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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha
+       Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy
+
+Author: Madhava Acharya
+
+Translator: E. B. Cowell
+            A. E. Gough
+
+Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                         Transcriber's Note:
+
+     The Diacritical marks in this book are not consistent throughout
+     the book. The original Diacritical marks have been retained.
+
+
+                              TRÜBNER'S
+
+                           ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+
+
+                                 THE
+
+                        SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṂGRAHA
+
+                                  OR
+
+        _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._
+
+
+
+                                  BY
+
+                           MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA.
+
+
+                            TRANSLATED BY
+
+                          E. B. COWELL, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE
+      IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE
+      UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.
+
+                                 AND
+
+                          A. E. GOUGH, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND
+      PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                               LONDON:
+
+                     TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
+
+                                1882.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
+Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mádhava
+Áchárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
+Paṇḍit Íśvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent edition, with no
+important alterations, was published in 1872 by Paṇḍit Táránátha
+Tarkaváchaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
+the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
+Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
+been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
+those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
+of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
+originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
+character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
+from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
+noticed the same thing in the Nágarí copies of Mádhava's Commentary on
+the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.
+
+As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic
+Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
+read it with my friend Paṇḍit Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna, the present
+Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
+translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
+engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
+England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
+chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
+were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
+longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Paṇḍits
+of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
+years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
+that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
+of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
+it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
+accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
+advantage of the help of some of the Paṇḍits of Benares, especially of
+Paṇḍit Ráma Miśra, the assistant Professor of Sáṅkhya, who was himself
+a Rámánuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
+things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
+throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
+abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
+the Benares Paṇḍit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
+revised for their present republication.
+
+The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
+The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical
+systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
+gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
+principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
+them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
+for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
+were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
+with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
+the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
+interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
+course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
+details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
+guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
+Darśanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
+the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
+materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
+controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
+the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
+continually following in their track even where he does not quote
+their exact words.[2]
+
+The systems are arranged from the Vedánta point of view,--our author
+having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smárta order in
+the Maṭh of Śṛingeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Śaṃkara
+Áchárya, the great Vedántist teacher of the eighth century, through
+whose efforts the Vedánta became what it is at present--the
+acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
+ascending scale,--the first, the Chárváka and Bauddha, being the
+lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedánta, and the last, the
+Sáṅkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.
+
+The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest
+minds in India throughout the mediæval period of its history. Hiouen
+Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les écoles philosophiques sont
+constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnées s'élève
+comme les flots de la mer. Les hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent
+à des maîtres particuliers, et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous
+au même but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the
+mediæval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among
+the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
+trees Árhata begging monks, Śvetapadas, Mahápáśupatas, Páṇḍarabhikshus,
+Bhágavatas, Varṇins, Keśaluñchanas, Lokáyatikas, Kápilas, Káṇádas,
+Aupanishadas, Ísvarakárins, Dharmaśástrins, Pauráṇikas, Sáptatantavas,
+Śábdas, Páñcharátrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets
+and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in
+the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Mádhava's poem on the
+controversial triumphs of Śaṃkara Áchárya, and in the spurious prose work
+on the same subject, ascribed to Anantánandagiri. Well may some old poet
+have put into the mouth of Yudhishṭhira the lines which one so often hears
+from the lips of modern paṇḍits--
+
+    Vedá vibhinnáḥ smṛitayo vibhinná,
+    Násau munir yasya mataṃ na bhinnam,
+    Dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guháyáṃ,
+    Mahájano yena gataḥ sa pantháḥ.[4]
+
+And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,
+
+μιᾶς τοίνυν οὔσης τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος μυρίας
+ἐκτροπὰς ἔχει, καθάπερ αἱ βάκχαι τὰ τοῦ Πενθέως διαφορήσασαι
+μέλη αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε
+Ἑλληνικῆς αἱρέσεις, ἑκάστη ὅπερ ἔλαχεν, ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ
+τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φωτὸς δ', οἶμαι, ἀνατολῇ πάντα φωτίζεται.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
+equanimity is that of Váchaspati Miśra, who wrote standard treatises
+on each of the six systems except the Vaiśeshika, adopting, of course,
+the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
+alien tenet.]
+
+[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
+given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
+in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Śríharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 4: Found in the Mahábh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
+give them as I have heard them from Paṇḍit Rámanáráyaṇa Vidyáratna.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+                                                                 Page
+
+    I.    The Chárváka System (E. B. C.)                           2
+
+   II.    The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)                           12
+
+  III.    The Árhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)                   36
+
+   IV.    The Rámánuja System (A. E. G.)                          64
+
+    V.    The Púrṇa-prajña System (A. E. G.)                      87
+
+   VI.    The Nakulíśa-Páśupata System (A. E. G.)                103
+
+  VII.    The Śaiva System (E. B. C.)                            112
+
+ VIII.    The Pratyabhijñá or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)      128
+
+   IX.    The Raseśvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)           137
+
+    X.    The Vaiśeshika or Aulúkya System (E. B. C.)            145
+
+   XI.    The Akshapáda or Nyáya System (E. B. C.)               161
+
+  XII.    The Jaiminíya System (E. B. C.)                        178
+
+ XIII.    The Páṇiníya System (E. B. C.)                         203
+
+  XIV.    The Sáṅkhya System (E. B. C.)                          221
+
+   XV.    The Pátañjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)                231
+
+  XVI.    The Vedánta or System of Saṃkara Áchárya               273
+
+          APPENDIX--On the Upádhi (E. B. C.)                     275
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA.
+
+
+THE PROLOGUE.
+
+
+1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
+supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
+_him_ only has this all a maker.
+
+2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Ágamas,
+the son of Śárṅgapáṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
+of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
+proper meaning of the term Soul.
+
+3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava
+mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
+fortunate Sáyaṇa.
+
+4. Having thoroughly searched the Śástras of former teachers, very
+hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyaṇa-Mádhava[5] the lord has
+expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
+with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
+delight in a garland strung of various flowers?
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
+Vaṃśa-Bráhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mádhava and
+Sáyaṇa. Sáyaṇa is a pure Draviḍian name given to a child who is born
+after all the elder children have died. Mádhava elsewhere calls Sáyaṇa
+his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
+himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sáyaṇa-Mádhavaḥ
+here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
+same person. The body seems meant by the Sáyaṇa of the third śloka.
+Máyaṇa was the father of Mádhava, and the true reading may be
+_śríman-máyaṇa_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.
+
+
+[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the
+abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
+how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
+felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka,
+the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
+of Bṛihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be
+eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
+refrain--
+
+    While life is yours, live joyously;
+    None can escape Death's searching eye:
+    When once this frame of ours they burn,
+    How shall it e'er again return?
+
+The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and
+enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
+denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
+found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for
+that school is Lokáyata,--a name well accordant with the thing
+signified.[6]
+
+In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original
+principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
+intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
+from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are
+destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti
+for this [Bṛihad Áraṇy. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
+elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
+destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the
+soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
+since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
+such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
+only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.
+
+The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
+may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
+always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
+the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
+inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
+fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
+wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
+straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
+not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
+which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
+refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
+devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
+because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
+contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
+he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
+poet--
+
+    The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
+    Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning
+        of fools;
+    The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
+    What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered
+        with husk and dust?[9]
+
+If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
+world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
+agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
+expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
+accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are
+only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
+three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then
+again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
+destructive, as the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa is overthrown by
+those who maintain that of the karma-káṇḍa, while those who maintain
+the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa reject that of the karma-káṇḍa; and
+lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
+of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--
+
+     The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
+     and smearing oneself with ashes,--
+
+     Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those
+     who have no manliness nor sense.
+
+Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
+produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is
+the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
+eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
+holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such
+phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible,
+as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside
+in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
+body" is metaphorical "the head of Ráhu" [Ráhu being really _all
+head_].
+
+All this has been thus summed up--
+
+    In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;
+    And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--
+    Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, &c., mixed together;
+    Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the
+        same subject,
+    And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the
+        soul and no other,
+    And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.
+
+"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
+inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
+else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
+thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
+hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
+those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"
+
+All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.
+
+Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or
+middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
+found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
+major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
+of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does
+not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
+_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by
+virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this
+connection's being known?
+
+We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is
+held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by
+the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
+the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
+contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
+particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
+such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
+proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
+middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
+Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
+has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
+a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
+particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
+implying fire].
+
+Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
+the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
+object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
+as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their
+objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."
+
+Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal
+proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
+require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
+arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.
+
+Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege
+in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeshika doctrine of Kaṇáda, that
+this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
+this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
+that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
+the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the
+child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more
+reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
+invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,
+&c. [which, of course, we Chárvákas reject].
+
+And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
+knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
+whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
+major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
+no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
+smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
+oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.
+
+Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the
+means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
+impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
+connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is
+to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
+relation of a name to something so named.
+
+Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as
+the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal
+proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
+establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
+therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself
+perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
+non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
+inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
+been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
+the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
+extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying
+the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
+accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
+term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal],
+are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
+fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
+sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
+causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it
+is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning
+_samásama_.[23]
+
+But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
+knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
+knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
+the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a
+connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
+by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
+knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
+invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
+adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
+Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
+proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]
+
+The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
+knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
+former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
+this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
+coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
+drugs, &c.
+
+From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can
+only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
+not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become
+destitute of any cause.
+
+But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
+can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+    The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
+    By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.
+
+And all this has been also said by Bṛihaspati--
+
+    There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
+    Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
+        effect.
+    The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and
+        smearing one's self with ashes,
+    Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
+        and manliness.
+    If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,
+    Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]
+    If the Śráddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
+    Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is
+        needless to give provisions for the journey.
+    If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Śráddha here,
+    Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the
+        housetop?
+    While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
+        though he runs in debt;
+    When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
+    If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
+    How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
+        kindred?
+    Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have
+        established here
+    All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.
+    The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
+    All the well-known formulæ of the pandits, jarpharí, turpharí, &c.[27]
+    And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśwamedha,
+    These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
+        presents to the priests,[28]
+    While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
+        demons.
+
+Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
+to the doctrine of Chárváka. Such is the pleasant consummation.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 6: "Śaṅkara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the
+Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka"
+(Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
+the world" (_loka_ and _áyata_). Laukáyatika occurs in Páṇini's
+ukthagaṇa.]
+
+[Footnote 7: _Kiṇwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
+fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c."
+Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: "The faculty of thought results from a
+modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
+ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
+betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
+exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."]
+
+[Footnote 8: Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very
+different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
+existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
+Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 9: I take _kaṇa_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunṛ_. Cf.
+Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Aśváḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháḥ._]
+
+[Footnote 10: See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.]
+
+[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehaḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
+invariable concomitance (_vyápti_)."]
+
+[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _niśchita upádhi_ see Siddhánta
+Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]
+
+[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
+(as of smoke by fire).]
+
+[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in
+every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
+and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
+other place.]
+
+[Footnote 17: See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
+Siddhánta-M., p. 80.]
+
+[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the
+rhetorical, argument.]
+
+[Footnote 19: "_Upamána_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the
+instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
+particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
+name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]
+
+[Footnote 20: The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to
+restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
+has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
+the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
+of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.]
+
+[Footnote 21: 'Αντιστρἑφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A
+with distributed predicate.]
+
+[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi
+"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
+accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is
+non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
+would serve as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi, to establish the _vyabhichára_
+fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
+clause excludes it, as an upádhi must be consistent with _either_
+party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being
+produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
+defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
+constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi "the
+nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
+class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
+only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
+found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
+upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
+accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi "the not
+causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of
+hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
+where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where
+a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,
+universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
+predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the
+existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
+will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
+the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
+because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
+fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
+fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
+fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
+non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
+inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
+by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
+will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus
+invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
+fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
+reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
+accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
+here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
+another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-śaṅgraha to my old friend and
+teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
+College.]
+
+[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
+Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority
+of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
+genus and species.]
+
+[Footnote 25: _Adṛishṭa_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions
+which produce their effects in future births.]
+
+[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
+209.]
+
+[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's
+Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]
+
+[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
+handled in the rites."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.
+
+
+At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid
+down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
+your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
+easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
+accordingly been said--
+
+     "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
+     a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not
+     through the mere observation of the desired result in
+     similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
+     dissimilar cases."[29]
+
+On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and
+non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
+that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
+of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
+impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
+future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that
+uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
+system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
+may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
+stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
+entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
+practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
+terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30]
+
+1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
+designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
+(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
+from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
+or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
+instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
+five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
+its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
+is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
+non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.
+
+2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
+ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
+we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
+arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
+as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
+self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
+where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
+exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
+the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
+to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For
+reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
+there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
+no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
+two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
+can reference to the same object take place where there is a
+reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
+for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.
+
+It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
+cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).
+
+If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
+_pramáṇa_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
+is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
+allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
+maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
+the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
+inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
+(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
+absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
+Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
+and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
+homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
+affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
+words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
+existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
+yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
+term. Conformably it has been said by Tathágata--
+
+     "The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
+     its being present to the understanding of others.
+
+     "The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
+     negation by a certain person."
+
+All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
+for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.
+
+These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
+standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mádhyamika,
+Yogáchára, Sautrántika, and Vaibháshika, these Buddhists adopt
+respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
+void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
+(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects
+(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
+teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
+of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
+the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
+to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
+and so forth, according to their several inclinations.
+
+It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
+viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
+all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.
+
+Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
+and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
+from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)
+like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one
+object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
+existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
+perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
+exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
+established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary
+succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
+the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
+efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
+succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
+succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
+manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--
+
+     "In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
+     alternative;
+
+     "Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
+     repugnance in the very statement."[33]
+
+And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
+and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
+existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.
+
+Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
+the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
+to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
+future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
+efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
+cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
+deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
+which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
+time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
+thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
+power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
+practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
+not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
+instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
+while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
+past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.
+
+You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there
+is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
+future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
+the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
+not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
+the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
+assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
+other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
+cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
+will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
+adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:
+
+     "What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
+     is on the skin of man;
+
+     "If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
+     and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
+     produced upon it."
+
+Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_
+its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
+its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
+their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
+without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
+the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
+give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
+afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
+stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
+additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in
+infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another
+auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
+series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
+regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
+additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
+water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
+would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on
+the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
+otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
+a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
+to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
+requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
+productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
+established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
+supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.
+
+Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
+the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
+or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
+the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
+is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
+the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
+take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
+and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
+additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
+regression is firmly set up.
+
+In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
+subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
+the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
+additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
+by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
+your embarrassment.
+
+Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
+supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
+may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the
+supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
+supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
+_kurvad rúpa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
+the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
+its fruit.
+
+Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
+Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
+for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
+(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
+effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
+of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
+will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
+the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
+reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.
+
+That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
+heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
+Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
+not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
+disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
+allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
+times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
+That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
+that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
+time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
+of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
+produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
+stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
+seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
+efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
+The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
+anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
+of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
+exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
+to those times.
+
+(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
+being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
+to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
+which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
+there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
+of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
+"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
+observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
+the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jñána-śrí--
+
+     "What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
+     things;
+
+     "The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
+     and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
+     eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);
+
+     "Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
+     the work of another;
+
+     "For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
+     simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
+     true in regard to that which we have to prove."
+
+Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
+Vaiśeshikas and Naiyáyikas, that existence is a participation in the
+universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
+particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
+universal) could have no existence.
+
+Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
+co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for
+such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_
+existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
+dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
+many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
+all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
+forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.
+Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
+everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
+in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
+and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-páda
+has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
+present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
+of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
+another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
+other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
+the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
+qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
+itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
+does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
+place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
+inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
+you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
+of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
+of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.
+
+Conformably it has been said--
+
+     "Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
+     place, engages without moving from that place in producing
+     itself in another place.
+
+     "This entity (universality) is not connected with that
+     wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
+     that place: great is this miracle.
+
+     "It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
+     divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
+     of difficulties!"
+
+If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
+rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
+repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
+heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
+verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
+found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
+bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
+pain, and pain alone.
+
+If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
+instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
+being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
+impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
+all is like itself alone, like itself alone.
+
+In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
+are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
+not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
+(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
+of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular
+nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon
+that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
+so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
+semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
+fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
+The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
+superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection
+between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be
+unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
+objects of the negation; the Mádhyamikas excellently wise explain as
+follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
+total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
+like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
+momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
+assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
+reality.
+
+The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four
+alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
+and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
+this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
+the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.
+
+If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
+is said--
+
+     "Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
+     like, for instance;
+
+     "No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
+     of the sky and the like, for instance."
+
+The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
+inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
+Buddha in the Alaṅkárávatára[34]--
+
+     "Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
+     ascertained;[35]
+
+     "Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
+     natureless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
+     sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."
+
+That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
+alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--
+
+     "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
+     views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
+     carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."
+
+In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
+come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
+Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be
+taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
+student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
+putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
+Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
+These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
+religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
+their conventional designation of Mádhyamikas (or mediocre).
+
+Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogácháras, because while they
+accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
+the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
+void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
+admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent
+cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
+is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakírti: "To one
+who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."
+
+An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the
+following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
+from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
+which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
+what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
+you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
+cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
+the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
+supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
+apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a
+complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
+by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
+alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
+not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
+been said--
+
+     "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
+     have six surfaces;
+
+     "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
+     body of atomic dimension."
+
+Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is
+shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous
+with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
+     cognition ulterior thereto;
+
+     "There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
+     intellect shines forth of itself alone."
+
+The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
+is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
+soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
+and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
+were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
+not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
+identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
+determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
+interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
+illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
+cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
+beginning and without interruption; as it has been said--
+
+     "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
+     cognition thereof are identical;
+
+     "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
+     cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
+     reason of illusory perceptions,
+
+     "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
+     of percipient."
+
+Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the
+energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
+sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
+the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
+subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
+virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
+reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
+conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
+to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
+another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
+     appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,
+
+     "Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
+     percipient;
+
+     "So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
+     example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
+     the like,
+
+     "Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
+     percipient and percept."
+
+Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
+ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.
+
+When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
+view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
+knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
+such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
+_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).
+
+Others again (the Sautrántikas) hold that the position that there is
+no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
+contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
+cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
+accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
+being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they
+proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
+invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because
+inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
+manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
+as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
+object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
+should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the
+cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
+blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
+and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
+so it has been said--
+
+     "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
+     portion,
+
+     "This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
+     illusion."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
+     as if it were external."
+
+To this we reply (say the Sautrántikas): This is untenable, for if
+there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
+comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
+senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
+mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
+illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
+duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
+involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
+cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
+their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
+and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
+states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
+difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
+like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
+external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and
+your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.
+
+If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
+the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrántikas) reply that this
+objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
+the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
+and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
+interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--
+
+     "If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They
+     recognise perceptibility,
+
+     "And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
+     its imposition of its form."
+
+To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
+nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
+from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
+be inferred. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
+     without losing the nature of a half;
+
+     "The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
+     is the nature of the knowable."
+
+For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
+cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
+indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
+to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
+external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
+at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
+instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
+speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
+walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
+discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
+are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
+recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
+manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as
+it has been said--
+
+     "That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
+     about the Ego:
+
+     "That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
+     the rest."
+
+Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
+it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
+which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
+world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
+presentments resulting from ideation.
+
+According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vijñánavádin_),
+ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
+presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
+single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
+produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
+sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
+train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
+to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
+momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
+are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
+subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
+presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
+had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
+stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
+this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
+intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
+must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
+consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
+percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
+smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
+conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
+suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,
+the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
+the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
+like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
+forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
+restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
+medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
+the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
+one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been
+equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
+who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
+causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
+its modifications.
+
+So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
+of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
+(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
+these, the sensible world (_rúpa-skandha_) is the sense organs and
+their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
+discriminated (_rúpyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the
+stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
+affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
+generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
+world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words
+"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
+desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
+miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.
+
+Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
+and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
+principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
+     four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36]
+
+In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
+"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
+(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
+these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
+concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
+of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
+causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
+being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
+germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
+elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
+the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
+as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
+touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
+the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism
+comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
+Tathágatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
+by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
+determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
+cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathágata
+Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
+between the cause and effect, results from production or from
+non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
+exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
+the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
+the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_
+(in the word _sthititā_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
+by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
+some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
+effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
+it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
+that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
+causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
+observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
+genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,
+from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
+hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
+blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
+neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
+the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
+being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
+two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
+matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
+unduly prolix.
+
+Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
+rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
+(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
+knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
+ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrántika arose from
+the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
+who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism
+(_sútra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
+Sautrántikas."
+
+Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
+odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to
+produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
+venerated Buddha styled Práthamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
+attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
+is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the
+internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
+inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddhá
+bháshá_), and are known under the designation of Vaibháshikas. Their
+technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of
+inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
+no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
+impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
+contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
+therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
+is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
+representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
+evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
+     non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
+     appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
+
+     "The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
+     were aught else,
+
+     "There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
+     derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."
+
+Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
+is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
+universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
+replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
+for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
+if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
+gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
+for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
+fully discussed in describing the Sautrántikas (cf. p. 27), and
+therefore need not here be further detailed.
+
+It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according
+to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
+for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--
+
+     "The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
+     accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
+     (of those who are to be taught),
+
+     "Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
+     plurality of methods.
+
+     "For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
+     superficial,
+
+     "Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
+     universal void which is a negation of duality."
+
+It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
+inner seats (_áyatana_) is conducive to felicity.
+
+     "After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats
+
+     "Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
+     aught else below?
+
+     "The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,
+
+     "The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
+     the wise as the twelve inner seats."
+
+The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
+Viveka-vilása:--
+
+     "Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
+     universe is momentarily fluxional;
+
+     "The following four principles in order are to be known by
+     the name of the noble truths:--
+
+     "Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
+     held,[38]
+
+     "And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
+     heard in order.
+
+     "Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are
+     declared to be five,--
+
+     "Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.
+
+     "The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
+     and the rest, the common sensory,
+
+     "And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the
+     twelve inner seats.
+
+     "This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
+     it arises in the heart of man.
+
+     "Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
+     aggregate.
+
+     "The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,
+
+     "This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
+     emancipation.
+
+     "Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
+     perception and inference.
+
+     "The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
+     the Vaibháshikas and the rest.
+
+     "The Vaibháshika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
+     cognition;
+
+     "The Sautrántika allows no external object apprehensible by
+     perception;
+
+     "The Yogáchára admits only intellect accompanied with forms;
+
+     "The Mádhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.
+
+     "All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
+     emancipation,
+
+     "Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of
+     cognitions and impressions.
+
+     "The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
+     single meal in the forenoon,
+
+     "The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
+     Bauddha mendicants."[39]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 29: This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
+89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
+read more correctly, _'darśanán na na darśanát_.]
+
+[Footnote 30: Kusumánjali, iii. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--
+
+(1.) Mádhyamikas or Nihilists.
+
+(2.) Yogácháras or Subjective Idealists.
+
+(3.) Sautrántikas or Representationists.
+
+(4.) Vaibháshikas or Presentationists.]
+
+[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
+
+"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
+heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
+half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
+ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
+although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
+reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
+never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
+any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth
+part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
+an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
+another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
+because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
+refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
+declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
+given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
+one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in
+another."]
+
+[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]
+
+[Footnote 34: Query, Laṅkávatára?]
+
+[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
+every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_
+the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
+is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
+the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
+of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
+calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
+more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
+sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."]
+
+[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read
+_samudaya_?]
+
+[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
+"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
+of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
+because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
+into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
+wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
+_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
+forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
+definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
+agency."]
+
+[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
+30.]
+
+[Footnote 39: Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
+Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
+explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudáya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem
+to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.
+
+
+The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
+Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain
+extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
+(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
+arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
+be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that
+one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
+conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
+its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
+continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
+subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
+the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts
+only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
+
+But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
+sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
+In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
+'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel
+line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
+and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if
+this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A
+might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an
+essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
+effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
+sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
+certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
+stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series
+to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
+with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
+the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
+it has been said--
+
+     "'In whatever series of successive states the original
+     impression of the action was produced,
+
+     "'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
+     produced in cotton.
+
+     "'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the
+     citron, &c.,
+
+     "'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see
+     it?'"
+
+But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
+overthrown by the following dilemma:--
+
+In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your
+favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
+It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
+always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
+example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
+the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove
+your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
+consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
+momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
+of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
+it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
+this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
+said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
+origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."
+
+As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
+proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
+attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
+_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
+holders of the Syád-váda[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the
+indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
+example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
+and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
+moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
+without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
+individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
+in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
+held to be one [throughout all"].
+
+Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
+between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
+follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
+remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
+might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
+and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
+away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
+enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya--
+
+"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
+not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of
+memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
+these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
+destruction!"
+
+Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
+of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
+does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
+the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
+perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
+the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
+and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
+like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
+cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
+and consequently the _Álambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.
+29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
+(_pratyaya_).[43]
+
+If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
+will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
+existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
+For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
+certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
+explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
+impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
+it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
+incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
+perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
+abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
+external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a
+definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],
+and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
+mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
+object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
+&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
+exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all
+our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
+"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
+say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
+possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are
+applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
+belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a
+mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it
+represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
+object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
+be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
+itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
+grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
+hopeless difficulties.
+
+If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
+perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
+would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is
+a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
+lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
+perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
+being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
+the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
+jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
+the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
+And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
+blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
+both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
+character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
+perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
+constituting its character.[46]
+
+All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
+length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the
+_Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
+the book too much.
+
+Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept
+the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine.
+The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,[47]
+in his _Áptaniśchayálaṅkára_.
+
+"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
+overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the
+declarer of things as they are."
+
+But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
+path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
+to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhaṭṭa Kumárila[48]]?
+
+1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
+ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
+help us as a sign to infer his existence.
+
+2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals
+an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
+passages (_arthaváda_) be applied here.
+
+3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
+quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
+repetitions (_anuváda_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
+before.
+
+4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
+of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
+spurious Veda?
+
+5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?
+How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
+support?
+
+6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
+omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
+point be established without some previously established foundation?
+
+7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
+of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
+words.
+
+8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
+we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
+proof, comparison (_upamána_).
+
+9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
+embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,
+if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."
+
+We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
+existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
+proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,
+&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become
+omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
+remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
+Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
+when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
+just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
+darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its
+hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things
+remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
+the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
+grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímáṃsist could not maintain
+that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
+authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be
+the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
+argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
+existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that
+universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
+of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
+Púrva Mímáṃsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
+for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
+all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
+prohibitions, as is said [by Śabara in his commentary on the Sútras,
+i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
+the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it
+is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
+knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
+certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
+["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior
+assaults of argument can be put to flight.
+
+But the Naiyáyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
+which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
+sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
+can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
+been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
+eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
+eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
+like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated"
+necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the
+latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
+the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
+being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?
+according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a
+maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
+argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
+have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
+their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
+horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
+being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
+relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
+(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
+the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?
+
+Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would
+include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
+contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it
+would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by
+intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the
+third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
+disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,
+because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
+alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
+substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
+itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
+something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
+former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
+has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
+latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
+point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
+relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you
+mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
+terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
+such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
+existence.
+
+Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach
+too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
+to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
+be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
+something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
+contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
+all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
+all-pervading].
+
+And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?
+
+In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
+erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of
+many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if
+all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
+be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vítarágastuti_, or "Praise
+of Jina"--
+
+1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
+independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
+whose teacher art _thou_."
+
+And again--
+
+2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
+influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
+of yourself or all the artisans, if Íśwara fabricates the three
+worlds?"
+
+Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
+when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.
+
+Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are
+impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this
+universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
+omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
+faults as _Anyonyáśrayatá_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal
+succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
+endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
+much for this preliminary discussion.
+
+The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are
+thus described in the _Paramágamasára_ (which is devoted to the
+exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right
+knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
+thus explained by Yogadeva:--
+
+(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been
+declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
+faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary
+idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
+_Tattvártha-sútra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right
+'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
+predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
+produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
+"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
+another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
+teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.
+
+(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
+&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
+doubt; as it has been said--
+
+"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
+predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
+wise."
+
+This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _śruta_, _avadhi_,
+_manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _ś_ruta,
+_avadhi_, _manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The
+meaning of this is as follows:--
+
+1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the
+operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
+being abolished.
+
+2. _Śruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the
+obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
+
+3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
+abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
+&c.[56]
+
+4. _Manas-paryáya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's
+thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
+knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
+
+5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
+ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
+
+The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
+manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
+itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
+ways."
+
+But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
+the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
+
+(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
+evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
+diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
+constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
+the Arhat--
+
+1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of
+blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
+the 'five vows,' _ahiṃsá_, _súnṛita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharyá_, and
+_aparigraha_.[57]
+
+2. "The 'vow' of _ahiṃsá_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
+of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
+
+3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
+_súnṛita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
+others and prejudicial.
+
+4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
+_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
+killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
+
+5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharyá_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
+abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
+and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
+one's causing another to act.
+
+6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive
+interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
+may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
+
+7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
+these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."
+
+The full account of the five states of mind (_bhávaná_) has been given
+in the following passage [of which we only quote one śloka]--
+
+"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _súnṛita_ uninterruptedly by the
+abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
+deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.
+
+These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
+united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
+an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,
+and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce
+the elixir's effect, but not severally.
+
+Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,
+_jíva_ and _ajíva_; the soul, _jíva_, is pure intelligence; the
+non-soul, _ajíva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
+said--
+
+"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
+'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
+pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
+affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
+the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
+be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."
+
+_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
+place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
+of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
+_pradeśa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
+[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
+its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
+be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
+these."[61]
+
+Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real
+nature of the soul viewed as _pariṇata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];
+but by the influence of _upaśamakshaya_ and _kshayopaśama_ it appears
+in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence
+of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
+&c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]--
+
+"The _aupaśamika_, the _Ksháyika_, and the 'mixed' states are the
+nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Páriṇámika_."
+
+1. The _aupaśamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of
+past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
+future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
+mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
+nut-plant,[64] &c.
+
+2. The _Ksháyika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
+actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
+
+3. The "mixed" (_miśra_) state combines both these, as when water is
+partly pure.
+
+4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
+influence on the future]. The _Páriṇámika_ state is the soul's innate
+condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent
+states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the
+above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
+happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.
+
+This has been explained in the _Svarúpa-sambodhana_--
+
+"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some
+way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;
+such is the soul described to be."
+
+If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
+we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
+equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
+support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
+non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
+is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
+advocates of the _Syád-váda_) it is perfectly notorious that all
+things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.
+
+Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned
+above, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; they hold that there are five _astikáyas_
+or categories,--_jíva_, _ákáśa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.
+To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67]
+as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
+apply the idea of "body" (_káya_),[68] from their occupying several
+parts of space.
+
+The _jívas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
+"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
+divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),
+and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _saṃjñá_,
+_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
+instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
+also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable"
+(_sthávara_).
+
+The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
+taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as
+possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
+earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be
+made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are
+aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
+appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
+hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
+must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which
+have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,
+are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of
+earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]
+These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense
+of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
+passing into any other state of existence.
+
+_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _ákáśa_ are singular categories [and not
+generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
+the causes of a substance's change of place.
+
+_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They
+assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
+extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
+Lokákáśa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
+from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
+_ákáśa_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
+occupied by another.
+
+_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
+two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the
+compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
+the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
+from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
+separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
+_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_púr_), and "dissolve" (_gal_).
+Although "time" is not properly an _astikáya_, because it does not
+occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
+still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;
+"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities
+reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
+general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jíva_, form, &c., of the
+body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
+into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
+"demerit," and _ákáśa_. "Action" (_paryáya_) has thus been defined;
+the actions (_paryáyáḥ_) of a substance are, as has been said, its
+existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
+course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jíva_, the knowledge of
+objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the
+lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special
+functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_
+[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].
+
+Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--
+
+"The _tattvas_ are _jíva_, _ajíva_, _ásrava_, _bandha_, _saṃvara_,
+_nirjará_, and _moksha_." _Jíva_ and _ajíva_ have been already described.
+_Ásrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]
+through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
+_audárika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _ásrava_,
+because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is
+called _ásrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
+flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
+it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
+collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
+which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
+lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jíva_, heated
+by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
+by _yoga_. _Kasháya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
+(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
+pride, delusion, and lust. _Ásrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
+abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what
+is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.
+
+These various subdivisions of _ásrava_ have been described at length
+in several _Sútras_. "_Ásrava_ is the impulse to action with body,
+speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
+demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Ásrava_ is the
+action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
+the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
+means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
+&c."[76]
+
+_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
+intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kasháya_),
+and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many
+parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
+suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--
+
+     "Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
+     bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"
+
+In this quotation the word "sin" (_kasháya_) is used to include the
+other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
+Váchakáchárya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
+of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
+sin."
+
+(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural
+character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
+of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or
+derived, when learned by another's teaching.
+
+(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
+the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.
+
+(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pramáda_) is a want of effort to practise the
+five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.
+
+(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction
+that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of
+bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubháva_; _yoga_ [or _ásrava_] causes
+those kinds called _prakṛiti_ and _pradeśa_.
+
+"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakṛiti_, _sthiti_,
+_anubháva_, and _pradeśa_ are its four kinds."
+
+1. _Prakṛiti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
+sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
+eight _múla-prakṛitis_.[77]
+
+Thus obstructions (_ávaraṇa_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,
+as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)
+_jnánávaraṇa_, or (_b_) _darśanávaraṇa_. (_c_) An object recognised as
+simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
+pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedaníya_. (_d_)
+A delusion (_mohaníya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the
+Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
+conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)
+_Áyus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _Náman_, or
+"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
+paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of
+noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antaráya_
+produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the
+king by considerations of economy.
+
+Thus is the _prakṛiti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the
+eight _múla-prakṛitis_, with subdivisions according to the different
+actions of the various subject-matter.
+
+And thus has Umáswáti-váchakáchárya[80] declared: "The first kind of
+_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
+_vedaníya_, _mohaníya_, _áyus_, _náman_, _gotra_, and _antaráya_;" and he
+has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
+twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
+explained at full length in the _Vidyánanda_ and other works, and here is
+omitted through fear of prolixity.
+
+2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued
+unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
+three _múla-prakṛitis_, _jnánávaraṇa_, &c., and the last, _antaráya_, have
+not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
+described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of
+periods of time measured by thirty _ságaropamas_."[81] This continuance is
+_sthiti_.
+
+3. _Anubháva._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there
+exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
+producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies
+produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubháva_)
+for producing their respective effects.
+
+4. _Pradeśa._ The _bandha_ called _pradeśa_ is the entrance into the
+different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
+number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
+consequences of actions.
+
+_Saṃvara_ is the stopping of _ásrava_--that by which the influence of
+past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
+divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the
+soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it
+is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the
+acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
+into five kinds, as _íryá_,[83] _bháshá_, &c., as has been explained
+by Hemachandra.
+
+1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
+circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
+call _íryá_.
+
+2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with
+all people; this is called _bháshá-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of
+speech.
+
+3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
+which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshaṇá-samiti_.[85]
+
+4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
+him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the
+_ádána-samiti_.
+
+5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
+in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the
+_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed
+as that which closes (_sam_ + _vṛiṇoti_) the door of the stream of
+_ásrava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_Ásrava_ is the cause
+of mundane existence, _saṃvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this
+is the Árhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
+of this.'"
+
+_Nirjará_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
+self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
+of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
+and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
+&c. This _nirjará_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yathákála_) and
+ancillary (_aupakramaṇika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
+dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
+that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,
+_nirjará_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.
+But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
+means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjará_ of
+actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
+which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjará_ arises, which is
+twofold, _sakámá_ and _akámá_. That called _sakámá_ belongs to
+ascetics, the _akámá_ to other embodied spirits."[91]
+
+_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
+absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
+perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are
+abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjará_, there arises the
+absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been
+said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
+(_nirjará_) of the causes of bondage and of existence."
+
+Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
+wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
+stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
+contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_
+exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
+onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
+sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
+encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
+isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
+the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.
+
+"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
+interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _saṅga_ is
+merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--
+
+"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
+from the absence of _saṅga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
+the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
+potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
+castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."
+
+Hence they recite a śloka:--
+
+     "However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
+     moon, and the rest;
+
+     "But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
+     Álokákáśa."
+
+Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
+soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
+untainted by any pain or impression thereof.
+
+Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
+foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
+This has been declared in the _Siddhánta_, "_Jíva_, _ajíva_, _puṇya_,
+_pápa_, _ásrava_, _saṃvara_, _nirjaraṇa_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are
+the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.
+
+Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
+_sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
+be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
+be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
+"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
+and not predicable." All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:--
+
+1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
+'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'
+
+2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure
+likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
+be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.
+
+3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
+as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
+indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.
+
+4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
+employed simultaneously."
+
+_Syát_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
+part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "This particle _syát_ is in the form of a verb, but, from
+     its being connected with the sense, it denotes
+     indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
+     on the implied meaning."
+
+If, again, the word _syát_ denoted determinateness, then it would be
+needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
+indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syát_,
+"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathaṃchit_; and so it is
+not really useless. As one has said--
+
+"The doctrine of the _syád-váda_ arises from our everywhere rejecting
+the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_,
+and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
+be accepted."
+
+If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
+everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
+ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
+treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
+But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
+certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
+Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_
+or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the
+thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the
+phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghaṭósti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"
+would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
+words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
+argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been
+declared--
+
+     "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
+     implies 'is;'
+
+     "Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
+     non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.
+
+The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
+severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
+non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
+inexplicable (_anirvachaníyatá_);[97] three other classes hold one or
+other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,
+when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
+&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
+&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
+to the holder of the _Syád-váda_, which ascertains the entire meaning
+of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syádváda-mañjarí_--
+
+"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
+omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
+scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point
+proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syád-váda_,
+which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."
+
+"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
+and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
+with no partiality equally favours all sects."
+
+The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri--
+
+"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
+giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
+liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
+deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our
+system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
+knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of
+knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
+(_pramáṇa_) in the _Syád-váda_ doctrine,--sense-perception and
+inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
+nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jíva_, the _ajíva_, merit and demerit,
+_ásrava_, _saṃvara_, _bandha_, _nirjará_, _mukti_,--we will now
+explain each. _Jíva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajíva_ is all other
+than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
+opposite; _ásrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjará_ is the
+unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight
+forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
+included in _saṃvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _ásrava_.
+
+"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is
+hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
+liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetámbaras are the destroyers of
+all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,
+they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
+Jaina _Sádhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry
+peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
+eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the
+Jaina Ṛishis.
+
+"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so
+say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
+between them and the Śwetámbaras."[106]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]
+
+[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,
+alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
+hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syád-vádinám_.]
+
+[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _gráhyasya_
+for _agráhyasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]
+
+[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyágrahaṇaṃ_ to _tasyá
+grahaṇaṃ_ (_tasyá_ being _jaḍatáyáḥ_).]
+
+[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen
+though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the
+_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]
+
+[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarúpam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,
+_infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's
+writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
+Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a
+little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
+repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
+there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhát kaśchid
+vidyáleśo játaḥ._]
+
+[Footnote 49: Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
+his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
+proofs,--the sixth, _abháva_, being negative, is, of course, not
+applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability
+of "presumption" or _arthá-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
+were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
+but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
+retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
+Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
+cannot be convincing in his own.]
+
+[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhávávedakasya_ for
+_tatsadbhávádekasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilárthajñanát notpatty_, I
+propose to read _nikhilárthajñánotpatty_.]
+
+[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Kárya_ and equally disputed.]
+
+[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Śarírí_), "my
+hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
+notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]
+
+[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the
+_Anavasthádosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed
+fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
+everybody's eyes.]
+
+[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvárthe_ for
+_tattvártham_.]
+
+[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarśanádi_ for
+_asamyagdarśanádi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
+of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sútras_, ii. 30.
+Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 58: I read _kámánám_ for _kámáṇám_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 =
+18).]
+
+[Footnote 59: For _abháshaṇa_, see Hemach. 16.]
+
+[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,
+_raśayanajñánaśraddhávacháraṇáni_ for _rasáyaṇajñanaṃ
+śraddhánávaraṇáni_. For _avacháraṇa_, see _Suśruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,
+&c. If _anávaraṇa_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
+absence of obstructions."]
+
+[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
+by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upaśamakshaya_ or
+_kshayopaśama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]
+
+[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushádyákáreṇa_ for
+_kalushányákáreṇa_. The _upaśamakshaya_ and _kshayopaśama_ seem to
+correspond to the _aupaśamika_ and _ksháyika_ states about to be
+described.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]
+
+[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not
+really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]
+
+[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
+and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
+the eye, light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'stíti_ for _sthiti_.]
+
+[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikáya_.]
+
+[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one
+sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas
+trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo_.]
+
+[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _teshám ajívatvát_ for _tesháṃ
+jívatvát_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
+the former only are animate."]
+
+[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatrávasthite_ for
+_sarvatrávasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _álokenávachchhinne_ for
+_álokenávichchhinne_.]
+
+[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is
+_upabhoga-sádhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyaṇuka_. This category
+takes up the forms of _sthávara_ which were excluded from _jíva_.]
+
+[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava
+for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
+analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
+definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaiśesh. Sútra_, i. 1, 15. _Paryáya_ is
+explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Paryáya_, in p. 36, line 11
+(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
+which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
+_Abhidh_. 1503, _paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
+to act.]
+
+[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _ásravaṇakáraṇatvád_.]
+
+[Footnote 76: The _jnána_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
+by its connection with the senses and external objects.]
+
+[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in
+Govindánanda's gloss, _Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33.]
+
+[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _ádaraṇíyasya_ for
+_ávaraṇíyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _ávaraṇíya_ may be used for
+_ávarana_ (_Páṇ._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga Sút._, ii. 52, where Vyása's
+Comm. has _ávaraṇíya_.]
+
+[Footnote 79: _Jálavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 80: Umásvámi-?]
+
+[Footnote 81: For the _ságaropama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.
+309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ityádyuktakálád úrdhvam api_ for the
+obscure _ityádyuktaṃ káladurddhánavat_. I also read at the end of the
+line _prachyutiḥ sthitiḥ_ for _prachyutisthitiḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svakáryakaraṇe_.]
+
+[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _írshyá_ read
+_íryá_,--a bad misreading.]
+
+[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _ápadyetá_ for _ápadyatá_.]
+
+[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshaṇá_ read _saishaṇá_.]
+
+[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagatítale_.]
+
+[Footnote 87: Mádhava omits the remaining divisions of _saṃvara_.
+Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishahá_,
+"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
+patience, gentleness," &c.; _bhávaná_, "conviction," such as that
+worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _cháritra_, "virtuous
+observance."]
+
+[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _ásravasrotaso_.]
+
+[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]
+
+[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yathákála-_ for _yathá
+kála-_.]
+
+[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably
+corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
+_nirjará_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
+passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjará_
+is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
+attainment of the highest good. The former is _akámá_, "desireless,"
+because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
+latter is _sakámá_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
+under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
+37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
+which future actions are to be performed.]
+
+[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."]
+
+[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_, see Ved. S.
+Gloss., ii. 2, 23.]
+
+[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
+line, _kim vṛitatadvidheḥ_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]
+
+[Footnote 96: Thus Govindánanda applies it (_Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33) to
+"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 97: 'Ακαταληψἱα. This is Śriharsha's tenet in the
+_Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya_.]
+
+[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _matenámiśritáni_ read _matena
+miśritáni_.]
+
+[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
+really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidhána-chintámaṇi_,
+72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antaráyás_, _rágadwesháv
+aviratiḥ smaraḥ_, and _háso_ for _himsá_. The order of the eighteen
+_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
+10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.]
+
+[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartiniḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]
+
+[Footnote 103: In last line, for _saṃsrave_ read _saṃvare_.]
+
+[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
+the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's
+_Bhagavatí_, pp. 250, 261-266.]
+
+[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharaṇáh_ is explained by the _rajoharaṇadhárin_
+(= _vratin_) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.]
+
+[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _strím_ read _strí_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE RÁMÁNUJA SYSTEM.
+
+
+This doctrine of the Árhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
+whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
+co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
+plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
+any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
+existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
+should there not be an alternation between existence and
+non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that
+alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
+multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa
+and of the incarnation of Vishṇu as half man, half lion; for the
+elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
+in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
+being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
+a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
+same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
+in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
+compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
+times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
+indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
+be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
+and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different
+relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
+contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
+Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
+reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
+thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
+_bhaṅgas_ (Árhata tenets).
+
+Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhaṅgas_, which lies at
+the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
+or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
+there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
+multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
+prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
+proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for
+the neck of the Syád-Vádin.
+
+An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Árhata
+system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
+when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
+or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
+organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
+whether it be ninefold or not!
+
+In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Árhatas
+say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
+the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
+assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul
+for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
+(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
+body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
+body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
+filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
+resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
+the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
+according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
+road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
+of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
+that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
+non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
+and evil unmerited.
+
+As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
+rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
+the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.
+
+Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
+revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyása accordingly
+propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
+one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rámánuja with the
+express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
+of Rámánuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as
+soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
+     (Vishṇu)
+
+     "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
+     world is not-soul."
+
+Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkaráchárya), maintain that pure
+intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
+really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,
+pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
+individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
+(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
+The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
+and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
+reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
+sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
+forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
+beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
+individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
+with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
+spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
+things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
+Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
+thinking themselves very wise, the Śáṅkaras will not tolerate this
+division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
+Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This
+might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
+there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
+suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
+ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
+(to explain the views of the Śáṅkara)--
+
+     "Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
+     knowledge,
+
+     "Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."
+
+This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
+the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
+who leans on the arm of Prabhákara, or one to whom Kumárila-bhaṭṭa
+gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--
+
+     "By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
+     existent and non-existent,
+
+     "Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.
+
+     "Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
+     Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
+     else is observed."
+
+They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
+cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and
+knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
+knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
+maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
+argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
+consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
+by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
+If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
+knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
+is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
+presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
+not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Śáṅkaras continue) as the
+foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
+entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
+ignorance.
+
+All this (the Rámánuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
+for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
+ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
+would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
+as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
+presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
+of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
+how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
+object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
+revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
+thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance
+accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
+rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
+arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
+to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
+therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
+not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
+cognition allowed by us both.
+
+Well, then (the Śáṅkaras may contend), let the form of cognition
+evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
+follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
+entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior
+non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
+which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
+knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
+not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
+first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
+grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
+illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
+admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
+not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
+is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
+illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
+that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
+knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
+ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
+ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
+We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The counterposition (of the Rámánujas) is as follows:--The illusion
+under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
+because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any
+one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
+about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not
+start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
+existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
+(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
+also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,
+constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
+any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
+cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
+gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
+light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,
+as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
+mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
+quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,
+while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
+as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
+within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
+within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
+itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
+suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
+which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
+this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
+thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
+like texts.
+
+It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
+existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
+(_anṛita_); for the word untruth (_anṛita_) denotes that which is
+other than truth (_ṛita_). The word _ṛita_ has a passive sense, as
+appears from the words, Drinking _ṛita_. _Ṛita_ means works done
+without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
+bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
+question, untruth (_anṛita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
+during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
+propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is
+obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the
+entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
+this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such
+texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_máyá_) to be the primary
+emanative cause (_prakṛiti_), the term (_máyá_) designates the
+emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guṇa_), and
+creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
+inexplicable illusion (for which the Śáṅkaras contend).
+
+In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
+moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_máyá_) of the barbarian were
+swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
+(_máyá_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
+projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
+inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
+from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
+thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
+Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
+the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
+supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
+excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
+Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
+repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
+emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
+pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
+as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
+Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
+Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
+spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
+one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vádin may
+reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
+the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
+souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
+power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
+case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
+Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
+different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
+to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
+understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
+object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
+known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
+must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
+place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
+That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
+abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
+finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
+infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
+This suggestion (the Rámánujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
+no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
+Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
+"implication" (_lakshaṇá_, both This and That being used in their
+denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
+and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
+to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
+supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
+past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
+to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
+by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
+unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
+admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
+thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
+differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be
+inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
+will be triumphant.
+
+We have, therefore (the Rámánujas continue), laid it down in this
+question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
+individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
+body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
+body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
+the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
+soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
+is the body.
+
+Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are
+designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
+variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
+human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
+body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
+Hence--
+
+God, Man, Yaksha, Piśácha, serpent, Rákshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
+wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they
+what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
+of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
+things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
+individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
+complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
+That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
+Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktávalí and in the Chaturantara--
+
+     "God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
+     than That, called the established entity,
+
+     "Of this there is much significant and undoubted
+     exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;
+
+     "Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
+     form of gods, mortals, and the rest
+
+     "When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
+     a diversity of names and forms in the world."
+
+In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
+rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
+systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
+"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that
+it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
+lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all
+words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
+ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
+Rámánuja in the Vedártha-saṅgraha, when analysing the Vedic text about
+names and forms.
+
+Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
+can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
+in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
+thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
+not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
+form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
+universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
+was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
+knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
+illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
+there is no proof of these positions.
+
+Nor is there an absurdity (as the Śáṅkaras would say), on the
+hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
+that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
+is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
+cause (_prakṛiti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
+elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
+the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
+so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
+is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute
+spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
+absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
+there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
+cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
+unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
+cognition all cognition would be sublated.
+
+It is laid down (by the Rámánujas) that retractation into the universe
+(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
+and the originant (_prakṛiti_), returns to its imperceptible state,
+unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
+spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
+gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
+soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
+condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
+the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyása)
+treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
+Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
+deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
+those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
+explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
+existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
+with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
+forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
+forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]
+
+What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
+universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
+admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
+all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
+one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
+soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the
+essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
+not to be confounded.
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
+consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
+in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
+and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
+Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
+proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
+Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
+not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
+and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
+susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
+the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
+controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
+fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
+majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
+auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
+himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
+adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
+divine.
+
+Veṅkaṭa-nátha has given the following distribution of things:--
+
+     "Those who know it have declared the principle to be
+     twofold, substance and non-substance;
+
+     "Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
+     former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.
+
+     "The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'
+     (_parák_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
+     Lord;
+
+     "The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
+     principle some have called the unsentient primary."
+
+Of these--
+
+     "Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
+     originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;
+
+     "Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and
+     cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;
+
+     "Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
+     cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
+     characterised by goodness;
+
+     "The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
+     intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
+     summarily recounted."
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
+souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
+text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
+Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kaṇáda, iii. 2, 20),
+Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
+of souls is often spoken of in revelation--
+
+     "The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
+     it again cease to be;
+
+     "Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
+     killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gítá, ii. 20).
+
+Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
+requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
+accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautaṃa, iii. 25): Because
+no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
+atomic is well known from revelation--
+
+     "If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
+     hundred times,
+
+     "The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
+     capable of infinity."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
+     wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
+     atomic."
+
+The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
+divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
+fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
+Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vásudeva
+(a patronymic of Kṛishṇa), and the like.
+
+     "Vásudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
+     auspicious attributes,
+
+     "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
+     animator of spirits."
+
+This same Vásudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
+to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
+rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
+pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
+(_archá_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vyúha_), "the
+subtile" (_súkshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
+is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Ráma,
+and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vásudeva,
+Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
+entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vásudeva. His
+attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
+from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
+without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
+The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
+the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
+worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
+of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
+becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
+has, therefore, been said--
+
+     "Vásudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
+     desired by each,
+
+     "According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
+     recompense.
+
+     "For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
+     embodiments;
+
+     "Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
+     'emanations;'
+
+     "As Saṅkarshaṅa, Vásudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
+     manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
+     is the entire six attributes;
+
+     "That self-same called Vásudeva is styled the Supreme
+     Spirit;
+
+     "The internal controller is declared as residing in the
+     soul, the actuator of the soul,
+
+     "Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
+     as 'Who abiding in the soul.'
+
+     "By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
+     defilement becomes a qualified votary;
+
+     "By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
+     qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,
+
+     "By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
+     to behold the 'internal controller.'"
+
+The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcha-rátra as
+consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
+preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
+access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
+temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
+like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
+Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
+to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishṇu, the
+commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
+the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
+visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
+the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
+Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
+lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
+marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no
+future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
+traditionary text--
+
+     "When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
+     undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
+     having attained to the supreme consummation.
+
+     "Vásudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
+     mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
+     return."
+
+After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
+the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedánta aphorisms by
+the venerated Bodháyanachárya too prolix, Rámánuja composed a
+commentary on the Śárírakamímánsá (or Vedánta theosophy). In this the
+sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
+to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism
+means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
+glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
+know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because
+one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
+meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
+perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
+for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
+the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
+essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
+excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
+knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
+mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
+away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
+knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
+of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
+the latter Mímánsá constitute one system of institutes. On this
+account the glossator has described this system as one with the
+sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
+perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
+has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
+spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
+the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
+reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
+other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
+efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
+who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
+delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
+both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
+immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
+Pañcharátra-rahasya--
+
+     "That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,
+
+     "For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.
+
+     "These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
+     Subtile, the Internal Controller,
+
+     "Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
+     knowledge.
+
+     "As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,
+
+     "He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
+     embodiment.
+
+     "Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
+     traditional,
+
+     "By the aforesaid worship Vásudeva becomes propitious to
+     mankind.
+
+     "Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
+     meditation,
+
+     "At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
+     aggregate of works.
+
+     "Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
+     transmigration has vanished,
+
+     "Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.
+
+     "These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
+     the Lord,
+
+     "Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
+     Deity.
+
+     "Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
+     which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;
+
+     "They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."
+
+It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
+must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
+spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
+to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
+and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
+desire is predominant (in the word _jijñásitavya_), and desired
+knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
+must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
+such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
+knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
+any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
+even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
+Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
+be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
+let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
+knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
+understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
+_shaḍaṅgena vedo'dhyeyo jñeyaścha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,
+is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
+must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
+engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
+and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
+be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
+understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
+aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
+significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
+succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
+the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
+knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
+emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.
+
+     "Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,
+
+     "And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
+     Highest and Lowest,"
+
+because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
+indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
+an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
+the representations. The author of the Vákya has treated of all this
+in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
+characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
+not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
+Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
+its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
+choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
+of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--
+
+     "To them always devoted, who worship me with love,
+
+     "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
+     me."
+
+And again--
+
+     "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
+     unwavering."
+
+But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
+motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
+desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
+other means. As is said by the author of the Vákya: Attainment
+thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),
+practice (_abhyása_), observance (_kriyá_), excellence (_kalyáṇa_),
+freedom from despondency (_anavasáda_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),
+according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
+(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
+resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
+discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
+by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
+is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
+quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
+explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gítá) by (Rámánuja) the
+author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
+Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
+tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
+text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
+supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
+(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
+veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
+explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
+Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
+dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
+been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
+dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
+rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
+presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
+incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
+(Vaikuṇṭha) is attained. Thus Yámuna says: Attainable by the final and
+absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
+and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
+the devotion of works and knowledge.
+
+In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to
+be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
+the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
+creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
+universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
+sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
+multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmá
+to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
+this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
+which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
+indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
+omniscient, and omnipotent.
+
+In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
+absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
+itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
+source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
+that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
+the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
+knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
+the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
+form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
+absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
+illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
+effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
+It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
+that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.
+
+Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
+kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
+of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
+anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
+aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
+exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is
+the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
+the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
+end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
+Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
+sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
+cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
+that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
+son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
+cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
+have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
+from the original (viz., Rámánuja's Bháshya on the Vedánta aphorisms);
+we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
+and thus all is clear.[110]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
+Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
+statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
+and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
+if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
+inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
+both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
+Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
+proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
+information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
+declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
+Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
+and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
+297, 298.]
+
+[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
+pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
+the plaything of God.]
+
+[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._]
+
+[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Rámánuja and his system,
+see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
+The _Tattva-muktávalí_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;
+but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.
+
+
+Ánanda-tírtha (Púrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rámánuja
+system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
+of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
+without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
+self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
+dependency upon the Pañcha-rátra, the reality of plurality in the
+universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
+reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the
+tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
+number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
+a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
+new explication of the Brahma-Mímáṇsá (or Vedánta).
+
+For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
+independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--
+
+     "Independent and dependent, two principles are received;
+
+     "The independent is Vishṇu the Lord, exempt from
+     imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
+
+Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vádins): Why predicate of the
+absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
+which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
+heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not
+so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
+positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
+for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
+a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
+will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
+difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
+The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
+and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
+such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
+asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
+of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
+contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
+thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
+without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
+(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
+its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
+apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
+apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
+cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
+cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
+the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
+non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
+even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
+contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
+concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
+follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
+difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
+maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
+the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
+Bráhman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being
+irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
+the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
+if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
+this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
+first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
+and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
+example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
+first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
+judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
+contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishṇu-tattva-nirṇaya:
+"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
+determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
+predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
+proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
+counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
+circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
+predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
+difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
+if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
+_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
+such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
+presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
+judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
+same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
+aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
+Sáṅkhya-káriká, v. vii.)--
+
+     "From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
+     defect in the organs, from instability of the common
+     sensory,
+
+     "From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
+     and from aggregation of similars."
+
+There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
+of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
+applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
+lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
+the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
+by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
+sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
+things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
+light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
+overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
+similars.
+
+Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
+harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
+and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
+possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
+in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
+ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
+infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
+ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
+say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
+Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
+for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
+inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
+it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
+little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
+no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
+is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
+then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
+trouble.
+
+Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
+Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
+obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
+person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring
+as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
+slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
+become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
+all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
+excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
+gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
+
+     "And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
+     all that they desire."
+
+Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vádins) in their thirst to be one
+with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a
+mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
+fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishṇu
+they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same
+thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
+Mahábhárata-tátparya-nirṇaya:--
+
+     "O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishṇu's anger is waxed
+     great;
+
+     "He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
+     decide blindly."
+
+This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
+into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.
+
+Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
+weapons of Náráyaṇa (or Vishṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means
+of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
+of the Sákalya-samhitá:--
+
+     "The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
+     Vishṇu, which is the might of the gods,
+
+     "He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuṇṭha)
+     which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:
+
+     "The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
+     gods entered that heaven;
+
+     "Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
+     world, that weapon Bráhmans wear (stamped upon them);
+
+     "Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
+     Vishṇu;
+
+     "Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishṇu), let
+     us become beatified."
+
+Again, the Taittiríyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
+is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
+particular parts to be branded are specified in the Ágneya-puráṇa:--
+
+     "On his right hand let the Bráhman wear Sudarśana,
+
+     "On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
+     Veda declared."
+
+In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
+branded with the discus:--
+
+     "Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,
+
+     "Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
+     Vishṇu.
+
+     "Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
+     hand of Vishṇu,
+
+     "Adored by all the gods; O Páṅchajanya, to thee be
+     adoration."
+
+(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
+names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
+Lord.
+
+(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
+(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
+(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
+sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
+dedication to Náráyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
+     of ten kinds."
+
+Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
+also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
+difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
+setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
+rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
+divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
+the truth, O Bráhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
+individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
+illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."
+
+Again:--
+
+     "After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,
+
+     "In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
+     perish not" (Bhagavad-gítá, xiv. 2).
+
+According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
+because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."
+
+Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
+of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
+text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
+Bráhman devoutly a Śúdra becomes a Bráhman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.
+
+If any one urge that according to the text:--
+
+     "If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"
+
+this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
+duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
+you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
+meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
+come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
+fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
+illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue
+of the testimony of many such passages as:--
+
+     "The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
+
+     "The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O
+     Infinite.
+
+     "The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
+     because it produces ideas;
+
+     "The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed
+     (_avidyá_) ignorance:
+
+     "Styled (_máyá_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
+     the name _máyá_ is used of the pre-eminent;
+
+     "The excellent knowledge of Vishṇu is called, though one
+     only, by these names;
+
+     "For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
+     by spontaneous beatitude."
+
+That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
+sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
+therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
+in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
+illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
+as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).
+
+If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
+answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
+Vishṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
+Accordingly, the grand revelation:--
+
+     "A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
+     between the unsentient and the Lord,
+
+     "A difference among souls, and a difference of the
+     unsentient and the soul each from the other.
+
+     "Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
+     the world with its five divisions.
+
+     "This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
+     beginning it would have an end:
+
+     "Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
+     illusorily imagined:
+
+     "For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
+     ceases.
+
+     "That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
+     that lack knowledge;
+
+     "For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
+     and sustained by Vishṇu."
+
+The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
+excellence of Vishṇu. With this in view the Lord declared:--
+
+     "Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
+     the imperishable;
+
+     "The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
+     unmodified.
+
+     "The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
+     Spirit,
+
+     "Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
+     worlds.
+
+     "Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
+     the imperishable (soul),
+
+     "Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
+     of persons (_Purushottama_);
+
+     "He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
+     all-knowing worships me in every wise.
+
+     "Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
+     (Arjuna):
+
+     "Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
+     has to do, O Bhárata" (Bhagavad-gítá, xv. 16-20).
+
+So in the Mahá-varáha--
+
+     "The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
+     spouse of Śrī;
+
+     "Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
+     must be subordinate."
+
+It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
+excellence of Vishṇu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,
+according to the text of the Bhállaveya Upanishad: While merit,
+wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
+therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
+emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishṇu, according to the
+text of the Náráyaṇa Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
+state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
+while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
+the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
+from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
+Vishṇu-puráṇa--
+
+"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
+and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
+supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
+emancipation."
+
+And it is declared that the grace of Vishṇu is won only through the
+knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
+Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
+of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
+thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
+the real purport.
+
+     "The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
+     unknown,
+
+     "The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
+     be one?"
+
+And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
+the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
+revelation:--
+
+     "The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
+     similarity of cognition,
+
+     "Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
+     place of the individual;
+
+     "Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
+     different,
+
+     "The difference being independence and completeness (in the
+     Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
+     individual spirit)."
+
+Or to propose another explanation of the text, _Átmá tat tvam asi_,
+That art thou, it may be divided, _átmá tat tvam asi_. He alone is
+soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
+not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
+of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--
+
+     "Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be
+     well got rid of."
+
+According, therefore, to the Tattva-váda-rahasya, the words in the
+nine examples (in the Chhándogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
+a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
+non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--
+
+     "Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
+     trees;
+
+     "Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;
+
+     "Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;
+
+     "So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.
+
+     "Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
+     the supreme Hari
+
+     "Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
+     individual spirit, though he is its actuator;
+
+     "On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
+     he is bound."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Brahmá, Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
+     decay of their bodies;
+
+     "Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
+     for the sustentation of Lakshmí.
+
+     "By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
+     knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,
+
+     "All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
+     him."
+
+And again:--
+
+     "Knowing Vishṇu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
+     from transmigration,
+
+     "Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.
+
+     "Vishṇu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
+     ruler.
+
+     "Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."
+
+That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
+evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
+things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
+knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
+expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
+known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
+knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
+and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
+Advaita-vádins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_
+and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
+made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
+must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
+recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
+name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,
+cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
+these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
+with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
+such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
+words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
+then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
+statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
+statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
+statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.
+
+Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
+reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or
+transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
+author of the Nyáya-nirváṇa: The proof of the permanence of the
+transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
+And in the Tárkika-rakshá--
+
+     "When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
+     or not such and such,
+
+     "The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
+     called Nitya-sama."
+
+With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
+stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
+results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
+rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
+the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
+general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
+the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
+an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
+subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
+form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
+in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
+true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
+said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
+equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.
+
+If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
+its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
+carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
+money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
+are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
+be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to
+purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
+qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.
+
+Accordingly it is stated in the Gáruḍa-puráṇa:--
+
+     "All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
+     regularly; what then is the reason of this?
+
+     "And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
+     the most excellent?
+
+     "Tell me this, Brahmá, that I may know it truly."
+
+Thus addressed by Nárada, the most excellent Brahmá replied:--
+
+     "The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
+     in an auspicious sense,
+
+     "And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."
+
+It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
+because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Náráyana,
+and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
+which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
+the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
+The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
+result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
+words of the Skanda-puráṇa--
+
+     "He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
+     emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
+     involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"
+
+and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
+adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
+has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
+way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
+Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
+Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
+Kaurma-puráṇa--
+
+     "Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case
+
+     "Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
+     evidence;
+
+     "Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
+     revelation and tradition,
+
+     "Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
+     hesitation."
+
+What a Śástra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
+the Skanda-puráṇa:--
+
+     "The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the
+     Atharva-veda, the Mahábhárata, the Pañcha-rátra, and the
+     original Rámáyaṇa, are called Śástras.
+
+     "That also which is conformable to these is called Śástra.
+
+     "Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
+     heterodoxy."
+
+According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
+is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
+viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
+duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
+there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
+duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
+can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
+texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
+has said:--
+
+     "I ever laud Náráyaṇa, the one being to be known from
+     genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
+     imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
+     excellences."
+
+It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
+of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth
+aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
+the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
+construction, in the Bṛihat-saṃhitá:--
+
+     "Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
+     eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
+     purport is ascertained."
+
+It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the
+Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
+institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
+remains may be sought from the Ánandatírtha-bháshya-vyákhyána (or
+exposition of the Commentary of Ánanda-tírtha). We desist for fear of
+giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
+promulgated by Púrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
+third incarnation of Váyu:--
+
+     "The first was Hanumat, the second Bhíma,
+
+     "The third Púrṇa-prajña, the worker of the work of the
+     Lord."
+
+After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
+following stanza at the conclusion of his work:--
+
+     "That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
+     text of the Veda, sufficiently
+
+     "Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
+     splendour of the Veda;
+
+     "The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
+     the words of Ráma (Hanumat); the second was Bhíma;
+
+     "By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
+     composed in regard to Keśava."
+
+The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
+texts.
+
+The purport of this is that Vishṇu is the principle above all others
+in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 111: For a further account of Ánanda-tírtha or Madhva see
+Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
+Brahma-sútras has been printed in Calcutta.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE PÁŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULÍŚA.
+
+
+Certain Máheśvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishṇavas known
+by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch
+as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be
+a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as
+stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing
+for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend
+upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and
+others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme
+Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free
+from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these
+arguments, these Máheśvaras adopt the Páśupata system, which is
+conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to
+the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then
+we shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati. The meaning
+is as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and
+this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the
+spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in
+the Gaṇakáriká:--
+
+     "But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one
+     with three factors;
+
+     "He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a
+     spiritual guide.
+
+     "The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the
+     localities, the perseverance, the purifications,
+
+     "The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and
+     there are three functions."
+
+The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three
+(_tríṇi_), instead of the feminine three (_tisraḥ_), is a Vedic
+construction.
+
+(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and
+is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of
+the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattáchárya says: Knowledge,
+penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.
+
+(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is
+of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also
+says:--
+
+     "False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and
+     falling,
+
+     "These five, the root of bondage, are in this system
+     especially to be shunned."
+
+(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to
+liberation.
+
+These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.
+Thus he also says:--
+
+     "Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant
+     recollection of Rudra,
+
+     "And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients
+     of acquirements."
+
+(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the
+aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual
+teachers and the rest. Thus he says:--
+
+     "The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the
+     burning-ground, and Rudra only."
+
+(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads
+until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the
+differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:--
+
+     "The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,
+     and devotion as the fifth."
+
+(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false
+conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five
+species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said--
+
+     "The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of
+     interestedness,
+
+     "And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification
+     of the state of bondage."
+
+(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:--
+
+     "The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the
+     spiritual guide as the fifth."
+
+(_h._) The five powers are as follow:--
+
+     "Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,
+     conquest of pleasure and pain,
+
+     "Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of
+     power."
+
+The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent
+with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,
+mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.
+All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.
+
+In the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to
+introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),
+that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of
+pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _paśu_ we are
+to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that
+which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to
+understand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord,
+who is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of
+the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.
+
+In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and
+personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute
+extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the
+visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only
+one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly
+describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,
+discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of
+every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though
+imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of
+principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is
+cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.
+Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole
+system of institutes, according to the text and according to its
+significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and
+pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,
+summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this
+intellectual power.
+
+The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of
+three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of
+assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the
+possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with
+unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the
+faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.
+The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy
+even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.
+
+All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is
+threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,
+sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees
+according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive
+sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as
+proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable
+by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the
+cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in
+general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the
+light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive
+sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the
+objects of the sentient soul.
+
+The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,
+is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The
+insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and
+the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.
+The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,
+viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the
+three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the
+cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions
+ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and
+determination.
+
+The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,
+is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is
+the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is
+the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are
+to be found in the Pañchártha-bháshyadípiká and other works. The cause
+is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.
+This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of
+attributes and actions (into Maheśvara, Vishṇu, &c.) The Lord is the
+possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely
+first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as
+possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is
+expounded by the author of the Ádarśa, and other institutional
+authorities.
+
+Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and
+is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that
+characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by
+action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union
+characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c.
+
+Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of
+two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal
+is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise
+is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are
+bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and
+devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakulíśa says:--
+
+     "He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
+     Oblation is an observance divided into six members."
+
+Thus the author of the aphorisms says:--
+
+     "He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,
+     laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious
+     ejaculation."
+
+Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and
+lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of
+Maheśvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-śástra, or
+art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars
+saltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and
+with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal
+sentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the
+bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the
+palate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like
+the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be
+gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require
+exposition.
+
+The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,
+talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being
+asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the
+joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if
+the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an
+_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is
+doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what
+should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the
+utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no
+meaning, and the like.
+
+The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution
+for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on
+broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:
+Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.
+
+(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive
+power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,
+relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in
+detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes
+generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we
+shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati). Detail is the
+fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the
+instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the
+Ráśíkara-bháshya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these
+categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an
+enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,
+different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the
+cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the
+Sānkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is
+the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other
+systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall
+become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,
+the sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is
+determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of
+works, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus
+determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while
+in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of
+the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres
+involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in
+nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by
+such return to transmigratory experiences.
+
+Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,
+since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,
+then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be
+simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be
+created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge
+two difficulties. Think not so, replies the Páśupata, for your
+supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without
+results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will
+follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the
+efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer
+of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the
+works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only
+when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so
+furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of
+Yayáti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one
+will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman
+engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient
+creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the
+creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all
+his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to
+be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Páśupata,
+that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,
+inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed
+active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose
+power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed
+in sacred tradition:--
+
+     "Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by
+     the efficacy of works,
+
+     "For this reason is he in this system the cause of all
+     causes."
+
+Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through
+a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies
+the Páśupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere
+knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or
+the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for
+then it would follow that the study of any system would be
+superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,
+like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that
+Mahádeva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of
+the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is
+competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of
+various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.
+On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an
+accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent
+to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be
+realised apart from the system of the Páśupatas. Therefore it is that
+our great teacher has said:--
+
+     "If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,
+     but intuition is unattainable;
+
+     "There is no accurate characterisation of principles
+     otherwise than by the five categories."
+
+Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man
+must adopt the system of the Páśupatas, which undertakes the
+exposition of the five categories.
+
+A. E. G.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.
+
+
+[The seventh system in Mádhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha is the
+Śaiva-darśana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,
+especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about
+the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been
+lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the
+Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,
+by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,
+has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He
+has there translated the Tattuva-Kaṭṭalei, or law of the Tattwas, the
+Śiva-Gnánapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the
+Śiva-Pirakásam, or light of Śiva, and the three works shed immense
+light on the outline as given by Mádhava. One great use of the latter
+is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their
+Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _aṛul_ for _anugraha_
+and _tíḍchei_ for _díkshá_ may testify.
+
+The Śaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sánkhya; they
+hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,
+and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and
+gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system,
+and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the
+allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a
+well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.
+
+There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sútras. One is in
+five books, called by Colebrooke the Paśupati-śástra, which is probably
+the work quoted by Mádhava in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas;
+another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemarája, with its first
+sútra, _chaítanyam átmá_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,
+and opens with the śloka given in the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 91, lines
+1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words--
+
+    _Kathañchid ásádya Maheśvarasya dásyam._
+
+None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the
+present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight
+Ágamas and some of the Puráṇas. A list of the Ágamas is given in Mr.
+Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion;" and of these the Kiraṇa
+and Karaṇa are quoted in the following treatise.]
+
+
+THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.
+
+Certain, however, of the Máheśvara sect receiving the system of truth
+authoritatively laid down in the Śaiva Ágama,[112] reject the
+foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of
+our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation
+of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion
+that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;"
+and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the
+Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the
+cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in
+the Tantra doctrines--
+
+     "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sútra
+     the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four
+     feet, has again declared the same at full length."
+
+The meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three
+before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,
+meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,
+possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not
+independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as
+being different from these, is first declared; next follows the
+account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing
+intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order
+of the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means
+to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without
+knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the
+Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the
+real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place
+as first the "foot" of _knowledge_ (_jñána_) which makes known all
+this unto us.[114] Next follows the "foot" of _ceremonial action_
+(_kriyá_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the
+divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be
+attained, hence the "foot" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next,
+which declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts.
+And as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the
+fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is
+forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty
+(_charyá_), which includes all this.
+
+Now Śiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in
+the divine nature of Śiva belongs to liberated souls and to such
+beings as Vidyeśvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they
+depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised
+to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact
+of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being
+effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent
+being. By the strength of this inference is the universal
+acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.
+
+"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an
+effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body
+being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that
+a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been
+seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not
+from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they
+possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are
+destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to
+infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus
+the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker,
+from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the
+afore-mentioned middle term (_sádhana_) must have the afore-mentioned
+major (_sádhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the
+latter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the
+authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been
+given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,
+that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions
+done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]--
+
+     "This ignorant _jívátman_, incapable of its own true
+     pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction
+     [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go
+     to heaven or always to hell."[117]
+
+Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,
+since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that
+he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the
+king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of
+his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru--
+
+     "It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to
+     employ means, &c.;
+
+     "This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting
+     irrespectively of works, &c."
+
+And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Śruti) establishes the
+existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their
+means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various
+individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable
+Bṛihaspati--
+
+     "He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and
+     material causes,--
+
+     "Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that
+     resides in accumulated actions should ripen."--
+
+     "The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must
+     have had an intelligent maker,
+
+     "This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see
+     in any other effect, as jars, &c."
+
+God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with
+everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot
+produce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious
+Mṛigendra[119]--
+
+     "He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:
+     for it is an established principle
+
+     "That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,
+     parts, and end."
+
+"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent
+maker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all
+effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as
+potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be
+like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or
+omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal
+soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover,
+even though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still
+maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The
+Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of
+matter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body,
+but only a body of pure energy (Sákta),[122] since we know that his
+body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Śakti, according
+to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the _Iśána_ as his head, the
+_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _Vámedeva_
+as his secret parts, and the _Sadyojáta_ as his feet."[123] And this
+body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but
+is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are
+respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and
+production.[124] This has been said in the Śrímat Mṛigendra--
+
+     "From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the
+     body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."
+
+And it has also been said elsewhere--
+
+     "His body is composed of the five mantras which are
+     subservient to the five operations,
+
+     "And his head, &c., are formed out of the Ísa, Tatpurusha,
+     Aghora, Váma, and other hymns."
+
+If you object to this view that "such passages in the Ágamas as 'He is
+five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the
+Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what
+you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his
+assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since
+meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely
+destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara--
+
+     "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the
+     devotee."
+
+And similarly elsewhere--
+
+     "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of
+     form;
+
+     "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."
+
+Bhojarája[125] has thus detailed the five operations--
+
+     "Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,
+     destruction, and obscuration,
+
+     "And to these must be added the active grace of him who is
+     eternally exalted."
+
+Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to
+be performed directly by Śiva, but in that of the toilsome Path they
+are ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the Śrímat
+Karaṇa[127]--
+
+     "In the Pure Path Śiva is declared to be the only agent, but
+     Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."
+
+It must here be understood that the word Śiva includes in its proper
+meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Śiva,
+as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheśwara, the emancipated souls who have
+become Śivas, and the inspired teachers (_váchakas_), together with
+all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of
+Śiva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_).
+
+We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_paśu_). The
+individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the
+non-atomic,[128] the _Kshetrajña_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is
+the _Paśu_. For we must not say with the Chárvákas that it is the same
+as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as
+there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.
+Nor may we say with the Naiyáyikas that it is cognisable by
+perception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As
+has been said--
+
+     "If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a
+     second knower;[131]
+
+     "And this would require another still, if the second were
+     itself to be known."
+
+Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with
+the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been
+said--
+
+     "That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or
+     time,
+
+     "They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's
+     all-pervadingness and eternity."
+
+Nor may we say with the Vedántin that it is only one, since the
+apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many
+individual souls; nor with the Sánkhyas that it is devoid of action,
+since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Śruti informs us of
+a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the
+form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been
+declared in the Śrímat Mṛigendra--
+
+     "It is revealed that identity with Śiva results when all
+     fetters are removed."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in
+     his soul
+
+     "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after
+     liberation, Śruti calls it that which faces every way."
+
+It is also said in the Tattva-prakáśa--
+
+     "The liberated souls are themselves Śivas, but these are
+     liberated by his favour;
+
+     "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose
+     body is the five Mantras."
+
+Now the souls are threefold, as denominated _vijñánákaláḥ_,
+_pralayákaláḥ_, and _sakaláḥ_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are
+under the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by
+receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and
+knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments,
+such as _kalá_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of
+cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The
+second are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since
+in their case _kalá_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence
+their name _pralayákala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the
+three fetters of _mala_, _máyá_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_.
+The first class are again subdivided into _samápta-kalusháḥ_ and
+_asamápta-kalusháḥ_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly
+exhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of
+their corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the
+privilege, raised by Śiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge
+(the Vidyeśvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of
+Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya--
+
+     "Ananta, and Súkshma, and Śivottama,
+
+     "Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimúrttika,
+
+     "Śríkaṇṭha and Śikhaṇḍin,--these are declared to be the
+     Vidyeśvaras."
+
+The latter Śiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million
+Mantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prakáśa.[135] Similarly
+Soma-Śambhu has said--
+
+     "One class is named _vijñánákala_, the second _pralayákala_,
+
+     "The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the Śástra
+     regards as objects of mercy.
+
+     "The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_
+     and _karma_,
+
+     "The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with
+     _kalá_ and ending with 'earth.'"[136]
+
+The _Pralayákaláḥ_ are also twofold, as being _pakvapáśadvaya_ or not,
+_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in
+whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the
+power of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryashṭaka_[137] body, and pass
+through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa--
+
+     "Those among the Pralayákalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are
+     immature,
+
+     "Go, united with the _puryashṭaka_ body, into many births by
+     the power of _karman_."
+
+The _puryashṭaka_ is also thus described in the same work--
+
+     "The _puryashṭaka_ is composed of the internal organ,
+     thought (_dhí_), _karman_, and the instruments."
+
+This is thus explained by Aghora Śiva Áchárya, "the _puryashṭaka_ is a
+subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from
+the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is
+composed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending
+with _kalá_." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha--
+
+     "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending
+     with _kalá_, is assigned to each soul,
+
+     "And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies
+     produced by the world."
+
+The following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word
+"_internal organ_," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence,"
+"egoism," and "reason,"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which
+enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those
+called _kalá_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and
+quality;[140] the words "_thought_" (_dhí_) and _karman_ signify the
+five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile
+rudiments. By the word "_instruments_" are comprehended the ten organs
+of sense and action.
+
+"But is it not declared in the Śrímat Kálottara that 'The set of five,
+sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,
+these constitute the _puryashṭaka_?'"
+
+How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and
+hence the venerable Ráma Kaṇṭha has explained that sútra in its
+literal meaning [_i. e_., as _puryashṭaka_, is derived from _ashṭa_,
+"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you
+ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal
+definition of _puryashṭaka_, we reply that there is really no
+contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in
+the following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five
+rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;
+(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.)
+nature [prakṛiti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning
+with _kalá_, which form a kind of case.[142]
+
+Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the
+_puryashṭaka_ body, Maheśvara Ananta having compassionated them as
+possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the
+world; as has been said--
+
+     "Maheśvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the
+     world."
+
+The class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_
+and _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in
+conformity with their maturity (_paripáka_), puts forth a power
+agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred
+and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Maṇḍalí,
+&c., as has been said--
+
+     "The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection
+     with _Kalá_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;
+
+     "The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen
+     of these the Lords of the Mantras.
+
+     "Eight of these are called _Maṇḍalins_; eight again are
+     Krodha, &c.;
+
+     "Víreśa, Śríkaṇṭha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together
+     are the hundred and eighteen."
+
+In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a
+teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his
+manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the
+process of initiation; as has been said--
+
+     "These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a
+     healing power,
+
+     "He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to
+     the highest principle."
+
+It is also said in the Srímad Mṛigendra--
+
+     "He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which
+     previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[143]
+
+All this has been explained at great length by Náráyaṇa-Kaṇṭha, and
+there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear
+of prolixity.
+
+But as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the
+Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,
+appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy
+the rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said--
+
+     "The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he
+     appoints to enjoy their various deserts,
+
+     "According to their respective actions: such are the various
+     kinds of souls."
+
+We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _páśa_).
+This is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _máyá_, and _rodha-śakti_.[145]
+But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Śaiva Ágamas that the
+chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been
+shown to mean Śiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic
+bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence
+matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only
+fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal
+dot, which is the germinal atom of _máyá_, and is called a
+Śiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the
+highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Śiva,
+still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that
+it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the
+state of such deities as Vidyeśvara, &c. Thus we see there is no
+contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa--
+
+     "The bonds of matter will be fourfold."
+
+And again in the Srímad Mṛigendra--
+
+     "The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer
+     (_rodha_), action, and the work of Máyá,
+
+     "These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively
+     called by the name of 'merit.'"
+
+The following is the meaning of this couplet:--
+
+(1.) "Enveloping," because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the
+soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because _mala_, a
+natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As
+has been said--
+
+     "_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts
+     the soul's vision and action;
+
+     "It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on
+     copper."[147]
+
+(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond"
+[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Śiva
+obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself
+partaking of the nature of matter].
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of
+     all,
+
+     "I am metaphorically called _páśa_,[148] because I follow
+     desert."
+
+(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed
+by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,
+like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning
+series. As has been said in the Śrímat Kiraṇa--
+
+     "As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are
+     beginningless:
+
+     "If an eternal character is thus established, then what
+     cause could produce any change therein?"
+
+(4.) "_Máyá_," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all
+the world is potentially contained (_máti_) at a mundane destruction,
+and again at a creation it all comes (_yáti_) into manifestation,
+hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Śrímat
+Saurabheya--
+
+     "The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed
+     therein at a mundane destruction,
+
+     "And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form
+     of effects as _kalá_, &c."[149]
+
+Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here
+through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three
+categories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter.
