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diff --git a/34125.txt b/34125.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b87a10 --- /dev/null +++ b/34125.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13571 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha + Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy + +Author: Madhava Acharya + +Translator: E. B. Cowell + A. E. Gough + +Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA *** + + + + +Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + TRUBNER'S + + ORIENTAL SERIES. + + + + + THE + + SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA + + OR + + _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._ + + + + BY + + MADHAVA ACHARYA. + + + TRANSLATED BY + + E. B. COWELL, M.A. + + PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE + IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE + UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. + + AND + + A. E. GOUGH, M.A. + + PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND + PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA. + + + + + + + LONDON: + + TRUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. + + 1882. + + * * * * * + + + + +PREFACE. + + +I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of +Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhava +Acharya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by +Pandit Isvarachandra Vidyasagara, but a subsequent edition, with no +important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pandit Taranatha +Tarkavachaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of +the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic +Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have +been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and +those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity +of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought +originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu +character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose +from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have +noticed the same thing in the Nagari copies of Madhava's Commentary on +the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India. + +As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic +Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently +read it with my friend Pandit Mahesachandra Nyayaratna, the present +Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to +translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other +engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to +England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several +chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest, +were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no +longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits +of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for +years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at +that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking +of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do +it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we +accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the +advantage of the help of some of the Pandits of Benares, especially of +Pandit Rama Misra, the assistant Professor of Sankhya, who was himself +a Ramanuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some +things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to +throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original +abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in +the Benares Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully +revised for their present republication. + +The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. +The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical +systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and +gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the +principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain +them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself +for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it +were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance +with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of +the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always +interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the +course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure +details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better +guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these +Darsanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in +the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his +materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical +controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from +the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is +continually following in their track even where he does not quote +their exact words.[2] + +The systems are arranged from the Vedanta point of view,--our author +having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smarta order in +the Math of Sringeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Samkara +Acharya, the great Vedantist teacher of the eighth century, through +whose efforts the Vedanta became what it is at present--the +acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually +ascending scale,--the first, the Charvaka and Bauddha, being the +lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedanta, and the last, the +Sankhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it. + +The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest +minds in India throughout the mediaeval period of its history. Hiouen +Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les ecoles philosophiques sont +constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnees s'eleve +comme les flots de la mer. Les heretiques des diverses sectes s'attachent +a des maitres particuliers, et, par des voies differentes, marchent tous +au meme but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the +mediaeval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among +the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the +trees Arhata begging monks, Svetapadas, Mahapasupatas, Pandarabhikshus, +Bhagavatas, Varnins, Kesalunchanas, Lokayatikas, Kapilas, Kanadas, +Aupanishadas, Isvarakarins, Dharmasastrins, Pauranikas, Saptatantavas, +Sabdas, Pancharatrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets +and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in +the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Madhava's poem on the +controversial triumphs of Samkara Acharya, and in the spurious prose work +on the same subject, ascribed to Anantanandagiri. Well may some old poet +have put into the mouth of Yudhishthira the lines which one so often hears +from the lips of modern pandits-- + + Veda vibhinnah smritayo vibhinna, + Nasau munir yasya matam na bhinnam, + Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam, + Mahajano yena gatah sa panthah.[4] + +And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria, + +[Greek: mias toinyn ouses tes aletheias, to gar pseudos myrias +ektropas echei, kathaper hai bakchai ta tou Pentheos diaphoresasai +mele hai tes philosophias tes te barbarou tes te +Hellenikes haireseis, hekaste hoper elachen, hos pasan auchei +ten aletheian, photos d', oimai, anatole panta photizetai.] + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical +equanimity is that of Vachaspati Misra, who wrote standard treatises +on each of the six systems except the Vaiseshika, adopting, of course, +the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every +alien tenet.] + +[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is +given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also +in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.] + +[Footnote 3: Sriharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)] + +[Footnote 4: Found in the Mahabh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I +give them as I have heard them from Pandit Ramanarayana Vidyaratna.] + + + + +CONTENTS. + + Page + + I. The Charvaka System (E. B. C.) 2 + + II. The Bauddha System (A. E. G.) 12 + + III. The Arhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.) 36 + + IV. The Ramanuja System (A. E. G.) 64 + + V. The Purna-prajna System (A. E. G.) 87 + + VI. The Nakulisa-Pasupata System (A. E. G.) 103 + + VII. The Saiva System (E. B. C.) 112 + + VIII. The Pratyabhijna or Recognitive System (A. E. G.) 128 + + IX. The Rasesvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.) 137 + + X. The Vaiseshika or Aulukya System (E. B. C.) 145 + + XI. The Akshapada or Nyaya System (E. B. C.) 161 + + XII. The Jaiminiya System (E. B. C.) 178 + + XIII. The Paniniya System (E. B. C.) 203 + + XIV. The Sankhya System (E. B. C.) 221 + + XV. The Patanjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.) 231 + + XVI. The Vedanta or System of Samkara Acharya 273 + + APPENDIX--On the Upadhi (E. B. C.) 275 + + * * * * * + + + + +THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA. + + +THE PROLOGUE. + + +1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of +supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in +_him_ only has this all a maker. + +2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajna-Vishnu, who knows all the Agamas, +the son of Sarngapani, who has gone to the further shore of the seas +of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the +proper meaning of the term Soul. + +3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Madhava +mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the +fortunate Sayana. + +4. Having thoroughly searched the Sastras of former teachers, very +hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sayana-Madhava[5] the lord has +expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen +with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not +delight in a garland strung of various flowers? + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the +Vamsa-Brahmana, has solved the riddle of the relation of Madhava and +Sayana. Sayana is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born +after all the elder children have died. Madhava elsewhere calls Sayana +his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body, +himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sayana-Madhavah +here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the +same person. The body seems meant by the Sayana of the third sloka. +Mayana was the father of Madhava, and the true reading may be +_sriman-mayana_.] + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. + + +[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Siva, the +abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but +how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme +felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, +the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine +of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be +eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current +refrain-- + + While life is yours, live joyously; + None can escape Death's searching eye: + When once this frame of ours they burn, + How shall it e'er again return? + +The mass of men, in accordance with the Sastras of policy and +enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and +denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are +found to follow only the doctrine of Charvaka. Hence another name for +that school is Lokayata,--a name well accordant with the thing +signified.[6] + +In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original +principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, +intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed +from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are +destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Sruti +for this [Brihad Arany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these +elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are +destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the +soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, +since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as +such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the +only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c. + +The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor +may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are +always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy +the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which +inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the +fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he +wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, +straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is +not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure +which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not +refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to +devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, +because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the +contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, +he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the +poet-- + + The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects, + Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning + of fools; + The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains, + What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered + with husk and dust?[9] + +If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future +world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the +agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great +expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be +accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are +only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the +three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then +again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually +destructive, as the authority of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by +those who maintain that of the karma-kanda, while those who maintain +the authority of the jnana-kanda reject that of the karma-kanda; and +lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies +of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying-- + + The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, + and smearing oneself with ashes,-- + + Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those + who have no manliness nor sense. + +Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain +produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is +the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's +eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By +holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such +phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible, +as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside +in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my +body" is metaphorical "the head of Rahu" [Rahu being really _all +head_]. + +All this has been thus summed up-- + + In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air; + And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,-- + Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed together; + Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the + same subject, + And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the + soul and no other, + And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically. + +"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if +inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; +else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the +thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on +hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do +those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?" + +All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. + +Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or +middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be +found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the +major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute +of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does +not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its +_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by +virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this +connection's being known? + +We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is +held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by +the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not +the required means; for although it is possible that the actual +contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the +particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be +such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal +proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the +middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known. +Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition +has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise +a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this +particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as +implying fire]. + +Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that +the mind has any power to act independently towards an external +object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, +as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their +objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others." + +Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal +proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also +require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would +arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression. + +Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege +in reply, in accordance with the Vaiseshika doctrine of Kanada, that +this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that +this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier +that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on +the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the +child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more +reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are +invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu, +&c. [which, of course, we Charvakas reject]. + +And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the +knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to +whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and +major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be +no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as +smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for +oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words. + +Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the +means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is +impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned +connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is +to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the +relation of a name to something so named. + +Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as +the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal +proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to +establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and +therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself +perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself +non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to +inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already +been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of +the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in +extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying +the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly +accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major +term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal], +are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such +fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of +sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not +causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it +is established by the sloka of the great Doctor beginning +_samasama_.[23] + +But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the +knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the +knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of +the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a +connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished +by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the +knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the +invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with +adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. +Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a +proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24] + +The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the +knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a +former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases +this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the +coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, +drugs, &c. + +From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can +only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do +not allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become +destitute of any cause. + +But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena +can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. +Thus it has been said-- + + The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn; + By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born. + +And all this has been also said by Brihaspati-- + + There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world, + Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real + effect. + The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and + smearing one's self with ashes, + Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge + and manliness. + If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven, + Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26] + If the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead, + Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is + needless to give provisions for the journey. + If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sraddha here, + Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the + housetop? + While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even + though he runs in debt; + When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again? + If he who departs from the body goes to another world, + How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his + kindred? + Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have + established here + All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere. + The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons. + All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turphari, &c.[27] + And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswamedha, + These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of + presents to the priests,[28] + While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling + demons. + +Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge +to the doctrine of Charvaka. Such is the pleasant consummation. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 6: "Sankara, Bhaskara, and other commentators name the +Lokayatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Charvaka" +(Colebrooke). Lokayata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in +the world" (_loka_ and _ayata_). Laukayatika occurs in Panini's +ukthagana.] + +[Footnote 7: _Kinwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce +fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c." +Colebrooke quotes from Sankara: "The faculty of thought results from a +modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a +ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as +betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an +exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."] + +[Footnote 8: Of course Sankara, in his commentary, gives a very +different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual +existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. +Sabara's Comm. Jaimini Sut., i. i. 5.] + +[Footnote 9: I take _kana_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunr_. Cf. +Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Asvah kana gavas tandula masakas tushah._] + +[Footnote 10: See Nyaya Sutras, ii. 57.] + +[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.] + +[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehah_.] + +[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have +invariable concomitance (_vyapti_)."] + +[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _nischita upadhi_ see Siddhanta +Muktavali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.] + +[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance +(as of smoke by fire).] + +[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in +every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; +and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some +other place.] + +[Footnote 17: See Sahitya Darpana (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and +Siddhanta-M., p. 80.] + +[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the +rhetorical, argument.] + +[Footnote 19: "_Upamana_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the +instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This +particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a +name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.] + +[Footnote 20: The upadhi is the condition which must be supplied to +restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain +has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of +the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case +of a true vyapti, there is, of course, no upadhi.] + +[Footnote 21: '[Greek: Antistrephei] (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We +have here our A with distributed predicate.] + +[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upadhi +"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly +accompanied by it," then in the Naiyayika argument "sound is +non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" +would serve as a Mimamsaka upadhi, to establish the _vyabhichara_ +fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted +clause excludes it, as an upadhi must be consistent with _either_ +party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyayika maintains that "being +produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we +defined the upadhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and +constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upadhi "the +nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the +class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar +only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is +found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the +upadhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly +accompanying the major," we might have as a Mimamsaka upadhi "the not +causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of +hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found +where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.] + +[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure sloka of Udayanacharya, "where +a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._, +universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their +predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the +existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second +will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by +the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke +because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as +fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by +fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet +fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the +non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious +inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied +by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this +will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus +invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has +fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not +reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably +accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add +here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many +another, difficulty in the Sarva-darsana-sangraha to my old friend and +teacher, Pandit Mahesa Chandra Nyayaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit +College.] + +[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the +Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority +of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or +genus and species.] + +[Footnote 25: _Adrishta_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions +which produce their effects in future births.] + +[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. +209.] + +[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's +Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.] + +[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be +handled in the rites."] + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. + + +At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Charvakas) laid +down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, +your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is +easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has +accordingly been said-- + + "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as + a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not + through the mere observation of the desired result in + similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in + dissimilar cases."[29] + +On the hypothesis (of the Naiyayikas) that it is concomitance and +non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not) +that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance +of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being +impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and +future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyayika) rejoin that +uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our +system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect +may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a +stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be +entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in +practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt +terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30] + +1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the +designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance +(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise +from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition +or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for +instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by +five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to +its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect +is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its +non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised. + +2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the +ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever +we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute +arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch +as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own +self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and +where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can +exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of +the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference +to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For +reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where +there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is +no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the +two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor +can reference to the same object take place where there is a +reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, +for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other. + +It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a +cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants). + +If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence, +_pramana_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference +is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you +allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the +maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is +the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that +inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument +(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an +absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren. +Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence +and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their +homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you +affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of +words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the +existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you +yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle +term. Conformably it has been said by Tathagata-- + + "The admission of a form of evidence in general results from + its being present to the understanding of others. + + "The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its + negation by a certain person." + +All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist +for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise. + +These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four +standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Madhyamika, +Yogachara, Sautrantika, and Vaibhashika, these Buddhists adopt +respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external +void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects +(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects +(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one +teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity +of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer, +the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time +to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, +and so forth, according to their several inclinations. + +It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out, +viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.) +all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void. + +Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue +and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred +from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional) +like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one +object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an +existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by +perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the +exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is +established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary +succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of +the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical +efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under +succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between +succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a +manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule-- + + "In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior + alternative; + + "Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a + repugnance in the very statement."[33] + +And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent, +and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine +existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D. + +Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in +the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious +to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and +future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical +efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it +cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot +deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that +which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that +time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is +thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such +power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because +practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does +not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for +instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity +while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its +past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction. + +You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there +is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and +future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do +the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are +not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with +the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this +assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is +other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the +cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect +will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the +adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said: + + "What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect + is on the skin of man; + + "If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent; + and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect + produced upon it." + +Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_ +its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up +its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round +their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and +without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does +the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries +give rise to another additament or not? In either case the +afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of +stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another +additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in +infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another +auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless +series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite +regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an +additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as +water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament +would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on +the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries; +otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that +a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add +to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves +requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be +productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be +established an infinite regression of additaments to (or +supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries. + +Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of +the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like, +or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if +the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed +is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require +the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must +take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over +and over again an endless series of additaments added to the +additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite +regression is firmly set up. + +In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another +subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of +the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of +additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented +by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to +your embarrassment. + +Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a +supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it +may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the +supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the +supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism) +_kurvad rupa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus +the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne +its fruit. + +Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible. +Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time; +for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this +(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its +effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production +of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity +will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on +the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as +reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate. + +That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as +heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions. +Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has +not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term +disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are +allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different +times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz., +That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at +that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that +time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence +of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to +produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of +stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the +seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical +efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. +The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does +anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement +of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity +exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper +to those times. + +(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there +being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard +to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence +which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and +there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue +of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or +"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance +observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by +the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jnana-sri-- + + "What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent + things; + + "The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency, + and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as + eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.); + + "Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do + the work of another; + + "For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and + simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains + true in regard to that which we have to prove." + +Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the +Vaiseshikas and Naiyayikas, that existence is a participation in the +universal form existence; for were this the case, universality, +particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the +universal) could have no existence. + +Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and +co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for +such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_ +existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a +dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the +many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through +all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so +forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it. +Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present +everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things +in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal), +and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Prasasta-pada +has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is +present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature +of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to +another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the +other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes), +the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie +qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach +itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, +does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another +place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to +inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as +you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base +of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence +of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated. + +Conformably it has been said-- + + "Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one + place, engages without moving from that place in producing + itself in another place. + + "This entity (universality) is not connected with that + wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies + that place: great is this miracle. + + "It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently + divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series + of difficulties!" + +If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many +rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to +repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of +heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity. + +That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common +verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be +found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for +bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is +pain, and pain alone. + +If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an +instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised +being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is +impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that +all is like itself alone, like itself alone. + +In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we +are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has +not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were +(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act +of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular +nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon +that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and +so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a +semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a +fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs. +The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily +superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection +between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be +unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally +objects of the negation; the Madhyamikas excellently wise explain as +follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a +total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression +like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a +momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory +assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of +reality. + +The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four +alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality +and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify +this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like, +the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous. + +If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it +is said-- + + "Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the + like, for instance; + + "No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers + of the sky and the like, for instance." + +The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are +inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated +Buddha in the Alankaravatara[34]-- + + "Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is + ascertained;[35] + + "Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and + natureless." + +And again-- + + "This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No + sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated." + +That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four +alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said-- + + "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three + views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a + carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey." + +In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are +come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result. +Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be +taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the +student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the +putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained. +Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher. +These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the +religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence +their conventional designation of Madhyamikas (or mediocre). + +Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogacharas, because while they +accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and +the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a +void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been +admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent +cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe +is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakirti: "To one +who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent." + +An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the +following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise +from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that +which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for +what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do +you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting +cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with +the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a +supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be +apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a +complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected +by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former +alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it +not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has +been said-- + + "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would + have six surfaces; + + "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a + body of atomic dimension." + +Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is +shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous +with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said-- + + "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no + cognition ulterior thereto; + + "There being no distinction between percept and percipient, + intellect shines forth of itself alone." + +The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which +is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as +soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue +and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there +were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could +not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no +identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to +determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an +interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an +illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The +cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without +beginning and without interruption; as it has been said-- + + "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the + cognition thereof are identical; + + "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory + cognitions, as in the example of the single moon." + +And again-- + + "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by + reason of illusory perceptions, + + "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and + of percipient." + +Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the +energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual +sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though +the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and +subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in +virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by +reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient, +conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as +to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and +another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it +has been said-- + + "As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, + appears, by reason of illusory cognitions, + + "Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and + percipient; + + "So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the + example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and + the like, + + "Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as + percipient and percept." + +Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless +ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms. + +When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of +view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises +knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects, +such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called +_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation). + +Others again (the Sautrantikas) hold that the position that there is +no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they +contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous +cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you +accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive, +being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they +proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be +invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because +inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is +manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity +as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the +object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it +should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the +cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A +blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external +and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and +so it has been said-- + + "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other + portion, + + "This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an + illusion." + +And again-- + + "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself + as if it were external." + +To this we reply (say the Sautrantikas): This is untenable, for if +there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the +comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his +senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless +mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the +illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of +duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are +involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that +cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as +their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such, +and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal +states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is +difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity, +like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were +external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and +your own arrow will return upon you and wound you. + +If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with +the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrantikas) reply that this +objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to +the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production, +and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The +interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised-- + + "If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They + recognise perceptibility, + + "And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is + its imposition of its form." + +To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as +nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred +from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may +be inferred. Therefore it has been said-- + + "With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition) + without losing the nature of a half; + + "The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable + is the nature of the knowable." + +For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the +cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if +indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things +to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of +external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only +at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for +instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of +speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or +walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under +discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, +are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the +recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the +manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as +it has been said-- + + "That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant + about the Ego: + + "That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and + the rest." + +Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let +it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible, +which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external +world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of +presentments resulting from ideation. + +According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vijnanavadin_), +ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or +presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a +single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to +produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or +sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental +train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted +to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all +momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness +are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the +subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of +presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations) +had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the +stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have +this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any +intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding, +must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his +consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense +percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and +smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four +conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the +suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these, +the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in +the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the +like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of +forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The +restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the +medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant, +the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of +one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been +equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he +who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four +causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and +its modifications. + +So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is +of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional, +(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of +these, the sensible world (_rupa-skandha_) is the sense organs and +their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are +discriminated (_rupyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the +stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The +affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain +generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) +world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words +"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as +desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser +miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit. + +Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain, +and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the +principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been +said-- + + "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the + four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36] + +In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the +"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as +(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of +these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by +concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition +of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of +causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious +being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A +germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six +elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in +the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light +as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces +touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound; +the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism +comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the +Tathagatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or +by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and +determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the +cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathagata +Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation +between the cause and effect, results from production or from +non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something +exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of +the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where +the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_ +(in the word _sthitita_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination +by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here +some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and +effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason +it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to +that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in +causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is +observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a +genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ, +from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the +hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the +blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate +neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and +the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of +being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts +two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific +matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise +unduly prolix. + +Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the +rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method +(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the +knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former +ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrantika arose from +the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples +who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism +(_sutra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be +Sautrantikas." + +Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of +odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to +produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the +venerated Buddha styled Prathamika (primary) disciples. A second school, +attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation +is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the +internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are +inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddha +bhasha_), and are known under the designation of Vaibhashikas. Their +technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of +inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently +no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be +impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a +contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects, +therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension +is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere +representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of +evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said-- + + "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is + non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the + appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion. + + "The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it + were aught else, + + "There could neither be things, nor evidence of things + derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense." + +Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how +is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the +universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be +replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted +for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as +if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the +gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre +for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been +fully discussed in describing the Sautrantikas (cf. p. 27), and +therefore need not here be further detailed. + +It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according +to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox); +for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta-- + + "The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha) + accommodating themselves to the character and disposition + (of those who are to be taught), + + "Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a + plurality of methods. + + "For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and + superficial, + + "Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a + universal void which is a negation of duality." + +It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve +inner seats (_ayatana_) is conducive to felicity. + + "After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats + + "Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing + aught else below? + + "The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, + + "The common sensory and the intellect have been described by + the wise as the twelve inner seats." + +The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the +Viveka-vilasa:-- + + "Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the + universe is momentarily fluxional; + + "The following four principles in order are to be known by + the name of the noble truths:-- + + "Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is + held,[38] + + "And the path (method); of all this let the explication be + heard in order. + + "Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are + declared to be five,-- + + "Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form. + + "The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound + and the rest, the common sensory, + + "And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the + twelve inner seats. + + "This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when + it arises in the heart of man. + + "Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the + aggregate. + + "The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary, + + "This is to be known as the path, and is also styled + emancipation. + + "Furthermore, there are two instruments of science, + perception and inference. + + "The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects, + the Vaibhashikas and the rest. + + "The Vaibhashika highly esteems an object concomitant to the + cognition; + + "The Sautrantika allows no external object apprehensible by + perception; + + "The Yogachara admits only intellect accompanied with forms; + + "The Madhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent. + + "All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same + emancipation, + + "Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of + cognitions and impressions. + + "The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the + single meal in the forenoon, + + "The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the + Bauddha mendicants."[39] + +A. E. G. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 29: This sloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p. +89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there +read more correctly, _'darsanan na na darsanat_.] + +[Footnote 30: Kusumanjali, iii. 7.] + +[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into-- + +(1.) Madhyamikas or Nihilists. + +(2.) Yogacharas or Subjective Idealists. + +(3.) Sautrantikas or Representationists. + +(4.) Vaibhashikas or Presentationists.] + +[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119. + +"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western +heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within +half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull +ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, +although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your +reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you +never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see +any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth +part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone +an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by +another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but +because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason +refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to +declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has +given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no +one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in +another."] + +[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.] + +[Footnote 34: Query, Lankavatara?] + +[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If +every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_ +the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that +is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is +the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics +of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by +calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps +more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into +sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."] + +[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read +_samudaya_?] + +[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85. +"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement +of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, +because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves +into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, +wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they +_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite +forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in +definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical +agency."] + +[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p. +30.] + +[Footnote 39: Madhava probably derived most of his knowledge of +Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his +explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudaya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem +to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE ARHATA SYSTEM. + + +The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the +Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain +extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. +(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the +arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will +be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that +one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this +conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap +its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a +continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the +subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable +the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts +only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part. + +But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary +sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? +In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, +'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel +line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent +and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if +this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A +might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an +essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and +effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in +sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite +certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the +stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series +to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled +with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through +the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As +it has been said-- + + "'In whatever series of successive states the original + impression of the action was produced, + + "'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness + produced in cotton. + + "'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the + citron, &c., + + "'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see + it?'" + +But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is +overthrown by the following dilemma:-- + +In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your +favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other? +It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not +always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your +example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to +the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove +your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and +consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is +momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition +of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as +it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since +this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been +said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an +origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration." + +As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is +proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory +attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," +_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the +holders of the Syad-vada[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the +indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the +example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, +and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each +moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated +without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In +individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or +in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is +held to be one [throughout all"]. + +Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation +between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would +follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be +remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter +might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; +and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed +away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was +enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenavakya-- + +"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing +not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of +memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of +these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary +destruction!" + +Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time +of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment) +does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence +the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a +perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of +the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object +and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, +like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of +cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession], +and consequently the _Alambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p. +29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes +(_pratyaya_).