a self-determining power, these +definitions in order to make out a _quasi_ liberty and ability, are +nothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception. + +You tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will; and when he replies to +you, that on your own principles the required volition is impossible, +you refer him to the common notions of mankind. According to these, you +say a man is guilty when he forbears to do right, since nothing is +wanting to right-doing but a volition,--and guilty when he does wrong, +because he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions, too, a +man may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is wanting but a +will to do right. But do we find this distinction of natural and moral +ability in the common notions of men? When nothing is required to the +performance of a deed but a volition, do men conceive of any inability +whatever? Do they not feel that the volition has a metaphysical +possibility as well as that the sequent of the volition has a physical +possibility? Have we not at least some reason to suspect that the +philosophy of responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion +lying in the common notions of men, are something widely different from +the scheme of a necessitated volition? + +This last class of theologians, equally with the first, derive all the +force of their preaching from a philosophy, upon which they are +compelled to act, but which they stoutly deny. Let them carry out their +philosophy, and for preaching no place remains. + +Preaching can produce good effects only by producing good volitions; and +good volitions can be produced only by good motives: but good motives +can exist under preaching only when the subjects of the preaching are +correlated with the state of mind. But by supposition this is not the +case, for the heart is totally depraved. + +To urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions in reference to his +regeneration, may consist with a self-determining power of will, but is +altogether irrelevant on this system. It is urging _him_ to do what _he_ +cannot do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do _in him_ as a +mere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite easy, +because nothing is required of him but to will, is equivalent to +assuring him that the affair is quite easy, because it will be done when +he has done it. The man may reply, the affair would indeed be quite easy +if there existed in me a motive to produce the volition; but as there +does not, the volition is impossible. And as I cannot put forth the +volition without the motive, so neither can I make the motive which is +to produce the volition--for then an effect would make its cause. What I +cannot do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from +heaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and duties, +and prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot take the +character of motives to influence my will, because they are not +agreeable to my heart. + +You indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that on your own +principles all your zeal and eloquence must necessarily have an opposite +effect from what you intend? My affections not being in correlation with +these subjects, the more you urge them, the more intense becomes my +sense of the most disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my +good friends, by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable +and ever-during chain. + +It is plainly impossible to escape from this conclusion, and yet +maintain the philosophy. All efforts of this kind, made by appealing to +the common sentiments of mankind, we have seen are self-contradictory. +It will not do to press forward the philosophy until involved in +difficulty and perplexity, and then to step aside and borrow arguments +from another system which is assumed to be overthrown. There is no +necessity more absolute and sovereign, than a logical necessity.[3] + +XVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards's system in the sections we +have been examining, from which the above consequences are deduced, are +the three following: + +1. The will is always determined by the strongest motive. + +2. The strongest motive is always "the most agreeable." + +3. The will is necessarily determined. + +I shall close this part of the present treatise with a brief examination +of the reasoning by which he endeavours to establish these points. + +The reasoning by which the first point is aimed to be established, is +the general reasoning respecting cause and effect. Volition is an +effect, and must have a cause. Its cause is the motive lying in the +correlation of mind and object. When several physical causes conflict +with each other, we call that the strongest which prevails and produces +its appropriate effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where +there are several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other, +we call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is not +opposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect; and in +this case we do not say the _strongest_ cause produces the effect, +because there is no comparison. So also there are cases in which there +is but one moral cause or motive present, when there being no +comparison, we cannot affirm that the volition is determined by the +_strongest_ motive: the doing of something may be entirely agreeable, +and the not doing of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the +motive is only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a +comparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the effect +which actually takes place, is produced by the strongest cause or +motive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a mere postulate, +as if we should say,--let a cause or motive producing effects be called +the strongest. It may be represented, also, as a _petitio principii_, or +reasoning in a circle,--since the proof that the will is determined by +the strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined. It +may be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest motive. How +do you know this? Because it is determined. How does this prove it? +Because that which determines it must be the strongest.[4] + +Edwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of volition. This +assumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to sustain, when he +argues against a self-determining will. If the will do not cause its own +volitions, then it must follow that motive is the cause. The argument +against a self-determining will we are about to take up. + +2. _The strongest motive is always the most agreeable_. Edwards +maintains that the motive which always prevails to cause volition, has +this characteristic,--that it is the most agreeable or pleasant at the +time, and that volition itself is nothing but the sense of the most +agreeable. If there should be but one motive present to the mind, as in +that case there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say +that the will is determined by _the agreeable_. + +But how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this +characteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case +may be? We can know it only by consulting our consciousness. If, +whenever we will, we find the sense of the most agreeable identified +with the volition, and if we are conscious of no power of willing, save +under this condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then +certainly there remains no farther question on this point. The +determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the +determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider. + +Does Edwards appeal to consciousness? + +He does,--but without formally announcing it. The following passage is +an appeal to consciousness, and contains Edwards's whole thought on this +subject: "There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the +sense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and +do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most +_agreeable to them_. To say that they do what _pleases_ them, but yet +what is not _agreeable_ to them, is the same thing as to say, they do +what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, +that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please." (p. +25.) Motives differ widely, intrinsically considered. Some are in +accordance with reason and conscience; some are opposed to reason and +conscience. Some are wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are +bad. But whatever may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this +characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it is by +this characteristic that their strength is measured. The appeal, +however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way to beg the very +point in question. Will not every one admit, that "when men act +_voluntarily and do what they please_, they do what suits them best, and +what is most agreeable to them?" Yes. Is it not a palpable +contradiction, to say that men "do what pleases them," and yet do "what +is not agreeable to them," according to the ordinary use of these words? +Certainly. + +But the point in question is, whether men, acting voluntarily, always do +what is pleasing to them: and this point Edwards assumes. He assumes it +here, and he assumes it throughout his treatise. We have seen that, in +his psychology, he identifies will and desire or the affections:--hence +volition is the prevailing desire or affection, and the object which +moves the _desire_ must of course appear _desirable_, or agreeable, or +pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men always will what they +most desire, and desire what they will, then of course when they act +voluntarily, they do what they please; and when they do what they +please, they do what suits them best and is most agreeable to them. + +Edwards runs the changes of these words with great plausibility, and we +must say deceives himself as well as others. The great point,--whether +will and desire are one,--whether the volition is as the most +agreeable,--he takes up at the beginning as an unquestionable fact, and +adheres to throughout as such; but he never once attempts an analysis of +consciousness in relation to it, adequate and satisfactory. His +psychology is an assumption. + +3. The will is necessarily determined. + +How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general connexion of causes and +effects. Causes necessarily produce effects, unless resisted and +overcome by opposing forces; but where several causes are acting in +opposition, the strongest will necessarily prevail, and produce its +appropriate effects. + +Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the connexion between motives +and volitions is the same with that of any other causes and effects. The +difference is merely in the terms: and when he calls the necessity which +characterizes the connexion of motive and volition "a moral necessity," +he refers not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected. +In this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between cause +and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, all causation +is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, in his system, is +characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays himself open to all the +consequences of a universal and absolute necessity. + +2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of volition by a method of +approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, for the sake of the argument, +that the will may oppose the strongest motive in a given case; but then +he contends that it is supposable that the strength of the motive may be +increased beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this +point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the will +must be considered necessary. "Whatever power," he remarks, "men may be +supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not +infinite." If the power of the man is finite, that of the motive may be +supposed to be infinite: hence the resistance of the man must at last be +necessarily overcome. This reasoning seems plausible at first; but a +little examination, I think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does +not determine the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic +qualities, but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But +agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,--relative to the +will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would be a motive of +infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be such only by an +infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The same of course must hold +true of any motive less than infinite: and universally, whatever be the +degree of strength of the motive, there must be in the man an affection +of corresponding intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in +the will to any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this +power of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of +agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a sense of +agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall predominate and +become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain that if the first be +increased, the second may be supposed to be increased likewise; if the +first can become infinite, the second can become infinite likewise: and +hence the power of resistance may be supposed always to meet the motive +required to be resisted, and a point of necessary determination may +never be reached. + +If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the strength of motives +intrinsically considered, then the answer is ready. There are motives of +infinite strength, thus considered, which men are continually resisting: +for example, the motive which urges them to obey and love God, and seek +the salvation of their souls. + + + + +III. + +AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND +CONTINGENT WILL. + +Edwards's first and great argument against a self-determining will, is +given in part II. sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows: + +The will,--or the soul, or man, by the faculty of willing, effects every +thing within its power as a cause, by acts of choice. "The will +determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice; +and there is no other way of the will's determining, directing, or +commanding any thing at all." Hence, if the will determines itself, it +does it by an act of choice; "and if it has itself under its command, +and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the +same way that it determines other things which are under its command." +But if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course we +have an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice which is +not determined by a choice,--"which brings us directly to a +contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first +act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free +act of the will before the first free act of the will: or else we must +come at last to an act of the will determining the consequent acts, +wherein the will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in +this notion of freedom." (p. 43.) + +This reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt to meet various +evasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates of a self-determining +will, depend mainly upon the assumption, that if the will determines +itself, it must determine itself by an act of choice; that is, inasmuch +as those acts of the will, or of the soul, considered in its power of +willing, or in its personal activity, by which effects are produced out +of the activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for +example, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down: therefore, if +the soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions, it must cause them +by volitions. The causative act by which the soul causes volitions, must +itself be a volition. This assumption Edwards does not even attempt to +sustain, but takes for granted that it is of unquestionable validity. If +the assumption be of unquestionable validity, then his position is +impregnable; for nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will +determining volitions by volitions, in an interminable series. + +Before directly meeting the assumption, I remark, that if it be valid, +it is fatal to all causality. Will is simply cause; volition is effect. +I affirm that the will is the sole and adequate cause of volition. +Edwards replies: if will is the cause of volition, then, to cause it, it +must put forth a causative act; but the only act of will is volition +itself: hence if it cause its own volitions, it must cause them by +volitions. + +Now take any other cause: there must be some effect which according to +the general views of men stands directly connected with it as its +effect. The effect is called the phenomenon, or that by which the cause +manifests itself. But how does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a +causative act:--but this causative act, according to Edwards's +reasoning, must itself be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect +comes between the cause, and what was at first considered the immediate +effect but the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative +act; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have another +causative act before it; and so on, _ad infinitum_. We have here then an +infinite series of causative acts--an absurdity of the same kind, with +an infinite series of volitions. + +It follows from this, that there can be no cause whatever. An infinite +series of causative acts, without any first, being, according to this +reasoning, the consequence of supposing a cause to cause its own acts, +it must therefore follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but +that they must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause +out of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must cause +these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act of its +own:--but the same difficulties occur in relation to the second cause as +in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own acts, and they must +therefore be caused out of itself by some other cause; and so on, _ad +infinitum_. We have here again the absurdity of an infinite series of +causative acts; and also, the absurdity of an infinite series of causes +without a first cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which +causes its own acts, without an act of causation; but this is +impossible, according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there +cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the denial of +this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are driven to the +conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every cause must either +cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused out of itself. Neither of +these is possible; therefore, there is no cause. + +Take the will itself as an illustration of this last consequence. The +will is cause; the volition, effect. But the will does not cause its own +volition; the volition is caused by the motive. But the motive, as a +cause, must put forth a causative act in the production of a volition. +If the motive determine the will, then there must be an act of the +motive to determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to +act. But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of +the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its own act, +then it must do this by a previous act, according to the principle of +this reasoning; and this again by another previous act; and so on, _ad +infinitum_. + +Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the same. + +It may be said in reply to the above, that volition is an effect +altogether peculiar. It implies selection or determination in one +direction rather than in another, and therefore that in inquiring after +its cause, we inquire not merely after the energy which makes it +existent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in +one direction rather than in another. "The question is not so much, how +a spirit endowed with activity comes to _act_, as why it exerts _such_ +an act, and not another; or why it acts with a particular determination? +If activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for +instance) acts and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause +why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined." (p. +58.) + +Every phenomenon or effect is particular and limited. It must +necessarily be one thing and not another, be in one place and not in +another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause +which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise +all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must, +in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction. + +Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular +determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every +volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily +give it character, and particular direction and determination. + +Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular +determination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect +cannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause +cannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection. +There must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus, +if fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles, +and produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular +determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of +effect without a particular determination. But in what lies the +selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain +objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently +exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the +title of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and +particular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the +correlation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects; +and volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by +will, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the +selection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or +direction of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which +appears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is +produced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-constitution and +disposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause. + +From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles +there is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to +shield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the +consequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and +efficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which +produces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily, +and often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the +most agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system +to make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the +efficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and +allurements of passion and desire, and from the laws of reason and +conscience. + +Thus far my argument against Edwards's assumption,--that, to make the +will the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions +by an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has +been fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to +deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition +to the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will +not be deemed superfluous. + +Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and +consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in +relation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its +effect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its +effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and +effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by +phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a +self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we +do, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable. + +The will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by +volitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms, +generally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this +way; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they +must come under the general law, and be determined by volitions. + +The first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does +not prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable. + +In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from +the first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not +necessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of +volitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts +of the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications +of the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the +will can be effected only by that modification of itself called +volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if +effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of +itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in +external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this +experience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions. +The acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are +volitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the +will are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the +will. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have assigned +the cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the +will--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I +do not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the +production of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The +connexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and +inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does +volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun +raise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I +know that such are the facts, it is enough. + +Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the +cause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by +volitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity. + +It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will +produce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to +connect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or +logic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes +such only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an assumption +unsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will +to be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely, +the motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he +creates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains +to motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by +exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it +the cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards +attributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us +look at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly. +What is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and +actual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is +cause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena, +and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to cause. But how do +we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or +energy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed. +Is it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not +observe; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat +to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion. +Where then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is +the _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to +anticipate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask +every one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I +wish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an +effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the +volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort +is simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this +effort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This +effort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the +will itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes +that know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may +make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of +course do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal +it to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we +observe in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be +self-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the +_nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their +wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in +physical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only +the phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one +comes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows +himself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is +conscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a +phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a +phenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the +sequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible +world, that he reveals himself to others. + +Sometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives +no external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm +may be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and +is not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will +during a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful +force; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain. + +It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may +place my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or +volition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining +of my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given; +I am resisted by a greater power than myself. + +The most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the +bosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original +movement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To +deny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and +energy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition, +admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance +of the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or +_nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause +itself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every +cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of +itself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without +arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all +cause. + +The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own +volitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported +alike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the +absurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten +upon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it +assails the opposite system. + +_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining +power of will. + +Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There +is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition +is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable. +But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will, +assuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the +absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time +he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in +correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all +natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for +example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these +natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so +constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So, +likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the +cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will, +acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the +most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an +object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its +appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most +agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but +also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the +mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the +mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind +acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is +a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are +acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its +inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of +volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat +may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind," +Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It +follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the +affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the +affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any +other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a +cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means +nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a +cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its +own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its +invariable sequents. + +Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a +volition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common +and necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of +cause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is +in fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to +produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that +in assigning as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will, +he really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very +point he laboured to overthrow. + +The point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after +all, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will +be self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other +words, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena. + +But the real point in dispute is this: "_Is the will necessarily +determined, or not?_" + +The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted and fixed, that the +_nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take +place according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be +true with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism, +magnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at +work in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to +fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do +not conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other +phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which they actually +produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass of dry gunpowder, an +explosion must take place. + +Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under +given circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must +its _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a +uniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the +sensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its +sense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its +volition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to +itself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation +to every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what +its volition will be at a given time, and under given circumstances. +Moral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in +the nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary +as any physical phenomenon. + +Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a +mere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for +nothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily +follow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can +distinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from +the sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest +desire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow, +because the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a +necessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of +consciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our +undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's +argument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined. +This he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word +contingent; it is important in marking a distinction. + +Edwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes +and begs the question under discussion. + +1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if +identical with chance or no cause. "Any thing is said to be contingent, +or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of +such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according +to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we +have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be +contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass +without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word +_contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that +whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to +foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous +ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain +connexion." (p. 31.) + +Thus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same +sense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation +of these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain +phenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their +existence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as +applied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he +elaborately discusses the question--"whether any event whatsoever, and +volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its +existence;" and in sec. 4,--"whether volition can arise without a cause, +through the activity of the nature of the soul." + +If, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the +determination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a +class of phenomena as existing without "any previous ground or reason +with which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,"--as +existing without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by +chance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any +previous ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate +argument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That +"every phenomenon must have a cause," is unquestionably one of those +primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration, +because they precede all demonstration, and must be assumed as the basis +of all demonstration. + +By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By +contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a +cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated +will, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By +contingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free +will. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be +supposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not +necessary I call contingent. + +Now an argument against contingency of will on the assumption that we +intend, under this title, to represent volitions as existing without a +cause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing. + +But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with +chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered +that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is +possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity. + +The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is +contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and +absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency +is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a +universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry +respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and +rational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine +whether the will be contingent or necessary. + +The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The +second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to +follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument +against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the +first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is +brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first +part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute. +Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss +contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is +inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the +question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring +whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to +necessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be +necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be +necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for +inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be +no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these +two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause, +for example, will, which is contingent. + +If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a +contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has +logically determined nothing in relation to it. + +But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether +contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be +contradictory and absurd. + +Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They +at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is +necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether +contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any +subject, remains to be determined. + +Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with +necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual +application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it, +is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events. + +What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:-- + +1. Viewed in relation to will. + +2. Viewed irrespective of will. + +The first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but +insufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in +opposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and +the progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_. + +The second does not take will into consideration at all, and applies to +subjects where opposition of will is not supposable; for example, +logical necessity, a is b, and c is a, therefore c is b: mathematical +necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre of a circle is a point equally distant +from every point in the circumference: metaphysical necessity, the +existence of a first cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this +second kind of necessity under the general designation of metaphysical +or philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is absolute. +It is impossible to conceive of these subjects differently from what +they are. We cannot conceive of no space; no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5, +and so of the rest. + +Necessity under both points of view he distinguishes into particular and +general. + +Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity relative to individual +will; as general, relative to all will. + +Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a necessity irrespective of +individual will; as general, irrespective of all will. + +Relative necessity is relative to the will in the connexion between +volition and its sequents. When a volition of individual will takes +place, without the sequent aimed at, because a greater force is opposed +to it, then the sequent of this greater force is necessary with a +particular relative necessity. When the greater force is greater than +all supposable will, then its sequents take place by a general relative +necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, the will +of God cannot be included, as there can be no greater force than a +divine volition. + +Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes the opposition of +individual will. Under this Edwards brings the connexion of motive and +volition. The opposition of will, he contends, is excluded from this +connexion, because will can act only by volition, and motive is the +cause of volition. Volition is necessary by a particular metaphysical +necessity, because the will of the individual cannot be opposed to it; +but not with a general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may +be opposed to it. + +Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the opposition of all +will--even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4--that the centre of a circle +is a point equally distant from every point in the circumference--the +existence of time and space--are all true and real, independently of all +will. Will hath not constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It +would imply a contradiction to suppose them different from what they +are. According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary with +a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these volitions are caused +by motives, and infinite will, as well as finite will, must act by +volitions, the opposition of infinite will itself is excluded in the +production of infinite volitions. + +Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points +of view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is +and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_. + +1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event +which is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of +an individual will. + +2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which +cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite +will. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable. + +3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it +is, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will. + +4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it +is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will. + +All this, however, in the last analysis on Edwards's system, becomes +absolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a +metaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by +the infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a +metaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are +merely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular +individual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our +view. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the +infinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its +force absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the +opposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily +not only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to +the infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it. + +Having thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on +Edwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea +of contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea? + +Necessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be +otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be +_that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be +otherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect +to anything which is independent of will;--time and space;--mathematical +and metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal, +that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they +are seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will, +nor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not +conceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of +contingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to +causes, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation +is the effect of divine volition. "God said, let there be light, and +there was light:" thus did the whole creation come to be. + +Now every one will grant, that the creation does not seem necessary as +time and space; and intuitive truths with their logical deductions, seem +necessary. We cannot conceive of these as having not been, or as ceasing +to be; but we can conceive of the creation as not having been, and as +ceasing to be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or +void space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may +be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and +relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, different +from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in one word this +difference between space and body, or in general this difference between +that which exists independently of will, and that which exists purely as +the effect of will, we call the first necessary; the second, contingent. +The first we cannot conceive to be different from what it is. The second +we can conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the +creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true +likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All these +events are either directly or mediately the effects of will, divine or +human. Now we can conceive of these as not being at all, or as being +modified indefinitely, different from what they are;--and under this +conception we call them contingent. + +No one I think will deny that we do as just represented, conceive of the +possibility of the events and creations of will, either as having no +being, or as being different from what they are. This conception is +common to all men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a +chimera? It must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for +according to this, there really is no possibility that any event of will +might have had no being at all, or might have been different from what +it is. Will is determined by motives antecedent to itself. And this +applies to the divine will, likewise, which is determined by an infinite +and necessary wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of +that which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be +chimerical. But although the system would force us to this conclusion, +the conception still reigns in our minds, and does not _seem_ to us +chimerical;--the deduction from the system strangely conflicts with our +natural and spontaneous judgements. There are few men who would not be +startled by the dogma that all things and all events, even the +constantly occuring volitions of their minds, are absolutely necessary, +as necessary as a metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,--necessary +with a necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise +than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological +abettors of Edwards's system, who would not also be startled by it. I +suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the broad +conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here represented, +being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not affect the sequents of +volition; that if a man can do as he pleases, he has a natural liberty +and ability which relieves him from the chain of metaphysical necessity. +I have already shown how utterly futile this attempted distinction +is--how completely the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called +natural liberty and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted +to, then we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley, +"Necessity, thou mother of the world!" But why the reluctance to escape +from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this system admit that +there is something opposed to necessity? But what is this something +opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that choice is opposed to +necessity? But how opposed--is choice contingent? Do they admit the +possibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or +might have been different from what it is? + +We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity by merely calling it +choice, or an act of the will. If will is not necessitated, we wish to +know under what condition it exists. Volition is plainly under necessity +on Edwards's system, just as every other event is under necessity. And +the connexion between volition and its sequents is just as necessary as +the connexion between volition and its motives. Explain,--why do you +endeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to +volition? why do you claim liberty here? Do _you_ likewise have a +natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It is +evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the doctrine of +necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink from its application +to will. They first establish the doctrine of necessity universally and +absolutely, and then claim for will an exception from the general +law,--not by logically and psychologically pointing out the grounds and +nature of the exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and +natural judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they +please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes it +from necessity;--nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement against +necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere illusion. + +There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this spontaneous +judgement--and the will comes under the idea opposed to necessity. But +what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under +it? Edwards and his followers have not answered these questions--their +attempt at a solution is self-contradictory and void. + +Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than that of contingency, +viz.--that which is or may be, and possibly might not be, or might be +otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is a truth which cannot possibly +not be, or be otherwise than it is. But this book which I hold in my +hand, I can conceive of as not being at all, or being different from +what it is, without implying any contradiction, according to this +spontaneous judgement. + +The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot conceive of as not +existing, or as being altered so as to transpose the terms, making that +right which now is wrong, and that wrong which now is right. But the +volition which I now put forth to move this pen over the paper, I can +conceive of as not existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a +volition to write words different from those which I am writing. That +this idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, that +all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most rational idea. +Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of necessity, do either adopt +this idea in relation to will by a self-contradiction, and under a false +position, as the abettors of the scheme which I am opposing for example, +or in the ordinary conduct of life, they act upon it. All the +institutions of society, all government and law, all our feelings of +remorse and compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself, +seem based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is +somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes arising +from _will_. + +That the will actually does come under this idea of contingency, must be +shown psychologically if shown at all. An investigation to this effect +must be reserved therefore for another occasion. In this place, I shall +simply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea +of contingency? + +The contingency of any phenomenon or event must depend upon the nature +of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or event is one which may be +conceived of, as one that might not have been at all, or might have been +different from what it is; but wherein lies the possibility that it +might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it +is? This possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine +nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in anything +which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing in relation to +its existence. The cause therefore which actually gives it existence, +and existence under its particular form, can alone contain the +possibility of its not having existed at all, or of its having existed +under a different form. But what is the nature of such a cause? It is a +cause which in determining a particular event, has at the very moment of +doing so, the power of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not +chained to any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of +objects--as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its +correlation to a certain class of objects which we thence call +combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in +opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to produce an +effect which it may produce, and of any given number of effects alike +within its power, it may take any one of them in opposition to all the +others; and at the very moment it takes one effect, it has the power of +taking any other. It is a cause contingent and not necessitated. The +contingency of the event, therefore, arises from the contingency of the +cause. Now every cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A +necessary cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to +act differently from its actual developements--fire must +burn--gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth's centre. If there +be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent cause above +defined, for there is no third conception. We must choose therefore +between a universal and absolute necessity, and the existence of +contingent causes. If we take necessity to be universal and absolute, +then we must take all the consequences, likewise, as deduced in part II. +There is no possible escape from this. As then all causes must be either +necessary or contingent, we bring will under the idea of contingency, by +regarding it as a contingent cause--"a power to do, or not to +do,"[5]--or a faculty of determining "to do, or not to do something +which we conceive to be in our power."[6] + +We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a +contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its nature, also. What is this +nature? It is a nature in fixed correlation with certain objects, so +that it is inconceivable that its phenomena might be different from +those which long and established observation have assigned to it. It is +inconceivable that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it +is inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing +temperature. But is this necessity a necessity _per se_, or a determined +necessity? It is a determined necessity--determined by the creative +will. If the creative will be under the law of necessity, then of course +every cause determined by will becomes an absolute necessity. + +The only necessity _per se_ is found in that infinite and necessary +wisdom in which Edwards places the determining motives of the divine +will. All intuitive truths and their logical deductions are necessary +_per se_. But the divine will is necessary with a determined necessity +on Edwards's system,--and so of all other wills and all other causes, +dependent upon will--the divine will being the first will determined. We +must recollect, however, that on Edwards's theory of causation, a cause +is always determined out of itself; and that consequently there can be +no cause necessary _per se_; and yet at the same time there is by this +theory, an absolute necessity throughout all causality. + +Now let us consider the result of making will a contingent cause. In the +first place, we have the divine will as the first and supreme contingent +cause. Then consequently in the second place, all causes ordained by the +divine will, considered as effects, are contingent. They might not have +been. They might cease to be. They might be different from what they +are. But in the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not +all contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are necessary +with a determined necessity. They are necessary as fixed by the divine +will. They are necessary with a relative necessity--relatively to the +divine will. They put forth their _nisus_, and produce phenomena by a +fixed and invariable law, established by the divine will. But will is of +the nature, being made after the image of the divine will. The divine +will is infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The +created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its given +capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its _nisus_ to do, are +limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may make an effort, +or volition, or _nisus_, to do anything of which it can conceive--but +the actual production of phenomena out of itself, must depend upon the +instrumental and physical connexion which the divine will has +established between it and the world, external to itself. Of all the +volitions or _nisus_ within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any +one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes any one +_nisus_ or volition, it has the power of making any other. + +It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, essential, and first +cause. Whatever other causes exist, are determined and fixed by will, +and are therefore properly called secondary or instrumental causes. And +as we ourselves are will, we must first of all, and most naturally and +most truly gain our idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate +these second causes--we observe only their phenomena; but we know +ourselves in the very first _nisus_ of causation. + +To reason therefore from these secondary causes to ourselves, is indeed +reversing the natural and true order on this subject. Now what is the +ground of all this clamour against contingency? Do you say it represents +phenomena as existing without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency +not to cause, but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the +phenomena of physical causation,--we reply that you have no right to +reason from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in +general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties of +matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an absurd and +pernicious doctrine--then turn and look at the doctrine of an absolute +necessity in all its bearings and consequences, and where lies the +balance of absurdity and pernicious consequences? But we deny that there +is anything absurd and pernicious in contingency as above explained. +That it is not pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of +moral and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course of +our inquiries. + +After what has already been said in the preceding pages, it perhaps is +unnecessary to make any further reply to its alleged absurdity. + +There is one form under which this allegation comes up, however, which +is at first sight so plausible, that I shall be pardoned for prolonging +this discussion in order to dispose of it. It is as follows: That in +assigning contingency to will, we do not account for a volition being in +one direction rather than in another. The will, it is urged, under the +idea of contingency, is indifferent to any particular volition. How then +can we explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of +indifferency to a choice or volition? + +In answer to this, I remark:--It has already been made clear, that +selection and particular determination belong to every cause. In +physical causes, this selection and particular determination lies in the +correlation of the nature of the cause with certain objects; and this +selection and particular determination are necessary by a necessity +determined out of the cause itself--that is, they are determined by the +creative will, which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes. +Now Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination of +will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is correlated to +certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by the creative will, +which gave origin to the secondary dependent will, the selection and +particular determination of will, is necessary with a necessity +determined out of itself. But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to +oppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the +correlation of its nature with certain objects--a will, indeed, which +has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent; +for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection +and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its +action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of +itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an absolute +and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of a will forming +volitions particular and determinate, or in other words, making a +_nisus_ towards particular objects, without any correlation of its +nature with the objects. Is this conception a possible and rational +conception? It is not a possible conception if will and the sensitivity, +or the affections are identical--for the very definition of will then +becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and necessarily +affected by them. + +But now let us conceive of the will as simply and purely an activity or +cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or affections--a cause capable +of producing changes or phenomena in relation to a great variety of +objects, and conscious that it is thus capable, but conscious also that +it is not drawn by any necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a +possible and rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause +different from all other causes; and on this conception there are but +two _kinds_ of causes. The physical, which are necessarily determined by +the correlation of their nature with certain objects, and will, which is +a pure activity not thus determined, and therefore not necessitated, but +contingent. + +Now I may take this as a rational conception, unless its palpable +absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be proved to involve some +contradiction. + +Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after +all, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that +the particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or +attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular +determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which +quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of +will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of +the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular +determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A +physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will +is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental +of a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is +the first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in +its energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to +place, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because +made in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self +moved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make +it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its +objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any +particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any +particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted +for in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of +the uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its +dependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and +could annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed +the instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects. +The man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his +arm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of +himself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him, +but he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than +himself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created +will aware of its feebleness and dependence. + +But although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent, +arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with +sensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason, +and, the sensitivity or the affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or +soul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not +follow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling. + +I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a +scheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent +will, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal +necessity. + +According to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the +soul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not +necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to +do. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the "source and substance" +of pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and +commands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or +the affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the +capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the +sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in +correlation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation, +are the emotions and passions awakened. + +Next let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality, +or more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean +the me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving +cause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives +the laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with +the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at the same +time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them. + +Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention +to the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain +objects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other +objects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain, +become rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power +to resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may +direct itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them, +and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and +disgust. + +We may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity +relatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of +disagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the +reason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are +repelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have +the second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying +reason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in +obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa. + +Now if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the +possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it +were always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of +resistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system +of Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition. + +The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a +will as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey +reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or +obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the +indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or +passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be +asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause +of its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and +self-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys +the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of +obedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we +called upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a +self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute +necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to +explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest +desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the +will obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this +again by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most +reasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for +obedience to passion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience +to reason, by referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in +the direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then +the act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may +find its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and +is no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is +most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable? +because to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable. + +Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous to intuitive or first +truths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they +form the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first +movements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of +antecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis +of all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of +no explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of +power. In God, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man, +it is finite, primary cause, constituted by God's creative act, but not +necessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be +power after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical +or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents +and sequents. + +God's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains +all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics +of creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But +when we inquire _why_ God's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we +must either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and +goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute +necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a +first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all +effects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself. + +When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition, +we bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the +reason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys +reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; we must +either represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences +of a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the +will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in +explaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any +explanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it +requires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the +fact of its existence. + +Edwards, while he burdens the question of the will's determination with +monstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down, +indeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry +which he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or +the volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the +most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or +capacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and +volitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The +question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to +produce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may +be the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but +that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its +relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is +at one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another +foolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will, +it always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question +therefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of +volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most +agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may +suppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and +the different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and +conditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose +the arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and +the different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the +sensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may +suppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions +of the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus +giving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet +at an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the +different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about? +On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the +sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in +both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the +sensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask +again, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to +itself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that +which is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects +have the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then +also we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make +the right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the +wrong and foolish. + +These last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not +presume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of +the volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and +the nature and circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is +such as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the +rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does +the correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that +the volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a +mere repetition of the question; for the question amounts simply to +this:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather +than the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most +agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the +most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its +state in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their +relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable +in one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of +the same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent +will. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the +direction of passion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the +power of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by +merely referring to the will. + +According to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives +the sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the +reason; and now in the direction of passion--but why?--Why does the +reason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure +desire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which +is equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in +reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it +is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the +most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on +Edwards's system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular +direction of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be +referred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other +explanation of the different determinations of this cause, except +referring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible, +indeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which +governs the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the +question must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the +correlation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at +another time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself +as having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do +or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the +opposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent +cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will: +then the question would be, why the infinite will determines the +sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at +another to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that +it seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to +him? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable, +that it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according +to the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most +reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards, +the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say +that God wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is +to say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he +does will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same +thing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it +is the most agreeable. + +To represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine +will, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is +supposed to pertain to contingent self-determination. + +Let us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of +some repetition. + +Contingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its +_nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of +itself--now obeying reason, and now obeying passion. If it be asked why +it determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction +in which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that +it determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this +particular direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it +may be said that it determines in this direction, because it is +pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of +reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot +say that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not passion; because +the one is all reason, and the other is all passion, and of course they +cannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be +compared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the +gratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it +is reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the +will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is +nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey +desire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act +of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any +other explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the +other, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the +other. + +To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this +system? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what +is the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most +agreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most +agreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But +why does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than +another; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at +another time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the +question,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather +than of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time, +and in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine +itself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the +sense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards's system. If +Edwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the +motive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being +affected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most +disagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with +the one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason +appears more agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for +the obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of +the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey +reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea +of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on +his system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is, +the reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of +will being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it +is obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the +sense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is +obeyed. + +To refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary +to the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be +considered a difficulty, only farther back. + +If God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it +is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the +reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a +circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch +as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows +that God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only +because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and +thus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another, +or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards, +unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not +to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation, +and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will +to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in +an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless +series, and an absolute necessity. + +All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have +above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the +sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the +direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good, +&c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic +from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is +generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind, +vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason? +Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction +because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go +in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause +_per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that +direction. + +There are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the +constitution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just, +the right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same +constitution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable +in reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its +_nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in +either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes +its _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good; +should we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the +just, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount +to saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true, +but only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the +_nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again +we might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction +of the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an +absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction +of the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_ +is made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the +rational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always +made in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to +explain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the +rational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have +an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the +direction of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back +in a circle to our first position. + +How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall we adopt the +psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then +as the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if +the sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are +plunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the +sensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we +have to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed +to be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will +when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met +with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as +more agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one +time, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations +are resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go +up to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question +it in like manner. + +But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary +cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in +itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and +neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their +particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will. + +The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered. +The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will +as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a +power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects. + +It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or +belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the +false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined +by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and +the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the +conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing +within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of +modification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every +_nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its +self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and +accountable. + +Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or +rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the +reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the +archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to +be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved +and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in +harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a +triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not +separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without +eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and +isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be +without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations. + +The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but +then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free +of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are +not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the +will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can +excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up +objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and +yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations. + +The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would +have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities +would lie dormant without the reason. + +So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the +will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in +itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and +sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without +rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing +what to do. + +It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing +peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to +necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_ +feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given +its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has +awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is +as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a +power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power +which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free. + +It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason +and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason +or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such +relation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be +called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of +will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing, +bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however, +frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention, +and which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be +required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting +one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and +sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily +determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection, +and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general +motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to +illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to +prove that the will can act without a motive. + +I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the +chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a +selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select? +The illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected, +and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the +sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the +absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at +illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this +selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency +as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the +reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no +affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as +most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares. + +It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of +Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_ +a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very +beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if +this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in +a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are +so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that +they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the +other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and +death." (p. 73.) + +Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the +sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state +of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of +indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his +system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment +volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in +indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest +ceases with motion. + +But according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I +shall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is +clearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of +feeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the +sensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory; +and a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the +quality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory +likewise; it would be confounding that which we had already +distinguished. From Edwards's very definition of will it cannot be +indifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise +than indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and +sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference +which it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it +determines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the +determination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of +reason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is +wakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only +the _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the +sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the will +again knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this +direction. + +In the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting +together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in +connexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation +between physical causes and the masses which they operate upon, may lead +to the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the +will and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at +least, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the +sensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We +have already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not +relieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent +will, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the +sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the +difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the will. In our +psychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable +those powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will +is, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to +the most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another, +in opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we +perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated +to reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know +that we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act +otherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But +when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its +direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when +we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is +still simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and +conviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion +and passion their place in the sensitivity alone. + +ARGUMENT + +FROM + +THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. + +Edwards's argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn +from the divine prescience, remains to be considered. + +The argument is introduced as follows: "That the acts of the wills of +moral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without +all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events." +(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to "the evidence of God's +certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents." In the +following section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his +argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the +consequences of his position. + +God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence +necessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee +them; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to +all events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of +everything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events +exist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions, +and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine +volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of +his work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the +doctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part +II. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then +we are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of +volitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would +practically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the +alternative. "If it could be demonstrated," remarks Dugald Stewart, +(vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) "which in my opinion has not yet been done, +that the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible +with the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in +favour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the +foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to +affirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of +contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not +extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of +God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?" +If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity, +there is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral +and theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument +of Edwards. + +This argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order. + +I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, "having already +made sure of existence;" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and +is therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever +is, is. He next affirms, that whatever is "indissolubly connected with +other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;" but events +infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the +foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, have an +indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore +necessary. + +The force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between +foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be +"indissoluble;" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with +the event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine +foreknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence +foreknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our +knowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it +came to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a +certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it +cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his +walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary +antecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or +necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I +looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the +knowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the +man walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the +mode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a +contingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of +prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this +faculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by +the faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday. +The knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a +knowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the +object known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in +relation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and +present, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in +relation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge. +Edwards remarks, (p. 121.) "All certain knowledge, whether it be +foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the +thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that +it is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true." + +Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of +existence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist. +Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the +present knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course +the reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or, +more strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of +time, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the +knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its +existence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event, +or if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon +strict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would +be affirmed of the event likewise. + +That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them, +they will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive +affirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, God's +foreknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend +them; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God's +foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or +determine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the +contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing +how wills act in the time present, takes away from them their +contingency and freedom. God in his prescience, _is the spectator of the +future, as really as we are the spectators of the present_. + +Edwards's reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes +for exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for +example, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that +place, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes +away, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things, +that a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then +it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or +go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is +entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or +contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine +foreknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are +subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being, +"who inhabiteth eternity:" but this necessary condition of their +existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency +of their particular causation. + +II. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, "No future event +can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without +all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It +is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without +_evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3. +Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of +knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or +_proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something +which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the +object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is +known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all +axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed +evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which +anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore, +whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as +immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God +otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal +Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or +as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So +much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A +contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards +that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising +from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is +self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or +proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be +self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into +futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its +nature." + +But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in +_anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is +evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed +that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of +the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its +contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He illustrates his +meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven +hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine +Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at +once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular +nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of +God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or +reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all +with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no +evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be +seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there +was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in +something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion +is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.) + +The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent +event exists "_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the +matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or +any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is +really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right +in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event +without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing +now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is +connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I +do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not +opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being +by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet +have sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence +have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses +only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign +choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold +the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but +from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view +to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own +volitions. + +The ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain +and reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are +never without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the +individual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of +the individual volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible +existence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and +constitution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not +required to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions +may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual +existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition; +he cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough, +as I have already shown, to assign him prescience, in order to bring +within his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows +all the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the +possible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that class of +the actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively +necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring up under +the characteristic of contingency. + +And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine +prescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the +contingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far +otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the +planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the +comets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions +of the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations. + +But if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable +calculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something "that is +evident" and "now existent, with which the future existence of the +_contingent_ event is connected." + +There are three kinds of certainty. _First_, absolute certainty. This is +the certainty which lies in necessary and eternal principles e. g. 2 x +2=4; the existence of space; every body must be in space; every +phenomenon must have a cause; the being of God. + +Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between premises and +conclusion, is likewise absolute. + +_Secondly_. Physical certainty. This is the certainty which lies in the +connexion between physical causes and their phenomena: e. g. +gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in general, mechanical forces. + +The reason conceives of these causes as inherently active and uniform; +and hence, wherever a physical cause exists, we expect its proper +phenomena. + +Now we do not call the operation of these causes _absolutely_ certain, +because they depend ultimately upon will,--the will of God; and we can +conceive that the same will which ordained them, can change, suspend, or +even annihilate them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes +given in time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If +in any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to recognise +the presence of that will which ordained them. Such change or suspension +we call a _miracle_; that is, a surprise,--a wonder, because it is +unlooked for. + +When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically certain, we mean +that it is certain in the immutability of a cause acting in time and +space, and under a necessity relatively to the divine will; but still +not _absolutely_ certain, because there is a possibility of a miracle. +But when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain, we mean that it +is certain as comprehended in a principle which is unalterable in its +very nature, and is therefore independent of will. + +_Thirdly_. Moral certainty, is the certainty which lies between the +connexion of motive and will. By will we mean a self-conscious and +intelligent cause, or a cause in unity with intelligence. It is also, in +the fullest sense, a cause _per se_; that is, it contains within itself +proper efficiency, and determines its own direction. By _motives_ we +mean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general, all +activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons; for they have +the same meaning: but in mere material masses, the rule is not +contemplated by the acting force,--it is contemplated only by the +intelligence which ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the +contrary, the activity which we call will is self-conscious, and is +connected with a perception of the reasons, or ends, or motives of +action. These motives or ends of action are of two kinds. _First_, those +found in the ideas of the practical reason, which decides what is fit +and right. These are reasons of supreme authority. _Secondly_, those +found in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately useful +and expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are right only +when subordinate to the first. + +Now these reasons and motives are a light to the will, and serve to +direct its activities; and the human conscience, which is but the +reason, has drawn up for the will explicit rules, suited to all +circumstances and relations, which are called _ethics_, or _the rules_. + +These rules the will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every +volition it is conscious of a power to do or not to do; but yet, as the +will forms a unity with the intelligence, we take for granted that it +will obey them, unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent. +But the only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a +state of sinfulness,--a corruption of the sensitivity, or a disposition +to violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual constitution. Hence +moral certainty can exist only where the harmony of the spiritual being +is preserved. For example: God and good angels. In God moral certainty +is infinite. His dispositions are infinitely pure, and his will freely +determines to do right; it is not compelled or necessitated, for then +his infinite meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is _not +absolute_, because will being a power to do or not to do, there is +always a possibility, although there may be no probability, nay an +infinite improbability, that the will may disobey the laws of the +reason. + +In the case of angels and good men, the moral certainty is such as to be +attended with no apprehension of a dereliction. With respect to such men +as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a +very high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they +will act in any given circumstances involving the influence of motives. +We know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,--that is, the _first_ +class of motives; and the _second_ only so far as they are authorized by +the first. If the first class of motives are forsaken, then human +conduct can be calculated only according to the influence of the second +class. + +Human character, however, is mixed and variously compounded. We might +make a scale of an indefinite number of degrees, from the highest point +of moral excellence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then +our predictions of human conduct would vary with every degree. + +In any particular case where we are called upon to reason from the +connexion of motives with the will, it is evident we must determine the +character of the individual as accurately as possible, in order to know +the probable _resultant_ of the opposite moral forces which we are +likely to find. + +We have remarked that moral certainty exists only where the harmony of +the moral constitution is preserved. Here we know the right will be +obeyed. It may be remarked in addition to this, however, that moral +certainty may almost be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral +degradation, where the right is altogether forsaken. Here the rule is, +"whatever is most agreeable;" and the volition is indeed merged into the +sense of the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide +field of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of human +nature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of life, is not +the knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but as it is in its +vast variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from observation +and history. What human nature ought to be, we learn from reason. + +On a subject of so much importance, and where it is so desirable to have +clear and definite ideas, the rhetorical ungracefulness of repetition is +of little moment, when this repetition serves our great end. I shall be +pardoned, therefore, in calling the attention of the reader to a point +above suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and +sensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed to +derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts which are in +the direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very trifling +acts; and therefore acts of this description, although possible, we may +conclude are very rare. In calculating, then, future acts of will, we +may, like the mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume +that all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or sensitivity, +or of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious of power to +do, out of the direction of both reason and sensitivity, still, in the +triunity in which it exists, it submits itself to the general interests +of the being, and consults the authority of conscience, or the +enjoyments of passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself +habits and a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted +himself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, to the +laws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has formed for +himself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many +occasions, noble, generous, and pure feelings; and hence we conclude +that his sensitivity harmonizes with conscience. Or he is known to have +violated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and in a great +variety of transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for +himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on many +occasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we conclude that +his sensitivity is in collision with conscience. + +In both cases supposed, and in like manner in all supposable cases, +there is plainly a basis on which, in any given circumstances, we may +foresee and predict volitions. There is something "that is evident and +now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is +connected." On the one hand these predictions exert no necessitating +influence over the events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected +with the causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events +need not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of +probable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations would no +longer be merely probable:--they would, on the contrary, take the +precision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses and other +phenomena based upon necessary laws. But these calculations can aim only +at _moral_ certainty, because they are made according to the generally +known and received determinations of will in a unity with reason and +sensitivity; but still a will which is known also to have the power to +depart at any moment from the line of determination which it has +established for itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting +the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based on his known +integrity, and the calculations which we make respecting another, based +on his known dishonesty, may alike disappoint us, through the +unexpected, though possible dereliction of the first, and the +unexpected, though possible reformation of the latter. When we reason +from moral effects to moral causes, or from moral causes to moral +effects, we cannot regard the operation of causes as positive and +uniform under the same law of necessity which appertains to physical +causes, because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and +last determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a high +degree of probability, with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely +and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we cannot reason respecting +human conduct, as we reason respecting the phenomena of the physical +world, because it is possible for the human will to disappoint +calculations based upon the ordinary influence of motives: e. g. the +motive does not hold the same relation to will which fire holds to +combustible substance; the fire must burn; the will may or may not +determine in view of motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance, +probable evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral +evidence being generally probable, all probable evidence is called +moral. + +The will differs from physical causes in being a cause _per se_, but +although a cause _per se_, it has laws to direct its volitions. It may +indeed violate these laws and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law +unto itself; but this violation of law and this arbitrary determination +do not arise from it necessarily as a cause _per se_, but from an abuse +of its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the reason, we +expect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and perfect movements it +is uniform. Physical causes are uniform because God has determined and +fixed them according to laws derived from infinite wisdom. + +The human will may likewise be uniform by obeying the laws of +conscience, but the departures may also be indefinitely numerous and +various. + +To sum up these observations in general statements, we remark;-- + +First: The connexion on which we base predictions of human volitions, is +the connexion of will with reason and sensitivity in the unity of the +mind or spirit. + +Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be designed to be +regulated by truth and righteousness, and by feeling subordinated to +these. + +Thirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is thus regulated. + +Fourthly: This regulation, however, does not take place by the necessary +governance which reason and sensitivity have over will, but