+
+A different mode of treating the subject is found in the
+Jñánaratnávalí, &c., in such lines as--
+
+     "The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the
+     cause
+
+     "Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six
+     categories."
+
+But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.
+Thus our account of the system is complete.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Paśupati-sástra_
+(_Maheśvara-siddhánta or Sivágama_), as the text-book of the Páśupata
+sect. The Ágamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the
+Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion").]
+
+[Footnote 113: "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,
+matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with
+the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _páśa_ is
+eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.
+58 we find the _advaita_ of the Vedánta attacked. In p. 62 it is said
+that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his
+five operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that
+is required for previous desert.]
+
+[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life
+(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_,
+_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gnánam_. The first is the stage of practical
+piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second
+is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications
+involved in true _pújá_; the third is that of the eight observances of
+the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for
+intimate union with God.]
+
+[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 116: _Nyáyena_ may here mean "argument."]
+
+[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be
+only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects
+proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)
+necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural
+stress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original
+meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahábhárata, iii. 1144 (cf.
+Gauḍapáda, S. Kár. 61).]
+
+[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read
+_Karaṇásambhaváchcha_.]
+
+[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meykáṇḍa of the Tamil
+work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _Mṛigendra_(?).]
+
+[Footnote 120: Should we read _távad anaśaríraḥ_ in p. 83, line 2?]
+
+[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._]
+
+[Footnote 122: "_Máyá_ (or Prakṛiti) is the material, Śakti the
+instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).]
+
+[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras
+which are included in the five _kalás_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).
+The Śivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is
+composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Śiva (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse
+order in Taitt. Áraṇyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Nyáyá-málávist._ p. 3).]
+
+[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of
+Śiva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are
+_Sáthákkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sadákshaya?_) or _Sadá-Śiva_, who is Śiva and
+Śakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or
+_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_Śuddhavidyá_) which is
+properly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vishṇu_, and _Brahma_. They are
+respectively symbolised by the _náda_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of
+Om.]
+
+[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tántrik
+work, the _Narapati-jaya-charyá_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhár.]
+
+[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of Śiva in the Atharva-śiras Upanishad
+(see Indische Stud. i. 385).]
+
+[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Ágamas (see
+Foulkes' Catechism).]
+
+[Footnote 128: _Aṇu?_ "The soul, when clothed with these primary
+things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body"
+(Foulkes). Anaṇu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Bṛihad Ar. Up.
+iii. 8. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.]
+
+[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bháshá
+Parichchheda, śloka 49).]
+
+[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p.
+103).]
+
+[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,
+137. They are there described as being respectively under the
+influence of _áṇavam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or
+these with _mayei malam_. The _áṇavam_ is described as original sin,
+or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_
+is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its
+deserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the
+source of the senses. Mádhava uses "_kalá_," &c., for _máyá_. The
+reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the
+five _vidyátattvas_ (_kalá_, _vidyá_, _rága_, _niyati_, and _kalá_)
+and the twenty-four _átmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile
+elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual
+faculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_, and _chitta_), are all
+developed from _máyá_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from
+Soma Śambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what Mádhava says, p. 77,
+in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, where he describes _kalá_ as
+unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five
+_tanmátras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_ and
+_manas_.]
+
+[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakaraṇát_ in
+p. 86, line 3.]
+
+[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.
+It, however, names the three classes as _vijñána-kevala_,
+_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.]
+
+[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidyátattvas_ and
+all the twenty-four _átmatattvas_.]
+
+[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _purí_, "body" (cf.
+_puriśaya_ for _purusha_, Bṛihad Ár. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ashṭaka_
+(cf. also the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya, p. 135).]
+
+[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?]
+
+[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_, _chitta_.]
+
+[Footnote 140: These are the seven _viḍyá-tattvas_, _kalá_, _kála_,
+_niyati_ (fate), _vidyá_, _rága_, _prakṛiti_, and _guṇa_. Hoisington,
+however, puts _purushan_ "the principle of life," instead of _guṇa_,
+which seems better, as the three _guṇas_ are included in _prakṛiti_.
+He translates _kalá_ by "continency," and describes it as "the power
+by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into
+subjection."]
+
+[Footnote 141: This "instrument" (_karaṇa_) seems to mean what
+Hoisington calls _purushan_ or "the principle of life which
+establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes
+it one of the seven _vidyátattvas_. According to Mádhava, it should be
+what he calls _guṇa_.]
+
+[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four
+_átmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanmátras_, ten organs of sense
+and action, four organs of the _antaḥkaraṇa_, and seven _vidyátattvas_
+as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)]
+
+[Footnote 143: I take _aṇu_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean
+the second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of
+_mala_ is the _máyá-mala_, the second _áṇava-mala_, the third
+_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).]
+
+[Footnote 144: "The soul, when clothed with these primary things
+(desire, knowledge, action, the _kaládipanchaka_, &c.), is an
+exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called
+_áṇava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to
+souls.]
+
+[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J.
+A. O. S., viz., _áṇavam_, _kanmam_, and _máyei_, the last is the
+"obscuring" power of Máyesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Śaivas
+hold that Páśa, like the Sánkhya Prakṛiti, is in itself eternal,
+although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 228).]
+
+[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _máyá_,
+and _rodhaśakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the
+Śiva-prakáśa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable
+_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.
+From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit
+letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and
+external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual
+knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have
+been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after
+these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be
+enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious
+deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the
+abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the
+abode of Śiva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union
+with him." _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,
+153 (cf. also Weber, _Rámatápanyía Up_. pp. 312-315).]
+
+[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.]
+
+[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _páśa_
+from _paśchát_.]
+
+[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _sá káryeṇa_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.
+
+
+Other Máheśvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva
+system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things
+causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating
+spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the
+construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)
+is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this
+Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several
+cognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self
+posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by
+revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of
+witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives
+manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150]
+as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon
+recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the
+highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest
+trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,
+suppression of the breath, and the like, these Máheśvaras set forth
+the system of recognition (_pratyabhijñá_). The extent of this system
+is thus described by one of their authorities--
+
+     "The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two
+     explications, the greater and the less,
+
+     "The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system
+     of recognition."
+
+The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:--
+
+     "Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of
+     Maheśvara, and wishing also to help mankind,
+
+     "I set forth the recognition of Maheśvara, as the method of
+     attaining all felicity."
+
+[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:--
+
+"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus
+feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached,"
+having fully attained, this condition, having made it the
+unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which
+has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:
+otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.
+
+Maheśvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,
+beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence
+Vishṇu, Viriñchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they
+transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite
+illusion.
+
+The condition of being a slave to Maheśvara is the being a recipient
+of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the
+divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things
+according to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _dásya_, from _dá_).
+
+The word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the
+doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom
+this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest
+reward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end
+of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the
+Śiva-dṛishṭi by that supreme guide the revered Sománandanátha--
+
+     "When once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things
+     has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof
+     or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,
+
+     "There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further
+     reflection. When he knows Suvarṇa (or Śiva) a man may cease
+     to act and to reflect."
+
+The word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self
+which has recognised the nature of Maheśvara, and which manifests to
+itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,
+for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of
+others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a
+motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man
+that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a
+regard for others. Thus Akshapáda (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive
+is that object towards which a man energises.
+
+The preposition _upa_ in _upapádayami_ (I set forth) indicates
+proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.
+
+Hence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all
+felicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all
+felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a
+man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all
+the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what
+else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpaláchárya says--
+
+     "What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of
+     devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"
+
+We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method
+of attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound
+term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a
+Bahuvríhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Maheśvara, the
+knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full
+attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external
+and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the
+language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an
+object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the
+same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in
+this system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the
+accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from
+argumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self
+the cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection
+of the powers of that God.
+
+This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I
+establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it
+convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism
+of the Recognitive Institutes.]
+
+Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial
+with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The
+answer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the
+soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and
+therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence
+of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the
+recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and
+active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as
+total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight
+the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This
+self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;
+for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he
+is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,
+therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here
+employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of
+things, the teaching of the Naiyáyikas may be accepted. It has thus
+been said by the son of Udayákara--
+
+     "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that
+     self-active and cognitive is Maheśvara the primal being?
+
+     "Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the
+     powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and
+     imperfectly discerned."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The continuance of all living creatures in this
+     transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory
+     _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of
+     living creatures.
+
+     "Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action
+     (or ritual), which is best at Káśi,
+
+     "Is indicated by others also: different from these is real
+     knowledge."
+
+And also--
+
+     "The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those
+     things:
+
+     "The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge
+     without succession, is Maheśvara."
+
+Sománandanátha also says--
+
+     "He always knows by identity with Śiva: he always knows by
+     identity with the real."
+
+Again at the end of the section on knowledge--
+
+     "Unless there were this unity with Śiva, cognitions could
+     not exist as facts of daily life:
+
+     "Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the
+     one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).
+
+     "He is Maheśvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken
+     continuity of objects:
+
+     "Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the
+     deity."
+
+The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, "After
+that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that
+shines diversely this ALL," teaches that God illumines the whole round
+of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the
+diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which
+irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises
+from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,
+God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all
+limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,
+self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Śaiva
+aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are
+Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective
+Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This
+self-same existing self is knowledge.
+
+By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Sománandanátha cited
+above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of
+these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy
+constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory
+experience. This is described in the section on activity--
+
+     "He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,
+     through the efficacy of his will: this activity is
+     creativeness."
+
+And at the close of the same section--
+
+     "The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world
+     under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his
+     activity worked out by motive and agent.
+
+     "This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be
+     that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,
+     insentient things."
+
+According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the
+insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of
+Maheśvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands
+of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or
+that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in
+the series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his
+progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his
+universal creativeness.
+
+How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the
+following illustration--
+
+     "The tree or jar produced by the mere will of
+     thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to
+     serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."
+
+If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the
+jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of
+the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of
+clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition
+of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact
+notorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from
+different materials.
+
+As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without
+materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he
+does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:
+they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation
+of the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception,
+must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the
+potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a
+body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the
+successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the
+genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the
+thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.
+
+On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahádeva,
+amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the
+Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus
+operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptáchárya says--
+
+"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without
+appliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him
+resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."
+
+It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how
+comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The
+answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution--
+
+     "This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates
+     through the fatality of works:
+
+     "Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,
+     he is enfranchised."
+
+It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what
+difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated
+in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this
+question is given in a section of the Tattvártha-Saṅgraha--
+
+     "Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical
+     with itself, like Maheśvara free from bondage: the other (or
+     unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."
+
+An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the
+soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if
+all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate
+because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the
+recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to
+the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two
+degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in
+developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines
+felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the
+conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such
+recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In
+the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the
+power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the
+attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting
+in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the
+essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.
+
+It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious
+self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A
+certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular
+gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated
+by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote
+to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to
+her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities
+she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and
+she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she
+recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them
+out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self
+be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation
+effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of
+those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director
+to recognise in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience,
+omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of
+being.
+
+It is therefore said in the fourth section--
+
+     "As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as
+     like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he
+     humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:
+     In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be
+     the universal soul, in which there is no perfection
+     unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and
+     therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."
+
+This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other
+teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we
+cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become
+too prolix. This then may suffice.[152]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 150: Read _bháván_ for _bhávát_.]
+
+[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. Mádhava here condenses Abhinava
+Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the
+eleventh century (see Bühler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).]
+
+[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Śiva
+sútras by Utpala, the son of Udayákara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+THE RASEŚVARA-DARŚANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153]
+
+
+Other Máheśvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self
+with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life
+taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily
+frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver
+as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _párada_,
+because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of
+transmigratory states. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called
+     _párada_."
+
+And again in the Rasárṇava--
+
+     "It is styled _párada_ because it is employed for the
+     highest end by the best votaries.
+
+     "Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from
+     my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called
+     _rasa_."
+
+It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is
+incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another
+manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in
+the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this
+there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it
+free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise--
+
+     "Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the
+     death of the body.
+
+     "Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an
+     emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.
+
+     "Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of
+     mercury and of medicaments."
+
+Govinda-bhagavat also says--
+
+     "Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are
+     not permanent, one should strive
+
+     "After emancipation; but emancipation results from
+     knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible
+     in a healthy body."
+
+The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its
+permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the
+body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is
+dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaurí under the names
+of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahṛidaya--
+
+     "They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new
+     body, the creation of Hara and Gaurí,
+
+     "They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose
+     service is the aggregate of magic texts."
+
+The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should
+first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is
+produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaurí, and mica is
+produced from Gaurí, mercury and mica are severally identified with
+Hara and Gaurí in the verse--
+
+     "Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;
+
+     "The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of
+     death and poverty."
+
+This is very little to say about the matter. In the
+Raseśvara-siddhánta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and
+mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by
+acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.
+
+     "Certain of the gods, Maheśa and others; certain Daityas,
+     Śukra and others;
+
+     "Certain Munis, the Bálakhilyas and others; certain kings,
+     Someśvara and others;
+
+     "Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-náyaka,
+
+     "Charvaṭi, Kapila, Vyáli, Kápáli, Kandaláyana,
+
+     "These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while
+     alive,
+
+     "Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith
+     identified."
+
+The meaning of this, as explicated by Parameśvara to Parameśvarí, is
+as follows:--
+
+     "By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,
+     the preservation of the body;
+
+     "And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and
+     air,
+
+     "Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they
+     restore to life,
+
+     "Bound they give the power of flying about."
+
+The swooning state of mercury is thus described--
+
+     "They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,
+     as characterised thus--
+
+     "Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.
+
+     "A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the
+     following marks are seen--
+
+     "Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."
+
+The bound condition is described in another place as follows:--
+
+     "The character of bound quicksilver is that it is--
+
+     "Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it
+     parts asunder under friction."
+
+Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaurí were
+proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but
+how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as
+that _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is
+stated by the authorities--
+
+     "Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully
+     discriminated,
+
+     "In the first place, as pure in every process, for
+     perfecting the adepts."
+
+And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus--
+
+     "Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,
+     restraining,
+
+     "Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,
+     covering,
+
+     "Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and
+     pouring,
+
+     "And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen
+     modes of treating quicksilver."
+
+These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,
+Sarvajña-rámeśvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here
+omitted to avoid prolixity.
+
+The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of
+the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,
+a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the
+Rasárṇava--
+
+"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the
+blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it
+attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),
+quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This
+makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try
+it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."
+
+It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a
+celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the
+self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,
+and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being
+inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahṛidaya--
+
+     "That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems
+     in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,
+
+     "Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings
+     whose bodies are unglorified?
+
+     "He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from
+     cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,
+
+     "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities
+     of the cognitive organs are obstructed.
+
+     "A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the
+     enjoyment of sensual pleasures,
+
+     "An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain
+     to emancipation?"
+
+Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass
+through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be
+extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two
+mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The
+objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following
+dilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which
+all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or
+as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is
+cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive
+cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddhánta--
+
+     "The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the
+     mercurial system, O subtile thinker.
+
+     "In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity
+     of argument,
+
+     "Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all
+     sacred texts;
+
+     "One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore
+     there is and must be life."
+
+And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents
+of the doctrine of Vishṇu-svámin maintain the eternity of the body of
+Vishṇu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sákára-siddhi--
+
+     "I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishṇu-svámin,
+
+     "Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and
+     inconceivably perfect beatitude."
+
+If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which
+appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real
+existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be
+otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of
+proof: (1.) by the intuition of Śanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts
+such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puráṇic texts such
+as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the
+conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other
+like predicates are affirmed also by Śríkánta-miśra, the devoted
+adherent of Vishṇu-svámin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest
+end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which
+we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus
+been said--
+
+     "What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,
+     immortal,
+
+     "The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,
+     pleasure, liberation?"
+
+It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as
+it is said--
+
+     "Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying
+     and imperishable."
+
+Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by
+seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasárṇava--
+
+     "From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from
+     merely remembering it,
+
+     "From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,
+     appear its six virtues.
+
+     "Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from
+     seeing all the phallic emblems
+
+     "On earth, those at Kedára, and all others whatsoever."
+
+In another place we read--
+
+     "The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific
+     than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Káśi and
+     elsewhere,
+
+     "Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,
+     exemption from decay, and immortality."
+
+The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--
+
+     "The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged
+     should recall quicksilver to mind.
+
+     "He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his
+     blasphemy for ever filled with sin."
+
+The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes
+place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the
+practice of union (ἕνωσις) after the acquisition of a divine body in
+the manner we have described. Thereafter--
+
+     "The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain
+     men of holy vision,
+
+     "Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the
+     universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:
+
+     "Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof
+     is luminousness, undifferenced,
+
+     "From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,
+     tranquil, self-recognised:
+
+     "Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole
+     universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,
+
+     "The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his
+     bondage to works annulled."
+
+A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained
+this he becomes beatitude.
+
+Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of
+passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we
+have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the
+supreme self--
+
+     "May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from
+     dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,
+
+     "Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those
+     that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,
+
+     "Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the
+     soul awakes,
+
+     "Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines
+     forth by itself from itself."
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogís in Colonel
+Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Párada-pána_ is one of the practices of
+the Siddhopásakas in the Śaṅkara-digvijaya, § 49, to obviate
+_apamṛityu_, _akálamṛityu_, &c.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE VAIŚESHIKA OR AULÚKYA DARŚANA.[154]
+
+
+Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by
+the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be
+essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to
+know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the
+Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such
+passages as these (_Śvetáśvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--
+
+     "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,
+
+     "Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of
+     Śiva."
+
+Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing
+(_śravaṇa_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhávaná_), as it has
+been said--
+
+     "By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated
+     meditation,--
+
+     "By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the
+     highest union (_yoga_)."
+
+Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the
+knowledge of the _vyápti_ (or universal proposition), and the
+knowledge of the _vyápti_ follows the right understanding of the
+categories,--hence the saint Kaṇáda[155] establishes the six
+categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now,
+therefore, we shall explain duty."
+
+In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all
+the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first
+_áhnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_játi_), in the
+second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the
+similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the
+first _áhnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the
+second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third
+book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the
+first _áhnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he
+discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _áhnika_,
+and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates
+action; in the first _áhnika_ he considers action as connected with
+the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he
+examines merit and demerit as revealed in Śruti; in the first _áhnika_
+he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second
+the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book
+he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _áhnika_ he
+considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those
+qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the
+eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception,
+and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics
+of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of
+inference.[156]
+
+The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"
+"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected,
+"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold,
+not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really
+included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare
+that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and
+intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an
+example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this
+definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since
+"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the
+categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in
+its generic character in all substances [though different substances
+have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with
+"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then
+"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"
+inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate
+relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.
+
+If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since
+'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of
+the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of
+conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the
+objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only
+six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the
+thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it
+is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,
+if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends
+his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite
+number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we
+cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a
+seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite
+number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if
+others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow
+to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a
+_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.
+
+Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvádi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance,
+quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,
+quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_)
+is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the
+(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and
+does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]
+
+The genus of quality (_guṇatva_) is that which is immediately
+subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation
+in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of
+action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the
+genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything
+eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _sámánya_) is that which is found
+in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the
+counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]
+(_viśesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of
+generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation
+(_samaváya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate
+relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.
+
+Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,
+soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_pṛithivítva_), are the
+definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality
+which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same
+subject with colour produced by baking.[168]
+
+The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and
+sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon
+and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to
+substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the
+skin.[169]
+
+As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be
+subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their
+technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is
+found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special
+quality which is not produced by contact.[170]
+
+Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the
+mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is
+not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that
+pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is
+not time.[173] The general terms _átmatva_ and _manastva_ are the
+respective definitions of soul (_átman_) and mind (_manas_). The
+general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being
+also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]
+(_amúrtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to
+substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an
+atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any
+substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned
+directly in Kaṇáda's Sútras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch,
+number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,
+proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
+effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word
+"_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,
+and sound. Their respective genera (_rúpatva_, &c.) are their several
+definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is
+subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In
+the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.
+
+"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing
+upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:
+revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus
+of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The
+genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists
+with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of
+conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the
+definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is
+twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found
+with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and
+action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of
+generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation
+cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite
+number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate
+relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.
+
+There is a popular proverb--
+
+"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by
+disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true
+Vaiśeshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the
+production of duality, &c.
+
+There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;
+thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the
+distinguishing perception _apekshábuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this
+is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_
+(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of
+duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it
+exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_saṃskára_).[177]
+
+But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus
+produced from _apekshábuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained
+that _apekshábuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because
+duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we
+cannot hold _apekshábuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and
+therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being
+produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,
+maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c.,
+cannot be held to be made known (_jñápya_) by that non-eternal
+apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._,
+_apekshábuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a
+plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as
+"severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshábuddhi_ is not their
+_jñápaka_, it must be their _janaka_].
+
+Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From
+_apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality
+(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;
+next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises,
+simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the
+destruction of _apekshábuddhi_; next from the destruction of
+_apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two
+substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of
+the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of
+imagination (_saṃskára_), the destruction of the knowledge of the
+quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the
+knowledge of the substances.
+
+The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,
+and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be
+found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are
+the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the
+rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a
+special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary
+duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of
+the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two
+things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to
+the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the
+subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its
+abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate
+action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshábuddhi_,
+there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united
+influence of both.[181]
+
+_Apekshábuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind
+which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._,
+destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]
+
+Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the
+destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyaṇuka_), another
+compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of
+this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,
+the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of
+steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the
+conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,
+&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire
+arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from
+conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the
+atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is
+produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,
+there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that
+former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another
+atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;
+ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms)
+are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the
+_dvyaṇuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The
+other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,
+are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if
+we hold (with the Vaiśeshikas) that the baking process takes place in
+the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyáyikas, however, maintain that the
+baking process takes place in the jar.
+
+"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by
+the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that
+produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause
+[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.
+
+It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the
+[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect
+[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a
+disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a
+disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,
+again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied
+by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary
+with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke
+without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking
+in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187]
+without there having previously been the origination of that
+disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot
+was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts
+produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the
+disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one
+part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which
+had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction
+of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causâ cessat
+effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which
+resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes
+of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the
+pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,
+initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a
+disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the
+pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to
+produce it.[188]
+
+But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the
+hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,
+initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the
+original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the
+intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand
+produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates
+also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and
+the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]
+and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and
+the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of
+the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second
+disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the
+body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the
+action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing
+in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of
+disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we
+must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause
+and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the
+body and the points of space.
+
+But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.
+147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely
+unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different
+opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bháṭṭa Mímáṃsakas
+and the Vedántins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Śrídhara
+Áchárya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus
+darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prábhákara Mímáṃsakas
+hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the
+Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we
+assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of
+the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible
+alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of
+the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different
+one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one
+you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should
+certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that
+it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself
+destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the
+very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of
+qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different
+substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that
+darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed
+of the dark blue of the tamála blossom?" We reply, that this is merely
+an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But
+enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it
+follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since
+you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some
+substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye
+as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,
+the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression
+independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind],
+because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an
+indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain
+that "absence or non-existence (_abháva_[195]) is incapable of being
+expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use
+such phrases as _tenebræ oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere
+non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would
+include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,
+destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do
+speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all
+are cases of _abháva_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of
+the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ
+which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
+would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is
+the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the
+fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness
+is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
+very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the
+qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_
+attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is
+connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert
+that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced
+by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
+object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's
+absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that
+on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on
+to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no
+dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend
+thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
+that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates
+the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will
+require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we
+cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is
+necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,
+else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is
+implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence,
+having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇáda
+uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]:
+"_Dravya-guṇa-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyád abhávas tamas_" (_Vaiś.
+Sút._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is
+dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."
+The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness
+is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances,
+if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the
+eye to be visible].
+
+Non-existence (_abháva_) is considered to be the seventh category, as
+established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that
+which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate
+relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and
+"reciprocal non-existence."
+
+The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and
+"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without
+any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though
+having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence
+which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal
+non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet
+no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_,
+as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].
+
+If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really
+the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to
+lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence"
+is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is
+not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose
+opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor
+need you here raise the objection that "_abháva_ can never be a means
+of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum
+bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for
+the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the
+category of _abháva_].
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 154: The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra's
+_Abhidhána-chintámaṇi_; in the Váyu-puráṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's
+_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kaṇáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are
+called the sons of Śiva.]
+
+[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhaksha.]
+
+[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book
+treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,
+&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the
+qualities of the soul, and the three causes.]
+
+[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bháshya_ of Vátsyáyana,
+see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]
+
+[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, śloka 14.]
+
+[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_viśesha_) resides by "intimate
+relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would
+apply to "duality" and "conjunction."]
+
+[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply
+to "existence" (_sattá_), which is the _summum genus_, to which
+substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]
+
+[Footnote 162: Existence (_sattá_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guṇa_,
+and _kriyâ_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and
+all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and
+disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _saṃyoga_, _rúpa_, &c.) may be
+mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the
+essence of _guṇa_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]
+
+[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found
+in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nityá-samavetatva_;
+this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College
+Library.]
+
+[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,
+however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore,
+the former clause of the definition is added.]
+
+[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeshika) is not
+"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is
+the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being
+single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different
+atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,
+water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus
+ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own
+indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _viśesha_ as "ultimate
+difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _viśesha_.]
+
+[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyonyábháva_) exists between
+two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;"
+but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]
+
+[Footnote 167: "_Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játiḥ_," Siddh.
+Mukt. (_Saṃyoga_ being a _guṇa_ has _guṇatva_ existing in it with
+intimate relation).]
+
+[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot
+nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union
+with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]
+
+[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an aërial
+integument.--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the
+_first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is
+added to exclude God's knowledge, while _saṃyogájanya_ excludes the
+soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind
+and the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time
+with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate
+cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the
+instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaraṇaṃ_.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daiśika_ and _kálika_.]
+
+[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the
+last, however, is not pervading but atomic.]
+
+[Footnote 174: The three other _padárthas_, beside soul, which are
+_amúrtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]
+
+[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,
+_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things
+themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our
+choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]
+
+[Footnote 176: _Saṃskára_ is here the idea conceived by the
+mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material
+previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or
+mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]
+
+[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the
+original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]
+
+[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _jñápaka_ or _janaka_;
+_apekshábuddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]
+
+[Footnote 179: _Apekshábuddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is
+one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of
+these, but in _both_ together.]
+
+[Footnote 180: The Vaiśeshikas held that the jívátman and space are
+each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each
+have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is
+ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion
+has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has
+mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said
+in Sútra 26--
+
+     _----athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa
+     ishyate,_
+
+which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are
+limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special
+qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are
+limited to different portions and of momentary duration."]
+
+[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the
+destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14
+(_apekshábuddhi-náśa_), viz., _áśrayanáśa_, and the united action of
+_both_:--
+
+1. Ekatva-jñána        |Avayava-kriyá              |    . . .
+2. Apekshábuddhi       |Avayava-vibhága            |Avayava-kriyá.
+3. Dvitvotpatti and    |Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa       |Avayava-vibhága.
+   ekatva-jñána-náśa   |                           |
+4. Dvitvatvajñána      |Dvitvádhárasya             |Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa.
+                       |(_i.e._,                   |
+                       |avayavinaḥ) náśaḥ           |
+5. Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi|Dvitva-náśa                    |Ádhára-náśa
+   and                 |of avayavin). (_i.e._,     |
+   apekshábuddhi-náśa  |(of avayavin).             |
+6. Dvitva-náśa  and    |         . . .             |Dvitva-náśa.
+   dravya-buddhi       |                           |
+
+The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the
+course of the six steps of _ekatvajñána_, &c., one of the two parts is
+itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the
+first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth
+moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding
+_dvitvádhára-náśa_, or, as Mádhava calls it, _áśrayanivṛitti_. In the
+second case, the _náśa_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by
+both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united
+action of two causes, _apekshábuddhi-náśa_ and _ádhára-náśa_. Any
+_kriyá_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would
+be unimportant, as the _náśa_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take
+place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and
+in this way it would be too late to affect that result.]
+
+[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apekshábuddhi_ follows
+the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously
+described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of
+_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvajñána_, &c. (cf.
+Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the
+counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]
+
+[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in
+the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;
+thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black
+(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two
+atoms.]
+
+[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]
+
+[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta
+Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the
+destruction of the _dvyaṇuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from
+the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the
+destruction of the black colour in the _dvyaṇuka_, and the
+simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyaṇuka_ with
+that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the
+simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the
+action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The
+remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]
+
+[Footnote 186: The Vaiśeshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old
+black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c.,
+being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour
+in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,
+eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps
+prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of
+the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different
+compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the
+old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes
+not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is
+red, not black.]
+
+[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read
+_gagaṇavibhágakartṛitvasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 188: The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series
+of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the
+disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction
+which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.
+by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the
+severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction
+with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the
+cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second
+disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced
+by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the
+pot.]
+
+[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibhágán_, _i.e._,
+disjunctions from the several points.]
+
+[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of
+space.]
+
+[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.]
+
+[Footnote 192: For _dravyádi_ read _pṛithivyádi_.]
+
+[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read
+_viddhavevidhayá_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vṛiddhavívadhayá_.]
+
+[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a
+serpent.]
+
+[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bháve_.]
+
+[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadhánádishu_.
+_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying
+"command;" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bhávabodhaka-kriyá_. It
+has that meaning in Kávya-prakáśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).]
+
+[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _áloka-jñána_, therefore it would
+perceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by
+the _eye_.]
+
+[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a
+jar's absence in the dark.]
+
+[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation
+is the _dhvaṃsábháva_, or "emergent non-existence."]
+
+[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p.
+110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,
+therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and
+would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sút. p. 250), "_yadi hi
+níla-rúpavan nílaṃ rúpam eva vá tamaḥ syát, váhyálokapragraham
+antareṇa chakshushá na gṛihyeta_."]
+
+[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.]
+
+[Footnote 202: "Relative non-existence" (_saṃsargábháva_) is the
+negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is
+"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent,"
+and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the
+jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the
+spot of ground,--it is the _játi ghaṭatva_ which resides in the jar.]
+
+[Footnote 204: The opposite is "there _is_ colour in the air."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE AKSHAPÁDA (OR NYÁYA) DARŚANA.
+
+
+The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of
+pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
+sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
+particular tenet[205] of the Nyáya school, as is declared by the
+author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
+proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
+the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
+Nyáya Śástra. Now the Nyáya Śástra consists of five books, and each
+book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
+first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
+categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
+remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_váda_). In the first
+daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
+four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
+being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
+"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
+already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mímáṃsakas as
+separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
+examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
+second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first
+daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravṛitti_),
+the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
+"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to
+the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
+first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
+of futility (_játi_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
+for rebuke" (_nigrahasthána_, or "unfitness to be argued with").
+
+In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
+measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pramáṇa_) is
+first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
+first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
+accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
+from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of
+knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes
+the peculiar tenet of the Nyáya School that God is a source of right
+knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
+(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
+knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
+that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
+And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
+the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
+chapter of the Kusumáñjali:
+
+"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
+possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
+school, the being separated from all absence thereof.
+
+"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
+and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
+existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being
+swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
+slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Śiva, is my authority; what
+have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
+with rising doubts?"
+
+"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
+analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
+right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
+objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
+fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
+is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
+possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
+therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant
+qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
+particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The
+thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
+motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.
+"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
+general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]
+A "tenet" (_siddhánta_) is something which is accepted as being
+authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
+to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
+[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
+dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
+sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
+are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
+and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the
+showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
+of a false major[211] (cf. Sút. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of
+eleven kinds, as _vyágháta_, _átmáśraya_, _itaretaráśraya_, &c.
+
+"Ascertainment" (_nirṇaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
+of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
+perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_váda_) is
+a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
+of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only
+wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
+of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitaṇdá_) is the talk of a man
+who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
+43). "Dialogue" (_kathá_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
+disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
+prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
+"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
+or "mistimed" (Sút. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing
+forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
+sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
+term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
+(_játi_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
+twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyáya
+aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
+his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
+described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
+here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
+prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.
+
+But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,
+are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
+of the Nyáya Śástra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Nyáya_, or logic,
+properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
+We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
+said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
+Nyáya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
+inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
+feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
+being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
+by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyáya from its
+establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
+action;"[212] and by Pakshila Swámin, "This is the science of
+reasoning (_ánvíkshikí_) divided into the different categories,
+'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
+actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
+the declarations of science."[213]
+
+But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
+arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
+ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
+"No," for it is said in the second Nyáya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
+activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of
+these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
+by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
+thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
+"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
+soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
+it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
+to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
+"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
+stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
+impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
+by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;
+by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity"
+produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,
+as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,
+by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right
+activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
+leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
+and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
+which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
+this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
+continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
+existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
+whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
+deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
+that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
+pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
+abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced
+it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
+knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
+knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his
+mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
+things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
+disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
+them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
+cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
+absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
+that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
+as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyáya Sútras:
+"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the
+successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
+the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
+them] final beatitude."
+
+"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,
+'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
+as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this
+continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
+We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
+include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
+being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
+royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
+is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
+Mádhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
+soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
+the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
+being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,
+we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
+alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued
+succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?
+(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyáyikas allow
+that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish
+cognition as a cause of _pravṛitti_ or action[220]], for who would
+oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,
+then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,
+again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
+supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive
+to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
+principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
+and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
+very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].
+
+"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
+intelligence [_i.e._, the Yogácháras and the Sautrántikas[222]], that
+'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
+the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
+there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
+the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
+if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
+contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
+as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
+things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
+they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
+irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
+recognition of the real nature of things.
+
+And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
+accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and
+when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
+establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
+able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now
+liberated.
+
+Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
+releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
+impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
+he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and
+error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
+body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
+upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of
+a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
+said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
+parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
+definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
+parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
+of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has
+parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
+non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
+this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
+Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
+what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
+thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
+during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
+which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
+former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
+soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
+"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
+agent possessing form?[227]
+
+Again, if we take the Chárváka's view "that the only bondage is
+dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
+liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
+have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
+no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
+involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
+equalled.[228]
+
+Again, the Sánkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
+are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's
+remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
+withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
+pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
+the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
+nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
+the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
+that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
+it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
+Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
+then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
+spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
+the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.
+
+Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
+doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the
+manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
+but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
+come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the
+proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is
+precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its
+authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
+as floating stones.[230]
+
+"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
+happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
+only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
+dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
+rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
+speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
+truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of
+pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
+pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of
+perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
+involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
+its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
+proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
+since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
+incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
+is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
+attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is
+inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
+who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
+it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
+rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
+many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
+together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
+issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
+consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
+experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
+him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
+Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
+Śruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
+soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.
+
+But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
+of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Śruti? Certainly
+perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,
+must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
+universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor
+can Śruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be
+sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
+as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
+school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
+under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for
+comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
+sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a
+moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
+to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
+unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
+excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
+once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had
+a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
+(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
+rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a
+doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
+to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
+with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
+first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
+ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
+much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
+which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
+therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
+holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
+of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may
+adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the
+"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
+possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]
+
+(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
+(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal
+proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
+to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].
+(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikánta_), since it is never
+found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in
+the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor
+again is it precluded (_bádhita_ or _kálátyayopadishṭa_), for there is no
+superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it
+counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be
+any such equally valid antagonist.
+
+If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
+&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
+produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this
+pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
+can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
+"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
+produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
+argument thus involves the fallacy called _vyápyatvásiddhi_].[239] Nor
+can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
+cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
+the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
+to limitation by any suggested condition (_upádhi_),[240] [such as
+"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
+"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
+valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
+&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
+acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
+that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
+of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
+involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
+the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
+and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
+causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
+the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
+of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
+these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
+doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
+There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to
+the present case--
+
+     "When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
+     establish its validity,
+
+     "Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
+     account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
+     major term."
+
+If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
+"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
+&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
+whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
+not.[241]
+
+As has been said by Udayana Áchárya [in the Kusumáñjali, iii. 5]--
+
+     "If Śruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
+     fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
+     objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
+     ever."
+
+Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
+argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
+being known or unknown.[242]
+
+"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
+the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
+other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
+something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
+the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
+possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
+it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
+advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
+call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
+you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
+would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
+rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
+checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
+for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
+another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
+create the world." This has been said by Bhaṭṭáchárya--
+
+     "Not even a fool acts without some object in view;
+
+     "Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
+     be left undone by  Him?"--
+
+We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for
+a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
+suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
+compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
+happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
+cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
+will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
+created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
+independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
+since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
+one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this
+there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
+Śvetáśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
+admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your
+deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
+Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
+existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
+reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
+dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
+to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It
+cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
+dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
+possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
+being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
+Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
+can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
+for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_
+endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tívra_,[246] &c.)
+
+Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
+duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
+obtained; thus everything is clear.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.
+
+We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvábhásas_
+of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhántamukt._, § 71, _Tarkasaṃgr._,
+55-67), viz., _anaikánta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kálátyayopadishṭa_
+or _bádhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first
+of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichára_ or "erratic,"
+_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sádhyasama_ or "unproved," and
+_atítakála_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list
+of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_
+corresponds imperfectly to _prakaraṇasama_. The _prakaraṇasama_ or
+"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
+for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
+is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
+"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
+authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
+difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is
+non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
+this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
+question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one
+which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
+eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
+is a product."
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.]
+
+[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
+_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyáya Sút. iv.
+68).]
+
+[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include
+the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 208: Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramáṇa_)
+according to the definition, because he is _pramáyá áśrayaḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.]
+
+[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
+i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
+smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is
+the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).
+Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
+(_vyápaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyápya_").]
+
+[Footnote 212: Action (_pravṛitti_) follows after the ascertainment of
+the truth by _nyáya_.]
+
+[Footnote 213: Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
+reads _prakírtitá_ for _paríkshitá_.]
+
+[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
+indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]
+
+[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for
+_tannivartakam_.]
+
+[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
+authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
+eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the
+stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki's
+_Nítisára_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p.
+3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.]
+
+[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
+lick her ear."]
+
+[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road
+through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with
+tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]
+
+[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
+during the second, and ceases in the third.]
+
+[Footnote 220: See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
+Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have
+sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
+line 11.]
+
+[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]
+
+[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,
+all is unreal.]
+
+[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _kleśas_ or "afflictions."]
+
+[Footnote 225: _Ávaraṇa_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]
+
+[Footnote 226: But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
+happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,
+mind (Bháshá P. § 83).]
+
+[Footnote 227: The reading _múrtapratibandhát_ is difficult, but I
+believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyápti_, as it does in Sánkhya
+Sútras, i. 100.]
+
+[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be
+_niratiśaya_,--incapable of being added to.]
+
+[Footnote 229: _Yogyánupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and
+yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
+light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_grávánaḥ plavanti_,"
+see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _aśmánaḥ plavanti_ occurs
+in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.]
+
+[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."]
+
+[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]
+
+[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
+authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
+to reveal the existence of God.]
+
+[Footnote 234: The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under
+inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
+relation of a name to the thing named.]
+
+[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
+everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]
+
+[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
+its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
+ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
+air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
+_viśesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
+"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"
+excludes ether, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
+eternal substances being the one or the other.]
+
+[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where
+the major term is.]
+
+[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
+from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
+there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the
+mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
+vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
+restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
+wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
+objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
+validity of the assumed middle term."]
+
+[Footnote 240: For the _upádhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]
+
+[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
+subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
+to the fault of _áśrayásiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your
+subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
+locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as
+that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
+unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]
+
+[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
+He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
+p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparáhatatvát_, and then begin
+the next clause with _syád etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparáhataḥ
+syát tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]
+
+[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
+Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
+as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
+constitutes his gross body (viráj).]
+
+[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]
+
+[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyáśraya_ fallacy, see
+_Nyáyasútra vṛitti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]
+
+[Footnote 246: For _tívra_ cf. _Yoga sútras_, i. 21, 22.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.
+
+
+An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
+merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how
+is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
+reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mímáṃsá by the
+holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímáṃsá consists of twelve books.[248] In
+the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
+of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),
+"explanatory passage" (_arthaváda_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition
+(_smṛiti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
+[as _e.g._, on _apúrva_] relating to the difference of various rites,
+refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
+performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
+third, _Śruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_liṅga_), "context"
+(_vákya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent
+opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karmáṇi_,
+things mentioned incidentally (_anárabhyádhíta_), things accessory to
+several main objects, as _prayájas_, &c., and the duties of the
+sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
+principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhú_ being
+made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which
+form subordinate parts of the _rájasúya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the
+relative order of different passages of _Śruti_, &c., the order of
+different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
+_vájapeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
+the respective force of the words of _Śruti_, order of mention, &c.,
+in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
+qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
+enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
+rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the
+different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
+ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
+text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
+transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
+"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
+takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
+adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_úha_), the
+adaptation of _sámans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions
+connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
+the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
+non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
+are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
+discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _sámans_,
+and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
+negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
+fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined
+into one], and _ávápa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In
+the twelfth, a discussion on _prasaṅga_ [where the rite is performed
+for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
+_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.
+
+Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the
+Púrva-Mímáṃsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
+know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
+"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the
+subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _primâ facie_ argument, (_d._)
+the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_saṅgati_).
+The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
+teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
+sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
+whether the study of Jaimini's _śástra_ concerning duty, beginning
+with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
+instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
+_anváhárya_," is to be commenced or not. The _primâ facie_ argument is
+that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
+Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
+fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
+fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning
+of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
+enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
+or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
+we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,
+for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
+from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
+reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would
+present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
+injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
+baked flour cake called _puroḍása_ is made only of rice prepared by
+being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
+have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
+and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
+the principal _apúrva_, by means of the various minor effects or
+subordinate _apúrvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of
+the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apúrva_ of the
+unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
+the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
+restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
+knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
+studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
+no injunction to study the Púrva Mímáṃsá as a means of knowing the
+sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
+injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
+the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
+although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
+words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
+which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
+is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
+Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
+that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
+that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
+offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
+characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
+present case also. As it has been said--
+
+"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
+injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
+heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
+analogy of the Viśvajit, &c."
+
+Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛiti rule from being violated: "Having
+read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
+long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
+student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
+he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
+house to read the Mímáṃsá discussions, and thus the idea of no
+interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three
+reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mímáṃsá is not enjoined, (_b._) that
+heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)
+that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
+we maintain that the study of the Mímáṃsá discussions on duty is not
+to be commenced.
+
+The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhánta_), however, is as
+follows:--
+
+We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been
+adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
+could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
+of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
+_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be
+rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
+effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
+corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
+Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
+word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
+reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
+end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
+consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
+the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
+the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
+mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
+never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
+production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us
+is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
+sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
+has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
+aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
+sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
+the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
+written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
+"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
+reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
+duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _apúrva_,
+produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
+establishes the subordinate _apúrvas_ produced by the inferior
+sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _apúrva_
+produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
+_apúrva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which
+prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
+sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this
+future influence called _apúrva_, the same doubt might equally
+invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same
+level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
+that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Viśvajit_
+offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
+of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
+suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
+     unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of
+     a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."
+
+But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
+the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
+who reads the Veda with its _aṅgas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this
+knowledge, the study of Mímáṃsá will be useless." But this is not
+true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
+literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
+discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
+gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will
+determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
+with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mímáṃsá discussion that the true
+meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
+brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of
+Mímáṃsá is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
+passage of Smṛiti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
+implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
+any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
+return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
+read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
+both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
+common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
+the injunction we conclude that the study of the Púrva Mímáṃsá Śástra,
+consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic
+is connected with the main subject of the Śástra as being a subsidiary
+digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
+which helps to establish the main subject."[257]
+
+I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
+in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhákara.
+
+In the Smṛiti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
+eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct
+him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
+Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
+ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
+since, by Páṇini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ní_ is used in the
+_átmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a
+teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
+pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
+both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
+Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Bráhman who girds his pupil with the
+sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
+_aṅgas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_áchárya_)."
+Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
+without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
+very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
+obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
+one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
+the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
+if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
+injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
+as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuváda_
+or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _primâ facie_
+argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
+was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
+another way to suit this new view.
+
+Now the _primâ facie_ argument was that the study of Mímáṃsá, not
+being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
+"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
+authoritatively enjoined.
+
+Now the upholders of the former or _primâ facie_ view argue as
+follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
+dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
+understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
+bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
+teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
+what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
+and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
+sufficient, the Mímáṃsá discussions in question will have no subject
+or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
+doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
+way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
+should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
+the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
+accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
+use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
+intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
+in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
+present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
+useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mímáṃsá
+is not to be commenced."
+
+We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
+corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
+still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _aṅgas_, and
+has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
+respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
+of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
+may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
+son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
+not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
+eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
+meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old
+objection will recur with full force that the study of Mímáṃsá will
+have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
+the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
+astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
+that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
+really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
+the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
+poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
+trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
+this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
+which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
+literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
+doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
+intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mímáṃsá
+discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
+"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
+obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
+authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
+subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
+Mímáṃsá _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.
+
+"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyáya], "but how can
+the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
+is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
+personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
+tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
+with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged
+characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those
+who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of
+tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
+universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
+is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
+no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
+since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
+second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
+viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
+some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former
+supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
+apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
+overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is
+inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
+omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
+person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
+personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda
+must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
+character of sentences like those of Kálidása and other writers. And,
+again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
+person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
+time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.
+
+But [ask the Mímáṃsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
+Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
+since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
+which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
+uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
+This reasoning, however [the Naiyáyikas answer], cannot rise to the
+height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
+illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahábhárata was preceded by
+an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
+of the Mahábhárata, which must have been the same in former times as
+now." But [the Mímáṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference
+between these two cases, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu
+incarnate as] Vyása was the author of the Mahábhárata, in accordance
+with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishṇu could be the maker
+of the Mahábhárata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
+Smṛiti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
+since those words of the Purushasúkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
+sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
+him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.
+
+Further [proceed the Naiyáyikas] we hold that sound is
+non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
+external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]
+"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
+arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)
+as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
+extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
+our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as
+in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
+of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mímáṃsaka] how
+can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has
+no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
+pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyáyika] is
+not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he
+can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
+worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
+the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."
+
+I shall now [says the Mímáṃsaka] clear up the whole question. What is
+meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]
+which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)
+from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
+ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with
+a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of
+proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
+If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
+us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
+(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)
+The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
+equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Málatímádhava
+[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
+character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
+clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line
+21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
+sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
+prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
+establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
+other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just
+as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
+if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order
+to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
+he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
+of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
+time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
+other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
+for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
+experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhákara] when he
+refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--
+
+     "Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]
+     it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
+     thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
+     or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
+     of form."
+
+Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
+by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
+Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses"]. For the
+rule of Páṇini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
+grammatical affixes with which such names as Káṭhaka, Kálápa, and
+Taittiríya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
+"uttered by" Kaṭha, Kalápin, &c., though we maintain that these names
+have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
+these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
+schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
+reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
+institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.
+
+Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,
+because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
+consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
+the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
+the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
+identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this
+idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
+forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
+the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
+shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
+cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises
+from the latter reason, we Mímáṃsakas, who hold that the Veda is its
+own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--
+
+     "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
+     him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
+     go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
+     mass of doubts."
+
+(_b._) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
+and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
+species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
+individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
+different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
+such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This
+objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
+as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
+there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
+_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
+[the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
+Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
+magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
+modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
+short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímáṃsaka doctrine
+of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
+diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
+respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
+ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
+distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
+contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
+[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
+from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
+for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
+admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
+uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
+times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
+distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
+difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
+apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
+that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
+indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
+"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
+which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
+teacher--
+
+     "The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species
+     is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
+     which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
+     is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
+     of species is useless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
+     recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
+     superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
+     non-eternity."
+
+This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyáyika] treatise
+by Vágíśwara, entitled _Mána-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the
+fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
+sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."
+
+We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the
+[Sáṅkhya and Vedánta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
+overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if
+we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no
+dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)
+the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upádhi_] of
+_aśrávaṇatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at
+great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
+imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
+perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
+non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
+such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
+arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply
+[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises
+from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
+story, the demon Tála went away [as well as Betála] when the offering
+of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised
+by the author of the _Nyáyabhúshaṇa_,[279] that, if sound were
+eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
+perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
+allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
+articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyáyika) argument against the
+existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
+between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
+both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
+invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
+the soul.[282]
+
+Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
+personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
+thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
+that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
+duty.
+
+"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how
+about another well-known controversy? It is said--
+
+"'The Sáṅkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
+are self-proved; the followers of the Nyáya hold that both are proved by
+something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
+self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
+Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
+non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
+this discussion, how do the Mímáṃsakas accept as established their tenet
+that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
+of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that
+authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the
+right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the
+instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge
+in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
+knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right
+knowledge?
+
+"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of
+cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
+these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness
+cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if
+knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
+would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)
+It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
+be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general
+characteristic (_upádhi_) or a species (_játi_);[287] for if we call
+it an _upádhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
+contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
+the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we
+all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
+we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)
+Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
+knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
+causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
+the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
+'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
+_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
+particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
+therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
+knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
+Mímáṃsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
+considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong
+knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
+produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask
+whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which
+produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
+of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
+followers of the Nyáya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
+something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that
+authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
+combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter
+alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
+'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
+absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
+right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
+presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same
+time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that
+non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
+whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
+should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
+non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
+effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
+at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumáñjali,
+i. 10]--
+
+     "'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
+     as well as an effect.'
+
+"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge
+depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,
+from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
+just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through
+something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises
+in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
+non-authoritativeness.
+
+"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
+and recognised by means of something external, the Mímáṃsá tenet that
+'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
+rotten."
+
+This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
+strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase
+"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
+instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other
+cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
+full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
+causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
+produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
+knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be
+brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
+something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
+equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
+produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
+is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being
+knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
+arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless
+complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
+it a _guṇa_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]
+
+"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
+knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
+right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
+absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
+acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
+     _guṇas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence
+     the non-existence of the two kinds of
+     non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general
+     conclusion."[300]
+
+(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
+by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
+knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this
+view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
+thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
+although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
+also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
+&c.
+
+As for your argument [O Naiyáyika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines
+17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
+or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
+itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
+whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
+should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some
+other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
+will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.
+
+As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumáñjali, when he
+tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
+on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
+which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
+of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
+a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
+an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
+closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
+on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
+throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mímáṃsá idea of
+the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
+action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
+who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
+actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
+that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
+knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
+causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
+distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
+authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
+deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
+as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
+authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
+is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
+have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
+controversy; since it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
+     (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
+     fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
+     which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
+     discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]
+
+Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
+authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
+divergency between the two great Mímáṃsá schools]:--The Veda is
+composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_),
+"explanatory passages" (_arthaváda_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and
+by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
+sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third
+person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
+rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
+opinion of the followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumárila, who maintain that words
+signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the
+sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhákara, on the contrary, hold
+that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
+they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
+done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 247: Mádhava here calls it the _práchí Mímáṃsá_.]
+
+[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyáyamálávist_, pp. 5-9.]
+
+[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
+priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
+one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
+_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;
+but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
+thus it must be a case of _ávápa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately
+(_J. Nyáyamálá_, xi. 1, 13).]
+
+[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshaṇa-dṛishṭaphala_.]
+
+[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter
+a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprápto niyamaḥ pákshike
+sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisaṃkhyá vidhíyate_.]
+
+[Footnote 252: The Mímáṃsá holds that the potential and similar
+affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one
+they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
+root-meaning (_artha-bhávaná_); by the other an enforcing power in the
+word (_śabda-bhávaná_). Thus in _svargakámo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies
+"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
+up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
+an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
+self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
+course of action.]
+
+[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
+remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
+that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
+perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
+six _vikáras_ mentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasúchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,
+_jáyate_, _vardhate_, _vipariṇamate_, _apakshíyate_, _naśyati_. I do
+not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
+_apúrva_, sc. _phala_, _samudáya_, _utpatti_, and _aṅga_, described in
+Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]
+
+[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yáska's
+_nirukta_.]
+
+[Footnote 255: See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.]
+
+[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]
+
+[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the
+_saṃgati_.]
+
+[Footnote 258: Cf. Aśvaláyana's Gṛihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.]
+
+[Footnote 259: The _anuváda_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,
+which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
+authority. The _anuváda_ in the present case is the passage which
+mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
+_vidhi_ as to teaching.]
+
+[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamánasya_, and so
+the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamánasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently
+borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
+iii. p. 88.]
+
+[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive
+transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]
+
+[Footnote 263: Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though
+unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
+contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
+perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
+an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
+origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
+question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598,
+from the MS. anthology called the _Subháshitárṇava_. For _muktaka_,
+see _Sáh. Darp._, § 558.]
+
+[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
+Mímáṃsá that sound is eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
+air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _viśesha_, not
+_sámánya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
+Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
+reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
+arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiśeshika school than to the
+Nyáya.]
+
+[Footnote 266: The Mímáṃsaka allows that the _uchcháraṇa_ or utterance
+is non-eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
+arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
+their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
+sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
+after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
+possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
+composition of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
+material limitations.]
+
+[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
+developments (_atiśayáḥ_) in their saints.]
+
+[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
+"manifest" the always existing sound.]
+
+[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_náda_) is these
+'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
+air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mímáṃsá Aphorisms_, i. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 273: The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively
+special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
+of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
+course, have its corresponding special quality.]
+
+[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshásiddheḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for the
+_upádhi_. The _upádhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle
+term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
+but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
+"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
+mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
+Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects
+that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
+belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes
+found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in
+_sound_ itself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he
+proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
+readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while
+not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
+sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
+would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and
+the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
+sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]
+
+[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwaṃsa_ of sound, in
+the latter its _prágabháva_.]
+
+[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samápohi_,
+_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _úh_.]
+
+[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two
+demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the
+Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
+how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]
+
+[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's
+_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]
+
+[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the
+vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
+is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
+a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _saṃskṛita_
+here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]
+
+[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,
+_saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam_.]
+
+[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichára_. The Naiyáyika
+argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus
+manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
+senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
+species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
+manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would
+equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
+perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
+manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
+sure that I rightly understand the argument.]
+
+[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _púrva-paksha_, from p. 131, line
+18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 284: This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118).
+The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_prámáṇya_),
+which resides in it as its characteristic.]
+
+[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
+and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
+a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
+quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
+and therefore a substance.]
+
+[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]
+
+[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
+"action," are called _játis_ or species; the last four, "genus,"
+"_viśesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
+_upádhis_ or "general characteristics."]
+
+[Footnote 288: The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
+causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
+_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]
+
+[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshábháva_ there is _pramá_; if
+not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshábhávatvena_ for
+_doshábhávasahakṛitatvena_.]
+
+[Footnote 291: _Anyathásiddhatvam_ means _niyatapúrvavartitve sati
+anávaśyakatvam_.]
+
+[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshábháva_.]
+
+[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshábháva_ or the presence of a
+"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]
+
+[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramátva_) can only reside in
+knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in
+a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes
+than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it
+is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also
+produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has
+nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in
+Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass
+muster. The jar is not
+produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-
+at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]
+
+[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
+the previous long púrva-paksha.]
+
+[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect"
+(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
+knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
+bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
+the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former
+alone.]
+
+[Footnote 297: The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
+"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
+_guṇa_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
+true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]
+
+[Footnote 298: The _guṇa_ (or βελτἱστη ἕξις) of an organ is not
+properly a cause of _pramá_ but rather _doshábháva-bodhaka_.]
+
+[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained
+non-authoritativeness" (_niśchitáprámáṇya_).]
+
+[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not
+necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
+conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
+causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
+of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _prámáṇya_.]
+
+[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
+and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
+Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
+edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]
+
+[Footnote 303: I read _tat-práchuryam_ for _tatpráchurye_ in p. 134,
+line 7.]
+
+[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá
+school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
+is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]
+
+[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _śakti_; _siddhe_
+means _ghaṭádau_.]
+
+[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, called
+_abhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ_, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by
+themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidhá_ or
+"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
+one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ_, hold that
+words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
+connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
+with an action. In _gám ánaya_, _gám_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but
+_ánayanánvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with
+"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
+and _vice versâ_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative
+Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
+we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
+But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
+which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
+thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
+as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+THE PÁṆINI-DARŚANA.[307]
+
+
+If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
+affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
+this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
+waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is
+notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
+of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
+first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great
+Commentary," is "_atha śabdánuśásanam_," "Now comes the exposition of
+words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new
+topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
+meant the system of grammar put forth by Páṇini. Now a doubt might
+here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
+words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
+doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle
+implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
+exclusion of everything else.
+
+The word "exposition" (_anuśásana_), as here used, implies that thereby
+Vaidic words, such as those in the line _śaṃ no devír abhishṭaye_,[308]
+&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
+"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of
+the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly
+formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
+We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
+the object [_śabdánuśásanam_ standing for _śabdasyánuśásanam_], and as
+there is a rule of Páṇini (_karmaṇi cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
+composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
+phrase _śabdánuśásanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised
+compound.
+
+Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
+alleged rule of Páṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
+object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
+connection with a word ending with a _kṛit_ affix, there the object
+alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this
+limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprápti_ in the sútra as a
+_bahuvríhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
+of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
+that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
+in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
+the Káśiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
+option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
+equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the
+teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
+the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
+relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once
+understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any
+such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
+and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,
+this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
+ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
+rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
+connection with a word ending with a kṛit affix, is to be put in the
+genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_
+compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
+such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraśchana_, _paláśa-śátana_,
+&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
+_shashṭhítatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in
+accordance with Páṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
+in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for
+by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase
+against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
+alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
+thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
+genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
+hence Bhartṛihari in his _Vákyapadíya_ has shown that these rules are
+mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this
+effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána--
+
+     "In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
+
+     "But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
+     employed.
+
+     "Thus have they explained the meaning of Páṇini's sútras,
+     since
+
+     "He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuḥ_ and
+     _tatprayojakaḥ_."[314]
+
+Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
+(of the _Mahábháshya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
+of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
+concerning words' are now commenced."
+
+"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
+meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
+as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
+excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
+the employment of such a word as _śabdánuśásanam_, the sense of which
+can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
+intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
+subordinate study (_aṅga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were
+no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
+readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
+will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
+with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
+(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,
+it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
+is mentioned which will establish that it is an _aṅga_ of the Veda.
+Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
+haste to say--
+
+     "Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
+     common life,
+
+     "And therefore grammar is useless?"
+
+Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _aṅga_ of the
+Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
+students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
+it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
+set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that
+grammar is an _aṅga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
+should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
+knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
+involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
+consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
+sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
+incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now
+it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _aṅga_ of
+the Veda that he uses the words _atha śabdánuśásanam_ and not _atha
+vyákaraṇam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
+end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
+in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
+the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
+concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
+say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
+true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
+word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
+understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
+into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that
+Bṛihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
+words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
+word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
+Bṛihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
+years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much
+less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
+rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,
+practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
+would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
+word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
+consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not
+established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
+knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
+And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
+examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
+roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
+this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
+for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmaṇi_, the affix
+_aṇ_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
+it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakára_, "a potter,"
+_káṇḍaláva_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special
+rule (iii. 2, 3), _áto 'nupasarge kaḥ_, directing that the affix _ka_
+is to be used after a root that ends in long _á_ when there is no
+_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
+[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But
+since there are other _aṅgas_, why do you single out grammar as the
+one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _aṅgas_ the
+principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
+is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
+     austerities,
+
+     "The wise have called grammar the first _aṅga_ of the Veda."
+
+Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
+the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,
+of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
+great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is
+preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]
+Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
+Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
+according to the _śástra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda
+itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly
+understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
+Thus (they say)--
+
+     "They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
+     well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;
+
+     "But those who use such false forms as _achíkramata_ must
+     trudge thither on foot."[320]
+
+Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
+since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
+For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
+heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
+the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
+commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of
+words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
+mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
+tense-affixes, _laṭ_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
+(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
+"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
+the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
+three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
+(_vṛishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshaṇa_), _i.e._,
+from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
+_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the
+word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the
+great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters
+mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
+declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.
+
+The eternal word, called _sphoṭa_, without parts, and the cause of the
+world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartṛihari in
+the part of his book called the Brahmakáṇḍa--
+
+     "Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
+     essence of speech,
+
+     "Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
+     springs the creation of the world."
+
+"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
+and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
+too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírṇaka--
+
+     "Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
+     fivefold,
+
+     "Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
+     like."
+
+Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including
+_karmapravachaníyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
+great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaníyas_ distinguish a
+connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
+out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
+kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
+(_upasargas_).[324]
+
+"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
+_sphoṭa_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
+is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
+there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
+distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
+absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
+word is a false perception.
+
+Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphoṭa_, as
+otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
+word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
+bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
+following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
+of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
+first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
+cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
+single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
+[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
+other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
+(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
+cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphoṭa_ by means of which
+arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphoṭa_ is an eternal
+sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
+the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphuṭyate_) or
+revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphoṭa_, as revealed by
+the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
+_sphoṭa_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two
+etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
+said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
+the word '_cow_' _gauḥ_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
+there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
+hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage
+commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
+from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
+expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
+following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
+wished]," and ending, "The _Vákyapadíya_ has established at length
+that it is the _sphoṭa_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed
+by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]
+
+Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
+that the _sphoṭa_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
+under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
+convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
+latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
+conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphoṭa_ is supposed
+to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
+independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
+to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
+alternative, viz., that _sphoṭa_ conveys the meaning when it is itself
+manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
+manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
+adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
+of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
+hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphoṭa_." This has
+been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mímáṃsá-śloka-várttika--
+
+     "The grammarian who holds that _sphoṭa_ is manifested by the
+     letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
+     and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
+     difficulty."
+
+The truth is, that, as Páṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both
+lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
+the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
+apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
+help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as
+in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in
+_ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would
+not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
+of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
+said by Tautátita--
+
+     "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
+     perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
+     be the meaning which they convey."
+
+Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
+attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
+alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
+thing called _sphoṭa_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
+letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
+view having been shown to be irrelevant].
+
+All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
+a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
+you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
+conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
+collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]
+could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
+separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
+the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
+with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
+"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
+together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
+Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a
+horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
+perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
+pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
+power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
+manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
+imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
+involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
+one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
+convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
+their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
+their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
+letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
+_sphoṭa_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
+thing called _sphoṭa_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
+alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
+will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
+with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is
+only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
+between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
+reveals the invisible _sphoṭa_, and each successive letter makes this
+_sphoṭa_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
+is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
+of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
+manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
+authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
+sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
+the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
+letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛihari has shown in his first book that
+the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
+the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
+such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to
+assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphoṭa_ as a distinct
+category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
+has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus"
+(_játi_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
+ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]
+(Brahman).
+
+"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
+will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
+ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
+uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
+purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--
+
+     "The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
+     be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
+     and not by combination."
+
+     "Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
+     trouble of refuting."
+
+All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
+colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
+blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is
+variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
+severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
+various conventional words which arise from the different
+species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum
+genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have
+the following authoritative testimony--
+
+     "Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
+     joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
+     possessing that colour."
+
+And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
+divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with
+different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
+words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
+This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
+affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Páṇini v. 1, 119).
+
+"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,
+horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
+resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really
+different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and
+_aśvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
+residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
+expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum
+genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
+cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
+of the stem-word (_prátipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as
+that which expresses _bháva_;[333] now, as _bháva_ is "existence," the
+meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root
+should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriyá_); but here
+again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
+"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
+subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
+line--
+
+     "Others say that action (_kriyá_) is a genus, residing in
+     many individuals."
+
+So, too, if we accept Páṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
+affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we
+speak of the nature (_bháva_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
+that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _tá_ [as _aśvatva_ and
+_aśvatá_] are used in the sense of _bháva_, that they do express
+"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
+coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
+phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
+space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
+Such is the meaning of Hari's two _kárikás_ quoted above. So, too, it
+is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that
+the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
+Substance.
+
+"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
+substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
+object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
+discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
+[without owners] is expressed."[336]
+
+So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the
+Várttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
+in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
+meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
+determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of
+horse," &c.]
+
+According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words
+mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides
+by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
+apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
+particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,
+denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
+connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
+connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
+in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
+the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
+into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
+produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"
+we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly
+denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
+denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _paṭhati_, "he reads," &c.,
+since we find here a meaning common to all who read.
+
+In the doctrine of Vyáḍi, who maintained that words meant individual
+things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
+forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
+[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
+"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]
+
+Both views are allowed by the great teacher Páṇini; since in i. 2, 58,
+he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
+"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
+optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured,"
+which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
+64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
+where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
+things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the
+plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a
+dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
+assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
+Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is
+that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.
+
+As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
+     true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
+     shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."
+
+Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the
+nature of this true meaning--
+
+     "That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
+     perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
+     doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who
+     know the end of the three Vedas."
+
+So too in his description of substance, he says--
+
+     "_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of
+     modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
+     earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they
+     call the Supreme Nature."
+
+The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
+to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
+cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.
+
+"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
+identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
+thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
+souls."[344]
+
+The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted
+by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
+it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
+the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
+result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
+power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
+conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
+the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us--
+
+     "As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
+     of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
+     development of illusion likewise."
+
+When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
+joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
+ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best
+defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
+text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
+Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the
+"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
+     diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
+     science of sciences."[347]
+
+And so again--
+
+     "This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
+     final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
+     travellers to emancipation."
+
+Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śástra of grammar should be
+studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 307: Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
+adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá school that
+sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphoṭa_ here, and not in his
+Jaimini chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]
+
+[Footnote 309: _Śabdánuśásana_, if judged by the apparent sense of
+Páṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
+because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
+whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
+an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as
+_ácháryeṇa_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _áścharyo
+godoho śikshitena gopálena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
+can we say _áścharyo gaváṃ doho' śikshitasya gopálasya_ (as it would
+violate ii. 3, 66).]
+
+[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprápti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a
+_bahuvríhi_ agreeing with _kṛiti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
+discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Páṇini.]
+
+[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Páṇini, ii.
+2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_
+(_i.e._, _shashṭhí-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]
+
+[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Páṇini's own sútras (i. 4, 30,
+and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
+to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
+_shashṭhí śeshe_.]
+
+[Footnote 315: The very word _śabda_ in _śabdánuśásanam_ implies the
+Veda, since this is pre-eminently _śabda_.]
+
+[Footnote 316: Compare Max Müller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is
+quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.]
+
+[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _daṇḍa_ in line 3
+after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _śabdánám_.]
+
+[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]
+
+[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahábháshya_, pp. 12, 64.]
+
+[Footnote 320: _Achíkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form
+of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achaṅkramyata_.]
+
+[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
+lines of Bhartṛihari which immediately follow.]
+
+[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _śabdasya_ after _sámyam_,
+but the Mahábháshya has _naḥ sámyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]
+
+[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases
+of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]
+
+[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaníyas_ imply a verb other than the one
+expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
+by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Śákalyasaṃhitám anu
+právarshat_, "he rained after the Śákalya hymns," _anu_ implies an
+understood verb _niśamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
+is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
+_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]
+
+[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might
+mean _krameṇa_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]
+
+[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
+_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _viná_ after _nimittam_.]
+
+[Footnote 329: The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are
+collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
+by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
+dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddeśyásiddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphoṭakabhávam_ for
+_sphoṭábhávam_.]
+
+[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9,
+32.]
+
+[Footnote 332: The Mímáṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (_játi_)
+and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyáya holds that a word means
+an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]
+
+[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Prátiś. xii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
+the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]
+
+[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]
+
+[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really
+meant, the one abiding existence.]
+
+[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.]
+
+[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _aśvattha_.]
+
+[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical
+categories, _játi_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _saṅjná_, and _kriyá_.]
+
+[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.]
+
+[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that
+the Mímáṃsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
+since otherwise there would be _vyabhichára_ and _ánantya_ (cf. also
+Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakáśa, p. 10). If a word is
+held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as
+it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
+include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an
+endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]
+
+[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmát
+dvayaṃ satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmád
+advayaṃ satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]
+
+[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
+exists.]
+
+[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jíva_) and Brahman.]
+
+[Footnote 345: The _Saṃvṛiti_ of the text seems to correspond to the
+_ávaraṇa_ so frequent in Vedánta books.]
+
+[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi.
+22.]
+
+[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
+it is explained by [']Saṃkara as _vidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad
+adhividyam_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE SÁNKHYA-DARŚANA.
+
+
+"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
+by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _púrva_ and _uttara_
+Mímáṃsá schools], when the system of development propounded by the
+Sáṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
+the Śástra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
+several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,
+that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
+and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is
+only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
+itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
+the evolvent (_prakṛiti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
+of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
+expressed [in the Sáṅkhya Káriká], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
+It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
+the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
+&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
+should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a
+_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued
+series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
+senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the
+hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
+egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the Sáṅkhya Káriká (§ 3),
+"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
+the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great
+principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute
+of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
+egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhimána_), is the evolute
+of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
+the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
+subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
+the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
+perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
+action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
+mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
+our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
+cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
+by Íśvara Kṛishṇa in his Kárikás[351] (§ 24-27), "Self-consciousness
+is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
+the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the
+class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
+elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
+darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
+one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
+ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
+voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
+mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
+organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with
+them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher
+Váchaspati Miśra in the Sáṅkhya-tattva-kaumudí.
+
+(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,
+and the eleven organs, as said in the Káriká, "The evolute consists of
+sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
+evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents
+of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different
+"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are
+not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
+that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
+jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
+consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of
+dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
+ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
+and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
+precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
+two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs
+has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sáṅkhya
+Káriká (§ 22)--
+
+     "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
+     this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
+     proceed the five gross elements."
+
+(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the Káriká, "The soul is
+neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
+eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
+nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
+establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Káriká (§ 4).
+
+"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
+acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode
+of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
+which is to be proven."
+
+Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
+effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from
+the non-existent; the Naiyáyikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent
+is produced from the existent; the Vedántins, that all effects are an
+illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
+existent; while the Sáṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from
+the existent.
+
+(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
+itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
+than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
+identical.
+
+(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
+it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
+originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
+produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the
+cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are
+not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
+incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
+regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
+the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
+existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
+produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
+the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
+milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
+the production of a thing previously non-existent.
+
+Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
+with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's
+existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
+two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
+from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
+of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sáṅkhya
+teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
+no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
+who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
+utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
+not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
+capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
+from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
+allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
+oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
+non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
+whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
+not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
+apply here].
+
+From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
+that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
+is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
+[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
+we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
+cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
+other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
+is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
+its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate
+threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
+office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
+of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
+limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
+and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
+as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and
+are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
+concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
+as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
+existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gítá (ii. 16)--
+
+     "There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
+     non-existence for the existent."
+
+And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
+the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakṛiti_). This has
+been said [in the Káriká, § 9]--
+
+     "Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
+     cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
+     selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
+     every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
+     is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]
+
+Nor can we say [with the Vedántin] that the world is an illusory
+emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
+contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _primâ
+facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
+of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
+discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
+nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
+unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
+to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
+mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
+similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of
+the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
+endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
+a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material
+cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
+case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
+composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
+goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
+activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
+darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
+(_i.e._, _prakṛiti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
+found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
+happiness is found in his wife Satyavatí, because the quality of
+"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
+her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
+towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
+possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
+manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
+causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
+viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
+being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
+the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused,"
+since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
+which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
+composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
+Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
+in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--
+
+     "The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
+     unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
+     a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
+     her when once she has been enjoyed."
+
+Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
+"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally
+possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
+concealing.
+
+Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
+Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
+produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some
+intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
+supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
+unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
+experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
+intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
+the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
+unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
+unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
+has been said in the Káriká (§ 57)--
+
+     "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
+     calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."
+
+But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
+which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
+existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
+hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
+act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply
+that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be
+no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
+living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
+compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
+reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
+created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
+at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He
+had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
+Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of
+the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union
+of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
+as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
+unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
+proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
+caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
+blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
+experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
+the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
+fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
+recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or
+absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
+Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
+Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]
+travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
+separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
+dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
+mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
+indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
+man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
+effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
+dependent. This has been said in the Káriká (§ 21)--
+
+     "For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
+     separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
+     and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."
+
+"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
+the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply,
+that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
+does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
+retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
+the Káriká (§ 59)--
+
+     "As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
+     desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
+     manifested herself to Soul."
+
+For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
+of the atheistic Sáṅkhya School, been propounded.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]
+
+[Footnote 349: Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 350: One great defect in the Sáṅkhya nomenclature is the
+ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddhí_) and those for
+mind (_manas_). Mádhava here applies to the former the term
+_antaḥkaraṇa_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
+have ventured to alter it in the translation.]
+
+[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sáṅkhya
+authority, and not the Sáṅkhya Sútras.]
+
+[Footnote 352: _Vaikṛita_ is here a technical term meaning that
+goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká,
+comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sáṅkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.]
+
+[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
+reading _saṃkalpavikalpátmakam_ must be corrected by the Sáṅkhya
+Káriká.]
+
+[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanmátras_
+will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
+elements.]
+
+[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]
+
+[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabháva_) cannot be
+altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]
+
+[Footnote 357: I take _arthántaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.
+Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumudí_, p. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.]
+
+[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of
+beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
+and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
+caused their misery at all.]
+
+[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only
+_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.
+_Sáṅkhyapravachanabháshya_, i. 58).]
+
+[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
+is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in
+the Gesta Romanorum.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+THE PATANJALI-DARSÁNA.
+
+
+We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
+opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the
+system of the Theistic Sáṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the
+so-called Yoga Śástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four
+chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sáṅkhya Pravachana," or
+detailed explanation of the Sáṅkhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof
+the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
+exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the
+Yoga Śástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
+his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
+the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
+Meditation (_samádhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of
+aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
+mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
+the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet
+thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
+or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
+series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
+spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,
+contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
+"subjugation" (_saṃyama_), and also the various superhuman powers
+which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
+series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
+mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
+Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
+"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five
+principles [of the Sáṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme
+Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
+fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
+to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and
+is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
+of mundane existence.
+
+"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
+of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
+Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
+Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
+is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
+influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
+quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
+declared--
+
+     "It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
+     understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
+     torment,[365]
+
+     And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
+     identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."
+
+It has been also said by Patañjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer,
+which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
+object which is developed and transferred experiences the
+modifications thereof."
+
+Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
+the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or
+reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it
+experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,
+being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
+understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
+in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
+and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
+the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
+thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
+forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
+for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
+length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
+between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
+ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
+desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
+undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.
+
+The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
+concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
+intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
+object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
+and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
+word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
+[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
+be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
+_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
+particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
+gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_
+is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now
+(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'
+Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
+comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly
+suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
+previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
+singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for
+it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
+"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
+whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
+general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence
+[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
+accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
+inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
+something else; and since this is at once understood without any
+direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
+_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
+because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
+does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet
+these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
+exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
+[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold
+that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
+predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
+mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
+(_anuśásana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
+which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,
+divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
+such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the
+rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
+follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
+others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
+knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,
+in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Therefore having become
+tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
+and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word
+_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
+knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
+even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
+mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
+produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
+[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
+exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
+or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
+presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
+must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it
+is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we
+have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upanishad, ii.
+12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the
+Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
+sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛiti as that [in the
+Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
+will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
+interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
+previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
+course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body
+strong].
+
+But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism,
+"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Áchárya
+has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of
+the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
+will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
+_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of
+tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
+the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
+contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
+to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
+so-called "means."[370]
+
+"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why
+should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
+be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
+auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
+unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
+being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
+auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is
+in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore
+it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
+that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
+cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary
+meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
+auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
+drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
+the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
+auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
+unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply,
+that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
+meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
+of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
+"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."
+
+"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
+the beginning of a Śástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
+would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
+begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
+it has been said by the wise, 'Those śástras become widely famous
+which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
+auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
+invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies
+'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛiti which says,
+
+     "'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the
+     ancient time,
+
+     "'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
+     are both auspicious.'
+
+"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying
+'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vṛiddhi_' used by Páṇini in his
+opening sútra '_vṛiddhir ád aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is
+untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious
+influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
+signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is
+auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
+can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used
+here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
+new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such
+other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
+some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
+journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smṛiti, since the smṛiti
+will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
+only that they produce an auspicious effect.
+
+Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a
+previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
+apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
+already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
+as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
+if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
+would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
+has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
+exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sútra,
+the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
+Táṇḍya Bráhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
+this is the Viśvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as
+signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
+just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the
+exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
+Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga
+Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
+and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
+be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and
+also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this
+_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
+after a successful understanding of the śástra through the attainment of
+the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
+explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
+the smṛiti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the
+Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher
+thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
+Patañjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
+to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
+Puráṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
+_anuśásana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which
+followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
+the system.
+
+Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
+meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
+institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this
+institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
+is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
+fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
+(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.
+The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the
+producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_
+and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
+well known from Śruti and Smṛiti, as I have before shown. And it is
+established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
+are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
+one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
+opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a
+wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to
+establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
+liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the word
+_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
+a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
+regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
+question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
+the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the
+determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
+place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
+not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
+the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
+we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
+interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
+of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
+"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
+or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
+would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
+"_śruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
+it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
+14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
+the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into
+collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
+more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
+summed up--
+
+     "A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
+     precluded by any of the preceding modes;
+
+     "But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
+     precludes, depends on circumstances."
+
+Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
+settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
+preliminaries, the study of the Śástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
+be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of
+Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
+be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
+the Śástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
+which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śástra,
+especially directed thereto, this Śástra is the means for its
+production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
+concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
+operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up
+and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than
+to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in
+his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śástra as his primary
+object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
+"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
+that the commencing the Yogaśástra is that which primarily claims our
+attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
+the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sáśtra. "But as we read
+in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of
+'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean
+'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
+Yájñavalkya:[381]--
+
+     'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
+     called _yoga_.'"
+
+This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
+action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
+souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
+opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
+conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
+Vaiśeshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
+theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
+Mímáṃsá [or Vedánta], our Yogaśástra would be rendered nugatory by this
+concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
+identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
+something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
+be produced by our Śástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
+used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here
+in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all
+     held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
+     are their evidence."
+
+Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert
+in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samádhi_." Nor does this
+contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,
+may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--
+
+     "_Samádhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and
+     supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
+     _samádhi_ of the individual soul."
+
+It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the
+Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samádhi_."
+
+An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samádhi_ is
+used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
+ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and
+the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
+principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
+other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
+we see in the _darśapúrṇamása_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites
+the _prayájas_, and therefore _samádhi_ cannot be the meaning of
+_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
+although the term _samádhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to
+express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
+contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
+devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
+to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
+declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
+ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
+alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
+_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to
+go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
+words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
+would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i.
+2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
+in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the
+suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
+second or principal sense of _samádhi_ will therefore be quite
+distinct from the first or inferior.]
+
+"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the
+modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
+abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
+their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
+abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
+antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
+the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in
+accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
+the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
+soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
+because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
+hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
+"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
+(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
+unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
+perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
+intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument
+to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
+the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
+is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this
+soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
+occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
+modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
+always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
+pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this
+which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
+substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
+an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
+proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
+and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
+understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
+not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
+"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
+susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
+influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or
+want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
+knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
+spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
+with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
+knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
+although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
+given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
+certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
+of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
+understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
+that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
+as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of
+the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
+understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire,
+volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
+firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchaśikha
+declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
+that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The
+modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from
+the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
+argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the
+understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
+various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
+of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
+notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of
+"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the
+understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
+"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
+diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
+becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
+when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the
+perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
+newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
+condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
+reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
+there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
+and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
+"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.
+
+[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
+said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the
+suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply
+also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
+suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,
+_múḍha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
+for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
+_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
+attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.
+For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is
+restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed
+about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _múḍha_,
+'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
+sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].
+It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
+first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here,
+however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
+Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛishṇa, is fickle, turbulent,
+violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
+occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
+but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
+&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
+Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
+laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
+attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind
+are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by
+the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
+mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
+two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
+means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
+heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
+attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
+notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
+failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
+meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
+even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
+we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
+laid down as the definition of _yoga_.
+
+We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
+three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _múḍha_, and
+_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
+all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
+modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
+[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two
+conditions called _ekágra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and
+attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
+two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now
+by _ekágra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
+_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
+_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
+and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.
+
+Now this _samádhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
+in which there is distinct recognition" (_saṃprajñáta_), and "that in
+which distinct recognition is lost" (_asaṃprajñáta_) [Yoga S., i. 17,
+18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
+intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
+notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
+or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]
+is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajñáyate_) as distinct from Nature. It
+has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichára_, _sánanda_, and
+_sásmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhávaná_),
+which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
+other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
+pondered is of two kinds, being either Íśwara or the twenty-five
+principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not
+senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are
+senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
+which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
+elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
+investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in
+the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
+produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
+(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
+five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
+relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
+(_savichára_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
+"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
+(_sánanda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
+manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object
+the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
+or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sásmita_),
+because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual
+faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
+quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].
+
+But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
+the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.
+
+"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
+suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
+where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
+we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
+quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
+of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
+because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
+"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
+operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
+and the "stock of deserts."[400]
+
+The "afflictions" (_kleśa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
+egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
+a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidyá_,
+"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayíbháva_
+compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
+"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadháraya_]
+compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
+"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvríhi_ compound, where both portions are
+dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
+cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
+predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
+_avidyá_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the
+express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,
+as _avidyá_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
+to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very
+form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
+second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
+characterised by (_a_ + _vidyá_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and
+cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
+then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,[403]
+"there is a _bahuvríhi_ compound which is formed with some word
+meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
+this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvríhi_
+compound _avidyá_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as
+_avidyá_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidyá_
+existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidyá_
+could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the
+other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were
+associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and
+were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
+the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sásmita_ meditation].
+
+Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
+[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be
+dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
+"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
+them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
+on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
+are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
+strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
+several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
+This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's
+Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:--
+
+     "The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
+     are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but
+     existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
+     'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the
+     'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
+     with worldly objects."
+
+"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidyá_ as a
+_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,
+because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
+Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]
+the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
+would be overthrown."
+
+[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
+have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryudása_ [where
+the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidyá_ means a
+contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidyá_;
+and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
+said--
+
+     "The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
+     [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
+     thus the words _abráhmaṇa_ and _adharma_ respectively
+     signify, 'what is other than a Bráhman' and 'what is
+     contrary to justice.'"