[43] + +If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it +will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have +existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold. +For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a +certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of +explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of +impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon +it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid +incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the +perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the +abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the +external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a +definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar], +and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a +mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the +object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near," +&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as +exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all +our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as +"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you +say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really +possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are +applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really +belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a +mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it +represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an +object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object +be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become +itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to +grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into +hopeless difficulties. + +If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the +perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there +would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is +a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has +lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no +perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its +being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, +the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a +jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that +the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. +And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the +blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that +both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the +character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on +perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also +constituting its character.[46] + +All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full +length by the Jaina authors, Pratapachandra and others, in the +_Prameyakamalamartanda_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling +the book too much. + +Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept +the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Arhata doctrine. +The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-suri,[47] +in his _Aptanischayalankara_. + +"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has +overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the +declarer of things as they are." + +But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the +path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found +to apply, as has been declared by Tautatita [Bhatta Kumarila[48]]? + +1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by +ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might +help us as a sign to infer his existence. + +2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals +an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory +passages (_arthavada_) be applied here. + +3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to +quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic +repetitions (_anuvada_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere +before. + +4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject +of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and +spurious Veda? + +5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word? +How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal +support? + +6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one +omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either +point be established without some previously established foundation? + +7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word +of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's +words. + +8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, +we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth] +proof, comparison (_upamana_). + +9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which +embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative, +if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on." + +We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's +existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative +proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference, +&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become +omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects +remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. +Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, +when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, +just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of +darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its +hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things +remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is +the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for +grasping all things; for otherwise the Mimamsist could not maintain +that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the +authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be +the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite +argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their +existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyaya will grant that +universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth +of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the +Purva Mimamsa accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity +for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing +all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and +prohibitions, as is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the Sutras, +i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, +the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it +is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's +knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are +certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three +["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior +assaults of argument can be put to flight. + +But the Naiyayika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, +which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having +sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there +can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has +been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your +eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is +eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," +like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated" +necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the +latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of +the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his +being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.? +according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a +maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This +argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they +have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of +their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the +horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the +being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate +relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or +(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being +the object of an idea involving the notion of parts? + +Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would +include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in +contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it +would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by +intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the +third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much +disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_, +because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following +alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a +substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to +itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to +something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the +former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and +has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the +latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original +point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate +relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you +mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your +terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow +such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its +existence. + +Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach +too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object +of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged +to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still +be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with +something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object +of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual +contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is +all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not +all-pervading]. + +And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent? + +In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend +erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of +many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if +all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would +be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vitaragastuti_, or "Praise +of Jina"-- + +1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading, +independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, +whose teacher art _thou_." + +And again-- + +2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his +influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use +of yourself or all the artisans, if Iswara fabricates the three +worlds?" + +Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced +when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to. + +Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are +impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this +universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former +omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such +faults as _Anyonyasrayata_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal +succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the +endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So +much for this preliminary discussion. + +The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are +thus described in the _Paramagamasara_ (which is devoted to the +exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right +knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been +thus explained by Yogadeva:-- + +(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been +declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute +faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary +idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the +_Tattvartha-sutra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right +'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the +predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is +produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction." +"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of +another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the +teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c. + +(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, +&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or +doubt; as it has been said-- + +"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the +predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the +wise." + +This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _sruta_, _avadhi_, +_manas-paryaya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _s_ruta, +_avadhi_, _manas-paryaya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The +meaning of this is as follows:-- + +1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the +operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge +being abolished. + +2. _Sruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the +obstructions of knowledge being abolished. + +3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the +abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," +&c.[56] + +4. _Manas-paryaya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's +thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of +knowledge caused by the veil of envy. + +5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which +ascetics practise various kinds of penance. + +The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are. +Thus it has been said-- + +"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which +manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and +itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two +ways." + +But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from +the authoritative treatise above-mentioned. + +(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to +evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is +diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which +constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by +the Arhat-- + +1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of +blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as +the 'five vows,' _ahimsa_, _sunrita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharya_, and +_aparigraha_.[57] + +2. "The 'vow' of _ahimsa_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act +of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing. + +3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of +_sunrita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to +others and prejudicial. + +4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of +_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is +killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it. + +5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharya_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the +abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, +and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by +one's causing another to act. + +6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive +interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought +may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal. + +7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, +these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode." + +The full account of the five states of mind (_bhavana_) has been given +in the following passage [of which we only quote one sloka]-- + +"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _sunrita_ uninterruptedly by the +abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the +deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth. + +These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when +united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of +an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, +and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce +the elixir's effect, but not severally. + +Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two, +_jiva_ and _ajiva_; the soul, _jiva_, is pure intelligence; the +non-soul, _ajiva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus +said-- + +"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;' +'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who +pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The +affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for +the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to +be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_." + +_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes +place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation +of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of +_pradesa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces +[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with +its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather +be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than +these."[61] + +Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real +nature of the soul viewed as _parinata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself]; +but by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ it appears +in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence +of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, +&c.[63] As has been said by Vachakacharya [in a sutra]-- + +"The _aupasamika_, the _Kshayika_, and the 'mixed' states are the +nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Parinamika_." + +1. The _aupasamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of +past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the +future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling +mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing +nut-plant,[64] &c. + +2. The _Kshayika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of +actions and their effects, as in final liberation. + +3. The "mixed" (_misra_) state combines both these, as when water is +partly pure. + +4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent +influence on the future]. The _Parinamika_ state is the soul's innate +condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent +states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the +above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether +happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sutra quoted above. + +This has been explained in the _Svarupa-sambodhana_-- + +"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some +way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last; +such is the soul described to be." + +If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, +we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being +equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to +support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid +non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this +is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the +advocates of the _Syad-vada_) it is perfectly notorious that all +things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes. + +Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned +above, _jiva_ and _ajiva_; they hold that there are five _astikayas_ +or categories,--_jiva_, _akasa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_. +To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67] +as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly +apply the idea of "body" (_kaya_),[68] from their occupying several +parts of space. + +The _jivas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the +"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also +divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_), +and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _samjna_, +_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving +instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are +also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable" +(_sthavara_). + +The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and +taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as +possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are +earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be +made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are +aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is +appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will +hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions +must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which +have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies, +are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of +earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70] +These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense +of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of +passing into any other state of existence. + +_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _akasa_ are singular categories [and not +generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are +the causes of a substance's change of place. + +_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They +assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally +extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called +Lokakasa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred +from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of +_akasa_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously +occupied by another. + +_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of +two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the +compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by +the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise +from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from +separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called +_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_pur_), and "dissolve" (_gal_). +Although "time" is not properly an _astikaya_, because it does not +occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition], +still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold; +"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities +reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the +general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jiva_, form, &c., of the +body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion +into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit," +"demerit," and _akasa_. "Action" (_paryaya_) has thus been defined; +the actions (_paryayah_) of a substance are, as has been said, its +existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its +course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jiva_, the knowledge of +objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the +lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special +functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_ +[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"]. + +Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said-- + +"The _tattvas_ are _jiva_, _ajiva_, _asrava_, _bandha_, _samvara_, +_nirjara_, and _moksha_." _Jiva_ and _ajiva_ have been already described. +_Asrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74] +through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, +_audarika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _asrava_, +because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is +called _asrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences +flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to +it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, +collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions +which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated +lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jiva_, heated +by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought +by _yoga_. _Kashaya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts" +(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, +pride, delusion, and lust. _Asrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus +abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what +is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech. + +These various subdivisions of _asrava_ have been described at length +in several _Sutras_. "_Asrava_ is the impulse to action with body, +speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or +demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Asrava_ is the +action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; +the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by +means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form, +&c."[76] + +_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false +intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kashaya_), +and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many +parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are +suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said-- + + "Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes + bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'" + +In this quotation the word "sin" (_kashaya_) is used to include the +other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed. +Vachakacharya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes +of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and +sin." + +(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural +character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence +of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or +derived, when learned by another's teaching. + +(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and +the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c. + +(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pramada_) is a want of effort to practise the +five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c. + +(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction +that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of +bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubhava_; _yoga_ [or _asrava_] causes +those kinds called _prakriti_ and _pradesa_. + +"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakriti_, _sthiti_, +_anubhava_, and _pradesa_ are its four kinds." + +1. _Prakriti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or +sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into +eight _mula-prakritis_.[77] + +Thus obstructions (_avarana_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition, +as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_) +_jnanavarana_, or (_b_) _darsanavarana_. (_c_) An object recognised as +simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and +pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedaniya_. (_d_) +A delusion (_mohaniya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the +Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in +conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_) +_Ayus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _Naman_, or +"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter +paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of +noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antaraya_ +produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the +king by considerations of economy. + +Thus is the _prakriti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the +eight _mula-prakritis_, with subdivisions according to the different +actions of the various subject-matter. + +And thus has Umaswati-vachakacharya[80] declared: "The first kind of +_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition, +_vedaniya_, _mohaniya_, _ayus_, _naman_, _gotra_, and _antaraya_;" and he +has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine, +twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been +explained at full length in the _Vidyananda_ and other works, and here is +omitted through fear of prolixity. + +2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued +unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first +three _mula-prakritis_, _jnanavarana_, &c., and the last, _antaraya_, have +not swerved from their respective natures even through the period +described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of +periods of time measured by thirty _sagaropamas_."[81] This continuance is +_sthiti_. + +3. _Anubhava._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there +exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for +producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies +produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubhava_) +for producing their respective effects. + +4. _Pradesa._ The _bandha_ called _pradesa_ is the entrance into the +different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless +number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the +consequences of actions. + +_Samvara_ is the stopping of _asrava_--that by which the influence of +past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is +divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the +soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it +is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the +acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided +into five kinds, as _irya_,[83] _bhasha_, &c., as has been explained +by Hemachandra. + +1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk +circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good +call _irya_. + +2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with +all people; this is called _bhasha-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of +speech. + +3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults +which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshana-samiti_.[85] + +4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let +him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the +_adana-samiti_. + +5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations +in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the +_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed +as that which closes (_sam_ + _vrinoti_) the door of the stream of +_asrava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_Asrava_ is the cause +of mundane existence, _samvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this +is the Arhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification +of this.'" + +_Nirjara_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by +self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit +of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness +and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair, +&c. This _nirjara_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yathakala_) and +ancillary (_aupakramanika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is +dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at +that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at, +_nirjara_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c. +But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into +means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjara_ of +actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions +which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjara_ arises, which is +twofold, _sakama_ and _akama_. That called _sakama_ belongs to +ascetics, the _akama_ to other embodied spirits."[91] + +_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire +absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false +perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are +abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjara_, there arises the +absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been +said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay +(_nirjara_) of the causes of bondage and of existence." + +Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's +wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have +stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated +contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_ +exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul +onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, +sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its +encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its +isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of +the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame. + +"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual +interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _sanga_ is +merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:-- + +"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, +from the absence of _sanga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from +the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the +potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the +castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire." + +Hence they recite a sloka:-- + + "However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, + moon, and the rest; + + "But never to this day have returned any who have gone to + Alokakasa." + +Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the +soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself +untainted by any pain or impression thereof. + +Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the +foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain. +This has been declared in the _Siddhanta_, "_Jiva_, _ajiva_, _punya_, +_papa_, _asrava_, _samvara_, _nirjarana_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are +the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here. + +Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the +_sapta-bhangi-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may +be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may +be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable," +"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not, +and not predicable." All this Anantavirya has thus laid down:-- + +1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say +'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.' + +2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure +likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it +be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it. + +3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first +as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its +indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises. + +4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be +employed simultaneously." + +_Syat_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a +part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it +has been said-- + + "This particle _syat_ is in the form of a verb, but, from + its being connected with the sense, it denotes + indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect + on the implied meaning." + +If, again, the word _syat_ denoted determinateness, then it would be +needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes +indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syat_, +"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathamchit_; and so it is +not really useless. As one has said-- + +"The doctrine of the _syad-vada_ arises from our everywhere rejecting +the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhangi-naya_, +and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to +be accepted." + +If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, +everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would +ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to +treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. +But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at +certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. +Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_ +or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the +thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the +phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghatosti_), as the two words "is" and "pot" +would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the +words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same +argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been +declared-- + + "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' + implies 'is;' + + "Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and + non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c. + +The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents +severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and +non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is +inexplicable (_anirvachaniyata_);[97] three other classes hold one or +other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now, +when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?" +&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way," +&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues +to the holder of the _Syad-vada_, which ascertains the entire meaning +of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syadvada-manjari_-- + +"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the +omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of +scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point +proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syad-vada_, +which ascertains the entire meaning of all things." + +"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions +and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which +with no partiality equally favours all sects." + +The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-suri-- + +"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, +giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, +liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, +deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our +system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true +knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of +knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof +(_pramana_) in the _Syad-vada_ doctrine,--sense-perception and +inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are +nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jiva_, the _ajiva_, merit and demerit, +_asrava_, _samvara_, _bandha_, _nirjara_, _mukti_,--we will now +explain each. _Jiva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajiva_ is all other +than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the +opposite; _asrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjara_ is the +unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight +forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is +included in _samvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _asrava_. + +"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is +hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute +liberation is declared by Jina. The Swetambaras are the destroyers of +all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair, +they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the +Jaina _Sadhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry +peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they +eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the +Jaina Rishis. + +"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so +say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point +between them and the Swetambaras."[106] + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."] + +[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_, +alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the +hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._] + +[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syad-vadinam_.] + +[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _grahyasya_ +for _agrahyasya_.] + +[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.] + +[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyagrahanam_ to _tasya +grahanam_ (_tasya_ being _jadatayah_).] + +[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen +though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the +_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!] + +[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarupam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3, +_infra_.] + +[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kumarila's +writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the +Sankara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumarila had a +little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He +repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that +there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhat kaschid +vidyaleso jatah._] + +[Footnote 49: Kumarila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as +his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised +proofs,--the sixth, _abhava_, being negative, is, of course, not +applicable. I understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability +of "presumption" or _artha-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat +were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, +but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by +retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a +Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it +cannot be convincing in his own.] + +[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhavavedakasya_ for +_tatsadbhavadekasya_.] + +[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilarthajnanat notpatty_, I +propose to read _nikhilarthajnanotpatty_.] + +[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Karya_ and equally disputed.] + +[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Sariri_), "my +hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the +notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."] + +[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the +_Anavasthadosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed +fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before +everybody's eyes.] + +[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvarthe_ for +_tattvartham_.] + +[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarsanadi_ for +_asamyagdarsanadi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition +of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.] + +[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sutras_, ii. 30. +Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.] + +[Footnote 58: I read _kamanam_ for _kamanam_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 times +3 times 3 = 18).] + +[Footnote 59: For _abhashana_, see Hemach. 16.] + +[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17, +_rasayanajnanasraddhavacharanani_ for _rasayanajnanam +sraddhanavaranani_. For _avacharana_, see _Susruta_, vol. ii. p. 157, +&c. If _anavarana_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the +absence of obstructions."] + +[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it +by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.] + +[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ or +_kshayopasama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."] + +[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushadyakarena_ for +_kalushanyakarena_. The _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ seem to +correspond to the _aupasamika_ and _kshayika_ states about to be +described.] + +[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._] + +[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sankhya philosophy, the soul is not +really bound though it seems to itself to be so.] + +[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, +and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as +the eye, light, &c.] + +[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'stiti_ for _sthiti_.] + +[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikaya_.] + +[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one +sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _sankhagandolakaprabhritayas +trasas chaturvidhah prithivyaptejo_.] + +[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _tesham ajivatvat_ for _tesham +jivatvat_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because +the former only are animate."] + +[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatravasthite_ for +_sarvatravasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _alokenavachchhinne_ for +_alokenavichchhinne_.] + +[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddhanta-muktavali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is +_upabhoga-sadhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyanuka_. This category +takes up the forms of _sthavara_ which were excluded from _jiva_.] + +[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Madhava +for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is +analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this +definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaisesh. Sutra_, i. 1, 15. _Paryaya_ is +explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Paryaya_, in p. 36, line 11 +(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that +which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach. +_Abhidh_. 1503, _paryayo 'nukramah kramah_.] + +[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul +to act.] + +[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _asravanakaranatvad_.] + +[Footnote 76: The _jnana_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold +by its connection with the senses and external objects.] + +[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in +Govindananda's gloss, _Ved. Sut._, ii. 2, 33.] + +[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _adaraniyasya_ for +_avaraniyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _avaraniya_ may be used for +_avarana_ (_Pan._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga Sut._, ii. 52, where Vyasa's +Comm. has _avaraniya_.] + +[Footnote 79: _Jalavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.] + +[Footnote 80: Umasvami-?] + +[Footnote 81: For the _sagaropama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p. +309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ityadyuktakalad urdhvam api_ for the +obscure _ityadyuktam kaladurddhanavat_. I also read at the end of the +line _prachyutih sthitih_ for _prachyutisthitih_.] + +[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svakaryakarane_.] + +[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _irshya_ read +_irya_,--a bad misreading.] + +[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _apadyeta_ for _apadyata_.] + +[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshana_ read _saishana_.] + +[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagatitale_.] + +[Footnote 87: Madhava omits the remaining divisions of _samvara_. +Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishaha_, +"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic, +patience, gentleness," &c.; _bhavana_, "conviction," such as that +worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _charitra_, "virtuous +observance."] + +[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _asravasrotaso_.] + +[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.] + +[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yathakala-_ for _yatha +kala-_.] + +[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably +corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary +_nirjara_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a +passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjara_ +is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the +attainment of the highest good. The former is _akama_, "desireless," +because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the +latter is _sakama_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire +under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.] + +[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p. +37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in +which future actions are to be performed.] + +[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."] + +[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhangi-naya_, see Ved. S. +Gloss., ii. 2, 23.] + +[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first +line, _kim vritatadvidheh_, and therefore leave them untranslated.] + +[Footnote 96: Thus Govindananda applies it (_Ved. Sut._, ii. 2, 33) to +"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.] + +[Footnote 97: '[Greek: AkatalepsiaAkatalepsia]. This is +Sriharsha's tenet in the _Khandana-khanda-khadya_.] + +[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _matenamisritani_ read _matena +misritani_.] + +[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.] + +[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is +really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidhana-chintamani_, +72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antarayas_, _ragadweshav +aviratih smarah_, and _haso_ for _himsa_. The order of the eighteen +_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, +10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.] + +[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartinih_.] + +[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.] + +[Footnote 103: In last line, for _samsrave_ read _samvare_.] + +[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, +the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's +_Bhagavati_, pp. 250, 261-266.] + +[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharanah_ is explained by the _rajoharanadharin_ +(= _vratin_) of Halayudha, ii. 189.] + +[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _strim_ read _stri_.] + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE RAMANUJA SYSTEM. + + +This doctrine of the Arhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for +whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous +co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a +plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should +any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of +existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why +should there not be an alternation between existence and +non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that +alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is +multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ganesa +and of the incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for the +elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human +in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts +being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of +a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the +same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence +in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be +compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different +times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then +indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to +be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length +and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different +relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no +contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects. +Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as +reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same +thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other +_bhangas_ (Arhata tenets). + +Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhangas_, which lies at +the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory), +or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform, +there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are +multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to +prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent) +proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for +the neck of the Syad-Vadin. + +An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Arhata +system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be, +when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine +or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his +organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, +whether it be ninefold or not! + +In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Arhatas +say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in +the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism +assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul +for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not +(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole +body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine +body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of +filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul +resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like +the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion, +according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the +road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior +of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition) +that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently +non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good +and evil unmerited. + +As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the +rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of +the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated. + +Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible +revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyasa accordingly +propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in +one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Ramanuja with the +express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets +of Ramanuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as +soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer. +Thus it has been said-- + + "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari + (Vishnu) + + "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible + world is not-soul." + +Others, again (the followers of Sankaracharya), maintain that pure +intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is +really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal, +pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the +individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object" +(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation. +The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject +and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one +reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair +sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so +forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this +beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of +individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity +with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows +spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of +things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz., +Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and +thinking themselves very wise, the Sankaras will not tolerate this +division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and +Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This +might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But +there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity, +suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am +ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said +(to explain the views of the Sankara)-- + + "Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by + knowledge, + + "Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate." + +This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about +the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One +who leans on the arm of Prabhakara, or one to whom Kumarila-bhatta +gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words-- + + "By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the + existent and non-existent, + + "Thing is recognised something by some at certain times. + + "Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. + Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught + else is observed." + +They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being +cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and +knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of +knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who +maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above +argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and +other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the +consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised +by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent? +If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of +knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there +is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness +presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will +not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Sankaras continue) as the +foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be +entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and +other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative +ignorance. + +All this (the Ramanuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be +for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative +ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we +would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and +as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is +presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge +of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented, +how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no +object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is +revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and +thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance +accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we +rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must +arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion +to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must, +therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know +not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of +cognition allowed by us both. + +Well, then (the Sankaras may contend), let the form of cognition +evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as +follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another +entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior +non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge, +which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of +knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object +not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the +first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand +grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent) +illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not +admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do +not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example +is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that +illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only +that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by +knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only +ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition, +ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness. +We dismiss further prolixity. + +The counterposition (of the Ramanujas) is as follows:--The illusion +under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge, +because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any +one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion +about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not +start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare +existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about +(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness, +also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c., +constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If +any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have +cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a +gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of +light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light, +as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a +mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a +quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul, +while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence +as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always +within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is +within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is +itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no +suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul +which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For +this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the +thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the +like texts. + +It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the +existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth +(_anrita_); for the word untruth (_anrita_) denotes that which is +other than truth (_rita_). The word _rita_ has a passive sense, as +appears from the words, Drinking _rita_. _Rita_ means works done +without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the +bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in +question, untruth (_anrita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed +during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from +propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is +obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the +entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not +this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such +texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_maya_) to be the primary +emanative cause (_prakriti_), the term (_maya_) designates the +emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guna_), and +creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the +inexplicable illusion (for which the Sankaras contend). + +In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child, +moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_maya_) of the barbarian were +swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion" +(_maya_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of +projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an +inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred +from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art +thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate +Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of +the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a +supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of +excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme +Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a +repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the +emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a +pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts +as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word +Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the +Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual +spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates +one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vadin may +reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in +the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of +souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate +power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the +case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that +Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a +different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation +to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is +understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same +object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be +known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That) +must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and +place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text, +That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by +abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz., +finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and +infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul). +This suggestion (the Ramanujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is +no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that +Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of +"implication" (_lakshana_, both This and That being used in their +denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past +and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed +to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a +supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being +past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede +to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable +by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is +unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we +admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one +thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it +differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be +inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things +will be triumphant. + +We have, therefore (the Ramanujas continue), laid it down in this +question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the +individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the +body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the +body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with +the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the +soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul +is the body. + +Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are +designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a +variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine, +human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the +body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit. +Hence-- + +God, Man, Yaksha, Pisacha, serpent, Rakshasa, bird, tree, creeper, +wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they +what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means +of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting +things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the +individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole +complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within. +That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme +Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktavali and in the Chaturantara-- + + "God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else + than That, called the established entity, + + "Of this there is much significant and undoubted + exemplification in common speech and in the Veda; + + "Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the + form of gods, mortals, and the rest + + "When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made + a diversity of names and forms in the world." + +In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the +rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in +systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words, +"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that +it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord, +lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all +words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be +ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by +Ramanuja in the Vedartha-sangraha, when analysing the Vedic text about +names and forms. + +Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there +can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even +in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned) +thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could +not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented +form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the +universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what +was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does +knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this +illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that +there is no proof of these positions. + +Nor is there an absurdity (as the Sankaras would say), on the +hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming +that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it +is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary +cause (_prakriti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary +elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and +the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and +so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms, +is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute +spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is +absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect), +there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one +cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were +unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one +cognition all cognition would be sublated. + +It is laid down (by the Ramanujas) that retractation into the universe +(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls +and the originant (_prakriti_), returns to its imperceptible state, +unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute +spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the +gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is +soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the +condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way +the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyasa) +treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the +Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to +deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by +those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are +explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real +existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical +with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all +forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being +forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109] + +What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a +universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is +admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as +all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that +one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as +soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the +essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and +not to be confounded. + +Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls, +consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped +in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction +and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. +Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains +proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the +Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are +not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure +and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, +susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of +the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal +controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of +fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, +majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of +auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than +himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite +adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and +divine. + +Venkata-natha has given the following distribution of things:-- + + "Those who know it have declared the principle to be + twofold, substance and non-substance; + + "Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the + former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time. + + "The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant' + (_parak_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the + Lord; + + "The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other + principle some have called the unsentient primary." + +Of these-- + + "Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the + originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords; + + "Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and + cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord; + + "Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three + cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as + characterised by goodness; + + "The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is + intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance + summarily recounted." + +Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called +souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the +text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20). +Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kanada, iii. 2, 20), +Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity +of souls is often spoken of in revelation-- + + "The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall + it again cease to be; + + "Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not + killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gita, ii. 