by a +self-subjection of will to their rules and inducements;--this +constitutes meritoriousness,--the opposite conduct constitutes ill +desert. + +Fifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to the degree and +fixedness of this self-subjection to reason and right feeling; or where +this does not exist, according to the degree and fixedness of the habits +of wrong doing, in a self-subjection to certain passions in opposition +to reason. + +Sixthly: Our calculations will be more or less certain according to the +extent and accuracy of our observations upon human conduct. + +Seventhly: Our calculations can never be attended with _absolute_ +certainty, because the will being contingent, has the power of +disappointing calculations made upon the longest observed uniformity. + +Eighthly: Our expectations respecting the determinations of Deity are +attended with the highest moral certainty. We say _moral_ certainty, +because it is certainty not arising from necessity, and in that sense +absolute; but certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely +pure being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is +affirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that he has +not the power to change or to determine contrary to truth; but that +there is an infinite moral certainty arising from the perfection of his +nature, that he never will depart from infinite wisdom and rectitude. + +To assign God any other immutability would be to deprive him of freedom. + +Ninthly: The divine foresight of human volitions need not be supposed to +necessitate them, any more than human foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing +them, has no necessary connexion in any case with their causation. +Again, if it does not appear essential to the divine foresight of +volitions that they should be necessary. We have seen that future +contingent volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty +even by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in the +same way to calculate them through _media_,--the reach and accuracy of +his calculations must be in the proportion of his intelligence, and how +far short of a certain and perfect knowledge of all future contingent +volitions can infinite intelligence be supposed to fall by such +calculations? + +Tenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite mind is compelled to +resort to deduction, or to employ _media_ for arriving at any particular +knowledge. In the attribute of prescience, he is really present to all +the possible and actual of the future. + +III. The third and last point of Edwards's argument is as follows: "To +suppose the future volitions of moral agents, not to be necessary +events; or which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible +but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God +certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's +knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God certainly +and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which +at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not +be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one +thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows." +(page 117.) + +The substance of this reasoning is this. That inasmuch as a contingent +future event is _uncertain_ from its very nature and definition, it +cannot be called an object of _certain_ knowledge, to any mind, not even +to the divine mind, without a manifest contradiction. "It is the same as +to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, +which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth." + +We have here again an error arising from not making a proper +distinction, which I have already pointed out,--the distinction between +the certainty of a future volition as a mere fact existent, and the +manner in which that fact came to exist. + +The fact of volition comes to exist contingently; that is, by a power +which in giving it existence, is under no law of necessity, and at the +moment of causation, is conscious of ability to withhold the causative +_nibus_. Now all volitions which have already come to exist in this way, +have both a certain and contingent existence. It is certain that they +have come to exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their +existence is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by +necessity as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and +free, and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions, +had the power to withhold them. + +Certainty and contingency are not opposed, and exclusive of each other +in reference to what has already taken place. Are they opposed and +exclusive of each other in reference to the future? In the first place, +we may reason on probable grounds. Contingent causes have already +produced volitions--hence they may produce volitions in the future. They +have produced volitions in obedience to laws of reason and +sensitivity--hence they may do so in the future. They have done this +according to a uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually +observed--hence this uniformity may be continued in the future. + +A future contingent event may therefore have a high degree of +probability, and even a moral certainty. + +But to a being endowed with prescience, what prevents a positive and +infallible knowledge of a future contingent event? His mind extends to +the actual in the future, as easily as to the actual in the past; but +the actual of the future is not only that which comes to pass by his own +determination and _nibus_, and therefore necessarily in its relation to +himself as cause, but also that which comes to pass by the _nibus_ of +constituted wills, contingent and free, as powers to do or not to do. +There is no opposition, as Edwards supposes, between the infallible +divine foreknowledge, and the contingency of the event;--the divine +foreknowledge is infallible from its own inherent perfection; and of +course there can be no doubt but that the event foreseen will come to +pass; but then it is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently, +and not necessarily. + +The error we have just noted, appears again in the corollary which +Edwards immediately deduces from his third position. "From what has been +observed," he remarks, "it is evident, that the absolute _decrees_ of +God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the +necessity of the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute +foreknowledge of God." (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God are the +determinations of his will, and comprehend the events to which they +relate, as the cause comprehends the effect. Foreknowledge, on the +contrary, has no causality in relation to events foreknown. It is not a +determination of divine will, but a form of the divine intelligence. +Hence the decrees of God do actually and truly necessitate events; while +the foreknowledge of God extends to events which are not necessary but +contingent,--as well as to those which are pre-determined. + +Edwards always confounds contingency with chance or no cause, and thus +makes it absurd in its very definition. He also always confounds +certainty with necessity, and thus compels us to take the latter +universal and absolute, or to plunge into utter uncertainty, doubt, and +disorder. + +Prescience is an essential attribute of Deity. Prescience makes the +events foreknown, certain; but if certain, they must be necessary. And +on the other hand, if the events were not certain, they could not be +foreknown,--for that which is uncertain cannot be the object of positive +and infallible knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be +foreknown, then they must be necessary. + +Again: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all future events +supposed to come under it, out of all possible connexion with anything +preceding and now actually existent, and consequently allows of no basis +upon which they can be calculated and foreseen. Contingence, also, as +opposed to necessity, destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility +even of divine prescience. This is the course of Edwards's reasoning. + +Now if we have reconciled contingence with both cause and certainty, and +have opposed it only to necessity, thus separating cause and certainty +from the absolute and unvarying dominion of necessity, then this +reasoning is truly and legitimately set aside. + +Necessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the sensitivity connected +with it:--contingency lies only in will. But the future acts of will can +be calculated from its known union with, and self-subjection to the +reason and sensitivity. + +These calculations are more or less probable, or are certain according +to the known character of the person who is the subject of these +calculations. + +Of God we do not affirm merely the power of calculating future +contingent events upon known data, but a positive prescience of all +events. He sees from the beginning how contingent causes or wills, will +act. He sees with absolute infallibility and certainty--and the events +to him are infallible and certain. But still they are not necessary, +because the causes which produce them are not determined and +necessitated by anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free, +and conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in +doing. + +I am persuaded that inattention to the important distinction of the +certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge, and the necessity implied +in the divine predetermination or decree, is the great source of +fallacious reasonings and conclusions respecting the divine prescience. +When God pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity +relative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It cannot be +otherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains. But when he +foreknows an event, he presents us merely a form of his infinite +intelligence, exerting no causative, and consequently no necessitating +influence whatever. The volitions which I am now conscious of +exercising, are just what they are, whether they have been foreseen or +not--and as they now do actually exist, they have certainty; and yet +they are contingent, because I am conscious that I have power not to +exercise them. They are, but they might not have been. Now let the +intelligence of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have +foreseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain that this +foresight does not destroy the contingency of the volitions, nor does +the contingency render the foresight absurd. The supposition is both +rational and possible. + +It is not necessary for us to consider the remaining corollaries of +Edwards, as the application of the above reasoning to them will be +obvious. + +Before closing this part of the treatise in hand, I deem it expedient to +lay down something like a scale of certainty. In doing this, I shall +have to repeat some things. But it is by repetition, and by placing the +same things in new positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and +succeed in rendering philosophical ideas familiar. + +First: Let us consider minutely the distinction between certainty and +necessity. Necessity relates to truths and events considered in +themselves. Certainty relates to our apprehension or conviction of them. +Hence necessity is not certainty itself, but a ground of certainty. +_Absolute certainty_ relates only to truths or to being. + +First or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions drawn from them, are +necessary with an absolute necessity. They do not admit of negative +suppositions, and are irrespective of will. The being of God, and time, +and space, are necessary with an absolute necessity. + +_Relative necessity_ relates to logical conclusions and events or +phenomena. Logical conclusions are always necessary relatively to the +premises, but cannot be absolutely necessary unless the premises from +which they are derived, are absolutely necessary. + +All phenomena and events are necessary with only a relative necessity; +for in depending upon causes, they all ultimately depend upon will. +Considered therefore in themselves, they are contingent; for the will +which produced them, either immediately or by second or dependent +causes, is not necessitated, but free and contingent--and therefore +their non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to +will. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; when +therefore the _nibus_ of this will was made, creation was the necessary +result. The Deity is under no necessity of willing; but when he does +will, the effect is said necessarily to follow--meaning by this, that +the _nibus_ of the divine will is essential power, and that there is no +other power that can prevent its taking effect. + +Created will is under no necessity of willing; but when it does will or +make its _nibus_, effects necessarily follow, according to the connexion +established by the will of Deity, between the _nibus_ of created will +and surrounding objects. Where a _nibus_ of created will is made, and +effects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater force of a +resisting power, established by Deity likewise; so that whatever follows +the _nibus_ of created will, whether it be a phenomenon without, or the +mere experience of a greater resisting force, it follows by a necessity +relative to the divine will. + +When we come to consider will in relation to its own volitions, we have +no more necessity, either absolute er relative; we have contingency and +absolute freedom. + +Now certainty we have affirmed to relate to our knowledge or conviction +of truths and events. + +Necessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute and relative. We +have a certain knowledge or conviction of that which we perceive to be +necessary in its own nature, or of which a negative is not supposable; +and this, as based upon an _absolute necessity_, may be called an +absolute certainty. + +The established connexion between causes and effects, is another ground +of certainty. Causes are of two kinds; first causes, or causes _per se_, +or contingent and free causes, or will; and second or physical causes, +which are necessary with a relative necessity. + +First causes are of two degrees, the infinite and the finite. + +Now we are certain, that whatever God wills, will take place. This may +likewise be called an absolute certainty, because the connexion between +divine volitions and effects is absolutely necessary. It is not +supposable that God should will in vain, for that would contradict his +admitted infinity. + +The connexion between the volitions of created will and effects, and the +connexion between physical causes and effects, supposing each of course +to be in its proper relations and circumstances, is a connexion of +relative necessity; that is, relative to the divine will. Now the +certainty of our knowledge or conviction that an event will take place, +depending upon volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different +from the certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain +conviction that an event which infinite power wills, will take place. +The will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend or +change the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my hand over +this paper, it will move, supposing of course the continued healthiness +of the limb; but it is possible for God so to alter the constitution of +my being, that my will shall have no more connexion with my hands than +it now has with the circulation of the blood. I believe also that if I +throw this paper into the fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God +so to alter the constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper +will not burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will +continue to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This +certainly is not an _absolute certainty_, but a _conditional_ certainty: +events will thus continue to take place on condition the divine will +does not change the condition of things. This conditional certainty is +likewise called a _physical_ certainty, because the events contemplated +include besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so +commonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world, or +nature. + +But we must next look at will itself in relation to its volitions: Here +all is contingency and freedom,--here is no necessity. Is there any +ground of certain knowledge respecting future volitions? + +If will as a cause _per se_, were isolated and in no relation whatever, +there could not be any ground of any knowledge whatever, respecting +future volitions. But will is not thus isolated. On the contrary, it +forms a unity with the sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals _what +ought to be done_, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The +sensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the ground +of personal experience. Now although it is granted that will can act +without deriving a reason or inducement of action from the reason and +the sensitivity, still the instances in which it does so act, are so +rare and trifling, that they may be thrown out of the account. We may +therefore safely assume as a general law, that the will determines +according to reasons and inducements drawn from the reason and the +sensitivity. This law is not by its very definition, and by the very +nature of the subject to which it relates, a necessary law--but a law +revealed in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise +of its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of our +being, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In obeying the +one or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to perfect beings, +therefore, we can calculate with certainty as to their volitions under +any given circumstances. Whatever is commanded by reason, whatever +appears attractive to the pure sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed. + +But what kind of certainty is this? It is not absolute certainty, +because it is supposable that the will which obeys may not obey, for it +has power not to obey. Nor is it _physical_ certainty, for it does not +relate to a physical cause, nor to the connexion between volition and +its effects, but to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor +again can we, strictly speaking, call it a _conditional_ certainty; +because the will, as a power _per se_, is under no conditions as to the +production of its volitions. To say that the volitions will be in +accordance with the reason and pure sensitivity, if the will continue to +obey the reason and pure sensitivity, is merely saying that the +volitions will be right if the willing power put forth right volitions. +What kind of certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty +altogether peculiar,--a certainty based upon the relative state of the +reason and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the +commands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name of +_moral_[7] laws, simply because they have this relation,--and as the +sensitivity, when harmonizing with the reason, is thence called morally +pure, because attracting to the same conduct which the reason +commands,--this certainty may fitly be called _moral certainty_. The +name, however, does not mark _degree_. Does this certainty possess +degrees? It does. With respect to the volitions of God, we have the +highest degree of moral certainty,--an infinite moral certainty. He, +indeed, in his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions +whatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the harmony of +infinite reason with the divine affections of infinite benevolence, +truth, and justice, we are certain that his volitions will always be +right, good, and wise. Besides, he has assured us of his fixed +determination to maintain justice, truth, and love; and he has given us +this assurance as perfectly knowing himself in the whole eternity of his +being. Let no one attempt to confound this perfect moral certainty with +necessity, for the distinction is plain. If God's will were affirmed to +be necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness, and +love, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the +determination of the divine will: viz.