+
+And again--
+
+     "We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
+     the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
+     from the use in which it has been already employed."
+
+Váchaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings
+depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
+occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter
+portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
+this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
+here too [in _avidyá_] the real meaning is something contrary to
+_vidyá_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
+positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said
+in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
+non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
+eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is
+defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413]
+[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
+"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining
+the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a
+proverbial couplet[415]--
+
+     "The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
+     place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its
+     composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from
+     death [as even a Bráhman's body defiles],--and from the fact
+     that it has to be made pure by rites."
+
+So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
+15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
+pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through
+the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
+impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
+opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
+pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the
+idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands,
+sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
+_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said--
+
+     "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
+     'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;
+
+     "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
+     liberation."
+
+Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]
+
+But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
+should there not be given some general definition applying to them
+all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be
+established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumárila--
+
+     "'Without some general definition, a more special definition
+     cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
+     mentioned here.'"
+
+This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
+the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
+"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
+
+"Egoism" (_asmitá_) is the notion that the two separate things, the
+soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said
+(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
+sight." "Desire" (_rága_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
+the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
+the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the
+feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
+the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
+expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
+"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).
+
+Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
+word _anuśayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _kṛit_ affix _ṇini_ in
+the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the
+sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _ṇini_
+cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anuśí_;
+for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the Sútra, iii. 2, 4,
+and has been exerting its influence in the following sútras, this word
+must have been introduced a second time in the Sútra, iii. 2, 78,
+_supy ajátau ṇinis táchchhílye_,[419] on purpose to exclude
+prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
+strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sútra, vii.
+2, 115, _acho ñṇiti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to
+_vṛiddhi_, and so the word must be _anuśáyin_, in accordance with the
+analogy of such words as _atiśáyin_, &c. Nor is the latter view
+tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since
+_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--
+
+     'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable
+     nor a _kṛit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
+     a word in the locative case;'
+
+and the word _anuśaya_ is clearly a _kṛit_ formation as it ends with
+the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
+renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word
+_anuśayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
+very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be
+admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
+generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
+essential importance. Hence the author of the Vṛitti has said--
+
+     "The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular
+     acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
+     this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]."
+
+Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _káryin_,
+_káryika_ [where the affixes are added after a _kṛit_ formation],
+_taṇḍulin_, _taṇḍulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning
+"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
+_kṛit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
+the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anuśaya_ is formed by
+a _kṛit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.
+
+The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
+(_abhiniveśa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
+from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
+immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
+the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
+left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
+in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
+individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
+declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
+through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
+philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as
+the "afflictions" (_kleśa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
+upon it various mundane troubles.
+
+[We next describe the _karmáśaya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
+"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or
+forbidden actions, as the _jyotishṭoma_ sacrifice, bráhmanicide, &c.
+"Stock" (_áśaya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
+which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
+merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
+experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
+
+Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
+the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
+operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not
+considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
+[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
+could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
+the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the
+thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
+described hereafter], _madhumatí_, _madhupratíká_, _viśoká_, and
+_saṃskáraśeshatá_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its
+etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
+thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed
+(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
+"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
+that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
+This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
+development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
+state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
+assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]
+"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
+to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
+_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
+as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
+skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
+in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
+that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
+reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
+who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
+perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
+
+Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
+to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to
+practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
+especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛishṇa in the
+Bhagavad Gítá [vi. 3]--
+
+     "Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
+     _yoga_;
+
+     But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
+     the means."
+
+Patañjali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical
+concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
+to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yájñavalkya has described "mortification"--
+
+     "By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
+     chándráyaṇa fast, &c.,
+
+     "Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
+     mortifications."[429]
+
+"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
+_gáyatrí_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and
+Tántrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
+chanted. Those chanted are the _sámans_; those not chanted are either
+in metre, _i.e._, the _ṛichas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yajúṃshi_,
+as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _ṛich_ in which
+by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _pádas_
+[or portions of a verse]; the name _sáman_ is applied to chanted
+portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_
+are called Tántrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
+directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again
+threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--
+
+     "The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and
+     neuter:
+
+     "The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,
+     the exclamation _sváhá_); the neuter those which end in
+     _namas_;
+
+     "The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
+     all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."
+
+They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all
+defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
+ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.
+
+Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_saṃskára_) are ten, and
+they have been thus described in the _Śáradá-tilaka_--
+
+     "There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
+     to _mantras_ efficacy:
+
+     "These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
+     consecrated.
+
+     "The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
+     'awakening,'
+
+     "The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
+
+     "The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
+     'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.
+
+     "The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the
+     _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.
+
+     "The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
+     _mantra_, each united to Om,
+
+     "According to the number of the letters. This they call the
+     'vivifying' (_jívana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite
+     each with sandal-water,
+
+     "Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is
+     called the 'smiting' (_táḍana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike
+     them with oleander flowers,
+
+     "Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
+     'awakening' (_bodhana_).
+
+     "Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
+     own special _tantra_,
+
+     "Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
+     leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
+     (_abhisheka_).
+
+     "Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him
+     consume by the _jyotir-mantra_
+
+     "The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the
+     'purification' (_vimalí-karaṇa_).
+
+     "The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and
+     the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,
+
+     "And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
+     of kuśa grass,
+
+     "With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this
+     is held to be the 'fattening' (_ápyáyana_).
+
+     "The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with
+     _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpaṇa_).
+
+     "The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of
+     Máyá[434] and Ramá[435] is called its 'illumining'
+     (_dípana_).
+
+     "The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being
+     muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).
+
+     "These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
+     _tantras_;
+
+     "And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
+     obtains his desire;
+
+     "And _ruddha_, _kílita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _śapta_, and
+     the rest,
+
+     "All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by
+     these excellent consecrations."
+
+But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries
+connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an
+unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]
+
+The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord"
+(_íśvara-praṇidhána_), is the consigning all one's works, whether
+mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
+Supremely Venerable. As it has been said--
+
+     "Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
+
+     "That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."
+
+This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
+the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
+since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
+sung in the Bhagavad Gítá [ii. 47]--
+
+     "Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
+     fruits;
+
+     "Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
+     attached to inaction."
+
+The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
+by the venerable Nílakaṇṭha-bháratí--
+
+     "Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
+     by desire,
+
+     "Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
+     has been licked by a dog."
+
+Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
+resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for
+producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words
+called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
+"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
+meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
+with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
+meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
+a motive. This has been declared in the _Kávya-prakáśa_ [ii. 9]--
+
+     "When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
+     principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
+     another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
+     this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."
+
+Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter
+_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
+the feminine _sá_] would have signified some neuter word, like
+"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
+indicated." But _sá_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
+with _lakshaṇá_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is
+put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
+been explained by Kaiyaṭa, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
+of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
+former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kuśala_) in
+business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
+_kuśala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed
+etymologically as _kuśaṃ_ + _láti_, "one who gathers kuśa grass for
+the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
+of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
+this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
+is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
+with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--
+
+     "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
+     their immediate significance, just as is the case in
+     'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."
+
+Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
+Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
+meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
+indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
+and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
+originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
+by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
+the author of the Kávya-prakáśa used the expression, "This is
+'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
+based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as
+"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2.
+indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
+are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent
+indication, as "the man of the Panjáb is an ox" [here the object is
+not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
+indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
+5. pure superimponent indication, as "_ghí_ is life;" 6. pure
+introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
+all explained in the Kávya-prakáśa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
+churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.
+
+This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
+(_aṅga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not
+wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
+[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
+mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
+32]; and these are described in the Vishṇu Puráṇa [vi. 7, 36-38]--
+
+     "The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
+     Brahman, practises, void of all desire,
+
+     "Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
+     and non-coveting;
+
+     "Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
+     purification, contentment, and austerity,
+
+     "And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
+     Brahman.
+
+     "These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
+     the five 'religious observances;'
+
+     "They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
+     reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."
+
+"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
+kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _víra_, _svastika_, _daṇḍaka_,
+_sopáśraya_, _paryaṅka_, _krauñchanishadana_, _ushṭranishadana_,
+_samasaṃsthána_. Yájñavalkya has described each of them in the passage
+which commences--
+
+     "Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
+     but in reverse order,
+
+     "Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Bráhmans,
+     on his thighs;
+
+     "This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all."
+
+The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this
+steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
+practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
+inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
+the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
+body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
+both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
+general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
+to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _púraka_, and _kumbhaka_." We
+reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
+"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
+in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of
+the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
+has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _púraka_, which is the
+[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
+"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,
+when the vital air, called _práṇa_, remains motionless like water in a
+jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
+and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
+is needless.
+
+Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghaṭikás_ and a
+half[440] in each artery[441] (_náḍi_), like the revolving buckets on
+a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are
+produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said
+by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning
+the transmission of the _ajapámantra_[443]--
+
+     "Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self-existent
+     Brahman,
+
+     "Six thousand to Vishṇu, six thousand to Śiva,
+
+     "One thousand to the Guru (Bṛihaspati), one thousand to the
+     Supreme Soul,
+
+     "And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
+     performed muttering."
+
+So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
+elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different
+colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
+thus explained by the wise--
+
+     "Let each artery convey the air two _ghaṭís_ and a half from
+     sunrise.
+
+     "There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]
+     to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
+
+     "Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
+     place [in the hour],
+
+     "And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
+     six hundred in a day and night.
+
+     "The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guṇa_
+     letters,[445]
+
+     "That time elapses while the air passes along in the
+     interval between two arteries.
+
+     "There are five elements in each of the two conducting
+     arteries,--
+
+     "They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
+     the self-restrained.
+
+     "Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;
+
+     "Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.
+
+     "They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;
+
+     "This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
+     arteries.
+
+     "The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,
+
+     "Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
+
+     "This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
+     reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
+
+     "Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,
+
+     "Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
+
+     "There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has
+     fifty _palas_,
+
+     "And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
+     five properties of earth
+
+     "Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
+     and these decrease one by one.
+
+     "The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
+     the influence of 'quiet,'
+
+     "But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
+     'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]
+
+     "The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
+     ether are now declared;--
+
+     "Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
+     the second arises desire;
+
+     "From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
+     of mind;
+
+     "From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
+     impressions of latent merit.
+
+     "Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
+     finger in each nostril,
+
+     "And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
+     of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
+     of his eyes,
+
+     "Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
+     earth and the other elements within him,
+
+     "The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
+     spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol."
+
+When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
+accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
+discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
+     breath."[450]
+
+And again--
+
+     "As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
+
+     "So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
+     the breath."[451]
+
+Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
+the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
+attain "self-mastery" (_saṃyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_pratyáhára_).
+"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to
+the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered
+nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
+objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
+This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
+to it (_á_ + _hṛi_), away from them (_pratípa_).
+
+"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
+senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
+therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
+could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say
+is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
+eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
+were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
+accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
+of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
+concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
+accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
+mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are
+restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
+follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
+the Vishṇu-puráṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]--
+
+     "Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
+     ever tend to pursue external objects,
+
+     "Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
+     mind;
+
+     "By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
+     senses;
+
+     "If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish
+     his _yoga_."[454]
+
+"Attention" (_dháraṇá_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
+all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
+self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
+the _sushumṇá_ artery, &c., or something external, as Prajápati,
+Vásava, Hiraṇyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
+"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
+say the followers of the Puráṇas--
+
+     "By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
+     restraint the senses,
+
+     "Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
+     his mind."[455]
+
+The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
+be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
+"contemplation" (_dhyána_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
+thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--
+
+     "A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
+     that kind and desiring no other,
+
+     "This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first
+     six of the ancillary things."
+
+We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
+remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_samádhi_, see p.
+243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a
+long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
+hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
+"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
+names Madhumatí and the rest.
+
+"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
+words from the dialects of Karṇáṭa, Gauḍa,[456] and Láṭa?"[457] We do
+not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
+meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
+needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
+
+i. The _Madhumatí_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,
+called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
+illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
+"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
+"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c.
+Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
+which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to
+the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._,
+when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
+yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are
+well known to be of four kinds, viz.,--
+
+i. The _práthamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]
+but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
+the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubhúmika_,
+who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
+_prajñájyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
+_atikránta-bhávaníya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.
+
+ii. The _Madhupratíká_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.
+These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
+organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
+thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
+motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the
+attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
+to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
+the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
+perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
+subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
+conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
+itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
+state is called _Madhupratíká_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].
+
+iii. The _Viśoká_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all
+existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
+to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
+the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
+supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
+existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
+but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
+other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished],
+and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
+upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
+modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is
+"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
+immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of
+mind]."
+
+iv. The _Saṃskáraśeshatá_ state is also called _asaṃprajñáta_, _i.e._,
+"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
+it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object]
+which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
+afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
+enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
+all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
+"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which
+distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
+exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
+modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
+thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _saṃskáraśesha_,
+i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
+everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
+rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
+abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
+there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
+"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
+into the primal _prakṛiti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure
+intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
+connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with
+existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation
+is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
+the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have
+consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,
+or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
+33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
+individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
+for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
+cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
+objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
+decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
+of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
+absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
+possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
+one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
+dumb man praised it."[465]
+
+Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
+Yoga-śástra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
+disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śástra also
+treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
+This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
+the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
+experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
+is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same
+fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
+other Śástras also. Thus all has been made clear.
+
+The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is
+the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
+is therefore left untouched here.[467]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON THE YOGA.
+
+There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
+Raivataka in Mágha (iv. 55):--
+
+"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
+(_maitrí_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully
+abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
+a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
+essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
+Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."
+
+It is curious to notice that _maitrí_, which plays such a prominent
+part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
+condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
+start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=
+_prasádhaka_) in Vyása's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
+borrowed by Mágha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
+an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
+in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in
+themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
+which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
+Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
+
+For the word _vyákopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
+_infra_), cf. Kusumáñjali, p. 6, l. 7.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sáṅkhya Pr. Bhásh., p.
+20; S. Sára, p. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
+meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
+in the arts of life.]
+
+[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means
+rather "susceptible of suffering."]
+
+[Footnote 366: This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.]
+
+[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]
+
+[Footnote 368: Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]
+
+[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbháve'pi_,
+understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is
+supposed to assume as being necessarily present.]
+
+[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
+the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
+hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
+&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself
+_sukha_.]
+
+[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious,"
+why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
+particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]
+
+[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
+some other word to complete the construction.]
+
+[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya
+(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vṛiddhiḥ_ is
+placed at the beginning of the first sútra, while _guṇaḥ_ in the
+second is placed at the end (_ad eṅ guṇaḥ_), in order to ensure an
+auspicious opening, _vṛiddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
+well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."]
+
+[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍí, we have an interesting
+list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
+the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman,
+a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
+hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
+"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
+_dúrvá_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
+corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
+men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
+a guana (_godhiká_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
+all śástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
+the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
+and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]
+
+[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
+lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
+officiating Bráhmans.]
+
+[Footnote 378: He is here called _phaṇipati_, "lord of
+snakes,"--Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented
+as a snake in mythology.]
+
+[Footnote 379: Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.]
+
+[Footnote 380: This is the Mímáṃsá rule for settling the relative
+value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
+_Śruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
+are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Liṅga_, "a sign,"
+or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
+text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
+divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
+solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _Vákya_, "the being
+mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I
+cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
+"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
+the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
+welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
+"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakaraṇa_, "the
+subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
+parts," as in the _darśa-púrṇamása_ sacrifice, where the _prayája_
+ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
+a mystic influence (_apúrva_) which helps forward that influence of
+the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakaraṇa_
+proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sthána_ (or _krama_), "relative
+position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Śundhadhvam_, &c.,
+"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
+of the _sánnáyya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
+ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Samákhyá_,
+"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
+_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima
+facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
+aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
+first, _śruti_, being the most important; the last, _samákhyá_, the
+least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14; _Mímáṃsáparibháshá_, pp. 8,
+9.]
+
+[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of the
+_Yájñavalkya-gítá_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl.
+Catal._, p. 87 _b_.]
+
+[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriyâ_, which properly
+belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashṭṛi_.]
+
+[Footnote 383: _Scil. samádhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses
+to profound contemplation.]
+
+[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation (_samádhi_)."]
+
+[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa
+samádhiḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the
+destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
+itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
+intimate relation (_samaváya-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavyánám_ for _nirodhánám_.]
+
+[Footnote 388: _Chit-śakti_ and _chiti-śakti_ = soul.]
+
+[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]
+
+[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
+(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
+image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]
+
+[Footnote 391: Váchaspati explains _lakshaṇa_ as _kálabheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 392: I take _ádi_ as meaning _asphuṭatva_. The change of state
+takes place between the several moments of the _lakshaṇa-pariṇáma_. Cf.
+the Commentaries on iii. 13.]
+
+[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the
+thinking principle, _chittabhúmayas_ or _avasthás_. Cf. Commentary, i.
+2, 18.]
+
+[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,
+demons, and gods.]
+
+[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
+have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?]
+
+[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the
+elements or the elements the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprakáśamayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _sattámátra_ for
+_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmitá_ from _ahaṃkára_.]
+
+[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]
+
+[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
+English translation.]
+
+[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called
+_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the
+_paryudása_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
+verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
+as, _e.g._--
+
+(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
+
+(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
+
+The former corresponds to the logician's _atyantábháva_, the latter to
+_anyonyábháva_ or _bheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 403: Cf. the _várttika_ in Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.]
+
+[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-mánadhana_, with
+_vidyamána_ omitted in the compound.]
+
+[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 406: As it is _avidyá_ after all.]
+
+[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Váchaspati's
+Gloss), _sarvavṛittinirodhasampannáyá api tathátvaprasaṅgát_.]
+
+[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavastháścha_ with the printed edition of
+Váchaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdháścha_ is correct, it must mean
+_tanutvena dagdháh_.]
+
+[Footnote 409: As in _rámalakshmaṇau_, Ráma and Lakshmaṇa.]
+
+[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]
+
+[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other
+hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
+_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."]
+
+[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _káyádau_ for
+_káryádau_.]
+
+[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga
+Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of
+it; he calls it _vaiyásakí gáthá_.]
+
+[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
+increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
+(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]
+
+[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."]
+
+[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
+of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _ṇini_ be used after a root in the sense
+of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a
+word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."]
+
+[Footnote 420: "Let _vṛiddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a
+vowel, when that which has an indicatory _ñ_ or _ṇ_ follows;" _ṇini_
+has an indicatory _ṇ_.]
+
+[Footnote 421: Sc. _anuśaya_ + _ini_ = _anuśayin_.]
+
+[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _ṭhan_, which respectively leave _in_ and
+_ika_; thus _daṇḍa_ gives _daṇḍin_ and _daṇḍika_. The line is quoted
+by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Páṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
+the _Káśiká_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
+the examples:--(1.) _svaván_, _khaván_; (2.) _kárakaván_; (3.)
+_vyághraván_, _siṃhaván_; (4.) _daṇḍavatí śálá_ (_i.e._, _daṇḍá asyáṃ
+santi_).]
+
+[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]
+
+[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
+study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]
+
+[Footnote 425: See the _Káśiká_ on Páṇ. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshártha_
+(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Páṇ. ii. 2, 27.
+The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamártha_.]
+
+[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vṛitter abhávaḥ_, but
+_abhávasyáśryaḥ_.]
+
+[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,
+_prakáśapravṛittiniyamarúpa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 428: See Káśiká, ii. 3, 36.]
+
+[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yájñavalkya-gítá_
+of Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
+note.]
+
+[Footnote 430: Mímáṃsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.]
+
+[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
+_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kámya_.]
+
+[Footnote 432: The _víja_ of air is the syllable _jaṃ_.]
+
+[Footnote 433: The _víja_ of water is the syllable _baṃ_.]
+
+[Footnote 434: _Hríṃ._]
+
+[Footnote 435: _Śríṃ._]
+
+[Footnote 436: _Táṇḍava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his
+votaries.]
+
+[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
+one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est," _Livy_, xlii.
+44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
+vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
+translation of the Sáhitya-darpaṇa.]
+
+[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
+is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
+relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of
+longevity.]
+
+[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghaṭiká_ being twenty-four
+minutes.]
+
+[Footnote 441: The _náḍís_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
+to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
+_náḍís_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]
+
+[Footnote 442: Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
+passage in the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the
+vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
+the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
+other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
+and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
+the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
+waterwheel (_ghaṭíyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their
+course."]
+
+[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
+that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
+as their sound expresses the word _so'haṃ_ (i.e., _haṃsaḥ_), "I am
+he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
+it is called the _ajapámantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without
+voluntary muttering.]
+
+[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
+breath.]
+
+[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarṇánám_ for
+_guṇavarṇánáṃ_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarṇa_ is a
+_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_
+make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
+details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
+fifth act of the _Málatímádhava_.]
+
+[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghaṭiká_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
+= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghaṭikás_ or one hour).]
+
+[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]
+
+[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]
+
+[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhándogya Up._, viii. 6;
+_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the _Amṛita-náda
+Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting
+of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
+attention, and meditation.]
+
+[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]
+
+[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
+reading of the Bombay edition of the Puráṇa (only reading in line 3
+_chalátmanám_).]
+
+[Footnote 455: Vishṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
+"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]
+
+[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]
+
+[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
+is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.]
+
+[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravṛitta_ for
+_pravṛitti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's
+Comm.)]
+
+[Footnote 459: Read _vikaraṇabhávaḥ_; Váchaspati explains it as
+"_videhánám indriyáṇáṃ karaṇabhávaḥ_."]
+
+[Footnote 460: Vyása has _karaṇapañchakarúpajaya_; Váchaspati explains
+_rúpa_ by _grahaṇádi_ (cf. iii. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám_,
+from Vyása's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]
+
+[Footnote 463: _Viśoká._]
+
+[Footnote 464: This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent
+impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
+_vyutthána_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
+'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by
+the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
+this in 'egoism' (_asmitá_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
+(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,
+_prakṛiti_)." _Prakṛiti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in
+equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
+effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
+becomes predominant.]
+
+[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áraṇyaka
+i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
+quotes the Śvetáśv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takes _avindat_ as "he
+pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
+Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 466: This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
+15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]
+
+[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pañchadaśí. A Calcutta
+Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf.
+Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmaṇa, p.
+x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, it is
+by Bháratítírthavidyáraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
+88).]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
+
+
+[As the _upádhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
+is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
+the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí,
+which treat of it.]
+
+     cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term
+     (sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
+     is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set
+     forth._
+
+Our author now proceeds to define the _upádhi_ or condition,[468]
+which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
+laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The
+meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
+accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
+invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
+middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
+because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
+produced from wet fuel," as an _upádhi_, since "wet fuel" is
+necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
+_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]
+
+"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
+follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
+argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be
+dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being
+produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch
+as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
+does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have
+nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the
+argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the
+site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
+form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
+is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and
+therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
+accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
+is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
+a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
+existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
+"emergent," _dvaṃśábháva_], inasmuch as perishability is found in
+antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
+included in any positive category of existence."
+
+We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
+definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to
+determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
+our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
+be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
+is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from
+feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
+determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is
+discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
+argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
+not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,
+"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
+as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
+object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
+"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
+the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]
+(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
+produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
+invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
+the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
+advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
+"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
+that this is produced at all.]
+
+But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
+middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably
+accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
+and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
+This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
+that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
+determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
+cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
+rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
+particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
+which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
+constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
+that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
+site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or
+else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
+excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is
+determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
+the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
+term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]
+
+     cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects
+     with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus
+     common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
+     in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]
+
+     cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
+     middle term that the Condition has to be employed._
+
+The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term
+being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that
+it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of
+having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably
+accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle
+term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact
+that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in
+the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we
+infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is
+too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is
+too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too
+general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we
+take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which
+the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle
+term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases
+possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is
+equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,
+"B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of
+being Mitrá's son" is too general in regard to the _sádhya_, "dark
+colour," because it is too general in regard to the _upádhi_, "feeding
+on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's
+parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having
+fed on vegetables previous to his birth].
+
+[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a
+condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your
+definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle
+term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire
+because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the
+being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this
+certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it
+is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to
+be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'
+since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as
+for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in
+this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You
+never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere
+than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some
+direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the
+first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your
+antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major
+term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly
+one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is
+self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally
+employed to overthrow the contrary argument].
+
+But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being
+always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition,
+[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant
+tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be
+non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
+"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by
+sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _upádhi_ here is a
+means of overthrowing the false argument].
+
+Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is
+disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But
+"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed
+even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
+of logical controversy.[481]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 468: The _upádhi_ is the "condition" which must be supplied
+to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus
+restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;
+if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has
+fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied
+by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if
+the mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have
+smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is
+Mitrá's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her
+former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her
+happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove
+that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle
+term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.]
+
+[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from
+the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from
+her living on ghee.]
+
+[Footnote 470: By Bháshá-parich. śl. 25, the four elements, earth,
+water, air, and fire, are _sparśavat_, but by śl. 27 of these air is
+neither _pratyaksha_ nor _rúpavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue
+from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive
+existence, not non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 472: "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was
+not _soul_, but _air_.]
+
+[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitrá's first son in the
+two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire"
+(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and
+"Mitrá's first son A is dark because he is Mitrá's offspring" (when
+her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective
+_sádhyas_ or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are
+respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the
+mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.]
+
+[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrá's second
+son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire"
+and "the being Mitrá's offspring" do not possess the respective
+conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor,
+consequently, the respective major terms (_sádhya_) "smoke" and "dark
+colour."]
+
+[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in
+(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,
+though they are the sites of the _sádhya_ "dark colour," they do not
+admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term
+"the being Mitrá's son."]
+
+[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel
+there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in
+their extension.]
+
+[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _sádhya_ (as in
+the red-hot ball of iron), there the _upádhi_ also is not applicable.]
+
+[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark,
+such as the three objected arguments required in § 137.]
+
+[Footnote 479: The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is
+artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an
+artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._,
+one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point."
+Here the proposed _upádhi_ "the being always found elsewhere than in
+fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the
+_hetu_ "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the
+_sádhya_ "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.]
+
+[Footnote 480: As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a
+maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist
+disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing
+a body." See Kusumáñjali, v. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the
+outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own
+point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a
+true condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.]
+
+THE END.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+TRÜBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+    "A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental
+    literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the
+    general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the
+    Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense
+    strides have been made within the present century in these
+    branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the
+    range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient
+    literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred
+    books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian,
+    Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been
+    deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more
+    recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of
+    all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects
+    have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were
+    contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or
+    scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals.
+    Messrs. Trübner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does
+    them infinite credit, have determined to supply the
+    constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at
+    least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to
+    the world."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.
+
+By the HON. SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,
+
+Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,
+
+Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India.
+
+Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the
+general results of the Census of 1881.
+
+     "It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a
+     marvellous combination of literary condensation and
+     research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire,
+     its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy
+     outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional
+     opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing
+     could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of
+     the economic and political condition of India at the present
+     time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the
+     India of the past."--_The Times._
+
+
+_THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED_:--
+
+Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.
+
+ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.
+
+BY MARTIN HAUG, PH.D.,
+
+Late of the Universities of Tübingen, Göttingen, and Bonn;
+Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the
+Poona College.
+
+EDITED AND ENLARGED BY DR. E. W. WEST.
+
+To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. HAUG by Prof.
+E. P. EVANS.
+
+I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of
+the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.
+
+II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.
+
+III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.
+
+IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.
+
+     "'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of
+     the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E.
+     W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to
+     expand the materials contained in this work into a
+     comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the
+     design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have,
+     however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the
+     researches into the sacred writings and religion of the
+     Parsis from the earliest times down to the present--a
+     dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a
+     translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the
+     Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with
+     especial reference to its origin and development."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.
+
+TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON
+
+COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."
+
+_With Accompanying Narratives._
+
+Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese,
+University College, London.
+
+    The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition,
+    as edited by Fausböll, by Max Müller's English, and Albrecht
+    Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six
+    chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather
+    recension, as now translated by Mr. Beal, consists of
+    thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who possess
+    Fausböll's text, or either of the above-named translations,
+    will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the
+    Chinese version; the thirteen above-named additional sections
+    not being accessible to them in any other form; for, even if
+    they understand Chinese, the Chinese original would be
+    unobtainable by them.
+
+     "Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most
+     valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains
+     authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and
+     generally connected with some incident in the history of
+     Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light
+     which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote
+     period at which they were written, and upon the method of
+     teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method
+     employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the
+     tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well
+     as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds
+     of millions of people, make them a very remarkable
+     study."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has
+     added to the great services he has already rendered to the
+     comparative study of religious history."--_Academy._
+
+     "Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its
+     purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader
+     face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct
+     which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is
+     now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid
+     its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies,
+     forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so
+     inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder
+     denied a God, now worships that founder as a god
+     himself."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.
+
+BY ALBRECHT WEBER.
+
+Translated from the Second German Edition by JOHN MANN, M.A., and
+THÉODOR ZACHARIAE, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.
+
+    Dr. BUHLER, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:--"When I
+    was Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I
+    frequently felt the want of such a work to which I could
+    refer the students."
+
+    Professor COWELL, of Cambridge, writes:--"It will be
+    especially useful to the students in our Indian colleges and
+    universities. I used to long for such a book when I was
+    teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students are intensely interested
+    in the history of Sanskrit literature, and this volume will
+    supply them with all they want on the subject."
+
+    Professor WHITNEY, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.,
+    writes:--"I was one of the class to whom the work was
+    originally given in the form of academic lectures. At their
+    first appearance they were by far the most learned and able
+    treatment of their subject; and with their recent additions
+    they still maintain decidedly the same rank."
+
+     "Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of
+     Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the
+     volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and
+     at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to
+     be by far the most learned and able treatment of the
+     subject. They have now been brought up to date by the
+     addition of all the most important results of recent
+     research."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price
+7s. 6d.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.
+
+BY ROBERT N. CUST.
+
+The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of
+which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the
+languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge
+had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might
+be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he
+had collected for his own edification.
+
+     "Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt."--_Times._
+
+     "The book before us is then a valuable contribution to
+     philological science. It passes under review a vast number
+     of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every
+     case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of
+     the best-informed writers."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.
+
+A Poem. BY KALIDASA.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by RALPH T. H.
+GRIFFITH, M.A.
+
+     "A very spirited rendering of the _Kumárasambhava_, which
+     was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are
+     glad to see made once more accessible."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to
+     most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or
+     enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative
+     imagination of its author."--_Indian Antiquary._
+
+     "We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor
+     Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a
+     second edition better."--_Athenæum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.
+
+A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY,
+HISTORY, AND LITERATURE.
+
+BY JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.
+
+     "This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to
+     students of Indian literature, but is also of great general
+     interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible
+     form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu
+     mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little
+     is known outside the limited circle of _savants_."--_Times._
+
+     "It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly
+     and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the
+     few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions
+     detract but little from the general excellence of Mr.
+     Dowson's work."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.
+
+SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.
+
+BY EDWARD WILLIAM LANE,
+
+Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c, &c.
+
+A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by STANLEY
+LANE POOLE.
+
+     "... Has been long esteemed in this country as the
+     compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the
+     time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the
+     'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the
+     value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a
+     great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of
+     comment, and prefixing an introduction."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer....
+     Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible
+     for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for
+     literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable
+     form."--_Englishman, Calcutta._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,
+
+BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.
+
+BY MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L.,
+
+Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay
+Asiatic Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of
+Oxford.
+
+Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, with
+Illustrations and a Map.
+
+     "In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a
+     thoughtful man on some of the most important questions
+     connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened
+     observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant
+     people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the
+     public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of
+     the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have
+     seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of
+     every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of
+     Modern India--a subject with which we should be specially
+     familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee
+     or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of
+     their manners, their creeds, and their
+     necessities."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.
+
+METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.
+
+With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from
+Classical Authors.
+
+BY J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.
+
+     "... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."--_Times._
+
+     "... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration
+     alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the
+     legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."--_Edinburgh
+     Daily Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE GULISTAN;
+
+OR, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU'D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ.
+
+Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an
+Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,
+
+BY EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.
+
+     "It is a very fair rendering of the original."--_Times._
+
+     "The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed
+     by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The
+     _Gulistan_ is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest
+     order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long
+     established itself in a secure position as the best version
+     of Sadi's finest work."--_Academy._
+
+     "It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price
+28s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.
+
+BY BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, ESQ., F.R.S.,
+
+Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the
+Institute; Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at
+the Court of Nepal, &c, &c.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+     SECTION I.--On the Kocch, Bódó, and Dhimál Tribes.--Part I.
+     Vocabulary.--Part II. Grammar.--Part III. Their Origin,
+     Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition,
+     with a General Description of the Climate they dwell
+     in--Appendix.
+
+     SECTION II.--On Himalayan Ethnology.--I. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of
+     Népál.--II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti
+     Language.--III. Grammatical Analysis of the Váyu Language.
+     The Váyu Grammar.--IV. Analysis of the Báhing Dialect of the
+     Kiranti language. The Báhing Grammar.--V. On the Váyu or
+     Háyu Tribe of the Central Himaláya.--VI. On the Kiranti
+     Tribe of the Central Himaláya.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+     SECTION III.--On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India.
+     Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, Bódó, and Gáró
+     Tongues.
+
+     SECTION IV.--Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION V.--Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION VI.--The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their
+     connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.
+
+     SECTION VII.--The Mongolian Affinities of the
+     Caucasians.--Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and
+     Mongolian Words.
+
+     SECTION VIII.--Physical Type of Tibetans.
+
+     SECTION IX.--The Aborigines of Central India.--Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central
+     India.--Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.--Vocabulary of some
+     of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the
+     Northern Sircars.--Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks
+     on their Affinities.--Supplement to the Nilgirian
+     Vocabularies.--The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.
+
+     SECTION X.--Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks
+     on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.
+
+     SECTION XI.--Route from Káthmándú, the Capital of Nepâl, to
+     Darjeeling in Sikim.--Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis
+     of Nepâl.
+
+     SECTION XII.--Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police
+     as recognised in the State of Nepâl.
+
+     SECTION XIII.--The Native Method of making the Paper
+     denominated Hindustan, Népálese.
+
+     SECTION XIV.--Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the
+     Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the
+     People of India.
+
+     "For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian
+     Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable
+     both to the philologist and the ethnologist."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326,
+cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,
+
+THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.
+
+The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.
+
+BY THE RIGHT REV. P. BIGANDET,
+
+Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.
+
+     "The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only
+     illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect
+     encyclopædia of Buddhist lore."--_Times._
+
+     "A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism
+     with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their
+     investigations."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."--_Indian Antiquary._
+
+     "Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place
+     students of the subject under a deep obligation to its
+     author."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "This work is one of the greatest authorities upon
+     Buddhism."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.
+
+CHINESE BUDDHISM.
+
+A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.
+
+BY J. EDKINS, D.D.
+
+Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c.
+
+     "It contains a vast deal of important information on the
+     subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued
+     study on the spot."--_Athenæum._
+
+     "Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the
+     extent of its original research, and the simplicity with
+     which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,
+     literature, and ritual is set forth."--_British Quarterly
+     Review._
+
+     "The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves
+     most careful study from all interested in the history of the
+     religions of the world, and expressly of those who are
+     concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins
+     notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise
+     bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English
+     writers."--_Record._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.
+
+WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to
+the Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of "The Modern Languages of the
+East Indies."
+
+     "We know none who has described Indian life, especially the
+     life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and
+     literary talent."--_Academy._
+
+     "They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original
+     remarks."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+     "His book contains a vast amount of information. The result
+     of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and
+     speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as
+     of food for thought."--_Tablet._
+
+     "Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and
+     antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one
+     having authority."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "The author speaks with the authority of personal
+     experience.... It is this constant association with the
+     country and the people which gives such a vividness to many
+     of the pages."--_Athenæum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.
+
+BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.
+
+The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:
+
+BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,
+
+For the first time Edited in the original Pāli.
+
+BY V. FAUSBOLL;
+
+And Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
+
+Translation. Volume I.
+
+     "These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of
+     what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are
+     probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan
+     stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as
+     India. The introduction contains a most interesting
+     disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing
+     their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore
+     legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of
+     the Judgment of Solomon."--_Times._
+
+     "It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his
+     right to be heard on this subject by his able article on
+     Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclopædia
+     Britannica.'"--_Leeds Mercury._
+
+     "All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel
+     deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established
+     reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for
+     the fidelity of his version, and the style of his
+     translations is deserving of high praise."--_Academy._
+
+     "No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than
+     Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jātaka book we have, then, a
+     priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of
+     our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete
+     picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs
+     of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to
+     ourselves, just as they were passing through the first
+     stages of civilisation."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;
+
+OR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND
+THE KABBALAH.
+
+Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis
+According to the Talmud," &c.
+
+With Notes and Copious Indexes.
+
+     "To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a
+     general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at
+     least."--_Times._
+
+     "Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive
+     to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent
+     scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and
+     indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon
+     the Scriptures."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+     "Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful
+     notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet
+     appeared."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Without overlooking in the slightest the several
+     attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental
+     Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses
+     them all in interest."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we
+     believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for
+     themselves."--_The Record._
+
+     "This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of
+     knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and
+     unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the
+     wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so
+     Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars
+     of the Chosen People."--_Inquirer._
+
+     "The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact
+     that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but
+     throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those
+     Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and
+     Christian alike."--_John Bull._
+
+     "It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument
+     of learned, loving, light-giving labour."--_Jewish Herald._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.
+
+BY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of "Yeigo Heñkaku Shirañ."
+
+     "A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted
+     much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature
+     of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into
+     English verse."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the
+     first attempt which has been made to interpret the
+     literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to
+     the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for
+     indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we
+     have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful
+     English verse."--_Tablet._
+
+     "It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric
+     literature which has appeared during the close of the last
+     year."--_Celestial Empire._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he
+     undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.
+     But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts
+     are successful to a degree."--_London and China Express._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C.
+681-668.
+
+     Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders
+     and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with
+     a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the
+     Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and
+     List of Eponyms, &c.
+
+BY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's
+College, Cambridge.
+
+     "Students of scriptural archæology will also appreciate the
+     'History of Esarhaddon.'"--_Times._
+
+     "There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It
+     does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in
+     their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it
+     does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers
+     both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary
+     non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling
+     its results."--_Academy._
+
+     "Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to
+     Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be
+     feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due
+     to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted
+     himself in his laborious task."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE MESNEVI
+
+(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA
+(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.
+
+Book the First.
+
+_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his
+Ancestors, and of his Descendants._
+
+Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected
+by their Historian,
+
+MEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI.
+
+Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,
+
+BY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c.
+
+     "A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "This book will be a very valuable help to the reader
+     ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight
+     into a very important department of the literature extant in
+     that language."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.
+
+EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS
+
+ILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS.
+
+BY REV. J. LONG,
+
+Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.
+
+     "We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide
+     circulation and attentive reading."--_Record._
+
+     "Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."--_Globe._
+
+     "It is full of interesting matter."--_Antiquary._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+INDIAN POETRY;
+
+     Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from
+     the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books
+     from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom"
+     from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental
+     Poems.
+
+BY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."
+
+     "In this new volume of Messrs. Trübner's Oriental Series,
+     Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through
+     the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of
+     Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of
+     Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have
+     introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be
+     more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna
+     is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the
+     love of
+
+                 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'
+
+     from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five
+     senses are typified."--_Times._
+
+     "No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his
+     art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas
+     as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of
+     language contained in these mighty epics."--_Daily
+     Telegraph._
+
+     "The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and
+     sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of
+     the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody
+     sufficient to captivate the senses of the
+     dullest."--_Standard._
+
+     "The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has
+     adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original
+     text."--_Overland Mail._
+
+     "We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to
+     popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface
+     tells us, the goal towards which he bends his
+     efforts."--_Allen's Indian Mail._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE MIND OF MENCIUS;
+
+OR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
+
+A SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER
+MENCIUS.
+
+Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and
+Explanations,
+
+By the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society.
+
+Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,
+
+By the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.
+
+     "Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese
+     studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The
+     value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered
+     that at no time since relations commenced between China and
+     the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said
+     aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful
+     study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the
+     excellent series to which it belongs."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.
+
+BY A. BARTH.
+
+Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the
+Author.
+
+The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably
+enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of
+the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as
+an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.
+
+     "Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,
+     which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,
+     but also a useful work of reference."--_Academy._
+
+     "This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and
+     additions, of an article contributed by the learned author
+     two years ago to the 'Encyclopédie des Sciences
+     Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first
+     appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best
+     summary extant of the vast subject with which it
+     deals."--_Tablet._
+
+     "This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual
+     of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we
+     have in English. The present work ... shows not only great
+     knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but
+     also great insight into the inner history and the deeper
+     meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only
+     one, which it proposes to describe."--_Modern Review._
+
+     "The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by
+     the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country
+     and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few
+     Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a
+     good deal of information from it, and especially from the
+     extensive bibliography provided in the notes."--_Dublin
+     Review._
+
+     "Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a
+     master-hand."--_Critic (New York)._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.
+
+HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+THE SĀNKHYA KĀRIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA.
+
+An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyāya
+and Vais'eshika Systems.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.
+
+The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in
+the department of pure philosophy.
+
+     "The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and
+     learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the
+     philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he
+     may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the
+     system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give
+     an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions
+     which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the
+     world, the nature and relations of man and his future
+     destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the
+     connection of the Sānkhya system with the philosophy of
+     Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with
+     that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"--_Foreign Church
+     Chronicle._
+
+     "Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted
+     gain to all students of the development of thought. The
+     system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from
+     the Sānkhya Kārikā, is the only contribution of India to
+     pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to
+     the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.
+     Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to
+     appreciate these points in any adequate manner."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our
+     philosophical library."--_Notes and Queries._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.
+
+A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDÂNTASÂRA.
+
+Translated, with copious Annotations,
+
+BY MAJOR G. A. JACOB,
+
+Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.
+
+The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for
+others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an
+accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedânta.
+
+     "The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an
+     inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in
+     his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,
+     indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they
+     bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will
+     rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hindû
+     philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its
+     kind that we have seen."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+TSUNI--||GOAM:
+
+THE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI.
+
+BY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,
+
+Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the
+Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
+Society, Vienna, &c., &c.
+
+     "The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of
+     interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of
+     Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the
+     comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of
+     their religion and mythology were scattered about in various
+     books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and
+     printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what
+     he has been able to collect himself."--_Prof. Max Müller in
+     the Nineteenth Century._
+
+     "It is full of good things."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
+Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414,
+cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.
+
+TO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES
+AND EMENDATIONS.
+
+Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
+Notes.
+
+By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.
+
+     "As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,
+     it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if
+     they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and
+     for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove
+     useful."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+THE BHAGAVAD-GÎTÂ.
+
+Translated, with Introduction and Notes.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.)
+
+     "Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is, as
+     we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and
+     that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar
+     value."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.
+Bengal Civil Service.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.
+
+By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.
+
+     "Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with
+     considerable success, and his version contains much that
+     will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's
+     delightful selection."--_Academy._
+
+     "The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their
+     profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on
+     philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and
+     the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates
+     them."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.
+
+As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta
+Review_.
+
+By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of
+the Calcutta Madrasa.
+
+     "For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important
+     of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Trübner's
+     Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may
+     take it up the work must be one of profound
+     interest."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.
+
+By DR. C. P. TIELE.
+
+Vol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
+
+Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.
+
+By JAMES BALLINGAL.
+
+     "It places in the hands of the English readers a history of
+     Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on
+     the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the
+     latest results of research. In this volume there is a great
+     deal of information, as well as independent investigation,
+     for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in
+     itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive
+     religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the
+     New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and
+     minute."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.
+
+A POEM BY JAMI.
+
+Translated from the Persian into English Verse.
+
+BY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH.
+
+     "Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as
+     translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further
+     good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has
+     evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the
+     quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more
+     prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its
+     intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most
+     popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read
+     in all the independent native schools of India where Persian
+     is taught."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.
+
+LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.
+
+BY CARL ABEL.
+
+     "An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical
+     questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise
+     dry technicalities of the science."--_Standard._
+
+     "Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,
+     for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery
+     over the English language fits him to be a champion of
+     unpopular doctrines."--_Athenæum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;
+
+OR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+BY MADHAVA ACHARYA.
+
+Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the
+University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of
+Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.
+
+This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The
+author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems
+current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives
+what appears to him to be their most important tenets.
+
+     "The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted
+     sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has
+     familiarised the translators with Indian
+     thought."--_Athenæum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR.
+
+BY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER.
+
+Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,
+
+BY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A.
+
+     "Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of
+     Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western
+     analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from
+     Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the
+     Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred
+     books."--_Academy._
+
+     "The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better
+     hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the
+     lives of those scholars who have given their attention to
+     gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and
+     language."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing
+     stories, or for comparative folk-lore."--_Pall Mall
+     Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.
+
+UDÂNAVARGA.
+
+A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON.
+
+Compiled by DHARMATRÂTA.
+
+BEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts
+from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,
+
+BY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.
+
+     "Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which
+     assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding
+     of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of
+     comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan
+     version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,
+     who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a
+     translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which
+     has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be
+     congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult
+     task."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a
+Language Map, price 18s.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.
+
+     "Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do
+     better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclopædic in its
+     scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any
+     particular language, and is left free to add to the initial
+     sum of knowledge there collected."--_Natal Mercury._
+
+     "Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to
+     linguistic students."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL
+RELIGIONS.
+
+BY C. P. TIELE,
+
+Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the
+University of Leyden.
+
+Translated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A.
+
+     "Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide
+     thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to
+     gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of
+     investigations into the religious history of nations. As
+     Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are
+     outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But
+     there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of
+     far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the
+     crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these
+     pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps
+     also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and
+     thorough research."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A HISTORY OF BURMA.
+
+Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the
+Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.
+
+BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,
+Membre Correspondant de la Société Académique Indo-Chinoise de France.
+
+     "Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Trübner's Oriental
+     Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has
+     been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre
+     deserves great credit for the patience and industry which
+     has resulted in this History of Burma."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+RELIGION IN CHINA.
+
+By JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING.
+
+Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with
+Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People.
+
+     "Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and
+     often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of
+     considerable value of the subject."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to
+     study the existing religions in China, and his long
+     residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an
+     intimate knowledge of them as they at present
+     exist."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and
+     revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,
+     been the standard authority upon the subject of which it
+     treats."--_Nonconformist._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the
+     first authorities on Chinese religion and
+     language."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.
+
+Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed
+by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.
+
+Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.
+
+     "The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness
+     with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient
+     documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."--_Times._
+
+     "Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those
+     Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these
+     Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter
+     possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient
+     Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and
+     translated, have not yet attracted the attention of
+     scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon
+     the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded
+     in these venerable authorities."--_Daily News._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.
+
+With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.
+
+Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares
+College.
+
+Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.
+
+     "The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and
+     scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have
+     every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the
+     publishers."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price
+24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.
+
+BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,
+
+Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629).
+
+BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.,
+
+(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of
+Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,
+&c.
+
+An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--"Nothing
+more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's
+translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."
+
+     "It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the
+     best account of the condition of India at that ancient
+     period has come down to us in the books of travel written by
+     the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best
+     known."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.
+
+THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.
+
+By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.
+
+Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.
+
+     "This work is full of interest; while for the student of
+     sociology and the science of religion it is full of
+     importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in
+     so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently
+     translated."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a
+     really good translation of this well-known law book, first
+     rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not
+     only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced
+     lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications
+     the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in
+     clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very
+     grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could
+     be published of the translation left by Burnell."--F. MAX
+     MÜLLER in the _Academy._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,
+
+     Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his
+     Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original
+     and for most part Unpublished Documents.
+
+By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal
+Medical Service, Retired, &c.
+
+     "Not too soon have Messrs. Trübner added to their valuable
+     Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of
+     the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander
+     Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and
+     though an account of his career was demanded soon after his
+     decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of
+     his compatriot, Dr. Duka."--_Bookseller._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.
+
+Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches,"
+and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+I.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.
+
+II.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James
+Barton, of his several Surveys.
+
+III.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,
+dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.
+
+IV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.
+
+V.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.
+
+VI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.
+
+VII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst
+the Malays. By William Marsden.
+
+VIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By
+James Howison.
+
+IX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of
+Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.
+
+X.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying
+off Sumatra. By John Crisp.
+
+XI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales
+Island. By William Hunter, M.D.
+
+XII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.
+Leyden, M.D.
+
+XIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the
+Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.
+
+XIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of
+Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.
+
+XV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring
+Islands. By T. Ware.
+
+XVI.--Climate of Singapore.
+
+XVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.
+
+XVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.
+
+XIX.--Inscription at Singapore.
+
+XX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By
+Lieut.-Col. James Low.
+
+XXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By
+J. W. Laidlay.
+
+XXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.
+
+XXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.
+
+XXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian
+Archipelago.
+
+XXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.
+
+XXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+XXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from
+Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.
+
+XXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities
+in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence
+across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and
+Capt. J. G. Forlong.
+
+XXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui
+Tin Ore.
+
+XXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.
+
+XXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+XXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.
+By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.
+
+XXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and
+Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the
+Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.
+
+XXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.
+
+XL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+General Index.
+
+Index of Vernacular Terms.
+
+Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.
+
+     "The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China--its
+     philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a
+     very material and important contribution to our accessible
+     information regarding that country and its
+     people."--_Contemporary Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit
+
+By the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S.,
+
+Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.
+
+     "A very interesting addition to Trübner's Oriental
+     Series."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and
+     beauty of expression."--_St. James' Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.
+
+ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;
+
+Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.
+
+BY JAMES GRAY,
+
+Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.
+
+The Sanscrit-Pâli word Nîti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract,
+and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a
+general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and
+didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as
+form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to
+his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and
+have served as a most effective medium of instruction.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:
+
+THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.
+
+Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal
+Civil Service.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.
+
+ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D.,
+
+Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor
+of Law in the University of Calcutta.
+
+The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great
+Law Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts
+contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages
+before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for
+many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work
+will supply a want long felt.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.
+
+BY FREDERIC HENRY BALFOUR.
+
+Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic
+Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.
+
+LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.
+
+WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1847 TO 1887. _Second Series._
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, LL.D.,
+
+Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late
+Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.
+
+Edited by R. ROST, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office.
+
+SECOND SERIES.
+
+Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the
+Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian
+Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the
+Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.
+
+FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.
+
+By the REV. J. HINTON KNOWLES, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.
+
+(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.
+
+MEDIÆVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.
+
+     FRAGMENTS TOWARDS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
+     OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE
+     SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
+
+BY E. BRETSCHNEIDER, M.D.,
+
+Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.
+
+ALBERUNI'S INDIA:
+
+     AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE,
+     GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND
+     ASTROLOGY (ABOUT A.D. 1031).
+
+TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.
+
+With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.
+
+∵ The Arabic Original, with an Index of the Sanskrit Words, Edited by
+Professor SACHAU, is in the press.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.
+
+THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.
+
+BY THE SHAMANS HWUI LI AND YEN-TSUNG.
+
+With a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-TSING.
+
+BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.
+
+(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College,
+London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.
+
+Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic
+Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c.
+
+When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he
+took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent
+had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress,
+Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li,
+composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's
+travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to
+discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he
+revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised
+and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable
+sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many
+particulars.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_IN PREPARATION:--_
+
+Post 8vo.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.
+
+BY R. N. CUST, LL. D.
+
+Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of
+Africa," &c.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+LONDON: TRÜBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya
+
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diff --git a/34125-0.zip b/34125-0.zip
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha
+       Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy
+
+Author: Madhava Acharya
+
+Translator: E. B. Cowell
+            A. E. Gough
+
+Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                              TR�BNER'S
+
+                           ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+
+
+                                 THE
+
+                        SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
+
+                                  OR
+
+        _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._
+
+
+
+                                  BY
+
+                           M�DHAVA �CH�RYA.
+
+
+                            TRANSLATED BY
+
+                          E. B. COWELL, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE
+      IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE
+      UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.
+
+                                 AND
+
+                          A. E. GOUGH, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND
+      PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                               LONDON:
+
+                     TR�BNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
+
+                                1882.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
+Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of M�dhava
+�ch�rya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
+Pandit �svarachandra Vidy�s�gara, but a subsequent edition, with no
+important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pandit T�r�n�tha
+Tarkav�chaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
+the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
+Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
+been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
+those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
+of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
+originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
+character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
+from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
+noticed the same thing in the N�gar� copies of M�dhava's Commentary on
+the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.
+
+As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic
+Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
+read it with my friend Pandit Mahesachandra Ny�yaratna, the present
+Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
+translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
+engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
+England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
+chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
+were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
+longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits
+of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
+years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
+that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
+of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
+it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
+accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
+advantage of the help of some of the Pandits of Benares, especially of
+Pandit R�ma Misra, the assistant Professor of S�nkhya, who was himself
+a R�m�nuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
+things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
+throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
+abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
+the Benares Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
+revised for their present republication.
+
+The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
+The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical
+systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
+gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
+principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
+them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
+for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
+were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
+with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
+the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
+interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
+course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
+details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
+guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
+Darsanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
+the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
+materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
+controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
+the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
+continually following in their track even where he does not quote
+their exact words.[2]
+
+The systems are arranged from the Ved�nta point of view,--our author
+having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Sm�rta order in
+the Math of Sringeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Samkara
+�ch�rya, the great Ved�ntist teacher of the eighth century, through
+whose efforts the Ved�nta became what it is at present--the
+acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
+ascending scale,--the first, the Ch�rv�ka and Bauddha, being the
+lowest as the furthest removed from the Ved�nta, and the last, the
+S�nkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.
+
+The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest
+minds in India throughout the medi�val period of its history. Hiouen
+Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les �coles philosophiques sont
+constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionn�es s'�l�ve
+comme les flots de la mer. Les h�r�tiques des diverses sectes s'attachent
+� des ma�tres particuliers, et, par des voies diff�rentes, marchent tous
+au m�me but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the
+medi�val literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among
+the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
+trees �rhata begging monks, Svetapadas, Mah�p�supatas, P�ndarabhikshus,
+Bh�gavatas, Varnins, Kesalu�chanas, Lok�yatikas, K�pilas, K�n�das,
+Aupanishadas, �svarak�rins, Dharmas�strins, Paur�nikas, S�ptatantavas,
+S�bdas, P��char�trikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets
+and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in
+the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in M�dhava's poem on the
+controversial triumphs of Samkara �ch�rya, and in the spurious prose work
+on the same subject, ascribed to Anant�nandagiri. Well may some old poet
+have put into the mouth of Yudhishthira the lines which one so often hears
+from the lips of modern pandits--
+
+    Ved� vibhinn�h smritayo vibhinn�,
+    N�sau munir yasya matam na bhinnam,
+    Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guh�y�m,
+    Mah�jano yena gatah sa panth�h.[4]
+
+And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,
+
+[Greek: mias toinyn ous�s t�s al�theias, to gar pseudos myrias
+ektropas echei, kathaper hai bakchai ta tou Penthe�s diaphor�sasai
+mel� hai t�s philosophias t�s te barbarou t�s te
+Hell�nik�s haireseis, hekast� hoper elachen, h�s pasan auchei
+t�n al�theian, ph�tos d', oimai, anatol� panta ph�tizetai.]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
+equanimity is that of V�chaspati Misra, who wrote standard treatises
+on each of the six systems except the Vaiseshika, adopting, of course,
+the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
+alien tenet.]
+
+[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
+given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
+in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Sr�harsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 4: Found in the Mah�bh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
+give them as I have heard them from Pandit R�man�r�yana Vidy�ratna.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+                                                                 Page
+
+    I.    The Ch�rv�ka System (E. B. C.)                           2
+
+   II.    The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)                           12
+
+  III.    The �rhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)                   36
+
+   IV.    The R�m�nuja System (A. E. G.)                          64
+
+    V.    The P�rna-praj�a System (A. E. G.)                      87
+
+   VI.    The Nakul�sa-P�supata System (A. E. G.)                103
+
+  VII.    The Saiva System (E. B. C.)                            112
+
+ VIII.    The Pratyabhij�� or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)      128
+
+   IX.    The Rasesvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)           137
+
+    X.    The Vaiseshika or Aul�kya System (E. B. C.)            145
+
+   XI.    The Akshap�da or Ny�ya System (E. B. C.)               161
+
+  XII.    The Jaimin�ya System (E. B. C.)                        178
+
+ XIII.    The P�nin�ya System (E. B. C.)                         203
+
+  XIV.    The S�nkhya System (E. B. C.)                          221
+
+   XV.    The P�ta�jala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)                231
+
+  XVI.    The Ved�nta or System of Samkara �ch�rya               273
+
+          APPENDIX--On the Up�dhi (E. B. C.)                     275
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
+
+
+THE PROLOGUE.
+
+
+1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
+supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
+_him_ only has this all a maker.
+
+2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvaj�a-Vishnu, who knows all the �gamas,
+the son of S�rngap�ni, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
+of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
+proper meaning of the term Soul.
+
+3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable M�dhava
+mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
+fortunate S�yana.
+
+4. Having thoroughly searched the S�stras of former teachers, very
+hard to be crossed, the fortunate S�yana-M�dhava[5] the lord has
+expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
+with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
+delight in a garland strung of various flowers?
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
+Vamsa-Br�hmana, has solved the riddle of the relation of M�dhava and
+S�yana. S�yana is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born
+after all the elder children have died. M�dhava elsewhere calls S�yana
+his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
+himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term S�yana-M�dhavah
+here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
+same person. The body seems meant by the S�yana of the third sloka.
+M�yana was the father of M�dhava, and the true reading may be
+_sr�man-m�yana_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE CH�RV�KA SYSTEM.
+
+
+[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Siva, the
+abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
+how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
+felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Ch�rv�ka,
+the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
+of Brihaspati? The efforts of Ch�rv�ka are indeed hard to be
+eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
+refrain--
+
+    While life is yours, live joyously;
+    None can escape Death's searching eye:
+    When once this frame of ours they burn,
+    How shall it e'er again return?
+
+The mass of men, in accordance with the S�stras of policy and
+enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
+denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
+found to follow only the doctrine of Ch�rv�ka. Hence another name for
+that school is Lok�yata,--a name well accordant with the thing
+signified.[6]
+
+In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original
+principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
+intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
+from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are
+destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Sruti
+for this [Brihad �rany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
+elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
+destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the
+soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
+since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
+such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
+only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.
+
+The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
+may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
+always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
+the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
+inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
+fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
+wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
+straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
+not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
+which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
+refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
+devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
+because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
+contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
+he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
+poet--
+
+    The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
+    Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning
+        of fools;
+    The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
+    What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered
+        with husk and dust?[9]
+
+If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
+world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
+agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
+expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
+accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are
+only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
+three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then
+again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
+destructive, as the authority of the j��na-k�nda is overthrown by
+those who maintain that of the karma-k�nda, while those who maintain
+the authority of the j��na-k�nda reject that of the karma-k�nda; and
+lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
+of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--
+
+     The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
+     and smearing oneself with ashes,--
+
+     Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those
+     who have no manliness nor sense.
+
+Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
+produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is
+the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
+eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
+holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such
+phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible,
+as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside
+in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
+body" is metaphorical "the head of R�hu" [R�hu being really _all
+head_].
+
+All this has been thus summed up--
+
+    In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;
+    And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--
+    Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed together;
+    Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the
+        same subject,
+    And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the
+        soul and no other,
+    And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.
+
+"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
+inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
+else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
+thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
+hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
+those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"
+
+All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.
+
+Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or
+middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
+found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
+major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
+of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does
+not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
+_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by
+virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this
+connection's being known?
+
+We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is
+held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by
+the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
+the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
+contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
+particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
+such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
+proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
+middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
+Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
+has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
+a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
+particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
+implying fire].
+
+Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
+the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
+object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
+as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their
+objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."
+
+Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal
+proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
+require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
+arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.
+
+Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege
+in reply, in accordance with the Vaiseshika doctrine of Kan�da, that
+this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
+this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
+that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
+the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the
+child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more
+reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
+invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,
+&c. [which, of course, we Ch�rv�kas reject].
+
+And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
+knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
+whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
+major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
+no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
+smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
+oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.
+
+Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the
+means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
+impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
+connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is
+to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
+relation of a name to something so named.
+
+Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as
+the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal
+proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
+establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
+therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself
+perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
+non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
+inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
+been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
+the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
+extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying
+the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
+accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
+term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal],
+are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
+fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
+sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
+causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it
+is established by the sloka of the great Doctor beginning
+_sam�sama_.[23]
+
+But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
+knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
+knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
+the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a
+connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
+by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
+knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
+invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
+adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
+Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
+proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]
+
+The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
+knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
+former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
+this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
+coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
+drugs, &c.
+
+From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can
+only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
+not allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become
+destitute of any cause.
+
+But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
+can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+    The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
+    By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.
+
+And all this has been also said by Brihaspati--
+
+    There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
+    Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
+        effect.
+    The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and
+        smearing one's self with ashes,
+    Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
+        and manliness.
+    If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,
+    Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]
+    If the Sr�ddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
+    Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is
+        needless to give provisions for the journey.
+    If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sr�ddha here,
+    Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the
+        housetop?
+    While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
+        though he runs in debt;
+    When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
+    If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
+    How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
+        kindred?
+    Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have
+        established here
+    All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.
+    The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
+    All the well-known formul� of the pandits, jarphar�, turphar�, &c.[27]
+    And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswamedha,
+    These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
+        presents to the priests,[28]
+    While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
+        demons.
+
+Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
+to the doctrine of Ch�rv�ka. Such is the pleasant consummation.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 6: "Sankara, Bh�skara, and other commentators name the
+Lok�yatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Ch�rv�ka"
+(Colebrooke). Lok�yata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
+the world" (_loka_ and _�yata_). Lauk�yatika occurs in P�nini's
+ukthagana.]
+
+[Footnote 7: _Kinwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
+fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c."
+Colebrooke quotes from Sankara: "The faculty of thought results from a
+modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
+ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
+betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
+exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."]
+
+[Footnote 8: Of course Sankara, in his commentary, gives a very
+different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
+existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
+Sabara's Comm. Jaimini S�t., i. i. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 9: I take _kana_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunr_. Cf.
+Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Asv�h kan� g�vas tandul� masak�s tush�h._]
+
+[Footnote 10: See Ny�ya S�tras, ii. 57.]
+
+[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehah_.]
+
+[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
+invariable concomitance (_vy�pti_)."]
+
+[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _nischita up�dhi_ see Siddh�nta
+Mukt�vali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]
+
+[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
+(as of smoke by fire).]
+
+[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in
+every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
+and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
+other place.]
+
+[Footnote 17: See S�hitya Darpana (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
+Siddh�nta-M., p. 80.]
+
+[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the
+rhetorical, argument.]
+
+[Footnote 19: "_Upam�na_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the
+instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
+particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
+name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]
+
+[Footnote 20: The up�dhi is the condition which must be supplied to
+restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
+has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
+the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
+of a true vy�pti, there is, of course, no up�dhi.]
+
+[Footnote 21: '[Greek: Antistrephei] (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We
+have here our A with distributed predicate.]
+
+[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the up�dhi
+"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
+accompanied by it," then in the Naiy�yika argument "sound is
+non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
+would serve as a M�m�msaka up�dhi, to establish the _vyabhich�ra_
+fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
+clause excludes it, as an up�dhi must be consistent with _either_
+party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiy�yika maintains that "being
+produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
+defined the up�dhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
+constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an up�dhi "the
+nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
+class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
+only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
+found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
+up�dhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
+accompanying the major," we might have as a M�m�msaka up�dhi "the not
+causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of
+hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
+where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure sloka of Udayan�ch�rya, "where
+a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,
+universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
+predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the
+existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
+will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
+the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
+because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
+fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
+fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
+fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
+non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
+inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
+by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
+will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus
+invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
+fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
+reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
+accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
+here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
+another, difficulty in the Sarva-darsana-sangraha to my old friend and
+teacher, Pandit Mahesa Chandra Ny�yaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
+College.]
+
+[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
+Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority
+of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
+genus and species.]
+
+[Footnote 25: _Adrishta_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions
+which produce their effects in future births.]
+
+[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
+209.]
+
+[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's
+Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]
+
+[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
+handled in the rites."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.
+
+
+At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Ch�rv�kas) laid
+down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
+your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
+easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
+accordingly been said--
+
+     "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
+     a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not
+     through the mere observation of the desired result in
+     similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
+     dissimilar cases."[29]
+
+On the hypothesis (of the Naiy�yikas) that it is concomitance and
+non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
+that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
+of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
+impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
+future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiy�yika) rejoin that
+uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
+system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
+may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
+stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
+entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
+practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
+terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30]
+
+1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
+designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
+(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
+from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
+or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
+instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
+five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
+its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
+is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
+non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.
+
+2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
+ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
+we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
+arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
+as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
+self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
+where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
+exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
+the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
+to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For
+reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
+there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
+no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
+two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
+can reference to the same object take place where there is a
+reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
+for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.
+
+It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
+cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).
+
+If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
+_pram�na_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
+is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
+allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
+maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
+the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
+inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
+(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
+absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
+Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
+and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
+homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
+affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
+words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
+existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
+yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
+term. Conformably it has been said by Tath�gata--
+
+     "The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
+     its being present to the understanding of others.
+
+     "The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
+     negation by a certain person."
+
+All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
+for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.
+
+These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
+standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of M�dhyamika,
+Yog�ch�ra, Sautr�ntika, and Vaibh�shika, these Buddhists adopt
+respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
+void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
+(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects
+(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
+teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
+of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
+the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
+to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
+and so forth, according to their several inclinations.
+
+It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
+viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
+all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.
+
+Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
+and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
+from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)
+like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one
+object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
+existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
+perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
+exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
+established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary
+succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
+the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
+efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
+succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
+succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
+manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--
+
+     "In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
+     alternative;
+
+     "Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
+     repugnance in the very statement."[33]
+
+And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
+and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
+existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.
+
+Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
+the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
+to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
+future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
+efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
+cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
+deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
+which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
+time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
+thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
+power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
+practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
+not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
+instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
+while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
+past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.
+
+You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there
+is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
+future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
+the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
+not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
+the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
+assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
+other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
+cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
+will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
+adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:
+
+     "What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
+     is on the skin of man;
+
+     "If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
+     and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
+     produced upon it."
+
+Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_
+its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
+its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
+their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
+without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
+the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
+give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
+afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
+stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
+additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in
+infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another
+auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
+series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
+regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
+additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
+water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
+would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on
+the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
+otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
+a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
+to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
+requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
+productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
+established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
+supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.
+
+Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
+the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
+or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
+the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
+is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
+the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
+take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
+and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
+additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
+regression is firmly set up.
+
+In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
+subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
+the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
+additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
+by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
+your embarrassment.
+
+Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
+supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
+may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the
+supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
+supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
+_kurvad r�pa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
+the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
+its fruit.
+
+Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
+Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
+for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
+(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
+effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
+of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
+will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
+the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
+reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.
+
+That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
+heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
+Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
+not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
+disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
+allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
+times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
+That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
+that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
+time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
+of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
+produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
+stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
+seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
+efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
+The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
+anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
+of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
+exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
+to those times.
+
+(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
+being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
+to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
+which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
+there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
+of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
+"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
+observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
+the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by J��na-sr�--
+
+     "What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
+     things;
+
+     "The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
+     and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
+     eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);
+
+     "Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
+     the work of another;
+
+     "For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
+     simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
+     true in regard to that which we have to prove."
+
+Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
+Vaiseshikas and Naiy�yikas, that existence is a participation in the
+universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
+particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
+universal) could have no existence.
+
+Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
+co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for
+such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_
+existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
+dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
+many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
+all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
+forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.
+Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
+everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
+in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
+and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Prasasta-p�da
+has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
+present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
+of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
+another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
+other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
+the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
+qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
+itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
+does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
+place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
+inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
+you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
+of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
+of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.
+
+Conformably it has been said--
+
+     "Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
+     place, engages without moving from that place in producing
+     itself in another place.
+
+     "This entity (universality) is not connected with that
+     wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
+     that place: great is this miracle.
+
+     "It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
+     divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
+     of difficulties!"
+
+If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
+rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
+repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
+heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
+verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
+found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
+bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
+pain, and pain alone.
+
+If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
+instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
+being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
+impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
+all is like itself alone, like itself alone.
+
+In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
+are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
+not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
+(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
+of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular
+nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon
+that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
+so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
+semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
+fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
+The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
+superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection
+between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be
+unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
+objects of the negation; the M�dhyamikas excellently wise explain as
+follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
+total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
+like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
+momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
+assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
+reality.
+
+The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four
+alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
+and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
+this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
+the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.
+
+If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
+is said--
+
+     "Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
+     like, for instance;
+
+     "No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
+     of the sky and the like, for instance."
+
+The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
+inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
+Buddha in the Alank�r�vat�ra[34]--
+
+     "Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
+     ascertained;[35]
+
+     "Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
+     natureless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
+     sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."
+
+That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
+alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--
+
+     "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
+     views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
+     carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."
+
+In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
+come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
+Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be
+taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
+student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
+putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
+Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
+These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
+religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
+their conventional designation of M�dhyamikas (or mediocre).
+
+Certain other Buddhists are styled Yog�ch�ras, because while they
+accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
+the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
+void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
+admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent
+cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
+is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmak�rti: "To one
+who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."
+
+An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the
+following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
+from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
+which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
+what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
+you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
+cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
+the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
+supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
+apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a
+complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
+by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
+alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
+not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
+been said--
+
+     "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
+     have six surfaces;
+
+     "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
+     body of atomic dimension."
+
+Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is
+shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous
+with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
+     cognition ulterior thereto;
+
+     "There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
+     intellect shines forth of itself alone."
+
+The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
+is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
+soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
+and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
+were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
+not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
+identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
+determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
+interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
+illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
+cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
+beginning and without interruption; as it has been said--
+
+     "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
+     cognition thereof are identical;
+
+     "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
+     cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
+     reason of illusory perceptions,
+
+     "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
+     of percipient."
+
+Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the
+energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
+sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
+the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
+subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
+virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
+reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
+conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
+to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
+another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
+     appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,
+
+     "Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
+     percipient;
+
+     "So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
+     example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
+     the like,
+
+     "Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
+     percipient and percept."
+
+Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
+ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.
+
+When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
+view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
+knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
+such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
+_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).
+
+Others again (the Sautr�ntikas) hold that the position that there is
+no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
+contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
+cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
+accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
+being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they
+proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
+invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because
+inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
+manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
+as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
+object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
+should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the
+cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
+blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
+and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
+so it has been said--
+
+     "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
+     portion,
+
+     "This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
+     illusion."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
+     as if it were external."
+
+To this we reply (say the Sautr�ntikas): This is untenable, for if
+there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
+comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
+senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
+mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
+illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
+duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
+involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
+cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
+their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
+and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
+states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
+difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
+like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
+external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and
+your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.
+
+If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
+the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautr�ntikas) reply that this
+objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
+the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
+and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
+interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--
+
+     "If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They
+     recognise perceptibility,
+
+     "And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
+     its imposition of its form."
+
+To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
+nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
+from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
+be inferred. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
+     without losing the nature of a half;
+
+     "The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
+     is the nature of the knowable."
+
+For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
+cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
+indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
+to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
+external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
+at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
+instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
+speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
+walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
+discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
+are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
+recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
+manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as
+it has been said--
+
+     "That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
+     about the Ego:
+
+     "That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
+     the rest."
+
+Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
+it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
+which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
+world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
+presentments resulting from ideation.
+
+According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vij��nav�din_),
+ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
+presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
+single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
+produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
+sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
+train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
+to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
+momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
+are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
+subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
+presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
+had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
+stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
+this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
+intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
+must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
+consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
+percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
+smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
+conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
+suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,
+the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
+the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
+like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
+forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
+restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
+medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
+the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
+one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been
+equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
+who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
+causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
+its modifications.
+
+So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
+of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
+(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
+these, the sensible world (_r�pa-skandha_) is the sense organs and
+their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
+discriminated (_r�pyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the
+stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
+affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
+generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
+world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words
+"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
+desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
+miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.
+
+Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
+and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
+principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
+     four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36]
+
+In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
+"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
+(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
+these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
+concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
+of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
+causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
+being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
+germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
+elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
+the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
+as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
+touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
+the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism
+comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
+Tath�gatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
+by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
+determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
+cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tath�gata
+Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
+between the cause and effect, results from production or from
+non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
+exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
+the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
+the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_
+(in the word _sthitita_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
+by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
+some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
+effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
+it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
+that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
+causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
+observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
+genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,
+from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
+hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
+blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
+neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
+the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
+being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
+two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
+matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
+unduly prolix.
+
+Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
+rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
+(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
+knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
+ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautr�ntika arose from
+the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
+who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism
+(_s�tra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
+Sautr�ntikas."
+
+Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
+odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to
+produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
+venerated Buddha styled Pr�thamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
+attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
+is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the
+internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
+inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddh�
+bh�sh�_), and are known under the designation of Vaibh�shikas. Their
+technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of
+inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
+no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
+impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
+contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
+therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
+is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
+representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
+evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
+     non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
+     appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
+
+     "The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
+     were aught else,
+
+     "There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
+     derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."
+
+Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
+is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
+universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
+replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
+for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
+if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
+gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
+for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
+fully discussed in describing the Sautr�ntikas (cf. p. 27), and
+therefore need not here be further detailed.
+
+It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according
+to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
+for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--
+
+     "The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
+     accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
+     (of those who are to be taught),
+
+     "Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
+     plurality of methods.
+
+     "For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
+     superficial,
+
+     "Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
+     universal void which is a negation of duality."
+
+It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
+inner seats (_�yatana_) is conducive to felicity.
+
+     "After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats
+
+     "Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
+     aught else below?
+
+     "The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,
+
+     "The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
+     the wise as the twelve inner seats."
+
+The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
+Viveka-vil�sa:--
+
+     "Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
+     universe is momentarily fluxional;
+
+     "The following four principles in order are to be known by
+     the name of the noble truths:--
+
+     "Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
+     held,[38]
+
+     "And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
+     heard in order.
+
+     "Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are
+     declared to be five,--
+
+     "Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.
+
+     "The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
+     and the rest, the common sensory,
+
+     "And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the
+     twelve inner seats.
+
+     "This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
+     it arises in the heart of man.
+
+     "Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
+     aggregate.
+
+     "The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,
+
+     "This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
+     emancipation.
+
+     "Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
+     perception and inference.
+
+     "The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
+     the Vaibh�shikas and the rest.
+
+     "The Vaibh�shika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
+     cognition;
+
+     "The Sautr�ntika allows no external object apprehensible by
+     perception;
+
+     "The Yog�ch�ra admits only intellect accompanied with forms;
+
+     "The M�dhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.
+
+     "All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
+     emancipation,
+
+     "Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of
+     cognitions and impressions.
+
+     "The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
+     single meal in the forenoon,
+
+     "The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
+     Bauddha mendicants."[39]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 29: This sloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
+89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
+read more correctly, _'darsan�n na na darsan�t_.]
+
+[Footnote 30: Kusum�njali, iii. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--
+
+(1.) M�dhyamikas or Nihilists.
+
+(2.) Yog�ch�ras or Subjective Idealists.
+
+(3.) Sautr�ntikas or Representationists.
+
+(4.) Vaibh�shikas or Presentationists.]
+
+[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
+
+"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
+heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
+half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
+ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
+although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
+reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
+never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
+any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth
+part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
+an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
+another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
+because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
+refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
+declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
+given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
+one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in
+another."]
+
+[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]
+
+[Footnote 34: Query, Lank�vat�ra?]
+
+[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
+every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_
+the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
+is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
+the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
+of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
+calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
+more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
+sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."]
+
+[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read
+_samudaya_?]
+
+[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
+"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
+of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
+because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
+into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
+wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
+_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
+forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
+definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
+agency."]
+
+[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
+30.]
+
+[Footnote 39: M�dhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
+Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
+explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samud�ya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem
+to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE �RHATA SYSTEM.
+
+
+The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
+Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain
+extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
+(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
+arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
+be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that
+one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
+conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
+its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
+continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
+subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
+the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts
+only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
+
+But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
+sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
+In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
+'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel
+line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
+and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if
+this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A
+might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an
+essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
+effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
+sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
+certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
+stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series
+to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
+with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
+the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
+it has been said--
+
+     "'In whatever series of successive states the original
+     impression of the action was produced,
+
+     "'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
+     produced in cotton.
+
+     "'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the
+     citron, &c.,
+
+     "'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see
+     it?'"
+
+But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
+overthrown by the following dilemma:--
+
+In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your
+favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
+It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
+always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
+example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
+the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove
+your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
+consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
+momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
+of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
+it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
+this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
+said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
+origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."
+
+As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
+proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
+attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
+_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
+holders of the Sy�d-v�da[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the
+indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
+example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
+and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
+moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
+without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
+individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
+in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
+held to be one [throughout all"].
+
+Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
+between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
+follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
+remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
+might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
+and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
+away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
+enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasen�v�kya--
+
+"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
+not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of
+memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
+these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
+destruction!"
+
+Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
+of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
+does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
+the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
+perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
+the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
+and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
+like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
+cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
+and consequently the _�lambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.
+29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
+(_pratyaya_).[43]
+
+If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
+will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
+existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
+For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
+certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
+explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
+impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
+it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
+incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
+perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
+abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
+external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a
+definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],
+and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
+mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
+object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
+&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
+exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all
+our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
+"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
+say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
+possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are
+applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
+belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a
+mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it
+represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
+object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
+be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
+itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
+grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
+hopeless difficulties.
+
+If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
+perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
+would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is
+a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
+lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
+perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
+being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
+the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
+jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
+the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
+And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
+blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
+both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
+character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
+perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
+constituting its character.[46]
+
+All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
+length by the Jaina authors, Prat�pachandra and others, in the
+_Prameyakamalam�rtanda_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
+the book too much.
+
+Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept
+the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the �rhata doctrine.
+The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-s�ri,[47]
+in his _�ptanischay�lank�ra_.
+
+"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
+overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the
+declarer of things as they are."
+
+But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
+path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
+to apply, as has been declared by Taut�tita [Bhatta Kum�rila[48]]?
+
+1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
+ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
+help us as a sign to infer his existence.
+
+2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals
+an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
+passages (_arthav�da_) be applied here.
+
+3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
+quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
+repetitions (_anuv�da_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
+before.
+
+4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
+of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
+spurious Veda?
+
+5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?
+How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
+support?
+
+6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
+omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
+point be established without some previously established foundation?
+
+7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
+of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
+words.
+
+8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
+we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
+proof, comparison (_upam�na_).
+
+9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
+embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,
+if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."
+
+We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
+existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
+proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,
+&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become
+omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
+remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
+Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
+when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
+just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
+darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its
+hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things
+remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
+the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
+grasping all things; for otherwise the M�m�msist could not maintain
+that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
+authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be
+the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
+argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
+existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Ny�ya will grant that
+universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
+of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
+P�rva M�m�ms� accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
+for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
+all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
+prohibitions, as is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the S�tras,
+i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
+the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it
+is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
+knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
+certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
+["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior
+assaults of argument can be put to flight.
+
+But the Naiy�yika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
+which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
+sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
+can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
+been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
+eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
+eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
+like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated"
+necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the
+latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
+the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
+being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?
+according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a
+maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
+argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
+have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
+their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
+horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
+being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
+relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
+(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
+the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?
+
+Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would
+include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
+contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it
+would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by
+intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the
+third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
+disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,
+because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
+alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
+substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
+itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
+something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
+former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
+has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
+latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
+point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
+relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you
+mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
+terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
+such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
+existence.
+
+Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach
+too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
+to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
+be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
+something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
+contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
+all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
+all-pervading].
+
+And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?
+
+In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
+erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of
+many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if
+all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
+be superfluous. As it has been said in the _V�tar�gastuti_, or "Praise
+of Jina"--
+
+1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
+independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
+whose teacher art _thou_."
+
+And again--
+
+2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
+influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
+of yourself or all the artisans, if �swara fabricates the three
+worlds?"
+
+Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
+when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.
+
+Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are
+impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this
+universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
+omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
+faults as _Anyony�srayat�_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal
+succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
+endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
+much for this preliminary discussion.
+
+The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are
+thus described in the _Param�gamas�ra_ (which is devoted to the
+exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right
+knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
+thus explained by Yogadeva:--
+
+(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been
+declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
+faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary
+idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
+_Tattv�rtha-s�tra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right
+'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
+predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
+produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
+"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
+another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
+teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.
+
+(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
+&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
+doubt; as it has been said--
+
+"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
+predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
+wise."
+
+This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _sruta_, _avadhi_,
+_manas-pary�ya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _s_ruta,
+_avadhi_, _manas-pary�ya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The
+meaning of this is as follows:--
+
+1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the
+operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
+being abolished.
+
+2. _Sruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the
+obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
+
+3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
+abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
+&c.[56]
+
+4. _Manas-pary�ya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's
+thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
+knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
+
+5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
+ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
+
+The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
+manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
+itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
+ways."
+
+But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
+the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
+
+(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
+evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
+diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
+constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
+the Arhat--
+
+1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of
+blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
+the 'five vows,' _ahims�_, _s�nrita_, _asteya_, _brahmachary�_, and
+_aparigraha_.[57]
+
+2. "The 'vow' of _ahims�_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
+of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
+
+3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
+_s�nrita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
+others and prejudicial.
+
+4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
+_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
+killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
+
+5. "The 'vow' of _brahmachary�_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
+abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
+and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
+one's causing another to act.
+
+6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive
+interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
+may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
+
+7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
+these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."
+
+The full account of the five states of mind (_bh�van�_) has been given
+in the following passage [of which we only quote one sloka]--
+
+"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _s�nrita_ uninterruptedly by the
+abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
+deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.
+
+These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
+united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
+an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,
+and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce
+the elixir's effect, but not severally.
+
+Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,
+_j�va_ and _aj�va_; the soul, _j�va_, is pure intelligence; the
+non-soul, _aj�va_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
+said--
+
+"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
+'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
+pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
+affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
+the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
+be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."
+
+_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
+place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
+of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
+_pradesa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
+[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
+its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
+be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
+these."[61]
+
+Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real
+nature of the soul viewed as _parinata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];
+but by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ it appears
+in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence
+of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
+&c.[63] As has been said by V�chak�ch�rya [in a s�tra]--
+
+"The _aupasamika_, the _Ksh�yika_, and the 'mixed' states are the
+nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _P�rin�mika_."