20). + +Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of +requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has +accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25): Because +no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is +atomic is well known from revelation-- + + "If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a + hundred times, + + "The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is + capable of infinity." + +And again-- + + "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a + wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as + atomic." + +The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is +divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of +fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the +Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vasudeva +(a patronymic of Krishna), and the like. + + "Vasudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with + auspicious attributes, + + "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the + animator of spirits." + +This same Vasudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted +to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various +rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of +pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration" +(_archa_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vyuha_), "the +subtile" (_sukshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration" +is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Rama, +and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vasudeva, +Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the +entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vasudeva. His +attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt +from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless, +without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.) +The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to +the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by +worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end +of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary +becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It +has, therefore, been said-- + + "Vasudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as + desired by each, + + "According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large + recompense. + + "For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five + embodiments; + + "Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are + 'emanations;' + + "As Sankarshana, Vasudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his + manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile' + is the entire six attributes; + + "That self-same called Vasudeva is styled the Supreme + Spirit; + + "The internal controller is declared as residing in the + soul, the actuator of the soul, + + "Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such + as 'Who abiding in the soul.' + + "By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his + defilement becomes a qualified votary; + + "By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes + qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next, + + "By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able + to behold the 'internal controller.'" + +The worship of the Deity is described in the Pancha-ratra as +consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the +preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these, +access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the +temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the +like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities. +Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention +to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishnu, the +commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth +the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the +visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by +the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme +Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his +lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless, +marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no +future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the +traditionary text-- + + "When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer + undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory, + having attained to the supreme consummation. + + "Vasudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own + mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more + return." + +After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of +the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedanta aphorisms by +the venerated Bodhayanacharya too prolix, Ramanuja composed a +commentary on the Sarirakamimansa (or Vedanta theosophy). In this the +sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired +to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism +means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the +glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to +know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because +one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its +meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being +perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs +for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By +the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are +essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable +excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the +knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is +mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting +away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the +knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge +of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and +the latter Mimansa constitute one system of institutes. On this +account the glossator has described this system as one with the +sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is +perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable, +has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the +spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by +the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive +reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the +other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is +efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter +who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who +delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these +both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes +immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the +Pancharatra-rahasya-- + + "That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries, + + "For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him. + + "These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the + Subtile, the Internal Controller, + + "Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of + knowledge. + + "As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship, + + "He becomes qualified for the worship of each next + embodiment. + + "Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and + traditional, + + "By the aforesaid worship Vasudeva becomes propitious to + mankind. + + "Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of + meditation, + + "At once brings to a close that illusion which is the + aggregate of works. + + "Then in souls the essential attributes, from which + transmigration has vanished, + + "Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest. + + "These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and + the Lord, + + "Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the + Deity. + + "Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute, + which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior; + + "They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit." + +It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain +must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute +spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According +to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, +and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of +desire is predominant (in the word _jijnasitavya_), and desired +knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute +must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by +such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial +knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to +any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each, +even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as: +Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to +be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known, +let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond +knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being +understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz., +_shadangena vedo'dhyeyo jneyascha_, the Veda, with its six appendages, +is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda +must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages, +engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it +and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to +be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being +understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the +aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is +significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken +succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in +the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all +knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of +emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition. + + "Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts, + + "And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the + Highest and Lowest," + +because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self +indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is +an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of +the representations. The author of the Vakya has treated of all this +in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The +characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is +not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning; +Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds +its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is +choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is +of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself-- + + "To them always devoted, who worship me with love, + + "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to + me." + +And again-- + + "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith + unwavering." + +But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other +motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other +desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and +other means. As is said by the author of the Vakya: Attainment +thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_), +practice (_abhyasa_), observance (_kriya_), excellence (_kalyana_), +freedom from despondency (_anavasada_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_), +according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication +(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature, +resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of +discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and +by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption +is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the +quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary +explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gita) by (Ramanuja) the +author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof. +Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and +tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic +text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the +supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity +(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by +veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the +explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted. +Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of +dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus +been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been +dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain +rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a +presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as +incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit +(Vaikuntha) is attained. Thus Yamuna says: Attainable by the final and +absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works +and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by +the devotion of works and knowledge. + +In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to +be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which +the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the +creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the +universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation, +sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably +multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahma +to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from +this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities +which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as +indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, +omniscient, and omnipotent. + +In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an +absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes +itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its +source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be +that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is +the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of +knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is +the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other +form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the +absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the +illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an +effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin. +It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements, +that prove the existence of the absolute thus described. + +Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other +kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation +of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by +anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth +aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to +exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is +the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of +the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest +end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz., +Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a +sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with +cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe +that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A +son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the +cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We +have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt +from the original (viz., Ramanuja's Bhashya on the Vedanta aphorisms); +we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity; +and thus all is clear.[110] + +A. E. G. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of +Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular +statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands +and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, +if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to +inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples +both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the +Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he +proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive +information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he +declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean +Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, +and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp. +297, 298.] + +[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's +pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be +the plaything of God.] + +[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._] + +[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Ramanuja and his system, +see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. +The _Tattva-muktavali_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871; +but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.] + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA. + + +Ananda-tirtha (Purna-prajna, or Madhva) rejected this same Ramanuja +system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size +of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda +without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the +self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, +dependency upon the Pancha-ratra, the reality of plurality in the +universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to +reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the +tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a +number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under +a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a +new explication of the Brahma-Mimansa (or Vedanta). + +For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into +independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:-- + + "Independent and dependent, two principles are received; + + "The independent is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from + imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences." + +Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vadins): Why predicate of the +absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads, +which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and +heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not +so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs +positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception, +for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces +a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent +will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional +difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite? +The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing +and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes +such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be +asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension +of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its +contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be +thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or +without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw +(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and +its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing +apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous +apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for +cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the +cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference; +the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and +non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised +even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent +contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent +concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as +follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a +difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who +maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In +the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable +Brahman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being +irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is +the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but +if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere; +this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is +first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name +and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for +example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is +first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate +judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or +contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishnu-tattva-nirnaya: +"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and +determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or +predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were +proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its +counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical +circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real +predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because +difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as +if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word +_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as +such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a +presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and +judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the +same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., +aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the +Sankhya-karika, v. vii.)-- + + "From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from + defect in the organs, from instability of the common + sensory, + + "From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered, + and from aggregation of similars." + +There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak +of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium +applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of +lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or +the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered +by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common +sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of +things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the +light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being +overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of +similars. + +Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no +harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes +and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is +possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference +in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some +ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to +infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said +ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and +say that two things are different as differenced from the different. +Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, +for there being no difference to serve as the example in such +inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus +it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a +little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be +no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride +is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, +then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no +trouble. + +Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the +Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its +obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that +person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring +as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the +slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not +become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of +all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the +excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the +gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has +been said:-- + + "Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings, + + "And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence + all that they desire." + +Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vadins) in their thirst to be one +with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishnu is like a +mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a +fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishnu +they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same +thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the +Mahabharata-tatparya-nirnaya:-- + + "O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishnu's anger is waxed + great; + + "He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they + decide blindly." + +This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised +into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship. + +Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the +weapons of Narayana (or Vishnu) as a memorial of him, and as a means +of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel +of the Sakalya-samhita:-- + + "The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal + Vishnu, which is the might of the gods, + + "He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuntha) + which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into: + + "The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, the + gods entered that heaven; + + "Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the + world, that weapon Brahmans wear (stamped upon them); + + "Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of + Vishnu; + + "Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishnu), let + us become beatified." + +Again, the Taittiriyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded, +is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The +particular parts to be branded are specified in the Agneya-purana:-- + + "On his right hand let the Brahman wear Sudarsana, + + "On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the + Veda declared." + +In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being +branded with the discus:-- + + "Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns, + + "Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of + Vishnu. + + "Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the + hand of Vishnu, + + "Adored by all the gods; O Panchajanya, to thee be + adoration." + +(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such +names as Kesava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme +Lord. + +(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity, +(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body, +(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common +sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the +dedication to Narayana of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has +been said:-- + + "Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is + of ten kinds." + +Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may +also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also +difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts +setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All +rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the +divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know +the truth, O Brahman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is +individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is +illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion." + +Again:-- + + "After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me, + + "In creation they are not born again, in retractation they + perish not" (Bhagavad-gita, xiv. 2). + +According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation +because of occasion, and because of non-proximity." + +Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue +of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this +text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a +Brahman devoutly a Sudra becomes a Brahman, _i.e._, becomes exalted. + +If any one urge that according to the text:-- + + "If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end," + +this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that +duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What +you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real +meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt, +come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a +fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere +illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue +of the testimony of many such passages as:-- + + "The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment, + + "The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O + Infinite. + + "The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation, + because it produces ideas; + + "The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed + (_avidya_) ignorance: + + "Styled (_maya_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for + the name _maya_ is used of the pre-eminent; + + "The excellent knowledge of Vishnu is called, though one + only, by these names; + + "For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised + by spontaneous beatitude." + +That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects +sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained, +therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For +in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible, +illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which +as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature). + +If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the +answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality, +Vishnu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior. +Accordingly, the grand revelation:-- + + "A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference + between the unsentient and the Lord, + + "A difference among souls, and a difference of the + unsentient and the soul each from the other. + + "Also the difference of unsentient things from one another, + the world with its five divisions. + + "This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a + beginning it would have an end: + + "Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not + illusorily imagined: + + "For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never + ceases. + + "That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those + that lack knowledge; + + "For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known + and sustained by Vishnu." + +The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme +excellence of Vishnu. With this in view the Lord declared:-- + + "Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and + the imperishable; + + "The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the + unmodified. + + "The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme + Spirit, + + "Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three + worlds. + + "Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than + the imperishable (soul), + + "Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best + of persons (_Purushottama_); + + "He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he + all-knowing worships me in every wise. + + "Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless + (Arjuna): + + "Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he + has to do, O Bharata" (Bhagavad-gita, xv. 16-20). + +So in the Maha-varaha-- + + "The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme + spouse of Sri; + + "Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity + must be subordinate." + +It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme +excellence of Vishnu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men, +according to the text of the Bhallaveya Upanishad: While merit, +wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal; +therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And +emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu, according to the +text of the Narayana Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest +state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration, +while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated; +the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated +from this snare of works. According also to the words of the +Vishnu-purana-- + +"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth +and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the +supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of +emancipation." + +And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only through the +knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality. +Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory +of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art +thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of +the real purport. + + "The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally + unknown, + + "The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these + be one?" + +And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like +the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand +revelation:-- + + "The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either + similarity of cognition, + + "Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the + place of the individual; + + "Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is + different, + + "The difference being independence and completeness (in the + Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the + individual spirit)." + +Or to propose another explanation of the text, _Atma tat tvam asi_, +That art thou, it may be divided, _atma tat tvam asi_. He alone is +soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art +not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine +of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:-- + + "Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be + well got rid of." + +According, therefore, to the Tattva-vada-rahasya, the words in the +nine examples (in the Chhandogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with +a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of +non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:-- + + "Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various + trees; + + "Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water; + + "Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy; + + "So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different. + + "Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, + the supreme Hari + + "Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the + individual spirit, though he is its actuator; + + "On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise + he is bound." + +And again-- + + "Brahma, Siva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the + decay of their bodies; + + "Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is + for the sustentation of Lakshmi. + + "By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, + knowledge, pleasure, and the rest, + + "All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to + him." + +And again:-- + + "Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted + from transmigration, + + "Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss. + + "Vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme + ruler. + + "Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord." + +That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be +evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all +things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by +knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and +expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is +known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man +knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior +and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the +Advaita-vadins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_ +and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is +made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text +must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay +recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification, +name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real, +cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of +these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance +with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name +such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the +words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere, +then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the +statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the +statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the +statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true. + +Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious +reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or +transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the +author of the Nyaya-nirvana: The proof of the permanence of the +transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism. +And in the Tarkika-raksha-- + + "When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such, + or not such and such, + + "The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is + called Nitya-sama." + +With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is +stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes +results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid +rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for +the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, +general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and +the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of +an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the +subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general +form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma +in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself +true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be +said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is +equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence. + +If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not +its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the +carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of +money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence +are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity. + +The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to +be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to +purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the +qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason. + +Accordingly it is stated in the Garuda-purana:-- + + "All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence + regularly; what then is the reason of this? + + "And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those + the most excellent? + + "Tell me this, Brahma, that I may know it truly." + +Thus addressed by Narada, the most excellent Brahma replied:-- + + "The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and + in an auspicious sense, + + "And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason." + +It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute, +because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Narayana, +and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about +which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of +the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. +The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which +result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the +words of the Skanda-purana-- + + "He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are + emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge, + involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;" + +and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence +adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it +has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by +way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the +Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads. +Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the +Kaurma-purana-- + + "Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case + + "Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of + evidence; + + "Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by + revelation and tradition, + + "Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no + hesitation." + +What a Sastra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in +the Skanda-purana:-- + + "The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sama-veda, the + Atharva-veda, the Mahabharata, the Pancha-ratra, and the + original Ramayana, are called Sastras. + + "That also which is conformable to these is called Sastra. + + "Any aggregate of composition other than this is a + heterodoxy." + +According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes +is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, +viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the +duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as +there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the +duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there +can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the +texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it +has said:-- + + "I ever laud Narayana, the one being to be known from + genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the + imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible + excellences." + +It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence +of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth +aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this, +the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the +construction, in the Brihat-samhita:-- + + "Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit, + eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the + purport is ascertained." + +It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the +Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred +institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What +remains may be sought from the Anandatirtha-bhashya-vyakhyana (or +exposition of the Commentary of Ananda-tirtha). We desist for fear of +giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was +promulgated by Purna-prajna Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the +third incarnation of Vayu:-- + + "The first was Hanumat, the second Bhima, + + "The third Purna-prajna, the worker of the work of the + Lord." + +After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the +following stanza at the conclusion of his work:-- + + "That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the + text of the Veda, sufficiently + + "Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the + splendour of the Veda; + + "The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to + the words of Rama (Hanumat); the second was Bhima; + + "By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been + composed in regard to Kesava." + +The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic +texts. + +The purport of this is that Vishnu is the principle above all others +in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111] + +A. E. G. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 111: For a further account of Ananda-tirtha or Madhva see +Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the +Brahma-sutras has been printed in Calcutta.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE PASUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULISA. + + +Certain Mahesvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishnavas known +by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch +as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be +a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as +stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing +for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend +upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and +others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme +Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free +from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these +arguments, these Mahesvaras adopt the Pasupata system, which is +conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to +the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then +we shall expound the Pasupata union and rites of Pasupati. The meaning +is as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and +this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the +spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in +the Ganakarika:-- + + "But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one + with three factors; + + "He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a + spiritual guide. + + "The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the + localities, the perseverance, the purifications, + + "The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and + there are three functions." + +The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three +(_trini_), instead of the feminine three (_tisrah_), is a Vedic +construction. + +(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and +is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of +the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattacharya says: Knowledge, +penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth. + +(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is +of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also +says:-- + + "False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and + falling, + + "These five, the root of bondage, are in this system + especially to be shunned." + +(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to +liberation. + +These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest. +Thus he also says:-- + + "Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant + recollection of Rudra, + + "And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients + of acquirements." + +(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the +aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual +teachers and the rest. Thus he says:-- + + "The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the + burning-ground, and Rudra only." + +(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads +until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the +differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:-- + + "The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance, + and devotion as the fifth." + +(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false +conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five +species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said-- + + "The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of + interestedness, + + "And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification + of the state of bondage." + +(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:-- + + "The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the + spiritual guide as the fifth." + +(_h._) The five powers are as follow:-- + + "Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect, + conquest of pleasure and pain, + + "Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of + power." + +The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent +with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz., +mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies. +All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect. + +In the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to +introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation), +that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of +pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _pasu_ we are +to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that +which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to +understand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord, +who is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of +the words sacrifices and rites every one knows. + +In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and +personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute +extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the +visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only +one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly +describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation, +discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of +every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though +imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of +principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is +cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts. +Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole +system of institutes, according to the text and according to its +significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and +pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared, +summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this +intellectual power. + +The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of +three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of +assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the +possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with +unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the +faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of +works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms. +The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy +even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power. + +All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is +threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these, +sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees +according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive +sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as +proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable +by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the +cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in +general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the +light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive +sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the +objects of the sentient soul. + +The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious, +is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The +insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and +the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest. +The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds, +viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the +three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the +cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions +ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and +determination. + +The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain, +is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is +the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is +the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are +to be found in the Panchartha-bhashyadipika and other works. The cause +is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation. +This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of +attributes and actions (into Mahesvara, Vishnu, &c.) The Lord is the +possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely +first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as +possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is +expounded by the author of the Adarsa, and other institutional +authorities. + +Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and +is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that +characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by +action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union +characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c. + +Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of +two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal +is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise +is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are +bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and +devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakulisa says:-- + + "He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust. + Oblation is an observance divided into six members." + +Thus the author of the aphorisms says:-- + + "He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz., + laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious + ejaculation." + +Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and +lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of +Mahesvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-sastra, or +art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars +saltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and +with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal +sentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the +bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the +palate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like +the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be +gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require +exposition. + +The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly, +talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being +asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the +joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if +the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an +_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is +doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what +should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the +utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no +meaning, and the like. + +The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution +for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on +broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms: +Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing. + +(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive +power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, +relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in +detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes +generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we +shall expound the Pasupata union and rites of Pasupati). Detail is the +fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the +instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the +Rasikara-bhashya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these +categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an +enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters, +different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the +cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the +Sankhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is +the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other +systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall +become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth, +the sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is +determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of +works, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus +determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while +in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of +the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres +involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in +nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by +such return to transmigratory experiences. + +Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions, +since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works, +then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be +simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be +created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge +two difficulties. Think not so, replies the Pasupata, for your +supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of +works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without +results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will +follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the +efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer +of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the +works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only +when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so +furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of +Yayati, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one +will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman +engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient +creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the +creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all +his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to +be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Pasupata, +that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable, +inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed +active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose +power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed +in sacred tradition:-- + + "Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by + the efficacy of works, + + "For this reason is he in this system the cause of all + causes." + +Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through +a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies +the Pasupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere +knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or +the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for +then it would follow that the study of any system would be +superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might, +like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that +Mahadeva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of +the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is +competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of +various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh. +On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an +accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent +to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be +realised apart from the system of the Pasupatas. Therefore it is that +our great teacher has said:-- + + "If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system, + but intuition is unattainable; + + "There is no accurate characterisation of principles + otherwise than by the five categories." + +Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man +must adopt the system of the Pasupatas, which undertakes the +exposition of the five categories. + +A. E. G. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE SAIVA-DARSANA. + + +[The seventh system in Madhava's Sarva-darsana-sangraha is the +Saiva-darsana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India, +especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about +the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been +lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the +Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially, +by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal, +has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He +has there translated the Tattuva-Kattalei, or law of the Tattwas, the +Siva-Gnanapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the +Siva-Pirakasam, or light of Siva, and the three works shed immense +light on the outline as given by Madhava. One great use of the latter +is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their +Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _arul_ for _anugraha_ +and _tidchei_ for _diksha_ may testify. + +The Saivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sankhya; they +hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities, +and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and +gradually to unite it to God. Siva is the chief deity of the system, +and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the +allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pasupati is a +well-known name of Siva, as the master or creator of all things. + +There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sutras. One is in +five books, called by Colebrooke the Pasupati-sastra, which is probably +the work quoted by Madhava in his account of the Nakulisa Pasupatas; +another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemaraja, with its first +sutra, _chaitanyam atma_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta, +and opens with the sloka given in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, p. 91, lines +1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words-- + + _Kathanchid asadya Mahesvarasya dasyam._ + +None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the +present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight +Agamas and some of the Puranas. A list of the Agamas is given in Mr. +Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion;" and of these the Kirana +and Karana are quoted in the following treatise.] + + +THE SAIVA-DARSANA. + +Certain, however, of the Mahesvara sect receiving the system of truth +authoritatively laid down in the Saiva Agama,[112] reject the +foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of +our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation +of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion +that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;" +and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the +Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the +cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in +the Tantra doctrines-- + + "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sutra + the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four + feet, has again declared the same at full length." + +The meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three +before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action, +meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra, +possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not +independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as +being different from these, is first declared; next follows the +account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing +intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order +of the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means +to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without +knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the +Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the +real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place +as first the "foot" of _knowledge_ (_jnana_) which makes known all +this unto us.[114] Next follows the "foot" of _ceremonial action_ +(_kriya_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the +divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be +attained, hence the "foot" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next, +which declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts. +And as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the +fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is +forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty +(_charya_), which includes all this. + +Now Siva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in +the divine nature of Siva belongs to liberated souls and to such +beings as Vidyesvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they +depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised +to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact +of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being +effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent +being. By the strength of this inference is the universal +acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed. + +"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an +effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body +being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that +a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been +seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not +from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they +possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are +destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to +infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus +the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker, +from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the +afore-mentioned middle term (_sadhana_) must have the afore-mentioned +major (_sadhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the +latter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the +authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been +given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact, +that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions +done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]-- + + "This ignorant _jivatman_, incapable of its own true + pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction + [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go + to heaven or always to hell."[117] + +Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence, +since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that +he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the +king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of +his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru-- + + "It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to + employ means, &c.; + + "This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting + irrespectively of works, &c." + +And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Sruti) establishes the +existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their +means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various +individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable +Brihaspati-- + + "He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and + material causes,-- + + "Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that + resides in accumulated actions should ripen."-- + + "The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must + have had an intelligent maker, + + "This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see + in any other effect, as jars, &c." + +God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with +everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot +produce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious +Mrigendra[119]-- + + "He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things: + for it is an established principle + + "That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means, + parts, and end." + +"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent +maker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all +effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as +potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be +like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or +omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal +soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover, +even though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still +maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The +Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of +matter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body, +but only a body of pure energy (Sakta),[122] since we know that his +body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Sakti, according +to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the _Isana_ as his head, the +_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _Vamedeva_ +as his secret parts, and the _Sadyojata_ as his feet."[123] And this +body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but +is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are +respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and +production.[124] This has been said in the Srimat Mrigendra-- + + "From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the + body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours." + +And it has also been said elsewhere-- + + "His body is composed of the five mantras which are + subservient to the five operations, + + "And his head, &c., are formed out of the Isa, Tatpurusha, + Aghora, Vama, and other hymns." + +If you object to this view that "such passages in the Agamas as 'He is +five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the +Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what +you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his +assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since +meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely +destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara-- + + "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the + devotee." + +And similarly elsewhere-- + + "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of + form; + + "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object." + +Bhojaraja[125] has thus detailed the five operations-- + + "Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation, + destruction, and obscuration, + + "And to these must be added the active grace of him who is + eternally exalted." + +Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to +be performed directly by Siva, but in that of the toilsome Path they +are ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the Srimat +Karana[127]-- + + "In the Pure Path Siva is declared to be the only agent, but + Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme." + +It must here be understood that the word Siva includes in its proper +meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Siva, +as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheswara, the emancipated souls who have +become Sivas, and the inspired teachers (_vachakas_), together with +all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of +Siva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_). + +We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_pasu_). The +individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the +non-atomic,[128] the _Kshetrajna_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is +the _Pasu_. For we must not say with the Charvakas that it is the same +as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as +there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen. +Nor may we say with the Naiyayikas that it is cognisable by +perception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As +has been said-- + + "If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a + second knower;[131] + + "And this would require another still, if the second were + itself to be known." + +Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with +the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been +said-- + + "That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or + time, + + "They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's + all-pervadingness and eternity." + +Nor may we say with the Vedantin that it is only one, since the +apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many +individual souls; nor with the Sankhyas that it is devoid of action, +since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Sruti informs us of +a state of identity with Siva, which consists in intelligence in the +form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been +declared in the Srimat Mrigendra-- + + "It is revealed that identity with Siva results when all + fetters are removed." + +And again-- + + "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in + his soul + + "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after + liberation, Sruti calls it that which faces every way." + +It is also said in the Tattva-prakasa-- + + "The liberated souls are themselves Sivas, but these are + liberated by his favour; + + "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose + body is the five Mantras." + +Now the souls are threefold, as denominated _vijnanakalah_, +_pralayakalah_, and _sakalah_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are +under the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by +receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and +knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments, +such as _kala_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of +cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The +second are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since +in their case _kala_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence +their name _pralayakala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the +three fetters of _mala_, _maya_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_. +The first class are again subdivided into _samapta-kalushah_ and +_asamapta-kalushah_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly +exhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of +their corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the +privilege, raised by Siva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge +(the Vidyesvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of +Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya-- + + "Ananta, and Sukshma, and Sivottama, + + "Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimurttika, + + "Srikantha and Sikhandin,--these are declared to be the + Vidyesvaras." + +The latter Siva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million +Mantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prakasa.[135] Similarly +Soma-Sambhu has said-- + + "One class is named _vijnanakala_, the second _pralayakala_, + + "The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the Sastra + regards as objects of mercy. + + "The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_ + and _karma_, + + "The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with + _kala_ and ending with 'earth.'"[136] + +The _Pralayakalah_ are also twofold, as being _pakvapasadvaya_ or not, +_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in +whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the +power of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryashtaka_[137] body, and pass +through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakasa-- + + "Those among the Pralayakalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are + immature, + + "Go, united with the _puryashtaka_ body, into many births by + the power of _karman_." + +The _puryashtaka_ is also thus described in the same work-- + + "The _puryashtaka_ is composed of the internal organ, + thought (_dhi_), _karman_, and the instruments." + +This is thus explained by Aghora Siva Acharya, "the _puryashtaka_ is a +subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from +the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is +composed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending +with _kala_." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha-- + + "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending + with _kala_, is assigned to each soul, + + "And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies + produced by the world." + +The following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word +"_internal organ_," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence," +"egoism," and "reason,"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which +enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those +called _kala_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and +quality;[140] the words "_thought_" (_dhi_) and _karman_ signify the +five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile +rudiments. By the word "_instruments_" are comprehended the ten organs +of sense and action. + +"But is it not declared in the Srimat Kalottara that 'The set of five, +sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism, +these constitute the _puryashtaka_?'" + +How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and +hence the venerable Rama Kantha has explained that sutra in its +literal meaning [_i. e_., as _puryashtaka_, is derived from _ashta_, +"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you +ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal +definition of _puryashtaka_, we reply that there is really no +contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in +the following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five +rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action; +(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.) +nature [prakriti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning +with _kala_, which form a kind of case.