--that the divine determination +takes place, not in contingency and freedom, not with the power of +making an opposite determination, but in absolute necessity. But if it +be affirmed that God's will, will _certainly_ go in the direction of +truth, righteousness, and love, the affirmation respects our _knowledge_ +and _conviction_ of the character of the divine volitions in the whole +eternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire after the +grounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the necessity of the +divine determinations be the ground of this knowledge and conviction, it +must be allowed that it is a sufficient ground. But will any man assume +that necessity is the _only_ ground of certain knowledge and conviction? +If necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of +course there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other ground +of knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at least for the +sake of the argument, it be granted that there may be other grounds of +knowledge than necessity, then I would ask whether the infinite +excellence of the divine reason and sensitivity, in their perfect +harmony, does afford to us a ground for the most certain and +satisfactory belief that the divine will will create and mould all being +and order all events according to infinite wisdom and rectitude. In +order to have full confidence that God will forever do right, must we +know that his will is absolutely necessitated by his reason and his +affections? Can we not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him +absolute freedom of choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the +Earth will do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have +the power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when, in +his omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his purposes will +forever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does not the glory and +excellency of God appear in this,--that while he hath unlimited power, +he employs that power by his free choice, only to dispense justice, +mercy, and grace? And does not the excellency and meritoriousness of a +creature's faith appear in this,--that while God is known to be so +mighty and so absolute, he is confided in as a being who will never +violate any moral principle or affection? Suppose God's will to be +necessitated in its wise and good volitions,--the sun dispensing heat +and light, and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of +creation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,--and the +creature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in him, holds +no other relation to him than the sunflower to the sun--by a necessity +of its nature, ever turning its face upwards to receive the influences +which minister to its life and properties. + +The moral certainty attending the volitions of created perfect beings is +the same in kind with that attending the volitions of the Deity. It is a +certainty based upon the relative state of the reason and the +sensitivity, and their unity with the will. Wherever the reason and the +sensitivity are in harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this, +that in calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we +have not to calculate the relative energy of opposing principles:--all +which is now existent is, in the constituted unity of the soul, +naturally connected only with good volitions. But the _degree_ of the +moral certainty in created beings, when compared with that attending the +volitions of Deity, is only in the proportion of the finite to the +infinite. The confidence which we repose in the integrity of a good +being, does not arise from the conviction that his volitions are +necessitated, but from his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and +our sense of his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility +of his doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing +right while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under +temptations of doing wrong. + +A certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the necessity of the +volitions, would not differ from a physical certainty. But a moral +certainty has this plain distinction,--that it is based upon the +evidently pure dispositions and habits of the individual, without +implying, however, any necessity of volitions. + +Moral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral perfection, and +predicable in degrees according to the dignity and excellency of the +being. + +But now let us suppose any disorder to take place in the sensitivity; +that is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to any degree, to grow into +opposition to the reason, so that while the reason commands in one +direction, the sensitivity gives the sense of the most agreeable in the +opposite direction,--and then our calculations respecting future +volitions must vary accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer, +because volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing +principles: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in +different degrees. + +By _the probable_, we mean that which has not attained to certainty, but +which nevertheless has grounds on which it claims to be believed. We +call it _probable_ or _proveable_, because it both has proof and is +still under conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof. +That which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A +mathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity, and +admits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates its truth. + +The divine volitions are certain on the ground of the divine +perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is found in the +divine perfections. + +The volitions of a good created being are certain on the ground of the +purity of such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what is found +in this purity. + +But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being of reason, and of a +sensitivity corrupted totally or in different degrees, then we have +place not for certainty, but for probability. As our knowledge of the +future volitions of such a being can only be gathered from something now +existent, this knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present +relative state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of +this is in no case supposable,--so that, although our actual knowledge +of this being may be such as to afford us proof of what his volitions +may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be increased +indefinitely by close observation and study, so likewise will the proof +be increased. According to the definition of probability above given, +therefore, our knowledge of the future volitions of an imperfect being +can only amount to probable knowledge. + +The direction of the probabilities will be determined by the +preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed being supposed. If the +sensitivity be totally corrupted, the probabilities will generally go in +the direction of the corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed +general fact in relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments +of passion are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But +the state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be in a +highly developed state, and the convictions of the right consequently +clear and strong, there may be probabilities of volitions in opposition +to passion which cannot exist where the reason is undeveloped and +subject to the errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The +difference is that which is commonly known under the terms "enlightened +and unenlightened conscience." + +Where the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the direction of the +probabilities must depend upon the degree of corruption and the degree +to which the reason is developed or undeveloped. + +With a given state of the sensitivity and the reason, the direction of +the probabilities will depend also very much upon the correlated, or +upon the opposing objects and circumstances:--where the objects and +circumstances agree with the state of the sensitivity and the reason, or +to speak generally and collectively, with "the state of the mind," the +probabilities will clearly be more easily determined than where they are +opposed to "the state of the mind." + +The law which Edwards lays down as the law of volition universally, viz: +that "the volition is as the greatest apparent good:" understanding by +the term "good," as he does, simply, that which strikes us "agreeably," +is indeed a general rule, according to which the volitions of characters +deeply depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as +governed wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of +character. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is struggling +under the light of his reason against passion, and consequently the +probabilities in this last case must be calculated in a different way. +But in relation to the former it is a sufficient rule. + +Probability, as well as certainty, respects only the kind and degree of +our knowledge of any events, and not the causes by which those events +are produced: whether these causes be necessary or contingent is another +question. + +One great error in reasoning respecting the character of causes, in +connexion with the calculation of probabilities, is the assumption that +uniformity is the characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning +may be stated in the following syllogism: + +In order to calculate either with certainty or probability any events we +must suppose a uniform law of causation; but uniformity can exist only +where there is a necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose +a necessity of causation. + +This is another instance of applying to the will principles which were +first obtained from the observation of physical causes, and which really +belong to physical causes only. With respect to physical causes, _it is +true_ that uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary +causes, simply because physical causes are relatively necessary +causes:--but with respect to the will, _it is not true_ that uniformity +appears to be a characteristic of necessary cause, because the will is +not a necessary cause. That uniformity therefore, as in the case of +physical causes, seems to become a characteristic of necessary cause, +does not arise from the nature of the idea of cause, but from the nature +of the particular subject, viz., _physical_ cause. Uniformity in logical +strictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule. Cause +is simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the direction, aims, +and modes of power: cause explains the mere existence of phenomena: law +explains their relations and characteristics: law is the thought and +design of the reason. Now a cause may be so conditioned as to be +incapable of acting except in obedience to law, and this is the case of +all physical causes which act according to the law or design of infinite +wisdom, and thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to +these causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they +necessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned as to +be incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can oppose itself +to, and violate law, but still it is a cause in connexion with law, the +law found in the reason and sensitivity, which law of course has the +characteristic of uniformity. The law of the reason and pure sensitivity +is uniform--it is the law of right. The law of a totally corrupted +sensitivity is likewise a uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law +to do whatever is most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every +individual, whatever may be the degree of his corruption, forms for +himself certain rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces +uniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity of +conduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the design of +the supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature. Uniformity of +volitions is nothing but the design of reason and pure sensitivity, or +of corrupted passion developed in human conduct. The uniformity thus not +being the characteristic of cause as such, cannot be the characteristic +of necessary cause. The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues +nothing respecting the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause +or it may not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity +in a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform +rules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but which +we also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical causes we have +the uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we have the uniformity of +a free intelligent cause. We can conceive of perfect freedom and yet of +perfect order, because the free will can submit itself to the light of +the reason. Indeed, all the order and harmony of creation, although +springing from the _idea_ of the reason, has been constituted by the +power of the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not +necessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is altogether +an assumption incapable of being supported that freedom is identified +with disorder. + +_Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience._ + +These words are metaphorical: _fore_ and _pre_ do not qualify +_knowledge_ and _science_ in relation to the mind which has the +knowledge or science; but the time in which the knowledge takes place in +relation to the time in which the object of knowledge is found. The +metaphor consists in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge, +considered relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act +of knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining +greater perspicuity, let us say, + +First: All acts of knowing are present acts of knowing,--there is no +_fore_ knowledge and no _after_ knowledge. + +Secondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no relation to time and +space whatever, e. g. pure abstract and necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4; +and the being of God. Or the objects of knowledge may be in relations of +time and space, e. g. all physical phenomena. + +Now these relations of time and space are various;--the object of +knowledge may be in time past, or time present, or time future; and it +may be in a place near, or in a place distant. And the faculty of +knowledge may be of a capacity to know the object in all these relations +under certain limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of +knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under +certain limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in +time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near and +distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events in any of +these relations, or in any of these relations to their utmost limit. + +The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and +space, under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and +infinite form. Under this form it comprehends the present perfectly, and +the past and the future no less than the present--and it reaches through +all space. God's knowledge is an eternal now--an omnipresent here; that +is, all that is possible and actual in eternity and space, is now +perfectly known to him. Indeed God's knowledge ought not to be spoken of +in relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge, +from eternity to eternity the same; it is unchangeable, because it is +perfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished. + +We have shown before that the perfection of the knowledge does not +settle the mode of causation; that which comes to pass by necessity, and +that which comes to pass contingently, are alike known to God. + +CONCLUSION. + +I here finish my review of Edwards's System, and his arguments against +the opposite system. I hope I have not thought or written in vain. The +review I have aimed to conduct fairly and honourably, and in supreme +reverence of truth. As to style, I have laboured only for perspicuity, +and where a homely expression has best answered this end, I have not +hesitated to adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly +understood, cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a +flowery surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason, +is manifestly impossible. + +The great man with whose work I have been engaged, I honour and admire +for his intellectual might, and love and venerate for a purity and +elevation of spirit, which places him among the most sainted names of +the Christian church. But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his +genius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his +philosophy? I have not done wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he +leads me to the cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute +attention--and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to have +re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, I view him +in a different character, and here his voice does not sound to me so +sweet as Plato's. + +The first part of my undertaking is accomplished. When I again trouble +the public with my lucubrations, I shall appear not as a reviewer, but +in an original work, which in its turn must become the subject of +philosophical criticism. + +THE END. + + + + +Footnotes + +[1] "It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a +distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their +service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say natural or +physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not: at +the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly +physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the +_invincible_ effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less +natural, nor less insurmountable, if it is from the laws of spirit than +it would be if it were from the laws of matter."--(Witherspoon's +Lectures on Divinity, lect. xiii.) + +[2] Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this +usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the performance of +an action, and the existence of an impediment or antagonistic force, +which takes from a faculty supposed to exist, the _liberty_ of action, +have the same bearing upon responsibility. + +[3] It is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and +natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without intending +anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By moral inability +they do not appear to mean anything which really render the actions +required, impossible; but such an impediment as lies in corrupt +affections, an impediment which may be removed by a self-determination +to the use of means and appliances graciously provided or promised. By +natural ability they mean the possession of all the natural faculties +necessary to the performance of the actions required. In their +representations of this natural ability, they proceed according to a +popular method, rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural +ability as a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities, +but they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose upon +myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to point out +the connexion between the sensitivity and the will, both in a pure and a +corrupt state,--and explain what these natural faculties are, which, +according to the just meaning of these divines, form the ground of +rebuke and persuasion, and constitute responsibility. + +[4] "The great argument that men are determined by the strongest +motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call _petitio +principii_. It is impossible even to produce any medium of proof that it +is the strongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the +greatest in itself; nor does it seem to be in all respects the strongest +to the agent; but you say it appears strongest in the meantime. Why? +Because you are determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was +determined by the _strongest motive_, and you have only shown that I had +a _motive_ when I acted. But what has determined you then? Can any +effect be without a cause? I answer--supposing my self-determining power +to exist, it is as real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect, +as your moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and +is but one and the same thing on one side and on the other." +--(Witherspoon's Lectures, lect. xiii.) + +[5] Cousin. + +[6] Dr. Reid. + +[7] Lat. _moralis_, from _mos_,--i. e. custom or ordinary conduct. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of Edwards's, by Henry Tappan + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S *** + +***** This file should be named 35958.txt or 35958.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/9/5/35958/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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