+
+1. The _aupasamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of
+past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
+future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
+mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
+nut-plant,[64] &c.
+
+2. The _Ksh�yika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
+actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
+
+3. The "mixed" (_misra_) state combines both these, as when water is
+partly pure.
+
+4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
+influence on the future]. The _P�rin�mika_ state is the soul's innate
+condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent
+states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the
+above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
+happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the s�tra quoted above.
+
+This has been explained in the _Svar�pa-sambodhana_--
+
+"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some
+way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;
+such is the soul described to be."
+
+If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
+we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
+equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
+support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
+non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
+is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
+advocates of the _Sy�d-v�da_) it is perfectly notorious that all
+things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.
+
+Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned
+above, _j�va_ and _aj�va_; they hold that there are five _astik�yas_
+or categories,--_j�va_, _�k�sa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.
+To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67]
+as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
+apply the idea of "body" (_k�ya_),[68] from their occupying several
+parts of space.
+
+The _j�vas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
+"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
+divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),
+and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _samj��_,
+_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
+instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
+also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable"
+(_sth�vara_).
+
+The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
+taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as
+possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
+earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be
+made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are
+aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
+appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
+hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
+must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which
+have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,
+are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of
+earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]
+These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense
+of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
+passing into any other state of existence.
+
+_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _�k�sa_ are singular categories [and not
+generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
+the causes of a substance's change of place.
+
+_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They
+assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
+extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
+Lok�k�sa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
+from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
+_�k�sa_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
+occupied by another.
+
+_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
+two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the
+compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
+the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
+from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
+separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
+_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_p�r_), and "dissolve" (_gal_).
+Although "time" is not properly an _astik�ya_, because it does not
+occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
+still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;
+"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities
+reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
+general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _j�va_, form, &c., of the
+body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
+into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
+"demerit," and _�k�sa_. "Action" (_pary�ya_) has thus been defined;
+the actions (_pary�y�h_) of a substance are, as has been said, its
+existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
+course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _j�va_, the knowledge of
+objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the
+lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special
+functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_
+[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].
+
+Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--
+
+"The _tattvas_ are _j�va_, _aj�va_, _�srava_, _bandha_, _samvara_,
+_nirjar�_, and _moksha_." _J�va_ and _aj�va_ have been already described.
+_�srava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]
+through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
+_aud�rika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _�srava_,
+because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is
+called _�srava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
+flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
+it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
+collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
+which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
+lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _j�va_, heated
+by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
+by _yoga_. _Kash�ya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
+(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
+pride, delusion, and lust. _�srava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
+abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what
+is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.
+
+These various subdivisions of _�srava_ have been described at length
+in several _S�tras_. "_�srava_ is the impulse to action with body,
+speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
+demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_�srava_ is the
+action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
+the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
+means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
+&c."[76]
+
+_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
+intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kash�ya_),
+and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many
+parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
+suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--
+
+     "Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
+     bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"
+
+In this quotation the word "sin" (_kash�ya_) is used to include the
+other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
+V�chak�ch�rya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
+of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
+sin."
+
+(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural
+character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
+of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or
+derived, when learned by another's teaching.
+
+(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
+the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.
+
+(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pram�da_) is a want of effort to practise the
+five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.
+
+(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction
+that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of
+bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubh�va_; _yoga_ [or _�srava_] causes
+those kinds called _prakriti_ and _pradesa_.
+
+"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakriti_, _sthiti_,
+_anubh�va_, and _pradesa_ are its four kinds."
+
+1. _Prakriti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
+sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
+eight _m�la-prakritis_.[77]
+
+Thus obstructions (_�varana_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,
+as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)
+_jn�n�varana_, or (_b_) _darsan�varana_. (_c_) An object recognised as
+simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
+pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedan�ya_. (_d_)
+A delusion (_mohan�ya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the
+Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
+conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)
+_�yus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _N�man_, or
+"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
+paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of
+noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antar�ya_
+produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the
+king by considerations of economy.
+
+Thus is the _prakriti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the
+eight _m�la-prakritis_, with subdivisions according to the different
+actions of the various subject-matter.
+
+And thus has Um�sw�ti-v�chak�ch�rya[80] declared: "The first kind of
+_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
+_vedan�ya_, _mohan�ya_, _�yus_, _n�man_, _gotra_, and _antar�ya_;" and he
+has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
+twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
+explained at full length in the _Vidy�nanda_ and other works, and here is
+omitted through fear of prolixity.
+
+2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued
+unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
+three _m�la-prakritis_, _jn�n�varana_, &c., and the last, _antar�ya_, have
+not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
+described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of
+periods of time measured by thirty _s�garopamas_."[81] This continuance is
+_sthiti_.
+
+3. _Anubh�va._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there
+exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
+producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies
+produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubh�va_)
+for producing their respective effects.
+
+4. _Pradesa._ The _bandha_ called _pradesa_ is the entrance into the
+different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
+number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
+consequences of actions.
+
+_Samvara_ is the stopping of _�srava_--that by which the influence of
+past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
+divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the
+soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it
+is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the
+acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
+into five kinds, as _�ry�_,[83] _bh�sh�_, &c., as has been explained
+by Hemachandra.
+
+1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
+circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
+call _�ry�_.
+
+2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with
+all people; this is called _bh�sh�-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of
+speech.
+
+3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
+which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshan�-samiti_.[85]
+
+4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
+him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the
+_�d�na-samiti_.
+
+5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
+in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the
+_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed
+as that which closes (_sam_ + _vrinoti_) the door of the stream of
+_�srava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_�srava_ is the cause
+of mundane existence, _samvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this
+is the �rhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
+of this.'"
+
+_Nirjar�_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
+self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
+of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
+and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
+&c. This _nirjar�_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yath�k�la_) and
+ancillary (_aupakramanika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
+dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
+that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,
+_nirjar�_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.
+But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
+means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjar�_ of
+actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
+which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjar�_ arises, which is
+twofold, _sak�m�_ and _ak�m�_. That called _sak�m�_ belongs to
+ascetics, the _ak�m�_ to other embodied spirits."[91]
+
+_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
+absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
+perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are
+abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjar�_, there arises the
+absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been
+said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
+(_nirjar�_) of the causes of bondage and of existence."
+
+Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
+wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
+stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
+contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_
+exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
+onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
+sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
+encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
+isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
+the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.
+
+"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
+interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _sanga_ is
+merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--
+
+"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
+from the absence of _sanga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
+the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
+potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
+castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."
+
+Hence they recite a sloka:--
+
+     "However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
+     moon, and the rest;
+
+     "But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
+     �lok�k�sa."
+
+Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
+soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
+untainted by any pain or impression thereof.
+
+Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
+foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
+This has been declared in the _Siddh�nta_, "_J�va_, _aj�va_, _punya_,
+_p�pa_, _�srava_, _samvara_, _nirjarana_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are
+the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.
+
+Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
+_sapta-bhang�-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
+be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
+be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
+"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
+and not predicable." All this Anantav�rya has thus laid down:--
+
+1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
+'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'
+
+2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure
+likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
+be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.
+
+3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
+as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
+indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.
+
+4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
+employed simultaneously."
+
+_Sy�t_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
+part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "This particle _sy�t_ is in the form of a verb, but, from
+     its being connected with the sense, it denotes
+     indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
+     on the implied meaning."
+
+If, again, the word _sy�t_ denoted determinateness, then it would be
+needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
+indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _sy�t_,
+"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathamchit_; and so it is
+not really useless. As one has said--
+
+"The doctrine of the _sy�d-v�da_ arises from our everywhere rejecting
+the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhang�-naya_,
+and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
+be accepted."
+
+If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
+everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
+ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
+treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
+But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
+certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
+Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_
+or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the
+thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the
+phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghat�sti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"
+would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
+words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
+argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been
+declared--
+
+     "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
+     implies 'is;'
+
+     "Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
+     non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.
+
+The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
+severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
+non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
+inexplicable (_anirvachan�yat�_);[97] three other classes hold one or
+other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,
+when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
+&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
+&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
+to the holder of the _Sy�d-v�da_, which ascertains the entire meaning
+of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Sy�dv�da-ma�jar�_--
+
+"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
+omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
+scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point
+proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Sy�d-v�da_,
+which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."
+
+"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
+and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
+with no partiality equally favours all sects."
+
+The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-s�ri--
+
+"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
+giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
+liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
+deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our
+system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
+knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of
+knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
+(_pram�na_) in the _Sy�d-v�da_ doctrine,--sense-perception and
+inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
+nine or seven _tattwas_. The _j�va_, the _aj�va_, merit and demerit,
+_�srava_, _samvara_, _bandha_, _nirjar�_, _mukti_,--we will now
+explain each. _J�va_ is defined as intelligence; _aj�va_ is all other
+than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
+opposite; _�srava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjar�_ is the
+unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight
+forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
+included in _samvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _�srava_.
+
+"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is
+hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
+liberation is declared by Jina. The Swet�mbaras are the destroyers of
+all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,
+they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
+Jaina _S�dhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry
+peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
+eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the
+Jaina Rishis.
+
+"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so
+say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
+between them and the Swet�mbaras."[106]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]
+
+[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,
+alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
+hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Sy�d-v�din�m_.]
+
+[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _gr�hyasya_
+for _agr�hyasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]
+
+[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasy�grahanam_ to _tasy�
+grahanam_ (_tasy�_ being _jadat�y�h_).]
+
+[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen
+though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the
+_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]
+
+[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvar�pam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,
+_infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kum�rila's
+writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
+S�nkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kum�rila had a
+little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
+repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
+there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukh�t kaschid
+vidy�leso j�tah._]
+
+[Footnote 49: Kum�rila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
+his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
+proofs,--the sixth, _abh�va_, being negative, is, of course, not
+applicable. I understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability
+of "presumption" or _arth�-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
+were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
+but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
+retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
+Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
+cannot be convincing in his own.]
+
+[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbh�v�vedakasya_ for
+_tatsadbh�v�dekasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhil�rthaj�an�t notpatty_, I
+propose to read _nikhil�rthaj��notpatty_.]
+
+[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _K�rya_ and equally disputed.]
+
+[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Sar�r�_), "my
+hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
+notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]
+
+[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the
+_Anavasth�dosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed
+fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
+everybody's eyes.]
+
+[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattv�rthe_ for
+_tattv�rtham_.]
+
+[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarsan�di_ for
+_asamyagdarsan�di_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
+of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-s�tras_, ii. 30.
+Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 58: I read _k�m�n�m_ for _k�m�n�m_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 � 3 � 3 =
+18).]
+
+[Footnote 59: For _abh�shana_, see Hemach. 16.]
+
+[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,
+_rasayanaj��nasraddh�vach�ran�ni_ for _ras�yanaj�anam
+sraddh�n�varan�ni_. For _avach�rana_, see _Susruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,
+&c. If _an�varana_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
+absence of obstructions."]
+
+[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
+by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ or
+_kshayopasama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]
+
+[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalush�dy�k�rena_ for
+_kalush�ny�k�rena_. The _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ seem to
+correspond to the _aupasamika_ and _ksh�yika_ states about to be
+described.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]
+
+[Footnote 65: Just as in the S�nkhya philosophy, the soul is not
+really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]
+
+[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
+and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
+the eye, light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'st�ti_ for _sthiti_.]
+
+[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astik�ya_.]
+
+[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one
+sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _sankhagandolakaprabhritayas
+tras�s chaturvidh�h prithivyaptejo_.]
+
+[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _tesh�m aj�vatv�t_ for _tesh�m
+j�vatv�t_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
+the former only are animate."]
+
+[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatr�vasthite_ for
+_sarvatr�vasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _�loken�vachchhinne_ for
+_�loken�vichchhinne_.]
+
+[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddh�nta-mukt�vali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is
+_upabhoga-s�dhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyanuka_. This category
+takes up the forms of _sth�vara_ which were excluded from _j�va_.]
+
+[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly M�dhava
+for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
+analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
+definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaisesh. S�tra_, i. 1, 15. _Pary�ya_ is
+explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Pary�ya_, in p. 36, line 11
+(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
+which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
+_Abhidh_. 1503, _pary�yo 'nukramah kramah_.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
+to act.]
+
+[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _�sravanak�ranatv�d_.]
+
+[Footnote 76: The _jn�na_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
+by its connection with the senses and external objects.]
+
+[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in
+Govind�nanda's gloss, _Ved. S�t._, ii. 2, 33.]
+
+[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _�daran�yasya_ for
+_�varan�yasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _�varan�ya_ may be used for
+_�varana_ (_P�n._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga S�t._, ii. 52, where Vy�sa's
+Comm. has _�varan�ya_.]
+
+[Footnote 79: _J�lavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 80: Um�sv�mi-?]
+
+[Footnote 81: For the _s�garopama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.
+309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ity�dyuktak�l�d �rdhvam api_ for the
+obscure _ity�dyuktam k�ladurddh�navat_. I also read at the end of the
+line _prachyutih sthitih_ for _prachyutisthitih_.]
+
+[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svak�ryakarane_.]
+
+[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _�rshy�_ read
+_�ry�_,--a bad misreading.]
+
+[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _�padyet�_ for _�padyat�_.]
+
+[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshan�_ read _saishan�_.]
+
+[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagat�tale_.]
+
+[Footnote 87: M�dhava omits the remaining divisions of _samvara_.
+Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishah�_,
+"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
+patience, gentleness," &c.; _bh�van�_, "conviction," such as that
+worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _ch�ritra_, "virtuous
+observance."]
+
+[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _�sravasrotaso_.]
+
+[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]
+
+[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yath�k�la-_ for _yath�
+k�la-_.]
+
+[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably
+corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
+_nirjar�_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
+passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjar�_
+is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
+attainment of the highest good. The former is _ak�m�_, "desireless,"
+because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
+latter is _sak�m�_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
+under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
+37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
+which future actions are to be performed.]
+
+[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."]
+
+[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhang�-naya_, see Ved. S.
+Gloss., ii. 2, 23.]
+
+[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
+line, _kim vritatadvidheh_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]
+
+[Footnote 96: Thus Govind�nanda applies it (_Ved. S�t._, ii. 2, 33) to
+"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 97: '[Greek: Akatal�psiaAkatal�psia]. This is
+Sriharsha's tenet in the _Khandana-khanda-kh�dya_.]
+
+[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _maten�misrit�ni_ read _matena
+misrit�ni_.]
+
+[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
+really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidh�na-chint�mani_,
+72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antar�y�s_, _r�gadwesh�v
+aviratih smarah_, and _h�so_ for _hims�_. The order of the eighteen
+_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
+10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.]
+
+[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartinih_.]
+
+[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]
+
+[Footnote 103: In last line, for _samsrave_ read _samvare_.]
+
+[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
+the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's
+_Bhagavat�_, pp. 250, 261-266.]
+
+[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharan�h_ is explained by the _rajoharanadh�rin_
+(= _vratin_) of Hal�yudha, ii. 189.]
+
+[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _str�m_ read _str�_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE R�M�NUJA SYSTEM.
+
+
+This doctrine of the �rhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
+whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
+co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
+plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
+any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
+existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
+should there not be an alternation between existence and
+non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that
+alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
+multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ganesa
+and of the incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for the
+elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
+in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
+being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
+a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
+same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
+in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
+compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
+times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
+indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
+be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
+and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different
+relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
+contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
+Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
+reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
+thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
+_bhangas_ (�rhata tenets).
+
+Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhangas_, which lies at
+the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
+or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
+there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
+multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
+prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
+proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for
+the neck of the Sy�d-V�din.
+
+An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the �rhata
+system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
+when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
+or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
+organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
+whether it be ninefold or not!
+
+In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the �rhatas
+say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
+the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
+assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul
+for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
+(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
+body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
+body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
+filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
+resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
+the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
+according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
+road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
+of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
+that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
+non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
+and evil unmerited.
+
+As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
+rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
+the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.
+
+Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
+revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vy�sa accordingly
+propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
+one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by R�m�nuja with the
+express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
+of R�m�nuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as
+soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
+     (Vishnu)
+
+     "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
+     world is not-soul."
+
+Others, again (the followers of Sankar�ch�rya), maintain that pure
+intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
+really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,
+pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
+individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
+(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
+The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
+and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
+reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
+sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
+forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
+beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
+individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
+with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
+spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
+things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
+Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
+thinking themselves very wise, the S�nkaras will not tolerate this
+division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
+Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This
+might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
+there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
+suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
+ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
+(to explain the views of the S�nkara)--
+
+     "Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
+     knowledge,
+
+     "Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."
+
+This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
+the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
+who leans on the arm of Prabh�kara, or one to whom Kum�rila-bhatta
+gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--
+
+     "By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
+     existent and non-existent,
+
+     "Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.
+
+     "Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
+     Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
+     else is observed."
+
+They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
+cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and
+knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
+knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
+maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
+argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
+consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
+by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
+If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
+knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
+is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
+presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
+not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the S�nkaras continue) as the
+foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
+entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
+ignorance.
+
+All this (the R�m�nuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
+for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
+ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
+would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
+as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
+presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
+of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
+how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
+object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
+revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
+thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance
+accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
+rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
+arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
+to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
+therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
+not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
+cognition allowed by us both.
+
+Well, then (the S�nkaras may contend), let the form of cognition
+evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
+follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
+entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior
+non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
+which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
+knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
+not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
+first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
+grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
+illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
+admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
+not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
+is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
+illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
+that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
+knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
+ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
+ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
+We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The counterposition (of the R�m�nujas) is as follows:--The illusion
+under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
+because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any
+one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
+about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not
+start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
+existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
+(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
+also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,
+constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
+any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
+cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
+gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
+light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,
+as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
+mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
+quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,
+while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
+as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
+within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
+within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
+itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
+suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
+which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
+this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
+thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
+like texts.
+
+It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
+existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
+(_anrita_); for the word untruth (_anrita_) denotes that which is
+other than truth (_rita_). The word _rita_ has a passive sense, as
+appears from the words, Drinking _rita_. _Rita_ means works done
+without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
+bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
+question, untruth (_anrita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
+during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
+propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is
+obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the
+entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
+this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such
+texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_m�y�_) to be the primary
+emanative cause (_prakriti_), the term (_m�y�_) designates the
+emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guna_), and
+creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
+inexplicable illusion (for which the S�nkaras contend).
+
+In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
+moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_m�y�_) of the barbarian were
+swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
+(_m�y�_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
+projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
+inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
+from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
+thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
+Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
+the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
+supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
+excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
+Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
+repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
+emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
+pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
+as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
+Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
+Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
+spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
+one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-v�din may
+reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
+the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
+souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
+power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
+case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
+Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
+different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
+to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
+understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
+object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
+known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
+must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
+place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
+That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
+abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
+finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
+infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
+This suggestion (the R�m�nujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
+no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
+Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
+"implication" (_lakshan�_, both This and That being used in their
+denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
+and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
+to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
+supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
+past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
+to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
+by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
+unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
+admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
+thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
+differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be
+inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
+will be triumphant.
+
+We have, therefore (the R�m�nujas continue), laid it down in this
+question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
+individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
+body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
+body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
+the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
+soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
+is the body.
+
+Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are
+designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
+variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
+human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
+body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
+Hence--
+
+God, Man, Yaksha, Pis�cha, serpent, R�kshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
+wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they
+what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
+of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
+things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
+individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
+complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
+That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
+Spirit is stated in the Tattva-mukt�val� and in the Chaturantara--
+
+     "God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
+     than That, called the established entity,
+
+     "Of this there is much significant and undoubted
+     exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;
+
+     "Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
+     form of gods, mortals, and the rest
+
+     "When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
+     a diversity of names and forms in the world."
+
+In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
+rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
+systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
+"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that
+it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
+lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all
+words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
+ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
+R�m�nuja in the Ved�rtha-sangraha, when analysing the Vedic text about
+names and forms.
+
+Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
+can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
+in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
+thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
+not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
+form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
+universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
+was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
+knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
+illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
+there is no proof of these positions.
+
+Nor is there an absurdity (as the S�nkaras would say), on the
+hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
+that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
+is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
+cause (_prakriti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
+elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
+the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
+so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
+is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute
+spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
+absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
+there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
+cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
+unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
+cognition all cognition would be sublated.
+
+It is laid down (by the R�m�nujas) that retractation into the universe
+(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
+and the originant (_prakriti_), returns to its imperceptible state,
+unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
+spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
+gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
+soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
+condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
+the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vy�sa)
+treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
+Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
+deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
+those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
+explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
+existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
+with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
+forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
+forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]
+
+What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
+universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
+admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
+all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
+one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
+soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the
+essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
+not to be confounded.
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
+consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
+in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
+and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
+Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
+proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
+Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
+not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
+and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
+susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
+the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
+controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
+fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
+majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
+auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
+himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
+adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
+divine.
+
+Venkata-n�tha has given the following distribution of things:--
+
+     "Those who know it have declared the principle to be
+     twofold, substance and non-substance;
+
+     "Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
+     former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.
+
+     "The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'
+     (_par�k_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
+     Lord;
+
+     "The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
+     principle some have called the unsentient primary."
+
+Of these--
+
+     "Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
+     originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;
+
+     "Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and
+     cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;
+
+     "Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
+     cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
+     characterised by goodness;
+
+     "The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
+     intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
+     summarily recounted."
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
+souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
+text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
+Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kan�da, iii. 2, 20),
+Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
+of souls is often spoken of in revelation--
+
+     "The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
+     it again cease to be;
+
+     "Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
+     killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-g�t�, ii. 20).
+
+Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
+requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
+accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25): Because
+no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
+atomic is well known from revelation--
+
+     "If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
+     hundred times,
+
+     "The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
+     capable of infinity."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
+     wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
+     atomic."
+
+The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
+divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
+fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
+Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), V�sudeva
+(a patronymic of Krishna), and the like.
+
+     "V�sudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
+     auspicious attributes,
+
+     "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
+     animator of spirits."
+
+This same V�sudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
+to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
+rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
+pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
+(_arch�_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vy�ha_), "the
+subtile" (_s�kshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
+is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as R�ma,
+and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as V�sudeva,
+Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
+entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called V�sudeva. His
+attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
+from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
+without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
+The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
+the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
+worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
+of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
+becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
+has, therefore, been said--
+
+     "V�sudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
+     desired by each,
+
+     "According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
+     recompense.
+
+     "For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
+     embodiments;
+
+     "Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
+     'emanations;'
+
+     "As Sankarshana, V�sudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
+     manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
+     is the entire six attributes;
+
+     "That self-same called V�sudeva is styled the Supreme
+     Spirit;
+
+     "The internal controller is declared as residing in the
+     soul, the actuator of the soul,
+
+     "Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
+     as 'Who abiding in the soul.'
+
+     "By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
+     defilement becomes a qualified votary;
+
+     "By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
+     qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,
+
+     "By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
+     to behold the 'internal controller.'"
+
+The worship of the Deity is described in the Pa�cha-r�tra as
+consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
+preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
+access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
+temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
+like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
+Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
+to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishnu, the
+commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
+the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
+visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
+the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
+Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
+lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
+marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no
+future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
+traditionary text--
+
+     "When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
+     undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
+     having attained to the supreme consummation.
+
+     "V�sudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
+     mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
+     return."
+
+After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
+the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Ved�nta aphorisms by
+the venerated Bodh�yanach�rya too prolix, R�m�nuja composed a
+commentary on the S�r�rakam�m�ns� (or Ved�nta theosophy). In this the
+sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
+to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism
+means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
+glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
+know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because
+one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
+meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
+perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
+for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
+the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
+essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
+excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
+knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
+mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
+away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
+knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
+of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
+the latter M�m�ns� constitute one system of institutes. On this
+account the glossator has described this system as one with the
+sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
+perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
+has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
+spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
+the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
+reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
+other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
+efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
+who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
+delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
+both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
+immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
+Pa�char�tra-rahasya--
+
+     "That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,
+
+     "For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.
+
+     "These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
+     Subtile, the Internal Controller,
+
+     "Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
+     knowledge.
+
+     "As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,
+
+     "He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
+     embodiment.
+
+     "Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
+     traditional,
+
+     "By the aforesaid worship V�sudeva becomes propitious to
+     mankind.
+
+     "Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
+     meditation,
+
+     "At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
+     aggregate of works.
+
+     "Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
+     transmigration has vanished,
+
+     "Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.
+
+     "These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
+     the Lord,
+
+     "Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
+     Deity.
+
+     "Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
+     which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;
+
+     "They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."
+
+It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
+must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
+spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
+to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
+and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
+desire is predominant (in the word _jij��sitavya_), and desired
+knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
+must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
+such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
+knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
+any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
+even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
+Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
+be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
+let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
+knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
+understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
+_shadangena vedo'dhyeyo j�eyascha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,
+is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
+must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
+engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
+and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
+be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
+understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
+aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
+significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
+succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
+the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
+knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
+emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.
+
+     "Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,
+
+     "And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
+     Highest and Lowest,"
+
+because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
+indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
+an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
+the representations. The author of the V�kya has treated of all this
+in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
+characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
+not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
+Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
+its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
+choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
+of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--
+
+     "To them always devoted, who worship me with love,
+
+     "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
+     me."
+
+And again--
+
+     "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
+     unwavering."
+
+But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
+motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
+desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
+other means. As is said by the author of the V�kya: Attainment
+thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),
+practice (_abhy�sa_), observance (_kriy�_), excellence (_kaly�na_),
+freedom from despondency (_anavas�da_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),
+according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
+(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
+resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
+discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
+by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
+is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
+quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
+explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-g�t�) by (R�m�nuja) the
+author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
+Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
+tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
+text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
+supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
+(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
+veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
+explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
+Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
+dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
+been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
+dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
+rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
+presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
+incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
+(Vaikuntha) is attained. Thus Y�muna says: Attainable by the final and
+absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
+and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
+the devotion of works and knowledge.
+
+In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to
+be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
+the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
+creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
+universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
+sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
+multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahm�
+to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
+this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
+which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
+indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
+omniscient, and omnipotent.
+
+In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
+absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
+itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
+source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
+that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
+the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
+knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
+the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
+form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
+absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
+illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
+effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
+It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
+that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.
+
+Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
+kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
+of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
+anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
+aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
+exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is
+the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
+the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
+end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
+Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
+sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
+cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
+that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
+son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
+cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
+have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
+from the original (viz., R�m�nuja's Bh�shya on the Ved�nta aphorisms);
+we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
+and thus all is clear.[110]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
+Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
+statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
+and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
+if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
+inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
+both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
+Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
+proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
+information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
+declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
+Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
+and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
+297, 298.]
+
+[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
+pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
+the plaything of God.]
+
+[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._]
+
+[Footnote 110: For further details respecting R�m�nuja and his system,
+see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
+The _Tattva-mukt�val�_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;
+but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.
+
+
+�nanda-t�rtha (P�rna-praj�a, or Madhva) rejected this same R�m�nuja
+system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
+of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
+without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
+self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
+dependency upon the Pa�cha-r�tra, the reality of plurality in the
+universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
+reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the
+tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
+number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
+a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
+new explication of the Brahma-M�m�ns� (or Ved�nta).
+
+For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
+independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--
+
+     "Independent and dependent, two principles are received;
+
+     "The independent is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from
+     imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
+
+Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-v�dins): Why predicate of the
+absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
+which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
+heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not
+so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
+positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
+for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
+a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
+will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
+difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
+The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
+and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
+such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
+asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
+of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
+contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
+thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
+without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
+(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
+its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
+apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
+apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
+cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
+cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
+the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
+non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
+even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
+contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
+concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
+follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
+difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
+maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
+the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
+Br�hman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being
+irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
+the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
+if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
+this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
+first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
+and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
+example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
+first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
+judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
+contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishnu-tattva-nirnaya:
+"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
+determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
+predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
+proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
+counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
+circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
+predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
+difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
+if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
+_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
+such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
+presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
+judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
+same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
+aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
+S�nkhya-k�rik�, v. vii.)--
+
+     "From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
+     defect in the organs, from instability of the common
+     sensory,
+
+     "From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
+     and from aggregation of similars."
+
+There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
+of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
+applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
+lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
+the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
+by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
+sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
+things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
+light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
+overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
+similars.
+
+Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
+harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
+and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
+possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
+in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
+ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
+infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
+ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
+say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
+Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
+for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
+inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
+it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
+little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
+no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
+is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
+then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
+trouble.
+
+Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
+Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
+obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
+person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring
+as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
+slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
+become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
+all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
+excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
+gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
+
+     "And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
+     all that they desire."
+
+Thus the statement of those (Advaita-v�dins) in their thirst to be one
+with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishnu is like a
+mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
+fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishnu
+they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same
+thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
+Mah�bh�rata-t�tparya-nirnaya:--
+
+     "O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishnu's anger is waxed
+     great;
+
+     "He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
+     decide blindly."
+
+This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
+into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.
+
+Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
+weapons of N�r�yana (or Vishnu) as a memorial of him, and as a means
+of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
+of the S�kalya-samhit�:--
+
+     "The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
+     Vishnu, which is the might of the gods,
+
+     "He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuntha)
+     which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:
+
+     "The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
+     gods entered that heaven;
+
+     "Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
+     world, that weapon Br�hmans wear (stamped upon them);
+
+     "Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
+     Vishnu;
+
+     "Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishnu), let
+     us become beatified."
+
+Again, the Taittir�yaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
+is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
+particular parts to be branded are specified in the �gneya-pur�na:--
+
+     "On his right hand let the Br�hman wear Sudarsana,
+
+     "On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
+     Veda declared."
+
+In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
+branded with the discus:--
+
+     "Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,
+
+     "Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
+     Vishnu.
+
+     "Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
+     hand of Vishnu,
+
+     "Adored by all the gods; O P�nchajanya, to thee be
+     adoration."
+
+(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
+names as Kesava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
+Lord.
+
+(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
+(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
+(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
+sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
+dedication to N�r�yana of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
+     of ten kinds."
+
+Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
+also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
+difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
+setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
+rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
+divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
+the truth, O Br�hman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
+individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
+illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."
+
+Again:--
+
+     "After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,
+
+     "In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
+     perish not" (Bhagavad-g�t�, xiv. 2).
+
+According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
+because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."
+
+Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
+of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
+text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
+Br�hman devoutly a S�dra becomes a Br�hman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.
+
+If any one urge that according to the text:--
+
+     "If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"
+
+this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
+duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
+you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
+meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
+come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
+fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
+illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue
+of the testimony of many such passages as:--
+
+     "The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
+
+     "The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O
+     Infinite.
+
+     "The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
+     because it produces ideas;
+
+     "The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed
+     (_avidy�_) ignorance:
+
+     "Styled (_m�y�_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
+     the name _m�y�_ is used of the pre-eminent;
+
+     "The excellent knowledge of Vishnu is called, though one
+     only, by these names;
+
+     "For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
+     by spontaneous beatitude."
+
+That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
+sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
+therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
+in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
+illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
+as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).
+
+If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
+answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
+Vishnu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
+Accordingly, the grand revelation:--
+
+     "A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
+     between the unsentient and the Lord,
+
+     "A difference among souls, and a difference of the
+     unsentient and the soul each from the other.
+
+     "Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
+     the world with its five divisions.
+
+     "This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
+     beginning it would have an end:
+
+     "Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
+     illusorily imagined:
+
+     "For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
+     ceases.
+
+     "That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
+     that lack knowledge;
+
+     "For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
+     and sustained by Vishnu."
+
+The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
+excellence of Vishnu. With this in view the Lord declared:--
+
+     "Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
+     the imperishable;
+
+     "The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
+     unmodified.
+
+     "The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
+     Spirit,
+
+     "Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
+     worlds.
+
+     "Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
+     the imperishable (soul),
+
+     "Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
+     of persons (_Purushottama_);
+
+     "He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
+     all-knowing worships me in every wise.
+
+     "Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
+     (Arjuna):
+
+     "Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
+     has to do, O Bh�rata" (Bhagavad-g�t�, xv. 16-20).
+
+So in the Mah�-var�ha--
+
+     "The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
+     spouse of Sri;
+
+     "Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
+     must be subordinate."
+
+It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
+excellence of Vishnu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,
+according to the text of the Bh�llaveya Upanishad: While merit,
+wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
+therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
+emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu, according to the
+text of the N�r�yana Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
+state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
+while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
+the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
+from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
+Vishnu-pur�na--
+
+"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
+and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
+supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
+emancipation."
+
+And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only through the
+knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
+Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
+of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
+thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
+the real purport.
+
+     "The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
+     unknown,
+
+     "The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
+     be one?"
+
+And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
+the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
+revelation:--
+
+     "The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
+     similarity of cognition,
+
+     "Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
+     place of the individual;
+
+     "Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
+     different,
+
+     "The difference being independence and completeness (in the
+     Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
+     individual spirit)."
+
+Or to propose another explanation of the text, _�tm� tat tvam asi_,
+That art thou, it may be divided, _�tm� tat tvam asi_. He alone is
+soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
+not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
+of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--
+
+     "Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be
+     well got rid of."
+
+According, therefore, to the Tattva-v�da-rahasya, the words in the
+nine examples (in the Chh�ndogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
+a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
+non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--
+
+     "Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
+     trees;
+
+     "Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;
+
+     "Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;
+
+     "So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.
+
+     "Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
+     the supreme Hari
+
+     "Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
+     individual spirit, though he is its actuator;
+
+     "On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
+     he is bound."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Brahm�, Siva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
+     decay of their bodies;
+
+     "Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
+     for the sustentation of Lakshm�.
+
+     "By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
+     knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,
+
+     "All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
+     him."
+
+And again:--
+
+     "Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
+     from transmigration,
+
+     "Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.
+
+     "Vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
+     ruler.
+
+     "Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."
+
+That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
+evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
+things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
+knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
+expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
+known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
+knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
+and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
+Advaita-v�dins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_
+and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
+made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
+must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
+recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
+name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,
+cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
+these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
+with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
+such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
+words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
+then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
+statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
+statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
+statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.
+
+Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
+reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or
+transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
+author of the Ny�ya-nirv�na: The proof of the permanence of the
+transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
+And in the T�rkika-raksh�--
+
+     "When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
+     or not such and such,
+
+     "The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
+     called Nitya-sama."
+
+With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
+stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
+results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
+rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
+the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
+general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
+the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
+an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
+subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
+form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
+in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
+true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
+said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
+equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.
+
+If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
+its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
+carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
+money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
+are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
+be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to
+purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
+qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.
+
+Accordingly it is stated in the G�ruda-pur�na:--
+
+     "All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
+     regularly; what then is the reason of this?
+
+     "And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
+     the most excellent?
+
+     "Tell me this, Brahm�, that I may know it truly."
+
+Thus addressed by N�rada, the most excellent Brahm� replied:--
+
+     "The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
+     in an auspicious sense,
+
+     "And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."
+
+It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
+because emancipation is not attained without the grace of N�r�yana,
+and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
+which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
+the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
+The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
+result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
+words of the Skanda-pur�na--
+
+     "He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
+     emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
+     involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"
+
+and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
+adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
+has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
+way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
+Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
+Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
+Kaurma-pur�na--
+
+     "Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case
+
+     "Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
+     evidence;
+
+     "Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
+     revelation and tradition,
+
+     "Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
+     hesitation."
+
+What a S�stra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
+the Skanda-pur�na:--
+
+     "The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the S�ma-veda, the
+     Atharva-veda, the Mah�bh�rata, the Pa�cha-r�tra, and the
+     original R�m�yana, are called S�stras.
+
+     "That also which is conformable to these is called S�stra.
+
+     "Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
+     heterodoxy."
+
+According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
+is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
+viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
+duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
+there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
+duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
+can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
+texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
+has said:--
+
+     "I ever laud N�r�yana, the one being to be known from
+     genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
+     imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
+     excellences."
+
+It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
+of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth
+aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
+the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
+construction, in the Brihat-samhit�:--
+
+     "Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
+     eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
+     purport is ascertained."
+
+It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the
+Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
+institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
+remains may be sought from the �nandat�rtha-bh�shya-vy�khy�na (or
+exposition of the Commentary of �nanda-t�rtha). We desist for fear of
+giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
+promulgated by P�rna-praj�a Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
+third incarnation of V�yu:--
+
+     "The first was Hanumat, the second Bh�ma,
+
+     "The third P�rna-praj�a, the worker of the work of the
+     Lord."
+
+After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
+following stanza at the conclusion of his work:--
+
+     "That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
+     text of the Veda, sufficiently
+
+     "Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
+     splendour of the Veda;
+
+     "The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
+     the words of R�ma (Hanumat); the second was Bh�ma;
+
+     "By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
+     composed in regard to Kesava."
+
+The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
+texts.
+
+The purport of this is that Vishnu is the principle above all others
+in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 111: For a further account of �nanda-t�rtha or Madhva see
+Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
+Brahma-s�tras has been printed in Calcutta.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE P�SUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKUL�SA.
+
+
+Certain M�hesvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishnavas known
+by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch
+as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be
+a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as
+stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing
+for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend
+upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and
+others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme
+Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free
+from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these
+arguments, these M�hesvaras adopt the P�supata system, which is
+conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to
+the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then
+we shall expound the P�supata union and rites of Pasupati. The meaning
+is as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and
+this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the
+spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in
+the Ganak�rik�:--
+
+     "But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one
+     with three factors;
+
+     "He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a
+     spiritual guide.
+
+     "The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the
+     localities, the perseverance, the purifications,
+
+     "The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and
+     there are three functions."
+
+The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three
+(_tr�ni_), instead of the feminine three (_tisrah_), is a Vedic
+construction.
+
+(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and
+is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of
+the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradatt�ch�rya says: Knowledge,
+penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.
+
+(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is
+of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also
+says:--
+
+     "False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and
+     falling,
+
+     "These five, the root of bondage, are in this system
+     especially to be shunned."
+
+(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to
+liberation.
+
+These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.
+Thus he also says:--
+
+     "Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant
+     recollection of Rudra,
+
+     "And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients
+     of acquirements."
+
+(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the
+aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual
+teachers and the rest. Thus he says:--
+
+     "The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the
+     burning-ground, and Rudra only."
+
+(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads
+until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the
+differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:--
+
+     "The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,
+     and devotion as the fifth."
+
+(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false
+conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five
+species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said--
+
+     "The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of
+     interestedness,
+
+     "And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification
+     of the state of bondage."
+
+(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:--
+
+     "The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the
+     spiritual guide as the fifth."
+
+(_h._) The five powers are as follow:--
+
+     "Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,
+     conquest of pleasure and pain,
+
+     "Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of
+     power."
+
+The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent
+with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,
+mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.
+All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.
+
+In the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to
+introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),
+that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of
+pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _pasu_ we are
+to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that
+which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to
+understand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord,
+who is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of
+the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.
+
+In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and
+personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute
+extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the
+visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only
+one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly
+describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,
+discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of
+every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though
+imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of
+principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is
+cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.
+Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole
+system of institutes, according to the text and according to its
+significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and
+pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,
+summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this
+intellectual power.
+
+The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of
+three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of
+assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the
+possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with
+unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the
+faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.
+The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy
+even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.
+
+All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is
+threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,
+sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees
+according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive
+sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as
+proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable
+by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the
+cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in
+general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the
+light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive
+sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the
+objects of the sentient soul.
+
+The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,
+is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The
+insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and
+the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.
+The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,
+viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the
+three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the
+cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions
+ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and
+determination.
+
+The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,
+is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is
+the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is
+the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are
+to be found in the Pa�ch�rtha-bh�shyad�pik� and other works. The cause
+is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.
+This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of
+attributes and actions (into Mahesvara, Vishnu, &c.) The Lord is the
+possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely
+first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as
+possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is
+expounded by the author of the �darsa, and other institutional
+authorities.
+
+Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and
+is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that
+characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by
+action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union
+characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c.
+
+Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of
+two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal
+is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise
+is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are
+bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and
+devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakul�sa says:--
+
+     "He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
+     Oblation is an observance divided into six members."
+
+Thus the author of the aphorisms says:--
+
+     "He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,
+     laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious
+     ejaculation."
+
+Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and
+lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of
+Mahesvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-s�stra, or
+art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars
+saltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and
+with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal
+sentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the
+bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the
+palate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like
+the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be
+gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require
+exposition.
+
+The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,
+talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being
+asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the
+joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if
+the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an
+_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is
+doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what
+should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the
+utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no
+meaning, and the like.
+
+The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution
+for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on
+broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:
+Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.
+
+(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive
+power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,
+relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in
+detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes
+generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we
+shall expound the P�supata union and rites of Pasupati). Detail is the
+fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the
+instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the
+R�s�kara-bh�shya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these
+categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an
+enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,
+different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the
+cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the
+Sankhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is
+the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other
+systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall
+become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,
+the sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is
+determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of
+works, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus
+determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while
+in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of
+the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres
+involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in
+nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by
+such return to transmigratory experiences.
+
+Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,
+since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,
+then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be
+simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be
+created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge
+two difficulties. Think not so, replies the P�supata, for your
+supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without
+results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will
+follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the
+efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer
+of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the
+works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only
+when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so
+furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of
+Yay�ti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one
+will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman
+engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient
+creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the
+creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all
+his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to
+be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the P�supata,
+that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,
+inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed
+active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose
+power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed
+in sacred tradition:--
+
+     "Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by
+     the efficacy of works,
+
+     "For this reason is he in this system the cause of all
+     causes."
+
+Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through
+a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies
+the P�supata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere
+knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or
+the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for
+then it would follow that the study of any system would be
+superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,
+like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that
+Mah�deva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of
+the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is
+competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of
+various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.
+On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an
+accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent
+to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be
+realised apart from the system of the P�supatas. Therefore it is that
+our great teacher has said:--
+
+     "If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,
+     but intuition is unattainable;
+
+     "There is no accurate characterisation of principles
+     otherwise than by the five categories."
+
+Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man
+must adopt the system of the P�supatas, which undertakes the
+exposition of the five categories.
+
+A. E. G.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE SAIVA-DARSANA.
+
+
+[The seventh system in M�dhava's Sarva-darsana-sangraha is the
+Saiva-darsana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,
+especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about
+the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been
+lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the
+Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,
+by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,
+has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He
+has there translated the Tattuva-Kattalei, or law of the Tattwas, the
+Siva-Gn�napotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the
+Siva-Pirak�sam, or light of Siva, and the three works shed immense
+light on the outline as given by M�dhava. One great use of the latter
+is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their
+Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _arul_ for _anugraha_
+and _t�dchei_ for _d�ksh�_ may testify.
+
+The Saivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic S�nkhya; they
+hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,
+and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and
+gradually to unite it to God. Siva is the chief deity of the system,
+and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the
+allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pasupati is a
+well-known name of Siva, as the master or creator of all things.
+
+There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva s�tras. One is in
+five books, called by Colebrooke the Pasupati-s�stra, which is probably
+the work quoted by M�dhava in his account of the Nakul�sa P�supatas;
+another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemar�ja, with its first
+s�tra, _cha�tanyam �tm�_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,
+and opens with the sloka given in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, p. 91, lines
+1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words--
+
+    _Katha�chid �s�dya Mahesvarasya d�syam._
+
+None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the
+present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight
+�gamas and some of the Pur�nas. A list of the �gamas is given in Mr.
+Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion;" and of these the Kirana
+and Karana are quoted in the following treatise.]
+
+
+THE SAIVA-DARSANA.
+
+Certain, however, of the M�hesvara sect receiving the system of truth
+authoritatively laid down in the Saiva �gama,[112] reject the
+foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of
+our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation
+of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion
+that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;"
+and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the
+Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the
+cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in
+the Tantra doctrines--
+
+     "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one s�tra
+     the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four
+     feet, has again declared the same at full length."
+
+The meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three
+before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,
+meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,
+possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not
+independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as
+being different from these, is first declared; next follows the
+account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing
+intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order
+of the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means
+to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without
+knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the
+Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the
+real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place
+as first the "foot" of _knowledge_ (_j��na_) which makes known all
+this unto us.[114] Next follows the "foot" of _ceremonial action_
+(_kriy�_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the
+divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be
+attained, hence the "foot" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next,
+which declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts.
+And as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the
+fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is
+forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty
+(_chary�_), which includes all this.
+
+Now Siva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in
+the divine nature of Siva belongs to liberated souls and to such
+beings as Vidyesvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they
+depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised
+to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact
+of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being
+effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent
+being. By the strength of this inference is the universal
+acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.
+
+"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an
+effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body
+being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that
+a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been
+seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not
+from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they
+possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are
+destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to
+infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus
+the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker,
+from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the
+afore-mentioned middle term (_s�dhana_) must have the afore-mentioned
+major (_s�dhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the
+latter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the
+authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been
+given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,
+that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions
+done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]--
+
+     "This ignorant _j�v�tman_, incapable of its own true
+     pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction
+     [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go
+     to heaven or always to hell."[117]
+
+Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,
+since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that
+he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the
+king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of
+his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru--
+
+     "It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to
+     employ means, &c.;
+
+     "This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting
+     irrespectively of works, &c."
+
+And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Sruti) establishes the
+existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their
+means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various
+individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable
+Brihaspati--
+
+     "He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and
+     material causes,--
+
+     "Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that
+     resides in accumulated actions should ripen."--
+
+     "The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must
+     have had an intelligent maker,
+
+     "This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see
+     in any other effect, as jars, &c."
+
+God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with
+everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot
+produce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious
+Mrigendra[119]--
+
+     "He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:
+     for it is an established principle
+
+     "That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,
+     parts, and end."
+
+"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent
+maker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all
+effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as
+potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be
+like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or
+omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal
+soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover,
+even though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still
+maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The
+Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of
+matter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body,
+but only a body of pure energy (S�kta),[122] since we know that his
+body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Sakti, according
+to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the _Is�na_ as his head, the
+_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _V�medeva_
+as his secret parts, and the _Sadyoj�ta_ as his feet."[123] And this
+body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but
+is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are
+respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and
+production.[124] This has been said in the Sr�mat Mrigendra--
+
+     "From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the
+     body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."
+
+And it has also been said elsewhere--
+
+     "His body is composed of the five mantras which are
+     subservient to the five operations,
+
+     "And his head, &c., are formed out of the �sa, Tatpurusha,
+     Aghora, V�ma, and other hymns."
+
+If you object to this view that "such passages in the �gamas as 'He is
+five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the
+Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what
+you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his
+assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since
+meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely
+destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara--
+
+     "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the
+     devotee."
+
+And similarly elsewhere--
+
+     "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of
+     form;
+
+     "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."
+
+Bhojar�ja[125] has thus detailed the five operations--
+
+     "Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,
+     destruction, and obscuration,
+
+     "And to these must be added the active grace of him who is
+     eternally exalted."
+
+Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to
+be performed directly by Siva, but in that of the toilsome Path they
+are ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the Sr�mat
+Karana[127]--
+
+     "In the Pure Path Siva is declared to be the only agent, but
+     Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."
+
+It must here be understood that the word Siva includes in its proper
+meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Siva,
+as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheswara, the emancipated souls who have
+become Sivas, and the inspired teachers (_v�chakas_), together with
+all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of
+Siva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_).
+
+We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_pasu_). The
+individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the
+non-atomic,[128] the _Kshetraj�a_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is
+the _Pasu_. For we must not say with the Ch�rv�kas that it is the same
+as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as
+there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.
+Nor may we say with the Naiy�yikas that it is cognisable by
+perception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As
+has been said--
+
+     "If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a
+     second knower;[131]
+
+     "And this would require another still, if the second were
+     itself to be known."
+
+Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with
+the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been
+said--
+
+     "That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or
+     time,
+
+     "They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's
+     all-pervadingness and eternity."
+
+Nor may we say with the Ved�ntin that it is only one, since the
+apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many
+individual souls; nor with the S�nkhyas that it is devoid of action,
+since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Sruti informs us of
+a state of identity with Siva, which consists in intelligence in the
+form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been
+declared in the Sr�mat Mrigendra--
+
+     "It is revealed that identity with Siva results when all
+     fetters are removed."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in
+     his soul
+
+     "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after
+     liberation, Sruti calls it that which faces every way."
+
+It is also said in the Tattva-prak�sa--
+
+     "The liberated souls are themselves Sivas, but these are
+     liberated by his favour;
+
+     "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose
+     body is the five Mantras."
+
+Now the souls are threefold, as denominated _vij��n�kal�h_,
+_pralay�kal�h_, and _sakal�h_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are
+under the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by
+receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and
+knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments,
+such as _kal�_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of
+cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The
+second are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since
+in their case _kal�_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence
+their name _pralay�kala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the
+three fetters of _mala_, _m�y�_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_.
+The first class are again subdivided into _sam�pta-kalush�h_ and
+_asam�pta-kalush�h_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly
+exhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of
+their corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the
+privilege, raised by Siva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge
+(the Vidyesvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of
+Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya--
+
+     "Ananta, and S�kshma, and Sivottama,
+
+     "Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trim�rttika,
+
+     "Sr�kantha and Sikhandin,--these are declared to be the
+     Vidyesvaras."
+
+The latter Siva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million
+Mantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prak�sa.[135] Similarly
+Soma-Sambhu has said--
+
+     "One class is named _vij��n�kala_, the second _pralay�kala_,
+
+     "The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the S�stra
+     regards as objects of mercy.
+
+     "The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_
+     and _karma_,
+
+     "The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with
+     _kal�_ and ending with 'earth.'"[136]
+
+The _Pralay�kal�h_ are also twofold, as being _pakvap�sadvaya_ or not,
+_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in
+whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the
+power of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryashtaka_[137] body, and pass
+through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prak�sa--
+
+     "Those among the Pralay�kalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are
+     immature,
+
+     "Go, united with the _puryashtaka_ body, into many births by
+     the power of _karman_."
+
+The _puryashtaka_ is also thus described in the same work--
+
+     "The _puryashtaka_ is composed of the internal organ,
+     thought (_dh�_), _karman_, and the instruments."
+
+This is thus explained by Aghora Siva �ch�rya, "the _puryashtaka_ is a
+subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from
+the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is
+composed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending
+with _kal�_." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha--
+
+     "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending
+     with _kal�_, is assigned to each soul,
+
+     "And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies
+     produced by the world."
+
+The following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word
+"_internal organ_," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence,"
+"egoism," and "reason,"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which
+enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those
+called _kal�_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and
+quality;[140] the words "_thought_" (_dh�_) and _karman_ signify the
+five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile
+rudiments. By the word "_instruments_" are comprehended the ten organs
+of sense and action.
+
+"But is it not declared in the Sr�mat K�lottara that 'The set of five,
+sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,
+these constitute the _puryashtaka_?'"
+
+How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and
+hence the venerable R�ma Kantha has explained that s�tra in its
+literal meaning [_i. e_., as _puryashtaka_, is derived from _ashta_,
+"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you
+ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal
+definition of _puryashtaka_, we reply that there is really no
+contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in
+the following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five
+rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;
+(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.)
+nature [prakriti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning
+with _kal�_, which form a kind of case.[142]
+
+Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the
+_puryashtaka_ body, Mahesvara Ananta having compassionated them as
+possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the
+world; as has been said--
+
+     "Mahesvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the
+     world."
+
+The class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_
+and _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in
+conformity with their maturity (_parip�ka_), puts forth a power
+agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred
+and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Mandal�,
+&c., as has been said--
+
+     "The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection
+     with _Kal�_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;
+
+     "The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen
+     of these the Lords of the Mantras.
+
+     "Eight of these are called _Mandalins_; eight again are
+     Krodha, &c.;
+
+     "V�resa, Sr�kantha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together
+     are the hundred and eighteen."
+
+In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a
+teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his
+manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the
+process of initiation; as has been said--
+
+     "These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a
+     healing power,
+
+     "He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to
+     the highest principle."
+
+It is also said in the Sr�mad Mrigendra--
+
+     "He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which
+     previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[143]
+
+All this has been explained at great length by N�r�yana-Kantha, and
+there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear
+of prolixity.
+
+But as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the
+Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,
+appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy
+the rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said--
+
+     "The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he
+     appoints to enjoy their various deserts,
+
+     "According to their respective actions: such are the various
+     kinds of souls."
+
+We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _p�sa_).
+This is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _m�y�_, and _rodha-sakti_.[145]
+But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Saiva �gamas that the
+chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been
+shown to mean Siva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic
+bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence
+matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only
+fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal
+dot, which is the germinal atom of _m�y�_, and is called a
+Siva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the
+highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Siva,
+still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that
+it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the
+state of such deities as Vidyesvara, &c. Thus we see there is no
+contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prak�sa--
+
+     "The bonds of matter will be fourfold."
+
+And again in the Sr�mad Mrigendra--
+
+     "The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer
+     (_rodha_), action, and the work of M�y�,
+
+     "These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively
+     called by the name of 'merit.'"
+
+The following is the meaning of this couplet:--
+
+(1.) "Enveloping," because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the
+soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because _mala_, a
+natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As
+has been said--
+
+     "_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts
+     the soul's vision and action;
+
+     "It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on
+     copper."[147]
+
+(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond"
+[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Siva
+obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself
+partaking of the nature of matter].
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of
+     all,
+
+     "I am metaphorically called _p�sa_,[148] because I follow
+     desert."
+
+(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed
+by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,
+like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning
+series. As has been said in the Sr�mat Kirana--
+
+     "As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are
+     beginningless:
+
+     "If an eternal character is thus established, then what
+     cause could produce any change therein?"
+
+(4.) "_M�y�_," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all
+the world is potentially contained (_m�ti_) at a mundane destruction,
+and again at a creation it all comes (_y�ti_) into manifestation,
+hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Sr�mat
+Saurabheya--
+
+     "The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed
+     therein at a mundane destruction,
+
+     "And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form
+     of effects as _kal�_, &c."[149]
+
+Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here
+through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three
+categories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter.
+
+A different mode of treating the subject is found in the
+J��naratn�val�, &c., in such lines as--
+
+     "The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the
+     cause
+
+     "Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six
+     categories."
+
+But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.
+Thus our account of the system is complete.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Pasupati-s�stra_
+(_Mahesvara-siddh�nta or Siv�gama_), as the text-book of the P�supata
+sect. The �gamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the
+Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion").]
+
+[Footnote 113: "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,
+matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with
+the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _p�sa_ is
+eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.
+58 we find the _advaita_ of the Ved�nta attacked. In p. 62 it is said
+that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his
+five operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that
+is required for previous desert.]
+
+[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life
+(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_,
+_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gn�nam_. The first is the stage of practical
+piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second
+is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications
+involved in true _p�j�_; the third is that of the eight observances of
+the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for
+intimate union with God.]
+
+[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 116: _Ny�yena_ may here mean "argument."]
+
+[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be
+only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects
+proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)
+necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural
+stress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original
+meaning of the passage; it occurs Mah�bh�rata, iii. 1144 (cf.
+Gaudap�da, S. K�r. 61).]
+
+[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read
+_Karan�sambhav�chcha_.]
+
+[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meyk�nda of the Tamil
+work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _Mrigendra_(?).]
+
+[Footnote 120: Should we read _t�vad anasar�rah_ in p. 83, line 2?]
+
+[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._]
+
+[Footnote 122: "_M�y�_ (or Prakriti) is the material, Sakti the
+instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).]
+
+[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras
+which are included in the five _kal�s_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).
+The Sivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is
+composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Siva (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse
+order in Taitt. �ranyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Ny�y�-m�l�vist._ p. 3).]
+
+[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of
+Siva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are
+_S�th�kkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sad�kshaya?_) or _Sad�-Siva_, who is Siva and
+Sakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or
+_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_Suddhavidy�_) which is
+properly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vishnu_, and _Brahma_. They are
+respectively symbolised by the _n�da_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of
+Om.]
+
+[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a T�ntrik
+work, the _Narapati-jaya-chary�_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dh�r.]
+
+[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of Siva in the Atharva-siras Upanishad
+(see Indische Stud. i. 385).]
+
+[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight �gamas (see
+Foulkes' Catechism).]
+
+[Footnote 128: _Anu?_ "The soul, when clothed with these primary
+things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body"
+(Foulkes). Ananu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Brihad Ar. Up.
+iii. 8. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.]
+
+[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bh�sh�
+Parichchheda, sloka 49).]
+
+[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakul�sa P�supatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p.
+103).]
+
+[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,
+137. They are there described as being respectively under the
+influence of _�navam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or
+these with _mayei malam_. The _�navam_ is described as original sin,
+or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_
+is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its
+deserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the
+source of the senses. M�dhava uses "_kal�_," &c., for _m�y�_. The
+reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the
+five _vidy�tattvas_ (_kal�_, _vidy�_, _r�ga_, _niyati_, and _kal�_)
+and the twenty-four _�tmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile
+elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual
+faculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamk�ra_, and _chitta_), are all
+developed from _m�y�_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from
+Soma Sambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what M�dhava says, p. 77,
+in his account of the Nakul�sa P�supatas, where he describes _kal�_ as
+unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five
+_tanm�tras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _ahamk�ra_ and
+_manas_.]
+
+[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakaran�t_ in
+p. 86, line 3.]
+
+[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.
+It, however, names the three classes as _vij��na-kevala_,
+_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.]
+
+[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidy�tattvas_ and
+all the twenty-four _�tmatattvas_.]
+
+[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _pur�_, "body" (cf.
+_purisaya_ for _purusha_, Brihad �r. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ashtaka_
+(cf. also the S�nkhya Pravachana Bh�shya, p. 135).]
+
+[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?]
+
+[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamk�ra_, _chitta_.]
+
+[Footnote 140: These are the seven _vidy�-tattvas_, _kal�_, _k�la_,
+_niyati_ (fate), _vidy�_, _r�ga_, _prakriti_, and _guna_. Hoisington,
+however, puts _purushan_ "the principle of life," instead of _guna_,
+which seems better, as the three _gunas_ are included in _prakriti_.
+He translates _kal�_ by "continency," and describes it as "the power
+by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into
+subjection."]
+
+[Footnote 141: This "instrument" (_karana_) seems to mean what
+Hoisington calls _purushan_ or "the principle of life which
+establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes
+it one of the seven _vidy�tattvas_. According to M�dhava, it should be
+what he calls _guna_.]
+
+[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four
+_�tmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanm�tras_, ten organs of sense
+and action, four organs of the _antahkarana_, and seven _vidy�tattvas_
+as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)]
+
+[Footnote 143: I take _anu_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean
+the second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of
+_mala_ is the _m�y�-mala_, the second _�nava-mala_, the third
+_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).]
+
+[Footnote 144: "The soul, when clothed with these primary things
+(desire, knowledge, action, the _kal�dipanchaka_, &c.), is an
+exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called
+_�nava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to
+souls.]
+
+[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J.
+A. O. S., viz., _�navam_, _kanmam_, and _m�yei_, the last is the
+"obscuring" power of M�yesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Saivas
+hold that P�sa, like the S�nkhya Prakriti, is in itself eternal,
+although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 228).]
+
+[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _m�y�_,
+and _rodhasakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the
+Siva-prak�sa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable
+_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.
+From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit
+letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and
+external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual
+knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have
+been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after
+these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be
+enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious
+deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the
+abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the
+abode of Siva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union
+with him." _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,
+153 (cf. also Weber, _R�mat�pany�a Up_. pp. 312-315).]
+
+[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.]
+
+[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _p�sa_
+from _pasch�t_.]
+
+[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _s� k�ryena_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.
+
+
+Other M�hesvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Saiva
+system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things
+causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating
+spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the
+construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)
+is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this
+Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several
+cognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self
+posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by
+revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of
+witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives
+manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150]
+as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon
+recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the
+highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest
+trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,
+suppression of the breath, and the like, these M�hesvaras set forth
+the system of recognition (_pratyabhij��_). The extent of this system
+is thus described by one of their authorities--
+
+     "The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two
+     explications, the greater and the less,
+
+     "The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system
+     of recognition."
+
+The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:--
+
+     "Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of
+     Mahesvara, and wishing also to help mankind,
+
+     "I set forth the recognition of Mahesvara, as the method of
+     attaining all felicity."
+
+[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:--
+
+"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus
+feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached,"
+having fully attained, this condition, having made it the
+unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which
+has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:
+otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.
+
+Mahesvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,
+beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence
+Vishnu, Viri�chi, and other deities are deities, who, though they
+transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite
+illusion.
+
+The condition of being a slave to Mahesvara is the being a recipient
+of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the
+divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things
+according to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _d�sya_, from _d�_).
+
+The word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the
+doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom
+this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest
+reward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end
+of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the
+Siva-drishti by that supreme guide the revered Som�nandan�tha--
+
+     "When once the nature of Siva that resides in all things
+     has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof
+     or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,
+
+     "There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further
+     reflection. When he knows Suvarna (or Siva) a man may cease
+     to act and to reflect."
+
+The word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self
+which has recognised the nature of Mahesvara, and which manifests to
+itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,
+for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of
+others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a
+motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man
+that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a
+regard for others. Thus Akshap�da (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive
+is that object towards which a man energises.
+
+The preposition _upa_ in _upap�dayami_ (I set forth) indicates
+proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.
+
+Hence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all
+felicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all
+felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a
+man acquired the mountain Rohana (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all
+the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what
+else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpal�ch�rya says--
+
+     "What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of
+     devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"
+
+We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method
+of attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound
+term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a
+Bahuvr�hi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Mahesvara, the
+knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full
+attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external
+and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the
+language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an
+object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the
+same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in
+this system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the
+accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from
+argumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self
+the cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection
+of the powers of that God.
+
+This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I
+establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it
+convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism
+of the Recognitive Institutes.]
+
+Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial
+with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The
+answer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the
+soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and
+therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence
+of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the
+recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and
+active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as
+total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight
+the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This
+self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;
+for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he
+is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,
+therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here
+employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of
+things, the teaching of the Naiy�yikas may be accepted. It has thus
+been said by the son of Uday�kara--
+
+     "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that
+     self-active and cognitive is Mahesvara the primal being?
+
+     "Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the
+     powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and
+     imperfectly discerned."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The continuance of all living creatures in this
+     transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory
+     _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of
+     living creatures.
+
+     "Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action
+     (or ritual), which is best at K�si,
+
+     "Is indicated by others also: different from these is real
+     knowledge."
+
+And also--
+
+     "The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those
+     things:
+
+     "The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge
+     without succession, is Mahesvara."
+
+Som�nandan�tha also says--
+
+     "He always knows by identity with Siva: he always knows by
+     identity with the real."
+
+Again at the end of the section on knowledge--
+
+     "Unless there were this unity with Siva, cognitions could
+     not exist as facts of daily life:
+
+     "Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the
+     one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).
+
+     "He is Mahesvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken
+     continuity of objects:
+
+     "Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the
+     deity."
+
+The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, "After
+that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that
+shines diversely this ALL," teaches that God illumines the whole round
+of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the
+diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which
+irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises
+from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,
+God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all
+limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,
+self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Saiva
+aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are
+Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective
+Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This
+self-same existing self is knowledge.
+
+By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Som�nandan�tha cited
+above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of
+these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy
+constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory
+experience. This is described in the section on activity--
+
+     "He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,
+     through the efficacy of his will: this activity is
+     creativeness."
+
+And at the close of the same section--
+
+     "The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world
+     under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his
+     activity worked out by motive and agent.
+
+     "This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be
+     that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,
+     insentient things."
+
+According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the
+insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of
+Mahesvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands
+of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or
+that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in
+the series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his
+progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his
+universal creativeness.
+
+How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the
+following illustration--
+
+     "The tree or jar produced by the mere will of
+     thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to
+     serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."
+
+If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the
+jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of
+the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of
+clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition
+of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact
+notorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from
+different materials.
+
+As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without
+materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he
+does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:
+they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation
+of the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception,
+must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the
+potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a
+body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the
+successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the
+genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the
+thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.
+
+On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mah�deva,
+amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the
+Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus
+operates. Thus it is that Vasugupt�ch�rya says--
+
+"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without
+appliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him
+resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."
+
+It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how
+comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The
+answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution--
+
+     "This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates
+     through the fatality of works:
+
+     "Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,
+     he is enfranchised."
+
+It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what
+difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated
+in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this
+question is given in a section of the Tattv�rtha-Sangraha--
+
+     "Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical
+     with itself, like Mahesvara free from bondage: the other (or
+     unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."
+
+An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the
+soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if
+all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate
+because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the
+recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to
+the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two
+degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in
+developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines
+felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the
+conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such
+recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In
+the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the
+power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the
+attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting
+in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the
+essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.
+
+It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious
+self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A
+certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular
+gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated
+by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote
+to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to
+her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities
+she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and
+she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she
+recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them
+out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self
+be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation
+effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of
+those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director
+to recognise in itself the perfections of Mahesvara, his omniscience,
+omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of
+being.
+
+It is therefore said in the fourth section--
+
+     "As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as
+     like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he
+     humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:
+     In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be
+     the universal soul, in which there is no perfection
+     unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and
+     therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."
+
+This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other
+teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we
+cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become
+too prolix. This then may suffice.[152]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 150: Read _bh�v�n_ for _bh�v�t_.]
+
+[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. M�dhava here condenses Abhinava
+Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the
+eleventh century (see B�hler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).]
+
+[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Siva
+s�tras by Utpala, the son of Uday�kara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+THE RASESVARA-DARSANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153]
+
+
+Other M�hesvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self
+with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life
+taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily
+frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver
+as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _p�rada_,
+because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of
+transmigratory states. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called
+     _p�rada_."
+
+And again in the Ras�rnava--
+
+     "It is styled _p�rada_ because it is employed for the
+     highest end by the best votaries.
+
+     "Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from
+     my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called
+     _rasa_."
+
+It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is
+incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another
+manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in
+the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this
+there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it
+free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise--
+
+     "Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the
+     death of the body.
+
+     "Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an
+     emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.
+
+     "Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of
+     mercury and of medicaments."
+
+Govinda-bhagavat also says--
+
+     "Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are
+     not permanent, one should strive
+
+     "After emancipation; but emancipation results from
+     knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible
+     in a healthy body."
+
+The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its
+permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the
+body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is
+dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaur� under the names
+of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahridaya--
+
+     "They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new
+     body, the creation of Hara and Gaur�,
+
+     "They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose
+     service is the aggregate of magic texts."
+
+The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should
+first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is
+produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaur�, and mica is
+produced from Gaur�, mercury and mica are severally identified with
+Hara and Gaur� in the verse--
+
+     "Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;
+
+     "The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of
+     death and poverty."
+
+This is very little to say about the matter. In the
+Rasesvara-siddh�nta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and
+mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by
+acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.
+
+     "Certain of the gods, Mahesa and others; certain Daityas,
+     Sukra and others;
+
+     "Certain Munis, the B�lakhilyas and others; certain kings,
+     Somesvara and others;
+
+     "Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-n�yaka,
+
+     "Charvati, Kapila, Vy�li, K�p�li, Kandal�yana,
+
+     "These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while
+     alive,
+
+     "Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith
+     identified."
+
+The meaning of this, as explicated by Paramesvara to Paramesvar�, is
+as follows:--
+
+     "By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,
+     the preservation of the body;
+
+     "And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and
+     air,
+
+     "Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they
+     restore to life,
+
+     "Bound they give the power of flying about."
+
+The swooning state of mercury is thus described--
+
+     "They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,
+     as characterised thus--
+
+     "Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.
+
+     "A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the
+     following marks are seen--
+
+     "Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."
+
+The bound condition is described in another place as follows:--
+
+     "The character of bound quicksilver is that it is--
+
+     "Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it
+     parts asunder under friction."
+
+Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaur� were
+proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but
+how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as
+that _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is
+stated by the authorities--
+
+     "Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully
+     discriminated,
+
+     "In the first place, as pure in every process, for
+     perfecting the adepts."
+
+And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus--
+
+     "Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,
+     restraining,
+
+     "Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,
+     covering,
+
+     "Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and
+     pouring,
+
+     "And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen
+     modes of treating quicksilver."
+
+These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,
+Sarvaj�a-r�mesvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here
+omitted to avoid prolixity.
+
+The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of
+the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,
+a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the
+Ras�rnava--
+
+"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the
+blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it
+attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),
+quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This
+makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try
+it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."
+
+It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a
+celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the
+self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,
+and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being
+inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahridaya--
+
+     "That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems
+     in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,
+
+     "Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings
+     whose bodies are unglorified?
+
+     "He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from
+     cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,
+
+     "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities
+     of the cognitive organs are obstructed.
+
+     "A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the
+     enjoyment of sensual pleasures,
+
+     "An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain
+     to emancipation?"
+
+Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass
+through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be
+extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two
+mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The
+objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following
+dilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which
+all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or
+as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is
+cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive
+cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddh�nta--
+
+     "The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the
+     mercurial system, O subtile thinker.
+
+     "In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity
+     of argument,
+
+     "Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all
+     sacred texts;
+
+     "One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore
+     there is and must be life."
+
+And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents
+of the doctrine of Vishnu-sv�min maintain the eternity of the body of
+Vishnu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the S�k�ra-siddhi--
+
+     "I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishnu-sv�min,
+
+     "Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and
+     inconceivably perfect beatitude."
+
+If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which
+appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real
+existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be
+otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of
+proof: (1.) by the intuition of Sanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts
+such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Pur�nic texts such
+as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the
+conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other
+like predicates are affirmed also by Sr�k�nta-misra, the devoted
+adherent of Vishnu-sv�min. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest
+end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which
+we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus
+been said--
+
+     "What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,
+     immortal,
+
+     "The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,
+     pleasure, liberation?"
+
+It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as
+it is said--
+
+     "Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying
+     and imperishable."
+
+Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by
+seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Ras�rnava--
+
+     "From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from
+     merely remembering it,
+
+     "From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,
+     appear its six virtues.
+
+     "Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from
+     seeing all the phallic emblems
+
+     "On earth, those at Ked�ra, and all others whatsoever."
+
+In another place we read--
+
+     "The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific
+     than the worship of all the phallic emblems at K�si and
+     elsewhere,
+
+     "Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,
+     exemption from decay, and immortality."
+
+The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--
+
+     "The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged
+     should recall quicksilver to mind.
+
+     "He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his
+     blasphemy for ever filled with sin."
+
+The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes
+place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the
+practice of union ([Greek: hen�sis]) after the acquisition of a
+divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter--
+
+     "The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain
+     men of holy vision,
+
+     "Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the
+     universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:
+
+     "Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof
+     is luminousness, undifferenced,
+
+     "From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,
+     tranquil, self-recognised:
+
+     "Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole
+     universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,
+
+     "The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his
+     bondage to works annulled."
+
+A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained
+this he becomes beatitude.
+
+Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of
+passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we
+have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the
+supreme self--
+
+     "May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from
+     dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,
+
+     "Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those
+     that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,
+
+     "Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the
+     soul awakes,
+
+     "Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines
+     forth by itself from itself."
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yog�s in Colonel
+Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _P�rada-p�na_ is one of the practices of
+the Siddhop�sakas in the Sankara-digvijaya, � 49, to obviate
+_apamrityu_, _ak�lamrityu_, &c.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE VAISESHIKA OR AUL�KYA DARSANA.[154]
+
+
+Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by
+the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be
+essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to
+know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the
+Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such
+passages as these (_Svet�svatara Upan_. vi. 20)--
+
+     "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,
+
+     "Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of
+     Siva."
+
+Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing
+(_sravana_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bh�van�_), as it has
+been said--
+
+     "By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated
+     meditation,--
+
+     "By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the
+     highest union (_yoga_)."
+
+Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the
+knowledge of the _vy�pti_ (or universal proposition), and the
+knowledge of the _vy�pti_ follows the right understanding of the
+categories,--hence the saint Kan�da[155] establishes the six
+categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now,
+therefore, we shall explain duty."
+
+In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all
+the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first
+_�hnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_j�ti_), in the
+second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the
+similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the
+first _�hnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the
+second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third
+book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the
+first _�hnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he
+discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _�hnika_,
+and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates
+action; in the first _�hnika_ he considers action as connected with
+the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he
+examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti; in the first _�hnika_
+he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second
+the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book
+he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _�hnika_ he
+considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those
+qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the
+eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception,
+and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics
+of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of
+inference.[156]
+
+The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"
+"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected,
+"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold,
+not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really
+included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare
+that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and
+intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an
+example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this
+definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since
+"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the
+categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in
+its generic character in all substances [though different substances
+have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with
+"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then
+"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"
+inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate
+relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.
+
+If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since
+'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of
+the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of
+conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the
+objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only
+six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the
+thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it
+is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,
+if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends
+his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite
+number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we
+cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a
+seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite
+number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if
+others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow
+to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a
+_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.
+
+Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatv�di_), _i.e._, the genera of substance,
+quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,
+quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_)
+is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the
+(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and
+does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]
+
+The genus of quality (_gunatva_) is that which is immediately
+subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation
+in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of
+action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the
+genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything
+eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _s�m�nya_) is that which is found
+in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the
+counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]
+(_visesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of
+generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation
+(_samav�ya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate
+relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.
+
+Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,
+soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_prithiv�tva_), are the
+definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality
+which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same
+subject with colour produced by baking.[168]
+
+The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and
+sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon
+and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to
+substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the
+skin.[169]
+
+As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be
+subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their
+technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is
+found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special
+quality which is not produced by contact.[170]
+
+Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the
+mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is
+not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that
+pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is
+not time.[173] The general terms _�tmatva_ and _manastva_ are the
+respective definitions of soul (_�tman_) and mind (_manas_). The
+general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being
+also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]
+(_am�rtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to
+substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an
+atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any
+substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned
+directly in Kan�da's S�tras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch,
+number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,
+proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
+effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word
+"_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,
+and sound. Their respective genera (_r�patva_, &c.) are their several
+definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is
+subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In
+the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.
+
+"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing
+upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:
+revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus
+of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The
+genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists
+with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of
+conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the
+definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is
+twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found
+with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and
+action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of
+generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation
+cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite
+number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate
+relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.
+
+There is a popular proverb--
+
+"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by
+disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true
+Vaiseshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the
+production of duality, &c.
+
+There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;
+thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the
+distinguishing perception _apeksh�buddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this
+is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_
+(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of
+duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it
+exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_samsk�ra_).[177]
+
+But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus
+produced from _apeksh�buddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained
+that _apeksh�buddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because
+duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we
+cannot hold _apeksh�buddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and
+therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being
+produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,
+maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c.,
+cannot be held to be made known (_j��pya_) by that non-eternal
+apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._,
+_apeksh�buddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a
+plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as
+"severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apeksh�buddhi_ is not their
+_j��paka_, it must be their _janaka_].
+
+Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From
+_apeksh�buddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality
+(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;
+next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises,
+simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the
+destruction of _apeksh�buddhi_; next from the destruction of
+_apeksh�buddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two
+substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of
+the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of
+imagination (_samsk�ra_), the destruction of the knowledge of the
+quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the
+knowledge of the substances.
+
+The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,
+and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be
+found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are
+the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the
+rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a
+special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary
+duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of
+the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two
+things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to
+the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the
+subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its
+abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate
+action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apeksh�buddhi_,
+there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united
+influence of both.[181]
+
+_Apeksh�buddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind
+which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._,
+destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]
+
+Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the
+destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyanuka_), another
+compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of
+this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,
+the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of
+steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the
+conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,
+&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire
+arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from
+conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the
+atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is
+produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,
+there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that
+former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another
+atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;
+ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms)
+are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the
+_dvyanuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The
+other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,
+are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if
+we hold (with the Vaiseshikas) that the baking process takes place in
+the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiy�yikas, however, maintain that the
+baking process takes place in the jar.
+
+"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by
+the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that
+produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause
+[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.
+
+It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the
+[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect
+[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a
+disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a
+disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,
+again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied
+by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary
+with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke
+without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking
+in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187]
+without there having previously been the origination of that
+disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot
+was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts
+produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the
+disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one
+part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which
+had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction
+of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante caus� cessat
+effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which
+resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes
+of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the
+pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,
+initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a
+disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the
+pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to
+produce it.[188]
+
+But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the
+hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,
+initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the
+original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the
+intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand
+produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates
+also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and
+the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]
+and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and
+the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of
+the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second
+disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the
+body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the
+action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing
+in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of
+disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we
+must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause
+and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the
+body and the points of space.
+
+But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.
+147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely
+unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different
+opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bh�tta M�m�msakas
+and the Ved�ntins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Sr�dhara
+�ch�rya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus
+darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Pr�bh�kara M�m�msakas
+hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the
+Naiy�yikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we
+assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of
+the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible
+alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of
+the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different
+one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one
+you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should
+certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that
+it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself
+destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the
+very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of
+qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different
+substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that
+darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed
+of the dark blue of the tam�la blossom?" We reply, that this is merely
+an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But
+enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it
+follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since
+you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some
+substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye
+as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,
+the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression
+independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind],
+because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an
+indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain
+that "absence or non-existence (_abh�va_[195]) is incapable of being
+expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use
+such phrases as _tenebr� oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere
+non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would
+include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,
+destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do
+speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all
+are cases of _abh�va_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of
+the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ
+which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
+would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is
+the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the
+fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness
+is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
+very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the
+qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_
+attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is
+connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert
+that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced
+by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
+object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's
+absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that
+on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on
+to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no
+dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend
+thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
+that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates
+the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will
+require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we
+cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is
+necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,
+else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is
+implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence,
+having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kan�da
+uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]:
+"_Dravya-guna-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmy�d abh�vas tamas_" (_Vais.
+S�t._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is
+dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."
+The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness
+is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances,
+if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the
+eye to be visible].
+
+Non-existence (_abh�va_) is considered to be the seventh category, as
+established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that
+which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate
+relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and
+"reciprocal non-existence."
+
+The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and
+"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without
+any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though
+having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence
+which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal
+non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet
+no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_,
+as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].
+
+If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really
+the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to
+lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence"
+is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is
+not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose
+opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor
+need you here raise the objection that "_abh�va_ can never be a means
+of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum
+bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for
+the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the
+category of _abh�va_].
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 154: The Vaiseshikas are called Aul�ky�h in Hemachandra's
+_Abhidh�na-chint�mani_; in the V�yu-pur�na (quoted in Aufrecht's
+_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshap�da, Kan�da, Ul�ka, and Vatsa are
+called the sons of Siva.]
+
+[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kanabhaksha.]
+
+[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book
+treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,
+&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the
+qualities of the soul, and the three causes.]
+
+[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bh�shya_ of V�tsy�yana,
+see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]
+
+[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bh�sh�-parichchheda_, sloka 14.]
+
+[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_visesha_) resides by "intimate
+relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would
+apply to "duality" and "conjunction."]
+
+[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply
+to "existence" (_satt�_), which is the _summum genus_, to which
+substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]
+
+[Footnote 162: Existence (_satt�_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guna_,
+and _kriy�_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and
+all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and
+disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _samyoga_, _r�pa_, &c.) may be
+mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the
+essence of _guna_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]
+
+[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found
+in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nity�-samavetatva_;
+this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College
+Library.]
+
+[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,
+however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore,
+the former clause of the definition is added.]
+
+[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiseshika) is not
+"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is
+the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being
+single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different
+atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,
+water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus
+ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own
+indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _visesha_ as "ultimate
+difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _visesha_.]
+
+[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyony�bh�va_) exists between
+two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;"
+but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]
+
+[Footnote 167: "_Samav�yasamband�bh�v�t samav�yo na j�tih_," Siddh.
+Mukt. (_Samyoga_ being a _guna_ has _gunatva_ existing in it with
+intimate relation).]
+
+[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot
+nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union
+with fire" (Bh�sh�-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]
+
+[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an a�rial
+integument.--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the
+_first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is
+added to exclude God's knowledge, while _samyog�janya_ excludes the
+soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind
+and the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time
+with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate
+cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the
+instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaranam_.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daisika_ and _k�lika_.]
+
+[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the
+last, however, is not pervading but atomic.]
+
+[Footnote 174: The three other _pad�rthas_, beside soul, which are
+_am�rtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]
+
+[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,
+_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things
+themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our
+choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]
+
+[Footnote 176: _Samsk�ra_ is here the idea conceived by the
+mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material
+previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or
+mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]
+
+[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the
+original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]
+
+[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _j��paka_ or _janaka_;
+_apeksh�buddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]
+
+[Footnote 179: _Apeksh�buddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is
+one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of
+these, but in _both_ together.]
+
+[Footnote 180: The Vaiseshikas held that the j�v�tman and space are
+each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each
+have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is
+ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion
+has not. Dr. R�er, in his version of the Bh�sh�-Parichchheda, has
+mistranslated an important S�tra which bears on this point. It is said
+in S�tra 26--
+
+     _----ath�k�sasar�rinam, avy�pyavrittih kshaniko visesha-guna
+     ishyate,_
+
+which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are
+limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special
+qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are
+limited to different portions and of momentary duration."]
+
+[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the
+destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14
+(_apeksh�buddhi-n�sa_), viz., _�srayan�sa_, and the united action of
+_both_:--
+
+1. Ekatva-j��na        |Avayava-kriy�              |    . . .
+2. Apeksh�buddhi       |Avayava-vibh�ga            |Avayava-kriy�.
+3. Dvitvotpatti and    |Avayava-samyoga-n�sa       |Avayava-vibh�ga.
+   ekatva-j��na-n�sa   |                           |
+4. Dvitvatvaj��na      |Dvitv�dh�rasya             |Avayava-samyoga-n�sa.
+                       |(_i.e._,                   |
+                       |avayavinah) n�sah           |
+5. Dvitvaguna-buddhi|Dvitva-n�sa                    |�dh�ra-n�sa
+   and                 |of avayavin). (_i.e._,     |
+   apeksh�buddhi-n�sa  |(of avayavin).             |
+6. Dvitva-n�sa  and    |         . . .             |Dvitva-n�sa.
+   dravya-buddhi       |                           |
+
+The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the
+course of the six steps of _ekatvaj��na_, &c., one of the two parts is
+itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the
+first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth
+moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding
+_dvitv�dh�ra-n�sa_, or, as M�dhava calls it, _�srayanivritti_. In the
+second case, the _n�sa_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by
+both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united
+action of two causes, _apeksh�buddhi-n�sa_ and _�dh�ra-n�sa_. Any
+_kriy�_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would
+be unimportant, as the _n�sa_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take
+place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and
+in this way it would be too late to affect that result.]