[142] + +Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the +_puryashtaka_ body, Mahesvara Ananta having compassionated them as +possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the +world; as has been said-- + + "Mahesvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the + world." + +The class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_ +and _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in +conformity with their maturity (_paripaka_), puts forth a power +agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred +and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Mandali, +&c., as has been said-- + + "The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection + with _Kala_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days; + + "The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen + of these the Lords of the Mantras. + + "Eight of these are called _Mandalins_; eight again are + Krodha, &c.; + + "Viresa, Srikantha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together + are the hundred and eighteen." + +In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a +teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his +manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the +process of initiation; as has been said-- + + "These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a + healing power, + + "He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to + the highest principle." + +It is also said in the Srimad Mrigendra-- + + "He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which + previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[143] + +All this has been explained at great length by Narayana-Kantha, and +there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear +of prolixity. + +But as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the +Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions, +appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy +the rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said-- + + "The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he + appoints to enjoy their various deserts, + + "According to their respective actions: such are the various + kinds of souls." + +We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _pasa_). +This is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _maya_, and _rodha-sakti_.[145] +But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Saiva Agamas that the +chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been +shown to mean Siva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic +bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence +matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only +fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal +dot, which is the germinal atom of _maya_, and is called a +Siva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the +highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Siva, +still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that +it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the +state of such deities as Vidyesvara, &c. Thus we see there is no +contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakasa-- + + "The bonds of matter will be fourfold." + +And again in the Srimad Mrigendra-- + + "The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer + (_rodha_), action, and the work of Maya, + + "These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively + called by the name of 'merit.'" + +The following is the meaning of this couplet:-- + +(1.) "Enveloping," because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the +soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because _mala_, a +natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As +has been said-- + + "_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts + the soul's vision and action; + + "It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on + copper."[147] + +(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond" +[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Siva +obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself +partaking of the nature of matter]. + +Thus it has been said-- + + "Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of + all, + + "I am metaphorically called _pasa_,[148] because I follow + desert." + +(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed +by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit, +like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning +series. As has been said in the Srimat Kirana-- + + "As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are + beginningless: + + "If an eternal character is thus established, then what + cause could produce any change therein?" + +(4.) "_Maya_," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all +the world is potentially contained (_mati_) at a mundane destruction, +and again at a creation it all comes (_yati_) into manifestation, +hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Srimat +Saurabheya-- + + "The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed + therein at a mundane destruction, + + "And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form + of effects as _kala_, &c."[149] + +Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here +through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three +categories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter. + +A different mode of treating the subject is found in the +Jnanaratnavali, &c., in such lines as-- + + "The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the + cause + + "Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six + categories." + +But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself. +Thus our account of the system is complete. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Pasupati-sastra_ +(_Mahesvara-siddhanta or Sivagama_), as the text-book of the Pasupata +sect. The Agamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the +Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion").] + +[Footnote 113: "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul, +matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with +the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _pasa_ is +eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p. +58 we find the _advaita_ of the Vedanta attacked. In p. 62 it is said +that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his +five operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that +is required for previous desert.] + +[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life +(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_, +_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gnanam_. The first is the stage of practical +piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second +is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications +involved in true _puja_; the third is that of the eight observances of +the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for +intimate union with God.] + +[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.] + +[Footnote 116: _Nyayena_ may here mean "argument."] + +[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be +only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects +proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions) +necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural +stress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original +meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahabharata, iii. 1144 (cf. +Gaudapada, S. Kar. 61).] + +[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read +_Karanasambhavachcha_.] + +[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meykanda of the Tamil +work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _Mrigendra_(?).] + +[Footnote 120: Should we read _tavad anasarirah_ in p. 83, line 2?] + +[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._] + +[Footnote 122: "_Maya_ (or Prakriti) is the material, Sakti the +instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).] + +[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras +which are included in the five _kalas_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243). +The Sivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is +composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Siva (see J. +A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse +order in Taitt. Aranyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Nyaya-malavist._ p. 3).] + +[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of +Siva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are +_Sathakkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sadakshaya?_) or _Sada-Siva_, who is Siva and +Sakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or +_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_Suddhavidya_) which is +properly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vishnu_, and _Brahma_. They are +respectively symbolised by the _nada_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of +Om.] + +[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tantrik +work, the _Narapati-jaya-charya_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhar.] + +[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of Siva in the Atharva-siras Upanishad +(see Indische Stud. i. 385).] + +[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Agamas (see +Foulkes' Catechism).] + +[Footnote 128: _Anu?_ "The soul, when clothed with these primary +things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body" +(Foulkes). Ananu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Brihad Ar. Up. +iii. 8. 8.] + +[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.] + +[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bhasha +Parichchheda, sloka 49).] + +[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.] + +[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakulisa Pasupatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p. +103).] + +[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87, +137. They are there described as being respectively under the +influence of _anavam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or +these with _mayei malam_. The _anavam_ is described as original sin, +or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_ +is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its +deserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the +source of the senses. Madhava uses "_kala_," &c., for _maya_. The +reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the +five _vidyatattvas_ (_kala_, _vidya_, _raga_, _niyati_, and _kala_) +and the twenty-four _atmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile +elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual +faculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamkara_, and _chitta_), are all +developed from _maya_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from +Soma Sambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what Madhava says, p. 77, +in his account of the Nakulisa Pasupatas, where he describes _kala_ as +unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five +_tanmatras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _ahamkara_ and +_manas_.] + +[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakaranat_ in +p. 86, line 3.] + +[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding. +It, however, names the three classes as _vijnana-kevala_, +_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.] + +[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidyatattvas_ and +all the twenty-four _atmatattvas_.] + +[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _puri_, "body" (cf. +_purisaya_ for _purusha_, Brihad Ar. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ashtaka_ +(cf. also the Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya, p. 135).] + +[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?] + +[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamkara_, _chitta_.] + +[Footnote 140: These are the seven _vidya-tattvas_, _kala_, _kala_, +_niyati_ (fate), _vidya_, _raga_, _prakriti_, and _guna_. Hoisington, +however, puts _purushan_ "the principle of life," instead of _guna_, +which seems better, as the three _gunas_ are included in _prakriti_. +He translates _kala_ by "continency," and describes it as "the power +by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into +subjection."] + +[Footnote 141: This "instrument" (_karana_) seems to mean what +Hoisington calls _purushan_ or "the principle of life which +establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes +it one of the seven _vidyatattvas_. According to Madhava, it should be +what he calls _guna_.] + +[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four +_atmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanmatras_, ten organs of sense +and action, four organs of the _antahkarana_, and seven _vidyatattvas_ +as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)] + +[Footnote 143: I take _anu_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean +the second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of +_mala_ is the _maya-mala_, the second _anava-mala_, the third +_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).] + +[Footnote 144: "The soul, when clothed with these primary things +(desire, knowledge, action, the _kaladipanchaka_, &c.), is an +exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called +_anava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to +souls.] + +[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J. +A. O. S., viz., _anavam_, _kanmam_, and _mayei_, the last is the +"obscuring" power of Mayesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Saivas +hold that Pasa, like the Sankhya Prakriti, is in itself eternal, +although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J. +A. O. S. iv. p. 228).] + +[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _maya_, +and _rodhasakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the +Siva-prakasa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable +_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed. +From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit +letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and +external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual +knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have +been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after +these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be +enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious +deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the +abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the +abode of Siva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union +with him." _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152, +153 (cf. also Weber, _Ramatapanyia Up_. pp. 312-315).] + +[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.] + +[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _pasa_ +from _paschat_.] + +[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _sa karyena_.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM. + + +Other Mahesvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Saiva +system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things +causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating +spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the +construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) +is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this +Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several +cognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self +posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by +revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of +witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives +manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150] +as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon +recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the +highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest +trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship, +suppression of the breath, and the like, these Mahesvaras set forth +the system of recognition (_pratyabhijna_). The extent of this system +is thus described by one of their authorities-- + + "The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two + explications, the greater and the less, + + "The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system + of recognition." + +The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:-- + + "Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of + Mahesvara, and wishing also to help mankind, + + "I set forth the recognition of Mahesvara, as the method of + attaining all felicity." + +[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:-- + +"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus +feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached," +having fully attained, this condition, having made it the +unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which +has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others: +otherwise the system would be a mere imposture. + +Mahesvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness, +beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence +Vishnu, Virinchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they +transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite +illusion. + +The condition of being a slave to Mahesvara is the being a recipient +of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the +divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things +according to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _dasya_, from _da_). + +The word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the +doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom +this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest +reward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end +of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the +Siva-drishti by that supreme guide the revered Somanandanatha-- + + "When once the nature of Siva that resides in all things + has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof + or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director, + + "There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further + reflection. When he knows Suvarna (or Siva) a man may cease + to act and to reflect." + +The word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self +which has recognised the nature of Mahesvara, and which manifests to +itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied, +for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of +others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a +motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man +that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a +regard for others. Thus Akshapada (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive +is that object towards which a man energises. + +The preposition _upa_ in _upapadayami_ (I set forth) indicates +proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God. + +Hence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all +felicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all +felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a +man acquired the mountain Rohana (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all +the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what +else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpalacharya says-- + + "What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of + devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?" + +We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method +of attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound +term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a +Bahuvrihi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Mahesvara, the +knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full +attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external +and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the +language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an +object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the +same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in +this system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the +accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from +argumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self +the cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection +of the powers of that God. + +This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I +establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it +convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism +of the Recognitive Institutes.] + +Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial +with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The +answer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the +soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and +therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence +of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the +recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and +active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as +total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight +the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This +self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers; +for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he +is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king, +therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here +employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of +things, the teaching of the Naiyayikas may be accepted. It has thus +been said by the son of Udayakara-- + + "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that + self-active and cognitive is Mahesvara the primal being? + + "Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the + powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and + imperfectly discerned." + +And again-- + + "The continuance of all living creatures in this + transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory + _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of + living creatures. + + "Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action + (or ritual), which is best at Kasi, + + "Is indicated by others also: different from these is real + knowledge." + +And also-- + + "The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those + things: + + "The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge + without succession, is Mahesvara." + +Somanandanatha also says-- + + "He always knows by identity with Siva: he always knows by + identity with the real." + +Again at the end of the section on knowledge-- + + "Unless there were this unity with Siva, cognitions could + not exist as facts of daily life: + + "Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the + one knower (or illuminator of cognitions). + + "He is Mahesvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken + continuity of objects: + + "Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the + deity." + +The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, "After +that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that +shines diversely this ALL," teaches that God illumines the whole round +of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the +diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which +irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises +from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality, +God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all +limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence, +self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Saiva +aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are +Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective +Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This +self-same existing self is knowledge. + +By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Somanandanatha cited +above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of +these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy +constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory +experience. This is described in the section on activity-- + + "He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects, + through the efficacy of his will: this activity is + creativeness." + +And at the close of the same section-- + + "The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world + under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his + activity worked out by motive and agent. + + "This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be + that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless, + insentient things." + +According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the +insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of +Mahesvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands +of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or +that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in +the series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his +progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his +universal creativeness. + +How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the +following illustration-- + + "The tree or jar produced by the mere will of + thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to + serve its proper purpose as tree or jar." + +If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the +jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of +the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of +clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition +of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact +notorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from +different materials. + +As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without +materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he +does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it: +they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation +of the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception, +must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the +potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a +body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the +successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the +genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the +thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible. + +On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahadeva, +amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the +Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus +operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptacharya says-- + +"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without +appliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him +resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident." + +It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how +comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The +answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution-- + + "This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates + through the fatality of works: + + "Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence, + he is enfranchised." + +It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what +difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated +in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this +question is given in a section of the Tattvartha-Sangraha-- + + "Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical + with itself, like Mahesvara free from bondage: the other (or + unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality." + +An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the +soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if +all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate +because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the +recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to +the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two +degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in +developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines +felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the +conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such +recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In +the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the +power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the +attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting +in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the +essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite. + +It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious +self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A +certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular +gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated +by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote +to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to +her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities +she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and +she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she +recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them +out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self +be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation +effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of +those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director +to recognise in itself the perfections of Mahesvara, his omniscience, +omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of +being. + +It is therefore said in the fourth section-- + + "As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as + like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he + humble himself before her with all manner of importunities: + In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be + the universal soul, in which there is no perfection + unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and + therefore this recognition thereof must come into play." + +This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other +teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we +cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become +too prolix. This then may suffice.[152] + +A. E. G. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 150: Read _bhavan_ for _bhavat_.] + +[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. Madhava here condenses Abhinava +Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the +eleventh century (see Buhler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).] + +[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Siva +sutras by Utpala, the son of Udayakara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE RASESVARA-DARSANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153] + + +Other Mahesvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self +with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life +taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily +frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver +as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _parada_, +because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of +transmigratory states. Thus it has been said-- + + "It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called + _parada_." + +And again in the Rasarnava-- + + "It is styled _parada_ because it is employed for the + highest end by the best votaries. + + "Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from + my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called + _rasa_." + +It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is +incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another +manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in +the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this +there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it +free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise-- + + "Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the + death of the body. + + "Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an + emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand. + + "Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of + mercury and of medicaments." + +Govinda-bhagavat also says-- + + "Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are + not permanent, one should strive + + "After emancipation; but emancipation results from + knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible + in a healthy body." + +The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its +permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the +body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is +dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gauri under the names +of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the +Rasahridaya-- + + "They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new + body, the creation of Hara and Gauri, + + "They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose + service is the aggregate of magic texts." + +The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should +first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is +produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gauri, and mica is +produced from Gauri, mercury and mica are severally identified with +Hara and Gauri in the verse-- + + "Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed; + + "The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of + death and poverty." + +This is very little to say about the matter. In the +Rasesvara-siddhanta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and +mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by +acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver. + + "Certain of the gods, Mahesa and others; certain Daityas, + Sukra and others; + + "Certain Munis, the Balakhilyas and others; certain kings, + Somesvara and others; + + "Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-nayaka, + + "Charvati, Kapila, Vyali, Kapali, Kandalayana, + + "These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while + alive, + + "Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith + identified." + +The meaning of this, as explicated by Paramesvara to Paramesvari, is +as follows:-- + + "By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses, + the preservation of the body; + + "And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and + air, + + "Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they + restore to life, + + "Bound they give the power of flying about." + +The swooning state of mercury is thus described-- + + "They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived, + as characterised thus-- + + "Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility. + + "A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the + following marks are seen-- + + "Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility." + +The bound condition is described in another place as follows:-- + + "The character of bound quicksilver is that it is-- + + "Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it + parts asunder under friction." + +Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gauri were +proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but +how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as +that _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is +stated by the authorities-- + + "Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully + discriminated, + + "In the first place, as pure in every process, for + perfecting the adepts." + +And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus-- + + "Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion, + restraining, + + "Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising, + covering, + + "Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and + pouring, + + "And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen + modes of treating quicksilver." + +These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat, +Sarvajna-ramesvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here +omitted to avoid prolixity. + +The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of +the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body, +a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the +Rasarnava-- + +"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the +blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it +attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied), +quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This +makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try +it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body." + +It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a +celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the +self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence, +and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being +inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the +Rasahridaya-- + + "That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems + in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away, + + "Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings + whose bodies are unglorified? + + "He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from + cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities, + + "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities + of the cognitive organs are obstructed. + + "A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the + enjoyment of sensual pleasures, + + "An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain + to emancipation?" + +Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass +through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be +extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two +mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The +objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following +dilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which +all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or +as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is +cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive +cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddhanta-- + + "The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the + mercurial system, O subtile thinker. + + "In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity + of argument, + + "Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all + sacred texts; + + "One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore + there is and must be life." + +And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents +of the doctrine of Vishnu-svamin maintain the eternity of the body of +Vishnu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sakara-siddhi-- + + "I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishnu-svamin, + + "Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and + inconceivably perfect beatitude." + +If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which +appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real +existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be +otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of +proof: (1.) by the intuition of Sanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts +such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puranic texts such +as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the +conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other +like predicates are affirmed also by Srikanta-misra, the devoted +adherent of Vishnu-svamin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest +end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which +we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus +been said-- + + "What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying, + immortal, + + "The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches, + pleasure, liberation?" + +It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as +it is said-- + + "Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying + and imperishable." + +Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by +seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasarnava-- + + "From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from + merely remembering it, + + "From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it, + appear its six virtues. + + "Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from + seeing all the phallic emblems + + "On earth, those at Kedara, and all others whatsoever." + +In another place we read-- + + "The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific + than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Kasi and + elsewhere, + + "Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health, + exemption from decay, and immortality." + +The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out-- + + "The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged + should recall quicksilver to mind. + + "He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his + blasphemy for ever filled with sin." + +The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes +place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the +practice of union ([Greek: henosis]) after the acquisition of a +divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter-- + + "The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain + men of holy vision, + + "Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the + universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun: + + "Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof + is luminousness, undifferenced, + + "From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, + tranquil, self-recognised: + + "Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole + universe manifested, made of pure intelligence, + + "The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his + bondage to works annulled." + +A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained +this he becomes beatitude. + +Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of +passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we +have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the +supreme self-- + + "May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from + dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis, + + "Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those + that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion, + + "Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the + soul awakes, + + "Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines + forth by itself from itself." + +A. E. G. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogis in Colonel +Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Parada-pana_ is one of the practices of +the Siddhopasakas in the Sankara-digvijaya, No. 49, to obviate +_apamrityu_, _akalamrityu_, &c.] + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THE VAISESHIKA OR AULUKYA DARSANA.[154] + + +Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by +the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be +essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to +know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the +Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such +passages as these (_Svetasvatara Upan_. vi. 20)-- + + "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather, + + "Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of + Siva." + +Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing +(_sravana_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhavana_), as it has +been said-- + + "By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated + meditation,-- + + "By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the + highest union (_yoga_)." + +Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the +knowledge of the _vyapti_ (or universal proposition), and the +knowledge of the _vyapti_ follows the right understanding of the +categories,--hence the saint Kanada[155] establishes the six +categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, +therefore, we shall explain duty." + +In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all +the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first +_ahnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_jati_), in the +second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the +similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the +first _ahnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the +second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third +book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the +first _ahnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he +discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _ahnika_, +and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates +action; in the first _ahnika_ he considers action as connected with +the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he +examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti; in the first _ahnika_ +he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second +the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book +he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _ahnika_ he +considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those +qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the +eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, +and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics +of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of +inference.[156] + +The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," +"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected, +"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold, +not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really +included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare +that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and +intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an +example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this +definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since +"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the +categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in +its generic character in all substances [though different substances +have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with +"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then +"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," +inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate +relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement. + +If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since +'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of +the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of +conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the +objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only +six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the +thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it +is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, +if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends +his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite +number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we +cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a +seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite +number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if +others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow +to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a +_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion. + +Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvadi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance, +quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, +quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_) +is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the +(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and +does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161] + +The genus of quality (_gunatva_) is that which is immediately +subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation +in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of +action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the +genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything +eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _samanya_) is that which is found +in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the +counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165] +(_visesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of +generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation +(_samavaya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate +relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories. + +Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, +soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_prithivitva_), are the +definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality +which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same +subject with colour produced by baking.[168] + +The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate +relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and +sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate +relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon +and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to +substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the +skin.[169] + +As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be +subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their +technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is +found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special +quality which is not produced by contact.[170] + +Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the +mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is +not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that +pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is +not time.[173] The general terms _atmatva_ and _manastva_ are the +respective definitions of soul (_atman_) and mind (_manas_). The +general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being +also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174] +(_amurtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to +substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an +atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any +substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned +directly in Kanada's Sutras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, +number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, +proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and +effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word +"_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, +and sound. Their respective genera (_rupatva_, &c.) are their several +definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is +subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In +the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest. + +"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing +upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: +revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus +of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The +genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists +with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of +conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the +definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is +twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found +with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and +action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of +generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation +cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite +number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate +relation being but one; their definitions have been given before. + +There is a popular proverb-- + +"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by +disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true +Vaiseshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the +production of duality, &c. + +There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; +thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the +distinguishing perception _apekshabuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this +is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_ +(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of +duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it +exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_samskara_).[177] + +But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus +produced from _apekshabuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained +that _apekshabuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because +duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we +cannot hold _apekshabuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and +therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being +produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, +maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c., +cannot be held to be made known (_jnapya_) by that non-eternal +apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._, +_apekshabuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a +plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as +"severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshabuddhi_ is not their +_jnapaka_, it must be their _janaka_]. + +Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From +_apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality +(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; +next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises, +simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the +destruction of _apekshabuddhi_; next from the destruction of +_apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two +substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of +the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of +imagination (_samskara_), the destruction of the knowledge of the +quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the +knowledge of the substances. + +The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, +and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be +found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are +the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the +rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a +special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary +duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of +the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two +things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to +the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the +subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its +abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate +action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshabuddhi_, +there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united +influence of both.[181] + +_Apekshabuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind +which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._, +destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182] + +Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the +destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyanuka_), another +compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of +this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, +the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of +steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the +conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, +&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire +arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from +conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the +atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is +produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, +there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that +former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another +atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; +ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms) +are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the +_dvyanuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The +other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, +are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if +we hold (with the Vaiseshikas) that the baking process takes place in +the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyayikas, however, maintain that the +baking process takes place in the jar. + +"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by +the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that +produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause +[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind. + +It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the +[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect +[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a +disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a +disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, +again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied +by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary +with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke +without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking +in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187] +without there having previously been the origination of that +disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot +was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts +produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the +disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one +part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which +had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction +of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causa cessat +effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which +resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes +of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the +pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, +initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a +disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the +pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to +produce it.[188] + +But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the +hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, +initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the +original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the +intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand +produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates +also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and +the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect] +and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and +the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of +the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second +disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the +body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the +action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing +in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of +disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we +must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause +and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the +body and the points of space. + +But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p. +147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely +unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different +opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bhatta Mimamsakas +and the Vedantins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Sridhara +Acharya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus +darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prabhakara Mimamsakas +hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the +Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we +assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of +the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible +alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of +the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different +one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one +you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should +certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that +it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself +destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the +very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of +qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different +substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that +darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed +of the dark blue of the tamala blossom?" We reply, that this is merely +an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But +enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it +follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since +you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some +substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye +as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, +the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression +independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind], +because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an +indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain +that "absence or non-existence (_abhava_[195]) is incapable of being +expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use +such phrases as _tenebrae oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere +non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would +include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, +destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do +speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all +are cases of _abhava_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of +the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ +which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it +would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is +the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the +fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness +is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is +very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the +qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_ +attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is +connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert +that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced +by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an +object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's +absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that +on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on +to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no +dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend +thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort +that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates +the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will +require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we +cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is +necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, +else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is +implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence, +having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kanada +uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]: +"_Dravya-guna-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyad abhavas tamas_" (_Vais. +Sut._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is +dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions." +The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness +is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances, +if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the +eye to be visible]. + +Non-existence (_abhava_) is considered to be the seventh category, as +established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that +which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate +relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and +"reciprocal non-existence." + +The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and +"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without +any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though +having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence +which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal +non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet +no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_, +as "antecedent" and "emergent" have]. + +If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really +the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to +lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" +is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is +not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose +opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor +need you here raise the objection that "_abhava_ can never be a means +of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum +bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for +the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the +category of _abhava_]. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 154: The Vaiseshikas are called Aulukyah in Hemachandra's +_Abhidhana-chintamani_; in the Vayu-purana (quoted in Aufrecht's +_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapada, Kanada, Uluka, and Vatsa are +called the sons of Siva.] + +[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kanabhaksha.] + +[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book +treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, +&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the +qualities of the soul, and the three causes.] + +[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bhashya_ of Vatsyayana, +see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.] + +[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bhasha-parichchheda_, sloka 14.] + +[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_visesha_) resides by "intimate +relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.] + +[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would +apply to "duality" and "conjunction."] + +[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply +to "existence" (_satta_), which is the _summum genus_, to which +substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.] + +[Footnote 162: Existence (_satta_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guna_, +and _kriya_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and +all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and +disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _samyoga_, _rupa_, &c.) may be +mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the +essence of _guna_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.] + +[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found +in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nitya-samavetatva_; +this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College +Library.] + +[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, +however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, +the former clause of the definition is added.] + +[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiseshika) is not +"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is +the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being +single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different +atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, +water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus +ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own +indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _visesha_ as "ultimate +difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _visesha_.] + +[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyonyabhava_) exists between +two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" +but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.] + +[Footnote 167: "_Samavayasambandabhavat samavayo na jatih_," Siddh. +Mukt. (_Samyoga_ being a _guna_ has _gunatva_ existing in it with +intimate relation).] + +[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot +nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union +with fire" (Bhasha-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).] + +[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an aerial +integument.