+
+[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apeksh�buddhi_ follows
+the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously
+described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of
+_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvaj��na_, &c. (cf.
+Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the
+counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]
+
+[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in
+the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;
+thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black
+(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two
+atoms.]
+
+[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]
+
+[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddh�nta
+Mukt�val�, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the
+destruction of the _dvyanuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from
+the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the
+destruction of the black colour in the _dvyanuka_, and the
+simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyanuka_ with
+that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the
+simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the
+action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The
+remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]
+
+[Footnote 186: The Vaiseshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old
+black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c.,
+being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour
+in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,
+eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps
+prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of
+the Ny�ya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different
+compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the
+old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes
+not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is
+red, not black.]
+
+[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read
+_gaganavibh�gakartritvasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 188: The Siddh�nta Mukt�val�, p. 112, describes the series
+of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the
+disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction
+which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.
+by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the
+severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction
+with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the
+cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second
+disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced
+by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the
+pot.]
+
+[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibh�g�n_, _i.e._,
+disjunctions from the several points.]
+
+[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of
+space.]
+
+[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad G�t�.]
+
+[Footnote 192: For _dravy�di_ read _prithivy�di_.]
+
+[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read
+_viddhavevidhay�_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vriddhav�vadhay�_.]
+
+[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a
+serpent.]
+
+[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bh�ve_.]
+
+[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadh�n�dishu_.
+_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying
+"command;" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bh�vabodhaka-kriy�_. It
+has that meaning in K�vya-prak�sa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).]
+
+[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _�loka-j��na_, therefore it would
+perceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by
+the _eye_.]
+
+[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a
+jar's absence in the dark.]
+
+[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation
+is the _dhvams�bh�va_, or "emergent non-existence."]
+
+[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p.
+110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,
+therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and
+would refer to the commentary (Vais. S�t. p. 250), "_yadi hi
+n�la-r�pavan n�lam r�pam eva v� tamah sy�t, v�hy�lokapragraham
+antarena chakshush� na grihyeta_."]
+
+[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.]
+
+[Footnote 202: "Relative non-existence" (_samsarg�bh�va_) is the
+negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is
+"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent,"
+and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the
+jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the
+spot of ground,--it is the _j�ti ghatatva_ which resides in the jar.]
+
+[Footnote 204: The opposite is "there _is_ colour in the air."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE AKSHAP�DA (OR NY�YA) DARSANA.
+
+
+The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of
+pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
+sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
+particular tenet[205] of the Ny�ya school, as is declared by the
+author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
+proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
+the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
+Ny�ya S�stra. Now the Ny�ya S�stra consists of five books, and each
+book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
+first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
+categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
+remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_v�da_). In the first
+daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
+four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
+being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
+"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
+already given [and therefore need not be added by the M�m�msakas as
+separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
+examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
+second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first
+daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravritti_),
+the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
+"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to
+the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
+first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
+of futility (_j�ti_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
+for rebuke" (_nigrahasth�na_, or "unfitness to be argued with").
+
+In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
+measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pram�na_) is
+first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
+first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
+accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
+from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of
+knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes
+the peculiar tenet of the Ny�ya School that God is a source of right
+knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
+(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
+knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
+that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
+And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
+the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
+chapter of the Kusum��jali:
+
+"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
+possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
+school, the being separated from all absence thereof.
+
+"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
+and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
+existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being
+swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
+slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Siva, is my authority; what
+have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
+with rising doubts?"
+
+"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
+analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
+right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
+objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
+fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
+is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
+possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
+therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant
+qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
+particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The
+thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
+motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.
+"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
+general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]
+A "tenet" (_siddh�nta_) is something which is accepted as being
+authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
+to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
+[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
+dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
+sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
+are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
+and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the
+showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
+of a false major[211] (cf. S�t. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of
+eleven kinds, as _vy�gh�ta_, _�tm�sraya_, _itaretar�sraya_, &c.
+
+"Ascertainment" (_nirnaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
+of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
+perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_v�da_) is
+a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
+of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only
+wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
+of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitand�_) is the talk of a man
+who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
+43). "Dialogue" (_kath�_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
+disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
+prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
+"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
+or "mistimed" (S�t. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing
+forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
+sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
+term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
+(_j�ti_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
+twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Ny�ya
+aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
+his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
+described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
+here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
+prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.
+
+But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,
+are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
+of the Ny�ya S�stra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Ny�ya_, or logic,
+properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
+We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
+said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
+Ny�ya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
+inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
+feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
+being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
+by Sarvaj�a, "This is the pre-eminent science of Ny�ya from its
+establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
+action;"[212] and by Pakshila Sw�min, "This is the science of
+reasoning (_�nv�kshik�_) divided into the different categories,
+'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
+actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
+the declarations of science."[213]
+
+But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
+arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
+ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
+"No," for it is said in the second Ny�ya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
+activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of
+these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
+by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
+thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
+"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
+soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
+it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
+to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
+"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
+stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
+impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
+by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;
+by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity"
+produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,
+as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,
+by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right
+activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
+leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
+and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
+which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
+this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
+continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
+existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
+whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
+deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
+that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
+pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
+abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced
+it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
+knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
+knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his
+mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
+things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
+disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
+them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
+cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
+absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
+that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
+as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Ny�ya S�tras:
+"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the
+successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
+the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
+them] final beatitude."
+
+"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,
+'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
+as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this
+continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
+We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
+include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
+being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
+royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
+is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
+M�dhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
+soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
+the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
+being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,
+we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
+alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued
+succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?
+(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiy�yikas allow
+that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish
+cognition as a cause of _pravritti_ or action[220]], for who would
+oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,
+then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,
+again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
+supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive
+to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
+principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
+and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
+very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].
+
+"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
+intelligence [_i.e._, the Yog�ch�ras and the Sautr�ntikas[222]], that
+'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
+the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
+there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
+the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
+if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
+contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
+as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
+things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
+they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
+irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
+recognition of the real nature of things.
+
+And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
+accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and
+when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
+establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
+able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now
+liberated.
+
+Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
+releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
+impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
+he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and
+error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
+body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
+upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of
+a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
+said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
+parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
+definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
+parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
+of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has
+parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
+non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
+this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
+Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
+what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
+thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
+during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
+which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
+former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
+soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
+"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
+agent possessing form?[227]
+
+Again, if we take the Ch�rv�ka's view "that the only bondage is
+dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
+liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
+have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
+no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
+involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
+equalled.[228]
+
+Again, the S�nkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
+are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's
+remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
+withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
+pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
+the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
+nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
+the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
+that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
+it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
+Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
+then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
+spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
+the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.
+
+Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
+doctrine of Bhatta Sarvaj�a and his followers, that "Liberation is the
+manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
+but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
+come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Sruti as the
+proof, we reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is
+precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its
+authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
+as floating stones.[230]
+
+"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
+happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
+only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
+dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
+rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
+speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
+truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of
+pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
+pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of
+perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
+involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
+its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
+proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
+since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
+incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
+is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
+attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is
+inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
+who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
+it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
+rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
+many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
+together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
+issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
+consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
+experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
+him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
+Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
+Sruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
+soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.
+
+But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
+of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Sruti? Certainly
+perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,
+must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
+universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor
+can Sruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be
+sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
+as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
+school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
+under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for
+comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
+sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a
+moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
+to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
+unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
+excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
+once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had
+a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
+(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
+rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a
+doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
+to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
+with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
+first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
+ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
+much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
+which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
+therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
+holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
+of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may
+adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the
+"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
+possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]
+
+(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
+(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal
+proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
+to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].
+(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaik�nta_), since it is never
+found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in
+the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor
+again is it precluded (_b�dhita_ or _k�l�tyayopadishta_), for there is no
+superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it
+counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be
+any such equally valid antagonist.
+
+If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
+&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
+produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this
+pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
+can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
+"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
+produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
+argument thus involves the fallacy called _vy�pyatv�siddhi_].[239] Nor
+can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
+cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
+the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
+to limitation by any suggested condition (_up�dhi_),[240] [such as
+"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
+"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
+valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
+&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
+acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
+that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
+of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
+involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
+the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
+and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
+causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
+the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
+of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
+these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
+doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
+There is a rule laid down by Sankara-kinkara which applies directly to
+the present case--
+
+     "When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
+     establish its validity,
+
+     "Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
+     account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
+     major term."
+
+If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
+"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
+&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
+whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
+not.[241]
+
+As has been said by Udayana �ch�rya [in the Kusum��jali, iii. 5]--
+
+     "If Sruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
+     fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
+     objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
+     ever."
+
+Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
+argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
+being known or unknown.[242]
+
+"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
+the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
+other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
+something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
+the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
+possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
+it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
+advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
+call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
+you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
+would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
+rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
+checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
+for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
+another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
+create the world." This has been said by Bhatt�ch�rya--
+
+     "Not even a fool acts without some object in view;
+
+     "Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
+     be left undone by  Him?"--
+
+We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for
+a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
+suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
+compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
+happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
+cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
+will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
+created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
+independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
+since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
+one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this
+there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
+Svet�svatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
+admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your
+deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
+Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
+existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
+reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
+dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
+to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It
+cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
+dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
+possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
+being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
+Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
+can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
+for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_
+endowed with the transcendent faculties (_t�vra_,[246] &c.)
+
+Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
+duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
+obtained; thus everything is clear.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.
+
+We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetv�bh�sas_
+of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddh�ntamukt._, � 71, _Tarkasamgr._,
+55-67), viz., _anaik�nta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _k�l�tyayopadishta_
+or _b�dhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first
+of these generally correspond to the _savyabhich�ra_ or "erratic,"
+_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _s�dhyasama_ or "unproved," and
+_at�tak�la_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list
+of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_
+corresponds imperfectly to _prakaranasama_. The _prakaranasama_ or
+"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
+for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
+is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
+"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
+authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
+difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is
+non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
+this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
+question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one
+which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
+eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
+is a product."
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 205: Cf. Ny�ya S�tras, i. 29.]
+
+[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
+_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Ny�ya S�t. iv.
+68).]
+
+[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include
+the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 208: �svara is a cause of right knowledge (_pram�na_)
+according to the definition, because he is _pram�y� �srayah_.]
+
+[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddh�nta-Mukt�vali, p. 115.]
+
+[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
+i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
+smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is
+the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).
+Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
+(_vy�paka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vy�pya_").]
+
+[Footnote 212: Action (_pravritti_) follows after the ascertainment of
+the truth by _ny�ya_.]
+
+[Footnote 213: Cp. V�tsy�yana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
+reads _prak�rtit�_ for _par�kshit�_.]
+
+[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
+indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]
+
+[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for
+_tannivartakam_.]
+
+[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
+authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
+eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the
+stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in K�mandaki's
+_N�tis�ra_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in V�tsy�yana's Com. p.
+3, from which M�dhava is here borrowing.]
+
+[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
+lick her ear."]
+
+[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road
+through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with
+tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]
+
+[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
+during the second, and ceases in the third.]
+
+[Footnote 220: See Ny�ya S�t. i. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
+Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiy�yikas have
+sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
+line 11.]
+
+[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]
+
+[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,
+all is unreal.]
+
+[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _klesas_ or "afflictions."]
+
+[Footnote 225: _�varana_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]
+
+[Footnote 226: But the Ny�ya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
+happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,
+mind (Bh�sh� P. � 83).]
+
+[Footnote 227: The reading _m�rtapratibandh�t_ is difficult, but I
+believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vy�pti_, as it does in S�nkhya
+S�tras, i. 100.]
+
+[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be
+_niratisaya_,--incapable of being added to.]
+
+[Footnote 229: _Yogy�nupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and
+yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
+light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_gr�v�nah plavanti_,"
+see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _asm�nah plavanti_ occurs
+in Shadv. Br. 5, 12.]
+
+[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."]
+
+[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]
+
+[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
+authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
+to reveal the existence of God.]
+
+[Footnote 234: The Ny�ya holds presumption to be included under
+inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
+relation of a name to the thing named.]
+
+[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
+everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]
+
+[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
+its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
+ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
+air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
+_visesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
+"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"
+excludes ether, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
+eternal substances being the one or the other.]
+
+[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where
+the major term is.]
+
+[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
+from the Kusum��jali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
+there. "The older Naiy�yikas maintained that the argument 'the
+mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
+vy�pyatv�siddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
+restricted (see Siddh�nta Mukt�v. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
+wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
+objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
+validity of the assumed middle term."]
+
+[Footnote 240: For the _up�dhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]
+
+[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
+subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
+to the fault of _�sray�siddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your
+subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
+locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusum��jali, iii. 2). "Just as
+that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
+unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]
+
+[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
+He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
+p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpapar�hatatv�t_, and then begin
+the next clause with _sy�d etat_. The printed text, _vikalpapar�hatah
+sy�t tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]
+
+[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
+Hiranyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
+as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
+constitutes his gross body (vir�j).]
+
+[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]
+
+[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyony�sraya_ fallacy, see
+_Ny�yas�tra vritti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]
+
+[Footnote 246: For _t�vra_ cf. _Yoga s�tras_, i. 21, 22.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+THE JAIMINI-DARSANA.
+
+
+An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
+merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how
+is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
+reply to this question has been given in the older[247] M�m�ms� by the
+holy sage Jaimini. Now the M�m�ms� consists of twelve books.[248] In
+the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
+of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),
+"explanatory passage" (_arthav�da_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition
+(_smriti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
+[as _e.g._, on _ap�rva_] relating to the difference of various rites,
+refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
+performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
+third, _Sruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_linga_), "context"
+(_v�kya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent
+opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karm�ni_,
+things mentioned incidentally (_an�rabhy�dh�ta_), things accessory to
+several main objects, as _pray�jas_, &c., and the duties of the
+sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
+principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juh�_ being
+made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which
+form subordinate parts of the _r�jas�ya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the
+relative order of different passages of _Sruti_, &c., the order of
+different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
+_v�japeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
+the respective force of the words of _Sruti_, order of mention, &c.,
+in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
+qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
+enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
+rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the
+different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
+ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
+text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
+transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
+"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
+takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
+adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_�ha_), the
+adaptation of _s�mans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions
+connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
+the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
+non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
+are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
+discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _s�mans_,
+and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
+negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
+fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined
+into one], and _�v�pa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In
+the twelfth, a discussion on _prasanga_ [where the rite is performed
+for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
+_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.
+
+Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the
+P�rva-M�m�ms� arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
+know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
+"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the
+subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _prim� facie_ argument, (_d._)
+the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sangati_).
+The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
+teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
+sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
+whether the study of Jaimini's _s�stra_ concerning duty, beginning
+with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
+instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
+_anv�h�rya_," is to be commenced or not. The _prim� facie_ argument is
+that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
+Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
+fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
+fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning
+of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
+enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
+or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
+we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,
+for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
+from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
+reading the Mah�bh�rata; and we see by this argument that it would
+present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
+injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
+baked flour cake called _purod�sa_ is made only of rice prepared by
+being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
+have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
+and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
+the principal _ap�rva_, by means of the various minor effects or
+subordinate _ap�rvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of
+the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _ap�rva_ of the
+unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
+the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
+restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
+knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
+studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
+no injunction to study the P�rva M�m�ms� as a means of knowing the
+sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
+injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
+the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
+although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
+words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
+which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
+is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
+Visvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
+that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
+that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
+offer the Visvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
+characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
+present case also. As it has been said--
+
+"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
+injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
+heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
+analogy of the Visvajit, &c."
+
+Thus, too, we shall keep the Smriti rule from being violated: "Having
+read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
+long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
+student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
+he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
+house to read the M�m�ms� discussions, and thus the idea of no
+interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three
+reasons, (_a._) that the study of M�m�ms� is not enjoined, (_b._) that
+heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)
+that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
+we maintain that the study of the M�m�ms� discussions on duty is not
+to be commenced.
+
+The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddh�nta_), however, is as
+follows:--
+
+We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been
+adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
+could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
+of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
+_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be
+rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
+effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
+corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
+Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
+word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
+reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
+end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
+consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
+the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
+the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
+mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
+never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
+production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us
+is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
+sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
+has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
+aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
+sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
+the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
+written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
+"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
+reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
+duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _ap�rva_,
+produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
+establishes the subordinate _ap�rvas_ produced by the inferior
+sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _ap�rva_
+produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
+_ap�rva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which
+prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
+sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this
+future influence called _ap�rva_, the same doubt might equally
+invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same
+level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
+that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Visvajit_
+offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
+of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
+suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
+     unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of
+     a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."
+
+But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
+the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
+who reads the Veda with its _angas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this
+knowledge, the study of M�m�ms� will be useless." But this is not
+true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
+literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
+discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
+gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will
+determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
+with oil, &c.; it is only by a M�m�ms� discussion that the true
+meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
+brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of
+M�m�ms� is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
+passage of Smriti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
+implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
+any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
+return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
+read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
+both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
+common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
+the injunction we conclude that the study of the P�rva M�m�ms� S�stra,
+consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic
+is connected with the main subject of the S�stra as being a subsidiary
+digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
+which helps to establish the main subject."[257]
+
+I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
+in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabh�kara.
+
+In the Smriti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
+eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct
+him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
+Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
+ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
+since, by P�nini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _n�_ is used in the
+_�tmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a
+teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
+pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
+both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
+Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Br�hman who girds his pupil with the
+sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
+_angas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_�ch�rya_)."
+Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
+without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
+very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
+obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
+one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
+the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
+if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
+injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
+as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuv�da_
+or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _prim� facie_
+argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
+was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
+another way to suit this new view.
+
+Now the _prim� facie_ argument was that the study of M�m�ms�, not
+being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
+"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
+authoritatively enjoined.
+
+Now the upholders of the former or _prim� facie_ view argue as
+follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
+dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
+understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
+bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
+teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
+what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
+and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
+sufficient, the M�m�ms� discussions in question will have no subject
+or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
+doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
+way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
+should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
+the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
+accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
+use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
+intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
+in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
+present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
+useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of M�m�ms�
+is not to be commenced."
+
+We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
+corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
+still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _angas_, and
+has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
+respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
+of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
+may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
+son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
+not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
+eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
+meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old
+objection will recur with full force that the study of M�m�ms� will
+have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
+the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
+astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
+that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
+really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
+the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
+poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
+trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
+this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
+which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
+literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
+doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
+intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of M�m�ms�
+discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
+"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
+obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
+authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
+subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
+M�m�ms� _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.
+
+"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Ny�ya], "but how can
+the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
+is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
+personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
+tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
+with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged
+characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those
+who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of
+tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
+universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
+is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
+no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
+since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
+second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
+viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
+some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former
+supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
+apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
+overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is
+inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
+omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
+person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
+personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda
+must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
+character of sentences like those of K�lid�sa and other writers. And,
+again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
+person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
+time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.
+
+But [ask the M�m�msakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
+Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
+since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
+which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
+uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
+This reasoning, however [the Naiy�yikas answer], cannot rise to the
+height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
+illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mah�bh�rata was preceded by
+an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
+of the Mah�bh�rata, which must have been the same in former times as
+now." But [the M�m�msakas will ask whether there is not a difference
+between these two cases, since] the Smriti declares that [Vishnu
+incarnate as] Vy�sa was the author of the Mah�bh�rata, in accordance
+with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be the maker
+of the Mah�bh�rata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
+Smriti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
+since those words of the Purushas�kta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
+sprang the Rich and S�man verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
+him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.
+
+Further [proceed the Naiy�yikas] we hold that sound is
+non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
+external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]
+"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
+arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)
+as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
+extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
+our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as
+in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
+of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the M�m�msaka] how
+can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara, who has
+no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
+pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiy�yika] is
+not happy, because, though Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he
+can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
+worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
+the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."
+
+I shall now [says the M�m�msaka] clear up the whole question. What is
+meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]
+which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)
+from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
+ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with
+a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of
+proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
+If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
+us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
+(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)
+The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
+equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the M�lat�m�dhava
+[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
+character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
+clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line
+21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
+sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
+prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
+establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
+other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just
+as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
+if we granted that Paramesvara might assume a body in sport, in order
+to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
+he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
+of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
+time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
+other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
+for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
+experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabh�kara] when he
+refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--
+
+     "Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]
+     it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
+     thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
+     or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
+     of form."
+
+Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
+by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
+Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Rich and S�man verses"]. For the
+rule of P�nini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
+grammatical affixes with which such names as K�thaka, K�l�pa, and
+Taittir�ya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
+"uttered by" Katha, Kal�pin, &c., though we maintain that these names
+have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
+these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
+schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
+reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
+institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.
+
+Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,
+because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
+consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
+the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
+the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
+identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this
+idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
+forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
+the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
+shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
+cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises
+from the latter reason, we M�m�msakas, who hold that the Veda is its
+own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--
+
+     "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
+     him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
+     go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
+     mass of doubts."
+
+(_b._) "But [the Naiy�yikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
+and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
+species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
+individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
+different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
+such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somasarman is reading'?" This
+objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
+as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
+there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
+_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
+[the Naiy�yika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
+Naiy�yika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
+magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
+modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
+short; so to the man who does not understand our [M�m�msaka doctrine
+of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
+diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
+respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
+ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
+distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
+contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
+[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
+from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
+for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
+admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
+uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
+times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
+distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
+difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
+apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
+that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
+indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
+"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
+which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
+teacher--
+
+     "The object which the Naiy�yikas seek by supposing a species
+     is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
+     which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
+     is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
+     of species is useless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
+     recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
+     superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
+     non-eternity."
+
+This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiy�yika] treatise
+by V�g�swara, entitled _M�na-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the
+fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
+sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."
+
+We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the
+[S�nkhya and Ved�nta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
+overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if
+we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no
+dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)
+the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_up�dhi_] of
+_asr�vanatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at
+great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
+imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
+perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
+non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
+such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
+arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply
+[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises
+from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
+story, the demon T�la went away [as well as Bet�la] when the offering
+of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised
+by the author of the _Ny�yabh�shana_,[279] that, if sound were
+eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
+perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
+allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
+articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiy�yika) argument against the
+existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
+between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
+both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
+invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
+the soul.[282]
+
+Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
+personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
+thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
+that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
+duty.
+
+"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how
+about another well-known controversy? It is said--
+
+"'The S�nkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
+are self-proved; the followers of the Ny�ya hold that both are proved by
+something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
+self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
+Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
+non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
+this discussion, how do the M�m�msakas accept as established their tenet
+that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
+of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that
+authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the
+right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the
+instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge
+in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
+knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right
+knowledge?
+
+"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of
+cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
+these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness
+cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if
+knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
+would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)
+It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
+be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general
+characteristic (_up�dhi_) or a species (_j�ti_);[287] for if we call
+it an _up�dhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
+contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
+the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we
+all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
+we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)
+Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
+knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
+causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
+the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
+'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
+_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
+particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
+therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
+knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
+M�m�msakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
+considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong
+knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
+produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask
+whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which
+produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
+of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
+followers of the Ny�ya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
+something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that
+authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
+combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter
+alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
+'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
+absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
+right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
+presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same
+time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that
+non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
+whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
+should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
+non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
+effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
+at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusum��jali,
+i. 10]--
+
+     "'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
+     as well as an effect.'
+
+"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge
+depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,
+from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
+just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through
+something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises
+in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
+non-authoritativeness.
+
+"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
+and recognised by means of something external, the M�m�ms� tenet that
+'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
+rotten."
+
+This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
+strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase
+"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
+instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other
+cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
+full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
+causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
+produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
+knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be
+brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
+something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
+equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
+produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
+is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being
+knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
+arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless
+complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
+it a _guna_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]
+
+"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
+knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
+right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
+absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
+acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
+     _gunas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence
+     the non-existence of the two kinds of
+     non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general
+     conclusion."[300]
+
+(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
+by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
+knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this
+view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
+thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
+although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
+also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
+&c.
+
+As for your argument [O Naiy�yika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines
+17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
+or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
+itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
+whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
+should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some
+other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
+will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.
+
+As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusum��jali, when he
+tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
+on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
+which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
+of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
+a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
+an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
+closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
+on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
+throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the M�m�ms� idea of
+the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
+action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
+who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
+actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
+that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
+knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
+causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
+distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
+authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
+deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
+as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
+authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
+is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
+have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
+controversy; since it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
+     (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
+     fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
+     which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
+     discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]
+
+Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
+authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
+divergency between the two great M�m�ms� schools]:--The Veda is
+composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_),
+"explanatory passages" (_arthav�da_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and
+by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
+sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third
+person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
+rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
+opinion of the followers of Bhatta Kum�rila, who maintain that words
+signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the
+sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabh�kara, on the contrary, hold
+that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
+they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
+done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 247: M�dhava here calls it the _pr�ch� M�m�ms�_.]
+
+[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Ny�yam�l�vist_, pp. 5-9.]
+
+[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
+priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
+one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
+_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;
+but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
+thus it must be a case of _�v�pa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately
+(_J. Ny�yam�l�_, xi. 1, 13).]
+
+[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshana-drishtaphala_.]
+
+[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter
+a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam apr�pto niyamah p�kshike
+sati, tatra ch�nyatra cha pr�ptau parisamkhy� vidh�yate_.]
+
+[Footnote 252: The M�m�ms� holds that the potential and similar
+affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one
+they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
+root-meaning (_artha-bh�van�_); by the other an enforcing power in the
+word (_sabda-bh�van�_). Thus in _svargak�mo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies
+"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
+up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
+an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
+self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
+course of action.]
+
+[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
+remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
+that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
+perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
+six _vik�ras_ mentioned in Sankara's Vajras�chi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,
+_j�yate_, _vardhate_, _viparinamate_, _apaksh�yate_, _nasyati_. I do
+not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
+_ap�rva_, sc. _phala_, _samud�ya_, _utpatti_, and _anga_, described in
+Ny�ya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]
+
+[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Y�ska's
+_nirukta_.]
+
+[Footnote 255: See Ny�ya-m�l�-vistara, i. 4, 19.]
+
+[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]
+
+[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the
+_samgati_.]
+
+[Footnote 258: Cf. Asval�yana's Grihya S�tras, i. 19, 1.]
+
+[Footnote 259: The _anuv�da_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,
+which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
+authority. The _anuv�da_ in the present case is the passage which
+mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
+_vidhi_ as to teaching.]
+
+[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyam�nasya_, and so
+the recension given in the Ny�ya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyam�nasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently
+borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
+iii. p. 88.]
+
+[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive
+transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]
+
+[Footnote 263: M�dhava means that the author of this stanza, though
+unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
+contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
+perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
+an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
+origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
+question is quoted in full in B�htlingk's Indische Spr�che, No. 5598,
+from the MS. anthology called the _Subh�shit�rnava_. For _muktaka_,
+see _S�h. Darp._, � 558.]
+
+[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
+M�m�ms� that sound is eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
+air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _visesha_, not
+_s�m�nya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
+Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
+reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
+arguments belong rather to the Ny�ya-vaiseshika school than to the
+Ny�ya.]
+
+[Footnote 266: The M�m�msaka allows that the _uchch�rana_ or utterance
+is non-eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
+arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
+their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
+sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
+after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
+possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
+composition of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
+material limitations.]
+
+[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
+developments (_atisay�h_) in their saints.]
+
+[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
+"manifest" the always existing sound.]
+
+[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_n�da_) is these
+'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
+air."--_Ballantyne_, _M�m�ms� Aphorisms_, i. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 273: The Ny�ya holds that colour and sound are respectively
+special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
+of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
+course, have its corresponding special quality.]
+
+[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyaksh�siddheh_.]
+
+[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Ch�rv�ka-darsana) for the
+_up�dhi_. The _up�dhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle
+term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
+but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
+"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
+mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
+Here, in answer to the Ny�ya argument in the text, our author objects
+that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
+belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes
+found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in
+_sound_ itself, according to the M�m�ms� doctrine. To obviate this he
+proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
+readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while
+not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
+sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
+would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the P�rva M�m�ms� and
+the Ny�ya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
+sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]
+
+[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwamsa_ of sound, in
+the latter its _pr�gabh�va_.]
+
+[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _sam�pohi_,
+_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _�h_.]
+
+[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. T�la and Bet�la are the two
+demons who carry Vikram�ditya on their shoulders in the
+Simh�san-batt�s�. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
+how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]
+
+[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bh�sarvaj�a (see Dr. Hall's
+_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]
+
+[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the
+vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
+is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
+a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _samskrita_
+here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]
+
+[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,
+_samsk�rakasamsk�ryabh�v�bh�v�num�nam_.]
+
+[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhich�ra_. The Naiy�yika
+argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus
+manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
+senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
+species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
+manifested by the species. But the M�m�ms� rejoins that this would
+equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
+perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
+manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
+sure that I rightly understand the argument.]
+
+[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _p�rva-paksha_, from p. 131, line
+18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 284: This is Prabh�kara's view (see Siddh. Mukt�v., p. 118).
+The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_pr�m�nya_),
+which resides in it as its characteristic.]
+
+[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
+and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
+a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
+quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
+and therefore a substance.]
+
+[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]
+
+[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
+"action," are called _j�tis_ or species; the last four, "genus,"
+"_visesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
+_up�dhis_ or "general characteristics."]
+
+[Footnote 288: The P�rva M�m�ms� denies that recollection is right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
+causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
+_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]
+
+[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _dosh�bh�va_ there is _pram�_; if
+not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _dosh�bh�vatvena_ for
+_dosh�bh�vasahakritatvena_.]
+
+[Footnote 291: _Anyath�siddhatvam_ means _niyatap�rvavartitve sati
+an�vasyakatvam_.]
+
+[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _dosh�bh�va_.]
+
+[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _dosh�bh�va_ or the presence of a
+"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]
+
+[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apram�tva_) can only reside in
+knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in
+a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes
+than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it
+is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also
+produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has
+nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in
+Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass
+muster. The jar is not
+produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-
+at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]
+
+[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
+the previous long p�rva-paksha.]
+
+[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect"
+(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
+knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
+bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
+the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former
+alone.]
+
+[Footnote 297: The Ny�ya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
+"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
+_guna_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
+true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]
+
+[Footnote 298: The _guna_ (or [Greek: beltist� hexis]) of an organ is not
+properly a cause of _pram�_ but rather _dosh�bh�va-bodhaka_.]
+
+[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained
+non-authoritativeness" (_nischit�pr�m�nya_).]
+
+[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not
+necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
+conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
+causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
+of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _pr�m�nya_.]
+
+[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
+and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
+Kusum��jali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
+edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]
+
+[Footnote 303: I read _tat-pr�churyam_ for _tatpr�churye_ in p. 134,
+line 7.]
+
+[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the M�m�ms�
+school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
+is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]
+
+[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _sakti_; _siddhe_
+means _ghat�dau_.]
+
+[Footnote 306: These are the two great M�m�ms� schools. The former, called
+_abhihit�nvaya-v�dinah_, hold (like the Naiy�yika school) that words by
+themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidh�_ or
+"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
+one connected idea. The latter, called _anvit�bhidh�na-v�dinah_, hold that
+words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
+connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
+with an action. In _g�m �naya_, _g�m_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but
+_�nayan�nvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with
+"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
+and _vice vers�_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative
+Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
+we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
+But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
+which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
+thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
+as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+THE P�NINI-DARSANA.[307]
+
+
+If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
+affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
+this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
+waters of Pata�jali this question produces no confusion, since it is
+notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
+of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
+first sentence of the venerable Pata�jali, the author of the "Great
+Commentary," is "_atha sabd�nus�sanam_," "Now comes the exposition of
+words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new
+topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
+meant the system of grammar put forth by P�nini. Now a doubt might
+here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
+words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
+doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle
+implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
+exclusion of everything else.
+
+The word "exposition" (_anus�sana_), as here used, implies that thereby
+Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no dev�r abhishtaye_,[308]
+&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
+"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of
+the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly
+formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
+We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
+the object [_sabd�nus�sanam_ standing for _sabdasy�nus�sanam_], and as
+there is a rule of P�nini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
+composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
+phrase _sabd�nus�sanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised
+compound.
+
+Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
+alleged rule of P�nini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
+object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
+connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object
+alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this
+limitation arising from our taking _ubhayapr�pti_ in the s�tra as a
+_bahuvr�hi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
+of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
+that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
+in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
+the K�sik� Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
+option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
+equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the
+teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
+the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
+relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once
+understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any
+such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
+and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,
+this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
+ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
+rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
+connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the
+genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_
+compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
+such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _pal�sa-s�tana_,
+&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
+_shashth�tatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in
+accordance with P�nini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
+in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for
+by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase
+against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
+alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
+thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
+genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
+hence Bhartrihari in his _V�kyapad�ya_ has shown that these rules are
+mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this
+effect are the words of the great doctor Vardham�na--
+
+     "In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
+
+     "But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
+     employed.
+
+     "Thus have they explained the meaning of P�nini's s�tras,
+     since
+
+     "He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and
+     _tatprayojakah_."[314]
+
+Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
+(of the _Mah�bh�shya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
+of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
+concerning words' are now commenced."
+
+"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
+meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
+as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
+excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
+the employment of such a word as _sabd�nus�sanam_, the sense of which
+can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
+intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
+subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were
+no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
+readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
+will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
+with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
+(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,
+it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
+is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda.
+Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
+haste to say--
+
+     "Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
+     common life,
+
+     "And therefore grammar is useless?"
+
+Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the
+Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
+students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
+it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
+set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that
+grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
+should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
+knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
+involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
+consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
+sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
+incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswat�." Now
+it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of
+the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabd�nus�sanam_ and not _atha
+vy�karanam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
+end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
+in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
+the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
+concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
+say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
+true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
+word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
+understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
+into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that
+Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
+words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
+word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
+Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
+years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much
+less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
+rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,
+practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
+would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
+word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
+consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not
+established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
+knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
+And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
+examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
+roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
+this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
+for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix
+_an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
+it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhak�ra_, "a potter,"
+_k�ndal�va_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special
+rule (iii. 2, 3), _�to 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_
+is to be used after a root that ends in long _�_ when there is no
+_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
+[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But
+since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the
+one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the
+principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
+is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
+     austerities,
+
+     "The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda."
+
+Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
+the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,
+of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
+great Commentary [quoting a V�rttika], "the end (or motive) is
+preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]
+Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
+K�ty�yana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
+according to the _s�stra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda
+itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly
+understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
+Thus (they say)--
+
+     "They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
+     well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;
+
+     "But those who use such false forms as _ach�kramata_ must
+     trudge thither on foot."[320]
+
+Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
+since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
+For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
+heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
+the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
+commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of
+words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
+mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
+tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
+(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
+"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
+the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
+three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
+(_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._,
+from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
+_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the
+word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the
+great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters
+mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
+declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.
+
+The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the
+world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in
+the part of his book called the Brahmak�nda--
+
+     "Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
+     essence of speech,
+
+     "Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
+     springs the creation of the world."
+
+"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
+and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
+too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prak�rnaka--
+
+     "Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
+     fivefold,
+
+     "Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
+     like."
+
+Hel�r�ja interprets the fivefold division as including
+_karmapravachan�yas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
+great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachan�yas_ distinguish a
+connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
+out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
+kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
+(_upasargas_).[324]
+
+"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
+_sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
+is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
+there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
+distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
+absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
+word is a false perception.
+
+Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as
+otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
+word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
+bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
+following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
+of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
+first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
+cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
+single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
+[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
+other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
+(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
+cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which
+arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal
+sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
+the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or
+revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by
+the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
+_sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two
+etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
+said by the worshipful Pata�jali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
+the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
+there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
+hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage
+commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
+from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
+expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
+following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
+wished]," and ending, "The _V�kyapad�ya_ has established at length
+that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed
+by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]
+
+Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
+that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
+under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
+convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
+latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
+conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed
+to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
+independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
+to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
+alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself
+manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
+manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
+adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
+of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
+hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has
+been said by Bhatta in his M�m�ms�-sloka-v�rttika--
+
+     "The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the
+     letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
+     and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
+     difficulty."
+
+The truth is, that, as P�nini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (S�t. ii. 123) both
+lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
+the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
+apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
+help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as
+in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _d�n�_ as in _nad�_, in _m�ra_ as in
+_r�ma_, in _r�ja_ as in _j�ra_, &c., these several pairs of words would
+not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
+of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
+said by Taut�tita--
+
+     "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
+     perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
+     be the meaning which they convey."
+
+Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
+attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
+alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
+thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
+letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
+view having been shown to be irrelevant].
+
+All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
+a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
+you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
+conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
+collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]
+could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
+separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
+the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
+with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
+"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
+together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
+Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a
+horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
+perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
+pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
+power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
+manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
+imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
+involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
+one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
+convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
+their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
+their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
+letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
+_sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
+thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
+alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
+will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
+with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is
+only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
+between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
+reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this
+_sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
+is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
+of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
+manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
+authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
+sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
+the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
+letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that
+the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
+the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
+such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to
+assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct
+category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
+has been established in the discussion (in the Mah�bh�shya) on "genus"
+(_j�ti_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
+ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]
+(Brahman).
+
+"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
+will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
+ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
+uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
+purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--
+
+     "The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
+     be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
+     and not by combination."
+
+     "Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
+     trouble of refuting."
+
+All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
+colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
+blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is
+variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
+severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
+various conventional words which arise from the different
+species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum
+genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have
+the following authoritative testimony--
+
+     "Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
+     joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
+     possessing that colour."
+
+And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
+divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with
+different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
+words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
+This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
+affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (P�nini v. 1, 119).
+
+"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,
+horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
+resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really
+different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and
+_asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
+residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
+expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum
+genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
+cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
+of the stem-word (_pr�tipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as
+that which expresses _bh�va_;[333] now, as _bh�va_ is "existence," the
+meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root
+should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriy�_); but here
+again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
+"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
+subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
+line--
+
+     "Others say that action (_kriy�_) is a genus, residing in
+     many individuals."
+
+So, too, if we accept P�nini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
+affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we
+speak of the nature (_bh�va_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
+that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _t�_ [as _asvatva_ and
+_asvat�_] are used in the sense of _bh�va_, that they do express
+"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
+coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
+phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
+space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
+Such is the meaning of Hari's two _k�rik�s_ quoted above. So, too, it
+is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that
+the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
+Substance.
+
+"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
+substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
+object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
+discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
+[without owners] is expressed."[336]
+
+So, too, the author of the Mah�bh�shya, when explaining the
+V�rttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
+in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
+meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
+determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of
+horse," &c.]
+
+According to the opinion of V�japy�yana, who maintains that all words
+mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides
+by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
+apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
+particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,
+denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
+connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
+connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
+in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
+the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
+into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
+produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"
+we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly
+denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
+denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c.,
+since we find here a meaning common to all who read.
+
+In the doctrine of Vy�di, who maintained that words meant individual
+things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
+forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
+[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
+"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]
+
+Both views are allowed by the great teacher P�nini; since in i. 2, 58,
+he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
+"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
+optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Br�hman is to be honoured,"
+which may equally run, "Br�hmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
+64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
+where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
+things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means R�ma and R�ma, and the
+plural means R�ma, and R�ma and R�ma; but we retain only one, adding a
+dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
+assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
+Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is
+that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.
+
+As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
+     true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
+     shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."
+
+Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the
+nature of this true meaning--
+
+     "That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
+     perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
+     doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who
+     know the end of the three Vedas."
+
+So too in his description of substance, he says--
+
+     "_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of
+     modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
+     earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they
+     call the Supreme Nature."
+
+The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
+to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
+cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.
+
+"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
+identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
+thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
+souls."[344]
+
+The meaning of this K�rik� is that Brahman is the one object denoted
+by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
+it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
+the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
+result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
+power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
+conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
+the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Ved�nta lore tell us--
+
+     "As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
+     of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
+     development of illusion likewise."
+
+When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
+joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
+ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best
+defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
+text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
+Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the
+"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
+     diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
+     science of sciences."[347]
+
+And so again--
+
+     "This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
+     final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
+     travellers to emancipation."
+
+Therefore our final conclusion is that the S�stra of grammar should be
+studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 307: M�dhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
+adopted and fully developed the idea of the P�rva-M�m�ms� school that
+sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his
+Jaimini chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]
+
+[Footnote 309: _Sabd�nus�sana_, if judged by the apparent sense of
+P�nini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
+because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
+whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
+an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as
+_�ch�ryena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _�scharyo
+godoho sikshitena gop�lena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
+can we say _�scharyo gav�m doho' sikshitasya gop�lasya_ (as it would
+violate ii. 3, 66).]
+
+[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayapr�pti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a
+_bahuvr�hi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
+discussed at some length in the Commentaries on P�nini.]
+
+[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to P�nini, ii.
+2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_
+(_i.e._, _shashth�-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]
+
+[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in P�nini's own s�tras (i. 4, 30,
+and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
+to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
+_shashth� seshe_.]
+
+[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabd�nus�sanam_ implies the
+Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.]
+
+[Footnote 316: Compare Max M�ller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is
+quoted as from the Veda in the Mah�bh�shya.]
+
+[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3
+after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabd�n�m_.]
+
+[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]
+
+[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mah�bh�shya_, pp. 12, 64.]
+
+[Footnote 320: _Ach�kramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form
+of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.]
+
+[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
+lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.]
+
+[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _s�myam_,
+but the Mah�bh�shya has _nah s�myam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]
+
+[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases
+of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]
+
+[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachan�yas_ imply a verb other than the one
+expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
+by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _S�kalyasamhit�m anu
+pr�varshat_, "he rained after the S�kalya hymns," _anu_ implies an
+understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
+is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
+_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]
+
+[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might
+mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]
+
+[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
+_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _vin�_ after _nimittam_.]
+
+[Footnote 329: The ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are
+collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
+by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
+dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddesy�siddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphotakabh�vam_ for
+_sphot�bh�vam_.]
+
+[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mah�bh�shya, pp. 9,
+32.]
+
+[Footnote 332: The M�m�ms� holds that a word means the genus (_j�ti_)
+and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Ny�ya holds that a word means
+an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]
+
+[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Pr�tis. xii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
+the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]
+
+[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]
+
+[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really
+meant, the one abiding existence.]
+
+[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mah�bh�shya, pp. 44, 50.]
+
+[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _asvattha_.]
+
+[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical
+categories, _j�ti_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sanjn�_, and _kriy�_.]
+
+[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Mukt�v., p. 6, line 12.]
+
+[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddh�nta Mukt�vali, p. 82, that
+the M�m�ms� holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
+since otherwise there would be _vyabhich�ra_ and _�nantya_ (cf. also
+Mahesachandra Ny�yaratna's note, K�vya-prak�sa, p. 10). If a word is
+held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as
+it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
+include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an
+endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]
+
+[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasm�t
+dvayam satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasm�d
+advayam satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]
+
+[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
+exists.]
+
+[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_j�va_) and Brahman.]
+
+[Footnote 345: The _Samvriti_ of the text seems to correspond to the
+_�varana_ so frequent in Ved�nta books.]
+
+[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitr� Upanishad, vi.
+22.]
+
+[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
+it is explained by [']Samkara as _vidy�sv adhi yad dar[']sanam tad
+adhividyam_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE S�NKHYA-DARSANA.
+
+
+"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
+by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _p�rva_ and _uttara_
+M�m�ms� schools], when the system of development propounded by the
+S�nkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
+the S�stra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
+several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,
+that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
+and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is
+only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
+itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
+the evolvent (_prakriti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
+of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
+expressed [in the S�nkhya K�rik�], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
+It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
+the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
+&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
+should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a
+_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued
+series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
+senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the
+hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
+egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the S�nkhya K�rik� (� 3),
+"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
+the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great
+principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute
+of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
+egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhim�na_), is the evolute
+of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
+the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
+subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
+the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
+perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
+action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
+mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
+our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
+cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
+by �svara Krishna in his K�rik�s[351] (� 24-27), "Self-consciousness
+is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
+the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the
+class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
+elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
+darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
+one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
+ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
+voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
+mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
+organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with
+them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher
+V�chaspati Misra in the S�nkhya-tattva-kaumud�.
+
+(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,
+and the eleven organs, as said in the K�rik�, "The evolute consists of
+sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
+evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents
+of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different
+"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are
+not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
+that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
+jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
+consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of
+dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
+ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
+and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
+precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
+two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs
+has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the S�nkhya
+K�rik� (� 22)--
+
+     "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
+     this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
+     proceed the five gross elements."
+
+(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the K�rik�, "The soul is
+neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
+eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
+nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
+establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the K�rik� (� 4).
+
+"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
+acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode
+of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
+which is to be proven."
+
+Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
+effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from
+the non-existent; the Naiy�yikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent
+is produced from the existent; the Ved�ntins, that all effects are an
+illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
+existent; while the S�nkhyas hold that the existent is produced from
+the existent.
+
+(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
+itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
+than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
+identical.
+
+(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
+it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
+originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
+produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the
+cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are
+not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
+incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
+regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
+the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
+existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
+produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
+the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
+milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
+the production of a thing previously non-existent.
+
+Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
+with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's
+existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
+two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
+from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
+of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the S�nkhya
+teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
+no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
+who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
+utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
+not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
+capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
+from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
+allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
+oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
+non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
+whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
+not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
+apply here].
+
+From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
+that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
+is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
+[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
+we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
+cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
+other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
+is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
+its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate
+threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
+office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
+of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
+limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
+and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
+as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and
+are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
+concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
+as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
+existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad G�t� (ii. 16)--
+
+     "There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
+     non-existence for the existent."
+
+And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
+the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakriti_). This has
+been said [in the K�rik�, � 9]--
+
+     "Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
+     cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
+     selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
+     every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
+     is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]
+
+Nor can we say [with the Ved�ntin] that the world is an illusory
+emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
+contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _prim�
+facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
+of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
+discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
+nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
+unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
+to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
+mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
+similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of
+the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
+endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
+a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material
+cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
+case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
+composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
+goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
+activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
+darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
+(_i.e._, _prakriti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
+found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
+happiness is found in his wife Satyavat�, because the quality of
+"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
+her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
+towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
+possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
+manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
+causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
+viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
+being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
+the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused,"
+since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
+which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
+composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
+Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
+in the Svet�svatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--
+
+     "The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
+     unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
+     a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
+     her when once she has been enjoyed."
+
+Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
+"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally
+possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
+concealing.
+
+Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
+Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
+produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some
+intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
+supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
+unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
+experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
+intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
+the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
+unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
+unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
+has been said in the K�rik� (� 57)--
+
+     "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
+     calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."
+
+But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
+which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
+existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
+hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
+act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply
+that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be
+no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
+living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
+compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
+reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
+created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
+at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He
+had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
+Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of
+the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union
+of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
+as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
+unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
+proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
+caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
+blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
+experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
+the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
+fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
+recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or
+absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
+Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
+Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]
+travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
+separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
+dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
+mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
+indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
+man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
+effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
+dependent. This has been said in the K�rik� (� 21)--
+
+     "For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
+     separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
+     and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."
+
+"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
+the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply,
+that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
+does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
+retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
+the K�rik� (� 59)--
+
+     "As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
+     desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
+     manifested herself to Soul."
+
+For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
+of the atheistic S�nkhya School, been propounded.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]
+
+[Footnote 349: Compare Kusum��jali, i. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 350: One great defect in the S�nkhya nomenclature is the
+ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddh�_) and those for
+mind (_manas_). M�dhava here applies to the former the term
+_antahkarana_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
+have ventured to alter it in the translation.]
+
+[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is M�dhava's principal S�nkhya
+authority, and not the S�nkhya S�tras.]
+
+[Footnote 352: _Vaikrita_ is here a technical term meaning that
+goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this K�rik�,
+comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the S�nkhya-s�ra, pp. 30-35.]
+
+[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
+reading _samkalpavikalp�tmakam_ must be corrected by the S�nkhya
+K�rik�.]
+
+[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanm�tras_
+will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
+elements.]
+
+[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]
+
+[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabh�va_) cannot be
+altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]
+
+[Footnote 357: I take _arth�ntaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.
+T�r�n�tha Tarkav�chaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumud�_, p. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.]
+
+[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of
+beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
+and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
+caused their misery at all.]
+
+[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only
+_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.
+_S�nkhyapravachanabh�shya_, i. 58).]
+
+[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
+is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in
+the Gesta Romanorum.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+THE PATANJALI-DARS�NA.
+
+
+We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
+opinions of such Munis as Pata�jali and others, who originated the
+system of the Theistic S�nkhya philosophy. This school follows the
+so-called Yoga S�stra promulgated by Pata�jali, and consisting of four
+chapters, which also bears the name of the "S�nkhya Pravachana," or
+detailed explanation of the S�nkhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof
+the venerable Pata�jali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
+exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the
+Yoga S�stra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
+his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
+the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
+Meditation (_sam�dhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of
+aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
+mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
+the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet
+thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
+or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
+series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
+spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,
+contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
+"subjugation" (_samyama_), and also the various superhuman powers
+which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
+series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
+mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
+Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
+"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five
+principles [of the S�nkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme
+Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
+fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
+to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and
+is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
+of mundane existence.
+
+"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
+of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
+Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
+Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
+is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
+influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
+quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
+declared--
+
+     "It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
+     understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
+     torment,[365]
+
+     And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
+     identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."
+
+It has been also said by Pata�jali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer,
+which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
+object which is developed and transferred experiences the
+modifications thereof."
+
+Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
+the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or
+reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it
+experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,
+being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
+understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
+in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
+and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
+the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
+thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
+forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
+for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
+length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
+between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
+ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
+desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
+undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.
+
+The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
+concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
+intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
+object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
+and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
+word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
+[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
+be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
+_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
+particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
+gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_
+is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now
+(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'
+Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
+comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly
+suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
+previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
+singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for
+it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
+"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
+whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
+general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence
+[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
+accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
+inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
+something else; and since this is at once understood without any
+direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
+_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
+because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
+does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet
+these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
+exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
+[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold
+that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
+predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
+mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
+(_anus�sana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
+which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,
+divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
+such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the
+rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
+follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
+others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
+knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,
+in accordance with the words of Sruti: "Therefore having become
+tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
+and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word
+_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
+knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
+even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
+mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
+produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
+[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
+exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
+or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
+presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
+must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it
+is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we
+have such a passage of the Sruti as that [in the Katha Upanishad, ii.
+12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the
+Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
+sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smriti as that [in the
+Bhagavad G�t�, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
+will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
+interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
+previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
+course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body
+strong].
+
+But in the case of the Ved�nta S�tras, which open with the aphorism,
+"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Sankara �ch�rya
+has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of
+the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
+will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
+_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of
+tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
+the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
+contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
+to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
+so-called "means."[370]
+
+"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why
+should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
+be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
+auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
+unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
+being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
+auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is
+in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore
+it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
+that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
+cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary
+meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
+auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
+drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
+the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
+auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
+unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply,
+that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
+meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
+of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
+"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."
+
+"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
+the beginning of a S�stra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
+would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
+begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
+it has been said by the wise, 'Those s�stras become widely famous
+which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
+auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
+invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies
+'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smriti which says,
+
+     "'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the
+     ancient time,
+
+     "'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
+     are both auspicious.'
+
+"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying
+'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vriddhi_' used by P�nini in his
+opening s�tra '_vriddhir �d aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is
+untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious
+influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
+signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is
+auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
+can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used
+here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
+new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such
+other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
+some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
+journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smriti, since the smriti
+will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
+only that they produce an auspicious effect.
+
+Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a
+previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
+apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
+already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
+as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
+if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
+would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
+has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
+exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the s�tra,
+the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
+T�ndya Br�hmana, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
+this is the Visvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as
+signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
+just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mah�bh�shya, "now comes the
+exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
+Grammar. This has been declared by Vy�sa in his Commentary on the Yoga
+Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
+and V�chaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
+be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and
+also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this
+_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
+after a successful understanding of the s�stra through the attainment of
+the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
+explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
+the smriti of Y�j�avalkya say, 'Hiranyagarbha is the promulgator of the
+Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Pata�jali the teacher
+thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
+Pata�jali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
+to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
+Pur�nas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
+_anus�sana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which
+followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
+the system.
+
+Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
+meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
+institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this
+institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
+is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
+fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
+(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.
+The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the
+producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_
+and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
+well known from Sruti and Smriti, as I have before shown. And it is
+established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
+are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
+one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
+opening aphorism of the Ved�nta s�tras, "Now, therefore, there is a
+wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to
+establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
+liberation are duly qualified students of the Ved�nta. For the word
+_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
+a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
+regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
+question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
+the context. Hence it has been said, "When Sruti comes [as the
+determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
+place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
+not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
+the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
+we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
+interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
+of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
+"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
+or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
+would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
+"_sruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
+it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
+14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
+the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into
+collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
+more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
+summed up--
+
+     "A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
+     precluded by any of the preceding modes;
+
+     "But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
+     precludes, depends on circumstances."
+
+Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
+settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
+preliminaries, the study of the S�stra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
+be commenced like that of the Ved�nta, which discusses the nature of
+Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
+be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
+the S�stra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
+which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the S�stra,
+especially directed thereto, this S�stra is the means for its
+production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
+concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
+operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up
+and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than
+to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Pata�jali, in
+his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-S�stra as his primary
+object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
+"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
+that the commencing the Yogas�stra is that which primarily claims our
+attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
+the mind, is what is to be expounded in this S�stra. "But as we read
+in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of
+'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean
+'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
+Y�j�avalkya:[381]--
+
+     'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
+     called _yoga_.'"
+
+This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
+action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
+souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
+opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
+conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
+Vaiseshika and Ny�ya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
+theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
+M�m�ms� [or Ved�nta], our Yogas�stra would be rendered nugatory by this
+concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
+identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
+something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
+be produced by our S�stra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
+used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here
+in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all
+     held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
+     are their evidence."
+
+Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert
+in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _sam�dhi_." Nor does this
+contradict Y�j�avalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,
+may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--
+
+     "_Sam�dhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and
+     supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
+     _sam�dhi_ of the individual soul."
+
+It has been also said by the venerable Vy�sa [in his Commentary on the
+Yoga-s�tras, i. 1], "_Yoga is sam�dhi_."
+
+An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _sam�dhi_ is
+used by Pata�jali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
+ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and
+the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
+principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
+other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
+we see in the _darsap�rnam�sa_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites
+the _pray�jas_, and therefore _sam�dhi_ cannot be the meaning of
+_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
+although the term _sam�dhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to
+express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
+contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
+devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
+to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
+declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
+ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
+alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
+_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to
+go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
+words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
+would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the S�tra, i.
+2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
+in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the
+suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
+second or principal sense of _sam�dhi_ will therefore be quite
+distinct from the first or inferior.]
+
+"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the
+modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
+abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
+their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
+abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
+antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
+the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in
+accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
+the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
+soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
+because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
+hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
+"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
+(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
+unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
+perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
+intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument
+to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
+the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
+is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this
+soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
+occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
+modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
+always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
+pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this
+which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
+substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
+an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
+proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
+and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
+understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
+not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
+"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
+susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
+influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or
+want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
+knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
+spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
+with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
+knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
+although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
+given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
+certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
+of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
+understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
+that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
+as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of
+the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
+understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Sruti, "Desire,
+volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
+firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pa�chasikha
+declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
+that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Pata�jali also (iv. 18), "The
+modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from
+the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
+argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the
+understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
+various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
+of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
+notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of
+"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the
+understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
+"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
+diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
+becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
+when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the
+perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
+newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
+condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
+reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
+there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
+and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
+"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.
+
+[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
+said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the
+suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply
+also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
+suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,
+_m�dha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
+for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
+_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
+attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.
+For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is
+restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed
+about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _m�dha_,
+'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
+sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].
+It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
+first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here,
+however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
+Bhagavad G�t� (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Krishna, is fickle, turbulent,
+violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
+occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
+but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
+&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
+Yoga S�tras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
+laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
+attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind
+are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by
+the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
+mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
+two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
+means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
+heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
+attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
+notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
+failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
+meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
+even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
+we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
+laid down as the definition of _yoga_.
+
+We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
+three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _m�dha_, and
+_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
+all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
+modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
+[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two
+conditions called _ek�gra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and
+attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
+two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now
+by _ek�gra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
+_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
+_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
+and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.
+
+Now this _sam�dhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
+in which there is distinct recognition" (_sampraj��ta_), and "that in
+which distinct recognition is lost" (_asampraj��ta_) [Yoga S., i. 17,
+18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
+intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
+notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
+or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]
+is thoroughly recognised (_samyak praj��yate_) as distinct from Nature. It
+has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savich�ra_, _s�nanda_, and
+_s�smita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bh�van�_),
+which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
+other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
+pondered is of two kinds, being either �swara or the twenty-five
+principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not
+senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are
+senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
+which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
+elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
+investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in
+the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
+produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
+(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
+five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
+relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
+(_savich�ra_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
+"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
+(_s�nanda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
+manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object
+the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
+or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_s�smita_),
+because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual
+faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
+quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].
+
+But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
+the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.
+
+"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
+suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
+where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
+we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
+quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
+of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
+because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
+"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
+operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
+and the "stock of deserts."[400]
+
+The "afflictions" (_klesa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
+egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
+a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidy�_,
+"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyay�bh�va_
+compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
+"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadh�raya_]
+compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
+"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvr�hi_ compound, where both portions are
+dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
+cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
+predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
+_avidy�_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the
+express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,
+as _avidy�_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
+to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very
+form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
+second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
+characterised by (_a_ + _vidy�_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and
+cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
+then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vritti,[403]
+"there is a _bahuvr�hi_ compound which is formed with some word
+meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
+this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvr�hi_
+compound _avidy�_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as
+_avidy�_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidy�_
+existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidy�_
+could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the
+other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were
+associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and
+were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
+the quality of goodness [which is found in the _s�smita_ meditation].
+
+Now it is said [in the Yoga S�tras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
+[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be
+dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
+"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
+them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
+on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
+are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
+strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
+several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
+This has been expressed by V�chaspati Misra, in his Gloss on Vy�sa's
+Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:--
+
+     "The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
+     are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but
+     existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
+     'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the
+     'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
+     with worldly objects."
+
+"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidy�_ as a
+_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,
+because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
+Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]
+the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
+would be overthrown."
+
+[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
+have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryud�sa_ [where
+the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidy�_ means a
+contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidy�_;
+and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
+said--
+
+     "The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
+     [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
+     thus the words _abr�hmana_ and _adharma_ respectively
+     signify, 'what is other than a Br�hman' and 'what is
+     contrary to justice.'"
+
+And again--
+
+     "We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
+     the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
+     from the use in which it has been already employed."
+
+V�chaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings
+depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
+occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter
+portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
+this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
+here too [in _avidy�_] the real meaning is something contrary to
+_vidy�_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
+positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said
+in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
+non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
+eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is
+defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413]
+[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
+"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining
+the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a
+proverbial couplet[415]--
+
+     "The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
+     place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its
+     composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from
+     death [as even a Br�hman's body defiles],--and from the fact
+     that it has to be made pure by rites."
+
+So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
+15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
+pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through
+the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
+impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
+opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
+pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the
+idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands,
+sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
+_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said--
+
+     "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
+     'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;
+
+     "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
+     liberation."
+
+Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]
+
+But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
+should there not be given some general definition applying to them
+all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be
+established? For thus it has been said by Bhatta Kum�rila--
+
+     "'Without some general definition, a more special definition
+     cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
+     mentioned here.'"
+
+This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
+the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
+"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
+
+"Egoism" (_asmit�_) is the notion that the two separate things, the
+soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said
+(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
+sight." "Desire" (_r�ga_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
+the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
+the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the
+feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
+the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
+expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
+"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).
+
+Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
+word _anusayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _krit_ affix _nini_ in
+the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the
+sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _nini_
+cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anus�_;
+for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the S�tra, iii. 2, 4,
+and has been exerting its influence in the following s�tras, this word
+must have been introduced a second time in the S�tra, iii. 2, 78,
+_supy aj�tau ninis t�chchh�lye_,[419] on purpose to exclude
+prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
+strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the S�tra, vii.
+2, 115, _acho �niti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to
+_vriddhi_, and so the word must be _anus�yin_, in accordance with the
+analogy of such words as _atis�yin_, &c. Nor is the latter view
+tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since
+_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--
+
+     'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable
+     nor a _krit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
+     a word in the locative case;'
+
+and the word _anusaya_ is clearly a _krit_ formation as it ends with
+the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
+renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word
+_anusayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
+very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be
+admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
+generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
+essential importance. Hence the author of the Vritti has said--
+
+     "The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular
+     acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
+     this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]."
+
+Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _k�ryin_,
+_k�ryika_ [where the affixes are added after a _krit_ formation],
+_tandulin_, _tandulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning
+"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
+_krit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
+the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anusaya_ is formed by
+a _krit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.
+
+The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
+(_abhinivesa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
+from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
+immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
+the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
+left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
+in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
+individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
+declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
+through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
+philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as
+the "afflictions" (_klesa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
+upon it various mundane troubles.
+
+[We next describe the _karm�saya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
+"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or
+forbidden actions, as the _jyotishtoma_ sacrifice, br�hmanicide, &c.
+"Stock" (_�saya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
+which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
+merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
+experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
+
+Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
+the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
+operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not
+considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
+[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
+could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
+the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the
+thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
+described hereafter], _madhumat�_, _madhuprat�k�_, _visok�_, and
+_samsk�raseshat�_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its
+etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
+thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed
+(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
+"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
+that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
+This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
+development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
+state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
+assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]
+"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
+to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
+_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
+as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
+skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
+in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
+that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
+reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
+who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
+perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
+
+Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
+to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to
+practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
+especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Krishna in the
+Bhagavad G�t� [vi. 3]--
+
+     "Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
+     _yoga_;
+
+     But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
+     the means."
+
+Pata�jali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical
+concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
+to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Y�j�avalkya has described "mortification"--
+
+     "By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
+     ch�ndr�yana fast, &c.,
+
+     "Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
+     mortifications."[429]
+
+"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
+_g�yatr�_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and
+T�ntrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
+chanted. Those chanted are the _s�mans_; those not chanted are either
+in metre, _i.e._, the _richas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yaj�mshi_,
+as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _rich_ in which
+by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _p�das_
+[or portions of a verse]; the name _s�man_ is applied to chanted
+portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_
+are called T�ntrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
+directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again
+threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--
+
+     "The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and
+     neuter:
+
+     "The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,
+     the exclamation _sv�h�_); the neuter those which end in
+     _namas_;
+
+     "The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
+     all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."
+
+They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all
+defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
+ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.
+
+Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_samsk�ra_) are ten, and
+they have been thus described in the _S�rad�-tilaka_--
+
+     "There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
+     to _mantras_ efficacy:
+
+     "These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
+     consecrated.
+
+     "The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
+     'awakening,'
+
+     "The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
+
+     "The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
+     'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.
+
+     "The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the
+     _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.
+
+     "The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
+     _mantra_, each united to Om,
+
+     "According to the number of the letters. This they call the
+     'vivifying' (_j�vana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite
+     each with sandal-water,
+
+     "Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is
+     called the 'smiting' (_t�dana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike
+     them with oleander flowers,
+
+     "Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
+     'awakening' (_bodhana_).
+
+     "Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
+     own special _tantra_,
+
+     "Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
+     leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
+     (_abhisheka_).
+
+     "Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him
+     consume by the _jyotir-mantra_
+
+     "The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the
+     'purification' (_vimal�-karana_).
+
+     "The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and
+     the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,
+
+     "And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
+     of kusa grass,
+
+     "With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this
+     is held to be the 'fattening' (_�py�yana_).
+
+     "The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with
+     _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpana_).
+
+     "The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of
+     M�y�[434] and Ram�[435] is called its 'illumining'
+     (_d�pana_).
+
+     "The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being
+     muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).
+
+     "These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
+     _tantras_;
+
+     "And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
+     obtains his desire;
+
+     "And _ruddha_, _k�lita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _sapta_, and
+     the rest,
+
+     "All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by
+     these excellent consecrations."
+
+But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries
+connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an
+unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]
+
+The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord"
+(_�svara-pranidh�na_), is the consigning all one's works, whether
+mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
+Supremely Venerable. As it has been said--
+
+     "Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
+
+     "That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."
+
+This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
+the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
+since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
+sung in the Bhagavad G�t� [ii. 47]--
+
+     "Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
+     fruits;
+
+     "Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
+     attached to inaction."
+
+The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
+by the venerable N�lakantha-bh�rat�--
+
+     "Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
+     by desire,
+
+     "Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
+     has been licked by a dog."
+
+Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
+resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for
+producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words
+called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
+"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
+meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
+with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
+meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
+a motive. This has been declared in the _K�vya-prak�sa_ [ii. 9]--
+
+     "When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
+     principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
+     another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
+     this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."
+
+Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter
+_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
+the feminine _s�_] would have signified some neuter word, like
+"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
+indicated." But _s�_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
+with _lakshan�_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is
+put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
+been explained by Kaiyata, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
+of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
+former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kusala_) in
+business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
+_kusala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed
+etymologically as _kusam_ + _l�ti_, "one who gathers kusa grass for
+the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
+of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
+this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
+is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
+with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--
+
+     "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
+     their immediate significance, just as is the case in
+     'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."
+
+Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
+Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
+meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
+indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
+and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
+originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
+by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
+the author of the K�vya-prak�sa used the expression, "This is
+'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
+based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as
+"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2.
+indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
+are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent
+indication, as "the man of the Panj�b is an ox" [here the object is
+not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
+indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
+5. pure superimponent indication, as "_gh�_ is life;" 6. pure
+introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
+all explained in the K�vya-prak�sa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
+churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.
+
+This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
+(_anga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation [ii. 29]. Pata�jali says, "Forbearance consists in not
+wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
+[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
+mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
+32]; and these are described in the Vishnu Pur�na [vi. 7, 36-38]--
+
+     "The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
+     Brahman, practises, void of all desire,
+
+     "Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
+     and non-coveting;
+
+     "Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
+     purification, contentment, and austerity,
+
+     "And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
+     Brahman.
+
+     "These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
+     the five 'religious observances;'
+
+     "They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
+     reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."
+
+"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
+kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _v�ra_, _svastika_, _dandaka_,
+_sop�sraya_, _paryanka_, _krau�chanishadana_, _ushtranishadana_,
+_samasamsth�na_. Y�j�avalkya has described each of them in the passage
+which commences--
+
+     "Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
+     but in reverse order,
+
+     "Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Br�hmans,
+     on his thighs;
+
+     "This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all."
+
+The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this
+steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
+practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
+inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
+the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
+body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
+both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
+general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
+to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _p�raka_, and _kumbhaka_." We
+reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
+"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
+in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of
+the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
+has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _p�raka_, which is the
+[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
+"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,
+when the vital air, called _pr�na_, remains motionless like water in a
+jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
+and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
+is needless.
+
+Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghatik�s_ and a
+half[440] in each artery[441] (_n�di_), like the revolving buckets on
+a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are
+produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said
+by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning
+the transmission of the _ajap�mantra_[443]--
+
+     "Six hundred to Ganesa, six thousand to the self-existent
+     Brahman,
+
+     "Six thousand to Vishnu, six thousand to Siva,
+
+     "One thousand to the Guru (Brihaspati), one thousand to the
+     Supreme Soul,
+
+     "And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
+     performed muttering."
+
+So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
+elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different
+colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
+thus explained by the wise--
+
+     "Let each artery convey the air two _ghat�s_ and a half from
+     sunrise.
+
+     "There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]
+     to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
+
+     "Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
+     place [in the hour],
+
+     "And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
+     six hundred in a day and night.
+
+     "The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guna_
+     letters,[445]
+
+     "That time elapses while the air passes along in the
+     interval between two arteries.
+
+     "There are five elements in each of the two conducting
+     arteries,--
+
+     "They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
+     the self-restrained.
+
+     "Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;
+
+     "Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.
+
+     "They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;
+
+     "This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
+     arteries.
+
+     "The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,
+
+     "Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
+
+     "This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
+     reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
+
+     "Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,
+
+     "Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
+
+     "There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has
+     fifty _palas_,
+
+     "And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
+     five properties of earth
+
+     "Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
+     and these decrease one by one.
+
+     "The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
+     the influence of 'quiet,'
+
+     "But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
+     'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]
+
+     "The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
+     ether are now declared;--
+
+     "Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
+     the second arises desire;
+
+     "From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
+     of mind;
+
+     "From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
+     impressions of latent merit.
+
+     "Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
+     finger in each nostril,
+
+     "And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
+     of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
+     of his eyes,
+
+     "Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
+     earth and the other elements within him,
+
+     "The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
+     spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol."
+
+When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
+accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
+discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
+     breath."[450]
+
+And again--
+
+     "As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
+
+     "So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
+     the breath."[451]
+
+Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
+the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
+attain "self-mastery" (_samyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_praty�h�ra_).
+"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to
+the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered
+nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
+objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
+This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
+to it (_�_ + _hri_), away from them (_prat�pa_).
+
+"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
+senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
+therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
+could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say
+is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
+eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
+were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
+accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
+of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
+concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
+accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
+mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are
+restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
+follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
+the Vishnu-pur�na [vi. 7, 43, 44]--
+
+     "Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
+     ever tend to pursue external objects,
+
+     "Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
+     mind;
+
+     "By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
+     senses;
+
+     "If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish
+     his _yoga_."[454]
+
+"Attention" (_dh�ran�_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
+all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
+self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
+the _sushumn�_ artery, &c., or something external, as Praj�pati,
+V�sava, Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
+"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
+say the followers of the Pur�nas--
+
+     "By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
+     restraint the senses,
+
+     "Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
+     his mind."[455]
+
+The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
+be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
+"contemplation" (_dhy�na_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
+thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--
+
+     "A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
+     that kind and desiring no other,
+
+     "This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first
+     six of the ancillary things."
+
+We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
+remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_sam�dhi_, see p.
+243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a
+long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
+hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
+"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
+names Madhumat� and the rest.
+
+"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
+words from the dialects of Karn�ta, Gauda,[456] and L�ta?"[457] We do
+not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
+meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
+needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
+
+i. The _Madhumat�_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,
+called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
+illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
+"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
+"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c.
+Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
+which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to
+the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._,
+when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
+yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are
+well known to be of four kinds, viz.,--
+
+i. The _pr�thamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]
+but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
+the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubh�mika_,
+who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
+_praj��jyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
+_atikr�nta-bh�van�ya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.
+
+ii. The _Madhuprat�k�_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.
+These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
+organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
+thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
+motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the
+attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
+to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
+the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
+perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
+subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
+conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
+itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
+state is called _Madhuprat�k�_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].
+
+iii. The _Visok�_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all
+existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
+to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
+the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
+supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
+existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
+but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
+other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished],
+and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
+upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
+modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is
+"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
+immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of
+mind]."
+
+iv. The _Samsk�raseshat�_ state is also called _asampraj��ta_, _i.e._,
+"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
+it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object]
+which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
+afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
+enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
+all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
+"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which
+distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
+exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
+modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
+thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _samsk�rasesha_,
+i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
+everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
+rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
+abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
+there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
+"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
+into the primal _prakriti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure
+intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
+connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with
+existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation
+is described by Pata�jali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
+the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have
+consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,
+or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
+33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
+individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
+for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
+cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
+objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
+decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
+of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
+absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
+possibility. And so, too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
+one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
+dumb man praised it."[465]
+
+Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
+Yoga-s�stra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
+disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-s�stra also
+treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
+This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
+the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
+experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
+is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same
+fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
+other S�stras also. Thus all has been made clear.
+
+The system of Sankara, which comes next in succession, and which is
+the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
+is therefore left untouched here.[467]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON THE YOGA.
+
+There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
+Raivataka in M�gha (iv. 55):--
+
+"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
+(_maitr�_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully
+abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
+a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
+essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
+Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."
+
+It is curious to notice that _maitr�_, which plays such a prominent
+part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
+condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
+start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=
+_pras�dhaka_) in Vy�sa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
+borrowed by M�gha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
+an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
+in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in
+themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
+which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
+Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
+
+For the word _vy�kopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
+_infra_), cf. Kusum��jali, p. 6, l. 7.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to S�nkhya Pr. Bh�sh., p.
+20; S. S�ra, p. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
+meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
+in the arts of life.]
+
+[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means
+rather "susceptible of suffering."]
+
+[Footnote 366: This is really Vy�sa's comm. on S�t., iv. 21.]
+
+[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bh�sh�-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]
+
+[Footnote 368: Satapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]
+
+[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbh�ve'pi_,
+understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is
+supposed to assume as being necessarily present.]
+
+[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
+the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
+hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
+&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself
+_sukha_.]
+
+[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious,"
+why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
+particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]
+
+[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
+some other word to complete the construction.]
+
+[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mah�bh�shya
+(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vriddhih_ is
+placed at the beginning of the first s�tra, while _gunah_ in the
+second is placed at the end (_ad en gunah_), in order to ensure an
+auspicious opening, _vriddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
+well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."]
+
+[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chand�, we have an interesting
+list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
+the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Br�hman,
+a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
+hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
+"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
+_d�rv�_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
+corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
+men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
+a guana (_godhik�_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
+all s�stras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
+the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
+and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]
+
+[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
+lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
+officiating Br�hmans.]
+
+[Footnote 378: He is here called _phanipati_, "lord of
+snakes,"--Pata�jali, the author of the Mah�bh�shya, being represented
+as a snake in mythology.]
+
+[Footnote 379: Cf. Sankara, Ved�nta-S�t., iii. 3, 49.]
+
+[Footnote 380: This is the M�m�ms� rule for settling the relative
+value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
+_Sruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
+are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Linga_, "a sign,"
+or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
+text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
+divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
+solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _V�kya_, "the being
+mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I
+cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
+"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
+the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
+welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
+"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakarana_, "the
+subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
+parts," as in the _darsa-p�rnam�sa_ sacrifice, where the _pray�ja_
+ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
+a mystic influence (_ap�rva_) which helps forward that influence of
+the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakarana_
+proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sth�na_ (or _krama_), "relative
+position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Sundhadhvam_, &c.,
+"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
+of the _s�nn�yya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
+ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Sam�khy�_,
+"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
+_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima
+facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
+aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
+first, _sruti_, being the most important; the last, _sam�khy�_, the
+least. Cf. Jaimini's S�tras, iii. 3, 14; _M�m�ms�paribh�sh�_, pp. 8,
+9.]
+
+[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Y�j�avalkya, the author of the
+_Y�j�avalkya-g�t�_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl.
+Catal._, p. 87 _b_.]
+
+[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriy�_, which properly
+belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashtri_.]
+
+[Footnote 383: _Scil. sam�dhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses
+to profound contemplation.]
+
+[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation (_sam�dhi_)."]
+
+[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag �dh�yate mano yatra sa
+sam�dhih_.]
+
+[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the
+destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
+itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
+intimate relation (_samav�ya-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavy�n�m_ for _nirodh�n�m_.]
+
+[Footnote 388: _Chit-sakti_ and _chiti-sakti_ = soul.]
+
+[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]
+
+[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
+(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
+image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]
+
+[Footnote 391: V�chaspati explains _lakshana_ as _k�labheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 392: I take _�di_ as meaning _asphutatva_. The change of state
+takes place between the several moments of the _lakshana-parin�ma_. Cf.
+the Commentaries on iii. 13.]
+
+[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the
+thinking principle, _chittabh�mayas_ or _avasth�s_. Cf. Commentary, i.
+2, 18.]
+
+[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,
+demons, and gods.]
+
+[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
+have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?]
+
+[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the
+elements or the elements the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprak�samayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _satt�m�tra_ for
+_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmit�_ from _ahamk�ra_.]
+
+[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]
+
+[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
+English translation.]
+
+[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called
+_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the
+_paryud�sa_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
+verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
+as, _e.g._--
+
+(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
+
+(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
+
+The former corresponds to the logician's _atyant�bh�va_, the latter to
+_anyony�bh�va_ or _bheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 403: Cf. the _v�rttika_ in Siddh�nta Kaum., i. 401.]
+
+[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-m�nadhana_, with
+_vidyam�na_ omitted in the compound.]
+
+[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 406: As it is _avidy�_ after all.]
+
+[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of V�chaspati's
+Gloss), _sarvavrittinirodhasampann�y� api tath�tvaprasang�t_.]
+
+[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavasth�scha_ with the printed edition of
+V�chaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdh�scha_ is correct, it must mean
+_tanutvena dagdh�h_.]
+
+[Footnote 409: As in _r�malakshmanau_, R�ma and Lakshmana.]
+
+[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]
+
+[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on S�t., ii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other
+hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
+_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."]
+
+[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga S�t., i. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _k�y�dau_ for
+_k�ry�dau_.]
+
+[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vy�sa in his Comm. on Yoga
+S�tras, ii. 5, and I have followed V�chaspati in his explanation of
+it; he calls it _vaiy�sak� g�th�_.]
+
+[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
+increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
+(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]
+
+[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."]
+
+[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
+of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _nini_ be used after a root in the sense
+of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a
+word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."]
+
+[Footnote 420: "Let _vriddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a
+vowel, when that which has an indicatory _�_ or _n_ follows;" _nini_
+has an indicatory _n_.]
+
+[Footnote 421: Sc. _anusaya_ + _ini_ = _anusayin_.]
+
+[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _than_, which respectively leave _in_ and
+_ika_; thus _danda_ gives _dandin_ and _dandika_. The line is quoted
+by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on P�n. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
+the _K�sik�_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
+the examples:--(1.) _svav�n_, _khav�n_; (2.) _k�rakav�n_; (3.)
+_vy�ghrav�n_, _simhav�n_; (4.) _dandavat� s�l�_ (_i.e._, _dand� asy�m
+santi_).]
+
+[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]
+
+[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
+study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]
+
+[Footnote 425: See the _K�sik�_ on P�n. v. 2, 115. For _vivaksh�rtha_
+(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on P�n. ii. 2, 27.
+The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyam�rtha_.]
+
+[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vritter abh�vah_, but
+_abh�vasy�sryah_.]
+
+[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,
+_prak�sapravrittiniyamar�pa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 428: See K�sik�, ii. 3, 36.]
+
+[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Y�j�avalkya-g�t�_
+of Yogi-y�j�avalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
+note.]
+
+[Footnote 430: M�m�ms� S�tras, ii. 1, 35-37.]
+
+[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
+_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _k�mya_.]
+
+[Footnote 432: The _v�ja_ of air is the syllable _jam_.]
+
+[Footnote 433: The _v�ja_ of water is the syllable _bam_.]
+
+[Footnote 434: _Hr�m._]
+
+[Footnote 435: _Sr�m._]
+
+[Footnote 436: _T�ndava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Siva and his
+votaries.]
+
+[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
+one of the two." Cf. "Theb� ips� quod Boeoti� caput est," _Livy_, xlii.
+44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
+vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
+translation of the S�hitya-darpana.]
+
+[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
+is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
+relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of
+longevity.]
+
+[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghatik�_ being twenty-four
+minutes.]
+
+[Footnote 441: The _n�d�s_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
+to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
+_n�d�s_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]
+
+[Footnote 442: M�dhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
+passage in the Aitareya Br�hmana (iii. 29), where the relation of the
+vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
+the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
+other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
+and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
+the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
+waterwheel (_ghat�yantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their
+course."]
+
+[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
+that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
+as their sound expresses the word _so'ham_ (i.e., _hamsah_), "I am
+he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
+it is called the _ajap�mantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without
+voluntary muttering.]
+
+[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
+breath.]
+
+[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarn�n�m_ for
+_gunavarn�n�m_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarna_ is a
+_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_
+make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
+details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
+fifth act of the _M�lat�m�dhava_.]
+
+[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghatik�_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
+= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghatik�s_ or one hour).]
+
+[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]
+
+[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]
+
+[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chh�ndogya Up._, viii. 6;
+_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vy�sa's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Sloka 7 of the _Amrita-n�da
+Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga S�t., iii. 4, as consisting
+of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
+attention, and meditation.]
+
+[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]
+
+[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
+reading of the Bombay edition of the Pur�na (only reading in line 3
+_chal�tman�m_).]
+
+[Footnote 455: Vishnu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
+"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]
+
+[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]
+
+[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
+is the [Greek: Larik�] of Ptolemy.]
+
+[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravritta_ for
+_pravritti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vy�sa's
+Comm.)]
+
+[Footnote 459: Read _vikaranabh�vah_; V�chaspati explains it as
+"_videh�n�m indriy�n�m karanabh�vah_."]
+
+[Footnote 460: Vy�sa has _karanapa�chakar�pajaya_; V�chaspati explains
+_r�pa_ by _grahan�di_ (cf. iii. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-s�yavyavasey�tmak�n�m_,
+from Vy�sa's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]
+
+[Footnote 463: _Visok�._]
+
+[Footnote 464: This is explained by V�chaspati, "The latent
+impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
+_vyutth�na_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
+'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by
+the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
+this in 'egoism' (_asmit�_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
+(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,
+_prakriti_)." _Prakriti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in
+equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
+effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
+becomes predominant.]
+
+[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittir�ya-�ranyaka
+i. 11, 5. M�dhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
+quotes the Svet�sv. Up., iii. 19. M�dhava here takes _avindat_ as "he
+pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
+Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 466: This is taken from V�chaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
+15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]
+
+[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pa�chadas�. A Calcutta
+Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivarana-sangraha (cf.
+Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devat�dhy�ya-br�hmana, p.
+x), but, if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha, it is
+by Bh�rat�t�rthavidy�ranya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
+88).]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+ON THE UP�DHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
+
+
+[As the _up�dhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
+is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
+the sections in the Bh�sh�-parichchheda and the Siddh�nta-mukt�val�,
+which treat of it.]