--_Colebrooke._] + +[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the +_first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is +added to exclude God's knowledge, while _samyogajanya_ excludes the +soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind +and the senses, &c.] + +[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time +with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate +cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the +instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaranam_.] + +[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daisika_ and _kalika_.] + +[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the +last, however, is not pervading but atomic.] + +[Footnote 174: The three other _padarthas_, beside soul, which are +_amurtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.] + +[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, +_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things +themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our +choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.] + +[Footnote 176: _Samskara_ is here the idea conceived by the +mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material +previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or +mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)] + +[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the +original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.] + +[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _jnapaka_ or _janaka_; +_apekshabuddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.] + +[Footnote 179: _Apekshabuddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is +one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of +these, but in _both_ together.] + +[Footnote 180: The Vaiseshikas held that the jivatman and space are +each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each +have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is +ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion +has not. Dr. Roer, in his version of the Bhasha-Parichchheda, has +mistranslated an important Sutra which bears on this point. It is said +in Sutra 26-- + + _----athakasasaririnam, avyapyavrittih kshaniko visesha-guna + ishyate,_ + +which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are +limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special +qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are +limited to different portions and of momentary duration."] + +[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the +destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 +(_apekshabuddhi-nasa_), viz., _asrayanasa_, and the united action of +_both_:-- + +1. Ekatva-jnana |Avayava-kriya | . . . +2. Apekshabuddhi |Avayava-vibhaga |Avayava-kriya. +3. Dvitvotpatti and |Avayava-samyoga-nasa |Avayava-vibhaga. + ekatva-jnana-nasa | | +4. Dvitvatvajnana |Dvitvadharasya |Avayava-samyoga-nasa. + |(_i.e._, | + |avayavinah) nasah | +5. Dvitvaguna-buddhi|Dvitva-nasa |Adhara-nasa + and |of avayavin). (_i.e._, | + apekshabuddhi-nasa |(of avayavin). | +6. Dvitva-nasa and | . . . |Dvitva-nasa. + dravya-buddhi | | + +The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the +course of the six steps of _ekatvajnana_, &c., one of the two parts is +itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the +first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth +moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding +_dvitvadhara-nasa_, or, as Madhava calls it, _asrayanivritti_. In the +second case, the _nasa_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by +both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united +action of two causes, _apekshabuddhi-nasa_ and _adhara-nasa_. Any +_kriya_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would +be unimportant, as the _nasa_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take +place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and +in this way it would be too late to affect that result.] + +[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apekshabuddhi_ follows +the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously +described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of +_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvajnana_, &c. (cf. +Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the +counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.] + +[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in +the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; +thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black +(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two +atoms.] + +[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.] + +[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddhanta +Muktavali, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the +destruction of the _dvyanuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from +the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the +destruction of the black colour in the _dvyanuka_, and the +simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyanuka_ with +that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the +simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the +action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The +remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.] + +[Footnote 186: The Vaiseshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old +black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., +being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour +in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, +eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps +prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of +the Nyaya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different +compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the +old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes +not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is +red, not black.] + +[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read +_gaganavibhagakartritvasya_.] + +[Footnote 188: The Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 112, describes the series +of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the +disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction +which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. +by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the +severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction +with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the +cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second +disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced +by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the +pot.] + +[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibhagan_, _i.e._, +disjunctions from the several points.] + +[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of +space.] + +[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gita.] + +[Footnote 192: For _dravyadi_ read _prithivyadi_.] + +[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read +_viddhavevidhaya_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vriddhavivadhaya_.] + +[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a +serpent.] + +[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bhave_.] + +[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadhanadishu_. +_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying +"command;" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bhavabodhaka-kriya_. It +has that meaning in Kavya-prakasa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).] + +[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _aloka-jnana_, therefore it would +perceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by +the _eye_.] + +[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a +jar's absence in the dark.] + +[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation +is the _dhvamsabhava_, or "emergent non-existence."] + +[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p. +110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, +therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and +would refer to the commentary (Vais. Sut. p. 250), "_yadi hi +nila-rupavan nilam rupam eva va tamah syat, vahyalokapragraham +antarena chakshusha na grihyeta_."] + +[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.] + +[Footnote 202: "Relative non-existence" (_samsargabhava_) is the +negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is +"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," +and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.] + +[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the +jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the +spot of ground,--it is the _jati ghatatva_ which resides in the jar.] + +[Footnote 204: The opposite is "there _is_ colour in the air."] + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE AKSHAPADA (OR NYAYA) DARSANA. + + +The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of +pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain +sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a +particular tenet[205] of the Nyaya school, as is declared by the +author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be +proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is +the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the +Nyaya Sastra. Now the Nyaya Sastra consists of five books, and each +book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the +first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine +categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the +remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_vada_). In the first +daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the +four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their +being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that +"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof" +already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mimamsakas as +separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he +examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the +second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first +daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravritti_), +the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and +"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to +the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the +first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds +of futility (_jati_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion +for rebuke" (_nigrahasthana_, or "unfitness to be argued with"). + +In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be +measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pramana_) is +first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have +first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always +accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined +from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of +knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes +the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God is a source of right +knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared +(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right +knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact +that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge." +And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to +the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth +chapter of the Kusumanjali: + +"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the +possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's +school, the being separated from all absence thereof. + +"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him +and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various +existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being +swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the +slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Siva, is my authority; what +have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be +with rising doubts?" + +"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, +analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of +right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their +objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, +fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature +is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's +possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and +therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant +qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the +particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The +thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a +motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible. +"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a +general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210] +A "tenet" (_siddhanta_) is something which is accepted as being +authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common +to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption" +[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied +dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the +sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these +are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, +and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the +showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission +of a false major[211] (cf. Sut. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of +eleven kinds, as _vyaghata_, _atmasraya_, _itaretarasraya_, &c. + +"Ascertainment" (_nirnaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception +of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by +perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_vada_) is +a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment +of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only +wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side +of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitanda_) is the talk of a man +who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i. +43). "Dialogue" (_katha_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two +disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to +prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the +"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded" +or "mistimed" (Sut. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing +forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous +sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a +term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" +(_jati_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of +twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya +aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses +his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as +described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert +here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too +prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms. + +But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c., +are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name +of the Nyaya Sastra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Nyaya_, or logic, +properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]" +We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially +said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name +Nyaya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or +inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant +feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its +being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said +by Sarvajna, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyaya from its +establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing +action;"[212] and by Pakshila Swamin, "This is the science of +reasoning (_anvikshiki_) divided into the different categories, +'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all +actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in +the declarations of science."[213] + +But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation +arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation +ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply, +"No," for it is said in the second Nyaya aphorism, "Pain, birth, +activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of +these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it," +by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the +thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul; +"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the +soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to +it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable +to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different +"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the +stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man, +impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus +by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.; +by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity" +produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body, +as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c., +by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right +activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each +leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation; +and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain," +which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now +this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is +continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane +existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And +whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good +deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge +that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with +pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to +abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced +it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the +knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right +knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his +mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of +things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions +disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with +them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the +cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this +absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this, +that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive, +as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras: +"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the +successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of +the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of +them] final beatitude." + +"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._, +'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach +as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this +continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" +We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do +include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as +being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the +royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain +is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the +Madhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of +soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is +the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as +being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c., +we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either +alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued +succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom? +(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyayikas allow +that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish +cognition as a cause of _pravritti_ or action[220]], for who would +oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter, +then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and, +again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your +supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive +to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the +principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" +and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this +very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition]. + +"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure +intelligence [_i.e._, the Yogacharas and the Sautrantikas[222]], that +'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on +the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that +there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that +the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former, +if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha +contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that, +as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all +things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations, +they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at +irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct +recognition of the real nature of things. + +And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when +accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and +when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot +establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be +able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now +liberated. + +Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the +releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to +impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what +he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and +error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the +body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual +upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of +a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this +said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it +parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known +definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without +parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those +of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has +parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is +non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if +this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the +Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that +what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and +thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped +during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil +which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a +former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the +soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's +"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an +agent possessing form?[227] + +Again, if we take the Charvaka's view "that the only bondage is +dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true +liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we +have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then +no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power +involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being +equalled.[228] + +Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul +are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's +remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has +withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of +pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of +the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in +nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since +the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve +that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that +it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent. +Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former, +then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the +spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter, +the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on. + +Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the +doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajna and his followers, that "Liberation is the +manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;" +but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not +come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Sruti as the +proof, we reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is +precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its +authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things +as floating stones.[230] + +"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of +happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be +only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the +dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour +rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some +speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The +truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of +pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by +pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of +perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as +involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for +its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the +proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search," +since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some +incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative +is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any +attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is +inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man +who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that +it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by +rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how +many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got +together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future +issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers +consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious +experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for +him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the +Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed +Sruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the +soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation. + +But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence +of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Sruti? Certainly +perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., +must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no +universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor +can Sruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be +sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or +as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our +school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal]; +under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for +comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that +sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a +moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply +to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as +unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need +excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at +once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had +a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." +(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be +rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a +doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we +to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact +with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the +first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as +ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too +much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, +which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It +therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it +holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class +of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may +adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the +"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their +possessing intermediate magnitude.[237] + +(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" +(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal +proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term +to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker]. +(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikanta_), since it is never +found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in +the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor +again is it precluded (_badhita_ or _kalatyayopadishta_), for there is no +superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it +counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be +any such equally valid antagonist. + +If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, +&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not +produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this +pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn +can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words +"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not +produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the +argument thus involves the fallacy called _vyapyatvasiddhi_].[239] Nor +can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you +cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise +the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable +to limitation by any suggested condition (_upadhi_),[240] [such as +"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason +"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a +valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, +&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do +acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world +that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently +of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably +involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker" +the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, +and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other +causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if +the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action +of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since +these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous +doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all. +There is a rule laid down by Sankara-kinkara which applies directly to +the present case-- + + "When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to + establish its validity, + + "Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on + account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the + major term." + +If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as +"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body," +&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, +whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or +not.[241] + +As has been said by Udayana Acharya [in the Kusumanjali, iii. 5]-- + + "If Sruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument + fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old + objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than + ever." + +Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our +argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's +being known or unknown.[242] + +"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating +the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some +other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain +something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be +the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who +possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too +it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the +advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would +call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If +you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one +would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have +rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not +checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion; +for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing +another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to +create the world." This has been said by Bhattacharya-- + + "Not even a fool acts without some object in view; + + "Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would + be left undone by Him?"-- + +We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for +a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following +suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by +compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of +happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there +cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which +will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be +created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own +independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], +since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder +one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this +there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the +Svetasvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he +admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your +deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the +Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's +existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any +reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal +dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard +to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It +cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is +dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no +possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their +being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the +Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, +can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, +for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_ +endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tivra_,[246] &c.) + +Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of +duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is +obtained; thus everything is clear. + +E. B. C. + + * * * * * + +NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173. + +We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvabhasas_ +of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhantamukt._, No. 71, _Tarkasamgr._, +55-67), viz., _anaikanta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kalatyayopadishta_ +or _badhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first +of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichara_ or "erratic," +_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sadhyasama_ or "unproved," and +_atitakala_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list +of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_ +corresponds imperfectly to _prakaranasama_. The _prakaranasama_ or +"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available +for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it +is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, +"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other +authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same +difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is +non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here +this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old +question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one +which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is +eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it +is a product." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyaya Sutras, i. 29.] + +[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read +_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyaya Sut. iv. +68).] + +[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include +the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right +knowledge.] + +[Footnote 208: Isvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramana_) +according to the definition, because he is _pramaya asrayah_.] + +[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhanta-Muktavali, p. 115.] + +[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. +i. p. 315.] + +[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no +smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is +the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_). +Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke +(_vyapaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyapya_").] + +[Footnote 212: Action (_pravritti_) follows after the ascertainment of +the truth by _nyaya_.] + +[Footnote 213: Cp. Vatsyayana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition +reads _prakirtita_ for _parikshita_.] + +[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid +indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.] + +[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for +_tannivartakam_.] + +[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu +authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the +eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the +stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kamandaki's +_Nitisara_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vatsyayana's Com. p. +3, from which Madhava is here borrowing.] + +[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can +lick her ear."] + +[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road +through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with +tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._] + +[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains +during the second, and ceases in the third.] + +[Footnote 220: See Nyaya Sut. i. 2.] + +[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? +Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyayikas have +sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167, +line 11.] + +[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.] + +[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_, +all is unreal.] + +[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _klesas_ or "afflictions."] + +[Footnote 225: _Avarana_, cf. pp. 55, 58.] + +[Footnote 226: But the Nyaya holds that the attributes of the soul, as +happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense, +mind (Bhasha P. No. 83).] + +[Footnote 227: The reading _murtapratibandhat_ is difficult, but I +believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyapti_, as it does in Sankhya +Sutras, i. 100.] + +[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be +_niratisaya_,--incapable of being added to.] + +[Footnote 229: _Yogyanupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and +yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, +light, &c.] + +[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_gravanah plavanti_," +see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _asmanah plavanti_ occurs +in Shadv. Br. 5, 12.] + +[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."] + +[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.] + +[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be +authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward +to reveal the existence of God.] + +[Footnote 234: The Nyaya holds presumption to be included under +inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the +relation of a name to the thing named.] + +[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of +everything, as _e.g._, a jar.] + +[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in +its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, +ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and +air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category +_visesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word +"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation" +excludes ether, &c.] + +[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all +eternal substances being the one or the other.] + +[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where +the major term is.] + +[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken +from the Kusumanjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage +there. "The older Naiyayikas maintained that the argument 'the +mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of +vyapyatvasiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily +restricted (see Siddhanta Muktav. p. 77). The moderns, however, more +wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the +objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the +validity of the assumed middle term."] + +[Footnote 240: For the _upadhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.] + +[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a +subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable +to the fault of _asrayasiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your +subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the +locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumanjali, iii. 2). "Just as +that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be +unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."] + +[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if +He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in +p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparahatatvat_, and then begin +the next clause with _syad etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparahatah +syat tad etat_, seems unintelligible.] + +[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes +Hiranyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world +as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly +constitutes his gross body (viraj).] + +[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.] + +[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyasraya_ fallacy, see +_Nyayasutra vritti_, i. 39 (p. 33).] + +[Footnote 246: For _tivra_ cf. _Yoga sutras_, i. 21, 22.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. + + +An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that +merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how +is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A +reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mimamsa by the +holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mimamsa consists of twelve books.[248] In +the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections +of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_), +"explanatory passage" (_arthavada_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition +(_smriti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions +[as _e.g._, on _apurva_] relating to the difference of various rites, +refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of +performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the +third, _Sruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_linga_), "context" +(_vakya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent +opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karmani_, +things mentioned incidentally (_anarabhyadhita_), things accessory to +several main objects, as _prayajas_, &c., and the duties of the +sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the +principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhu_ being +made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which +form subordinate parts of the _rajasuya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the +relative order of different passages of _Sruti_, &c., the order of +different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the +_vajapeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and +the respective force of the words of _Sruti_, order of mention, &c., +in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons +qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for +enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory +rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the +different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the +ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic +text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth, +transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed +"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference +takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the +adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_uha_), the +adaptation of _samans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions +connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where +the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and +non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites +are precluded because other rites produce their special result, +discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _samans_, +and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of +negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the +fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined +into one], and _avapa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In +the twelfth, a discussion on _prasanga_ [where the rite is performed +for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference], +_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option. + +Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the +Purva-Mimamsa arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to +know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a +"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the +subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _prima facie_ argument, (_d._) +the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sangati_). +The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great +teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the +sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is +whether the study of Jaimini's _sastra_ concerning duty, beginning +with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an +instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the +_anvaharya_," is to be commenced or not. The _prima facie_ argument is +that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the +Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future +fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible +fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning +of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is +enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, +or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as +we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former, +for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof +from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of +reading the Mahabharata; and we see by this argument that it would +present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the +injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the +baked flour cake called _purodasa_ is made only of rice prepared by +being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might +have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon +and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is +the principal _apurva_, by means of the various minor effects or +subordinate _apurvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of +the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apurva_ of the +unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in +the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such +restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the +knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by +studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is +no injunction to study the Purva Mimamsa as a means of knowing the +sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic +injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with +the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, +although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal +words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning +which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, +is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the +Visvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let +that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes +that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to +offer the Visvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its +characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the +present case also. As it has been said-- + +"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the +injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose +heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the +analogy of the Visvajit, &c." + +Thus, too, we shall keep the Smriti rule from being violated: "Having +read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no +long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the +student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after +he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's +house to read the Mimamsa discussions, and thus the idea of no +interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three +reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mimamsa is not enjoined, (_b._) that +heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._) +that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, +we maintain that the study of the Mimamsa discussions on duty is not +to be commenced. + +The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhanta_), however, is as +follows:-- + +We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been +adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt +could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case +of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix +_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be +rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain +effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some +corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort. +Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole +word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of +reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an +end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, +consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could +the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as +the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really +mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could +never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action," +production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us +is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the +sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He +has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are +aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon +sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And +the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of +written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word +"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the +reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a +duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _apurva_, +produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and +establishes the subordinate _apurvas_ produced by the inferior +sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _apurva_ +produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous +_apurva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which +prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these +sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this +future influence called _apurva_, the same doubt might equally +invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same +level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one +that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Visvajit_ +offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form +of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to +suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said-- + + "Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an + unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of + a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless." + +But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of +the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he +who reads the Veda with its _angas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this +knowledge, the study of Mimamsa will be useless." But this is not +true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the +literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of +discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed +gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will +determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not +with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mimamsa discussion that the true +meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is +brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of +Mimamsa is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the +passage of Smriti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which +implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits +any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the +return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having +read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that +both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the +common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of +the injunction we conclude that the study of the Purva Mimamsa Sastra, +consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic +is connected with the main subject of the Sastra as being a subsidiary +digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression +which helps to establish the main subject."[257] + +I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic" +in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhakara. + +In the Smriti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when +eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct +him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. +Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you +ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher," +since, by Panini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ni_ is used in the +_atmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a +teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a +pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since +both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage +Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Brahman who girds his pupil with the +sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary +_angas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_acharya_)." +Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled +without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the +very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding +obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of +one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading +the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us +if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate +injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined +as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuvada_ +or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _prima facie_ +argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there +was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in +another way to suit this new view. + +Now the _prima facie_ argument was that the study of Mimamsa, not +being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the +"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus +authoritatively enjoined. + +Now the upholders of the former or _prima facie_ view argue as +follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following +dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to +understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the +bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of +teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding +what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient]; +and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is +sufficient, the Mimamsa discussions in question will have no subject +or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is +doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu +way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why +should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining +the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in +accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of +use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an +intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and +in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the +present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a +useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mimamsa +is not to be commenced." + +We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a +corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; +still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _angas_, and +has comprehended the general connection of the words with their +respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning +of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But +may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her +son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was +not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his +eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal +meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old +objection will recur with full force that the study of Mimamsa will +have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding +the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead +astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply, +that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not +really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of +the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat +poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and +trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that +this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, +which is underived from any personal author, why should not the +literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the +doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this +intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mimamsa +discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper +"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not +obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the +authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper +subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of +Mimamsa _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced. + +"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyaya], "but how can +the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there +is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no +personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of +tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case +with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged +characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those +who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of +tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the +universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author +is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that +no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted, +since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the +second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, +viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by +some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former +supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would +apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has +overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is +inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not +omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any +person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a +personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda +must have originated from a personal author, since they have the +character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other writers. And, +again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent +person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same +time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages. + +But [ask the Mimamsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the +Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, +since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character +which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this +uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda? +This reasoning, however [the Naiyayikas answer], cannot rise to the +height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously +illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahabharata was preceded by +an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study +of the Mahabharata, which must have been the same in former times as +now." But [the Mimamsakas will ask whether there is not a difference +between these two cases, since] the Smriti declares that [Vishnu +incarnate as] Vyasa was the author of the Mahabharata, in accordance +with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be the maker +of the Mahabharata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any +Smriti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless, +since those words of the Purushasukta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him +sprang the Rich and Saman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from +him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker. + +Further [proceed the Naiyayikas] we hold that sound is +non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the +external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265] +"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof +arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example) +as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is +extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute +our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as +in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or +of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mimamsaka] how +can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara, who has +no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have +pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyayika] is +not happy, because, though Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he +can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his +worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that +the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive." + +I shall now [says the Mimamsaka] clear up the whole question. What is +meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"] +which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_) +from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as +ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with +a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of +proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves? +If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between +us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established +(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._) +The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would +equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Malatimadhava +[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative +character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving +clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line +21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the +sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which +prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could +establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by +other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just +as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even +if we granted that Paramesvara might assume a body in sport, in order +to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that +he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want +of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in +time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and +other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, +for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past +experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhakara] when he +refutes the supposition of an omniscient author-- + + "Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270] + it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; + thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant + or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant + of form." + +Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established +by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the +Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Rich and Saman verses"]. For the +rule of Panini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the +grammatical affixes with which such names as Kathaka, Kalapa, and +Taittiriya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of +"uttered by" Katha, Kalapin, &c., though we maintain that these names +have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by +these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain +schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in +reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the +institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas. + +Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound, +because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our +consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as +the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although +the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their +identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this +idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put +forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being +the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience +shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the +cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises +from the latter reason, we Mimamsakas, who hold that the Veda is its +own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination-- + + "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to + him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will + go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a + mass of doubts." + +(_b._) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_ +and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the +species which exists the same in each, and not to the several +individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are +different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make +such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somasarman is reading'?" This +objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for +as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s, +there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species +_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand +[the Naiyayika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the +Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, +magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously +modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as +short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mimamsaka doctrine +of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the +diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their +respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way +ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of +distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of +contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference +[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.) +from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative; +for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be +admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has +uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten +times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent +distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a +difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the +apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., +that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one +indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._, +"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_, +which in each case is different. This has been said by the great +teacher-- + + "The object which the Naiyayikas seek by supposing a species + is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object + which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters, + is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption + of species is useless." + +And again-- + + "Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of + recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its + superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's + non-eternity." + +This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyayika] treatise +by Vagiswara, entitled _Mana-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the +fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of +sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye." + +We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the +[Sankhya and Vedanta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently +overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if +we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no +dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._) +the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upadhi_] of +_asravanatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at +great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is +imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is +perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the +non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of +such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has +arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply +[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises +from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the +story, the demon Tala went away [as well as Betala] when the offering +of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised +by the author of the _Nyayabhushana_,[279] that, if sound were +eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always +perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our +allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our +articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyayika) argument against the +existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed +between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they +both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is +invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of +the soul.[282] + +Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any +personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is +thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated +that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to +duty. + +"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how +about another well-known controversy? It is said-- + +"'The Sankhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness +are self-proved; the followers of the Nyaya hold that both are proved by +something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is +self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the +Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and +non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all +this discussion, how do the Mimamsakas accept as established their tenet +that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning +of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that +authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the +right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the +instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge +in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge +produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right +knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge +produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right +knowledge? + +"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of +cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore +these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness +cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if +knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it +would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._) +It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly +be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general +characteristic (_upadhi_) or a species (_jati_);[287] for if we call +it an _upadhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any +contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess +the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we +all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can +we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._) +Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right +knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental +causes which produce the general are included in those which produce +the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to +'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as, +_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the +particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would +therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true +knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most +Mimamsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be +considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong +knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which +produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask +whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which +produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence +of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the +followers of the Nyaya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by +something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that +authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge +combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter +alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a +'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this +absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of +right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its +presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same +time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that +non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you +whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we +should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent +non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an +effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you +at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumanjali, +i. 10]-- + + "'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause + as well as an effect.' + +"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge +depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge, +from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, +just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through +something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises +in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in +non-authoritativeness. + +"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced +and recognised by means of something external, the Mimamsa tenet that +'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and +rotten." + +This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to +strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase +"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the +instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other +cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in +full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental +causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is +produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of +knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be +brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on +something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the +equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not +produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and +is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being +knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can +arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless +complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call +it a _guna_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297] + +"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong +knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of +right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the +absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only +acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said-- + + "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of + _gunas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence + the non-existence of the two kinds of + non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general + conclusion."[300] + +(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced +by the same causes only which make us perceive the first +knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this +view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such +thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, +although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is +also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect," +&c. + +As for your argument [O Naiyayika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines +17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself +or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to +itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, +whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we +should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some +other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn +will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever. + +As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumanjali, when he +tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend +on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech +which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that +of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is +a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by +an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is +closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends +on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but +throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mimamsa idea of +the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of +action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief +who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had +actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge +that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this +knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which +causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can +distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of +authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to +deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, +as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of +authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what +is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would +have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix +controversy; since it has been said-- + + "Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which + (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real + fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,' + which perception is produced by some sign that proves the + discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304] + +Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and +authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following +divergency between the two great Mimamsa schools]:--The Veda is +composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_), +"explanatory passages" (_arthavada_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and +by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven +sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third +person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or +rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the +opinion of the followers of Bhatta Kumarila, who maintain that words +signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the +sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold +that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as +they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be +done.