+
+     cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term
+     (s�dhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
+     is called the Condition (up�dhi); its examination is now set
+     forth._
+
+Our author now proceeds to define the _up�dhi_ or condition,[468]
+which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
+laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The
+meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
+accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
+invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
+middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
+because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
+produced from wet fuel," as an _up�dhi_, since "wet fuel" is
+necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
+_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]
+
+"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
+follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
+argument, 'This [second] son of Mitr�'s, whom I have not seen, must be
+dark because he is Mitr�'s son,' we could not allege 'the being
+produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch
+as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
+does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have
+nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the
+argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the
+site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
+form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
+is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and
+therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
+accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
+is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
+a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
+existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
+"emergent," _dvams�bh�va_], inasmuch as perishability is found in
+antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
+included in any positive category of existence."
+
+We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
+definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to
+determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
+our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
+be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
+is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from
+feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
+determined by the fact that it is Mitr�'s son, whose dark colour is
+discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
+argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
+not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,
+"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
+as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
+object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
+"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
+the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]
+(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
+produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
+invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
+the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
+advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
+"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
+that this is produced at all.]
+
+But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
+middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably
+accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
+and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
+This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
+that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
+determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
+cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
+rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
+particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
+which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
+constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
+that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
+site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or
+else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
+excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is
+determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
+the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
+term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]
+
+     cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects
+     with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus
+     common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
+     in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]
+
+     cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
+     middle term that the Condition has to be employed._
+
+The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term
+being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that
+it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of
+having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably
+accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle
+term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact
+that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in
+the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we
+infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is
+too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is
+too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too
+general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we
+take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which
+the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle
+term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases
+possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is
+equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,
+"B is dark because he is Mitr�'s son," the middle term "the fact of
+being Mitr�'s son" is too general in regard to the _s�dhya_, "dark
+colour," because it is too general in regard to the _up�dhi_, "feeding
+on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitr�'s second son [Mitr�'s
+parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitr� herself not having
+fed on vegetables previous to his birth].
+
+[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a
+condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your
+definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle
+term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire
+because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the
+being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this
+certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it
+is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to
+be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'
+since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as
+for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in
+this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You
+never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere
+than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some
+direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the
+first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your
+antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major
+term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly
+one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is
+self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally
+employed to overthrow the contrary argument].
+
+But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being
+always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition,
+[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant
+tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be
+non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
+"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by
+sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _up�dhi_ here is a
+means of overthrowing the false argument].
+
+Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is
+disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But
+"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed
+even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
+of logical controversy.[481]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 468: The _up�dhi_ is the "condition" which must be supplied
+to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus
+restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;
+if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has
+fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied
+by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if
+the mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have
+smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is
+Mitr�'s son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her
+former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her
+happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove
+that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle
+term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.]
+
+[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from
+the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from
+her living on ghee.]
+
+[Footnote 470: By Bh�sh�-parich. sl. 25, the four elements, earth,
+water, air, and fire, are _sparsavat_, but by sl. 27 of these air is
+neither _pratyaksha_ nor _r�pavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue
+from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive
+existence, not non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 472: "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was
+not _soul_, but _air_.]
+
+[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitr�'s first son in the
+two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire"
+(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and
+"Mitr�'s first son A is dark because he is Mitr�'s offspring" (when
+her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective
+_s�dhyas_ or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are
+respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the
+mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.]
+
+[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitr�'s second
+son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire"
+and "the being Mitr�'s offspring" do not possess the respective
+conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor,
+consequently, the respective major terms (_s�dhya_) "smoke" and "dark
+colour."]
+
+[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in
+(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,
+though they are the sites of the _s�dhya_ "dark colour," they do not
+admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term
+"the being Mitr�'s son."]
+
+[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel
+there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in
+their extension.]
+
+[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _s�dhya_ (as in
+the red-hot ball of iron), there the _up�dhi_ also is not applicable.]
+
+[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark,
+such as the three objected arguments required in � 137.]
+
+[Footnote 479: The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is
+artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an
+artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._,
+one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point."
+Here the proposed _up�dhi_ "the being always found elsewhere than in
+fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the
+_hetu_ "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the
+_s�dhya_ "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.]
+
+[Footnote 480: As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a
+maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist
+disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing
+a body." See Kusum��jali, v. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the
+outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own
+point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a
+true condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.]
+
+THE END.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+TR�BNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+    "A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental
+    literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the
+    general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the
+    Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense
+    strides have been made within the present century in these
+    branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the
+    range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient
+    literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred
+    books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian,
+    Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been
+    deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more
+    recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of
+    all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects
+    have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were
+    contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or
+    scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals.
+    Messrs. Tr�bner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does
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+    constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at
+    least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to
+    the world."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.
+
+By the HON. SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,
+
+Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,
+
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+
+Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the
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+
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+     could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of
+     the economic and political condition of India at the present
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+
+
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+
+Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.
+
+ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.
+
+BY MARTIN HAUG, PH.D.,
+
+Late of the Universities of T�bingen, G�ttingen, and Bonn;
+Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the
+Poona College.
+
+EDITED AND ENLARGED BY DR. E. W. WEST.
+
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+E. P. EVANS.
+
+I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of
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+
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+
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+
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+
+     "'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of
+     the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E.
+     W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to
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+     translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the
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+
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+TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON
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+COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."
+
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+Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese,
+University College, London.
+
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+    as edited by Fausb�ll, by Max M�ller's English, and Albrecht
+    Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six
+    chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather
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+
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+     its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies,
+     forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so
+     inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder
+     denied a God, now worships that founder as a god
+     himself."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.
+
+BY ALBRECHT WEBER.
+
+Translated from the Second German Edition by JOHN MANN, M.A., and
+TH�ODOR ZACHARIAE, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.
+
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+
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+
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+
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+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
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+7s. 6d.
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+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.
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+
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+     the best-informed writers."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.
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+THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.
+
+A Poem. BY KALIDASA.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by RALPH T. H.
+GRIFFITH, M.A.
+
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+     was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are
+     glad to see made once more accessible."--_Times._
+
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+
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+
+       *       *       *       *       *
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+
+A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY,
+HISTORY, AND LITERATURE.
+
+BY JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.
+
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+
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+     detract but little from the general excellence of Mr.
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+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
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+
+SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.
+
+BY EDWARD WILLIAM LANE,
+
+Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c, &c.
+
+A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by STANLEY
+LANE POOLE.
+
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+
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+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,
+
+BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.
+
+BY MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L.,
+
+Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay
+Asiatic Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of
+Oxford.
+
+Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, with
+Illustrations and a Map.
+
+     "In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a
+     thoughtful man on some of the most important questions
+     connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened
+     observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant
+     people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the
+     public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of
+     the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have
+     seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of
+     every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of
+     Modern India--a subject with which we should be specially
+     familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee
+     or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of
+     their manners, their creeds, and their
+     necessities."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.
+
+METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.
+
+With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from
+Classical Authors.
+
+BY J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.
+
+     "... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."--_Times._
+
+     "... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration
+     alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the
+     legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."--_Edinburgh
+     Daily Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE GULISTAN;
+
+OR, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU'D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ.
+
+Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an
+Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,
+
+BY EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.
+
+     "It is a very fair rendering of the original."--_Times._
+
+     "The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed
+     by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The
+     _Gulistan_ is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest
+     order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long
+     established itself in a secure position as the best version
+     of Sadi's finest work."--_Academy._
+
+     "It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price
+28s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.
+
+BY BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, ESQ., F.R.S.,
+
+Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the
+Institute; Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at
+the Court of Nepal, &c, &c.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+     SECTION I.--On the Kocch, B�d�, and Dhim�l Tribes.--Part I.
+     Vocabulary.--Part II. Grammar.--Part III. Their Origin,
+     Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition,
+     with a General Description of the Climate they dwell
+     in--Appendix.
+
+     SECTION II.--On Himalayan Ethnology.--I. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of
+     N�p�l.--II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti
+     Language.--III. Grammatical Analysis of the V�yu Language.
+     The V�yu Grammar.--IV. Analysis of the B�hing Dialect of the
+     Kiranti language. The B�hing Grammar.--V. On the V�yu or
+     H�yu Tribe of the Central Himal�ya.--VI. On the Kiranti
+     Tribe of the Central Himal�ya.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+     SECTION III.--On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India.
+     Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, B�d�, and G�r�
+     Tongues.
+
+     SECTION IV.--Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION V.--Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION VI.--The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their
+     connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.
+
+     SECTION VII.--The Mongolian Affinities of the
+     Caucasians.--Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and
+     Mongolian Words.
+
+     SECTION VIII.--Physical Type of Tibetans.
+
+     SECTION IX.--The Aborigines of Central India.--Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central
+     India.--Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.--Vocabulary of some
+     of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the
+     Northern Sircars.--Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks
+     on their Affinities.--Supplement to the Nilgirian
+     Vocabularies.--The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.
+
+     SECTION X.--Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks
+     on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.
+
+     SECTION XI.--Route from K�thm�nd�, the Capital of Nep�l, to
+     Darjeeling in Sikim.--Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis
+     of Nep�l.
+
+     SECTION XII.--Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police
+     as recognised in the State of Nep�l.
+
+     SECTION XIII.--The Native Method of making the Paper
+     denominated Hindustan, N�p�lese.
+
+     SECTION XIV.--Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the
+     Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the
+     People of India.
+
+     "For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian
+     Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable
+     both to the philologist and the ethnologist."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326,
+cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,
+
+THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.
+
+The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.
+
+BY THE RIGHT REV. P. BIGANDET,
+
+Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.
+
+     "The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only
+     illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect
+     encyclop�dia of Buddhist lore."--_Times._
+
+     "A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism
+     with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their
+     investigations."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."--_Indian Antiquary._
+
+     "Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place
+     students of the subject under a deep obligation to its
+     author."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "This work is one of the greatest authorities upon
+     Buddhism."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.
+
+CHINESE BUDDHISM.
+
+A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.
+
+BY J. EDKINS, D.D.
+
+Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c.
+
+     "It contains a vast deal of important information on the
+     subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued
+     study on the spot."--_Athen�um._
+
+     "Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the
+     extent of its original research, and the simplicity with
+     which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,
+     literature, and ritual is set forth."--_British Quarterly
+     Review._
+
+     "The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves
+     most careful study from all interested in the history of the
+     religions of the world, and expressly of those who are
+     concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins
+     notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise
+     bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English
+     writers."--_Record._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.
+
+WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to
+the Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of "The Modern Languages of the
+East Indies."
+
+     "We know none who has described Indian life, especially the
+     life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and
+     literary talent."--_Academy._
+
+     "They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original
+     remarks."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+     "His book contains a vast amount of information. The result
+     of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and
+     speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as
+     of food for thought."--_Tablet._
+
+     "Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and
+     antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one
+     having authority."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "The author speaks with the authority of personal
+     experience.... It is this constant association with the
+     country and the people which gives such a vividness to many
+     of the pages."--_Athen�um._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.
+
+BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.
+
+The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:
+
+BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,
+
+For the first time Edited in the original Pali.
+
+BY V. FAUSBOLL;
+
+And Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
+
+Translation. Volume I.
+
+     "These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of
+     what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are
+     probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan
+     stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as
+     India. The introduction contains a most interesting
+     disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing
+     their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore
+     legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of
+     the Judgment of Solomon."--_Times._
+
+     "It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his
+     right to be heard on this subject by his able article on
+     Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclop�dia
+     Britannica.'"--_Leeds Mercury._
+
+     "All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel
+     deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established
+     reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for
+     the fidelity of his version, and the style of his
+     translations is deserving of high praise."--_Academy._
+
+     "No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than
+     Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jataka book we have, then, a
+     priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of
+     our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete
+     picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs
+     of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to
+     ourselves, just as they were passing through the first
+     stages of civilisation."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;
+
+OR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND
+THE KABBALAH.
+
+Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis
+According to the Talmud," &c.
+
+With Notes and Copious Indexes.
+
+     "To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a
+     general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at
+     least."--_Times._
+
+     "Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive
+     to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent
+     scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and
+     indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon
+     the Scriptures."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+     "Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful
+     notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet
+     appeared."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Without overlooking in the slightest the several
+     attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental
+     Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses
+     them all in interest."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we
+     believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for
+     themselves."--_The Record._
+
+     "This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of
+     knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and
+     unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the
+     wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so
+     Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars
+     of the Chosen People."--_Inquirer._
+
+     "The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact
+     that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but
+     throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those
+     Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and
+     Christian alike."--_John Bull._
+
+     "It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument
+     of learned, loving, light-giving labour."--_Jewish Herald._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.
+
+BY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of "Yeigo He�kaku Shira�."
+
+     "A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted
+     much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature
+     of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into
+     English verse."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the
+     first attempt which has been made to interpret the
+     literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to
+     the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for
+     indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we
+     have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful
+     English verse."--_Tablet._
+
+     "It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric
+     literature which has appeared during the close of the last
+     year."--_Celestial Empire._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he
+     undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.
+     But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts
+     are successful to a degree."--_London and China Express._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C.
+681-668.
+
+     Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders
+     and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with
+     a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the
+     Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and
+     List of Eponyms, &c.
+
+BY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's
+College, Cambridge.
+
+     "Students of scriptural arch�ology will also appreciate the
+     'History of Esarhaddon.'"--_Times._
+
+     "There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It
+     does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in
+     their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it
+     does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers
+     both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary
+     non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling
+     its results."--_Academy._
+
+     "Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to
+     Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be
+     feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due
+     to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted
+     himself in his laborious task."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE MESNEVI
+
+(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA
+(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.
+
+Book the First.
+
+_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his
+Ancestors, and of his Descendants._
+
+Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected
+by their Historian,
+
+MEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI.
+
+Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,
+
+BY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c.
+
+     "A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "This book will be a very valuable help to the reader
+     ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight
+     into a very important department of the literature extant in
+     that language."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.
+
+EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS
+
+ILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS.
+
+BY REV. J. LONG,
+
+Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.
+
+     "We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide
+     circulation and attentive reading."--_Record._
+
+     "Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."--_Globe._
+
+     "It is full of interesting matter."--_Antiquary._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+INDIAN POETRY;
+
+     Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from
+     the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books
+     from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom"
+     from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental
+     Poems.
+
+BY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."
+
+     "In this new volume of Messrs. Tr�bner's Oriental Series,
+     Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through
+     the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of
+     Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of
+     Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have
+     introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be
+     more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna
+     is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the
+     love of
+
+                 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'
+
+     from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five
+     senses are typified."--_Times._
+
+     "No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his
+     art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas
+     as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of
+     language contained in these mighty epics."--_Daily
+     Telegraph._
+
+     "The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and
+     sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of
+     the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody
+     sufficient to captivate the senses of the
+     dullest."--_Standard._
+
+     "The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has
+     adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original
+     text."--_Overland Mail._
+
+     "We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to
+     popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface
+     tells us, the goal towards which he bends his
+     efforts."--_Allen's Indian Mail._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE MIND OF MENCIUS;
+
+OR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
+
+A SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER
+MENCIUS.
+
+Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and
+Explanations,
+
+By the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society.
+
+Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,
+
+By the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.
+
+     "Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese
+     studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The
+     value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered
+     that at no time since relations commenced between China and
+     the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said
+     aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful
+     study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the
+     excellent series to which it belongs."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.
+
+BY A. BARTH.
+
+Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the
+Author.
+
+The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably
+enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of
+the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as
+an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.
+
+     "Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,
+     which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,
+     but also a useful work of reference."--_Academy._
+
+     "This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and
+     additions, of an article contributed by the learned author
+     two years ago to the 'Encyclop�die des Sciences
+     Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first
+     appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best
+     summary extant of the vast subject with which it
+     deals."--_Tablet._
+
+     "This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual
+     of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we
+     have in English. The present work ... shows not only great
+     knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but
+     also great insight into the inner history and the deeper
+     meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only
+     one, which it proposes to describe."--_Modern Review._
+
+     "The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by
+     the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country
+     and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few
+     Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a
+     good deal of information from it, and especially from the
+     extensive bibliography provided in the notes."--_Dublin
+     Review._
+
+     "Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a
+     master-hand."--_Critic (New York)._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.
+
+HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA.
+
+An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyaya
+and Vais'eshika Systems.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.
+
+The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in
+the department of pure philosophy.
+
+     "The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and
+     learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the
+     philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he
+     may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the
+     system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give
+     an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions
+     which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the
+     world, the nature and relations of man and his future
+     destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the
+     connection of the Sankhya system with the philosophy of
+     Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with
+     that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"--_Foreign Church
+     Chronicle._
+
+     "Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted
+     gain to all students of the development of thought. The
+     system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from
+     the Sankhya Karika, is the only contribution of India to
+     pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to
+     the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.
+     Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to
+     appreciate these points in any adequate manner."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our
+     philosophical library."--_Notes and Queries._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.
+
+A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VED�NTAS�RA.
+
+Translated, with copious Annotations,
+
+BY MAJOR G. A. JACOB,
+
+Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.
+
+The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for
+others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an
+accurate summary of the doctrines of the Ved�nta.
+
+     "The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an
+     inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in
+     his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,
+     indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they
+     bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will
+     rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hind�
+     philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its
+     kind that we have seen."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+TSUNI--||GOAM:
+
+THE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI.
+
+BY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,
+
+Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the
+Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
+Society, Vienna, &c., &c.
+
+     "The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of
+     interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of
+     Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the
+     comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of
+     their religion and mythology were scattered about in various
+     books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and
+     printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what
+     he has been able to collect himself."--_Prof. Max M�ller in
+     the Nineteenth Century._
+
+     "It is full of good things."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
+Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414,
+cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.
+
+TO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES
+AND EMENDATIONS.
+
+Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
+Notes.
+
+By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.
+
+     "As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,
+     it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if
+     they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and
+     for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove
+     useful."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+THE BHAGAVAD-G�T�.
+
+Translated, with Introduction and Notes.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.)
+
+     "Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad G�t� is, as
+     we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and
+     that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar
+     value."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.
+Bengal Civil Service.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.
+
+By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.
+
+     "Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with
+     considerable success, and his version contains much that
+     will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's
+     delightful selection."--_Academy._
+
+     "The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their
+     profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on
+     philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and
+     the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates
+     them."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.
+
+As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta
+Review_.
+
+By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of
+the Calcutta Madrasa.
+
+     "For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important
+     of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Tr�bner's
+     Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may
+     take it up the work must be one of profound
+     interest."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.
+
+By DR. C. P. TIELE.
+
+Vol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
+
+Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.
+
+By JAMES BALLINGAL.
+
+     "It places in the hands of the English readers a history of
+     Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on
+     the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the
+     latest results of research. In this volume there is a great
+     deal of information, as well as independent investigation,
+     for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in
+     itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive
+     religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the
+     New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and
+     minute."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.
+
+A POEM BY JAMI.
+
+Translated from the Persian into English Verse.
+
+BY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH.
+
+     "Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as
+     translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further
+     good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has
+     evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the
+     quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more
+     prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its
+     intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most
+     popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read
+     in all the independent native schools of India where Persian
+     is taught."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.
+
+LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.
+
+BY CARL ABEL.
+
+     "An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical
+     questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise
+     dry technicalities of the science."--_Standard._
+
+     "Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,
+     for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery
+     over the English language fits him to be a champion of
+     unpopular doctrines."--_Athen�um._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;
+
+OR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+BY MADHAVA ACHARYA.
+
+Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the
+University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of
+Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.
+
+This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The
+author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems
+current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives
+what appears to him to be their most important tenets.
+
+     "The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted
+     sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has
+     familiarised the translators with Indian
+     thought."--_Athen�um._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR.
+
+BY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER.
+
+Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,
+
+BY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A.
+
+     "Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of
+     Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western
+     analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from
+     Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the
+     Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred
+     books."--_Academy._
+
+     "The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better
+     hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the
+     lives of those scholars who have given their attention to
+     gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and
+     language."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing
+     stories, or for comparative folk-lore."--_Pall Mall
+     Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.
+
+UD�NAVARGA.
+
+A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON.
+
+Compiled by DHARMATR�TA.
+
+BEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts
+from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,
+
+BY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.
+
+     "Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which
+     assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding
+     of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of
+     comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan
+     version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,
+     who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a
+     translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which
+     has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be
+     congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult
+     task."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a
+Language Map, price 18s.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.
+
+     "Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do
+     better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclop�dic in its
+     scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any
+     particular language, and is left free to add to the initial
+     sum of knowledge there collected."--_Natal Mercury._
+
+     "Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to
+     linguistic students."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL
+RELIGIONS.
+
+BY C. P. TIELE,
+
+Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the
+University of Leyden.
+
+Translated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A.
+
+     "Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide
+     thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to
+     gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of
+     investigations into the religious history of nations. As
+     Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are
+     outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But
+     there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of
+     far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the
+     crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these
+     pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps
+     also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and
+     thorough research."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A HISTORY OF BURMA.
+
+Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the
+Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.
+
+BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,
+Membre Correspondant de la Soci�t� Acad�mique Indo-Chinoise de France.
+
+     "Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Tr�bner's Oriental
+     Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has
+     been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre
+     deserves great credit for the patience and industry which
+     has resulted in this History of Burma."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+RELIGION IN CHINA.
+
+By JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING.
+
+Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with
+Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People.
+
+     "Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and
+     often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of
+     considerable value of the subject."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to
+     study the existing religions in China, and his long
+     residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an
+     intimate knowledge of them as they at present
+     exist."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and
+     revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,
+     been the standard authority upon the subject of which it
+     treats."--_Nonconformist._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the
+     first authorities on Chinese religion and
+     language."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.
+
+Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed
+by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.
+
+Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.
+
+     "The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness
+     with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient
+     documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."--_Times._
+
+     "Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those
+     Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these
+     Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter
+     possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient
+     Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and
+     translated, have not yet attracted the attention of
+     scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon
+     the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded
+     in these venerable authorities."--_Daily News._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.
+
+With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.
+
+Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares
+College.
+
+Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.
+
+     "The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and
+     scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have
+     every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the
+     publishers."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price
+24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.
+
+BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,
+
+Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629).
+
+BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.,
+
+(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of
+Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,
+&c.
+
+An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--"Nothing
+more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's
+translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."
+
+     "It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the
+     best account of the condition of India at that ancient
+     period has come down to us in the books of travel written by
+     the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best
+     known."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.
+
+THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.
+
+By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.
+
+Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.
+
+     "This work is full of interest; while for the student of
+     sociology and the science of religion it is full of
+     importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in
+     so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently
+     translated."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a
+     really good translation of this well-known law book, first
+     rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not
+     only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced
+     lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications
+     the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in
+     clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very
+     grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could
+     be published of the translation left by Burnell."--F. MAX
+     M�LLER in the _Academy._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,
+
+     Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his
+     Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original
+     and for most part Unpublished Documents.
+
+By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal
+Medical Service, Retired, &c.
+
+     "Not too soon have Messrs. Tr�bner added to their valuable
+     Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of
+     the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander
+     Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and
+     though an account of his career was demanded soon after his
+     decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of
+     his compatriot, Dr. Duka."--_Bookseller._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.
+
+Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches,"
+and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+I.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.
+
+II.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James
+Barton, of his several Surveys.
+
+III.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,
+dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.
+
+IV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.
+
+V.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.
+
+VI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.
+
+VII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst
+the Malays. By William Marsden.
+
+VIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By
+James Howison.
+
+IX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of
+Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.
+
+X.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying
+off Sumatra. By John Crisp.
+
+XI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales
+Island. By William Hunter, M.D.
+
+XII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.
+Leyden, M.D.
+
+XIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the
+Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.
+
+XIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of
+Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.
+
+XV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring
+Islands. By T. Ware.
+
+XVI.--Climate of Singapore.
+
+XVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.
+
+XVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.
+
+XIX.--Inscription at Singapore.
+
+XX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By
+Lieut.-Col. James Low.
+
+XXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By
+J. W. Laidlay.
+
+XXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.
+
+XXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.
+
+XXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian
+Archipelago.
+
+XXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.
+
+XXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+XXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from
+Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.
+
+XXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities
+in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence
+across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and
+Capt. J. G. Forlong.
+
+XXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui
+Tin Ore.
+
+XXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.
+
+XXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+XXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.
+By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.
+
+XXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and
+Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the
+Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.
+
+XXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.
+
+XL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+General Index.
+
+Index of Vernacular Terms.
+
+Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.
+
+     "The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China--its
+     philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a
+     very material and important contribution to our accessible
+     information regarding that country and its
+     people."--_Contemporary Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit
+
+By the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S.,
+
+Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.
+
+     "A very interesting addition to Tr�bner's Oriental
+     Series."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and
+     beauty of expression."--_St. James' Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.
+
+ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;
+
+Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.
+
+BY JAMES GRAY,
+
+Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.
+
+The Sanscrit-P�li word N�ti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract,
+and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a
+general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and
+didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as
+form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to
+his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and
+have served as a most effective medium of instruction.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:
+
+THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.
+
+Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal
+Civil Service.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.
+
+ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D.,
+
+Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor
+of Law in the University of Calcutta.
+
+The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great
+Law Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts
+contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages
+before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha
+       Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy
+
+Author: Madhava Acharya
+
+Translator: E. B. Cowell
+            A. E. Gough
+
+Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+<div class="tr"><p class="center">Transcriber's Note:</p>
+<p class="center">The Diacritical marks in this book are not consistent throughout the book. The original Diacritical marks have been retained.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h5>TR&Uuml;BNER'S</h5>
+<h4>ORIENTAL SERIES.</h4>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+<h4>THE</h4>
+<h1>SARVA-DAR&#346;ANA-SA&#7746;GRAHA</h1>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h4>OR</h4>
+<h3><i>REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.</i></h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h2>BY</h2>
+
+  <h2>M&Aacute;DHAVA &Aacute;CH&Aacute;RYA.</h2>
+
+  <p>&nbsp;</p>
+  <h5>TRANSLATED BY</h5>
+  <h3> E. B. COWELL, M.A.</h3>
+
+  <h4>PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE IN THE<br />
+  UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,<br />
+ AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.</h4>
+  <h5> AND</h5>
+  <h3> A. E. GOUGH, M.A.</h3>
+
+  <h4>PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND<br />
+ PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.</h4>
+ <p>&nbsp;</p>
+ <p>&nbsp;</p>
+  <h3>LONDON:</h3>
+  <h3>TR&Uuml;BNER &amp; CO., LUDGATE HILL.</h3>
+  <h3> 1882. </h3>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p>
+<h2>PREFACE.</h2>
+
+
+<p>I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
+Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-dar&#347;ana-sa&#7747;graha of M&aacute;dhava
+&Aacute;ch&aacute;rya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
+Pa&#7751;&#7693;it &Iacute;&#347;varachandra Vidy&aacute;s&aacute;gara, but a subsequent edition, with no
+important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pa&#7751;&#7693;it T&aacute;r&aacute;n&aacute;tha
+Tarkav&aacute;chaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
+the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
+Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
+been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
+those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
+of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
+originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
+character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
+from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
+noticed the same thing in the N&aacute;gar&iacute; copies of M&aacute;dhava's Commentary on
+the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.</p>
+
+<p>As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span> Asiatic
+Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
+read it with my friend Pa&#7751;&#7693;it Mahe&#347;achandra Ny&aacute;yaratna, the present
+Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
+translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
+engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
+England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
+chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
+were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
+longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pa&#7751;&#7693;its
+of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
+years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
+that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
+of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
+it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
+accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
+advantage of the help of some of the Pa&#7751;&#7693;its of Benares, especially of
+Pa&#7751;&#7693;it R&aacute;ma Mi&#347;ra, the assistant Professor of S&aacute;&#7749;khya, who was himself
+a R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
+things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
+throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
+abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
+the Benares Pa&#7751;&#7693;it between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
+revised for their present republication.</p>
+
+<p>The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
+The author successively passes in review<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span> the sixteen philosophical
+systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
+gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
+principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
+them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
+for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
+were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
+with his own.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
+the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
+interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
+course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
+details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
+guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
+Dar&#347;anas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
+the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
+materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
+controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
+the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
+continually following in their track even where he does not quote
+their exact words.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
+
+<p>The systems are arranged from the Ved&aacute;nta point of view,&mdash;our author
+having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span>of the Sm&aacute;rta order in
+the Ma&#7789;h of &#346;&#7771;ingeri in the Mysore territory, founded by &#346;a&#7747;kara
+&Aacute;ch&aacute;rya, the great Ved&aacute;ntist teacher of the eighth century, through
+whose efforts the Ved&aacute;nta became what it is at present&mdash;the
+acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
+ascending scale,&mdash;the first, the Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka and Bauddha, being the
+lowest as the furthest removed from the Ved&aacute;nta, and the last, the
+S&aacute;&#7749;khya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.</p>
+
+<p>The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the
+noblest minds in India throughout the medi&aelig;val period of its history.
+Hiouen Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les &eacute;coles
+philosophiques sont constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs
+discussions passionn&eacute;es s'&eacute;l&egrave;ve comme les flots de la mer. Les
+h&eacute;r&eacute;tiques des diverses sectes s'attachent &agrave; des ma&icirc;tres particuliers,
+et, par des voies diff&eacute;rentes, marchent tous au m&ecirc;me but." We can
+still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the medi&aelig;val
+literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among the
+Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
+trees &Aacute;rhata begging monks, &#346;vetapadas, Mah&aacute;p&aacute;&#347;upatas,
+P&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;arabhikshus, Bh&aacute;gavatas, Var&#7751;ins, Ke&#347;alu&ntilde;chanas, Lok&aacute;yatikas,
+K&aacute;pilas, K&aacute;&#7751;&aacute;das, Aupanishadas, &Iacute;svarak&aacute;rins, Dharma&#347;&aacute;strins,
+Paur&aacute;&#7751;ikas, S&aacute;ptatantavas, &#346;&aacute;bdas, P&aacute;&ntilde;char&aacute;trikas, &amp;c., all listening
+to their own accepted tenets and zealously defending them."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Many of
+these sects will occupy us in the ensuing pages; many of them also are
+found in M&aacute;dhava's poem on the controversial triumphs <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span>of &#346;a&#7747;kara
+&Aacute;ch&aacute;rya, and in the spurious prose work on the same subject, ascribed
+to Anant&aacute;nandagiri. Well may some old poet have put into the mouth of
+Yudhish&#7789;hira the lines which one so often hears from the lips of
+modern pa&#7751;&#7693;its&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">Ved&aacute; vibhinn&aacute;&#7717; sm&#7771;itayo vibhinn&aacute;,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">N&aacute;sau munir yasya mata&#7747; na bhinnam,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Dharmasya tattva&#7747; nihita&#7747; guh&aacute;y&aacute;&#7747;,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Mah&aacute;jano yena gata&#7717; sa panth&aacute;&#7717;.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,</p>
+
+<p>&#956;&#953;&#8118;&#962; &#964;&#959;&#8055;&#957;&#965;&#957; &#959;&#8020;&#963;&#951;&#962; &#964;&#8134;&#962; &#7936;&#955;&#951;&#952;&#949;&#8055;&#945;&#962;,
+ &#964;&#8056; &#947;&#8048;&#961; &#968;&#949;&#8166;&#948;&#959;&#962; &#956;&#965;&#961;&#8055;&#945;&#962;<br />
+&#7952;&#954;&#964;&#961;&#959;&#960;&#8048;&#962; &#7956;&#967;&#949;&#953;, &#954;&#945;&#952;&#8049;&#960;&#949;&#961; &#945;&#7985; &#946;&#8049;&#954;&#967;&#945;&#953;
+ &#964;&#8048; &#964;&#959;&#8166; &#928;&#949;&#957;&#952;&#8051;&#969;&#962; &#948;&#953;&#945;&#966;&#959;&#961;&#8053;&#963;&#945;&#963;&#945;&#953;<br />
+&#956;&#8051;&#955;&#951; &#945;&#7985; &#964;&#8134;&#962; &#966;&#953;&#955;&#959;&#963;&#959;&#966;&#8055;&#945;&#962; &#964;&#8134;&#962; &#964;&#949;
+ &#946;&#945;&#961;&#946;&#8049;&#961;&#959;&#965; &#964;&#8134;&#962; &#964;&#949;<br />
+&#7961;&#955;&#955;&#951;&#957;&#953;&#954;&#8134;&#962; &#945;&#7985;&#961;&#8051;&#963;&#949;&#953;&#962;, &#7953;&#954;&#8049;&#963;&#964;&#951; &#8005;&#960;&#949;&#961;
+ &#7956;&#955;&#945;&#967;&#949;&#957;, &#8033;&#962; &#960;&#8118;&#963;&#945;&#957; &#945;&#8016;&#967;&#949;&#8150;<br />
+&#964;&#8052;&#957; &#7936;&#955;&#8053;&#952;&#949;&#953;&#945;&#957;, &#966;&#969;&#964;&#8056;&#962; &#948;', &#959;&#7990;&#956;&#945;&#953;,
+ &#7936;&#957;&#945;&#964;&#959;&#955;&#8135; &#960;&#8049;&#957;&#964;&#945; &#966;&#969;&#964;&#8055;&#950;&#949;&#964;&#945;&#953;.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
+equanimity is that of V&aacute;chaspati Mi&#347;ra, who wrote standard treatises
+on each of the six systems except the Vai&#347;eshika, adopting, of course,
+the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
+alien tenet.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
+given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
+in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> &#346;r&iacute;harsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Found in the Mah&aacute;bh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
+give them as I have heard them from Pa&#7751;&#7693;it R&aacute;man&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a Vidy&aacute;ratna.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+
+
+<table summary="Contents">
+<tr><td></td>
+<td></td>
+<td></td>
+<td></td>
+<td class="tocpg f1">Page</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">I.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_I">The Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_2">2</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">II.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_II">The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">III.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_III">The &Aacute;rhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">IV.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">The R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">V.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_V">The P&uacute;r&#7751;a-praj&ntilde;a System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_87">87</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">VI.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">The Nakul&iacute;&#347;a-P&aacute;&#347;upata System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">VII.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">The &#346;aiva System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">VIII.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">The Pratyabhij&ntilde;&aacute; or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">IX.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">The Rase&#347;vara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">X.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_X">The Vai&#347;eshika or Aul&uacute;kya System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XI.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">The Akshap&aacute;da or Ny&aacute;ya System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XII.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">The Jaimin&iacute;ya System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_178">178</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XIII.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">The P&aacute;&#7751;in&iacute;ya System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_203">203</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XIV.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">The S&aacute;&#7749;khya System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_221">221</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XV.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">The P&aacute;ta&ntilde;jala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_231">231</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="tocch">XVI.</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#Sankaracharya">The Ved&aacute;nta or System of Sa&#7747;kara &Aacute;ch&aacute;rya</a></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><span class="smcap"><a href="#APPENDIX">Appendix&mdash;On the Up&aacute;dhi (E. B. C.)</a></span></td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td></tr>
+</table>
+
+
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p>
+<h2>THE SARVA-DAR&#346;ANA-SA&#7748;GRAHA.</h2>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2>THE PROLOGUE.</h2>
+
+
+<p>1. I worship &#346;iva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
+supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
+<i>him</i> only has this all a maker.</p>
+
+<p>2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvaj&ntilde;a-Vish&#7751;u, who knows all the &Aacute;gamas,
+the son of &#346;&aacute;r&#7749;gap&aacute;&#7751;i, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
+of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
+proper meaning of the term Soul.</p>
+
+<p>3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable M&aacute;dhava
+mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
+fortunate S&aacute;ya&#7751;a.</p>
+
+<p>4. Having thoroughly searched the &#346;&aacute;stras of former teachers, very
+hard to be crossed, the fortunate S&aacute;ya&#7751;a-M&aacute;dhava<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> the lord has
+expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
+with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
+delight in a garland strung of various flowers?</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
+Va&#7747;&#347;a-Br&aacute;hma&#7751;a, has solved the riddle of the relation of M&aacute;dhava and
+S&aacute;ya&#7751;a. S&aacute;ya&#7751;a is a pure Dravi&#7693;ian name given to a child who is born
+after all the elder children have died. M&aacute;dhava elsewhere calls S&aacute;ya&#7751;a
+his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
+himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term S&aacute;ya&#7751;a-M&aacute;dhava&#7717;
+here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
+same person. The body seems meant by the S&aacute;ya&#7751;a of the third &#347;loka.
+M&aacute;ya&#7751;a was the father of M&aacute;dhava, and the true reading may be
+<i>&#347;r&iacute;man-m&aacute;ya&#7751;a</i>.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE CH&Aacute;RV&Aacute;KA SYSTEM.</h2>
+
+
+<p>[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to &#346;iva, the
+abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
+how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
+felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka,
+the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
+of B&#7771;ihaspati? The efforts of Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka are indeed hard to be
+eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
+refrain&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">While life is yours, live joyously;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">None can escape Death's searching eye:<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">When once this frame of ours they burn,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">How shall it e'er again return?<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>The mass of men, in accordance with the &#346;&aacute;stras of policy and
+enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
+denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
+found to follow only the doctrine of Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka. Hence another name for
+that school is Lok&aacute;yata,&mdash;a name well accordant with the thing
+signified.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p>
+
+<p>In this school the four elements, earth, &amp;c., are the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span>original
+principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
+intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
+from the mixing of certain ingredients;<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and when these are
+destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the &#346;ruti
+for this [B&#7771;ihad &Aacute;ra&#7751;y. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
+elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
+destroyed,&mdash;after death no intelligence remains."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Therefore the
+soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
+since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
+such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
+only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
+may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
+always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
+the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
+inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
+fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
+wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
+straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
+not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
+which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
+refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
+devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
+because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
+contents. If any one were <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span>so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
+he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
+poet&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,&mdash;such is the reasoning of fools;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
+world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
+agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
+expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
+accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &amp;c., are
+only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
+three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> then
+again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
+destructive, as the authority of the j&ntilde;&aacute;na-k&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a is overthrown by
+those who maintain that of the karma-k&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a, while those who maintain
+the authority of the j&ntilde;&aacute;na-k&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a reject that of the karma-k&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a; and
+lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
+of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
+and smearing oneself with ashes,&mdash;</p>
+<p>B&#7771;ihaspati says, these are
+but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor
+sense.</p></div>
+
+<p>Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
+produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &amp;c.; the only Supreme is
+the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
+eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
+holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span>such
+phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &amp;c., are at once intelligible,
+as the attributes of thinness, &amp;c., and self-consciousness will reside
+in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
+body" is metaphorical "the head of R&aacute;hu" [R&aacute;hu being really <i>all
+head</i>].</p>
+
+<p>All this has been thus summed up&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,&mdash;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Just like the intoxicating power from ki&#7751;wa, &amp;c., mixed together;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> abide in the same subject,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And since fatness, &amp;c., reside only in the body,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> it alone is the soul and no other,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
+inference, &amp;c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
+else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
+thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
+hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
+those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"</p>
+
+<p>All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.</p>
+
+<p>Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the <i>sign</i> or
+middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
+found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
+major.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
+of any condition accepted or disputed;<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> and this connection does
+not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
+<i>existence</i>, as the eye, &amp;c., are the cause of perception, but by
+virtue of its being <i>known</i>. What then is the means of this
+connection's being known?</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span></p><p>We will first show that it is not <i>perception</i>. Now perception is
+held to be of two kinds, external and internal [<i>i.e.</i>, as produced by
+the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
+the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
+contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
+particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
+such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
+proposition<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
+middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
+Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
+has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
+a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
+particular case<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
+implying fire].</p>
+
+<p>Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
+the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
+object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
+as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &amp;c., have their
+objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."</p>
+
+<p>Nor can <i>inference</i> be the means of the knowledge of the universal
+proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
+require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
+arise the fallacy of an <i>ad infinitum</i> retrogression.</p>
+
+<p>Nor can <i>testimony</i> be the means thereof, since we may either allege
+in reply, in accordance with the Vai&#347;eshika doctrine of Ka&#7751;&aacute;da, that
+this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
+this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
+that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span>stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
+the recognition of a <i>sign</i> in the form of the language used in the
+child's presence by the old man;<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and, moreover, there is no more
+reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
+invariably connected, than for our receiving the <i>ipse dixit</i> of Manu,
+&amp;c. [which, of course, we Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;kas reject].</p>
+
+<p>And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
+knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
+whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
+major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
+no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
+smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
+oneself<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> would have to end in mere idle words.</p>
+
+<p>Then again <i>comparison</i>,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> &amp;c., must be utterly rejected as the
+means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
+impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
+connection [<i>i.e.</i>, the universal proposition], because their end is
+to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
+relation of a name to something so named.</p>
+
+<p>Again, this same absence of a condition,<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> which has been given as
+the definition of an invariable connection [<i>i.e.</i>, a universal
+proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
+establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
+therefore, although the absence of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>perceptible things may be itself
+perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
+non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
+inference, &amp;c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
+been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
+the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
+extension<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> with the major term though not constantly accompanying
+the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
+accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
+term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [<i>i.e.</i>, reciprocal],
+are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
+fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
+sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
+causing audition;"<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> wherefore the definition holds,&mdash;and again it
+is established by the &#347;loka of the great Doctor beginning
+<i>sam&aacute;sama</i>.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span></p><p>But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
+knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
+knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
+the proposition is possible, <i>i.e.</i>, a knowledge in the form of such a
+connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
+by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
+knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
+invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
+adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
+Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
+proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p>
+
+<p>The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &amp;c., to the
+knowledge of fire, &amp;c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
+former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
+this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
+coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
+drugs, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>From this it follows that fate, &amp;c.,<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> do not exist, since these can
+only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
+not allow ad&#7771;ish&#7789;a, the various phenomena of the world become
+destitute of any cause.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span></p><p>But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
+can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
+Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>And all this has been also said by B&#7771;ihaspati&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &amp;c., produce any real effect.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">If a beast slain in the Jyotish&#7789;oma rite will itself go to heaven,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a><br /></span>
+<span class="i0">If the &#346;r&aacute;ddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the &#346;r&aacute;ddha here,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">If he who departs from the body goes to another world,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">All these ceremonies for the dead,&mdash;there is no other fruit anywhere.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">All the well-known formul&aelig; of the pandits, jarphar&iacute;, turphar&iacute;, &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a><br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the A&#347;wamedha,<br /></span>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span><span class="i0">These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a><br /></span>
+<span class="i0">While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
+to the doctrine of Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka. Such is the pleasant consummation.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> "&#346;a&#7749;kara, Bh&aacute;skara, and other commentators name the
+Lok&aacute;yatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka"
+(Colebrooke). Lok&aacute;yata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
+the world" (<i>loka</i> and <i>&aacute;yata</i>). Lauk&aacute;yatika occurs in P&aacute;&#7751;ini's
+ukthaga&#7751;a.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Ki&#7751;wa</i> is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
+fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &amp;c."
+Colebrooke quotes from &#346;a&#7749;kara: "The faculty of thought results from a
+modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
+ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
+betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
+exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Of course &#346;a&#7749;kara, in his commentary, gives a very
+different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
+existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
+&#346;abara's Comm. Jaimini S&uacute;t., i. i. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> I take <i>ka&#7751;a</i> as here equal to the Bengali <i>kun&#7771;</i>. Cf.
+Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. <i>A&#347;v&aacute;&#7717; ka&#7751;&aacute; g&aacute;vas ta&#7751;&#7693;ul&aacute; ma&#347;ak&aacute;s tush&aacute;&#7717;.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Ny&aacute;ya S&uacute;tras, ii. 57.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, personality and fatness, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> I read <i>dehe</i> for <i>deha&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
+invariable concomitance (<i>vy&aacute;pti</i>)."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For the <i>sandigdha</i> and <i>ni&#347;chita up&aacute;dhi</i> see Siddh&aacute;nta
+Mukt&aacute;vali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
+(as of smoke by fire).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The attributes of the class are not always found in
+every member,&mdash;thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
+and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
+other place.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> See S&aacute;hitya Darpa&#7751;a (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
+Siddh&aacute;nta-M., p. 80.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> The properly logical, as distinguished from the
+rhetorical, argument.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> "<i>Upam&aacute;na</i> or the knowledge of a similarity is the
+instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
+particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
+name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> The up&aacute;dhi is the condition which must be supplied to
+restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
+has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
+the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
+of a true vy&aacute;pti, there is, of course, no up&aacute;dhi.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> '&#913;&#957;&#964;&#953;&#963;&#964;&#961;&#7953;&#966;&#949;&#953; (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here
+our A with distributed predicate.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> If we omitted the first clause, and only made the up&aacute;dhi
+"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
+accompanied by it," then in the Naiy&aacute;yika argument "sound is
+non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
+would serve as a M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka up&aacute;dhi, to establish the <i>vyabhich&aacute;ra</i>
+fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
+clause excludes it, as an up&aacute;dhi must be consistent with <i>either</i>
+party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiy&aacute;yika maintains that "being
+produced" <i>always</i> accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
+defined the up&aacute;dhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
+constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an up&aacute;dhi "the
+nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
+class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
+only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
+found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
+up&aacute;dhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
+accompanying the major," we might have as a M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka up&aacute;dhi "the not
+causing audition," <i>i.e.</i>, the not being apprehended by the organs of
+hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
+where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> This refers to an obscure &#347;loka of Udayan&aacute;ch&aacute;rya, "where
+a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (<i>i.e.</i>,
+universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
+predicates) relate to the same argument (as <i>e.g.</i>, to prove the
+existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
+will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
+the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
+because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
+fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
+fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
+fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
+non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
+inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
+by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
+will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term <i>is</i> thus
+invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
+fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
+reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
+accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
+here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
+another, difficulty in the Sarva-dar&#347;ana-&#347;a&#7749;graha to my old friend and
+teacher, Pa&#7751;&#7693;it Mahe&#347;a Chandra Ny&aacute;yaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
+College.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
+Buddhist system <i>infra</i>, we have an attempt to establish the authority
+of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
+genus and species.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Ad&#7771;ish&#7789;a</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the merit and demerit in our actions
+which produce their effects in future births.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
+209.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the A&#347;wamedha rites, see Wilson's
+Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
+handled in the rites."</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.</h2>
+
+
+<p>At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;kas) laid
+down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
+your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
+easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
+accordingly been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
+a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance&mdash;not
+through the mere observation of the desired result in
+similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
+dissimilar cases."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>On the hypothesis (of the Naiy&aacute;yikas) that it is concomitance and
+non-concomitance (<i>e.g.</i>, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
+that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
+of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
+impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
+future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiy&aacute;yika) rejoin that
+uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
+system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
+may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
+stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span>alone are to be
+entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
+practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
+terminates where there is a practical absurdity."<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p>
+
+<p>1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
+designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
+(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
+from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
+or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
+instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
+five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
+its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
+is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
+non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.</p>
+
+<p>2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
+ascertainment of identity (<i>e.g.</i>, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
+we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
+arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
+as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
+self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
+where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
+exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
+the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
+to the same object (<i>i.e.</i>, predication),&mdash;This tree is a sisu. For
+reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
+there is no difference whatever (<i>e.g.</i>, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
+no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
+two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
+can reference to the same object take place where there is a
+reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
+for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
+cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).</p>
+
+<p>If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
+<i>pram&aacute;&#7751;a</i>, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
+is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
+allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
+maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
+the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
+inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
+(to prove, <i>i.e.</i>, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
+absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
+Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
+and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
+homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
+affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
+words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
+existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
+yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
+term. Conformably it has been said by Tath&aacute;gata&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
+its being present to the understanding of others.</p>
+
+<p>"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
+negation by a certain person."</p></div>
+
+<p>All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
+for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.</p>
+
+<p>These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
+standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of M&aacute;dhyamika,
+Yog&aacute;ch&aacute;ra, Sautr&aacute;ntika, and Vaibh&aacute;shika, these Buddhists adopt
+respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
+void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
+(representationism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span>), and the perceptibility of external objects
+(presentationism).<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
+teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
+of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
+the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
+to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
+and so forth, according to their several inclinations.</p>
+
+<p>It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
+viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
+all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.</p>
+
+<p>Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
+and so forth (<i>i.e.</i>, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
+from their existence; thus, whatever <i>is</i> is momentary (or fluxional)
+like a bank of clouds, and all these things <i>are</i>.<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Nor may any one
+object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
+existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
+perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
+exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
+established, provided that we exclude from <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span>it the non-momentary
+succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
+the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
+efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
+succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
+succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
+manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
+alternative;</p>
+
+<p>"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
+repugnance in the very statement."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
+and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
+existence of the alternative of momentariness.&mdash;<span class="smcap">q.e.d.</span></p>
+
+<p>Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
+the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
+to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
+future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
+efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
+cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
+deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
+which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
+time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
+thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
+power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
+practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
+not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
+instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
+while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
+past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.</p>
+
+<p>You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> subsidiaries, there
+is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
+future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
+the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
+not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
+the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
+assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
+other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
+cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
+will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
+adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
+is on the skin of man;</p>
+
+<p>"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
+and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
+produced upon it."</p></div>
+
+<p>Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, <i>together with</i>
+its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
+its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
+their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
+without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
+the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
+give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
+afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
+stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
+additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress <i>in
+infinitum</i>. If when the additament is to be generated another
+auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
+series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
+regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
+additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
+water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
+would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> on
+the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
+otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
+a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
+to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
+requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
+productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
+established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
+supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.</p>
+
+<p>Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
+the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
+or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
+the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
+is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
+the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
+take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
+and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
+additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
+regression is firmly set up.</p>
+
+<p>In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
+subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
+the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
+additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
+by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
+your embarrassment.</p>
+
+<p>Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
+supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
+may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that <i>minus</i> the
+supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
+supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
+<i>kurvad r&uacute;pa</i> (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
+the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
+its fruit.</p>
+
+<p>Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
+Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
+for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
+(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
+effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
+of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
+will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
+the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
+reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.</p>
+
+<p>That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
+heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
+Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
+not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
+disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
+allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
+times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
+That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
+that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
+time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
+of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
+produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
+stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
+seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
+efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
+The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
+anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
+of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
+exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
+to those times.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
+being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
+to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
+which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
+there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
+of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
+"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
+observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
+the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by J&ntilde;&aacute;na-&#347;r&iacute;&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
+things;</p>
+
+<p>"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
+and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
+eternal in things eternal (ether, &amp;c.);</p>
+
+<p>"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
+the work of another;</p>
+
+<p>"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
+simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
+true in regard to that which we have to prove."</p></div>
+
+<p>Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
+Vai&#347;eshikas and Naiy&aacute;yikas, that existence is a participation in the
+universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
+particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
+universal) could have no existence.</p>
+
+<p>Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
+co-inhesion dependent on any <i>sui generis</i> existence of their own; for
+such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many <i>sui generis</i>
+existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
+dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
+many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
+all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
+forth, like the string running<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> through the gems strung upon it.
+Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
+everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
+in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
+and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Pra&#347;asta-p&aacute;da
+has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
+present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
+of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
+another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
+other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
+the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
+qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
+itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
+does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
+place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
+inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
+you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
+of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
+of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.</p>
+
+<p>Conformably it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
+place, engages without moving from that place in producing
+itself in another place.</p>
+
+<p>"This entity (universality) is not connected with that
+wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
+that place: great is this miracle.</p>
+
+<p>"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
+divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
+of difficulties!"</p></div>
+
+<p>If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
+rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
+repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
+heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
+verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
+found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
+bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
+pain, and pain alone.</p>
+
+<p>If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
+instance,&mdash;we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
+being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
+impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
+all is like itself alone, like itself alone.</p>
+
+<p>In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
+are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
+not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
+(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
+of vision, to the (nacre, &amp;c.), which is the basis of its particular
+nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &amp;c., illusorily superposed upon
+that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
+so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
+semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
+fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
+The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
+superposed (silver, &amp;c.), the basis (nacre, &amp;c.), the connection
+between them, the act of vision, and the <i>videns</i>, if one or more be
+unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
+objects of the negation; the M&aacute;dhyamikas excellently wise explain as
+follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
+total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
+like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
+momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
+assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span> four
+alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
+and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
+this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
+the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.</p>
+
+<p>If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
+is said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
+like, for instance;</p>
+
+<p>"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
+of the sky and the like, for instance."</p></div>
+
+<p>The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
+inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
+Buddha in the Ala&#7749;k&aacute;r&aacute;vat&aacute;ra<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
+ascertained;<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p>
+
+<p>"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
+natureless."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
+sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."</p></div>
+
+<p>That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
+alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
+views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
+carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."</p></div>
+
+<p>In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
+come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
+Accordingly we have overtaken our end, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>and there is nothing to be
+taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
+student&mdash;interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
+putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
+Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
+These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
+religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
+their conventional designation of M&aacute;dhyamikas (or mediocre).</p>
+
+<p>Certain other Buddhists are styled Yog&aacute;ch&aacute;ras, because while they
+accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
+the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
+void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
+admitted? For their technology is as follows:&mdash;Self-subsistent
+cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
+is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmak&iacute;rti: "To one
+who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."</p>
+
+<p>An external <i>percipibile</i> is not admissible in consequence of the
+following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
+from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
+which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
+what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
+you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
+cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
+the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
+supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
+apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the <i>percipibile</i> a simple atom or a
+complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
+by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
+alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
+not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
+been said<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
+have six surfaces;</p>
+
+<p>"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
+body of atomic dimension."</p></div>
+
+<p>Intellect, therefore, as having no other <i>percipibile</i> but itself, is
+shown to be itself its own <i>percipibile</i>, self-subsistent, luminous
+with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
+cognition ulterior thereto;</p>
+
+<p>"There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
+intellect shines forth of itself alone."</p></div>
+
+<p>The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
+is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
+soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
+and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
+were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
+not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
+identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
+determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
+interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
+illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
+cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
+beginning and without interruption; as it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
+cognition thereof are identical;</p>
+
+<p>"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
+cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
+reason of illusory perceptions,</p>
+
+<p>"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
+of percipient."</p></div>
+
+<p>Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> juice, the
+energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
+sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
+the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
+subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
+virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
+reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
+conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
+to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
+another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
+has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
+appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,</p>
+
+<p>"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
+percipient;</p>
+
+<p>"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
+example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
+the like,</p>
+
+<p>"Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
+percipient and percept."</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
+ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.</p>
+
+<p>When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
+view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
+knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
+such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
+<i>Mahodaya</i> (the grand exaltation, emancipation).</p>
+
+<p>Others again (the Sautr&aacute;ntikas) hold that the position that there is
+no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
+contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
+cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
+accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
+being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span>
+proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
+invariability of simultaneous cognition,&mdash;we refuse this, because
+inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
+manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
+as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
+object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
+should be presented as <i>Ego</i>, not as <i>Hoc aliquid</i>, because the
+cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
+blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
+and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
+so it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
+portion,</p>
+
+<p>"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
+illusion."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
+as if it were external."</p></div>
+
+<p>To this we reply (say the Sautr&aacute;ntikas): This is untenable, for if
+there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
+comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
+senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
+mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
+illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
+duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
+involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
+cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
+their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
+and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
+states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
+difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
+like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
+external," you must already suppose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> an external <i>percipibile</i>, and
+your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.</p>
+
+<p>If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
+the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautr&aacute;ntikas) reply that this
+objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
+the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
+and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
+interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If it be asked, How can there be a past <i>percipibile</i>? They
+recognise perceptibility,</p>
+
+<p>"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
+its imposition of its form."</p></div>
+
+<p>To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
+nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
+from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
+be inferred. Therefore it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
+without losing the nature of a half;</p>
+
+<p>"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
+is the nature of the knowable."</p></div>
+
+<p>For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
+cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
+indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
+to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
+external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
+at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
+instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
+speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
+walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
+discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
+are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
+recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
+manifestation as blue and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span> so forth is a presentment of activity, as
+it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
+about the Ego:</p>
+
+<p>"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
+the rest."</p></div>
+
+<p>Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
+it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
+which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
+world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
+presentments resulting from ideation.</p>
+
+<p>According to the view of the Sensationalists (<i>vij&ntilde;&aacute;nav&aacute;din</i>),
+ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
+presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
+single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
+produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
+sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
+train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
+to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
+momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
+are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
+subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
+presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
+had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
+stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
+this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
+intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
+must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
+consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
+percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
+smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
+conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
+suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> dominant (organ). Of these,
+the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
+the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
+like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
+forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
+restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
+medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
+the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
+one particular cognition (form) where taste, &amp;c., might have been
+equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
+who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
+causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
+its modifications.</p>
+
+<p>So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
+of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
+(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
+these, the sensible world (<i>r&uacute;pa-skandha</i>) is the sense organs and
+their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
+discriminated (<i>r&uacute;pyante</i>) by these. The perceptional world is the
+stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
+affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
+generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
+world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words&mdash;the words
+"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
+desire, aversion, &amp;c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
+miseries, as conceit, pride, &amp;c., and merit and demerit.</p>
+
+<p>Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
+and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
+principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
+said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
+four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p></div>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
+"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
+(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
+these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
+concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
+of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
+causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
+being,&mdash;such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
+germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
+elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
+the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
+as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
+touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
+the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &amp;c. The aphorism
+comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
+Tath&aacute;gatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
+by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
+determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
+cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tath&aacute;gata
+Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
+between the cause and effect, results from production or from
+non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
+exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
+the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
+the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix <i>tal</i>
+(in the word <i>sthitit&#257;</i>) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
+by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
+some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
+effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
+it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
+that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
+causes and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
+observed.<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
+genesis to be gone through is as follows:&mdash;From the seed the germ,
+from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
+hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
+blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
+neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
+the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
+being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
+two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
+matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
+unduly prolix.</p>
+
+<p>Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
+rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
+(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
+knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
+ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautr&aacute;ntika arose from
+the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
+who asked what was the ultimate purport (<i>anta</i>) of the aphorism
+(<i>s&uacute;tra</i>), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
+Sautr&aacute;ntikas."</p>
+
+<p>Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
+odours, &amp;c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &amp;c., in order to
+produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
+venerated Buddha styled Pr&aacute;thamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
+attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
+is the only reality. A third school, who <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span>contend that both are true (the
+internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
+inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (<i>viruddh&aacute;
+bh&aacute;sh&aacute;</i>), and are known under the designation of Vaibh&aacute;shikas. Their
+technical language springs up as follows:&mdash;According to the doctrine of
+inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
+no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
+impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
+contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
+therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
+is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
+representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
+evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
+non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
+appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.</p>
+
+<p>"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
+were aught else,</p>
+
+<p>"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
+derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."</p></div>
+
+<p>Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
+is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
+universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
+replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
+for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
+if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
+gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
+for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
+fully discussed in describing the Sautr&aacute;ntikas (cf. p. 27), and
+therefore need not here be further detailed.</p>
+
+<p>It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> according
+to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
+for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
+accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
+(of those who are to be taught),</p>
+
+<p>"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
+plurality of methods.</p>
+
+<p>"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
+superficial,</p>
+
+<p>"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
+universal void which is a negation of duality."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
+inner seats (<i>&aacute;yatana</i>) is conducive to felicity.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats</p>
+
+<p>"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
+aught else below?</p>
+
+<p>"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,</p>
+
+<p>"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
+the wise as the twelve inner seats."</p></div>
+
+<p>The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
+Viveka-vil&aacute;sa:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
+universe is momentarily fluxional;</p>
+
+<p>"The following four principles in order are to be known by
+the name of the noble truths:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
+held,<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p>
+
+<p>"And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
+heard in order.</p>
+
+<p>"Pain, and the <i>skandhas</i> of the embodied one, which are
+declared to be five,&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.</p>
+
+<p>"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
+and the rest, the common sensory,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,&mdash;these are the
+twelve inner seats.</p>
+
+<p>"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
+it arises in the heart of man.</p>
+
+<p>"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
+aggregate.</p>
+
+<p>"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,</p>
+
+<p>"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
+emancipation.</p>
+
+<p>"Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
+perception and inference.</p>
+
+<p>"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
+the Vaibh&aacute;shikas and the rest.</p>
+
+<p>"The Vaibh&aacute;shika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
+cognition;</p>
+
+<p>"The Sautr&aacute;ntika allows no external object apprehensible by
+perception;</p>
+
+<p>"The Yog&aacute;ch&aacute;ra admits only intellect accompanied with forms;</p>
+
+<p>"The M&aacute;dhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.</p>
+
+<p>"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
+emancipation,</p>
+
+<p>"Arising from the extirpation of desire, &amp;c., the stream of
+cognitions and impressions.</p>
+
+<p>"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
+single meal in the forenoon,</p>
+
+<p>"The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
+Bauddha mendicants."<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p></div>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> This &#347;loka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
+89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
+read more correctly, <i>'dar&#347;an&aacute;n na na dar&#347;an&aacute;t</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Kusum&aacute;njali, iii. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> The Bauddhas are thus divided into&mdash;
+</p><p>
+(1.) M&aacute;dhyamikas or Nihilists.
+</p><p>
+(2.) Yog&aacute;ch&aacute;ras or Subjective Idealists.
+</p><p>
+(3.) Sautr&aacute;ntikas or Representationists.
+</p><p>
+(4.) Vaibh&aacute;shikas or Presentationists.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
+</p><p>
+"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
+heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
+half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
+ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
+although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
+reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
+never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
+any abiding colour, any colour which truly <i>is</i>. Within the millionth
+part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
+an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
+another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
+because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
+refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
+declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
+given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
+one of which <i>is</i>, because each of them continually vanishes in
+another."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Query, La&#7749;k&aacute;vat&aacute;ra?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
+every <i>completed</i> object of cognition must consist of object <i>plus</i>
+the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
+is, inchoate&mdash;that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
+the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
+of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
+calling it a <i>flux</i>&mdash;or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
+more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
+sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Cf. Burnouf, <i>Lotus</i>, p. 520.&mdash;Should we read
+<i>samudaya</i>?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
+"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
+of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
+because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
+into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
+wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
+<i>have</i> this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
+forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
+definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
+agency."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
+30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
+Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
+explanations (as, <i>e.g.</i>, that of <i>samud&aacute;ya</i> or <i>samudaya</i>, &amp;c.) seem
+to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE &Aacute;RHATA SYSTEM.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The Gymnosophists<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
+Muktakachchhas,<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> and maintaining continued existence to a certain
+extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
+(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
+arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
+be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible&mdash;that
+one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
+conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
+its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
+continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
+subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
+the doctrine of momentary existence, <i>i.e.</i>, an existence which lasts
+only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.</p>
+
+<p>But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
+sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
+In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
+'whatever is, is momentary, &amp;c.,' it follows that in each parallel
+line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
+and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>you object that, 'if
+this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'&mdash;[<i>i.e.</i>, A
+might act, and B receive the punishment]&mdash;because there is an
+essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
+effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
+sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
+certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
+stem, the branches, the peduncle, &amp;c., and so on by an unbroken series
+to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
+with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
+the same series of shoot, &amp;c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
+it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'In whatever series of successive states the original
+impression of the action was produced,</p>
+
+<p>"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
+produced in cotton.</p>
+
+<p>"'When lac juice, &amp;c., are poured on the flower of the
+citron, &amp;c.,</p>
+
+<p>"'A certain capacity is produced in it,&mdash;do you not see
+it?'"</p></div>
+
+<p>But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
+overthrown by the following dilemma:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>In the example of the "cloud," &amp;c. [<i>supra</i>, p. 15], was your
+favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
+It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
+always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
+example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
+the ground. Nor can it be the latter&mdash;because you might always prove
+your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
+consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
+momentary," &amp;c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
+of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
+it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
+this undoubtedly produces the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
+said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
+origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."</p>
+
+<p>As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
+proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
+attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
+<i>that</i> also is wrong&mdash;for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
+holders of the Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> doctrine [<i>vide infra</i>] willingly admit the
+indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
+example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
+and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
+moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
+without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
+individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
+in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
+held to be one [throughout all"].</p>
+
+<p>Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
+between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
+follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
+remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
+might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
+and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
+away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
+enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasen&aacute;v&aacute;kya&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The loss of the thing done,&mdash;the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
+not done,&mdash;the dissolution of all existence,&mdash;and the abolition of
+memory,&mdash;bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
+these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
+destruction!"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
+of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
+does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
+the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
+perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
+the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
+and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
+like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
+cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
+and consequently the <i>&Aacute;lambana</i>, or the object's data [<i>supra</i>, p.
+29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
+(<i>pratyaya</i>).<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p>
+
+<p>If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
+will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
+existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
+For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
+certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
+explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
+impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
+it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
+incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
+perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
+abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
+external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &amp;c., with a
+definite reference to each man's personality [<i>i.e.</i>, I see the jar],
+and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
+mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
+object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
+&amp;c., of the objects.<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
+exactly in accordance with your own <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span>views," because, in spite of all
+our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
+"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
+say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
+possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &amp;c., and they are
+applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
+belonging to it]"&mdash;because we do not find that this is the case in a
+mirror [<i>i.e.</i>, it does not become a <i>far</i> reflection because it
+represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
+object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
+be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
+itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
+grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
+hopeless difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
+perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
+would be no perception that the object is insentient,<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> and so it is
+a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
+lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
+perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
+being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
+the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
+jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
+the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
+And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
+blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
+both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
+character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
+perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
+constituting its character.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span></p><p>All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
+length by the Jaina authors, Prat&aacute;pachandra and others, in the
+<i>Prameyakamalam&aacute;rta&#7751;&#7693;a</i>, &amp;c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
+the book too much.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore those who wish for the <i>summum bonum</i> of man must not accept
+the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the &Aacute;rhata doctrine.
+The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-s&uacute;ri,<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a>
+in his <i>&Aacute;ptani&#347;chay&aacute;la&#7749;k&aacute;ra</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
+overcome all faults, desire, &amp;c.,&mdash;adored by the three worlds, the
+declarer of things as they are."</p>
+
+<p>But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
+path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
+to apply, as has been declared by Taut&aacute;tita [Bha&#7789;&#7789;a Kum&aacute;rila<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>]?</p>
+
+<p>1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
+ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
+help us as a sign to infer his existence.</p>
+
+<p>2. "Nor is there any injunction (<i>vidhi</i>) of scripture which reveals
+an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
+passages (<i>arthav&aacute;da</i>) be applied here.</p>
+
+<p>3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
+quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
+repetitions (<i>anuv&aacute;da</i>), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
+before.</p>
+
+<p>4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
+of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
+spurious Veda?</p>
+
+<p>5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>his own word?
+How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
+support?</p>
+
+<p>6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
+omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
+point be established without some previously established foundation?</p>
+
+<p>7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
+of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
+words.</p>
+
+<p>8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
+we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
+proof, comparison (<i>upam&aacute;na</i>).</p>
+
+<p>9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
+embraces virtue, vice, &amp;c., would not be established as authoritative,
+if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and so on."</p>
+
+<p>We reply as follows:&mdash;As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
+existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
+proofs,&mdash;this is untenable, because there <i>are</i> proofs, as inference,
+&amp;c., which <i>do</i> establish<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> his existence. Thus any soul will become
+omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
+remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
+Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
+when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
+just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
+darkness, &amp;c., are removed. Now there <i>is</i> such a soul, which has its
+hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>all things
+remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
+the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
+grasping all things; for otherwise the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sist could not maintain
+that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
+authoritative injunction of a text,<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>&mdash;nor could there otherwise be
+the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
+argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
+existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Ny&aacute;ya will grant that
+universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
+of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
+P&uacute;rva M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
+for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
+all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
+prohibitions, as is said [by &#346;abara in his commentary on the S&uacute;tras,
+i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
+the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &amp;c." Nor can you say that "it
+is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
+knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
+certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
+["gems"], right intuition, &amp;c. By this charm also, all inferior
+assaults of argument can be put to flight.</p>
+
+<p>But the Naiy&aacute;yika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
+which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
+sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
+can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
+been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
+eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
+eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
+like other liberated persons,&mdash;since the use of the term "liberated"
+necessarily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>implies the having been previously bound; and if the
+latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
+the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
+being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &amp;c.?
+according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &amp;c., must have had a
+maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
+argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
+have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
+their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
+horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
+being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
+relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
+(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
+the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?</p>
+
+<p>Not <i>the first</i>, because it would apply too widely, as it would
+include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
+contact with the parts of other things;] nor <i>the second</i>, because it
+would similarly include genus, &amp;c. [as this resides in a substance by
+intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor <i>the
+third</i>, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
+disputed as the one directly in question;<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> nor <i>the fourth</i>,
+because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
+alternative:&mdash;Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
+substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
+itself,&mdash;or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
+something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
+former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
+has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
+latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
+point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
+relation in the parts, or the so-called <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>"intimate causes," which you
+mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
+terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
+such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
+existence.</p>
+
+<p>Nor can <i>the fifth</i> alternative be allowed, because this would reach
+too far, as it would include soul, &amp;c., since soul can be the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
+to be not an effect.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
+be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
+something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
+contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
+all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
+all-pervading].</p>
+
+<p>And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?</p>
+
+<p>In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
+erroneously to palaces, &amp;c., where we see for ourselves the work of
+many different men, as carpenters, &amp;c., and [in the second case] if
+all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
+be superfluous. As it has been said in the <i>V&iacute;tar&aacute;gastuti</i>, or "Praise
+of Jina"&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
+independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
+whose teacher art <i>thou</i>."</p>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
+influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
+of yourself or all the artisans, if &Iacute;&#347;wara fabricates the three
+worlds?"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
+when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.</p>
+
+<p>Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &amp;c., are
+impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,&mdash;because this
+universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
+omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
+faults as <i>Anyony&aacute;&#347;rayat&aacute;</i>,<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> &amp;c., because we accept an eternal
+succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
+endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
+much for this preliminary discussion.</p>
+
+<p>The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &amp;c., are
+thus described in the <i>Param&aacute;gamas&aacute;ra</i> (which is devoted to the
+exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)&mdash;"Right intuition, right
+knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
+thus explained by Yogadeva:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a.</i>) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &amp;c., has been
+declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
+faith in the teaching, <i>i.e.</i>, the entire absence of any contrary
+idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
+<i>Tattv&aacute;rtha-s&uacute;tra</i>, "Faith in the predicaments<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> is right
+'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
+predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
+produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
+"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
+another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
+teaching of another in the form of explanation, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
+&amp;c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
+doubt; as it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span></p><p>"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
+predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
+wise."</p>
+
+<p>This knowledge is fivefold as divided into <i>mati</i>, <i>&#347;ruta</i>, <i>avadhi</i>,
+<i>manas-pary&aacute;ya</i>, and <i>kevala</i>; as it has been said, "<i>Mati</i>, <i>&#347;</i>ruta,
+<i>avadhi</i>, <i>manas-pary&aacute;ya</i>, and <i>kevala</i>, these are knowledge." The
+meaning of this is as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. <i>Mati</i> is that by which one cognises an object through the
+operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
+being abolished.</p>
+
+<p>2. <i>&#346;ruta</i> is the clear knowledge produced by <i>mati</i>, all the
+obstructions of knowledge being abolished.</p>
+
+<p>3. <i>Avadhi</i> is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
+abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
+&amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p>
+
+<p>4. <i>Manas-pary&aacute;ya</i> is the clear definite knowledge of another's
+thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
+knowledge caused by the veil of envy.</p>
+
+<p>5. <i>Kevala</i> is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
+ascetics practise various kinds of penance.</p>
+
+<p>The first of these (<i>mati</i>) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
+Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
+manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
+itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
+ways."</p>
+
+<p>But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
+the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c.</i>) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
+evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
+diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
+constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
+the Arhat&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span>of
+blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
+the 'five vows,' <i>ahi&#7747;s&aacute;</i>, <i>s&uacute;n&#7771;ita</i>, <i>asteya</i>, <i>brahmachary&aacute;</i>, and
+<i>aparigraha</i>.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p>
+
+<p>2. "The 'vow' of <i>ahi&#7747;s&aacute;</i> is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
+of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.</p>
+
+<p>3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
+<i>s&uacute;n&#7771;ita</i>. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
+others and prejudicial.</p>
+
+<p>4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
+<i>asteya</i>; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
+killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.</p>
+
+<p>5. "The 'vow' of <i>brahmachary&aacute;</i> (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
+abandonment of all desires,<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
+and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
+one's causing another to act.</p>
+
+<p>6. "The 'vow' of <i>aparigraha</i> is the renouncing of all delusive
+interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
+may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.</p>
+
+<p>7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
+these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."</p>
+
+<p>The full account of the five states of mind (<i>bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>) has been given
+in the following passage [of which we only quote one &#347;loka]&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Let him carry out the 'vow' of <i>s&uacute;n&#7771;ita</i> uninterruptedly by the
+abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
+deliberate avoidance of speech,"<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>&mdash;and so forth.</p>
+
+<p>These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
+united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
+an elixir, it is the knowledge of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>what it is, faith in its virtues,
+and the actual application of the medicine,<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> united, which produce
+the elixir's effect, but not severally.</p>
+
+<p>Here we may say concisely that the <i>tattvas</i> or predicaments are two,
+<i>j&iacute;va</i> and <i>aj&iacute;va</i>; the soul, <i>j&iacute;va</i>, is pure intelligence; the
+non-soul, <i>aj&iacute;va</i>, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
+said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
+'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
+pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
+affection, &amp;c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
+the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
+be pursued, which is defined as <i>upayoga</i>."</p>
+
+<p><i>Upayoga</i> [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
+place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
+of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
+<i>prade&#347;a</i> and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
+[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
+its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
+be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
+these."<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p>
+
+<p>Intelligence (<i>chaitanya</i>) is common to all souls, and is the real
+nature of the soul viewed as <i>pari&#7751;ata</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, as it is in itself];
+but by the influence of <i>upa&#347;amakshaya</i> and <i>kshayopa&#347;ama</i> it appears
+in the "mixed" form as possessing both,<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> or again, by the influence
+of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
+&amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> As has been said by V&aacute;chak&aacute;ch&aacute;rya [in a s&uacute;tra]&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span></p><p>"The <i>aupa&#347;amika</i>, the <i>Ksh&aacute;yika</i>, and the 'mixed' states are the
+nature of the soul, and also the <i>audayika</i> and the <i>P&aacute;ri&#7751;&aacute;mika</i>."</p>
+
+<p>1. The <i>aupa&#347;amika</i> state of the soul arises when all the effects of
+past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
+future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
+mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
+nut-plant,<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>2. The <i>Ksh&aacute;yika</i> state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
+actions and their effects, as in final liberation.</p>
+
+<p>3. The "mixed" (<i>mi&#347;ra</i>) state combines both these, as when water is
+partly pure.</p>
+
+<p>4. The <i>audayika</i> state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
+influence on the future]. The <i>P&aacute;ri&#7751;&aacute;mika</i> state is the soul's innate
+condition, as pure intelligence, &amp;c., and disregarding its apparent
+states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> This nature, in one of the
+above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
+happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the s&uacute;tra quoted above.</p>
+
+<p>This has been explained in the <i>Svar&uacute;pa-sambodhana</i>&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,&mdash;in some
+way both different and the same,&mdash;knowledge is its first and last;
+such is the soul described to be."</p>
+
+<p>If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
+we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
+equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
+support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
+non-perception<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
+is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
+advocates of the <i>Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da</i>) it is perfectly notorious that all
+things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p><p>Others lay down a different set of <i>tattvas</i> from the two mentioned
+above, <i>j&iacute;va</i> and <i>aj&iacute;va</i>; they hold that there are five <i>astik&aacute;yas</i>
+or categories,&mdash;<i>j&iacute;va</i>, <i>&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a</i>, <i>dharma</i>, <i>adharma</i>, and <i>pudgala</i>.
+To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (<i>asti</i>),<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>
+as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
+apply the idea of "body" (<i>k&aacute;ya</i>),<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> from their occupying several
+parts of space.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>j&iacute;vas</i> (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
+"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
+divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (<i>samanaska</i>),
+and those destitute of it (<i>amanaska</i>). The former possesses <i>sa&#7747;j&ntilde;&aacute;</i>,
+<i>i.e.</i>, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
+instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
+also divided into two, as "locomotive" (<i>trasa</i>), or "immovable"
+(<i>sth&aacute;vara</i>).</p>
+
+<p>The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
+taste], as shell-fish, worms, &amp;c., and are thus of four kinds [as
+possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
+earth, water, fire, air, and trees.<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> But here a distinction must be
+made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &amp;c., are
+aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
+appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
+hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
+must also be applied to the others, water, &amp;c. Now the souls which
+have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &amp;c., as their bodies,
+are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &amp;c., and the "bodies of
+earth," &amp;c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a>
+These other immovable things, and such as only possess <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>the one sense
+of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
+passing into any other state of existence.</p>
+
+<p><i>Dharma</i>, <i>adharma</i>, and <i>&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a</i> are singular categories [and not
+generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
+the causes of a substance's change of place.</p>
+
+<p><i>Dharma</i>, "merit," and <i>adharma</i>, "demerit," are well known. They
+assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
+extended<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
+Lok&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
+from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
+<i>&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a</i> is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
+occupied by another.</p>
+
+<p><i>Pudgala</i>, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
+two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> the
+compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
+the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
+from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
+separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
+<i>pudgalas</i>, because they "fill" (<i>p&uacute;r</i>), and "dissolve" (<i>gal</i>).
+Although "time" is not properly an <i>astik&aacute;ya</i>, because it does not
+occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
+still it is a <i>dravya</i> [or <i>tattva</i>], as the definition will hold;
+"substance" (<i>dravya</i>) possesses "qualities and action."<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Qualities
+reside <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
+general qualities, knowledge, &amp;c., of the <i>j&iacute;va</i>, form, &amp;c., of the
+body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
+into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
+"demerit," and <i>&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a</i>. "Action" (<i>pary&aacute;ya</i>) has thus been defined;
+the actions (<i>pary&aacute;y&aacute;&#7717;</i>) of a substance are, as has been said, its
+existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
+course to the end, as, <i>e.g.</i>, in the <i>j&iacute;va</i>, the knowledge of
+objects, as of a jar, &amp;c., happiness, pain, &amp;c.; in the <i>pudgala</i>, the
+lump of clay, the jar, &amp;c.; in merit and demerit, the special
+functions of progress, &amp;c. Thus there are six substances or <i>tattvas</i>
+[<i>i.e.</i>, the five above mentioned and "time"].</p>
+
+<p>Others reckon the <i>tattvas</i> as seven, as has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The <i>tattvas</i> are <i>j&iacute;va</i>, <i>aj&iacute;va</i>, <i>&aacute;srava</i>, <i>bandha</i>, <i>sa&#7747;vara</i>,
+<i>nirjar&aacute;</i>, and <i>moksha</i>." <i>J&iacute;va</i> and <i>aj&iacute;va</i> have been already described.
+<i>&Aacute;srava</i> is described as the movement of the soul called <i>yoga</i>,<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a>
+through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
+<i>aud&aacute;rika</i>, &amp;c. As a door opening into the water is called <i>&aacute;srava</i>,
+because it causes the stream to descend through it,<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> so this <i>yoga</i> is
+called <i>&aacute;srava</i>, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
+flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
+it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
+collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
+which are brought to it by <i>yoga</i>. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
+lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the <i>j&iacute;va</i>, heated
+by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
+by <i>yoga</i>. <i>Kash&aacute;ya</i> ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
+(<i>kash</i>) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
+pride, delusion, and lust. <i>&Aacute;srava</i> is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
+abstaining from doing injury is a good <i>yoga</i> of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>body; speaking what
+is true, measured, and profitable is a good <i>yoga</i> of the speech.</p>
+
+<p>These various subdivisions of <i>&aacute;srava</i> have been described at length
+in several <i>S&uacute;tras</i>. "<i>&Aacute;srava</i> is the impulse to action with body,
+speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
+demerit," &amp;c. Others, however, explain it thus:&mdash;"<i>&Aacute;srava</i> is the
+action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
+the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
+means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
+&amp;c."<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p>
+
+<p><i>Bandha</i>, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
+intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (<i>kash&aacute;ya</i>),
+and also by the force of <i>yoga</i>, assumes various bodies occupying many
+parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
+suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
+bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>In this quotation the word "sin" (<i>kash&aacute;ya</i>) is used to include the
+other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
+V&aacute;chak&aacute;ch&aacute;rya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
+of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
+sin."</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) "False intuition" is twofold,&mdash;either innate from one's natural
+character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
+of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,&mdash;or
+derived, when learned by another's teaching.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
+the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) "Carelessness" (<i>pram&aacute;da</i>) is a want of effort to practise the
+five kinds of <i>samiti</i>, <i>gupti</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>&amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) "Sin" consists of anger, &amp;c. Here we must make the distinction
+that the four things, false intuition, &amp;c., cause those kinds of
+bondage called <i>sthiti</i> and <i>anubh&aacute;va</i>; <i>yoga</i> [or <i>&aacute;srava</i>] causes
+those kinds called <i>prak&#7771;iti</i> and <i>prade&#347;a</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "<i>Prak&#7771;iti</i>, <i>sthiti</i>,
+<i>anubh&aacute;va</i>, and <i>prade&#347;a</i> are its four kinds."</p>
+
+<p>1. <i>Prak&#7771;iti</i> means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
+sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
+eight <i>m&uacute;la-prak&#7771;itis</i>.<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p>
+
+<p>Thus obstructions (<i>&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i>)<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> cloud the knowledge and intuition,
+as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (<i>a</i>)
+<i>jn&aacute;n&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i>, or (<i>b</i>) <i>dar&#347;an&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i>. (<i>c</i>) An object recognised as
+simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
+pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,&mdash;this is <i>vedan&iacute;ya</i>. (<i>d</i>)
+A delusion (<i>mohan&iacute;ya</i>) in intuition produces want of faith in the
+Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
+conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (<i>e</i>)
+<i>&Aacute;yus</i> produces the bond of body, like a snare.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> (<i>f</i>) <i>N&aacute;man</i>, or
+"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
+paints his different pictures. (<i>g</i>) <i>Gotra</i> produces the idea of
+noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (<i>h</i>) <i>Antar&aacute;ya</i>
+produces obstacles to liberality, &amp;c., as the treasurer hinders the
+king by considerations of economy.</p>
+
+<p>Thus is the <i>prak&#7771;iti-bandha</i> eightfold, being denominated as the
+eight <i>m&uacute;la-prak&#7771;itis</i>, with subdivisions according to the different
+actions of the various subject-matter.</p>
+
+<p>And thus has Um&aacute;sw&aacute;ti-v&aacute;chak&aacute;ch&aacute;rya<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> declared: "The first kind of
+<i>bandha</i> consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
+<i>vedan&iacute;ya</i>, <i>mohan&iacute;ya</i>, <i>&aacute;yus</i>, <i>n&aacute;man</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span><i>gotra</i>, and <i>antar&aacute;ya</i>;" and he
+has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
+twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
+explained at full length in the <i>Vidy&aacute;nanda</i> and other works, and here is
+omitted through fear of prolixity.</p>
+
+<p>2. <i>Sthiti.</i> As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &amp;c., have continued
+unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
+three <i>m&uacute;la-prak&#7771;itis</i>, <i>jn&aacute;n&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i>, &amp;c., and the last, <i>antar&aacute;ya</i>, have
+not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
+described in the words, "<i>sthiti</i> lasts beyonds crores of crores of
+periods of time measured by thirty <i>s&aacute;garopamas</i>."<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> This continuance is
+<i>sthiti</i>.</p>
+
+<p>3. <i>Anubh&aacute;va.</i> As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &amp;c., there
+exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
+producing<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> its several effects, so in the different material bodies
+produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (<i>anubh&aacute;va</i>)
+for producing their respective effects.</p>
+
+<p>4. <i>Prade&#347;a.</i> The <i>bandha</i> called <i>prade&#347;a</i> is the entrance into the
+different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
+number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
+consequences of actions.</p>
+
+<p><i>Sa&#7747;vara</i> is the stopping of <i>&aacute;srava</i>&mdash;that by which the influence of
+past actions (<i>karman</i>) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
+divided into <i>gupti</i>, <i>samiti</i>, &amp;c. <i>Gupti</i> is the withdrawal of the
+soul from that "impulse" (<i>yoga</i>) which causes mundane existence,&mdash;it
+is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. <i>Samiti</i> is the
+acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
+into five kinds, as <i>&iacute;ry&aacute;</i>,<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> <i>bh&aacute;sh&aacute;</i>, &amp;c., as has been explained
+by Hemachandra.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span></p><p>1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
+circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
+call <i>&iacute;ry&aacute;</i>.</p>
+
+<p>2. "Let him practise<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> a measured utterance in his intercourse with
+all people; this is called <i>bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-samiti</i>, dear to the restrainers of
+speech.</p>
+
+<p>3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
+which may accrue to alms, is called the <i>esha&#7751;&aacute;-samiti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p>
+
+<p>4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
+him take a seat, &amp;c., set it down, and meditate,&mdash;this is called the
+<i>&aacute;d&aacute;na-samiti</i>.</p>
+
+<p>5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
+in a spot free from all living creatures,<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a>&mdash;this is the
+<i>utsarga-samiti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Hence <i>samvara</i> has been etymologically analysed
+as that which closes (<i>sam</i> + <i>v&#7771;i&#7751;oti</i>) the door of the stream of
+<i>&aacute;srava</i>,<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> as has been said by the learned, '<i>&Aacute;srava</i> is the cause
+of mundane existence, <i>sa&#7747;vara</i> is the cause of liberation;<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> this
+is the &Aacute;rhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
+of this.'"</p>
+
+<p><i>Nirjar&aacute;</i> is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
+self-mortification, &amp;c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
+of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
+and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
+&amp;c. This <i>nirjar&aacute;</i> is twofold,<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> "temporary" (<i>yath&aacute;k&aacute;la</i>) and
+ancillary (<i>aupakrama&#7751;ika</i>). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
+dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
+that particular time, from this completion of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span>the object aimed at,
+<i>nirjar&aacute;</i> arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &amp;c.
+But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
+means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the <i>nirjar&aacute;</i> of
+actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
+which are the seeds of mundane existence, <i>nirjar&aacute;</i> arises, which is
+twofold, <i>sak&aacute;m&aacute;</i> and <i>ak&aacute;m&aacute;</i>. That called <i>sak&aacute;m&aacute;</i> belongs to
+ascetics, the <i>ak&aacute;m&aacute;</i> to other embodied spirits."<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p>
+
+<p><i>Moksha.</i> Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
+absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
+perception, &amp;c.) are stopped,<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> and since all past actions are
+abolished in the presence of the causes of <i>nirjar&aacute;</i>, there arises the
+absolute release from all actions,&mdash;this is <i>moksha</i>; as it has been
+said: "<i>Moksha</i> is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
+(<i>nirjar&aacute;</i>) of the causes of bondage and of existence."</p>
+
+<p>Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
+wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
+stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
+contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of <i>moksha</i>
+exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
+onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
+sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
+encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
+isolation,<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
+the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span></p><p>"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
+interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; <i>sa&#7749;ga</i> is
+merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
+from the absence of <i>sa&#7749;ga</i>, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
+the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
+potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
+castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."</p>
+
+<p>Hence they recite a &#347;loka:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
+moon, and the rest;</p>
+
+<p>"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
+&Aacute;lok&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a."</p></div>
+
+<p>Others hold <i>moksha</i> to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
+soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
+untainted by any pain or impression thereof.</p>
+
+<p>Others hold nine <i>tattwas</i>, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
+foregoing seven,&mdash;these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
+This has been declared in the <i>Siddh&aacute;nta</i>, "<i>J&iacute;va</i>, <i>aj&iacute;va</i>, <i>pu&#7751;ya</i>,
+<i>p&aacute;pa</i>, <i>&aacute;srava</i>, <i>sa&#7747;vara</i>, <i>nirjara&#7751;a</i>, <i>bandha</i>, and <i>moksha</i>, are
+the nine <i>tattwas</i>." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.</p>
+
+<p>Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
+<i>sapta-bha&#7749;g&iacute;-naya</i>,<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
+be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
+be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
+"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
+and not predicable." All this Anantav&iacute;rya has thus laid down:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
+'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'</p>
+
+<p>2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>procedure
+likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
+be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.</p>
+
+<p>3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
+as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
+indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.</p>
+
+<p>4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
+employed simultaneously."</p>
+
+<p><i>Sy&aacute;t</i>, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
+part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
+has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This particle <i>sy&aacute;t</i> is in the form of a verb, but, from
+its being connected with the sense, it denotes
+indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
+on the implied meaning."</p></div>
+
+<p>If, again, the word <i>sy&aacute;t</i> denoted determinateness, then it would be
+needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
+indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" <i>sy&aacute;t</i>,
+"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," <i>katha&#7747;chit</i>; and so it is
+not really useless. As one has said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The doctrine of the <i>sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da</i> arises from our everywhere rejecting
+the idea of the absolute;<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> it depends on the <i>sapta-bha&#7749;g&iacute;-naya</i>,
+and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
+be accepted."</p>
+
+<p>If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
+everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
+ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
+treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
+But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
+certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
+Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is <i>being</i>
+or <i>non-being</i> the real nature of the thing?" The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>real nature of the
+thing cannot be <i>being</i>, for then you could not properly use the
+phrase, "It is a pot" (<i>gha&#7789;&oacute;sti</i>), as the two words "is" and "pot"
+would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
+words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
+argument is to be used in other questions.<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> As it has been
+declared&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
+implies 'is;'</p>
+
+<p>"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
+non-existence are mutually exclusive," &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<p>The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
+severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
+non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
+inexplicable (<i>anirvachan&iacute;yat&aacute;</i>);<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> three other classes hold one or
+other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> Now,
+when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
+&amp;c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
+&amp;c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
+to the holder of the <i>Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da</i>, which ascertains the entire meaning
+of all things. Thus said the teacher in the <i>Sy&aacute;dv&aacute;da-ma&ntilde;jar&iacute;</i>&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
+omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
+scientific investigation.<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> When our reasonings based on one point
+proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed <i>Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da</i>,
+which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."</p>
+
+<p>"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
+and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
+with no partiality equally favours all sects."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></p><p>The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-s&uacute;ri&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
+giving and receiving,&mdash;sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
+liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
+deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (<i>dosha</i>) according to our
+system.<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
+knowledge of the <i>tattwas</i>. The path<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> of emancipation consists of
+knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
+(<i>pram&aacute;&#7751;a</i>) in the <i>Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;da</i> doctrine,&mdash;sense-perception and
+inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
+nine or seven <i>tattwas</i>. The <i>j&iacute;va</i>, the <i>aj&iacute;va</i>, merit and demerit,
+<i>&aacute;srava</i>, <i>sa&#7747;vara</i>, <i>bandha</i>, <i>nirjar&aacute;</i>, <i>mukti</i>,&mdash;we will now
+explain each. <i>J&iacute;va</i> is defined as intelligence; <i>aj&iacute;va</i> is all other
+than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
+opposite; <i>&aacute;srava</i> is the bondage of actions,<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> <i>nirjar&aacute;</i> is the
+unloosing thereof; <i>moksha</i> arises from the destruction of the eight
+forms of <i>karman</i> or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
+included in <i>sa&#7747;vara</i>,<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> and "demerit" in <i>&aacute;srava</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> and is
+hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
+liberation is declared by Jina. The &#346;wet&aacute;mbaras are the destroyers of
+all defilement, they live by alms,<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> they pluck out their hair,
+they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
+Jaina <i>S&aacute;dhus</i>. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>carry
+peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
+eat upright in the giver's house,&mdash;these are the second class of the
+Jaina &#7770;ishis.</p>
+
+<p>"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,&mdash;so
+say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
+between them and the &#346;wet&aacute;mbaras."<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Vivasanas</i>, "without garments."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> "The Buddhists are also called <i>Muktakachchhas</i>,
+alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
+hem of the lower garment untucked."&mdash;<i>Colebrooke.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> In p. 26, line 3, read <i>Sy&aacute;d-v&aacute;din&aacute;m</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, <i>infra</i>, <i>gr&aacute;hyasya</i>
+for <i>agr&aacute;hyasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> I correct the reading <i>tasy&aacute;graha&#7751;a&#7747;</i> to <i>tasy&aacute;
+graha&#7751;a&#7747;</i> (<i>tasy&aacute;</i> being <i>ja&#7693;at&aacute;y&aacute;&#7717;</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, if you say that the <i>avayava</i> may be not seen
+though the <i>avayavin</i> is seen, then I may say that the post is the
+<i>avayavin</i>, and the unperceived three worlds its <i>avayava</i>!</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> I read <i>arhatsvar&uacute;pam arhachchandra</i> in p. 27, line 3,
+<i>infra</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> The following passage occurs in some part of Kum&aacute;rila's
+writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
+S&aacute;&#7749;kara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kum&aacute;rila had a
+little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
+repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
+there was some truth in their teaching. <i>Jainagurumukh&aacute;t ka&#347;chid
+vidy&aacute;le&#347;o j&aacute;ta&#7717;.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Kum&aacute;rila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
+his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
+proofs,&mdash;the sixth, <i>abh&aacute;va</i>, being negative, is, of course, not
+applicable. I understand the last &#347;loka as showing the inapplicability
+of "presumption" or <i>arth&aacute;-patti</i>. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
+were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
+but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
+retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
+Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
+cannot be convincing in his own.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> In p. 29, line 2, read <i>tatsadbh&aacute;v&aacute;vedakasya</i> for
+<i>tatsadbh&aacute;v&aacute;dekasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> In p. 29, line 9, for <i>nikhil&aacute;rthaj&ntilde;an&aacute;t notpatty</i>, I
+propose to read <i>nikhil&aacute;rthaj&ntilde;&aacute;notpatty</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Janya</i> is included in <i>K&aacute;rya</i> and equally disputed.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Thus "I am possessed of a body" (<i>aham &#346;ar&iacute;r&iacute;</i>), "my
+hand," &amp;c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
+notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &amp;c. includes the
+<i>Anavasth&aacute;dosha</i> or reasoning <i>ad infinitum</i>. He accepts the supposed
+fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
+everybody's eyes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> In p. 31, line 5, <i>infra</i>, read <i>tattv&aacute;rthe</i> for
+<i>tattv&aacute;rtham</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> I read in p. 32, line 9, <i>Samyagdar&#347;an&aacute;di</i> for
+<i>asamyagdar&#347;an&aacute;di</i>; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
+of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Cf. the five <i>yamas</i> in the <i>Yoga-s&uacute;tras</i>, ii. 30.
+Hemachandra (<i>Abhidh</i> 81) calls them <i>yamas</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> I read <i>k&aacute;m&aacute;n&aacute;m</i> for <i>k&aacute;m&aacute;&#7751;&aacute;m</i> in p. 33, line 7 (2 &times; 3 &times; 3 =
+18).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> For <i>abh&aacute;sha&#7751;a</i>, see Hemach. 16.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> I propose in p. 33, line 17,
+<i>ra&#347;ayanaj&ntilde;&aacute;na&#347;raddh&aacute;vach&aacute;ra&#7751;&aacute;ni</i> for <i>ras&aacute;ya&#7751;aj&ntilde;ana&#7747;
+&#347;raddh&aacute;n&aacute;vara&#7751;&aacute;ni</i>. For <i>avach&aacute;ra&#7751;a</i>, see <i>Su&#347;ruta</i>, vol. ii. p. 157,
+&amp;c. If <i>an&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i> be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
+absence of obstructions."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
+by the scholiast to Hemachandra, <i>Abhidh</i>. 79.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Or this may mean "by the influence of <i>upa&#347;amakshaya</i> or
+<i>kshayopa&#347;ama</i>, it appears characterised by one or the other."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> I read in p. 34, line 7, <i>kalush&aacute;dy&aacute;k&aacute;re&#7751;a</i> for
+<i>kalush&aacute;ny&aacute;k&aacute;re&#7751;a</i>. The <i>upa&#347;amakshaya</i> and <i>kshayopa&#347;ama</i> seem to
+correspond to the <i>aupa&#347;amika</i> and <i>ksh&aacute;yika</i> states about to be
+described.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Strychnos potatorum.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Just as in the S&aacute;nkhya philosophy, the soul is not
+really bound though it seems to itself to be so.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
+and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
+the eye, light, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> I read in p. 35, line 5, <i>'st&iacute;ti</i> for <i>sthiti</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Hence the term here used for "category"&mdash;<i>astik&aacute;ya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> These (by Hemach. <i>Abhidh.</i> 21), possess only one
+sense&mdash;touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read <i>&#347;a&#7749;khaga&#7751;&#7693;olakaprabh&#7771;itayas
+tras&aacute;&#347; chaturvidh&aacute;&#7717; p&#7771;ithivyaptejo</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> In p. 35, line 16, I read <i>tesh&aacute;m aj&iacute;vatv&aacute;t</i> for <i>tesh&aacute;&#7747;
+j&iacute;vatv&aacute;t</i>. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
+the former only are animate."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read <i>sarvatr&aacute;vasthite</i> for
+<i>sarvatr&aacute;vasthiti</i>. In the preceding line I read <i>&aacute;loken&aacute;vachchhinne</i> for
+<i>&aacute;loken&aacute;vichchhinne</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Cf. Siddh&aacute;nta-mukt&aacute;vali, p. 27. The <i>vishaya</i> is
+<i>upabhoga-s&aacute;dhanam</i>, but it begins with the <i>dvya&#7751;uka</i>. This category
+takes up the forms of <i>sth&aacute;vara</i> which were excluded from <i>j&iacute;va</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly M&aacute;dhava
+for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
+analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
+definition of <i>dravya</i>,&mdash;cf. <i>Vai&#347;esh. S&uacute;tra</i>, i. 1, 15. <i>Pary&aacute;ya</i> is
+explained as <i>karman</i> in Hemach. <i>Anek</i>. <i>Pary&aacute;ya</i>, in p. 36, line 11
+(<i>infra</i>, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
+which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
+<i>Abhidh</i>. 1503, <i>pary&aacute;yo 'nukrama&#7717; krama&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>Yoga</i> seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
+to act.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> In line 18, read <i>&aacute;srava&#7751;ak&aacute;ra&#7751;atv&aacute;d</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> The <i>jn&aacute;na</i> is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
+by its connection with the senses and external objects.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> These are also called the eight <i>karmans</i> in
+Govind&aacute;nanda's gloss, <i>Ved. S&uacute;t.</i>, ii. 2, 33.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> The Calcutta MS. reads <i>&aacute;dara&#7751;&iacute;yasya</i> for
+<i>&aacute;vara&#7751;&iacute;yasya</i>, in p. 37, last line. But <i>&aacute;vara&#7751;&iacute;ya</i> may be used for
+<i>&aacute;varana</i> (<i>P&aacute;&#7751;.</i> iii. 4, 68). Cf. <i>Yoga S&uacute;t.</i>, ii. 52, where Vy&aacute;sa's
+Comm. has <i>&aacute;vara&#7751;&iacute;ya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> <i>J&aacute;lavat</i>? The printed text has <i>jalavat</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Um&aacute;sv&aacute;mi-?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> For the <i>s&aacute;garopama</i>, see Wilson's <i>Essays</i>, vol. i. p.
+309. In p. 38, line 16, I read <i>ity&aacute;dyuktak&aacute;l&aacute;d &uacute;rdhvam api</i> for the
+obscure <i>ity&aacute;dyukta&#7747; k&aacute;ladurddh&aacute;navat</i>. I also read at the end of the
+line <i>prachyuti&#7717; sthiti&#7717;</i> for <i>prachyutisthiti&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> In p. 38, line 18, read <i>svak&aacute;ryakara&#7751;e</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for <i>&iacute;rshy&aacute;</i> read
+<i>&iacute;ry&aacute;</i>,&mdash;a bad misreading.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> In p. 39, line 6, I read <i>&aacute;padyet&aacute;</i> for <i>&aacute;padyat&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> In p. 39, line 9, for <i>sesha&#7751;&aacute;</i> read <i>saisha&#7751;&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> In p. 39, line 12, join <i>nirjantu</i> and <i>jagat&iacute;tale</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava omits the remaining divisions of <i>sa&#7747;vara</i>.
+Wilson, <i>Essays</i>, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as <i>parishah&aacute;</i>,
+"endurance," as of a vow; <i>yatidharma</i>, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
+patience, gentleness," &amp;c.; <i>bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>, "conviction," such as that
+worldly existences are not eternal, &amp;c.; <i>ch&aacute;ritra</i>, "virtuous
+observance."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> In p. 39, line 14, read <i>&aacute;sravasrotaso</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> For <i>moha</i>, in line 16, read <i>moksha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> In p. 39, line 2 <i>infra</i>, I read <i>yath&aacute;k&aacute;la-</i> for <i>yath&aacute;
+k&aacute;la-</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> This passage is very difficult and not improbably
+corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
+<i>nirjar&aacute;</i> is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
+passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That <i>nirjar&aacute;</i>
+is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
+attainment of the highest good. The former is <i>ak&aacute;m&aacute;</i>, "desireless,"
+because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
+latter is <i>sak&aacute;m&aacute;</i>, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
+under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> I read <i>nirodhe</i> for <i>nirodhah</i> in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
+37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
+which future actions are to be performed.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> Literally "absence of <i>sanga</i>."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> In p. 41, line 7, read <i>sapta-bha&#7749;g&iacute;-naya</i>, see Ved. S.
+Gloss., ii. 2, 23.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
+line, <i>kim v&#7771;itatadvidhe&#7717;</i>, and therefore leave them untranslated.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Thus Govind&aacute;nanda applies it (<i>Ved. S&uacute;t.</i>, ii. 2, 33) to
+"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> '&#913;&#954;&#945;&#964;&#945;&#955;&#951;&#968;&#7985;&#945; This is &#346;riharsha's tenet in the
+<i>Kha&#7751;&#7693;ana-kha&#7751;&#7693;a-kh&aacute;dya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> In p. 42, line 17, for <i>maten&aacute;mi&#347;rit&aacute;ni</i> read <i>matena
+mi&#347;rit&aacute;ni</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> In p. 43, line 2, for <i>na yasya</i> read <i>nayasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
+really identical with that given in Hemachandra's <i>Abhidh&aacute;na-chint&aacute;ma&#7751;i</i>,
+72, 73; but we must correct the readings to <i>antar&aacute;y&aacute;s</i>, <i>r&aacute;gadwesh&aacute;v
+avirati&#7717; smara&#7717;</i>, and <i>h&aacute;so</i> for <i>hims&aacute;</i>. The order of the eighteen
+<i>doshas</i> in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
+10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> In p. 43, line 13, for <i>vartini</i> read <i>vartini&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> This seems corrupt,&mdash;a line is probably lost.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> In last line, for <i>sa&#7747;srave</i> read <i>sa&#7747;vare</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
+the liberated and liberation? These are called <i>ananta</i>. See Weber's
+<i>Bhagavat&iacute;</i>, pp. 250, 261-266.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>Sarajohara&#7751;&aacute;h</i> is explained by the <i>rajohara&#7751;adh&aacute;rin</i>
+(= <i>vratin</i>) of Hal&aacute;yudha, ii. 189.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> Cf. Wilson, <i>Essays</i>, i. 340. For <i>str&iacute;m</i> read <i>str&iacute;</i>.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE R&Aacute;M&Aacute;NUJA SYSTEM.</h2>
+
+
+<p>This doctrine of the &Aacute;rhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
+whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
+co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
+plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
+any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
+existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
+should there not be an alternation between existence and
+non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not <i>Ens</i>, that
+alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
+multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ga&#7751;e&#347;a
+and of the incarnation of Vish&#7751;u as half man, half lion; for the
+elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
+in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
+being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
+a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
+same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
+in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
+compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
+times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
+indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
+be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
+and shortness which pertain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span> to the same thing (in different
+relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
+contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
+Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
+reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
+thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
+<i>bha&#7749;gas</i> (&Aacute;rhata tenets).</p>
+
+<p>Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven <i>bha&#7749;gas</i>, which lies at
+the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
+or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
+there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
+multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
+prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
+proving nothing.<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> In either case, there is rope for a noose for
+the neck of the Sy&aacute;d-V&aacute;din.</p>
+
+<p>An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the &Aacute;rhata
+system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
+when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
+or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
+organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
+whether it be ninefold or not!</p>
+
+<p>In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the &Aacute;rhatas
+say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
+the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
+assume a plurality of bodies, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>there is a differentiation of the soul
+for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
+(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
+body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
+body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
+filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
+resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
+the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
+according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
+road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
+of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
+that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
+non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
+and evil unmerited.</p>
+
+<p>As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
+rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
+the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.</p>
+
+<p>Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
+revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vy&aacute;sa accordingly
+propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
+one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja with the
+express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
+of R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja are as follows:&mdash;Three categories are established, as
+soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
+Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
+(Vish&#7751;u)</p>
+
+<p>"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
+world is not-soul."</p></div>
+
+<p>Others, again (the followers of &#346;a&#7749;kar&aacute;ch&aacute;rya), maintain that pure
+intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
+really existent; and that this absolute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span> whose essence is eternal,
+pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
+individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
+(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
+The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
+and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
+reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
+sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
+forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
+beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
+individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
+with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
+spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
+things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
+Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
+thinking themselves very wise, the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;karas will not tolerate this
+division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
+Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:&mdash;This
+might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
+there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
+suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
+ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
+(to explain the views of the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;kara)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
+knowledge,</p>
+
+<p>"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."</p></div>
+
+<p>This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
+the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
+who leans on the arm of Prabh&aacute;kara, or one to whom Kum&aacute;rila-bha&#7789;&#7789;a
+gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
+existent and non-existent,</p>
+
+<p>"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
+Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
+else is observed."</p></div>
+
+<p>They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
+cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (<i>anupalabdhi</i>), and
+knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
+knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
+maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
+argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
+consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
+by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
+If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
+knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
+is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
+presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
+not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;karas continue) as the
+foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
+entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
+ignorance.</p>
+
+<p>All this (the R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
+for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
+ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
+would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
+as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
+presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
+of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
+how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
+object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
+revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
+thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span>
+accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
+rejoin:&mdash;Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
+arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
+to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
+therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
+not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
+cognition allowed by us both.</p>
+
+<p>Well, then (the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;karas may contend), let the form of cognition
+evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
+follows:&mdash;Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
+entity (<i>sc.</i> illusion), an entity different from mere prior
+non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
+which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
+knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
+not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
+first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
+grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
+illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
+admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
+not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
+is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
+illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
+that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
+knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
+ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
+ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
+We dismiss further prolixity.</p>
+
+<p>The counterposition (of the R&aacute;m&aacute;nujas) is as follows:&mdash;The illusion
+under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
+because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &amp;c. If any
+one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
+about nacre, &amp;c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> Do not
+start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
+existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
+(<i>i.e.</i>, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
+also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &amp;c.,
+constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
+any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
+cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
+gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
+light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres&mdash;for light,
+as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
+mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
+quality derived from determination by that substance,&mdash;so this soul,
+while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
+as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
+within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
+within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
+itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
+suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
+which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
+this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
+thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
+like texts.</p>
+
+<p>It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
+existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
+(<i>an&#7771;ita</i>); for the word untruth (<i>an&#7771;ita</i>) denotes that which is
+other than truth (<i>&#7771;ita</i>). The word <i>&#7771;ita</i> has a passive sense, as
+appears from the words, Drinking <i>&#7771;ita</i>. <i>&#7770;ita</i> means works done
+without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
+bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
+question, untruth (<i>an&#7771;ita</i>) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
+during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
+propitiation of the Supreme Spirit),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> which temporal fruit is
+obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (<i>brahman</i>); the
+entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
+this supreme sphere (<i>brahma-loka</i>) are enveloped in untruth. In such
+texts, again, as Let him know illusion (<i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>) to be the primary
+emanative cause (<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>), the term (<i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>) designates the
+emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (<i>gu&#7751;a</i>), and
+creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
+inexplicable illusion (for which the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;karas contend).</p>
+
+<p>In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
+moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (<i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>) of the barbarian were
+swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
+(<i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
+projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
+inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
+from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
+thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
+Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
+the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
+supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
+excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
+Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
+repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
+emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
+pastime;<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
+as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
+Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
+Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
+spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
+one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-v&aacute;din may
+reply: Why <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
+the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
+souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
+power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
+case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
+Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
+different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
+to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
+understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
+object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
+known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
+must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
+place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
+That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
+abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
+finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
+infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
+This suggestion (the R&aacute;m&aacute;nujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
+no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
+Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
+"implication" (<i>laksha&#7751;&aacute;</i>, both This and That being used in their
+denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
+and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
+to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
+supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
+past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
+to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
+by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
+unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
+admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
+thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
+differs as this and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> as that, permanence in things will be
+inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
+will be triumphant.</p>
+
+<p>We have, therefore (the R&aacute;m&aacute;nujas continue), laid it down in this
+question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
+individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
+body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
+body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
+the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
+soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
+is the body.</p>
+
+<p>Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. <span class="smcap">All</span> words are
+designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
+variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
+human, &amp;c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
+body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
+Hence&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>God, Man, Yaksha, Pi&#347;&aacute;cha, serpent, R&aacute;kshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
+wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,&mdash;these and all other words, be they
+what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
+of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
+things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
+individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
+complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
+That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
+Spirit is stated in the Tattva-mukt&aacute;val&iacute; and in the Chaturantara&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
+than That, called the established entity,</p>
+
+<p>"Of this there is much significant and undoubted
+exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;</p>
+
+<p>"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
+form of gods, mortals, and the rest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
+a diversity of names and forms in the world."</p></div>
+
+<p>In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
+rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
+systems," &amp;c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
+"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &amp;c., that
+it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
+lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &amp;c., that all
+words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
+ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
+R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja in the Ved&aacute;rtha-sa&#7749;graha, when analysing the Vedic text about
+names and forms.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
+can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
+in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
+thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
+not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
+form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
+universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
+was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
+knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
+illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
+there is no proof of these positions.</p>
+
+<p>Nor is there an absurdity (as the &#346;&aacute;&#7749;karas would say), on the
+hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
+that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
+is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
+cause (<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
+elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
+the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
+so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
+is all an effect, and that from the single cognition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span> of absolute
+spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
+absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
+there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
+cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
+unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
+cognition all cognition would be sublated.</p>
+
+<p>It is laid down (by the R&aacute;m&aacute;nujas) that retractation into the universe
+(<i>pralaya</i>) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
+and the originant (<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>), returns to its imperceptible state,
+unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
+spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
+gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
+soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
+condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
+the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vy&aacute;sa)
+treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
+Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
+deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
+those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
+explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
+existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
+with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
+forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
+forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p>
+
+<p>What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
+universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
+admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
+all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
+one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
+soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>that the
+essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
+not to be confounded.</p>
+
+<p>Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
+consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
+in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
+and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
+Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
+proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
+Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
+not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
+and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
+susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
+the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
+controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
+fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
+majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
+auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
+himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
+adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
+divine.</p>
+
+<p>Ve&#7749;ka&#7789;a-n&aacute;tha has given the following distribution of things:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Those who know it have declared the principle to be
+twofold, substance and non-substance;</p>
+
+<p>"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
+former being the unevolved (<i>avyakta</i>), and time.</p>
+
+<p>"The latter is the 'near' (<i>pratyak</i>) and the 'distant'
+(<i>par&aacute;k</i>); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
+Lord;</p>
+
+<p>"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
+principle some have called the unsentient primary."</p></div>
+
+<p>Of these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
+originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;</p>
+
+<p>"Time has the form of years, &amp;c.; soul is atomic and
+cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;</p>
+
+<p>"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
+cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
+characterised by goodness;</p>
+
+<p>"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
+intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
+summarily recounted."</p></div>
+
+<p>Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
+souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
+text: Two birds, companions, friends, &amp;c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
+Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Ka&#7751;&aacute;da, iii. 2, 20),
+Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
+of souls is often spoken of in revelation&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
+it again cease to be;</p>
+
+<p>"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
+killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-g&iacute;t&aacute;, ii. 20).</p></div>
+
+<p>Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
+requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
+accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gauta&#7747;a, iii. 25): Because
+no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
+atomic is well known from revelation&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
+hundred times,</p>
+
+<p>"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
+capable of infinity."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
+wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
+atomic."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
+divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
+fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
+Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), V&aacute;sudeva
+(a patronymic of K&#7771;ish&#7751;a), and the like.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"V&aacute;sudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
+auspicious attributes,</p>
+
+<p>"The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
+animator of spirits."</p></div>
+
+<p>This same V&aacute;sudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
+to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
+rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
+pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
+(<i>arch&aacute;</i>), "emanation" (<i>vibhava</i>), "manifestation" (<i>vy&uacute;ha</i>), "the
+subtile" (<i>s&uacute;kshma</i>), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
+is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as R&aacute;ma,
+and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as V&aacute;sudeva,
+Sa&#7749;karsha&#7751;a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
+entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called V&aacute;sudeva. His
+attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
+from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
+without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
+The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
+the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
+worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
+of the soul (<i>i.e.</i>, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
+becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
+has, therefore, been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"V&aacute;sudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
+desired by each,</p>
+
+<p>"According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
+recompense.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
+embodiments;</p>
+
+<p>"Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
+'emanations;'</p>
+
+<p>"As Sa&#7749;karsha&#7749;a, V&aacute;sudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
+manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
+is the entire six attributes;</p>
+
+<p>"That self-same called V&aacute;sudeva is styled the Supreme
+Spirit;</p>
+
+<p>"The internal controller is declared as residing in the
+soul, the actuator of the soul,</p>
+
+<p>"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
+as 'Who abiding in the soul.'</p>
+
+<p>"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
+defilement becomes a qualified votary;</p>
+
+<p>"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
+qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,</p>
+
+<p>"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
+to behold the 'internal controller.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>The worship of the Deity is described in the Pa&ntilde;cha-r&aacute;tra as
+consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
+preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
+access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
+temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
+like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
+Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
+to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vish&#7751;u, the
+commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
+the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
+visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
+the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
+Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
+lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
+marked by consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> of being like him, from which there is no
+future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
+traditionary text&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
+undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
+having attained to the supreme consummation.</p>
+
+<p>"V&aacute;sudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
+mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
+return."</p></div>
+
+<p>After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
+the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Ved&aacute;nta aphorisms by
+the venerated Bodh&aacute;yanach&aacute;rya too prolix, R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja composed a
+commentary on the &#346;&aacute;r&iacute;rakam&iacute;m&aacute;ns&aacute; (or Ved&aacute;nta theosophy). In this the
+sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
+to be known," is given as follows:&mdash;The word <i>then</i> in this aphorism
+means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
+glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
+know the absolute. The word <i>hence</i> states the reason, viz., because
+one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
+meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
+perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
+for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
+the word <i>absolute</i> is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
+essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
+excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
+knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
+mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
+away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
+knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
+of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
+the latter M&iacute;m&aacute;ns&aacute; constitute one system of institutes. On this
+account the glossator has described<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> this system as one with the
+sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
+perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
+has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
+spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
+the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
+reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
+other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
+efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
+who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
+delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
+both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
+immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
+Pa&ntilde;char&aacute;tra-rahasya&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,</p>
+
+<p>"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.</p>
+
+<p>"These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
+Subtile, the Internal Controller,</p>
+
+<p>"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
+knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,</p>
+
+<p>"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
+embodiment.</p>
+
+<p>"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
+traditional,</p>
+
+<p>"By the aforesaid worship V&aacute;sudeva becomes propitious to
+mankind.</p>
+
+<p>"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
+meditation,</p>
+
+<p>"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
+aggregate of works.</p>
+
+<p>"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
+transmigration has vanished,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.</p>
+
+<p>"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
+the Lord,</p>
+
+<p>"Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
+Deity.</p>
+
+<p>"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
+which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;</p>
+
+<p>"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
+must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
+spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
+to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
+and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
+desire is predominant (in the word <i>jij&ntilde;&aacute;sitavya</i>), and desired
+knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
+must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
+such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
+knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
+any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
+even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
+Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
+be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
+let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
+knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
+understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
+<i>sha&#7693;a&#7749;gena vedo'dhyeyo j&ntilde;eya&#347;cha</i>, the Veda, with its six appendages,
+is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
+must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
+engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
+and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
+be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
+understood<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
+aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
+significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
+succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
+the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
+knots,&mdash;that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
+emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,</p>
+
+<p>"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
+Highest and Lowest,"</p></div>
+
+<p>because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
+indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
+an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
+the representations. The author of the V&aacute;kya has treated of all this
+in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
+characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
+not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
+Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
+its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
+choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
+of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"To them always devoted, who worship me with love,</p>
+
+<p>"I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
+me."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
+unwavering."</p></div>
+
+<p>But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
+motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
+desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
+other means. As is said by the author of the V&aacute;kya: Attainment
+thereof<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> results from discrimination (<i>viveka</i>), exemption (<i>vimoka</i>),
+practice (<i>abhy&aacute;sa</i>), observance (<i>kriy&aacute;</i>), excellence (<i>kaly&aacute;&#7751;a</i>),
+freedom from despondency (<i>anavas&aacute;da</i>), satisfaction (<i>anuddharsha</i>),
+according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
+(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
+resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
+discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
+by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
+is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
+quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
+explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-g&iacute;t&aacute;) by (R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja) the
+author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
+Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
+tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
+text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
+supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
+(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
+veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
+explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
+Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
+dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
+been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
+dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
+rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
+presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
+incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
+(Vaiku&#7751;&#7789;ha) is attained. Thus Y&aacute;muna says: Attainable by the final and
+absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
+and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
+the devotion of works and knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> be desired to
+be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
+the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
+creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
+universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
+sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
+multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahm&aacute;
+to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
+this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
+which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
+indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
+omniscient, and omnipotent.</p>
+
+<p>In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
+absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
+itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
+source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
+that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
+the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
+knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
+the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
+form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
+absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
+illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
+effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
+It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
+that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.</p>
+
+<p>Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
+kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
+of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
+anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
+aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
+exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> system is
+the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
+the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
+end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
+Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
+sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
+cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
+that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
+son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
+cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
+have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
+from the original (viz., R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja's Bh&aacute;shya on the Ved&aacute;nta aphorisms);
+we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
+and thus all is clear.<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
+Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
+statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
+and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
+if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
+inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
+both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
+Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
+proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
+information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
+declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
+Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
+and simply pointed with his finger."&mdash;Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
+297, 298.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
+pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
+the plaything of God.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."&mdash;<i>Pope.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> For further details respecting R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja and his system,
+see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
+The <i>Tattva-mukt&aacute;val&iacute;</i> was printed in the <i>Pandit</i> for September 1871;
+but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>&Aacute;nanda-t&iacute;rtha (P&uacute;r&#7751;a-praj&ntilde;a, or Madhva) rejected this same R&aacute;m&aacute;nuja
+system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
+of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
+without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
+self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
+dependency upon the Pa&ntilde;cha-r&aacute;tra, the reality of plurality in the
+universe, and so forth,&mdash;yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
+reciprocally contradictory divisions, &amp;c., it coincides with the
+tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
+number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
+a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
+new explication of the Brahma-M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7751;s&aacute; (or Ved&aacute;nta).</p>
+
+<p>For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
+independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;</p>
+
+<p>"The independent is Vish&#7751;u the Lord, exempt from
+imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."</p></div>
+
+<p>Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-v&aacute;dins): Why predicate of the
+absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
+which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
+heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span> replied: Not
+so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
+positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
+for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
+a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
+will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
+difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
+The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
+and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
+such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
+asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
+of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
+contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
+thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
+without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
+(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
+its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
+apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
+apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
+cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
+cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
+the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
+non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
+even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
+contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
+concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
+follows:&mdash;Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
+difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
+maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
+the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
+Br&aacute;hman for the offence of a thief, the objections<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> you adduce being
+irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
+the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
+if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
+this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
+first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
+and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
+example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
+first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
+judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
+contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vish&#7751;u-tattva-nir&#7751;aya:
+"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
+determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
+predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
+proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
+counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
+circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
+predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
+difference is a <i>thing</i>) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
+if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
+<i>cow</i>. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
+such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
+presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
+judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
+same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
+aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
+S&aacute;&#7749;khya-k&aacute;rik&aacute;, v. vii.)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
+defect in the organs, from instability of the common
+sensory,</p>
+
+<p>"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
+and from aggregation of similars."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
+of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
+applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
+lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
+the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
+by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
+sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
+things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
+light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
+overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
+similars.</p>
+
+<p>Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
+harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
+and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
+possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
+in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
+ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
+infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
+ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
+say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
+Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
+for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
+inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
+it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
+little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
+no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
+is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
+then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
+trouble.</p>
+
+<p>Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
+Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
+obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
+person, a king, for instance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> from his attendant. For men, desiring
+as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
+slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
+become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
+all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
+excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
+gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
+been said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,</p>
+
+<p>"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
+all that they desire."</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus the statement of those (Advaita-v&aacute;dins) in their thirst to be one
+with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vish&#7751;u is like a
+mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
+fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme
+Vish&#7751;u they must enter into the hell of blind darkness
+(<i>andha-tamasa</i>). The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
+Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata-t&aacute;tparya-nir&#7751;aya:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vish&#7751;u's anger is waxed
+great;</p>
+
+<p>"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
+decide blindly."</p></div>
+
+<p>This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
+into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.</p>
+
+<p>Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
+weapons of N&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a (or Vish&#7751;u) as a memorial of him, and as a means
+of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
+of the S&aacute;kalya-samhit&aacute;:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
+Vish&#7751;u, which is the might of the gods,</p>
+
+<p>"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaiku<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>&#7751;&#7789;ha)
+which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:</p>
+
+<p>"The discus Sudar&#347;ana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
+gods entered that heaven;</p>
+
+<p>"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
+world, that weapon Br&aacute;hmans wear (stamped upon them);</p>
+
+<p>"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
+Vish&#7751;u;</p>
+
+<p>"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vish&#7751;u), let
+us become beatified."</p></div>
+
+<p>Again, the Taittir&iacute;yaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
+is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
+particular parts to be branded are specified in the &Aacute;gneya-pur&aacute;&#7751;a:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"On his right hand let the Br&aacute;hman wear Sudar&#347;ana,</p>
+
+<p>"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
+Veda declared."</p></div>
+
+<p>In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
+branded with the discus:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sudar&#347;ana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,</p>
+
+<p>"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
+Vish&#7751;u.</p>
+
+<p>"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
+hand of Vish&#7751;u,</p>
+
+<p>"Adored by all the gods; O P&aacute;&#7749;chajanya, to thee be
+adoration."</p></div>
+
+<p>(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
+names as Ke&#347;ava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
+Lord.</p>
+
+<p>(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
+(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
+(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
+sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
+dedication to N&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
+been said:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
+of ten kinds."</p></div>
+
+<p>Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
+also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
+difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
+setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
+rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
+divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
+the truth, O Br&aacute;hman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
+individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
+illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."</p>
+
+<p>Again:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,</p>
+
+<p>"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
+perish not" (Bhagavad-g&iacute;t&aacute;, xiv. 2).</p></div>
+
+<p>According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
+because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."</p>
+
+<p>Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
+of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
+text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
+Br&aacute;hman devoutly a &#346;&uacute;dra becomes a Br&aacute;hman, <i>i.e.</i>, becomes exalted.</p>
+
+<p>If any one urge that according to the text:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"</p></div>
+
+<p>this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
+duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
+you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
+meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
+come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
+fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
+illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> the Lord, in virtue
+of the testimony of many such passages as:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,</p>
+
+<p>"The originant, ideation,&mdash;thus is thy will called, O
+Infinite.</p>
+
+<p>"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
+because it produces ideas;</p>
+
+<p>"The illusion of Hari, who is called <i>a</i>, is termed
+(<i>avidy&aacute;</i>) ignorance:</p>
+
+<p>"Styled (<i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
+the name <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i> is used of the pre-eminent;</p>
+
+<p>"The excellent knowledge of Vish&#7751;u is called, though one
+only, by these names;</p>
+
+<p>"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
+by spontaneous beatitude."</p></div>
+
+<p>That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
+sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
+therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
+in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
+illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
+as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).</p>
+
+<p>If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
+answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
+Vish&#7751;u being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
+Accordingly, the grand revelation:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
+between the unsentient and the Lord,</p>
+
+<p>"A difference among souls, and a difference of the
+unsentient and the soul each from the other.</p>
+
+<p>"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
+the world with its five divisions.</p>
+
+<p>"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
+beginning it would have an end:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
+illusorily imagined:</p>
+
+<p>"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
+ceases.</p>
+
+<p>"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
+that lack knowledge;</p>
+
+<p>"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
+and sustained by Vish&#7751;u."</p></div>
+
+<p>The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
+excellence of Vish&#7751;u. With this in view the Lord declared:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
+the imperishable;</p>
+
+<p>"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
+unmodified.</p>
+
+<p>"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
+Spirit,</p>
+
+<p>"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
+worlds.</p>
+
+<p>"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
+the imperishable (soul),</p>
+
+<p>"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
+of persons (<i>Purushottama</i>);</p>
+
+<p>"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
+all-knowing worships me in every wise.</p>
+
+<p>"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
+(Arjuna):</p>
+
+<p>"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
+has to do, O Bh&aacute;rata" (Bhagavad-g&iacute;t&aacute;, xv. 16-20).</p></div>
+
+<p>So in the Mah&aacute;-var&aacute;ha&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
+spouse of &#346;r&#299;;</p>
+
+<p>"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
+must be subordinate."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
+excellence of Vish&#7751;u. For emancipation is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> the highest end of all men,
+according to the text of the Bh&aacute;llaveya Upanishad: While merit,
+wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
+therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
+emancipation is not won without the grace of Vish&#7751;u, according to the
+text of the N&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
+state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
+while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
+the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
+from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
+Vish&#7751;u-pur&aacute;&#7751;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
+and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
+supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
+emancipation."</p>
+
+<p>And it is declared that the grace of Vish&#7751;u is won only through the
+knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
+Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
+of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
+thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
+the real purport.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
+unknown,</p>
+
+<p>"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
+be one?"</p></div>
+
+<p>And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
+the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
+revelation:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
+similarity of cognition,</p>
+
+<p>"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
+place of the individual;</p>
+
+<p>"Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
+different,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The difference being independence and completeness (in the
+Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
+individual spirit)."</p></div>
+
+<p>Or to propose another explanation of the text, <i>&Aacute;tm&aacute; tat tvam asi</i>,
+That art thou, it may be divided, <i>&aacute;tm&aacute; tat tvam asi</i>. He alone is
+soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
+not-that (<i>atat</i>) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
+of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Or the division may be <i>Atat tvam</i>, and thus unity will be
+well got rid of."</p></div>
+
+<p>According, therefore, to the Tattva-v&aacute;da-rahasya, the words in the
+nine examples (in the Chh&aacute;ndogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
+a string, &amp;c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
+non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
+trees;</p>
+
+<p>"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;</p>
+
+<p>"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;</p>
+
+<p>"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.</p>
+
+<p>"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
+the supreme Hari</p>
+
+<p>"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
+individual spirit, though he is its actuator;</p>
+
+<p>"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
+he is bound."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Brahm&aacute;, &#346;iva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
+decay of their bodies;</p>
+
+<p>"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
+for the sustentation of Lakshm&iacute;.</p>
+
+<p>"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
+knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,</p>
+
+<p>"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
+him."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>And again:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Knowing Vish&#7751;u, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
+from transmigration,</p>
+
+<p>"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.</p>
+
+<p>"Vish&#7751;u is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
+ruler.</p>
+
+<p>"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."</p></div>
+
+<p>That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
+evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
+things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
+knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
+expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
+known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
+knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
+and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
+Advaita-v&aacute;dins that the world is false and illusory) the words <i>one</i>
+and <i>lump</i> in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
+made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
+must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
+recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
+name, clay (or other determinate object),&mdash;these alone are real,
+cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
+these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
+with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
+such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
+words <i>name</i> and <i>alone</i> would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
+then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
+statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
+statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
+statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
+reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span> permanent or
+transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
+author of the Ny&aacute;ya-nirv&aacute;&#7751;a: The proof of the permanence of the
+transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
+And in the T&aacute;rkika-raksh&aacute;&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
+or not such and such,</p>
+
+<p>"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
+called Nitya-sama."</p></div>
+
+<p>With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
+stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
+results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
+rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
+the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
+general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
+the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
+an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
+subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
+form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
+in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
+true or false? &amp;c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
+said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
+equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.</p>
+
+<p>If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
+its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
+carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
+money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
+are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.</p>
+
+<p>The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
+be desired to be known, is as follows:&mdash;The word <i>then</i> is allowed to
+purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
+qualification (of the aspirant). The word <i>hence</i> indicates a reason.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Accordingly it is stated in the G&aacute;ru&#7693;a-pur&aacute;&#7751;a:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
+regularly; what then is the reason of this?</p>
+
+<p>"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
+the most excellent?</p>
+
+<p>"Tell me this, Brahm&aacute;, that I may know it truly."</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus addressed by N&aacute;rada, the most excellent Brahm&aacute; replied:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
+in an auspicious sense,</p>
+
+<p>"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
+because emancipation is not attained without the grace of N&aacute;r&aacute;yana,
+and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
+which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
+the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
+The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
+result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
+words of the Skanda-pur&aacute;&#7751;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
+emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
+involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"</p></div>
+
+<p>and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
+adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
+has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
+way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
+Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
+Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
+Kaurma-pur&aacute;&#7751;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case</p>
+
+<p>"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
+evidence;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
+revelation and tradition,</p>
+
+<p>"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
+hesitation."</p></div>
+
+<p>What a &#346;&aacute;stra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
+the Skanda-pur&aacute;&#7751;a:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the S&aacute;ma-veda, the
+Atharva-veda, the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata, the Pa&ntilde;cha-r&aacute;tra, and the
+original R&aacute;m&aacute;ya&#7751;a, are called &#346;&aacute;stras.</p>
+
+<p>"That also which is conformable to these is called &#346;&aacute;stra.</p>
+
+<p>"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
+heterodoxy."</p></div>
+
+<p>According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
+is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
+viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
+duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
+there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
+duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
+can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
+texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
+has said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I ever laud N&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a, the one being to be known from
+genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
+imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
+excellences."</p></div>
+
+<p>It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
+of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, <i>Brahman</i>). (The fourth
+aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
+the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
+construction, in the B&#7771;ihat-sa&#7747;hit&aacute;:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
+eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
+purport is ascertained."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> the
+Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
+institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
+remains may be sought from the &Aacute;nandat&iacute;rtha-bh&aacute;shya-vy&aacute;khy&aacute;na (or
+exposition of the Commentary of &Aacute;nanda-t&iacute;rtha). We desist for fear of
+giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
+promulgated by P&uacute;r&#7751;a-praj&ntilde;a Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
+third incarnation of V&aacute;yu:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The first was Hanumat, the second Bh&iacute;ma,</p>
+
+<p>"The third P&uacute;r&#7751;a-praj&ntilde;a, the worker of the work of the
+Lord."</p></div>
+
+<p>After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
+following stanza at the conclusion of his work:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
+text of the Veda, sufficiently</p>
+
+<p>"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
+splendour of the Veda;</p>
+
+<p>"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
+the words of R&aacute;ma (Hanumat); the second was Bh&iacute;ma;</p>
+
+<p>"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
+composed in regard to Ke&#347;ava."</p></div>
+
+<p>The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
+texts.</p>
+
+<p>The purport of this is that Vish&#7751;u is the principle above all others
+in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> For a further account of &Aacute;nanda-t&iacute;rtha or Madhva see
+Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
+Brahma-s&uacute;tras has been printed in Calcutta.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE P&Aacute;&#346;UPATA SYSTEM OF NAKUL&Iacute;&#346;A.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Certain M&aacute;he&#347;varas disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaish&#7751;avas known
+by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch
+as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be
+a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as
+stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing
+for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend
+upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and
+others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme
+Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free
+from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these
+arguments, these M&aacute;he&#347;varas adopt the P&aacute;&#347;upata system, which is
+conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to
+the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then
+we shall expound the P&aacute;&#347;upata union and rites of Pa&#347;upati. The meaning
+is as follows:&mdash;The word <i>now</i> refers to something antecedent, and
+this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the
+spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in
+the Ga&#7751;ak&aacute;rik&aacute;:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one
+with three factors;</p>
+
+<p>"He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a
+spiritual guide.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the
+localities, the perseverance, the purifications,</p>
+
+<p>"The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and
+there are three functions."</p></div>
+
+<p>The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three
+(<i>tr&iacute;&#7751;i</i>), instead of the feminine three (<i>tisra&#7717;</i>), is a Vedic
+construction.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a.</i>) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and
+is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of
+the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradatt&aacute;ch&aacute;rya says: Knowledge,
+penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is
+of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also
+says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and
+falling,</p>
+
+<p>"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system
+especially to be shunned."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>c.</i>) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to
+liberation.</p>
+
+<p>These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.
+Thus he also says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant
+recollection of Rudra,</p>
+
+<p>"And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients
+of acquirements."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>d.</i>) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the
+aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual
+teachers and the rest. Thus he says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the
+burning-ground, and Rudra only."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>e.</i>) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads
+until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the
+differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,
+and devotion as the fifth."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>f.</i>) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false
+conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five
+species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of
+interestedness,</p>
+
+<p>"And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification
+of the state of bondage."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>g.</i>) The five initiations are thus enumerated:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the
+spiritual guide as the fifth."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>h.</i>) The five powers are as follow:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,
+conquest of pleasure and pain,</p>
+
+<p>"Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of
+power."</p></div>
+
+<p>The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent
+with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,
+mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.
+All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.</p>
+
+<p>In the first aphorism above recited, the word <i>now</i> serves to
+introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),
+that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of
+pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word <i>pa&#347;u</i> we are
+to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that
+which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word <i>pati</i> we are to
+understand the cause (or <i>principium</i>), the word designating the Lord,
+who is the cause of the universe, the <i>pati</i>, or ruler. The meaning of
+the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.</p>
+
+<p>In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and
+personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute
+extirpation of all pains; the personal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span> in supremacy consisting of the
+visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only
+one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly
+describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,
+discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of
+every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though
+imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of
+principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is
+cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.
+Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole
+system of institutes, according to the text and according to its
+significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and
+pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,
+summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this
+intellectual power.</p>
+
+<p>The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of
+three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of
+assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the
+possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with
+unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the
+faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.
+The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy
+even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.</p>
+
+<p>All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is
+threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,
+sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees
+according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive
+sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as
+proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable
+by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the
+cogitant organ every sentient being is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> cognisant of objects in
+general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the
+light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive
+sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the
+objects of the sentient soul.</p>
+
+<p>The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,
+is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The
+insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and
+the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.
+The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,
+viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the
+three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the
+cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions
+ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and
+determination.</p>
+
+<p>The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,
+is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is
+the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is
+the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are
+to be found in the Pa&ntilde;ch&aacute;rtha-bh&aacute;shyad&iacute;pik&aacute; and other works. The cause
+is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.
+This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of
+attributes and actions (into Mahe&#347;vara, Vish&#7751;u, &amp;c.) The Lord is the
+possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely
+first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as
+possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is
+expounded by the author of the &Aacute;dar&#347;a, and other institutional
+authorities.</p>
+
+<p>Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and
+is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that
+characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by
+action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union
+characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>&amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of
+two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal
+is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise
+is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are
+bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and
+devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakul&iacute;&#347;a says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
+Oblation is an observance divided into six members."</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus the author of the aphorisms says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,
+laughter, song, dance, muttering <i>hum</i>, adoration, and pious
+ejaculation."</p></div>
+
+<p>Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and
+lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &amp;c., of
+Mahe&#347;vara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-&#347;&aacute;stra, or
+art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the <i>ars
+saltatoria</i>, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and
+with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal
+sentiment. The ejaculation <i>hum</i> is a sacred utterance, like the
+bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the
+palate, an imitation of the sound <i>hudung</i>, ascribed to a bull, like
+the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be
+gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require
+exposition.</p>
+
+<p>The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,
+talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being
+asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the
+joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if
+the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an
+<i>innamorato</i> on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is
+doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what
+should and what should not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span> be done. Talking nonsensically is the
+utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no
+meaning, and the like.</p>
+
+<p>The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution
+for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on
+broken food, &amp;c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:
+Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.</p>
+
+<p>(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive
+power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,
+relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in
+detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes
+generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we
+shall expound the P&aacute;&#347;upata union and rites of Pa&#347;upati). Detail is the
+fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the
+instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the
+R&aacute;&#347;&iacute;kara-bh&aacute;shya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these
+categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an
+enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,
+different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the
+cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the
+S&#257;nkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is
+the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other
+systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall
+become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,
+the sentient and insentient. In other systems the <i>principium</i> is
+determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of
+works, whereas in this system the <i>principium</i> is the Lord not thus
+determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &amp;c., while
+in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of
+the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres
+involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in
+nearness to the Supreme Being, either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> followed or not followed by
+such return to transmigratory experiences.</p>
+
+<p>Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,
+since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,
+then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be
+simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be
+created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge
+two difficulties. Think not so, replies the P&aacute;&#347;upata, for your
+supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without
+results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will
+follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the
+efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer
+of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the
+works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only
+when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so
+furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of
+Yay&aacute;ti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one
+will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman
+engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient
+creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the
+creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all
+his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to
+be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the P&aacute;&#347;upata,
+that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,
+inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed
+active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose
+power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed
+in sacred tradition:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by
+the efficacy of works,</p>
+
+<p>"For this reason is he in this system the cause of all
+causes."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through
+a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies
+the P&aacute;&#347;upata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere
+knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or
+the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for
+then it would follow that the study of any system would be
+superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,
+like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that
+Mah&aacute;deva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of
+the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is
+competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of
+various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.
+On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an
+accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent
+to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be
+realised apart from the system of the P&aacute;&#347;upatas. Therefore it is that
+our great teacher has said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,
+but intuition is unattainable;</p>
+
+<p>"There is no accurate characterisation of principles
+otherwise than by the five categories."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man
+must adopt the system of the P&aacute;&#347;upatas, which undertakes the
+exposition of the five categories.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE &#346;AIVA-DAR&#346;ANA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>[The seventh system in M&aacute;dhava's Sarva-dar&#347;ana-sa&#7749;graha is the
+&#346;aiva-dar&#347;ana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,
+especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about
+the eleventh century <span class="smcap">a.d.</span> Several valuable contributions have been
+lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the
+Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,
+by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,
+has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He
+has there translated the Tattuva-Ka&#7789;&#7789;alei, or law of the Tattwas, the
+&#346;iva-Gn&aacute;napotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the
+&#346;iva-Pirak&aacute;sam, or light of &#346;iva, and the three works shed immense
+light on the outline as given by M&aacute;dhava. One great use of the latter
+is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their
+Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as <i>a&#7771;ul</i> for <i>anugraha</i>
+and <i>t&iacute;&#7693;chei</i> for <i>d&iacute;ksh&aacute;</i> may testify.</p>
+
+<p>The &#346;aivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic S&aacute;nkhya; they
+hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,
+and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and
+gradually to unite it to God. &#346;iva is the chief deity of the system,
+and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the
+allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pa&#347;upati is a
+well-known name of &#346;iva, as the master or creator of all things.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva s&uacute;tras. One is in
+five books, called by Colebrooke the Pa&#347;upati-&#347;&aacute;stra, which is probably
+the work quoted by M&aacute;dhava in his account of the Nakul&iacute;&#347;a P&aacute;&#347;upatas;
+another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemar&aacute;ja, with its first
+s&uacute;tra, <i>cha&iacute;tanyam &aacute;tm&aacute;</i>. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,
+and opens with the &#347;loka given in the Sarva-Dar&#347;ana-Sa&#7749;graha, p. 91, lines
+1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0"><i>Katha&ntilde;chid &aacute;s&aacute;dya Mahe&#347;varasya d&aacute;syam.</i><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the
+present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight
+&Aacute;gamas and some of the Pur&aacute;&#7751;as. A list of the &Aacute;gamas is given in Mr.
+Foulkes' "Catechism of the &#346;aiva Religion;" and of these the Kira&#7751;a
+and Kara&#7751;a are quoted in the following treatise.]</p>
+
+<h3>THE &#346;AIVA-DAR&#346;ANA.</h3>
+<p>Certain, however, of the M&aacute;he&#347;vara sect receiving the system of truth
+authoritatively laid down in the &#346;aiva &Aacute;gama,<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> reject the
+foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of
+our actions, &amp;c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation
+of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion
+that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &amp;c.;"
+and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the
+Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the
+cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in
+the Tantra doctrines&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one s&uacute;tra
+the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four
+feet, has again declared the same at full length."</p></div>
+
+<p>The meaning of this is as follows:&mdash;Its three categories are the three
+before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,
+meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,
+possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not
+independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as
+being different from these, is first declared; next follows the
+account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing
+intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order
+of the arrangement.<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> Since the ceremony of initiation is the means
+to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without
+knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the
+Lords of the hymns, &amp;c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the
+real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place
+as first the "foot" of <i>knowledge</i> (<i>j&ntilde;&aacute;na</i>) which makes known all
+this unto us.<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Next follows the "foot" of <i>ceremonial action</i>
+(<i>kriy&aacute;</i>) which declares the various rules of initiation with the
+divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be
+attained, hence the "foot" of <i>meditation</i> (<i>yoga</i>) follows next,
+which declares the various kinds of <i>yoga</i> with their several parts.
+And as meditation is worthless without practice, <i>i.e.</i>, the
+fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span>forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty
+(<i>chary&aacute;</i>), which includes all this.</p>
+
+<p>Now &#346;iva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in
+the divine nature of &#346;iva belongs to liberated souls and to such
+beings as Vidye&#347;vara, &amp;c., yet these are not independent, since they
+depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised
+to belong to the worlds, &amp;c., which resemble him, from the very fact
+of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being
+effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent
+being. By the strength of this inference is the universal
+acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.</p>
+
+<p>"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an
+effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body
+being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that
+a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been
+seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not
+from actual perception]. Bodies, &amp;c., must be effects, because they
+possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are
+destructible, as jars, &amp;c.; and from their being effects it is easy to
+infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus
+the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &amp;c.] must have had a maker,
+from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &amp;c.; that which has the
+afore-mentioned middle term (<i>s&aacute;dhana</i>) must have the afore-mentioned
+major (<i>s&aacute;dhya</i>); and that which has not the former will not have the
+latter, as the soul, &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> The argument which establishes the
+authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been
+given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,
+that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions
+done by living beings, is proved by the current verse<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a>&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This ignorant <i>j&iacute;v&aacute;tman</i>, incapable of its own true
+pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction
+[and its own merits not taken into account], would always go
+to heaven or always to hell."<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,
+since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that
+he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the
+king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of
+his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to
+employ means, &amp;c.;</p>
+
+<p>"This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting
+irrespectively of works, &amp;c."</p></div>
+
+<p>And thus we conclude that inference (as well as &#346;ruti) establishes the
+existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their
+means, material causes, &amp;c., according to the laws of the various
+individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable
+B&#7771;ihaspati&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and
+material causes,&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that
+resides in accumulated actions should ripen."&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must
+have had an intelligent maker,</p>
+
+<p>"This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see
+in any other effect, as jars, &amp;c."</p></div>
+
+<p>God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with
+everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot
+produce a thing.<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> This has been said by the illustrious
+M&#7771;igendra<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a>&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>"He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:
+for it is an established principle</p>
+
+<p>"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,
+parts, and end."</p></div>
+
+<p>"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent
+maker, but then he has no body.<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> Now experience shows that all
+effects, as jars, &amp;c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as
+potters, &amp;c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be
+like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or
+omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal
+soul does still produce motion, &amp;c., in its associated body; moreover,
+even though we conceded that God <i>did</i> possess a body, we should still
+maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The
+Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of
+matter, such as <i>mala</i>,<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> action, &amp;c., cannot have a material body,
+but only a body of pure energy (S&aacute;kta),<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> since we know that his
+body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of &#346;akti, according
+to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the <i>I&#347;&aacute;na</i> as his head, the
+<i>Tatpurusha</i> as his mouth, the <i>Aghora</i> as his heart, the <i>V&aacute;medeva</i>
+as his secret parts, and the <i>Sadyoj&aacute;ta</i> as his feet."<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> And this
+body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but
+is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are
+respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and
+production.<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> This has been said in the &#346;r&iacute;mat M&#7771;igendra&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>"From the impossibility of its possessing <i>mala</i>, &amp;c., the
+body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."</p></div>
+
+<p>And it has also been said elsewhere&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"His body is composed of the five mantras which are
+subservient to the five operations,</p>
+
+<p>"And his head, &amp;c., are formed out of the &Iacute;sa, Tatpurusha,
+Aghora, V&aacute;ma, and other hymns."</p></div>
+
+<p>If you object to this view that "such passages in the &Aacute;gamas as 'He is
+five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the
+Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &amp;c.," we concede what
+you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his
+assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since
+meditation, worship, &amp;c., are impossible towards a Being entirely
+destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the
+devotee."</p></div>
+
+<p>And similarly elsewhere&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of
+form;</p>
+
+<p>"For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."</p></div>
+
+<p>Bhojar&aacute;ja<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> has thus detailed the five operations&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,
+destruction, and obscuration,</p>
+
+<p>"And to these must be added the active grace of him who is
+eternally exalted."</p></div>
+
+<p>Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to
+be performed directly by &#346;iva, but in that of the toilsome Path they
+are ascribed to Ananta,<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> as is declared in the &#346;r&iacute;mat
+Kara&#7751;a<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a>&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"In the Pure Path &#346;iva is declared to be the only agent, but
+Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."</p></div>
+
+<p>It must here be understood that the word &#346;iva includes in its proper
+meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of &#346;iva,
+as the Lords of the Mantras, Mahe&#347;wara, the emancipated souls who have
+become &#346;ivas, and the inspired teachers (<i>v&aacute;chakas</i>), together with
+all the various means, as initiation, &amp;c., for obtaining the state of
+&#346;iva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (<i>pati</i>).</p>
+
+<p>We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (<i>pa&#347;u</i>). The
+individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the
+non-atomic,<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> the <i>Kshetraj&ntilde;a</i>, or knower of the body,<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> &amp;c., is
+the <i>Pa&#347;u</i>. For we must not say with the Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;kas that it is the same
+as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as
+there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.
+Nor may we say with the Naiy&aacute;yikas that it is cognisable by
+perception,<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> as this would involve an <i>ad infinitum</i> regressus. As
+has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a
+second knower;<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p>
+
+<p>"And this would require another still, if the second were
+itself to be known."</p></div>
+
+<p>Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with
+the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been
+said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or
+time,</p>
+
+<p>"They hold to be eternal and pervading,&mdash;hence the soul's
+all-pervadingness and eternity."</p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span></p><p>Nor may we say with the Ved&aacute;ntin that it is only one, since the
+apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many
+individual souls; nor with the S&aacute;nkhyas that it is devoid of action,
+since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, &#346;ruti informs us of
+a state of identity with &#346;iva, which consists in intelligence in the
+form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> This has been
+declared in the &#346;r&iacute;mat M&#7771;igendra&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is revealed that identity with &#346;iva results when all
+fetters are removed."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in
+his soul</p>
+
+<p>"This exists always and on every side, therefore, after
+liberation, &#346;ruti calls it that which faces every way."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is also said in the Tattva-prak&aacute;&#347;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The liberated souls are themselves &#346;ivas, but these are
+liberated by his favour;</p>
+
+<p>"He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose
+body is the five Mantras."</p></div>
+
+<p>Now the souls are threefold, as denominated <i>vij&ntilde;&aacute;n&aacute;kal&aacute;&#7717;</i>,
+<i>pralay&aacute;kal&aacute;&#7717;</i>, and <i>sakal&aacute;&#7717;</i>.<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> (<i>a.</i>) The first are those who are
+under the influence of <i>mala</i> only, since their actions are cancelled by
+receiving their proper fruits, or <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span>by abstraction, contemplation, and
+knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments,
+such as <i>kal&aacute;</i>, &amp;c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of
+cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (<i>b.</i>) The
+second are those who are under the influence of <i>mala</i> and <i>karman</i>, since
+in their case <i>kal&aacute;</i>, &amp;c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence
+their name <i>pralay&aacute;kala</i>. (<i>c.</i>) The third are those who are bound in the
+three fetters of <i>mala</i>, <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>, and <i>karman</i>, hence their name <i>sakala</i>.
+The first class are again subdivided into <i>sam&aacute;pta-kalush&aacute;&#7717;</i> and
+<i>asam&aacute;pta-kalush&aacute;&#7717;</i>, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly
+exhausted or not. The former,&mdash;having received the mature penalties of
+their corruptions,&mdash;are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the
+privilege, raised by &#346;iva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge
+(the Vidye&#347;varas), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of
+Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Ananta, and S&uacute;kshma, and &#346;ivottama,</p>
+
+<p>"Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trim&uacute;rttika,</p>
+
+<p>"&#346;r&iacute;ka&#7751;&#7789;ha and &#346;ikha&#7751;&#7693;in,&mdash;these are declared to be the
+Vidye&#347;varas."</p></div>
+
+<p>The latter &#346;iva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million
+Mantras.<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> All this is explained in the Tattva-prak&aacute;&#347;a.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Similarly
+Soma-&#346;ambhu has said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"One class is named <i>vij&ntilde;&aacute;n&aacute;kala</i>, the second <i>pralay&aacute;kala</i>,</p>
+
+<p>"The third <i>sakala</i>,&mdash;these are the three whom the &#346;&aacute;stra
+regards as objects of mercy.</p>
+
+<p>"The first is united to <i>mala</i> alone, the second to <i>mala</i>
+and <i>karma</i>,</p>
+
+<p>"The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with
+<i>kal&aacute;</i> and ending with 'earth.'"<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p><p>The <i>Pralay&aacute;kal&aacute;&#7717;</i> are also twofold, as being <i>pakvap&aacute;&#347;advaya</i> or not,
+<i>i.e.</i>, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in
+whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the
+power of <i>karman</i>, are endowed with the <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i><a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> body, and pass
+through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prak&aacute;&#347;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Those among the Pralay&aacute;kalas whose <i>karman</i> and <i>mala</i> are
+immature,</p>
+
+<p>"Go, united with the <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i> body, into many births by
+the power of <i>karman</i>."</p></div>
+
+<p>The <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i> is also thus described in the same work&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i> is composed of the internal organ,
+thought (<i>dh&iacute;</i>), <i>karman</i>, and the instruments."</p></div>
+
+<p>This is thus explained by Aghora &#346;iva &Aacute;ch&aacute;rya, "the <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i> is a
+subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from
+the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is
+composed of the thirty<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending
+with <i>kal&aacute;</i>." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending
+with <i>kal&aacute;</i>, is assigned to each soul,</p>
+
+<p>"And wanders by the law of <i>karman</i> through all the bodies
+produced by the world."</p></div>
+
+<p>The following is the full meaning of this passage:&mdash;The word
+"<i>internal organ</i>," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence,"
+"egoism," and "reason,"<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> includes also the seven tattvas which
+enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those
+called <i>kal&aacute;</i>, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and
+quality;<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>words "<i>thought</i>" (<i>dh&iacute;</i>) and <i>karman</i> signify the
+five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile
+rudiments. By the word "<i>instruments</i>" are comprehended the ten organs
+of sense and action.</p>
+
+<p>"But is it not declared in the &#346;r&iacute;mat K&aacute;lottara that 'The set of five,
+sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,
+these constitute the <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i>?'"</p>
+
+<p>How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and
+hence the venerable R&aacute;ma Ka&#7751;&#7789;ha has explained that s&uacute;tra in its
+literal meaning [<i>i. e</i>., as <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i>, is derived from <i>ash&#7789;a</i>,
+"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you
+ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal
+definition of <i>puryash&#7789;aka</i>, we reply that there is really no
+contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in
+the following manner:&mdash;(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five
+rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;
+(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> (7.)
+nature [prak&#7771;iti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning
+with <i>kal&aacute;</i>, which form a kind of case.<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p>
+
+<p>Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the
+<i>puryash&#7789;aka</i> body, Mahe&#347;vara Ananta having compassionated them as
+possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the
+world; as has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mahe&#347;vara pities some and grants them to be lords of the
+world."</p></div>
+
+<p>The class called <i>sakala</i> is also divided into two, as <i>pakvakalusha</i>
+and <i>apakvakalusha</i>. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in
+conformity with their maturity (<i>parip&aacute;ka</i>), <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>puts forth a power
+agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred
+and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Ma&#7751;&#7693;al&iacute;,
+&amp;c., as has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The rest are denominated <i>sakala</i>, from their connection
+with <i>Kal&aacute;</i>, &amp;c., seized by time whose mouths are days;</p>
+
+<p>"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen
+of these the Lords of the Mantras.</p>
+
+<p>"Eight of these are called <i>Ma&#7751;&#7693;alins</i>; eight again are
+Krodha, &amp;c.;</p>
+
+<p>"V&iacute;re&#347;a, &#346;r&iacute;ka&#7751;&#7789;ha, and the hundred Rudras,&mdash;these together
+are the hundred and eighteen."</p></div>
+
+<p>In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a
+teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his
+manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the
+process of initiation; as has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"These creatures whose <i>mala</i> is matured, by putting forth a
+healing power,</p>
+
+<p>"He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to
+the highest principle."</p></div>
+
+<p>It is also said in the Sr&iacute;mad M&#7771;igendra&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which
+previously exerted a contrary influence over it."<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>All this has been explained at great length by N&aacute;r&aacute;ya&#7751;a-Ka&#7751;&#7789;ha, and
+there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear
+of prolixity.</p>
+
+<p>But as for the second class, or those called <i>apakvakalusha</i>, the
+Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,
+appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy
+the rewards of their previous actions.<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> As has been said&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he
+appoints to enjoy their various deserts,</p>
+
+<p>"According to their respective actions: such are the various
+kinds of souls."</p></div>
+
+<p>We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or <i>p&aacute;&#347;a</i>).
+This is fourfold, <i>mala</i>,[1] <i>karman</i>, <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>, and <i>rodha-&#347;akti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a>
+But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the &#346;aiva &Aacute;gamas that the
+chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been
+shown to mean &#346;iva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic
+bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> hence
+matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only
+fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:&mdash;Although the <i>vindu</i> or nasal
+dot, which is the germinal atom of <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>, and is called a
+&#346;iva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the
+highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of &#346;iva,
+still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that
+it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the
+state of such deities as Vidye&#347;vara, &amp;c. Thus we see <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span>there is no
+contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prak&aacute;&#347;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The bonds of matter will be fourfold."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again in the Sr&iacute;mad M&#7771;igendra&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The enveloper-controller (<i>mala</i>), the overpowerer
+(<i>rodha</i>), action, and the work of M&aacute;y&aacute;,</p>
+
+<p>"These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively
+called by the name of 'merit.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>The following is the meaning of this couplet:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>(1.) "Enveloping," because <i>mala</i> exceedingly obscures and veils the
+soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because <i>mala</i>, a
+natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As
+has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Mala</i>, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts
+the soul's vision and action;</p>
+
+<p>"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on
+copper."<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond"
+[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of &#346;iva
+obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself
+partaking of the nature of matter].</p>
+
+<p>Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of
+all,</p>
+
+<p>"I am metaphorically called <i>p&aacute;&#347;a</i>,<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> because I follow
+desert."</p></div>
+
+<p>(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, <i>karman</i>] as being performed
+by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,
+like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning
+series. As has been said in the &#346;r&iacute;mat Kira&#7751;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As <i>Mala</i> has no beginning, its least actions are
+beginningless:</p>
+
+<p>"If an eternal character is thus established, then what
+cause could produce any change therein?"</p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span></p><p>(4.) "<i>M&aacute;y&aacute;</i>," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all
+the world is potentially contained (<i>m&aacute;ti</i>) at a mundane destruction,
+and again at a creation it all comes (<i>y&aacute;ti</i>) into manifestation,
+hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the &#346;r&iacute;mat
+Saurabheya&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed
+therein at a mundane destruction,</p>
+
+<p>"And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form
+of effects as <i>kal&aacute;</i>, &amp;c."<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here
+through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three
+categories been declared,&mdash;the Lord, the soul, and matter.</p>
+
+<p>A different mode of treating the subject is found in the
+J&ntilde;&aacute;naratn&aacute;val&iacute;, &amp;c., in such lines as&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the
+cause</p>
+
+<p>"Of the cessation thereof,&mdash;these are collectively the six
+categories."</p></div>
+
+<p>But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.
+Thus our account of the system is complete.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Colebrooke speaks of the <i>Pa&#347;upati-s&aacute;stra</i>
+(<i>Mahe&#347;vara-siddh&aacute;nta or Siv&aacute;gama</i>), as the text-book of the P&aacute;&#347;upata
+sect. The &Aacute;gamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the
+Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the &#346;aiva Religion").</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,
+matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with
+the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and <i>p&aacute;&#347;a</i> is
+eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.
+58 we find the <i>advaita</i> of the Ved&aacute;nta attacked. In p. 62 it is said
+that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his
+five operations (see <i>infra</i>) to disentangle it, bringing out all that
+is required for previous desert.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> These four feet are the four stages of religious life
+(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil <i>sarithei</i>,
+<i>kirikei</i>, <i>yokam</i>, and <i>gn&aacute;nam</i>. The first is the stage of practical
+piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second
+is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications
+involved in true <i>p&uacute;j&aacute;</i>; the third is that of the eight observances of
+the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for
+intimate union with God.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke, <i>Essays</i> (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> <i>Ny&aacute;yena</i> may here mean "argument."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> if there were only one cause there would be
+only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects
+proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)
+necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural
+stress to be laid on <i>eva</i>, but this is certainly not the original
+meaning of the passage; it occurs Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata, iii. 1144 (cf.
+Gau&#7693;ap&aacute;da, S. K&aacute;r. 61).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> In p. 82, line 3, <i>infra</i>, I read
+<i>Kara&#7751;&aacute;sambhav&aacute;chcha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> This may be the same with the Meyk&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a of the Tamil
+work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the <i>M&#7771;igendra</i>(?).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> Should we read <i>t&aacute;vad ana&#347;ar&iacute;ra&#7717;</i> in p. 83, line 2?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> I retain this word, see <i>infra.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> "<i>M&aacute;y&aacute;</i> (or Prak&#7771;iti) is the material, &#346;akti the
+instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> These are the five first names of the eleven mantras
+which are included in the five <i>kal&aacute;s</i> (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).
+The &#346;ivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is
+composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of &#346;iva (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse
+order in Taitt. &Aacute;ra&#7751;yaka, x. 43-47 (cf. <i>Ny&aacute;y&aacute;-m&aacute;l&aacute;vist.</i> p. 3).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> These are the operations of the five manifestations of
+&#346;iva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are
+<i>S&aacute;th&aacute;kkiyam</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>Sad&aacute;kshaya?</i>) or <i>Sad&aacute;-&#346;iva</i>, who is &#346;iva and
+&#346;akti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; <i>Ichchuran</i> or
+<i>Mayesuran</i>, the obscure; <i>Sutta-vittei</i> (<i>&#346;uddhavidy&aacute;</i>) which is
+properly the Hindu triad, <i>Rudra</i>, <i>Vish&#7751;u</i>, and <i>Brahma</i>. They are
+respectively symbolised by the <i>n&aacute;da</i>, <i>vindu</i>, <i>m</i>, <i>u</i>, and <i>a</i> of
+Om.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a T&aacute;ntrik
+work, the <i>Narapati-jaya-chary&aacute;</i>, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dh&aacute;r.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> Ananta is a name of &#346;iva in the Atharva-&#347;iras Upanishad
+(see Indische Stud. i. 385).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> This is the fourth of the twenty-eight &Aacute;gamas (see
+Foulkes' Catechism).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> <i>A&#7751;u?</i> "The soul, when clothed with these primary
+things (desire, knowledge, action, &amp;c.), is an exceedingly small body"
+(Foulkes). Ana&#7751;u is used as an epithet of Brahman in B&#7771;ihad Ar. Up.
+iii. 8. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> See Ind. Studien, i. 301.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;
+Parichchheda, &#347;loka 49).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> Delete the <i>iti</i> in p. 84, line 5, <i>infra</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> Cf. the Nakul&iacute;&#347;a P&aacute;&#347;upatas, p. 76, 4 (<i>supra</i>, p.
+103).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,
+137. They are there described as being respectively under the
+influence of <i>&aacute;&#7751;avam malam</i> only, or this with <i>kanmam malam</i>, or
+these with <i>mayei malam</i>. The <i>&aacute;&#7751;avam</i> is described as original sin,
+or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; <i>kanmam</i>
+is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its
+deserts; <i>mayei</i> is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the
+source of the senses. M&aacute;dhava uses "<i>kal&aacute;</i>," &amp;c., for <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>. The
+reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the
+five <i>vidy&aacute;tattvas</i> (<i>kal&aacute;</i>, <i>vidy&aacute;</i>, <i>r&aacute;ga</i>, <i>niyati</i>, and <i>kal&aacute;</i>)
+and the twenty-four <i>&aacute;tmatattvas</i> (<i>sc.</i> the gross and subtile
+elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual
+faculties <i>manas</i>, <i>buddhi</i>, <i>aha&#7747;k&aacute;ra</i>, and <i>chitta</i>), are all
+developed from <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>. This exactly agrees with the quotation from
+Soma &#346;ambhu, <i>infra</i>. We may compare with it what M&aacute;dhava says, p. 77,
+in his account of the Nakul&iacute;&#347;a P&aacute;&#347;upatas, where he describes <i>kal&aacute;</i> as
+unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five
+<i>tanm&aacute;tras</i>, and the ten organs, with <i>buddhi</i>, <i>aha&#7747;k&aacute;ra</i> and
+<i>manas</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read <i>anugrahakara&#7751;&aacute;t</i> in
+p. 86, line 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.
+It, however, names the three classes as <i>vij&ntilde;&aacute;na-kevala</i>,
+<i>pralaya-kevala</i>, and <i>sakala</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, thus including five of the <i>vidy&aacute;tattvas</i> and
+all the twenty-four <i>&aacute;tmatattvas</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> This term seems to be derived from <i>pur&iacute;</i>, "body" (cf.
+<i>puri&#347;aya</i> for <i>purusha</i>, B&#7771;ihad &Aacute;r. Up. ii. 5, 18), and <i>ash&#7789;aka</i>
+(cf. also the S&aacute;nkhya Pravachana Bh&aacute;shya, p. 135).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> Or rather thirty-one?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> <i>Manas</i>, <i>buddhi</i>, <i>aha&#7747;k&aacute;ra</i>, <i>chitta</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> These are the seven <i>vi&#7693;y&aacute;-tattvas</i>, <i>kal&aacute;</i>, <i>k&aacute;la</i>,
+<i>niyati</i> (fate), <i>vidy&aacute;</i>, <i>r&aacute;ga</i>, <i>prak&#7771;iti</i>, and <i>gu&#7751;a</i>. Hoisington,
+however, puts <i>purushan</i> "the principle of life," instead of <i>gu&#7751;a</i>,
+which seems better, as the three <i>gu&#7751;as</i> are included in <i>prak&#7771;iti</i>.
+He translates <i>kal&aacute;</i> by "continency," and describes it as "the power
+by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into
+subjection."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> This "instrument" (<i>kara&#7751;a</i>) seems to mean what
+Hoisington calls <i>purushan</i> or "the principle of life which
+establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes
+it one of the seven <i>vidy&aacute;tattvas</i>. According to M&aacute;dhava, it should be
+what he calls <i>gu&#7751;a</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> The thirty-one <i>tattvas</i> are as follow:&mdash;Twenty-four
+<i>&aacute;tmatattvas</i>, five elements, five <i>tanm&aacute;tras</i>, ten organs of sense
+and action, four organs of the <i>anta&#7717;kara&#7751;a</i>, and seven <i>vidy&aacute;tattvas</i>
+as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> I take <i>a&#7751;u</i> in this verse as the soul, but it may mean
+the second kind of <i>mala</i> mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of
+<i>mala</i> is the <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;-mala</i>, the second <i>&aacute;&#7751;ava-mala</i>, the third
+<i>kanma-mala</i> (<i>karman</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> "The soul, when clothed with these primary things
+(desire, knowledge, action, the <i>kal&aacute;dipanchaka</i>, &amp;c.), is an
+exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three <i>malas</i> is called
+<i>&aacute;&#7751;ava</i>, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to
+souls.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> The first three are the three kinds of <i>mala</i> in the J.
+A. O. S., viz., <i>&aacute;&#7751;avam</i>, <i>kanmam</i>, and <i>m&aacute;yei</i>, the last is the
+"obscuring" power of M&aacute;yesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The &#346;aivas
+hold that P&aacute;&#347;a, like the S&aacute;nkhya Prak&#7771;iti, is in itself eternal,
+although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 228).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> These are the five, <i>vindu</i>, <i>mala</i>, <i>karman</i>, <i>m&aacute;y&aacute;</i>,
+and <i>rodha&#347;akti</i>. <i>Vindu</i> is described in Foulkes' translation of the
+&#346;iva-prak&aacute;&#347;a-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable
+<i>om</i>;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.