[306] Thus all has been made plain. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 247: Madhava here calls it the _prachi Mimamsa_.] + +[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyayamalavist_, pp. 5-9.] + +[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family +priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured +one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for +_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both; +but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and +thus it must be a case of _avapa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately +(_J. Nyayamala_, xi. 1, 13).] + +[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshana-drishtaphala_.] + +[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter +a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprapto niyamah pakshike +sati, tatra chanyatra cha praptau parisamkhya vidhiyate_.] + +[Footnote 252: The Mimamsa holds that the potential and similar +affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one +they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the +root-meaning (_artha-bhavana_); by the other an enforcing power in the +word (_sabda-bhavana_). Thus in _svargakamo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies +"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make +up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies +an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the +self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this +course of action.] + +[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not +remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India +that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and +perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the +six _vikaras_ mentioned in Sankara's Vajrasuchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_, +_jayate_, _vardhate_, _viparinamate_, _apakshiyate_, _nasyati_. I do +not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of +_apurva_, sc. _phala_, _samudaya_, _utpatti_, and _anga_, described in +Nyaya M. V. ii. 1, 2.] + +[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yaska's +_nirukta_.] + +[Footnote 255: See Nyaya-mala-vistara, i. 4, 19.] + +[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.] + +[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the +_samgati_.] + +[Footnote 258: Cf. Asvalayana's Grihya Sutras, i. 19, 1.] + +[Footnote 259: The _anuvada_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_, +which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal +authority. The _anuvada_ in the present case is the passage which +mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous +_vidhi_ as to teaching.] + +[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamanasya_, and so +the recension given in the Nyaya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamanasya_.] + +[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently +borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. +iii. p. 88.] + +[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive +transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.] + +[Footnote 263: Madhava means that the author of this stanza, though +unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his +contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might +perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have +an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the +origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in +question is quoted in full in Bohtlingk's Indische Spruche, No. 5598, +from the MS. anthology called the _Subhashitarnava_. For _muktaka_, +see _Sah. Darp._, No. 558.] + +[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the +Mimamsa that sound is eternal.] + +[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and +air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _visesha_, not +_samanya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. +Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they +reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these +arguments belong rather to the Nyaya-vaiseshika school than to the +Nyaya.] + +[Footnote 266: The Mimamsaka allows that the _uchcharana_ or utterance +is non-eternal.] + +[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were +arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to +their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of +sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."] + +[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged +after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they +possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the +composition of Manu, &c."] + +[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to +material limitations.] + +[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman +developments (_atisayah_) in their saints.] + +[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air +"manifest" the always existing sound.] + +[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_nada_) is these +'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the +air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mimamsa Aphorisms_, i. 17.] + +[Footnote 273: The Nyaya holds that colour and sound are respectively +special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs +of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of +course, have its corresponding special quality.] + +[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshasiddheh_.] + +[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Charvaka-darsana) for the +_upadhi_. The _upadhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle +term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, +but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition +"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the +mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. +Here, in answer to the Nyaya argument in the text, our author objects +that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality +belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes +found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in +_sound_ itself, according to the Mimamsa doctrine. To obviate this he +proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will +readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while +not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of +sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition +would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Purva Mimamsa and +the Nyaya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of +sound, as their points of view are so totally different.] + +[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwamsa_ of sound, in +the latter its _pragabhava_.] + +[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samapohi_, +_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _uh_.] + +[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tala and Betala are the two +demons who carry Vikramaditya on their shoulders in the +Simhasan-battisi. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating +how one answer can suffice for two opponents.] + +[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhasarvajna (see Dr. Hall's +_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).] + +[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the +vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There +is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into +a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _samskrita_ +here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.] + +[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15, +_samskarakasamskaryabhavabhavanumanam_.] + +[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichara_. The Naiyayika +argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus +manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the +senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its +species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not +manifested by the species. But the Mimamsa rejoins that this would +equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense +perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be +manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not +sure that I rightly understand the argument.] + +[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _purva-paksha_, from p. 131, line +18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.] + +[Footnote 284: This is Prabhakara's view (see Siddh. Muktav., p. 118). +The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second +knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive +the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_pramanya_), +which resides in it as its characteristic.] + +[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, +and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is +a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a +quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause +and therefore a substance.] + +[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.] + +[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and +"action," are called _jatis_ or species; the last four, "genus," +"_visesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called +_upadhis_ or "general characteristics."] + +[Footnote 288: The Purva Mimamsa denies that recollection is right +knowledge.] + +[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental +causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these +_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.] + +[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshabhava_ there is _prama_; if +not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshabhavatvena_ for +_doshabhavasahakritatvena_.] + +[Footnote 291: _Anyathasiddhatvam_ means _niyatapurvavartitve sati +anavasyakatvam_.] + +[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshabhava_.] + +[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshabhava_ or the presence of a +"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.] + +[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramatva_) can only reside in +knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in +a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes +than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it +is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also +produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has +nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in +Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass +muster. The jar is not +produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while- +at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.] + +[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of +the previous long purva-paksha.] + +[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect" +(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right +knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to +bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by +the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former +alone.] + +[Footnote 297: The Nyaya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a +"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a +_guna_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a +true object), or by the absence of a "defect."] + +[Footnote 298: The _guna_ (or [Greek: beltiste hexis]) of an organ is not +properly a cause of _prama_ but rather _doshabhava-bodhaka_.] + +[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained +non-authoritativeness" (_nischitapramanya_).] + +[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not +necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the +conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common +causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.] + +[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second +knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive +the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth +of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _pramanya_.] + +[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, +and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the +Kusumanjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my +edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).] + +[Footnote 303: I read _tat-prachuryam_ for _tatprachurye_ in p. 134, +line 7.] + +[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mimamsa +school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness +is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)] + +[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _sakti_; _siddhe_ +means _ghatadau_.] + +[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mimamsa schools. The former, called +_abhihitanvaya-vadinah_, hold (like the Naiyayika school) that words by +themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidha_ or +"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing +one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitabhidhana-vadinah_, hold that +words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically +connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected +with an action. In _gam anaya_, _gam_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but +_anayananvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with +"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, +and _vice versa_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative +Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence +we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. +But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words +which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding +thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such +as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +THE PANINI-DARSANA.[307] + + +If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an +affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and +this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the +waters of Patanjali this question produces no confusion, since it is +notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point +of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very +first sentence of the venerable Patanjali, the author of the "Great +Commentary," is "_atha sabdanusasanam_," "Now comes the exposition of +words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new +topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is +meant the system of grammar put forth by Panini. Now a doubt might +here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of +words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such +doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle +implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the +exclusion of everything else. + +The word "exposition" (_anusasana_), as here used, implies that thereby +Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no devir abhishtaye_,[308] +&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for +"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of +the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly +formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. +We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of +the object [_sabdanusasanam_ standing for _sabdasyanusasanam_], and as +there is a rule of Panini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits +composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the +phrase _sabdanusasanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised +compound. + +Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the +alleged rule of Panini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an +object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in +connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object +alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this +limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprapti_ in the sutra as a +_bahuvrihi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking +of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing +that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put +in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in +the Kasika Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an +option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would +equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the +teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of +the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended +relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once +understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any +such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object +and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence, +this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under +ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another +rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in +connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the +genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_ +compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to +such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _palasa-satana_, +&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this +_shashthitatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in +accordance with Panini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used +in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for +by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase +against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your +alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should +thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a +genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and +hence Bhartrihari in his _Vakyapadiya_ has shown that these rules are +mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this +effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamana-- + + "In secular utterances men may proceed as they will, + + "But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be + employed. + + "Thus have they explained the meaning of Panini's sutras, + since + + "He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and + _tatprayojakah_."[314] + +Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question +(of the _Mahabhashya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules +of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition +concerning words' are now commenced." + +"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended +meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' +as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless +excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since +the employment of such a word as _sabdanusasanam_, the sense of which +can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author +intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a +subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were +no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the +readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application +will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda +with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any +(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction, +it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end +is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda. +Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in +haste to say-- + + "Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by + common life, + + "And therefore grammar is useless?" + +Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the +Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the +students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to +it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to +set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that +grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they +should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all +knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become +involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would +consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of +sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an +incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswati." Now +it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of +the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabdanusasanam_ and not _atha +vyakaranam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's +end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as +in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in +the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction +concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may +say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the +true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by +word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the +understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided +into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that +Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of +words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by +word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was +Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand +years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much +less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is +rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding, +practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life +would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading +word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and +consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not +established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the +knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. +And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many +examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called +roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in +this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, +for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix +_an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with +it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakara_, "a potter," +_kandalava_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special +rule (iii. 2, 3), _ato 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_ +is to be used after a root that ends in long _a_ when there is no +_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be +[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But +since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the +one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the +principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal +is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said-- + + "Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious + austerities, + + "The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda." + +Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of +the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., +of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the +great Commentary [quoting a Varttika], "the end (or motive) is +preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319] +Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus +Katyayana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word +according to the _sastra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda +itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly +understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." +Thus (they say)-- + + "They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in + well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech; + + "But those who use such false forms as _achikramata_ must + trudge thither on foot."[320] + +Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" +since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. +For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its +heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, +the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great +commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of +words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" +mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the +tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary +(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the +"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including +the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the +three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" +(_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._, +from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," +_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the +word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the +great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters +mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is +declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman. + +The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the +world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in +the part of his book called the Brahmakanda-- + + "Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible + essence of speech, + + "Which is developed in the form of things, and whence + springs the creation of the world." + +"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns +and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, +too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakirnaka-- + + "Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a + fivefold, + + "Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the + like." + +Helaraja interprets the fivefold division as including +_karmapravachaniyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the +great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaniyas_ distinguish a +connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking +out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular +kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions +(_upasargas_).[324] + +"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called +_sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there +is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus +there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word +distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the +absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the +word is a false perception. + +Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as +otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the +word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot +bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the +following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition +of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the +first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore +cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the +single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning +[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative +other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows +(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the +cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which +arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal +sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes +the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or +revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by +the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called +_sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two +etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been +said by the worshipful Patanjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is +the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced, +there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, +hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage +commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct +from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters +expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and +following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we +wished]," and ending, "The _Vakyapadiya_ has established at length +that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed +by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325] + +Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say +that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails +under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to +convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the +latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of +conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed +to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause +independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail +to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other +alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself +manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this +manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you +adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis +of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your +hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has +been said by Bhatta in his Mimamsa-sloka-varttika-- + + "The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the + letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one + and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single + difficulty." + +The truth is, that, as Panini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sut. ii. 123) both +lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at +the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the +apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they +help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as +in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _dina_ as in _nadi_, in _mara_ as in +_rama_, in _raja_ as in _jara_, &c., these several pairs of words would +not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order +of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been +said by Tautatita-- + + "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is + perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will + be the meaning which they convey." + +Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault +attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one +alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate +thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the +letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our +view having been shown to be irrelevant]. + +All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at +a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether +you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which +conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a +collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328] +could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of +separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be +the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done +with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term +"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united +together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an +Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a +horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not +perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and +pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" +power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only +manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you +imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would +involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the +one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to +convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, +their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of +their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that +letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of +_sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain +thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable +alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it +will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler +with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is +only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference +between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, +reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this +_sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, +is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature +of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely +manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the +authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the +sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, +the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered +letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that +the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest +the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain +such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to +assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct +category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this +has been established in the discussion (in the Mahabhashya) on "genus" +(_jati_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is +ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose +characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331] +(Brahman). + +"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words +will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical +ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the +uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no +purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said-- + + "The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to + be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn + and not by combination." + + "Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the + trouble of refuting." + +All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the +colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as +blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is +variously cognised through its connection with different things, as +severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the +various conventional words which arise from the different +species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum +genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have +the following authoritative testimony-- + + "Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally + joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as + possessing that colour." + +And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being +divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with +different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all +words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. +This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the +affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Panini v. 1, 119). + +"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows, +horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it +resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really +different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and +_asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as +residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as +expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum +genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, +cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning +of the stem-word (_pratipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as +that which expresses _bhava_;[333] now, as _bhava_ is "existence," the +meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root +should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriya_); but here +again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this +"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many +subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the +line-- + + "Others say that action (_kriya_) is a genus, residing in + many individuals." + +So, too, if we accept Panini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the +affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we +speak of the nature (_bhava_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact +that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _ta_ [as _asvatva_ and +_asvata_] are used in the sense of _bhava_, that they do express +"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all +coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all +phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in +space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." +Such is the meaning of Hari's two _karikas_ quoted above. So, too, it +is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that +the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose +characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word +Substance. + +"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true +substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the +object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of +discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea +[without owners] is expressed."[336] + +So, too, the author of the Mahabhashya, when explaining the +Varttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," +in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the +meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and +determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of +horse," &c.] + +According to the opinion of Vajapyayana, who maintains that all words +mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides +by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is +apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the +particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., +denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the +connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the +connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So +in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of +the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming +into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference +produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," +we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly +denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is +denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c., +since we find here a meaning common to all who read. + +In the doctrine of Vyadi, who maintained that words meant individual +things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put +forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied +[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of +"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341] + +Both views are allowed by the great teacher Panini; since in i. 2, 58, +he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that +"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be +optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Brahman is to be honoured," +which may equally run, "Brahmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, +64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, +where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of +things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Rama and Rama, and the +plural means Rama, and Rama and Rama; but we retain only one, adding a +dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all +assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. +Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is +that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman. + +As it has been said-- + + "Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one + true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, + shines out in many forms as the thing denoted." + +Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the +nature of this true meaning-- + + "That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the + perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of + doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who + know the end of the three Vedas." + +So too in his description of substance, he says-- + + "_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of + modification, as the gold remains under the form of the + earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they + call the Supreme Nature." + +The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order +to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a +cardinal doctrine of our philosophy. + +"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is +identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are +thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two +souls."[344] + +The meaning of this Karika is that Brahman is the one object denoted +by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon +it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of +the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the +result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the +power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the +conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is +the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedanta lore tell us-- + + "As all the extended world of dreams is only the development + of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a + development of illusion likewise." + +When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent +joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval +ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best +defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the +text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the +Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the +"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss. + +Thus it has been said-- + + "They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the + diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the + science of sciences."[347] + +And so again-- + + "This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of + final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the + travellers to emancipation." + +Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sastra of grammar should be +studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 307: Madhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians +adopted and fully developed the idea of the Purva-Mimamsa school that +sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his +Jaimini chapter.] + +[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.] + +[Footnote 309: _Sabdanusasana_, if judged by the apparent sense of +Panini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, +because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, +whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were +an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as +_acharyena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _ascharyo +godoho sikshitena gopalena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither +can we say _ascharyo gavam doho' sikshitasya gopalasya_ (as it would +violate ii. 3, 66).] + +[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprapti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a +_bahuvrihi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all +discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Panini.] + +[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Panini, ii. +2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.] + +[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_ +(_i.e._, _shashthi-sambandha_).] + +[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.] + +[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Panini's own sutras (i. 4, 30, +and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were +to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as +_shashthi seshe_.] + +[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabdanusasanam_ implies the +Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.] + +[Footnote 316: Compare Max Muller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is +quoted as from the Veda in the Mahabhashya.] + +[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3 +after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabdanam_.] + +[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.] + +[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahabhashya_, pp. 12, 64.] + +[Footnote 320: _Achikramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form +of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.] + +[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the +lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.] + +[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _samyam_, +but the Mahabhashya has _nah samyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).] + +[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases +of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.] + +[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaniyas_ imply a verb other than the one +expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced +by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Sakalyasamhitam anu +pravarshat_, "he rained after the Sakalya hymns," _anu_ implies an +understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there +is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This +_anu_ is said to determine this relation.] + +[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.] + +[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might +mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.] + +[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read +_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.] + +[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _vina_ after _nimittam_.] + +[Footnote 329: The ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are +collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way +by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day +dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddesyasiddhi_.] + +[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphotakabhavam_ for +_sphotabhavam_.] + +[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahabhashya, pp. 9, +32.] + +[Footnote 332: The Mimamsa holds that a word means the genus (_jati_) +and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyaya holds that a word means +an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).] + +[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Pratis. xii. 5.] + +[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by +the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.] + +[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.] + +[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really +meant, the one abiding existence.] + +[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahabhashya, pp. 44, 50.] + +[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _asvattha_.] + +[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical +categories, _jati_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sanjna_, and _kriya_.] + +[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktav., p. 6, line 12.] + +[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 82, that +the Mimamsa holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, +since otherwise there would be _vyabhichara_ and _anantya_ (cf. also +Mahesachandra Nyayaratna's note, Kavya-prakasa, p. 10). If a word is +held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as +it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not +include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an +endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."] + +[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmat +dvayam satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmad +advayam satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."] + +[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone +exists.] + +[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jiva_) and Brahman.] + +[Footnote 345: The _Samvriti_ of the text seems to correspond to the +_avarana_ so frequent in Vedanta books.] + +[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitri Upanishad, vi. +22.] + +[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where +it is explained by [']Samkara as _vidyasv adhi yad dar[']sanam tad +adhividyam_.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +THE SANKHYA-DARSANA. + + +"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held +by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _purva_ and _uttara_ +Mimamsa schools], when the system of development propounded by the +Sankhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now +the Sastra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four +several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only, +that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, +and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is +only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not +itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called +the evolvent (_prakriti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium +of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is +expressed [in the Sankhya Karika], "the root-evolvent is no evolute." +It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is +the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one," +&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we +should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a +_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued +series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our +senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the +hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one, +egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the Sankhya Karika (No. 3), +"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are +the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great +principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute +of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle +egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhimana_), is the evolute +of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by +the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called +subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is +the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of +perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of +action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the +mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in +our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a +cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared +by Isvara Krishna in his Karikas[351] (No. 24-27), "Self-consciousness +is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and +the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the +class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the +elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by +darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the +one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the +ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the +voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is +mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an +organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with +them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher +Vachaspati Misra in the Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi. + +(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c., +and the eleven organs, as said in the Karika, "The evolute consists of +sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not +evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents +of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different +"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are +not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is +that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows, +jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in +consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of +dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements, +ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste, +and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which +precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one, +two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs +has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sankhya +Karika (No. 22)-- + + "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from + this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen + proceed the five gross elements." + +(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the Karika, "The soul is +neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute, +eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent +nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as +establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Karika (No. 4). + +"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are +acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode +of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that +which is to be proven." + +Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and +effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from +the non-existent; the Naiyayikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent +is produced from the existent; the Vedantins, that all effects are an +illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really +existent; while the Sankhyas hold that the existent is produced from +the existent. + +(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is +itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more +than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be +identical. + +(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since +it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the +originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be +produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the +cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are +not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is +incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in +regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that +the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is +existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only +produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like +the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the +milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove +the production of a thing previously non-existent. + +Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected +with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's +existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between +two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise +from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action +of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sankhya +teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have +no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him +who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an +utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though +not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a +capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred +from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be +allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing +oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is +non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds, +whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or +not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally +apply here]. + +From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows +that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth +is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter +[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there +we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a +cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the +other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth +is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from +its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate +threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the +office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature +of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the +limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed, +and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, +as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and +are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are +concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing +as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the +existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gita (ii. 16)-- + + "There is no existence for the non-existent, nor + non-existence for the existent." + +And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish +the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakriti_). This has +been said [in the Karika, No. 9]-- + + "Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of + cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are + selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by + every means possible; what is capable does that to which it + is competent; and like is produced from like."[358] + +Nor can we say [with the Vedantin] that the world is an illusory +emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no +contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _prima +facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case +of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will +discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed +nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the +unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution +to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one +mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is +composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause +similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of +the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause +composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself +endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have +a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material +cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar +case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being +composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of +goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of +activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of +darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities +(_i.e._, _prakriti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are +found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's +happiness is found in his wife Satyavati, because the quality of +"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of +her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested +towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not +possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is +manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, +causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is +viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this +being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since +the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused," +since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to +which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being +composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause +Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared +in the Svetasvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)-- + + "The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one + unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces + a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons + her when once she has been enjoyed." + +Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities +"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally +possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and +concealing. + +Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent +Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to +produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some +intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing, +supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even +unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and +experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any +intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as +the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the +unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so +unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it +has been said in the Karika (No. 57)-- + + "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the + calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul." + +But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," +which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his +existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the +hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he +act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply +that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be +no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free +living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of +compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be +reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God +created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting +at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He +had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent +Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of +the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union +of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just +as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the +unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the +proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is +caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the +blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the +experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off +the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have +fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not +recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or +absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and +Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on +Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362] +travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become +separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great +dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man +mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path +indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame +man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is +effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually +dependent. This has been said in the Karika (No. 21)-- + + "For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final + separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man + and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed." + +"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of +the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply, +that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband +does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, +retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in +the Karika (No. 59)-- + + "As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators, + desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having + manifested herself to Soul." + +For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder +of the atheistic Sankhya School, been propounded. + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.] + +[Footnote 349: Compare Kusumanjali, i. 4.] + +[Footnote 350: One great defect in the Sankhya nomenclature is the +ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddhi_) and those for +mind (_manas_). Madhava here applies to the former the term +_antahkarana_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I +have ventured to alter it in the translation.] + +[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is Madhava's principal Sankhya +authority, and not the Sankhya Sutras.] + +[Footnote 352: _Vaikrita_ is here a technical term meaning that +goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Karika, +comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sankhya-sara, pp. 30-35.] + +[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The +reading _samkalpavikalpatmakam_ must be corrected by the Sankhya +Karika.] + +[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanmatras_ +will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross +elements.] + +[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.] + +[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabhava_) cannot be +altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.] + +[Footnote 357: I take _arthantaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf. +Taranatha Tarkavachaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumudi_, p. 47).] + +[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.] + +[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.] + +[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of +beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, +and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which +caused their misery at all.] + +[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only +_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf. +_Sankhyapravachanabhashya_, i. 58).] + +[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It +is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in +the Gesta Romanorum.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. + + +We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the +opinions of such Munis as Patanjali and others, who originated the +system of the Theistic Sankhya philosophy. This school follows the +so-called Yoga Sastra promulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four +chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sankhya Pravachana," or +detailed explanation of the Sankhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof +the venerable Patanjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the +exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the +Yoga Sastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of +his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of +the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of +Meditation (_samadhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of +aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is +mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds +the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet +thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients +or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the +series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some +spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention, +contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name +"subjugation" (_samyama_), and also the various superhuman powers +which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the +series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, +mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, +Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called +"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five +principles [of the Sankhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme +Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action, +fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order +to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and +is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal +of mundane existence. + +"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf +of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any +Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality +Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which +is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the +influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering +quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have +declared-- + + "It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the + understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which + torment,[365] + + And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly + identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering." + +It has been also said by Patanjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer, +which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an +object which is developed and transferred experiences the +modifications thereof." + +Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is +the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or +reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it +experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence, +being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the +understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though +in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; +and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from +the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is +thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, +forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and +for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at +length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction +between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," +ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of +desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the +undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished. + +The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of +concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the +intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the +object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise +and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The +word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, +[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may +be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word +_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this +particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their +gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_ +is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now +(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).' +Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or +comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly +suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a +previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for +singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for +it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of +"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything +whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the +general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence +[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in +accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment +inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing +something else; and since this is at once understood without any +direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle +_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; +because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration +does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet +these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of +exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance +[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold +that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the +predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of +mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" +(_anusasana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by +which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions, +divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that +such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the +rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must +follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to +others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived +knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, +in accordance with the words of Sruti: "Therefore having become +tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith +and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word +_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound +knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, +even granting that both these are present, they need not to be +mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to +produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still +[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the +exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude +or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain +presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it +must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it +is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we +have such a passage of the Sruti as that [in the Katha Upanishad, ii. +12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the +Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and +sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smriti as that [in the +Bhagavad Gita, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation +will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to +interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a +previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous +course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body +strong]. + +But in the case of the Vedanta Sutras, which open with the aphorism, +"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Sankara Acharya +has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of +the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at +will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after," +_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of +tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins +the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, +contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching +to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four +so-called "means."[370] + +"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why +should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot +be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such +auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an +unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as +being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this +auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is +in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore +it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is +that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness +cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary +meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself +auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a +drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into +the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of +auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally +unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply, +that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the +meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty +of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that +"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone." + +"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at +the beginning of a Sastra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that +would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to +begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since +it has been said by the wise, 'Those sastras become widely famous +which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and +auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are +invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies +'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smriti which says, + + "'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the + ancient time, + + "'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they + are both auspicious.' + +"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying +'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vriddhi_' used by Panini in his +opening sutra '_vriddhir ad aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is +untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious +influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special +signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is +auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How +can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used +here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a +new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such +other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for +some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a +journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smriti, since the smriti +will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean +only that they produce an auspicious effect. + +Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a +previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally +apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have +already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, +as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after," +if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" +would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic +has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by +exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sutra, +the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the +Tandya Brahmana, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now +this is the Visvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as +signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, +just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahabhashya, "now comes the +exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of +Grammar. This has been declared by Vyasa in his Commentary on the Yoga +Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" +and Vachaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may +be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and +also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this +_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive +after a successful understanding of the sastra through the attainment of +the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's +explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not +the smriti of Yajnavalkya say, 'Hiranyagarbha is the promulgator of the +Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patanjali the teacher +thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable +Patanjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was +to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the +Puranas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his +_anusasana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which +followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of +the system. + +Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full +meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the +institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this +institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, +is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its +fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption +(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced. +The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the +producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_ +and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is +well known from Sruti and Smriti, as I have before shown. And it is +established by the general context that those who aim at liberation +are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any +one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the +opening aphorism of the Vedanta sutras, "Now, therefore, there is a +wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to +establish by the general context that all persons who aim at +liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word +_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is +a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a +regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the +question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by +the context. Hence it has been said, "When Sruti comes [as the +determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no +place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is +not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and +the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever +we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of +interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text +of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the +"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion +or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which +would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of +"_sruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter +it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, +14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' +the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into +collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is +more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus +summed up-- + + "A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always + precluded by any of the preceding modes; + + "But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself + precludes, depends on circumstances." + +Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as +settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other +preliminaries, the study of the Sastra, which teaches the Yoga, is to +be commenced like that of the Vedanta, which discusses the nature of +Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to +be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not +the Sastra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that +which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Sastra, +especially directed thereto, this Sastra is the means for its +production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly +concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the +operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up +and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than +to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patanjali, in +his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Sastra as his primary +object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of +"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is +that the commencing the Yogasastra is that which primarily claims our +attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of +the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sastra. "But as we read +in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of +'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean +'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by +Yajnavalkya:[381]-- + + 'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is + called _yoga_.'" + +This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such +action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two +souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the +opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the +conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the +Vaiseshika and Nyaya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our +theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the +Mimamsa [or Vedanta], our Yogasastra would be rendered nugatory by this +concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the +identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school +something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to +be produced by our Sastra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are +used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here +in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said-- + + "Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all + held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading + are their evidence." + +Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert +in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samadhi_." Nor does this +contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him, +may bear this meaning; and he has himself said-- + + "_Samadhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and + supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the + _samadhi_ of the individual soul." + +It has been also said by the venerable Vyasa [in his Commentary on the +Yoga-sutras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samadhi_." + +An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samadhi_ is +used by Patanjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight +ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and +the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the +principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each +other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as +we see in the _darsapurnamasa_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites +the _prayajas_, and therefore _samadhi_ cannot be the meaning of +_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for +although the term _samadhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to +express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the +contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently +devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term +to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to +declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior +ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology +alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word +_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to +go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two +words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, +would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sutra, i. +2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word +in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the +suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The +second or principal sense of _samadhi_ will therefore be quite +distinct from the first or inferior.] + +"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the +modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications +abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, +their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also +abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the +antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as +the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in +accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect +the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the +soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; +because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be +hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," +"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ +(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is +unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative +perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the +intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument +to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from +the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing +is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this +soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be +occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these +modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul +always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially +pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this +which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible +substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces +an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own +proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, +and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the +understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is +not affected is not known; for the understanding is called +"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is +susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of +influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or +want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of +knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which +spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected +with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a +knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even +although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a +given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and +certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge +of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that +understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold +that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just +as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of +the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the +understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Sruti, "Desire, +volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of +firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Panchasikha +declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power +that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patanjali also (iv. 18), "The +modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from +the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the +argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the +understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its +various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ +of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is +notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of +"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the +understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of +"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a +diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property +becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" +when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the +perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] +newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of +condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the +reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that +there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" +and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their +"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ. + +[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have +said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the +suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply +also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or +suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_, +_mudha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible +for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called +_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the +attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely. +For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is +restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed +about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _mudha_, +'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is +sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_]. +It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the +first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here, +however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the +Bhagavad Gita (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Krishna, is fickle, turbulent, +violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may +occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; +but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, +&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the +Yoga Sutras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, +laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to +attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind +are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by +the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the +mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces +two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the +means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from +heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an +attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken +notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the +failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract +meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, +even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore +we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be +laid down as the definition of _yoga_. + +We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the +three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _mudha_, and +_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are +all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the +modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided +[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two +conditions called _ekagra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and +attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these +two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now +by _ekagra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the +_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by +_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, +and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain. + +Now this _samadhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that +in which there is distinct recognition" (_samprajnata_), and "that in +which distinct recognition is lost" (_asamprajnata_) [Yoga S., i. 17, +18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is +intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right +notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, +or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396] +is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajnayate_) as distinct from Nature. It +has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichara_, _sananda_, and +_sasmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhavana_), +which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all +other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be +pondered is of two kinds, being either Iswara or the twenty-five +principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not +senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are +senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects +which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross +elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an +investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in +the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be +produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative" +(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the +five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in +relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative" +(_savichara_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and +"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" +(_sananda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the +manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object +the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" +or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sasmita_), +because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual +faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become +quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things]. + +But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in +the suppression of all "modifications" whatever. + +"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the +suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation +where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since +we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the +quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality +of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, +because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the +"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the +operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," +and the "stock of deserts."[400] + +The "afflictions" (_klesa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, +egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here +a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidya_, +"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayibhava_ +compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word +"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadharaya_] +compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word +"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvrihi_ compound, where both portions are +dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It +cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were +predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in +_avidya_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the +express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently, +as _avidya_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable +to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very +form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the +second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be +characterised by (_a_ + _vidya_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and +cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for +then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vritti,[403] +"there is a _bahuvrihi_ compound which is formed with some word +meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of +this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvrihi_ +compound _avidya_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as +_avidya_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidya_ +existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidya_ +could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the +other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were +associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and +were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and +the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sasmita_ meditation]. + +Now it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field +[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be +dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be +"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake +them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating +on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they +are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other +strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their +several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. +This has been expressed by Vachaspati Misra, in his Gloss on Vyasa's +Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:-- + + "The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which + are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but + existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the + 'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the + 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact + with worldly objects." + +"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidya_ as a +_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant, +because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. +Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410] +the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' +would be overthrown." + +[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may +have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryudasa_ [where +the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidya_ means a +contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidya_; +and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been +said-- + + "The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' + [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root; + thus the words _abrahmana_ and _adharma_ respectively + signify, 'what is other than a Brahman' and 'what is + contrary to justice.'" + +And again-- + + "We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of + the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested + from the use in which it has been already employed." + +Vachaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings +depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we +occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter +portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of +this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even +here too [in _avidya_] the real meaning is something contrary to +_vidya_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the +positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said +in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the +non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) +eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is +defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413] +[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the +"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining +the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a +proverbial couplet[415]-- + + "The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original + place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its + composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from + death [as even a Brahman's body defiles],--and from the fact + that it has to be made pure by rites." + +So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii. +15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the +pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through +the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent +impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual +opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of +pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the +idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands, +sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul," +_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said-- + + "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of + 'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.; + + "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is + liberation." + +Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417] + +But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance +should there not be given some general definition applying to them +all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be +established? For thus it has been said by Bhatta Kumarila-- + + "'Without some general definition, a more special definition + cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even + mentioned here.'" + +This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by +the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as +"the imagining of a thing in its opposite." + +"Egoism" (_asmita_) is the notion that the two separate things, the +soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said +(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of +sight." "Desire" (_raga_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for +the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on +the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the +feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by +the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is +expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" +"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8). + +Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this +word _anusayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _krit_ affix _nini_ in +the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the +sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _nini_ +cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anusi_; +for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the Sutra, iii. 2, 4, +and has been exerting its influence in the following sutras, this word +must have been introduced a second time in the Sutra, iii. 2, 78, +_supy ajatau ninis tachchhilye_,[419] on purpose to exclude +prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did +strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sutra, vii. +2, 115, _acho nniti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to +_vriddhi_, and so the word must be _anusayin_, in accordance with the +analogy of such words as _atisayin_, &c. Nor is the latter view +tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since +_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse-- + + 'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable + nor a _krit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with + a word in the locative case;' + +and the word _anusaya_ is clearly a _krit_ formation as it ends with +the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so +renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word +_anusayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is +very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be +admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying +generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of +essential importance. Hence the author of the Vritti has said-- + + "The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular + acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of + this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]." + +Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _karyin_, +_karyika_ [where the affixes are added after a _krit_ formation], +_tandulin_, _tandulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning +"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after +_krit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of +the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anusaya_ is formed by +a _krit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled. + +The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence" +(_abhinivesa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings, +from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any +immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from +the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression +left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered +in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every +individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is +declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on +through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the +philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as +the "afflictions" (_klesa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing +upon it various mundane troubles. + +[We next describe the _karmasaya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or +"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or +forbidden actions, as the _jyotishtoma_ sacrifice, brahmanicide, &c. +"Stock" (_asaya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, +which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of +merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own +experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13]. + +Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of +the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the +operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not +considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications +[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it +could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather +the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the +thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully +described hereafter], _madhumati_, _madhupratika_, _visoka_, and +_samskaraseshata_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its +etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the +thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed +(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by +"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort +that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13]. +This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of +development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural +state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times +assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427] +"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again +to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, +_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, +as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its +skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire +in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those +that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the +reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one +who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from +perceiving the imperfections attached to them. + +Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and +to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to +practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of +especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Krishna in the +Bhagavad Gita [vi. 3]-- + + "Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to + _yoga_; + + But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be + the means." + +Patanjali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical +concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation +to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yajnavalkya has described "mortification"-- + + "By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult + chandrayana fast, &c., + + "Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all + mortifications."[429] + +"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the +_gayatri_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and +Tantrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not +chanted. Those chanted are the _samans_; those not chanted are either +in metre, _i.e._, the _richas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yajumshi_, +as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _rich_ in which +by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _padas_ +[or portions of a verse]; the name _saman_ is applied to chanted +portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_ +are called Tantrik which are set forth in sacred books that are +directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again +threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said-- + + "The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and + neuter: + + "The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._, + the exclamation _svaha_); the neuter those which end in + _namas_; + + "The rest are male, and considered the best. They are + all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c." + +They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all +defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the +ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted. + +Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_samskara_) are ten, and +they have been thus described in the _Sarada-tilaka_-- + + "There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give + to _mantras_ efficacy: + + "These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly + consecrated. + + "The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the + 'awakening,' + + "The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,' + + "The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the + 'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_. + + "The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the + _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants. + + "The wise man should mutter the several letters of the + _mantra_, each united to Om, + + "According to the number of the letters. This they call the + 'vivifying' (_jivana_). + + "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite + each with sandal-water, + + "Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is + called the 'smiting' (_tadana_). + + "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike + them with oleander flowers, + + "Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the + 'awakening' (_bodhana_). + + "Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his + own special _tantra_, + + "Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with + leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling' + (_abhisheka_). + + "Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him + consume by the _jyotir-mantra_ + + "The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the + 'purification' (_vimali-karana_). + + "The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and + the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni, + + "And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch + of kusa grass, + + "With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this + is held to be the 'fattening' (_apyayana_). + + "The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with + _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpana_). + + "The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of + Maya[434] and Rama[435] is called its 'illumining' + (_dipana_). + + "The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being + muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_). + + "These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all + _tantras_; + + "And the adept who practises them according to the tradition + obtains his desire; + + "And _ruddha_, _kilita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _sapta_, and + the rest, + + "All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by + these excellent consecrations." + +But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries +connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an +unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436] + +The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord" +(_isvara-pranidhana_), is the consigning all one's works, whether +mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the +Supremely Venerable. As it has been said-- + + "Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary, + + "That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee." + +This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of +the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, +since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is +sung in the Bhagavad Gita [ii. 47]-- + + "Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the + fruits; + + "Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou + attached to inaction." + +The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared +by the venerable Nilakantha-bharati-- + + "Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated + by desire, + + "Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which + has been licked by a dog." + +Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and +resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for +producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words +called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, +"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another +meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning +with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new +meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on +a motive. This has been declared in the _Kavya-prakasa_ [ii. 9]-- + + "When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the + principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it, + another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive, + this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." + +Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter +_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of +the feminine _sa_] would have signified some neuter word, like +"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is +indicated." But _sa_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree +with _lakshana_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is +put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has +been explained by Kaiyata, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity +of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the +former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kusala_) in +business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word +_kusala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed +etymologically as _kusam_ + _lati_, "one who gathers kusa grass for +the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation +of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and +this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each +is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance +with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said-- + + "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from + their immediate significance, just as is the case in + 'denotation' [the primary power of a word]." + +Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive. +Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal +meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently +indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning +and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which +originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly +by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that +the author of the Kavya-prakasa used the expression, "This is +'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication +based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as +"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2. +indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators +are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent +indication, as "the man of the Panjab is an ox" [here the object is +not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive +indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile]; +5. pure superimponent indication, as "_ghi_ is life;" 6. pure +introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been +all explained in the Kavya-prakasa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this +churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions. + +This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it +(_anga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures, +suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and +meditation [ii. 29]. Patanjali says, "Forbearance consists in not +wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting" +[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment, +mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. +32]; and these are described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7, 36-38]-- + + "The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining + Brahman, practises, void of all desire, + + "Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing, + and non-coveting; + + "Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts, + purification, contentment, and austerity, + + "And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme + Brahman. + + "These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and + the five 'religious observances;' + + "They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of + reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire." + +"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten +kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _vira_, _svastika_, _dandaka_, +_sopasraya_, _paryanka_, _kraunchanishadana_, _ushtranishadana_, +_samasamsthana_. Yajnavalkya has described each of them in the passage +which commences-- + + "Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands, + but in reverse order, + + "Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Brahmans, + on his thighs; + + "This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all." + +The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this +steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is +practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of +inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of +the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the +body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in +both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a +general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply +to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _puraka_, and _kumbhaka_." We +reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the +"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found +in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of +the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which +has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _puraka_, which is the +[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the +"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing, +when the vital air, called _prana_, remains motionless like water in a +jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration +and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt +is needless. + +Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghatikas_ and a +half[440] in each artery[441] (_nadi_), like the revolving buckets on +a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are +produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said +by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning +the transmission of the _ajapamantra_[443]-- + + "Six hundred to Ganesa, six thousand to the self-existent + Brahman, + + "Six thousand to Vishnu, six thousand to Siva, + + "One thousand to the Guru (Brihaspati), one thousand to the + Supreme Soul, + + "And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the + performed muttering." + +So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the +elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different +colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been +thus explained by the wise-- + + "Let each artery convey the air two _ghatis_ and a half from + sunrise. + + "There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444] + to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel. + + "Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take + place [in the hour], + + "And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand + six hundred in a day and night. + + "The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guna_ + letters,[445] + + "That time elapses while the air passes along in the + interval between two arteries. + + "There are five elements in each of the two conducting + arteries,-- + + "They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by + the self-restrained. + + "Fire bears above, water below; air moves across; + + "Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere. + + "They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether; + + "This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting + arteries. + + "The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty, + + "Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten. + + "This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the + reason that the two arteries are so disturbed + + "Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four, + + "Fire has three, air two, and ether one. + + "There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has + fifty _palas_, + + "And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the + five properties of earth + + "Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness; + and these decrease one by one. + + "The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by + the influence of 'quiet,' + + "But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,' + 'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448] + + "The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and + ether are now declared;-- + + "Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of + the second arises desire; + + "From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness + of mind; + + "From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental + impressions of latent merit. + + "Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle + finger in each nostril, + + "And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners + of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners + of his eyes, + + "Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the + earth and the other elements within him, + + "The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue + spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol." + +When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is +accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed +discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been +said-- + + "There is no austerity superior to regulation of the + breath."[450] + +And again-- + + "As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed, + + "So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of + the breath."[451] + +Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and +the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to +attain "self-mastery" (_samyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_pratyahara_). +"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to +the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered +nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several +objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. +This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn +to it (_a_ + _hri_), away from them (_pratipa_). + +"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the +senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and +therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, +could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say +is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an +eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it +were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the +accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence +of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of +concernment with their several objects for the sake of being +accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we +mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are +restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they +follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in +the Vishnu-purana [vi. 7, 43, 44]-- + + "Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which + ever tend to pursue external objects, + + "Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the + mind; + + "By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady + senses; + + "If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish + his _yoga_."[454] + +"Attention" (_dharana_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from +all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal +self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of +the _sushumna_ artery, &c., or something external, as Prajapati, +Vasava, Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism, +"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too, +say the followers of the Puranas-- + + "By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by + restraint the senses, + + "Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of + his mind."[455] + +The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to +be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is +"contemplation" (_dhyana_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform +thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said-- + + "A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of + that kind and desiring no other, + + "This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first + six of the ancillary things." + +We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the +remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_samadhi_, see p. +243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a +long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which +hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and +"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the +names Madhumati and the rest. + +"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous +words from the dialects of Karnata, Gauda,[456] and Lata?"[457] We do +not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the +meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so +needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention. + +i. The _Madhumati_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation, +called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the +illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of +"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of +"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c. +Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge +which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to +the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._, +when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second +yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are +well known to be of four kinds, viz.,-- + +i. The _prathamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458] +but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in +the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubhumika_, +who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The +_prajnajyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The +_atikranta-bhavaniya_, who has attained the highest dispassion. + +ii. The _Madhupratika_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c. +These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without +organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like +thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of +motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the +attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed +to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is +the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These +perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the +subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential +conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by +itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second +state is called _Madhupratika_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet]. + +iii. The _Visoka_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all +existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses, +to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of +the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the +supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all +existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are +but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the +other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished], +and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised +upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the +modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is +"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous +immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of +mind]." + +iv. The _Samskaraseshata_ state is also called _asamprajnata_, _i.e._, +"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" +it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object] +which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be +afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and +enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of +all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest +"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which +distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that +exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of +modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of +thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _samskarasesha_, +i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards +everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned +rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are +abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed, +there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded +"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects +into the primal _prakriti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure +intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all +connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with +existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation +is described by Patanjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is +the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have +consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation, +or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv. +33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the +individual be born again even though this should have been attained?" +for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the +cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this +objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor +decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence +of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like +absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a +possibility. And so, too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel; +one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a +dumb man praised it."[465] + +Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the +Yoga-sastra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of +disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-sastra also +treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. +This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from; +the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to +experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection +is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same +fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in +other Sastras also. Thus all has been made clear. + +The system of Sankara, which comes next in succession, and which is +the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it +is therefore left untouched here.[467] + +E. B. C. + + * * * * * + +NOTE ON THE YOGA. + +There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain +Raivataka in Magha (iv. 55):-- + +"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence +(_maitri_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully +abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of +a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the +essential difference between the quality Goodness and the +Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation." + +It is curious to notice that _maitri_, which plays such a prominent +part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary +condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first +start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (= +_prasadhaka_) in Vyasa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is +borrowed by Magha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is +an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as +in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in +themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations +which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to +Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue. + + * * * * * + +NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE. + +For the word _vyakopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3 +_infra_), cf. Kusumanjali, p. 6, l. 7. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sankhya Pr. Bhash., p. +20; S. Sara, p. 11.] + +[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the +meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind +in the arts of life.] + +[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means +rather "susceptible of suffering."] + +[Footnote 366: This is really Vyasa's comm. on Sut., iv. 21.] + +[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bhasha-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.] + +[Footnote 368: Satapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.] + +[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbhave'pi_, +understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is +supposed to assume as being necessarily present.] + +[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from +the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or +hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, +&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.] + +[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself +_sukha_.] + +[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious," +why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the +particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?] + +[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without +some other word to complete the construction.] + +[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mahabhashya +(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)] + +[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vriddhih_ is +placed at the beginning of the first sutra, while _gunah_ in the +second is placed at the end (_ad en gunah_), in order to ensure an +auspicious opening, _vriddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as +well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."] + +[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chandi, we have an interesting +list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has +the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Brahman, +a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He +hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling +"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya," +_durva_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, +corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and +men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing +a guana (_godhika_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to +all sastras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of +the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, +and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.] + +[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices +lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the +officiating Brahmans.] + +[Footnote 378: He is here called _phanipati_, "lord of +snakes,"--Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhashya, being represented +as a snake in mythology.] + +[Footnote 379: Cf. Sankara, Vedanta-Sut., iii. 3, 49.] + +[Footnote 380: This is the Mimamsa rule for settling the relative +value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1. +_Sruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds +are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Linga_, "a sign," +or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the +text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be +divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide +solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _Vakya_, "the being +mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I +cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words +"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in +the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the +welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words +"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakarana_, "the +subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its +parts," as in the _darsa-purnamasa_ sacrifice, where the _prayaja_ +ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, +a mystic influence (_apurva_) which helps forward that influence of +the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakarana_ +proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sthana_ (or _krama_), "relative +position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Sundhadhvam_, &c., +"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention +of the _sannayya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is +ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Samakhya_, +"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the +_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima +facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the +aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the +first, _sruti_, being the most important; the last, _samakhya_, the +least. Cf. Jaimini's Sutras, iii. 3, 14; _Mimamsaparibhasha_, pp. 8, +9.] + +[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Yajnavalkya, the author of the +_Yajnavalkya-gita_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl. +Catal._, p. 87 _b_.] + +[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriya_, which properly +belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashtri_.] + +[Footnote 383: _Scil. samadhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses +to profound contemplation.] + +[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures, +suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and +meditation (_samadhi_)."] + +[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag adhiyate mano yatra sa +samadhih_.] + +[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the +destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot +itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by +intimate relation (_samavaya-sambandha_).] + +[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavyanam_ for _nirodhanam_.] + +[Footnote 388: _Chit-sakti_ and _chiti-sakti_ = soul.] + +[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.] + +[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" +(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the +image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).] + +[Footnote 391: Vachaspati explains _lakshana_ as _kalabheda_.] + +[Footnote 392: I take _adi_ as meaning _asphutatva_. The change of state +takes place between the several moments of the _lakshana-parinama_. Cf. +the Commentaries on iii. 13.] + +[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the +thinking principle, _chittabhumayas_ or _avasthas_. Cf. Commentary, i. +2, 18.] + +[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men, +demons, and gods.] + +[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I +have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.] + +[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?] + +[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the +elements or the elements the senses, &c.] + +[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprakasamayasya_.] + +[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _sattamatra_ for +_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmita_ from _ahamkara_.] + +[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.] + +[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the +English translation.] + +[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called +_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the +_paryudasa_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the +verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, +as, _e.g._-- + +(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note." + +(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway." + +The former corresponds to the logician's _atyantabhava_, the latter to +_anyonyabhava_ or _bheda_.] + +[Footnote 403: Cf. the _varttika_ in Siddhanta Kaum., i. 401.] + +[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-manadhana_, with +_vidyamana_ omitted in the compound.] + +[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.] + +[Footnote 406: As it is _avidya_ after all.] + +[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Vachaspati's +Gloss), _sarvavrittinirodhasampannaya api tathatvaprasangat_.] + +[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavasthascha_ with the printed edition of +Vachaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdhascha_ is correct, it must mean +_tanutvena dagdhah_.] + +[Footnote 409: As in _ramalakshmanau_, Rama and Lakshmana.] + +[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.] + +[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on Sut., ii. 5.] + +[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other +hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So +_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."] + +[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga Sut., i. 8.] + +[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _kayadau_ for +_karyadau_.] + +[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vyasa in his Comm. on Yoga +Sutras, ii. 5, and I have followed Vachaspati in his explanation of +it; he calls it _vaiyasaki gatha_.] + +[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only +increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret +(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).] + +[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."] + +[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification +of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.] + +[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _nini_ be used after a root in the sense +of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a +word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."] + +[Footnote 420: "Let _vriddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a +vowel, when that which has an indicatory _n_ or _n_ follows;" _nini_ +has an indicatory _n_.] + +[Footnote 421: Sc. _anusaya_ + _ini_ = _anusayin_.] + +[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _than_, which respectively leave _in_ and +_ika_; thus _danda_ gives _dandin_ and _dandika_. The line is quoted +by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pan. v. 2, 115, and is explained in +the _Kasika_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by +the examples:--(1.) _svavan_, _khavan_; (2.) _karakavan_; (3.) +_vyaghravan_, _simhavan_; (4.) _dandavati sala_ (_i.e._, _danda asyam +santi_).] + +[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.] + +[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite +study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.] + +[Footnote 425: See the _Kasika_ on Pan. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshartha_ +(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pan. ii. 2, 27. +The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamartha_.] + +[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vritter abhavah_, but +_abhavasyasryah_.] + +[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line, +_prakasapravrittiniyamarupa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.] + +[Footnote 428: See Kasika, ii. 3, 36.] + +[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yajnavalkya-gita_ +of Yogi-yajnavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, +note.] + +[Footnote 430: Mimamsa Sutras, ii. 1, 35-37.] + +[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is +_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kamya_.] + +[Footnote 432: The _vija_ of air is the syllable _jam_.] + +[Footnote 433: The _vija_ of water is the syllable _bam_.] + +[Footnote 434: _Hrim._] + +[Footnote 435: _Srim._] + +[Footnote 436: _Tandava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Siva and his +votaries.] + +[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of +one of the two." Cf. "Thebae ipsae quod Boeotiae caput est," _Livy_, xlii. +44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem +vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.] + +[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's +translation of the Sahitya-darpana.] + +[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man +is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other +relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of +longevity.] + +[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghatika_ being twenty-four +minutes.] + +[Footnote 441: The _nadis_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned +to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal +_nadis_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.] + +[Footnote 442: Madhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the +passage in the Aitareya Brahmana (iii. 29), where the relation of the +vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to +the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each +other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold +and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting +the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a +waterwheel (_ghatiyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their +course."] + +[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, +that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, +as their sound expresses the word _so'ham_ (i.e., _hamsah_), "I am +he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; +it is called the _ajapamantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without +voluntary muttering.] + +[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled +breath.] + +[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarnanam_ for +_gunavarnanam_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarna_ is a +_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_ +make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical +details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the +fifth act of the _Malatimadhava_.] + +[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghatika_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 += 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghatikas_ or one hour).] + +[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.] + +[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."] + +[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhandogya Up._, viii. 6; +_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.] + +[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyasa's Comm.] + +[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Sloka 7 of the _Amrita-nada +Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.] + +[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sut., iii. 4, as consisting +of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, +attention, and meditation.] + +[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).] + +[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the +reading of the Bombay edition of the Purana (only reading in line 3 +_chalatmanam_).] + +[Footnote 455: Vishnu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The +"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.] + +[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.] + +[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it +is the [Greek: Larike] of Ptolemy.] + +[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravritta_ for +_pravritti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyasa's +Comm.)] + +[Footnote 459: Read _vikaranabhavah_; Vachaspati explains it as +"_videhanam indriyanam karanabhavah_."] + +[Footnote 460: Vyasa has _karanapanchakarupajaya_; Vachaspati explains +_rupa_ by _grahanadi_ (cf. iii. 47).] + +[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sayavyavaseyatmakanam_, +from Vyasa's Comm.] + +[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.] + +[Footnote 463: _Visoka._] + +[Footnote 464: This is explained by Vachaspati, "The latent +impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called +_vyutthana_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or +'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by +the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; +this in 'egoism' (_asmita_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' +(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._, +_prakriti_)." _Prakriti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in +equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and +effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another +becomes predominant.] + +[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiriya-Aranyaka +i. 11, 5. Madhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and +quotes the Svetasv. Up., iii. 19. Madhava here takes _avindat_ as "he +pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the +Comm.] + +[Footnote 466: This is taken from Vachaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. +15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.] + +[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Panchadasi. A Calcutta +Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivarana-sangraha (cf. +Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatadhyaya-brahmana, p. +x), but, if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha, it is +by Bharatitirthavidyaranya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p. +88).] + + + + +APPENDIX. + +ON THE UPADHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194). + + +[As the _upadhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which +is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of +the sections in the Bhasha-parichchheda and the Siddhanta-muktavali, +which treat of it.] + + cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term + (sadhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), + is called the Condition (upadhi); its examination is now set + forth._ + +Our author now proceeds to define the _upadhi_ or condition,[468] +which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as +laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The +meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably +accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus +invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his +middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke +because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being +produced from wet fuel," as an _upadhi_, since "wet fuel" is +necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as +_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.] + +"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not +follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the +argument, 'This [second] son of Mitra's, whom I have not seen, must be +dark because he is Mitra's son,' we could not allege 'the being +produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch +as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour +does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have +nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the +argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the +site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate +form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] +is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and +therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably +accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction +is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as +a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of +existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called +"emergent," _dvamsabhava_], inasmuch as perishability is found in +antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be +included in any positive category of existence." + +We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the +definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to +determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which +our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must +be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition +is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from +feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as +determined by the fact that it is Mitra's son, whose dark colour is +discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the +argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is +not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again, +"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility +as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external +object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term +"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by +the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472] +(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being +produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" +invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by +the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term +advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, +"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends +that this is produced at all.] + +But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid +middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably +accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, +and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. +This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object +that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate +determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the +cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general +rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any +particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term +which is too general, the required general rule consists in the +constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., +that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged +site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or +else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but +excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is +determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that +the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major +term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475] + + cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects + with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus + common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general + in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477] + + cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a + middle term that the Condition has to be employed._ + +The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term +being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that +it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of +having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably +accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle +term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact +that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in +the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we +infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is +too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is +too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too +general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we +take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which +the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle +term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases +possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is +equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, +"B is dark because he is Mitra's son," the middle term "the fact of +being Mitra's son" is too general in regard to the _sadhya_, "dark +colour," because it is too general in regard to the _upadhi_, "feeding +on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitra's second son [Mitra's +parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitra herself not having +fed on vegetables previous to his birth]. + +[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a +condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your +definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle +term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire +because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the +being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this +certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it +is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to +be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' +since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as +for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in +this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You +never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere +than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some +direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the +first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your +antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major +term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly +one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is +self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally +employed to overthrow the contrary argument]. + +But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being +always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition, +[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant +tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be +non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in +"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by +sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _upadhi_ here is a +means of overthrowing the false argument]. + +Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is +disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But +"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed +even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules +of logical controversy.[481] + +E. B. C. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 468: The _upadhi_ is the "condition" which must be supplied +to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus +restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid; +if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has +fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied +by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if +the mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have +smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is +Mitra's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her +former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her +happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove +that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle +term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.] + +[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from +the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from +her living on ghee.] + +[Footnote 470: By Bhasha-parich. sl. 25, the four elements, earth, +water, air, and fire, are _sparsavat_, but by sl. 27 of these air is +neither _pratyaksha_ nor _rupavat_.] + +[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue +from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive +existence, not non-existence.] + +[Footnote 472: "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was +not _soul_, but _air_.] + +[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitra's first son in the +two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" +(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and +"Mitra's first son A is dark because he is Mitra's offspring" (when +her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective +_sadhyas_ or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are +respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the +mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.] + +[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitra's second +son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire" +and "the being Mitra's offspring" do not possess the respective +conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor, +consequently, the respective major terms (_sadhya_) "smoke" and "dark +colour."] + +[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in +(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for, +though they are the sites of the _sadhya_ "dark colour," they do not +admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term +"the being Mitra's son."] + +[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel +there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in +their extension.] + +[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _sadhya_ (as in +the red-hot ball of iron), there the _upadhi_ also is not applicable.] + +[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark, +such as the three objected arguments required in No. 137.] + +[Footnote 479: The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is +artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an +artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._, +one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point." +Here the proposed _upadhi_ "the being always found elsewhere than in +fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the +_hetu_ "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the +_sadhya_ "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.] + +[Footnote 480: As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a +maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist +disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing +a body." See Kusumanjali, v. 2.] + +[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the +outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own +point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a +true condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.] + +THE END. + + * * * * * + + + + +TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. + + + "A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental + literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the + general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the + Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense + strides have been made within the present century in these + branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the + range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient + literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred + books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian, + Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been + deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more + recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of + all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects + have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were + contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or + scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals. + Messrs. Trubner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does + them infinite credit, have determined to supply the + constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at + least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to + the world."--_Times._ + + * * * * * + +Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s. + +THE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS. + +By the HON. SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D., + +Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, + +Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India. + +Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the +general results of the Census of 1881. + + "It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a + marvellous combination of literary condensation and + research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire, + its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy + outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional + opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing + could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of + the economic and political condition of India at the present + time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the + India of the past."--_The Times._ + + +_THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED_:-- + +Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s. + +ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS. + +BY MARTIN HAUG, PH.D., + +Late of the Universities of Tubingen, Gottingen, and Bonn; +Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the +Poona College. + +EDITED AND ENLARGED BY DR. E. W. WEST. + +To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. HAUG by Prof. +E. P. EVANS. + +I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of +the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present. + +II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures. + +III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis. + +IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development. + + "'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of + the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E. + W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to + expand the materials contained in this work into a + comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the + design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have, + however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the + researches into the sacred writings and religion of the + Parsis from the earliest times down to the present--a + dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a + translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the + Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with + especial reference to its origin and development."--_Times._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d. + +TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON + +COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA." + +_With Accompanying Narratives._ + +Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese, +University College, London. + + The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition, + as edited by Fausboll, by Max Muller's English, and Albrecht + Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six + chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather + recension, as now translated by Mr. Beal, consists of + thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who possess + Fausboll's text, or either of the above-named translations, + will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the + Chinese version; the thirteen above-named additional sections + not being accessible to them in any other form; for, even if + they understand Chinese, the Chinese original would be + unobtainable by them. + + "Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most + valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains + authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and + generally connected with some incident in the history of + Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light + which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote + period at which they were written, and upon the method of + teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method + employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the + tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well + as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds + of millions of people, make them a very remarkable + study."--_Times._ + + "Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has + added to the great services he has already rendered to the + comparative study of religious history."--_Academy._ + + "Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its + purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader + face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct + which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is + now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid + its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies, + forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so + inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder + denied a God, now worships that founder as a god + himself."--_Scotsman._ + + * * * * * + +Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d. + +THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE. + +BY ALBRECHT WEBER. + +Translated from the Second German Edition by JOHN MANN, M.A., and +THEODOR ZACHARIAE, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author. + + Dr. BUHLER, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:--"When I + was Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I + frequently felt the want of such a work to which I could + refer the students." + + Professor COWELL, of Cambridge, writes:--"It will be + especially useful to the students in our Indian colleges and + universities. I used to long for such a book when I was + teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students are intensely interested + in the history of Sanskrit literature, and this volume will + supply them with all they want on the subject." + + Professor WHITNEY, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A., + writes:--"I was one of the class to whom the work was + originally given in the form of academic lectures. At their + first appearance they were by far the most learned and able + treatment of their subject; and with their recent additions + they still maintain decidedly the same rank." + + "Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of + Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the + volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and + at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to + be by far the most learned and able treatment of the + subject. They have now been brought up to date by the + addition of all the most important results of recent + research."--_Times._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price +7s. 6d. + +A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES. + +BY ROBERT N. CUST. + +The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of +which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the +languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge +had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might +be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he +had collected for his own edification. + + "Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt."--_Times._ + + "The book before us is then a valuable contribution to + philological science. It passes under review a vast number + of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every + case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of + the best-informed writers."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s. + +THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD. + +A Poem. BY KALIDASA. + +Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by RALPH T. H. +GRIFFITH, M.A. + + "A very spirited rendering of the _Kumarasambhava_, which + was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are + glad to see made once more accessible."--_Times._ + + "Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to + most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or + enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative + imagination of its author."--_Indian Antiquary._ + + "We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor + Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a + second edition better."--_Athenaeum._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s. + +A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, +HISTORY, AND LITERATURE. + +BY JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College. + + "This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to + students of Indian literature, but is also of great general + interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible + form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu + mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little + is known outside the limited circle of _savants_."--_Times._ + + "It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly + and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the + few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions + detract but little from the general excellence of Mr. + Dowson's work."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s. + +SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN. + +BY EDWARD WILLIAM LANE, + +Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c, &c. + +A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by STANLEY +LANE POOLE. + + "... Has been long esteemed in this country as the + compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the + time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the + 'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the + value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a + great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of + comment, and prefixing an introduction."--_Times._ + + "Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer.... + Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible + for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for + literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable + form."--_Englishman, Calcutta._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s. + +MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS, + +BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS. + +BY MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L., + +Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay +Asiatic Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of +Oxford. + +Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, with +Illustrations and a Map. + + "In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a + thoughtful man on some of the most important questions + connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened + observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant + people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the + public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of + the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have + seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of + every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of + Modern India--a subject with which we should be specially + familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee + or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of + their manners, their creeds, and their + necessities."--_Times._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s. + +METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS. + +With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from +Classical Authors. + +BY J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D. + + "... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."--_Times._ + + "... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration + alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the + legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."--_Edinburgh + Daily Review._ + + * * * * * + +Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +THE GULISTAN; + +OR, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU'D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ. + +Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an +Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah, + +BY EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S. + + "It is a very fair rendering of the original."--_Times._ + + "The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed + by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The + _Gulistan_ is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest + order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long + established itself in a secure position as the best version + of Sadi's finest work."--_Academy._ + + "It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."--_Tablet._ + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price +28s. + +MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS. + +BY BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, ESQ., F.R.S., + +Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the +Institute; Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at +the Court of Nepal, &c, &c. + +_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._ + + SECTION I.--On the Kocch, Bodo, and Dhimal Tribes.--Part I. + Vocabulary.--Part II. Grammar.--Part III. Their Origin, + Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition, + with a General Description of the Climate they dwell + in--Appendix. + + SECTION II.--On Himalayan Ethnology.--I. Comparative + Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of + Nepal.--II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti + Language.--III. Grammatical Analysis of the Vayu Language. + The Vayu Grammar.--IV. Analysis of the Bahing Dialect of the + Kiranti language. The Bahing Grammar.--V. On the Vayu or + Hayu Tribe of the Central Himalaya.--VI. On the Kiranti + Tribe of the Central Himalaya. + +_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._ + + SECTION III.--On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India. + Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, Bodo, and Garo + Tongues. + + SECTION IV.--Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier. + + SECTION V.--Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier. + + SECTION VI.--The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their + connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative + Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative + Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim. + + SECTION VII.--The Mongolian Affinities of the + Caucasians.--Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and + Mongolian Words. + + SECTION VIII.--Physical Type of Tibetans. + + SECTION IX.--The Aborigines of Central India.--Comparative + Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central + India.--Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.--Vocabulary of some + of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the + Northern Sircars.--Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks + on their Affinities.--Supplement to the Nilgirian + Vocabularies.--The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon. + + SECTION X.--Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks + on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet. + + SECTION XI.--Route from Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal, to + Darjeeling in Sikim.--Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis + of Nepal. + + SECTION XII.--Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police + as recognised in the State of Nepal. + + SECTION XIII.--The Native Method of making the Paper + denominated Hindustan, Nepalese. + + SECTION XIV.--Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the + Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the + People of India. + + "For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian + Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable + both to the philologist and the ethnologist." + + * * * * * + +Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326, +cloth, price 21s. + +THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA, + +THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations. + +The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks. + +BY THE RIGHT REV. P. BIGANDET, + +Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu. + + "The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only + illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect + encyclopaedia of Buddhist lore."--_Times._ + + "A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism + with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their + investigations."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._ + + "Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."--_Indian Antiquary._ + + "Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place + students of the subject under a deep obligation to its + author."--_Calcutta Review._ + + "This work is one of the greatest authorities upon + Buddhism."--_Dublin Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s. + +CHINESE BUDDHISM. + +A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. + +BY J. EDKINS, D.D. + +Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c. + + "It contains a vast deal of important information on the + subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued + study on the spot."--_Athenaeum._ + + "Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the + extent of its original research, and the simplicity with + which this complicated system of philosophy, religion, + literature, and ritual is set forth."--_British Quarterly + Review._ + + "The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves + most careful study from all interested in the history of the + religions of the world, and expressly of those who are + concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins + notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise + bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English + writers."--_Record._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS. + +WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878. + +BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, + +Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to +the Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of "The Modern Languages of the +East Indies." + + "We know none who has described Indian life, especially the + life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and + literary talent."--_Academy._ + + "They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original + remarks."--_St. James's Gazette._ + + "His book contains a vast amount of information. The result + of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and + speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as + of food for thought."--_Tablet._ + + "Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and + antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one + having authority."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._ + + "The author speaks with the authority of personal + experience.... It is this constant association with the + country and the people which gives such a vividness to many + of the pages."--_Athenaeum._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s. + +BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales. + +The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant: + +BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA, + +For the first time Edited in the original Pali. + +BY V. FAUSBOLL; + +And Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. + +Translation. Volume I. + + "These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of + what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are + probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan + stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as + India. The introduction contains a most interesting + disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing + their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore + legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of + the Judgment of Solomon."--_Times._ + + "It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his + right to be heard on this subject by his able article on + Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclopaedia + Britannica.'"--_Leeds Mercury._ + + "All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel + deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established + reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for + the fidelity of his version, and the style of his + translations is deserving of high praise."--_Academy._ + + "No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than + Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jataka book we have, then, a + priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of + our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete + picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs + of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to + ourselves, just as they were passing through the first + stages of civilisation."--_St. James's Gazette._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s. + +A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY; + +OR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND +THE KABBALAH. + +Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis +According to the Talmud," &c. + +With Notes and Copious Indexes. + + "To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a + general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at + least."--_Times._ + + "Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive + to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent + scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and + indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon + the Scriptures."--_British Quarterly Review._ + + "Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful + notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet + appeared."--_Daily News._ + + "Without overlooking in the slightest the several + attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental + Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses + them all in interest."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._ + + "Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we + believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for + themselves."--_The Record._ + + "This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of + knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and + unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the + wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so + Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars + of the Chosen People."--_Inquirer._ + + "The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact + that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but + throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those + Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and + Christian alike."--_John Bull._ + + "It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument + of learned, loving, light-giving labour."--_Jewish Herald._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE. + +BY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of "Yeigo Henkaku Shiran." + + "A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted + much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature + of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into + English verse."--_Daily News._ + + "Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the + first attempt which has been made to interpret the + literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to + the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for + indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we + have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful + English verse."--_Tablet._ + + "It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric + literature which has appeared during the close of the last + year."--_Celestial Empire._ + + "Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he + undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form. + But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts + are successful to a degree."--_London and China Express._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C. +681-668. + + Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders + and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with + a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the + Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and + List of Eponyms, &c. + +BY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's +College, Cambridge. + + "Students of scriptural archaeology will also appreciate the + 'History of Esarhaddon.'"--_Times._ + + "There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It + does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in + their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it + does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers + both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary + non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling + its results."--_Academy._ + + "Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to + Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be + feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due + to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted + himself in his laborious task."--_Tablet._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s. + +THE MESNEVI + +(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA +(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI. + +Book the First. + +_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his +Ancestors, and of his Descendants._ + +Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected +by their Historian, + +MEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI. + +Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English, + +BY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c. + + "A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."--_Saturday + Review._ + + "This book will be a very valuable help to the reader + ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight + into a very important department of the literature extant in + that language."--_Tablet._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s. + +EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS + +ILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS. + +BY REV. J. LONG, + +Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S. + + "We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide + circulation and attentive reading."--_Record._ + + "Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."--_Globe._ + + "It is full of interesting matter."--_Antiquary._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +INDIAN POETRY; + + Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from + the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books + from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom" + from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental + Poems. + +BY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia." + + "In this new volume of Messrs. Trubner's Oriental Series, + Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through + the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of + Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of + Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have + introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be + more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna + is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the + love of + + 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,' + + from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five + senses are typified."--_Times._ + + "No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his + art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas + as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of + language contained in these mighty epics."--_Daily + Telegraph._ + + "The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and + sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of + the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody + sufficient to captivate the senses of the + dullest."--_Standard._ + + "The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has + adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original + text."--_Overland Mail._ + + "We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to + popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface + tells us, the goal towards which he bends his + efforts."--_Allen's Indian Mail._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +THE MIND OF MENCIUS; + +OR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY. + +A SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER +MENCIUS. + +Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and +Explanations, + +By the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society. + +Translated from the German, with Additional Notes, + +By the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong. + + "Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese + studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The + value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered + that at no time since relations commenced between China and + the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said + aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful + study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the + excellent series to which it belongs."--_Nature._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s. + +THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA. + +BY A. BARTH. + +Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the +Author. + +The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably +enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of +the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as +an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original. + + "Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India, + which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject, + but also a useful work of reference."--_Academy._ + + "This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and + additions, of an article contributed by the learned author + two years ago to the 'Encyclopedie des Sciences + Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first + appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best + summary extant of the vast subject with which it + deals."--_Tablet._ + + "This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual + of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we + have in English. The present work ... shows not only great + knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but + also great insight into the inner history and the deeper + meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only + one, which it proposes to describe."--_Modern Review._ + + "The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by + the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country + and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few + Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a + good deal of information from it, and especially from the + extensive bibliography provided in the notes."--_Dublin + Review._ + + "Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a + master-hand."--_Critic (New York)._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s. + +HINDU PHILOSOPHY. + +THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA. + +An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyaya +and Vais'eshika Systems. + +BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S. + +The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in +the department of pure philosophy. + + "The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and + learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the + philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he + may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the + system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give + an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions + which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the + world, the nature and relations of man and his future + destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the + connection of the Sankhya system with the philosophy of + Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with + that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"--_Foreign Church + Chronicle._ + + "Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted + gain to all students of the development of thought. The + system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from + the Sankhya Karika, is the only contribution of India to + pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to + the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr. + Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to + appreciate these points in any adequate manner."--_Saturday + Review._ + + "We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our + philosophical library."--_Notes and Queries._ + + * * * * * + +Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s. + +A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDANTASARA. + +Translated, with copious Annotations, + +BY MAJOR G. A. JACOB, + +Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools. + +The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for +others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an +accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedanta. + + "The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an + inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in + his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious, + indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they + bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will + rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hindu + philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its + kind that we have seen."--_Calcutta Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +TSUNI--||GOAM: + +THE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI. + +BY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D., + +Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the +Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological +Society, Vienna, &c., &c. + + "The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of + interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of + Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the + comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of + their religion and mythology were scattered about in various + books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and + printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what + he has been able to collect himself."--_Prof. Max Muller in + the Nineteenth Century._ + + "It is full of good things."--_St. James's Gazette._ + + * * * * * + +In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d., +Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414, +cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN. + +TO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES +AND EMENDATIONS. + +Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and +Notes. + +By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana. + + "As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India, + it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if + they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and + for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove + useful."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d. + +THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. + +Translated, with Introduction and Notes. + +BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.) + + "Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad Gita is, as + we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and + that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar + value."--_Dublin Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s. + +THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM. + +Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M. +Bengal Civil Service. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM. + +The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation. + +By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service. + + "Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with + considerable success, and his version contains much that + will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's + delightful selection."--_Academy._ + + "The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their + profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on + philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and + the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates + them."--_Calcutta Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s. + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS. + +As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta +Review_. + +By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of +the Calcutta Madrasa. + + "For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important + of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Trubner's + Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may + take it up the work must be one of profound + interest."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS. + +By DR. C. P. TIELE. + +Vol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION. + +Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author. + +By JAMES BALLINGAL. + + "It places in the hands of the English readers a history of + Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on + the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the + latest results of research. In this volume there is a great + deal of information, as well as independent investigation, + for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in + itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive + religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the + New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and + minute."--_Scotsman._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d. + +YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA. + +A POEM BY JAMI. + +Translated from the Persian into English Verse. + +BY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH. + + "Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as + translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further + good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has + evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the + quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more + prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its + intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most + popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read + in all the independent native schools of India where Persian + is taught."--_Scotsman._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s. + +LINGUISTIC ESSAYS. + +BY CARL ABEL. + + "An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical + questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise + dry technicalities of the science."--_Standard._ + + "Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ, + for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery + over the English language fits him to be a champion of + unpopular doctrines."--_Athenaeum._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA; + +OR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. + +BY MADHAVA ACHARYA. + +Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the +University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of +Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta. + +This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The +author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems +current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives +what appears to him to be their most important tenets. + + "The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted + sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has + familiarised the translators with Indian + thought."--_Athenaeum._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s. + +TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES. + +Translated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR. + +BY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER. + +Done into English from the German, with an Introduction, + +BY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A. + + "Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of + Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western + analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from + Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the + Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred + books."--_Academy._ + + "The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better + hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the + lives of those scholars who have given their attention to + gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and + language."--_Calcutta Review._ + + "Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing + stories, or for comparative folk-lore."--_Pall Mall + Gazette._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s. + +UDANAVARGA. + +A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON. + +Compiled by DHARMATRATA. + +BEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA. + +Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts +from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman, + +BY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL. + + "Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which + assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding + of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of + comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan + version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner, + who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a + translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which + has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be + congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult + task."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a +Language Map, price 18s. + +A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA. + +BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, + +Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service. + + "Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do + better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclopaedic in its + scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any + particular language, and is left free to add to the initial + sum of knowledge there collected."--_Natal Mercury._ + + "Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to + linguistic students."--_Nature._ + + * * * * * + +Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL +RELIGIONS. + +BY C. P. TIELE, + +Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the +University of Leyden. + +Translated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A. + + "Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide + thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to + gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of + investigations into the religious history of nations. As + Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are + outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But + there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of + far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the + crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these + pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps + also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and + thorough research."--_Scotsman._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s. + +A HISTORY OF BURMA. + +Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the +Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India. + +BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B., +Membre Correspondant de la Societe Academique Indo-Chinoise de France. + + "Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Trubner's Oriental + Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has + been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre + deserves great credit for the patience and industry which + has resulted in this History of Burma."--_Saturday Review._ + + * * * * * + +Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +RELIGION IN CHINA. + +By JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING. + +Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with +Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People. + + "Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and + often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of + considerable value of the subject."--_Scotsman._ + + "As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to + study the existing religions in China, and his long + residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an + intimate knowledge of them as they at present + exist."--_Saturday Review._ + + "Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and + revised edition, has, from the time that it was published, + been the standard authority upon the subject of which it + treats."--_Nonconformist._ + + "Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the + first authorities on Chinese religion and + language."--_British Quarterly Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s. + +THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER. + +Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed +by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten. + +Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China. + + "The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness + with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient + documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."--_Times._ + + "Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those + Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these + Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter + possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient + Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and + translated, have not yet attracted the attention of + scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon + the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded + in these venerable authorities."--_Daily News._ + + * * * * * + +Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s. + +THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA. + +With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries. + +Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares +College. + +Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL. + + "The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and + scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have + every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the + publishers."--_Calcutta Review._ + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price +24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. + +BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, + +Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629). + +BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A., + +(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of +Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, +&c. + +An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--"Nothing +more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's +translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears." + + "It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the + best account of the condition of India at that ancient + period has come down to us in the books of travel written by + the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best + known."--_Times._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s. + +THE ORDINANCES OF MANU. + +Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction. + +By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E. + +Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y. + + "This work is full of interest; while for the student of + sociology and the science of religion it is full of + importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in + so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently + translated."--_Scotsman._ + + "Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a + really good translation of this well-known law book, first + rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not + only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced + lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications + the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in + clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very + grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could + be published of the translation left by Burnell."--F. MAX + MULLER in the _Academy._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s. + +THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS, + + Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his + Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original + and for most part Unpublished Documents. + +By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal +Medical Service, Retired, &c. + + "Not too soon have Messrs. Trubner added to their valuable + Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of + the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander + Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and + though an account of his career was demanded soon after his + decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of + his compatriot, Dr. Duka."--_Bookseller._ + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s. + +MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA. + +Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches," +and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal." + +_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._ + +I.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping. + +II.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James +Barton, of his several Surveys. + +III.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse, +dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper. + +IV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang. + +V.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald. + +VI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald. + +VII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst +the Malays. By William Marsden. + +VIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By +James Howison. + +IX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of +Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D. + +X.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying +off Sumatra. By John Crisp. + +XI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales +Island. By William Hunter, M.D. + +XII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J. +Leyden, M.D. + +XIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the +Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D. + +XIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of +Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low. + +XV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring +Islands. By T. Ware. + +XVI.--Climate of Singapore. + +XVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore. + +XVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low. + +XIX.--Inscription at Singapore. + +XX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By +Lieut.-Col. James Low. + +XXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By +J. W. Laidlay. + +XXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low. + +XXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands. + +XXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian +Archipelago. + +XXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B +Tremenheere. + +XXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B. +Tremenheere. + +XXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report. + +XXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere. + +XXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from +Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure. + +XXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities +in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B. +Tremenheere. + +XXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence +across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and +Capt. J. G. Forlong. + +XXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui +Tin Ore. + +XXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth. + +XXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth. + +_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._ + +XXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands. +By Theodore Cantor, M.D. + +XXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan. + +XXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and +Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D. + +XXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the +Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith. + +XXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth. + +XL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere. + +General Index. + +Index of Vernacular Terms. + +Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II. + + "The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China--its + philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a + very material and important contribution to our accessible + information regarding that country and its + people."--_Contemporary Review._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s. + +THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI. + +Translated from the Sanskrit + +By the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S., + +Rector of Eggesford, North Devon. + + "A very interesting addition to Trubner's Oriental + Series."--_Saturday Review._ + + "Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and + beauty of expression."--_St. James' Gazette._ + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s. + +ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES; + +Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA. + +BY JAMES GRAY, + +Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c. + +The Sanscrit-Pali word Niti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract, +and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a +general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and +didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as +form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to +his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and +have served as a most effective medium of instruction. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +MASNAVI I MA' NAVI: + +THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI. + +Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal +Civil Service. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d. + +MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU. + +ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D., + +Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor +of Law in the University of Calcutta. + +The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great +Law Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts +contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages +before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for +many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work +will supply a want long felt. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d. + +LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK. + +BY FREDERIC HENRY BALFOUR. + +Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic +Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s. + +LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS. + +WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1847 TO 1887. _Second Series._ + +BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, LL.D., + +Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late +Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service. + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s. + +MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA. + +Edited by R. ROST, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office. + +SECOND SERIES. + +Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the +Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian +Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the +Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s. + +FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR. + +By the REV. J. HINTON KNOWLES, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c. + +(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris. + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s. + +MEDIAEVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES. + + FRAGMENTS TOWARDS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY + OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE + SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. + +BY E. BRETSCHNEIDER, M.D., + +Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin. + + * * * * * + +In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s. + +ALBERUNI'S INDIA: + + AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, + GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND + ASTROLOGY (ABOUT A.D. 1031). + +TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH. + +With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin. + +[3 asterisks in triangle] The Arabic Original, with an Index of +the Sanskrit Words, Edited by Professor SACHAU, is in the press. + + * * * * * + +Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s. + +THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG. + +BY THE SHAMANS HWUI LI AND YEN-TSUNG. + +With a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-TSING. + +BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A. + +(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College, +London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c. + +Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic +Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c. + +When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he +took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent +had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress, +Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li, +composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's +travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to +discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he +revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised +and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable +sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many +particulars. + + * * * * * + +_IN PREPARATION:--_ + +Post 8vo. + +A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA. + +BY R. N. CUST, LL. D. + +Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of +Africa," &c. + + * * * * * + +LONDON: TRUBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL. + + * * * * * + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA *** + +***** This file should be named 34125.txt or 34125.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/4/1/2/34125/ + +Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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