+From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit
+letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &amp;c., the bodily, intellectual, and
+external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual
+knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have
+been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after
+these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be
+enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious
+deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the
+abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the
+abode of &#346;iva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union
+with him." <i>Vindu</i> is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,
+153 (cf. also Weber, <i>R&aacute;mat&aacute;pany&iacute;a Up</i>. pp. 312-315).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> Some forced derivation seems here intended as of <i>p&aacute;&#347;a</i>
+from <i>pa&#347;ch&aacute;t</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> In p. 90, line 2, read <i>s&aacute; k&aacute;rye&#7751;a</i>.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Other M&aacute;he&#347;varas are dissatisfied with the views set out in the &#346;aiva
+system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things
+causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating
+spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the
+construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)
+is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this
+Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several
+cognitions and <i>cognita</i>, who is identical with the transcendent self
+posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by
+revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of
+witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives
+manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a>
+as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon
+recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the
+highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest
+trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,
+suppression of the breath, and the like, these M&aacute;he&#347;varas set forth
+the system of recognition (<i>pratyabhij&ntilde;&aacute;</i>). The extent of this system
+is thus described by one of their authorities&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two
+explications, the greater and the less,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The five topics, and the expositions,&mdash;such is the system
+of recognition."</p></div>
+
+<p>The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of
+Mahe&#347;vara, and wishing also to help mankind,</p>
+
+<p>"I set forth the recognition of Mahe&#347;vara, as the method of
+attaining all felicity."</p></div>
+
+<p>[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus
+feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached,"
+having fully attained, this condition, having made it the
+unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which
+has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:
+otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.</p>
+
+<p>Mahe&#347;vara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,
+beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence
+Vish&#7751;u, Viri&ntilde;chi, and other deities are deities, who, though they
+transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite
+illusion.</p>
+
+<p>The condition of being a slave to Mahe&#347;vara is the being a recipient
+of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the
+divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things
+according to his will and pleasure (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>d&aacute;sya</i>, from <i>d&aacute;</i>).</p>
+
+<p>The word <i>mankind</i> imports that there is no restriction of the
+doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom
+this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest
+reward, the emanatory <i>principium</i> itself operating to the highest end
+of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the
+&#346;iva-d&#7771;ish&#7789;i by that supreme guide the revered Som&aacute;nandan&aacute;tha&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When once the nature of &#346;iva that resides in all things
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span>has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof
+or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,</p>
+
+<p>"There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further
+reflection. When he knows Suvar&#7751;a (or &#346;iva) a man may cease
+to act and to reflect."</p></div>
+
+<p>The word <i>also</i> excludes the supposition that there is room in self
+which has recognised the nature of Mahe&#347;vara, and which manifests to
+itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,
+for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of
+others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a
+motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man
+that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a
+regard for others. Thus Akshap&aacute;da (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive
+is that object towards which a man energises.</p>
+
+<p>The preposition <i>upa</i> in <i>upap&aacute;dayami</i> (I set forth) indicates
+proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.</p>
+
+<p>Hence the word <i>all</i> in the phrase <i>the method of attaining all
+felicities</i>. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all
+felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a
+man acquired the mountain Roha&#7751;a (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all
+the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what
+else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpal&aacute;ch&aacute;rya says&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of
+devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"</p></div>
+
+<p>We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words <i>the method
+of attaining all felicities</i>, on the supposition that the compound
+term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a
+Bahuvr&iacute;hi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Mahe&#347;vara, the
+knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full
+attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> external
+and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the
+language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an
+object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the
+same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in
+this system,&mdash;there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the
+accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from
+argumentation,&mdash;there arises in relation to my presented personal self
+the cognition that I am that very God,&mdash;in virtue of my recollection
+of the powers of that God.</p>
+
+<p>This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I
+establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it
+convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism
+of the Recognitive Institutes.]</p>
+
+<p>Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial
+with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The
+answer is this:&mdash;The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the
+soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and
+therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence
+of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the
+recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and
+active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as
+total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight
+the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This
+self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;
+for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he
+is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,
+therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here
+employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of
+things, the teaching of the Naiy&aacute;yikas may be accepted. It has thus
+been said by the son of Uday&aacute;kara&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that
+self-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span>active and cognitive is Mahe&#347;vara the primal being?</p>
+
+<p>"Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the
+powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and
+imperfectly discerned."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The continuance of all living creatures in this
+transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory
+<i>involucrum</i>; knowledge and action are accounted the life of
+living creatures.</p>
+
+<p>"Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action
+(or ritual), which is best at K&aacute;&#347;i,</p>
+
+<p>"Is indicated by others also: different from these is real
+knowledge."</p></div>
+
+<p>And also&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those
+things:</p>
+
+<p>"The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge
+without succession, is Mahe&#347;vara."</p></div>
+
+<p>Som&aacute;nandan&aacute;tha also says&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He always knows by identity with &#346;iva: he always knows by
+identity with the real."</p></div>
+
+<p>Again at the end of the section on knowledge&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Unless there were this unity with &#346;iva, cognitions could
+not exist as facts of daily life:</p>
+
+<p>"Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the
+one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).</p>
+
+<p>"He is Mahe&#347;vara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken
+continuity of objects:</p>
+
+<p>"Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the
+deity."</p></div>
+
+<p>The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:&mdash;The text, "After
+that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that
+shines diversely this <span class="smcap">All</span>," teaches that God illumines the whole round
+of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the
+diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span> which
+irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises
+from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,
+God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all
+limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,
+self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the &#346;aiva
+aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are
+Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective
+Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This
+self-same existing self is knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Som&aacute;nandan&aacute;tha cited
+above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of
+these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy
+constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory
+experience. This is described in the section on activity&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,
+through the efficacy of his will: this activity is
+creativeness."</p></div>
+
+<p>And at the close of the same section&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world
+under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his
+activity worked out by motive and agent.</p>
+
+<p>"This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be
+that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,
+insentient things."</p></div>
+
+<p>According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the
+insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of
+Mahe&#347;vara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands
+of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or
+that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in
+the series of transmigratory environments,&mdash;his mere will is his
+progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his
+universal creativeness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the
+following illustration&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The tree or jar produced by the mere will of
+thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to
+serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."</p></div>
+
+<p>If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the
+jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of
+the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of
+clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition
+of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact
+notorious to all the world that <i>different</i> things must emanate from
+different materials.</p>
+
+<p>As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without
+materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he
+does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:
+they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation
+of the causal relation, <i>all</i> the co-efficients, without exception,
+must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the
+potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a
+body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the
+successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the
+genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the
+thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mah&aacute;deva,
+amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the
+Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus
+operates. Thus it is that Vasugupt&aacute;ch&aacute;rya says&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without
+appliances, without a wall to paint it on,&mdash;to him be glory, to him
+resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."</p>
+
+<p>It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span> than God, how
+comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The
+answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates
+through the fatality of works:</p>
+
+<p>"Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,
+he is enfranchised."</p></div>
+
+<p>It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what
+difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated
+in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this
+question is given in a section of the Tattv&aacute;rtha-Sa&#7749;graha&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical
+with itself, like Mahe&#347;vara free from bondage: the other (or
+unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."</p></div>
+
+<p>An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the
+soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if
+all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate
+because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the
+recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to
+the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two
+degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in
+developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines
+felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the
+conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such
+recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In
+the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the
+power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the
+attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting
+in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the
+essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.</p>
+
+<p>It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious
+self is observed independent of recognition.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> To this it is replied: A
+certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular
+gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated
+by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote
+to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to
+her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities
+she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and
+she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she
+recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them
+out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self
+be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation
+effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of
+those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director
+to recognise in itself the perfections of Mahe&#347;vara, his omniscience,
+omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of
+being.</p>
+
+<p>It is therefore said in the fourth section&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as
+like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he
+humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:
+In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be
+the universal soul, in which there is no perfection
+unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and
+therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."</p></div>
+
+<p>This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other
+teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we
+cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become
+too prolix. This then may suffice.<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> Read <i>bh&aacute;v&aacute;n</i> for <i>bh&aacute;v&aacute;t</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 113. M&aacute;dhava here condenses Abhinava
+Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the
+eleventh century (see B&uuml;hler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the &#346;iva
+s&uacute;tras by Utpala, the son of Uday&aacute;kara (cf. pp. 130, 131).&mdash;E. B. C.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE RASE&#346;VARA-DAR&#346;ANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></h2>
+
+
+<p>Other M&aacute;he&#347;varas there are who, while they hold the identity of self
+with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life
+taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily
+frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver
+as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called <i>p&aacute;rada</i>,
+because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of
+transmigratory states. Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called
+<i>p&aacute;rada</i>."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again in the Ras&aacute;r&#7751;ava&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is styled <i>p&aacute;rada</i> because it is employed for the
+highest end by the best votaries.</p>
+
+<p>"Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from
+my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called
+<i>rasa</i>."</p></div>
+
+<p>It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is
+incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another
+manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in
+the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this
+there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it
+free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the
+death of the body.</p>
+
+<p>"Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an
+emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of
+mercury and of medicaments."</p></div>
+
+<p>Govinda-bhagavat also says&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are
+not permanent, one should strive</p>
+
+<p>"After emancipation; but emancipation results from
+knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible
+in a healthy body."</p></div>
+
+<p>The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its
+permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the
+body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is
+dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaur&iacute; under the names
+of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the
+Rasah&#7771;idaya&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new
+body, the creation of Hara and Gaur&iacute;,</p>
+
+<p>"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose
+service is the aggregate of magic texts."</p></div>
+
+<p>The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should
+first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is
+produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaur&iacute;, and mica is
+produced from Gaur&iacute;, mercury and mica are severally identified with
+Hara and Gaur&iacute; in the verse&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;</p>
+
+<p>"The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of
+death and poverty."</p></div>
+
+<p>This is very little to say about the matter. In the
+Rase&#347;vara-siddh&aacute;nta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and
+mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by
+acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Certain of the gods, Mahe&#347;a and others; certain Daityas,
+&#346;ukra and others;</p>
+
+<p>"Certain Munis, the B&aacute;lakhilyas and others; certain kings,
+Some&#347;vara and others;</p>
+
+<p>"Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-n&aacute;yaka,</p>
+
+<p>"Charva&#7789;i, Kapila, Vy&aacute;li, K&aacute;p&aacute;li, Kandal&aacute;yana,</p>
+
+<p>"These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while
+alive,</p>
+
+<p>"Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith
+identified."</p></div>
+
+<p>The meaning of this, as explicated by Parame&#347;vara to Parame&#347;var&iacute;, is
+as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,
+the preservation of the body;</p>
+
+<p>"And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and
+air,</p>
+
+<p>"Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they
+restore to life,</p>
+
+<p>"Bound they give the power of flying about."</p></div>
+
+<p>The swooning state of mercury is thus described&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,
+as characterised thus&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.</p>
+
+<p>"A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the
+following marks are seen&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."</p></div>
+
+<p>The bound condition is described in another place as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The character of bound quicksilver is that it is&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it
+parts asunder under friction."</p></div>
+
+<p>Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaur&iacute; were
+proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but
+how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as
+that <i>can</i> be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is
+stated by the authorities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully
+discriminated,</p>
+
+<p>"In the first place, as pure in every process, for
+perfecting the adepts."</p></div>
+
+<p>And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,
+restraining,</p>
+
+<p>"Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,
+covering,</p>
+
+<p>"Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and
+pouring,</p>
+
+<p>"And eating it by parting and piercing it,&mdash;are the eighteen
+modes of treating quicksilver."</p></div>
+
+<p>These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,
+Sarvaj&ntilde;a-r&aacute;me&#347;vara and the other ancient authorities, and are here
+omitted to avoid prolixity.</p>
+
+<p>The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of
+the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,
+a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the
+Ras&aacute;r&#7751;ava&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the
+blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it
+attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),
+quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This
+makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try
+it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."</p>
+
+<p>It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a
+celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the
+self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,
+and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being
+inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the
+Rasah&#7771;idaya&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems
+in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,</p>
+
+<p>"Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings
+whose bodies are unglorified?</p>
+
+<p>"He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from
+cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,</p>
+
+<p>"He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities
+of the cognitive organs are obstructed.</p>
+
+<p>"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the
+enjoyment of sensual pleasures,</p>
+
+<p>"An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain
+to emancipation?"</p></div>
+
+<p>Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass
+through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be
+extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two
+mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The
+objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following
+dilemmatic argument:&mdash;Is this extrication, as to the nature of which
+all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or
+as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is
+cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive
+cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddh&aacute;nta&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the
+mercurial system, O subtile thinker.</p>
+
+<p>"In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity
+of argument,</p>
+
+<p>"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all
+sacred texts;</p>
+
+<p>"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore
+there is and must be life."</p></div>
+
+<p>And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents
+of the doctrine of Vish&#7751;u-sv&aacute;min maintain the eternity of the body of
+Vish&#7751;u half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the S&aacute;k&aacute;ra-siddhi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vish&#7751;u-sv&aacute;min,</p>
+
+<p>"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and
+inconceivably perfect beatitude."</p></div>
+
+<p>If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which
+appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real
+existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be
+otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of
+proof: (1.) by the intuition of &#346;anaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts
+such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Pur&aacute;&#7751;ic texts such
+as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the
+conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other
+like predicates are affirmed also by &#346;r&iacute;k&aacute;nta-mi&#347;ra, the devoted
+adherent of Vish&#7751;u-sv&aacute;min. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest
+end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which
+we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus
+been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,
+immortal,</p>
+
+<p>"The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,
+pleasure, liberation?"</p></div>
+
+<p>It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as
+it is said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying
+and imperishable."</p></div>
+
+<p>Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by
+seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Ras&aacute;r&#7751;ava&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from
+merely remembering it,</p>
+
+<p>"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,
+appear its six virtues.</p>
+
+<p>"Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from
+seeing all the phallic emblems</p>
+
+<p>"On earth, those at Ked&aacute;ra, and all others whatsoever."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In another place we read&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific
+than the worship of all the phallic emblems at K&aacute;&#347;i and
+elsewhere,</p>
+
+<p>"Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,
+exemption from decay, and immortality."</p></div>
+
+<p>The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged
+should recall quicksilver to mind.</p>
+
+<p>"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his
+blasphemy for ever filled with sin."</p></div>
+
+<p>The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes
+place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the
+practice of union (&#7957;&#957;&#969;&#963;&#953;&#962; after the acquisition of a divine
+body in the manner we have described. Thereafter&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain
+men of holy vision,</p>
+
+<p>"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the
+universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:</p>
+
+<p>"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof
+is luminousness, undifferenced,</p>
+
+<p>"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,
+tranquil, self-recognised:</p>
+
+<p>"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole
+universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,</p>
+
+<p>"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his
+bondage to works annulled."</p></div>
+
+<p>A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained
+this he becomes beatitude.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of
+passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we
+have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the
+supreme self&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from
+dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those
+that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,</p>
+
+<p>"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the
+soul awakes,</p>
+
+<p>"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines
+forth by itself from itself."</p></div>
+
+<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yog&iacute;s in Colonel
+Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. <i>P&aacute;rada-p&aacute;na</i> is one of the practices of
+the Siddhop&aacute;sakas in the &#346;a&#7749;kara-digvijaya, &sect; 49, to obviate
+<i>apam&#7771;ityu</i>, <i>ak&aacute;lam&#7771;ityu</i>, &amp;c.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE VAI&#346;ESHIKA OR AUL&Uacute;KYA DAR&#346;ANA.<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></h2>
+
+
+<p>Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by
+the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be
+essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to
+know the means of such escape,&mdash;learns that the knowledge of the
+Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such
+passages as these (<i>&#346;vet&aacute;&#347;vatara Upan</i>. vi. 20)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,</p>
+
+<p>"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of
+&#346;iva."</p></div>
+
+<p>Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing
+(<i>&#347;rava&#7751;a</i>), thought (<i>manana</i>), and reflection (<i>bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>), as it has
+been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated
+meditation,&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the
+highest union (<i>yoga</i>)."</p></div>
+
+<p>Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the
+knowledge of the <i>vy&aacute;pti</i> (or universal proposition), and the
+knowledge of the <i>vy&aacute;pti</i> follows the right understanding of the
+categories,&mdash;hence the saint Ka&#7751;&aacute;da<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> establishes the six
+categories in his tenfold <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span>treatise, commencing with the words, "Now,
+therefore, we shall explain duty."</p>
+
+<p>In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all
+the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first
+<i>&aacute;hnika</i> he defines those which possess "genus" (<i>j&aacute;ti</i>), in the
+second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the
+similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the
+first <i>&aacute;hnika</i> the characteristics of the five elements, and in the
+second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third
+book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the
+first <i>&aacute;hnika</i>, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he
+discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first <i>&aacute;hnika</i>,
+and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates
+action; in the first <i>&aacute;hnika</i> he considers action as connected with
+the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he
+examines merit and demerit as revealed in &#346;ruti; in the first <i>&aacute;hnika</i>
+he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &amp;c., in the second
+the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book
+he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first <i>&aacute;hnika</i> he
+considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those
+qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the
+eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception,
+and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics
+of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of
+inference.<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p>
+
+<p>The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"
+"definition," and "investigation."<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> "But," it may be objected,
+"ought we not to include 'division,' <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span>and so make the method fourfold,
+not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really
+included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare
+that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and
+intimate relation are the only six positive categories,&mdash;this is an
+example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this
+definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:&mdash;Since
+"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the
+categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in
+its generic character in all substances [though different substances
+have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with
+"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> then
+"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"
+inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> lastly, "intimate
+relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.</p>
+
+<p>If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since
+'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of
+the six as positive categories, <i>i.e.</i>, as being the objects of
+conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the
+objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only
+six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the
+thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it
+is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,
+if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends
+his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite
+number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we
+cannot admit; if darkness, &amp;c., are allowed to form certainly a
+seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite
+number) deny it to be one of the six <i>positive</i> categories,&mdash;and if
+others attempt to include <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span>"capacity," "number," &amp;c., which we allow
+to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a
+<i>seventh</i> category. But enough of this long discussion.</p>
+
+<p>Substantiality, &amp;c. (<i>dravyatv&aacute;di</i>), <i>i.e.</i>, the genera of substance,
+quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,
+quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (<i>dravyatva</i>)
+is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the
+(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> and
+does not exist with intimate relation in smell.<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p>
+
+<p>The genus of quality (<i>gu&#7751;atva</i>) is that which is immediately
+subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation
+in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> The genus of
+action (<i>karmatva</i>) is that which is immediately subordinate to the
+genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything
+eternal.<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Generality (or genus, <i>s&aacute;m&aacute;nya</i>) is that which is found
+in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the
+counter-entity to emergent non-existence.<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> Particularity<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a>
+(<i>vi&#347;esha</i>) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>of
+generality, which stops mutual non-existence.<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> Intimate relation
+(<i>samav&aacute;ya</i>) is that connection which itself has not intimate
+relation.<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> Such are the definitions of the six categories.</p>
+
+<p>Substance is ninefold,&mdash;earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,
+soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &amp;c. (<i>p&#7771;ithiv&iacute;tva</i>), are the
+definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality
+which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same
+subject with colour produced by baking.<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p>
+
+<p>The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and
+sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon
+and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to
+substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the
+skin.<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p>
+
+<p>As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be
+subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their
+technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is
+found in the same subject with the non-eternal (<i>janya</i>) special
+quality which is not produced by contact.<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p>
+
+<p>Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the
+mediate cause<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> of that idea of remoteness <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span>(<i>paratva</i>) which is
+not found with intimate relation in space;<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a> while space is that
+pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is
+not time.<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> The general terms <i>&aacute;tmatva</i> and <i>manastva</i> are the
+respective definitions of soul (<i>&aacute;tman</i>) and mind (<i>manas</i>). The
+general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being
+also found with intimate relation in that which is without form<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a>
+(<i>am&uacute;rtta</i>). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to
+substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an
+atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any
+substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned
+directly in Ka&#7751;&aacute;da's S&uacute;tras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch,
+number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,
+proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
+effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word
+"<i>and</i>," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,
+and sound. Their respective genera (<i>r&uacute;patva</i>, &amp;c.) are their several
+definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is
+subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In
+the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.</p>
+
+<p>"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing
+upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:
+revolution, evacuating, &amp;c., being included under "going." The genus
+of throwing upwards, &amp;c., will be their respective definitions. The
+genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists
+with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of
+conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the
+definitions of throwing downwards, &amp;c. Generality (or genus) is
+twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found
+with intimate connection in substance and quality, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span>or in quality and
+action; substance, &amp;c., are non-extensive. The definition of
+generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation
+cannot be divided,&mdash;in the former case in consequence of the infinite
+number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate
+relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.</p>
+
+<p>There is a popular proverb&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by
+disjunction,&mdash;he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true
+Vai&#347;eshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the
+production of duality, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;
+thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the
+distinguishing perception <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> [by which we apprehend "this
+is one," "this is one," &amp;c.]; then the production of duality, <i>dvitva</i>
+(in the object);<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> then the knowledge of the abstract genus of
+duality (<i>dvitvatva</i>); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it
+exists in the two things; then imagination<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> (<i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra</i>).<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p>
+
+<p>But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &amp;c., being thus
+produced from <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i>? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained
+that <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> must be the producer of duality, &amp;c., because
+duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we
+cannot hold <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> as the cause only of its being known [and
+therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being
+produced<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a>], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,
+maintain the same opinion by a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span>different argument; duality, &amp;c.,
+cannot be held to be made known (<i>j&ntilde;&aacute;pya</i>) by that non-eternal
+apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (<i>i.e.</i>,
+<i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i>), because these are qualities which reside in a
+plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>] just as
+"severalty" does [and, therefore, as <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> is not their
+<i>j&ntilde;&aacute;paka</i>, it must be their <i>janaka</i>].</p>
+
+<p>Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From
+<i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> arises, simultaneously with the production of duality
+(<i>dvitva</i>), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;
+next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (<i>dvitvatva</i>) arises,
+simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the
+destruction of <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i>; next from the destruction of
+<i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two
+substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of
+the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of
+imagination (<i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra</i>), the destruction of the knowledge of the
+quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the
+knowledge of the substances.</p>
+
+<p>The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,
+and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be
+found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are
+the subjects of the discussion <i>are</i> successively destroyed by the
+rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a
+special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary
+duration.<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of
+the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two
+things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span>to
+the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the
+subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its
+abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate
+action taking place simultaneously with the rise of <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i>,
+there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united
+influence of both.<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p>
+
+<p><i>Apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> is to be considered as that operation of the mind
+which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (<i>i.e.</i>,
+destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span></p><p>Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the
+destruction of the compound of two atoms (the <i>dvya&#7751;uka</i>), another
+compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &amp;c. In the course of
+this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,
+the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of
+steps commencing with the contact of fire;<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> secondly, from the
+conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,
+&amp;c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire
+arises the production of red, &amp;c., in the atom; fourthly, from
+conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> in the
+atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is
+produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,
+there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that
+former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another
+atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;
+ninthly, from the qualities, &amp;c., of the causes (<i>i.e.</i>, the atoms)
+are produced colour, &amp;c., the qualities of the effect (<i>i.e.</i>, the
+<i>dvya&#7751;uka</i>). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The
+other two series,<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,
+are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if
+we hold (with the Vai&#347;eshikas) that the baking process takes place in
+the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span>atoms of the jar.<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> The Naiy&aacute;yikas, however, maintain that the
+baking process takes place in the jar.</p>
+
+<p>"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,&mdash;that produced by
+the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that
+produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause
+[<i>i.e.</i>, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.</p>
+
+<p>It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the
+[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect
+[<i>i.e.</i>, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a
+disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a
+disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,
+again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied
+by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary
+with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke
+without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking
+in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a>
+without there having previously been the origination of that
+disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot
+was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts
+produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the
+disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one
+part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which
+had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction
+of the pot, according to the principle, <i>cessante caus&acirc; cessat
+effectus</i>. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span>resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes
+of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the
+pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,
+initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a
+disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the
+pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to
+produce it.<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p>
+
+<p>But the second kind is as follows:&mdash;As action which arises in the
+hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,
+initiates a disjunction<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> from the points of space in which the
+original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the
+intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand
+produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates
+also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and
+the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]
+and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and
+the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of
+the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second
+disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the
+body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the
+action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing
+in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of
+disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we
+must accept the view&mdash;that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause
+and the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span>non-cause<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> which causes the second disjunction of the
+body and the points of space.</p>
+
+<p>But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.
+147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &amp;c., is surely
+unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different
+opinions maintained on this point,&mdash;thus (<i>a.</i>) the Bh&aacute;&#7789;&#7789;a M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas
+and the Ved&aacute;ntins hold that darkness is a substance; (<i>b.</i>) &#346;r&iacute;dhara
+&Aacute;ch&aacute;rya<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus
+darkness will be a quality]; (<i>c.</i>) some of the Pr&aacute;bh&aacute;kara M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas
+hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (<i>d.</i>) the
+Naiy&aacute;yikas, &amp;c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we
+assert that as for the first alleged opinion (<i>a.</i>) it is quite out of
+the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible
+alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of
+the nine well-known substances, earth, &amp;c.,<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> or some different
+one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one
+you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should
+certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that
+it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself
+destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the
+very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of
+qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different
+substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that
+darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed
+of the dark blue of the tam&aacute;la blossom?" We reply, that this is merely
+an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But
+enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> (<i>b.</i>) Hence it
+follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since
+you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some
+substratum <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span>to receive it;<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> and again, we cannot conceive the eye
+as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,
+the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression
+independent of the eye [<i>i.e.</i>, produced by the internal sense, mind],
+because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an
+indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain
+that "absence or non-existence (<i>abh&aacute;va</i><a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a>) is incapable of being
+expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we <i>do</i> use
+such phrases as <i>tenebr&aelig; oriuntur</i>, darkness cannot be a mere
+non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would
+include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,
+destruction, inattention,<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> &amp;c. [and yet we all know that men do
+speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all
+are cases of <i>abh&aacute;va</i>]. (<i>c.</i>) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of
+the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ
+which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
+would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is
+the mind which perceives cognitions].<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Hence we conclude that the
+fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness
+is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
+very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the
+qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness <i>is</i>
+attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is
+connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert
+that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced
+by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
+object possessing colour,<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> as we see in the case of a jar's
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that
+on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on
+to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no
+dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend
+thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
+that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates
+the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and <i>this</i> will
+require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we
+cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is
+necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,
+else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is
+implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> Hence,
+having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Ka&#7751;&aacute;da
+uttered his aphorism [as an <i>ipse dixit</i> to settle the question]:
+"<i>Dravya-gu&#7751;a-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmy&aacute;d abh&aacute;vas tamas</i>" (<i>Vai&#347;.
+S&uacute;t.</i> v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is
+dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."
+The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness
+is perceived by the eye<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> [without light, whereas all substances,
+if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the
+eye to be visible].</p>
+
+<p>Non-existence (<i>abh&aacute;va</i>) is considered to be the seventh category, as
+established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that
+which, itself not having intimate relation, is <i>not</i> intimate
+relation;<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> and
+"reciprocal non-existence."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span></p><p>The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and
+"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without
+any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though
+having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence
+which abides in its own counter-entity;<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> "reciprocal
+non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet
+no defined limit [<i>i.e.</i>, no <i>terminus ad quem</i> nor <i>terminus a quo</i>,
+as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].</p>
+
+<p>If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really
+the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to
+lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence"
+is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is
+not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose
+opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> Nor
+need you here raise the objection that "<i>abh&aacute;va</i> can never be a means
+of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his <i>summum
+bonum</i>, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for
+the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the
+category of <i>abh&aacute;va</i>].</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> The Vai&#347;eshikas are called Aul&uacute;ky&aacute;&#7717; in Hemachandra's
+<i>Abhidh&aacute;na-chint&aacute;ma&#7751;i</i>; in the V&aacute;yu-pur&aacute;&#7751;a (quoted in Aufrecht's
+<i>Catal</i>. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshap&aacute;da, Ka&#7751;&aacute;da, Ul&uacute;ka, and Vatsa are
+called the sons of &#346;iva.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> He is here called by his synonym Ka&#7751;abhaksha.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book
+treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,
+&amp;c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the
+qualities of the soul, and the three causes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> For this extract from the old <i>bh&aacute;shya</i> of V&aacute;tsy&aacute;yana,
+see Colebrooke's <i>Essays</i> (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> Cf. <i>Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-parichchheda</i>, &#347;loka 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> "Particularity" (<i>vi&#347;esha</i>) resides by "intimate
+relation" in the eternal atoms, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would
+apply to "duality" and "conjunction."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply
+to "existence" (<i>satt&aacute;</i>), which is the <i>summum genus</i>, to which
+substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> Existence (<i>satt&aacute;</i>) is the genus of <i>dravya</i>, <i>gu&#7751;a</i>,
+and <i>kriy&acirc;</i>. <i>Dravya</i> alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and
+all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and
+disjunction. <i>Some</i> qualities (as <i>sa&#7747;yoga</i>, <i>r&uacute;pa</i>, &amp;c.) may be
+mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the
+essence of <i>gu&#7751;a</i>, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> As all karmas are transitory, <i>karmatva</i> is only found
+in the <i>anitya</i>. I correct in p. 105, line 20, <i>nity&aacute;-samavetatva</i>;
+this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College
+Library.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,
+however, is found in time, space, &amp;c.; to exclude these, therefore,
+the former clause of the definition is added.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> "Particularity" (whence the name Vai&#347;eshika) is not
+"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"&mdash;but it is
+the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being
+single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different
+atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,
+water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the <i>ne plus
+ultra</i>, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own
+indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated <i>vi&#347;esha</i> as "ultimate
+difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has <i>vi&#347;esha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> Mutual non-existence (<i>anyony&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>) exists between
+two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;"
+but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> "<i>Samav&aacute;yasamband&aacute;bh&aacute;v&aacute;t samav&aacute;yo na j&aacute;ti&#7717;</i>," Siddh.
+Mukt. (<i>Sa&#7747;yoga</i> being a <i>gu&#7751;a</i> has <i>gu&#7751;atva</i> existing in it with
+intimate relation).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot
+nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union
+with fire" (Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-parichchheda, <i>sl.</i> 103, 104).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> The organ of touch is an a&euml;rial
+integument.&mdash;<i>Colebrooke.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> Sound is twofold,&mdash;"produced from contact," as the
+<i>first</i> sound, and "produced from sound," as the <i>second</i>. <i>Janya</i> is
+added to exclude God's knowledge, while <i>sa&#7747;yog&aacute;janya</i> excludes the
+soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind
+and the senses, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time
+with some body, &amp;c., existing in time,&mdash;this latter is the intimate
+cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the
+instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read <i>adhikara&#7751;a&#7747;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> <i>Paratva</i> being of two kinds, <i>dai&#347;ika</i> and <i>k&aacute;lika</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the
+last, however, is not pervading but atomic.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> The three other <i>pad&aacute;rthas</i>, beside soul, which are
+<i>am&uacute;rtta</i>,&mdash;time, ether, and space,&mdash;are not genera.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,
+<i>i.e.</i>, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things
+themselves&mdash;each being <i>one</i>; and they only become two, &amp;c., by our
+choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> <i>Sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra</i> is here the idea conceived by the
+mind&mdash;created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material
+previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or
+mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the
+original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> Every cause must be either <i>j&ntilde;&aacute;paka</i> or <i>janaka</i>;
+<i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i>, not being the former, must be the latter.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> <i>Apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> apprehends "this is one," "this is
+one," &amp;c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of
+these, but in <i>both</i> together.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> The Vai&#347;eshikas held that the j&iacute;v&aacute;tman and space are
+each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each
+have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is
+ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion
+has not. Dr. R&ouml;er, in his version of the Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-Parichchheda, has
+mistranslated an important S&uacute;tra which bears on this point. It is said
+in S&uacute;tra 26&mdash;
+</p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p><i>&mdash;&mdash;ath&aacute;k&aacute;&#347;a&#347;ar&iacute;ri&#7751;am, avy&aacute;pyav&#7771;itti&#7717; ksha&#7751;iko vi&#347;esha-gu&#7751;a
+ishyate,</i></p></div>
+<p>
+which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are
+limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special
+qualities of ether and soul (<i>i.e.</i>, sound, knowledge, &amp;c.) are
+limited to different portions and of momentary duration."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> The author here mentions two other causes of the
+destruction of <i>dvitva</i> besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14
+(<i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi-n&aacute;&#347;a</i>), viz., <i>&aacute;&#347;rayan&aacute;&#347;a</i>, and the united action of
+<i>both</i>:&mdash;
+</p>
+<table summary="Vaiseshika">
+  <tr>
+    <td>1.</td>
+    <td>Ekatva-j&ntilde;&aacute;na</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-kriy&aacute;</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>.......</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>2.</td>
+    <td> Apeksh&aacute;buddhi </td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-vibh&aacute;ga </td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-kriy&aacute;.</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>3.</td>
+    <td> Dvitvotpatti and akatva-j&ntilde;&aacute;na-n&aacute;&#347;a</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-sa&#7747;yoga-n&aacute;&#347;a</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-vibh&aacute;ga.</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>4.</td>
+    <td>Dvitvatvaj&ntilde;&aacute;na </td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Dvitv&aacute;dh&aacute;rasya (<i>i.e.</i>,&nbsp; avayavina&#7717;) n&aacute;&#347;a&#7717;</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Avayava-sa&#7747;yoga-n&aacute;&#347;a.</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>5.</td>
+    <td>Dvitvagu&#7751;a-buddhi and&nbsp;apeksh&aacute;buddhi-n&aacute;&#347;a</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Dvitva-n&aacute;&#347;a (<i>i.e.</i>,&nbsp; of avayavin).</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>&Aacute;dh&aacute;ra-n&aacute;&#347;a (of avayavin).</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>6.</td>
+    <td>Dvitva-n&aacute;&#347;a  and dravya-buddhi&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>.......</td>
+    <td>|</td>
+    <td>Dvitva-n&aacute;&#347;a.</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+<p>
+The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the
+course of the six steps of <i>ekatvaj&ntilde;&aacute;na</i>, &amp;c., one of the two parts is
+itself divided either at the <i>first</i> or the <i>second</i> moment. In the
+first case, the <i>dvitva</i> of the whole is destroyed in the fifth
+moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding
+<i>dvitv&aacute;dh&aacute;ra-n&aacute;&#347;a</i>, or, as M&aacute;dhava calls it, <i>&aacute;&#347;rayaniv&#7771;itti</i>. In the
+second case, the <i>n&aacute;&#347;a</i> arrives at the same moment simultaneously by
+both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united
+action of two causes, <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi-n&aacute;&#347;a</i> and <i>&aacute;dh&aacute;ra-n&aacute;&#347;a</i>. Any
+<i>kriy&aacute;</i> which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would
+be unimportant, as the <i>n&aacute;&#347;a</i> of the <i>dvitva</i> of the whole would take
+place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and
+in this way it would be too late to affect that result.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, from the destruction of <i>apeksh&aacute;buddhi</i> follows
+the destruction of <i>dvitva</i>; but the other destructions previously
+described were followed by some production,&mdash;thus the knowledge of
+<i>dvitvatva</i> arose from the destruction of <i>ekatvaj&ntilde;&aacute;na</i>, &amp;c. (cf.
+Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the
+counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in
+the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;
+thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black
+(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two
+atoms.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, a kind of initiative tendency.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> These are explained at full length in the Siddh&aacute;nta
+Mukt&aacute;val&iacute;, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have&mdash;1. the
+destruction of the <i>dvya&#7751;uka</i> and simultaneously a disjunction from
+the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the
+destruction of the black colour in the <i>dvya&#7751;uka</i>, and the
+simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the <i>dvya&#7751;uka</i> with
+that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the
+simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the
+action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The
+remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> The Vai&#347;eshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old
+black jar is <i>destroyed</i>, its several compounds of two atoms, &amp;c.,
+being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour
+in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,
+eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps
+prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of
+the Ny&aacute;ya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different
+compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the
+old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes
+not the jar but its colour, &amp;c.,&mdash;it is still the same jar, only it is
+red, not black.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> In p. 109, line 14, I read
+<i>gaga&#7751;avibh&aacute;gakart&#7771;itvasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> The Siddh&aacute;nta Mukt&aacute;val&iacute;, p. 112, describes the series
+of steps:&mdash;1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the
+disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction
+which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.
+by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the
+severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction
+with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the
+cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second
+disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced
+by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the
+pot.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> The original has a plural <i>vibh&aacute;g&aacute;n</i>, <i>i.e.</i>,
+disjunctions from the several points.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the disjunction of the hand and the points of
+space.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute;.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> For <i>dravy&aacute;di</i> read <i>p&#7771;ithivy&aacute;di</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> I am not sure that it would not be better to read
+<i>viddhavevidhay&aacute;</i>, rewounding the wounded, instead of <i>v&#7771;iddhav&iacute;vadhay&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> Unless you <i>see</i> the rope you cannot mistake it for a
+serpent.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> In p. 110, last line, read <i>'bh&aacute;ve</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> Read in p. 110, last line, <i>anavadh&aacute;n&aacute;dishu</i>.
+<i>Vidhipratyaya</i> properly means an imperative or potential affix implying
+"command;" but the pandit takes <i>vidhi</i> here as <i>bh&aacute;vabodhaka-kriy&aacute;</i>. It
+has that meaning in K&aacute;vya-prak&aacute;&#347;a, V. (p. 114, l. 1).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> The mind perceives <i>&aacute;loka-j&ntilde;&aacute;na</i>, therefore it would
+perceive its absence, <i>i.e.</i>, darkness, but this last is perceived by
+the <i>eye</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a
+jar's absence in the dark.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation
+is the <i>dhva&#7747;s&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>, or "emergent non-existence."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> The reading <i>pratyayavedyatvena</i> seems supported by p.
+110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,
+therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read <i>pratyakshavedyatvena</i>, and
+would refer to the commentary (Vai&#347;. S&uacute;t. p. 250), "<i>yadi hi
+n&iacute;la-r&uacute;pavan n&iacute;la&#7747; r&uacute;pam eva v&aacute; tama&#7717; sy&aacute;t, v&aacute;hy&aacute;lokapragraham
+antare&#7751;a chakshush&aacute; na g&#7771;ihyeta</i>."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> "Relative non-existence" (<i>sa&#7747;sarg&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>) is the
+negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is
+"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent,"
+and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the
+jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the
+spot of ground,&mdash;it is the <i>j&aacute;ti gha&#7789;atva</i> which resides in the jar.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> The opposite is "there <i>is</i> colour in the air."</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE AKSHAP&Aacute;DA (OR NY&Aacute;YA) DAR&#346;ANA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The principle that final bliss, <i>i.e.</i>, the absolute abolition of
+pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
+sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
+particular tenet<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> of the Ny&aacute;ya school, as is declared by the
+author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
+proved, &amp;c.,&mdash;from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
+the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
+Ny&aacute;ya &#346;&aacute;stra. Now the Ny&aacute;ya &#346;&aacute;stra consists of five books, and each
+book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
+first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
+categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
+remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (<i>v&aacute;da</i>). In the first
+daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
+four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
+being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
+"presumption," &amp;c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
+already given [and therefore need not be added by the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas as
+separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
+examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
+second, "understanding" (<i>buddhi</i>), and "mind" (<i>manas</i>). In the first
+daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (<i>prav&#7771;itti</i>),
+the "faults," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>"transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
+"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> as to
+the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
+first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
+of futility (<i>j&aacute;ti</i>), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
+for rebuke" (<i>nigrahasth&aacute;na</i>, or "unfitness to be argued with").</p>
+
+<p>In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
+measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (<i>pram&aacute;&#7751;a</i>) is
+first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
+first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
+accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
+from the proper instruments [as the eye, &amp;c.], and from the site of
+knowledge [<i>i.e.</i>, the soul];<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> and this definition thus includes
+the peculiar tenet of the Ny&aacute;ya School that God is a source of right
+knowledge,<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
+(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
+knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
+that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
+And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
+the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
+chapter of the Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali:</p>
+
+<p>"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
+possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
+school, the being separated from all absence thereof.</p>
+
+<p>"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
+and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
+existing objects is contained,&mdash;all the chaff of our suspicion being
+swept away <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span>by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
+slightest want of observation in Him,&mdash;He, &#346;iva, is my authority; what
+have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
+with rising doubts?"</p>
+
+<p>"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
+analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
+right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
+objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
+fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
+is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
+possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
+therefore not distinctive,&mdash;or by its possessing only irrelevant
+qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
+particular point in question,<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a>&mdash;or by conflicting testimony. The
+thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
+motive" (<i>prayojana</i>); this is twofold, <i>i.e.</i>, visible and invisible.
+"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
+general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>
+A "tenet" (<i>siddh&aacute;nta</i>) is something which is accepted as being
+authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
+to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
+[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
+dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
+sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
+are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
+and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (<i>tarka</i>, i. 39) is the
+showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
+of a false major<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> (cf. S&uacute;t. i. 39, and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span>iv. 3); and this is of
+eleven kinds, as <i>vy&aacute;gh&aacute;ta</i>, <i>&aacute;tm&aacute;&#347;raya</i>, <i>itaretar&aacute;&#347;raya</i>, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>"Ascertainment" (<i>nir&#7751;aya</i>, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
+of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
+perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (<i>v&aacute;da</i>) is
+a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
+of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (<i>jalpa</i>) is the talk of a man only
+wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
+of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (<i>vita&#7751;d&aacute;</i>) is the talk of a man
+who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
+43). "Dialogue" (<i>kath&aacute;</i>) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
+disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
+prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
+"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
+or "mistimed" (S&uacute;t. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (<i>chhala</i>) is the bringing
+forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
+sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
+term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
+(<i>j&aacute;ti</i>) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
+twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Ny&aacute;ya
+aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
+his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
+described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
+here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
+prolix,&mdash;they are fully explained in the aphorisms.</p>
+
+<p>But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &amp;c.,
+are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
+of the Ny&aacute;ya &#346;&aacute;stra, [as reasoning, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>Ny&aacute;ya</i>, or logic,
+properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
+We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
+said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
+Ny&aacute;ya was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span> rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
+inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
+feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
+being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
+by Sarvaj&ntilde;a, "This is the pre-eminent science of Ny&aacute;ya from its
+establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
+action;"<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> and by Pakshila Sw&aacute;min, "This is the science of
+reasoning (<i>&aacute;nv&iacute;kshik&iacute;</i>) divided into the different categories,
+'proof,' &amp;c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
+actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
+the declarations of science."<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p>
+
+<p>But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
+arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
+ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
+"No," for it is said in the second Ny&aacute;ya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
+activity, faults, false notions,&mdash;on the successive annihilation of
+these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
+by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
+thinking the body, &amp;c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
+"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
+soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
+it,<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
+to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
+"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
+stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
+impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
+by the body he does injury, theft, &amp;c.; by the voice, falsehood, &amp;c.;
+by the mind, malevolence, &amp;c.; and this same sinful "activity"
+produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>his body,
+as alms, saving others, &amp;c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &amp;c.,
+by his voice, and guilelessness, &amp;c., by his mind; and this same right
+activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
+leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
+and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
+which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
+this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
+continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
+existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
+whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
+deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
+that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
+pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
+abolish the ignorance, &amp;c., which are the causes that produced
+it.<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
+knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
+knowledge divided into the four sciences,<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> there arises in his
+mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
+things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
+disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
+them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
+cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
+absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
+that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
+as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Ny&aacute;ya S&uacute;tras:
+"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,&mdash;since, on the
+successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span>the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
+them] final beatitude."</p>
+
+<p>"But is not your definition of the <i>summum bonum</i>, liberation, <i>i.e.</i>,
+'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
+as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> why then is this
+continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
+We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
+include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
+being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
+royal highway<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
+is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
+M&aacute;dhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
+soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
+the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
+being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &amp;c.,
+we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
+alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (<i>a.</i>) the continued
+succession of cognitions, or (<i>b.</i>) something different therefrom?
+(<i>a.</i>) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiy&aacute;yikas allow
+that cognition is evanescent,<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> and we do desire to abolish
+cognition as a cause of <i>prav&#7771;itti</i> or action<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a>], for who would
+oppose a view which makes for his own side? (<i>b.</i>) But if the latter,
+then, since it must be eternal,<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> its abolition is impossible; and,
+again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
+supposed "<i>summum bonum</i>;" for surely no sensible person would strive
+to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span>principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
+and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
+very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].</p>
+
+<p>"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
+intelligence [<i>i.e.</i>, the Yog&aacute;ch&aacute;ras and the Sautr&aacute;ntikas<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a>], that
+'the <i>summum bonum</i>' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
+the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
+there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
+the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
+if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
+contemplations<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
+as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
+things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
+they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
+irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
+recognition of the real nature of things.</p>
+
+<p>And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
+accompanied by the natural obstacles<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> is said to be "bound," and
+when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
+establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
+able to say that the very same being which <i>was</i> bound <i>is</i> now
+liberated.</p>
+
+<p>Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
+releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
+impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
+he means by "obstruction"?<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> If he answers "merit, demerit, and
+error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
+body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
+upspringing of the soul consequent on the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span>body's annihilation, as of
+a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
+said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
+parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
+definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
+parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
+of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> If you say that it has
+parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
+non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
+this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
+Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
+what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
+thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
+during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
+which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
+former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
+soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
+"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
+agent possessing form?<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p>
+
+<p>Again, if we take the Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka's view "that the only bondage is
+dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
+liberation,"&mdash;if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
+have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
+no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
+involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
+equalled.<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a></p>
+
+<p>Again, the S&aacute;nkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
+are utterly distinct, and then holds that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span>"liberation is the soul's
+remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
+withdrawn,"&mdash;even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
+pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
+the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
+nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
+the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
+that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
+it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
+Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
+then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
+spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
+the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.</p>
+
+<p>Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
+doctrine of Bha&#7789;&#7789;a Sarvaj&ntilde;a and his followers, that "Liberation is the
+manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
+but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
+come within the range of definite proof. If you allege &#346;ruti as the
+proof, we reply that &#346;ruti has no place when the thing itself is
+precluded by a valid non-perception;<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> or if you allow its
+authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
+as floating stones.<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p>
+
+<p>"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
+happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
+only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
+dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
+rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
+speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
+truth is that all happiness must <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span>be included under the category of
+pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
+pain, either as admitting of increase,<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> or as being an object of
+perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
+involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
+its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
+proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
+since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
+incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
+is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
+attempt to establish happiness as the <i>summum bonum</i>, since it is
+inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
+who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
+it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
+rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
+many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
+together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
+issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
+consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
+experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
+him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
+Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
+&#346;ruti, &amp;c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
+soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.</p>
+
+<p>But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
+of a Supreme Being, <i>i.e.</i>, perception, inference, or &#346;ruti? Certainly
+perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &amp;c.,
+must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
+universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> Nor
+can &#346;ruti, since neither of the resulting <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span>alternatives can be
+sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
+as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
+school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
+under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> As for
+comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
+sometimes called presumption, &amp;c.], they need not be thought of for a
+moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
+to the present case.<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
+unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
+excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
+once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &amp;c., must have had
+a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
+(<i>a.</i>) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
+rejected as unproved (<i>asiddha</i>), since it can be established beyond a
+doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
+to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
+with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
+first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
+ether,<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> &amp;c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
+much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
+which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
+therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
+holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
+of those substances which exist in intimate relation."<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> Or we may
+adopt another view and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span>maintain that it is easy to infer the
+"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
+possessing intermediate magnitude.<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
+(<i>viruddha</i>),<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a> since there is no such acknowledged universal
+proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
+to that in our syllogism [<i>i.e.</i>, that they must have had no maker].
+(<i>c.</i>) Nor is our middle term too general (<i>anaik&aacute;nta</i>), since it is never
+found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the <i>vipaksha</i> in
+the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (<i>d.</i>) Nor
+again is it precluded (<i>b&aacute;dhita</i> or <i>k&aacute;l&aacute;tyayopadish&#7789;a</i>), for there is no
+superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (<i>e.</i>) Nor is it
+counter-balanced (<i>sat-pratipakshita</i>), for there does not appear to be
+any such equally valid antagonist.</p>
+
+<p>If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
+&amp;c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
+produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"&mdash;this
+pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
+can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
+"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
+produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
+argument thus involves the fallacy called <i>vy&aacute;pyatv&aacute;siddhi</i>].<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> Nor
+can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
+cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
+the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span>smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
+to limitation by any suggested condition (<i>up&aacute;dhi</i>),<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> [such as
+"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
+"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
+valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
+&amp;c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
+acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
+that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
+of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
+involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
+the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
+and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
+causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
+the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
+of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
+these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
+doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
+There is a rule laid down by &#346;a&#7749;kara-ki&#7749;kara which applies directly to
+the present case&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
+establish its validity,</p>
+
+<p>"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
+account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
+major term."</p></div>
+
+<p>If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
+"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
+&amp;c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
+whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
+not.<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span></p><p>As has been said by Udayana &Aacute;ch&aacute;rya [in the Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, iii. 5]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"If &#346;ruti, &amp;c., have any authority, your negative argument
+fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
+objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
+ever."</p></div>
+
+<p>Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
+argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
+being known or unknown.<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p>
+
+<p>"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
+the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
+other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
+something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
+the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
+possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
+it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
+advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
+call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
+you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
+would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
+rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
+checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
+for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
+another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
+create the world." This has been said by Bha&#7789;&#7789;&aacute;ch&aacute;rya&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;</p>
+
+<p>"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
+be left undone by  Him?"&mdash;</p></div>
+
+<p>We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span>pleased for
+a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
+suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
+compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
+happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
+cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
+will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
+created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
+independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
+since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
+one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> and for this
+there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
+&#346;vet&aacute;&#347;vatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
+admits<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> not of a second," &amp;c. "But then how will you remedy your
+deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
+Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
+existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
+reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
+dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
+to their being produced or in regard to their being known?<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> It
+cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
+dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
+possibility of <i>His</i> being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
+being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
+Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
+can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
+for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span>any <i>yogin</i>
+endowed with the transcendent faculties (<i>t&iacute;vra</i>,<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> &amp;c.)</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
+duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
+obtained; thus everything is clear.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.</p>
+
+<p>We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or <i>hetv&aacute;bh&aacute;sas</i>
+of the modern Hindu logic (cf. <i>Siddh&aacute;ntamukt.</i>, &sect; 71, <i>Tarkasa&#7747;gr.</i>,
+55-67), viz., <i>anaik&aacute;nta</i>, <i>viruddha</i>, <i>asiddha</i>, <i>k&aacute;l&aacute;tyayopadish&#7789;a</i>
+or <i>b&aacute;dhita</i>, and <i>pratipakshita</i> or <i>sat-pratipaksha</i>. The four first
+of these generally correspond to the <i>savyabhich&aacute;ra</i> or "erratic,"
+<i>viruddha</i> or "contradictory," <i>s&aacute;dhyasama</i> or "unproved," and
+<i>at&iacute;tak&aacute;la</i> or "mistimed," <i>i.e.</i>, "precluded," as given in the list
+of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but <i>pratipakshita</i>
+corresponds imperfectly to <i>prakara&#7751;asama</i>. The <i>prakara&#7751;asama</i> or
+"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
+for both sides, as, <i>e.g.</i>, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
+is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
+"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
+authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
+difficulties as the original question, as, <i>e.g.</i>, "sound is
+non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
+this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
+question, "Is sound eternal?" But the <i>pratipakshita</i> reason is one
+which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
+eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
+is a product."</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> Cf. Ny&aacute;ya S&uacute;tras, i. 29.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
+<i>doshanimitta-tattva</i> for <i>doshanimittakatva</i> (compare Ny&aacute;ya S&uacute;t. iv.
+68).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> Without this last clause the definition might include
+the objects (<i>vishaya</i>), as these are, of course, connected with right
+knowledge.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> &Iacute;&#347;vara is a cause of right knowledge (<i>pram&aacute;&#7751;a</i>)
+according to the definition, because he is <i>pram&aacute;y&aacute; &aacute;&#347;raya&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> On this compare Siddh&aacute;nta-Mukt&aacute;vali, p. 115.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
+i. p. 315.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
+smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we <i>see</i> the smoke, is
+the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (<i>Ballantyne</i>).
+Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
+(<i>vy&aacute;paka</i>) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false <i>vy&aacute;pya</i>").</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> Action (<i>prav&#7771;itti</i>) follows after the ascertainment of
+the truth by <i>ny&aacute;ya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> Cp. V&aacute;tsy&aacute;yana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
+reads <i>prak&iacute;rtit&aacute;</i> for <i>par&iacute;kshit&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
+indifference, <i>moha</i>," which is however referred to presently.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> In p. 116, line 3, I would read <i>tannirvartakam</i> for
+<i>tannivartakam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
+authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
+eternal doctrine of polity,&mdash;these four sciences are the causes of the
+stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in K&aacute;mandaki's
+<i>N&iacute;tis&aacute;ra</i>, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in V&aacute;tsy&aacute;yana's Com. p.
+3, from which M&aacute;dhava is here borrowing.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
+lick her ear."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> Literally the "bell-road," <i>i.e.</i>, "the chief road
+through a village, or that by which elephants, &amp;c., decorated with
+tinkling ornaments, proceed."&mdash;<i>Wilson's Dict.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
+during the second, and ceases in the third.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> See Ny&aacute;ya S&uacute;t. i. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
+Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiy&aacute;yikas have
+sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
+line 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> See <i>supra</i>, pp. 24-32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> All is momentary, all is pain, all is <i>sui generis</i>,
+all is unreal.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> In the form of the various <i>kle&#347;as</i> or "afflictions."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> <i>&Aacute;vara&#7751;a</i>, cf. pp. 55, 58.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> But the Ny&aacute;ya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
+happiness, desire, aversion, &amp;c., are perceived by the internal sense,
+mind (Bh&aacute;sh&aacute; P. &sect; 83).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> The reading <i>m&uacute;rtapratibandh&aacute;t</i> is difficult, but I
+believe that <i>pratibandha</i> means here <i>vy&aacute;pti</i>, as it does in S&aacute;nkhya
+S&uacute;tras, i. 100.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> The true <i>summum bonum</i> must be
+<i>nirati&#347;aya</i>,&mdash;incapable of being added to.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> <i>Yogy&aacute;nupalabdhi</i> is when an object is not seen, and
+yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
+light, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "<i>gr&aacute;v&aacute;na&#7717; plavanti</i>,"
+see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase <i>a&#347;m&aacute;na&#7717; plavanti</i> occurs
+in Sha&#7693;v. Br. 5, 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
+authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
+to reveal the existence of God.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> The Ny&aacute;ya holds presumption to be included under
+inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
+relation of a name to the thing named.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
+everything, as <i>e.g.</i>, a jar.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
+its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
+ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
+air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
+<i>vi&#347;esha</i> does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
+"substances" excludes <i>tantutva</i>, and "existing in intimate relation"
+excludes ether, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
+eternal substances being the one or the other.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> The <i>viruddha-hetu</i> is that which is never found where
+the major term is.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
+from the Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
+there. "The older Naiy&aacute;yikas maintained that the argument 'the
+mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
+vy&aacute;pyatv&aacute;siddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
+restricted (see Siddh&aacute;nta Mukt&aacute;v. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
+wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
+objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
+validity of the assumed middle term."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> For the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> cf. pp. 7, 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
+subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
+to the fault of <i>&aacute;&#347;ray&aacute;siddhi</i>, a "baseless inference," since your
+subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
+locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, iii. 2). "Just as
+that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
+unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
+He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
+p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, <i>vikalpapar&aacute;hatatv&aacute;t</i>, and then begin
+the next clause with <i>sy&aacute;d etat</i>. The printed text, <i>vikalpapar&aacute;hata&#7717;
+sy&aacute;t tad etat</i>, seems unintelligible.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
+Hira&#7751;yagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
+as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
+constitutes his gross body (vir&aacute;j).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> The usual reading is <i>tasthur</i> for <i>tasthe</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> For these divisions of the <i>anyony&aacute;&#347;raya</i> fallacy, see
+<i>Ny&aacute;yas&uacute;tra v&#7771;itti</i>, i. 39 (p. 33).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> For <i>t&iacute;vra</i> cf. <i>Yoga s&uacute;tras</i>, i. 21, 22.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE JAIMINI-DAR&#346;ANA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
+merit (<i>dharma</i>) comes from the practice of duty (<i>dharma</i>), but how
+is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
+reply to this question has been given in the older<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; by the
+holy sage Jaimini. Now the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; consists of twelve books.<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> In
+the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
+of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (<i>vidhi</i>),
+"explanatory passage" (<i>arthav&aacute;da</i>), hymn (<i>mantra</i>), tradition
+(<i>sm&#7771;iti</i>), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
+[as <i>e.g.</i>, on <i>ap&uacute;rva</i>] relating to the difference of various rites,
+refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
+performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
+third, <i>&#346;ruti</i>, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (<i>li&#7749;ga</i>), "context"
+(<i>v&aacute;kya</i>), &amp;c., and their respective weight when in apparent
+opposition to one another, the ceremonies called <i>pratipatti-karm&aacute;&#7751;i</i>,
+things mentioned incidentally (<i>an&aacute;rabhy&aacute;dh&iacute;ta</i>), things accessory to
+several main objects, as <i>pray&aacute;jas</i>, &amp;c., and the duties of the
+sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
+principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the <i>juh&uacute;</i> being
+made of the <i>butea frondosa</i>, &amp;c., and the dice-playing, &amp;c., which
+form subordinate parts of the <i>r&aacute;jas&uacute;ya</i> sacrifice. In the fifth, the
+relative order of different <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>passages of <i>&#346;ruti</i>, &amp;c., the order of
+different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
+<i>v&aacute;japeya</i>], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
+the respective force of the words of <i>&#346;ruti</i>, order of mention, &amp;c.,
+in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
+qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
+enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
+rites, the <i>sattra</i> offerings, things proper to be given, and the
+different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
+ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
+text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
+transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
+"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
+takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
+adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (<i>&uacute;ha</i>), the
+adaptation of <i>s&aacute;mans</i> and <i>mantras</i>, and collateral questions
+connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
+the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
+non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
+are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
+discussions connected with the <i>graha</i> offerings, certain <i>s&aacute;mans</i>,
+and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
+negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
+fuller discussion of <i>tantra</i><a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> [where several acts are combined
+into one], and <i>&aacute;v&aacute;pa</i> [or the performing an act more than once]. In
+the twelfth, a discussion on <i>prasa&#7749;ga</i> [where the rite is performed
+for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
+<i>tantra</i>, cumulation of concurrent rites (<i>samuchchaya</i>) and option.</p>
+
+<p>Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span>the
+P&uacute;rva-M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
+know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
+"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (<i>a.</i>) the
+subject, (<i>b.</i>) the doubt, (<i>c.</i>) the <i>prim&acirc; facie</i> argument, (<i>d.</i>)
+the demonstrated conclusion, and (<i>e.</i>) the connection (<i>sa&#7749;gati</i>).
+The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
+teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
+sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
+whether the study of Jaimini's <i>&#347;&aacute;stra</i> concerning duty, beginning
+with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
+instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
+<i>anv&aacute;h&aacute;rya</i>," is to be commenced or not. The <i>prim&acirc; facie</i> argument is
+that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
+Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
+fruit. (<i>a.</i>) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
+fruit, and this can be no other<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> than the knowledge of the meaning
+of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
+enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
+or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
+we see in the rule for shelling rice.<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> It cannot be the former,
+for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
+from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
+reading the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata; and we see by this argument that it would
+present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
+injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
+baked flour cake called <i>puro&#7693;&aacute;sa</i> is made only of rice prepared by
+being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
+have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
+and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span>the principal <i>ap&uacute;rva</i>, by means of the various minor effects or
+subordinate <i>ap&uacute;rvas</i>, produced by the various subordinate parts of
+the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor <i>ap&uacute;rva</i> of the
+unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
+the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
+restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
+knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
+studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
+no injunction to study the P&uacute;rva M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; as a means of knowing the
+sense of the Veda. (<i>b.</i>) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
+injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
+the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
+although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
+words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
+which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
+is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
+Vi&#347;vajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
+that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
+that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
+offer the Vi&#347;vajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
+characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
+present case also. As it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
+injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
+heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
+analogy of the Vi&#347;vajit, &amp;c."</p>
+
+<p>Thus, too, we shall keep the Sm&#7771;iti rule from being violated: "Having
+read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
+long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
+student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
+he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
+house to read the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; discussions, and thus the idea of no
+interval between would be contradicted. Therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> for these three
+reasons, (<i>a.</i>) that the study of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; is not enjoined, (<i>b.</i>) that
+heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (<i>c.</i>)
+that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
+we maintain that the study of the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; discussions on duty is not
+to be commenced.</p>
+
+<p>The "authoritative conclusion" (<i>siddh&aacute;nta</i>), however, is as
+follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>We grant that it cannot be a case of <i>vidhi</i>, for it might have been
+adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
+could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
+of <i>niyama</i>. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
+<i>tavya</i> expresses an enforcing power in the word,<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> which is to be
+rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
+effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
+corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
+Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
+word <i>adhyetavya</i>, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
+reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
+end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
+consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
+the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
+the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
+mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
+never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
+production, &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> Therefore the only true end which remains to us
+is the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span>knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
+sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
+has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
+aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
+sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
+the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
+written books, &amp;c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
+"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
+reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
+duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal <i>ap&uacute;rva</i>,
+produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
+establishes the subordinate <i>ap&uacute;rvas</i> produced by the inferior
+sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &amp;c., so the mass of <i>ap&uacute;rva</i>
+produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
+<i>ap&uacute;rva</i> produced by the restricting injunction (<i>niyama</i>), which
+prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
+sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a <i>niyama</i> could have this
+future influence called <i>ap&uacute;rva</i>, the same doubt might equally
+invalidate the efficacy of a <i>vidhi</i> [as the two stand on the same
+level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
+that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the <i>Vi&#347;vajit</i>
+offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
+of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
+suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
+unseen one; but if a <i>vidhi</i> has the restricting meaning of
+a <i>niyama</i>, it does not thereby become meaningless."</p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span></p><p>But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
+the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
+who reads the Veda with its <i>a&#7749;gas</i>, grammar, &amp;c., may attain to this
+knowledge, the study of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; will be useless." But this is not
+true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
+literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
+discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
+gravel," neither grammar nor <i>nigama</i><a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> nor <i>nirukta</i> will
+determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
+with oil, &amp;c.; it is only by a M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; discussion that the true
+meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
+brightness."<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> It is therefore established that the study of
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
+passage of Sm&#7771;iti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
+implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
+any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
+return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
+read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
+both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
+common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
+the injunction we conclude that the study of the P&uacute;rva M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; &#346;&aacute;stra,
+consisting of a thousand "topics,"<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> is to be commenced. This topic
+is connected with the main subject of the &#346;&aacute;stra as being a subsidiary
+digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
+which helps to establish the main subject."<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p>
+
+<p>I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
+in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabh&aacute;kara.</p>
+
+<p>In the Sm&#7771;iti rule,<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
+eight years old (by investing him with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span>the sacred cord), let him instruct
+him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
+Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
+ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
+since, by P&aacute;&#7751;ini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root <i>n&iacute;</i> is used in the
+<i>&aacute;tmanepada</i> when honour, &amp;c., are implied, <i>i.e.</i>, here the duty which a
+teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
+pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
+both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
+Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Br&aacute;hman who girds his pupil with the
+sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
+<i>a&#7749;gas</i> and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (<i>&aacute;ch&aacute;rya</i>)."
+Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
+without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
+very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
+obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
+one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
+the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
+if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
+injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
+as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual <i>anuv&aacute;da</i>
+or "supplementary repetition."<a name="FNanchor_259_259" id="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> Therefore the former <i>prim&acirc; facie</i>
+argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
+was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
+another way to suit this new view.</p>
+
+<p>Now the <i>prim&acirc; facie</i> argument was that the study of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;, not
+being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
+"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
+authoritatively enjoined.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Now the upholders of the former or <i>prim&acirc; facie</i> view argue as
+follows:&mdash;"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
+dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
+understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
+bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
+teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
+what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
+and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
+sufficient, the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; discussions in question will have no subject
+or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
+doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
+way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
+should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
+the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
+accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
+use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
+intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
+in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
+present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
+useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;
+is not to be commenced."</p>
+
+<p>We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
+corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
+still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary <i>a&#7749;gas</i>, and
+has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
+respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
+of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
+may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
+son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
+not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
+eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
+meaning of the Veda does not express its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> real purport, the old
+objection will recur with full force that the study of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; will
+have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
+the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
+astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
+that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
+really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
+the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
+poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
+trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
+this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
+which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
+literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
+doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
+intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;
+discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
+"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
+obtained<a name="FNanchor_260_260" id="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
+authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
+subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; <i>is</i> enjoined, and should be commenced.</p>
+
+<p>"Well,<a name="FNanchor_261_261" id="FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> be it so" [say the followers of the Ny&aacute;ya], "but how can
+the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
+is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
+personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
+tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
+with the soul"?<a name="FNanchor_262_262" id="FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> This argument is weak, because the alleged
+characteristics [unbroken tradition, &amp;c.] are not proved; for those
+who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span>that the line of
+tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
+universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
+is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
+no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
+since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
+second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
+viz., is it meant (<i>a.</i>) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
+some one person, or (<i>b.</i>) by any person whatever? The former
+supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
+apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
+overcome pride and anger," &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_263_263" id="FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> And the latter supposition is
+inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
+omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
+person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
+personal author, for we argue as follows:&mdash;The sentences of the Veda
+must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
+character of sentences like those of K&aacute;lid&aacute;sa and other writers. And,
+again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
+person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
+time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.</p>
+
+<p>But [ask the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
+Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
+since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
+which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
+uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
+This reasoning, however [the Naiy&aacute;yikas <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>answer], cannot rise to the
+height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
+illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata was preceded by
+an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
+of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata, which must have been the same in former times as
+now." But [the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas will ask whether there is not a difference
+between these two cases, since] the Sm&#7771;iti declares that [Vish&#7751;u
+incarnate as] Vy&aacute;sa was the author of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata, in accordance
+with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vish&#7751;u could be the maker
+of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;rata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
+Sm&#7771;iti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
+since those words of the Purushas&uacute;kta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
+sprang the &#7770;ich and S&aacute;man verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
+him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.</p>
+
+<p>Further [proceed the Naiy&aacute;yikas] we hold that sound is
+non-eternal<a name="FNanchor_264_264" id="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
+external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.<a name="FNanchor_265_265" id="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a>
+"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
+arising from the fact that we recognise the letter <i>g</i> (for example)
+as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
+extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
+our argument, since it has reference only to identity of <i>species</i>, as
+in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
+of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka] how
+can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parame&#347;vara, who has
+no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
+pronounced the letters?" "This objection <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>[answers the Naiy&aacute;yika] is
+not happy, because, though Parame&#347;vara is by nature incorporeal, he
+can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
+worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
+the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."</p>
+
+<p>I shall now [says the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka] clear up the whole question. What is
+meant by this <i>paurusheyatva</i> ["derivation from a personal author"]
+which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (<i>utpannatva</i>)
+from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
+ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement&mdash;with
+a view to its manifestation&mdash;of knowledge acquired by other modes of
+proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
+If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
+us.<a name="FNanchor_266_266" id="FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
+(<i>a.</i>) by inference,<a name="FNanchor_267_267" id="FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> or (<i>b.</i>) by supernatural testimony? (<i>a.</i>)
+The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
+equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the M&aacute;lat&iacute;m&aacute;dhava
+[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
+character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
+clause, "while they possess authority,"<a name="FNanchor_268_268" id="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> [as supra, p. 188, line
+21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
+sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
+prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
+establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
+other evidence, this definition would be at once <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span>contradicted, just
+as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
+if we granted that Parame&#347;vara might assume a body in sport, in order
+to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
+he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
+of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
+time, and in nature.<a name="FNanchor_269_269" id="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
+other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
+for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
+experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabh&aacute;kara] when he
+refutes the supposition of an omniscient author&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,<a name="FNanchor_270_270" id="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a>
+it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
+thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
+or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
+of form."</p></div>
+
+<p>Hence (<i>b.</i>) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
+by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
+Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the &#7770;ich and S&aacute;man verses"]. For the
+rule of P&aacute;&#7751;ini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
+grammatical affixes with which such names as K&aacute;&#7789;haka, K&aacute;l&aacute;pa, and
+Taittir&iacute;ya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
+"uttered by" Ka&#7789;ha, Kal&aacute;pin, &amp;c., though we maintain that these names
+have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
+these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
+schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
+reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
+institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.</p>
+
+<p>Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span>of sound,
+because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
+consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
+the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
+the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
+identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question&mdash;Is this
+idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
+forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
+the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
+shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
+cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (<i>a.</i>) If it arises
+from the latter reason, we M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas, who hold that the Veda is its
+own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
+him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
+go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
+mass of doubts."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) "But [the Naiy&aacute;yikas will ask] does not this recognition of <i>g</i>
+and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
+species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
+individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
+different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
+such distinctions as we do when we say 'Soma&#347;arman is reading'?" This
+objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
+as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual <i>g</i>'s,
+there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
+<i>g</i>; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
+[the Naiy&aacute;yika doctrine of] the species <i>g</i>, the one species [in the
+Naiy&aacute;yika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
+magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
+modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
+short; so to the man who does not understand our [M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka doctrine
+of] one individual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> <i>g</i>, the one <i>g</i> (in our view) will by the
+diversity of "manifesters,"<a name="FNanchor_271_271" id="FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> appear to him associated with their
+respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
+ascribed [to the letter <i>g</i>], there is a fallacious appearance of
+distinction [between different <i>g</i>'s]. But does this ascription of
+contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
+[between the <i>g</i>'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
+from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
+for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
+admitted between different <i>g</i>'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
+uttered ten <i>g's</i>," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same <i>g</i> ten
+times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
+distinction between <i>g</i>'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
+difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
+apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &amp;c.,
+that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
+indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [<i>i.e.</i>,
+"different" as applied to the <i>g</i>'s] is really caused by the <i>noise</i>,
+which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
+teacher&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The object which the Naiy&aacute;yikas seek by supposing a species
+is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
+which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
+is attained from audible noises;<a name="FNanchor_272_272" id="FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> so that the assumption
+of species is useless."</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
+recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
+superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
+non-eternity."</p></div>
+
+<p>This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiy&aacute;yika] <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span>treatise
+by V&aacute;g&iacute;&#347;wara, entitled <i>M&aacute;na-manohara</i>, "sound is non-eternal from the
+fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
+sense<a name="FNanchor_273_273" id="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> (<i>sc.</i> the ear), just as colour is to the eye."</p>
+
+<p>We can also refute it in the following ways: (<i>a.</i>) If we follow the
+[S&aacute;&#7749;khya and Ved&aacute;nta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
+overthrown<a name="FNanchor_274_274" id="FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (<i>b.</i>) if
+we take it as referring to the <i>noise</i>, not the <i>sound</i>, we have no
+dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (<i>c.</i>)
+the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [<i>up&aacute;dhi</i>] of
+<i>a&#347;r&aacute;va&#7751;atva</i>, or "the not causing audition."<a name="FNanchor_275_275" id="FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> So Udayana tries at
+great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
+imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
+perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
+non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
+such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
+arisen."<a name="FNanchor_276_276" id="FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> But he is sufficiently answered<a name="FNanchor_277_277" id="FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> by our old reply
+[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span>distinction arises
+from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
+story, the demon T&aacute;la went away [as well as Bet&aacute;la] when the offering
+of blood was given to the latter.<a name="FNanchor_278_278" id="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> And as for the objection raised
+by the author of the <i>Ny&aacute;yabh&uacute;sha&#7751;a</i>,<a name="FNanchor_279_279" id="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> that, if sound were
+eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
+perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
+allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
+articulate noise.<a name="FNanchor_280_280" id="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> And as for the (Naiy&aacute;yika) argument against the
+existence<a name="FNanchor_281_281" id="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
+between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
+both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
+invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
+the soul.<a name="FNanchor_282_282" id="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a></p>
+
+<p>Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
+personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
+thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
+that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
+duty.</p>
+
+<p>"Well"<a name="FNanchor_283_283" id="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> [say our opponents], "let this question rest; <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span>but how
+about another well-known controversy? It is said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"'The S&aacute;&#7749;khyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
+are self-proved; the followers of the Ny&aacute;ya hold that both are proved by
+something else [as inference, &amp;c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
+self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
+Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
+non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
+this discussion, how do the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas accept as established their tenet
+that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
+of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (<i>a.</i>) that
+authoritativeness springs from itself? or (<i>b.</i>) that it springs from the
+right knowledge in which it resides? or (<i>c.</i>) that it springs from the
+instrumental causes [as the eye, &amp;c.] which produced the right knowledge
+in which it resides? or (<i>d.</i>) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
+knowledge?<a name="FNanchor_284_284" id="FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> or (<i>e.</i>) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes <i>only</i> which produced the right
+knowledge?</p>
+
+<p>"(<i>a.</i>) It cannot be the <i>first</i>, because wherever the relation of
+cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
+these two cannot reside in the same subject [<i>i.e.</i>, authoritativeness
+cannot cause itself]. (<i>b.</i>) It cannot be the <i>second</i>, because if
+knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
+would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.<a name="FNanchor_285_285" id="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> (<i>c.</i>)
+It cannot be the <i>third</i>, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
+be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span>'produced' at all,<a name="FNanchor_286_286" id="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> whether we call it a general
+characteristic (<i>up&aacute;dhi</i>) or a species (<i>j&aacute;ti</i>);<a name="FNanchor_287_287" id="FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> for if we call
+it an <i>up&aacute;dhi</i>, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
+contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
+the nature of recollection;<a name="FNanchor_288_288" id="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> and this cannot be produced, for we
+all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
+we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (<i>d.</i>)
+Nor can it be the <i>fourth</i>, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
+knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
+causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
+the particular,<a name="FNanchor_289_289" id="FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
+'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
+<i>e.g.</i>, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
+particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
+therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
+knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;sakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
+considered as residing in a particular knowledge [<i>i.e.</i>, a wrong
+knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
+produced the right knowledge. (<i>e.</i>) As for your <i>fifth</i> view, we ask
+whether by being produced by the instrumental causes <i>only</i> which
+produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
+of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
+followers of the Ny&aacute;ya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
+something external [as inference, &amp;c.], would at once grant that
+authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
+combined with the absence of a 'defect.' <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span>Neither can it be the latter
+alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
+'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
+absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
+right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
+presence, and be absent if it is absent,<a name="FNanchor_290_290" id="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> and it will at the same
+time be not an unimportant condition.<a name="FNanchor_291_291" id="FNanchor_291_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> If you object that
+non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
+whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
+should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
+non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
+effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
+at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali,
+i. 10]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
+as well as an effect.'</p></div>
+
+<p>"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:&mdash;Right knowledge
+depends on some cause<a name="FNanchor_292_292" id="FNanchor_292_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> other than the common causes of knowledge,
+from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
+just as wrong knowledge does.<a name="FNanchor_293_293" id="FNanchor_293_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_293_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> Authoritativeness is known through
+something external to itself [<i>e.g.</i>, inference], because doubt arises
+in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
+non-authoritativeness.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
+and recognised by means of something external, the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; tenet that
+'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
+rotten."</p>
+
+<p>This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
+strike the sky with his fist; for (<i>a.</i>) we mean by our phrase
+"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
+instrumental causes of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span>knowledge, it is not produced by any other
+cause (as "defect," &amp;c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
+full:&mdash;Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
+causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
+produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
+knowledge,&mdash;just like a jar.<a name="FNanchor_294_294" id="FNanchor_294_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> Nor can Udayana's<a name="FNanchor_295_295" id="FNanchor_295_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> argument be
+brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
+something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
+equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
+produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
+is also other than 'defect,'<a name="FNanchor_296_296" id="FNanchor_296_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> from the very fact of its being
+knowledge&mdash;like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
+arise from the causes of knowledge <i>per se</i>, it would be a needless
+complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
+it a <i>gu&#7751;a</i> or the absence of a "defect" (<i>dosha</i>).<a name="FNanchor_297_297" id="FNanchor_297_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a></p>
+
+<p>"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
+knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
+right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
+absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
+acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
+<i>gu&#7751;as</i> the absence of 'defects,'<a name="FNanchor_298_298" id="FNanchor_298_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> from their absence
+the non-existence of the two kinds of
+non-authoritativeness,<a name="FNanchor_299_299" id="FNanchor_299_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a> and from this the general
+conclusion."<a name="FNanchor_300_300" id="FNanchor_300_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
+by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
+knowledge<a name="FNanchor_301_301" id="FNanchor_301_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> [<i>sc.</i> the eye, mind, &amp;c.] Nor can you object that this
+view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
+thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
+although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
+also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
+&amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>As for your argument [O Naiy&aacute;yika! given <i>supra</i>, in p. 198, lines
+17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
+or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
+itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
+whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
+should have a case of <i>regressus in infinitum</i>, for it will want some
+other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
+will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.</p>
+
+<p>As for the argument urged by Udayana<a name="FNanchor_302_302" id="FNanchor_302_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> in the Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, when he
+tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
+on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
+which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span>of the wish,<a name="FNanchor_303_303" id="FNanchor_303_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
+a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
+an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
+closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
+on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
+throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; idea of
+the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
+action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
+who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
+actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
+that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
+knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
+causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
+distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
+authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
+deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
+as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
+authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
+is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
+have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
+controversy; since it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
+(authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
+fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
+which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
+discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."<a name="FNanchor_304_304" id="FNanchor_304_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
+authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
+divergency between the two great M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span>schools]:&mdash;The Veda is
+composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (<i>mantra</i>),
+"explanatory passages" (<i>arthav&aacute;da</i>), and "injunctions" (<i>vidhi</i>); and
+by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
+sacrifice with the jyotish&#7789;oma." Here <i>ta</i>, the affix of the third
+person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
+rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
+opinion of the followers of Bha&#7789;&#7789;a Kum&aacute;rila, who maintain that words
+signify<a name="FNanchor_305_305" id="FNanchor_305_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> something definite by themselves [apart from the
+sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabh&aacute;kara, on the contrary, hold
+that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
+they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
+done.<a name="FNanchor_306_306" id="FNanchor_306_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_306_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> Thus all has been made plain.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava here calls it the <i>pr&aacute;ch&iacute; M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> Cf. <i>J. Ny&aacute;yam&aacute;l&aacute;vist</i>, pp. 5-9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
+priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
+one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
+<i>tantra</i> or not? By <i>tantra</i> one offering to Agni would do for both;
+but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
+thus it must be a case of <i>&aacute;v&aacute;pa</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, offering the two separately
+(<i>J. Ny&aacute;yam&aacute;l&aacute;</i>, xi. 1, 13).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> In p. 123, line 4, I read <i>vilaksha&#7751;a-d&#7771;ish&#7789;aphala</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> In the former case it would be a <i>vidhi</i>, in the latter
+a <i>niyama</i>. Cf. the lines <i>vidhir atyantam apr&aacute;pto niyama&#7717; p&aacute;kshike
+sati, tatra ch&aacute;nyatra cha pr&aacute;ptau parisa&#7747;khy&aacute; vidh&iacute;yate</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> The M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; holds that the potential and similar
+affixes, which constitute a <i>vidhi</i>, have a twofold power; by the one
+they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
+root-meaning (<i>artha-bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>); by the other an enforcing power in the
+word (<i>&#347;abda-bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>). Thus in <i>svargak&aacute;mo yajeta</i>, the <i>eta</i> implies
+"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
+up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
+an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
+self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
+course of action.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
+remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
+that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
+perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
+six <i>vik&aacute;ras</i> mentioned in &#346;a&#7749;kara's Vajras&uacute;chi, 2, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>asti</i>,
+<i>j&aacute;yate</i>, <i>vardhate</i>, <i>vipari&#7751;amate</i>, <i>apaksh&iacute;yate</i>, <i>na&#347;yati</i>. I do
+not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
+<i>ap&uacute;rva</i>, sc. <i>phala</i>, <i>samud&aacute;ya</i>, <i>utpatti</i>, and <i>a&#7749;ga</i>, described in
+Ny&aacute;ya M. V. ii. 1, 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> The <i>nigamas</i> are the Vedic quotations in Y&aacute;ska's
+<i>nirukta</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> See Ny&aacute;ya-m&aacute;l&aacute;-vistara, i. 4, 19.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> The exact number is 915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> This is to explain the last of the five members, the
+<i>sa&#7747;gati</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> Cf. A&#347;val&aacute;yana's G&#7771;ihya S&uacute;tras, i. 19, 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_259_259" id="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> The <i>anuv&aacute;da</i>, of course, implies a previous <i>vidhi</i>,
+which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
+authority. The <i>anuv&aacute;da</i> in the present case is the passage which
+mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
+<i>vidhi</i> as to teaching.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_260_260" id="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> I read in p. 127, line 12, <i>anava-gamyam&aacute;nasya</i>, and so
+the recension given in the Ny&aacute;ya M. V. p. 14, <i>na budhyam&aacute;nasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_261_261" id="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> In the next two or three pages I have frequently
+borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his <i>Sanskrit Texts</i>, vol.
+iii. p. 88.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_262_262" id="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> The soul may be traced back through successive
+transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_263_263" id="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava means that the author of this stanza, though
+unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
+contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
+perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
+an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
+origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
+question is quoted in full in B&ouml;htlingk's Indische Spr&uuml;che, No. 5598,
+from the MS. anthology called the <i>Subh&aacute;shit&aacute;r&#7751;ava</i>. For <i>muktaka</i>,
+see <i>S&aacute;h. Darp.</i>, &sect; 558.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_264_264" id="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; that sound is eternal.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265_265" id="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
+air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have <i>vi&#347;esha</i>, not
+<i>s&aacute;m&aacute;nya</i> or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
+Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
+reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
+arguments belong rather to the Ny&aacute;ya-vai&#347;eshika school than to the
+Ny&aacute;ya.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266_266" id="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> The M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;saka allows that the <i>uchch&aacute;ra&#7751;a</i> or utterance
+is non-eternal.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_267_267" id="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
+arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
+their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
+sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &amp;c."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_268_268" id="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
+after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
+possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
+composition of Manu, &amp;c."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_269_269" id="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
+material limitations.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_270_270" id="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
+developments (<i>ati&#347;ay&aacute;&#7717;</i>) in their saints.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_271_271" id="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
+"manifest" the always existing sound.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_272_272" id="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> "What is meant by 'noise' (<i>n&aacute;da</i>) is these
+'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
+air."&mdash;<i>Ballantyne</i>, <i>M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; Aphorisms</i>, i. 17.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_273_273" id="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> The Ny&aacute;ya holds that colour and sound are respectively
+special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
+of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
+course, have its corresponding special quality.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_274_274" id="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> In p. 131, line 7, I read <i>pratyaksh&aacute;siddhe&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_275_275" id="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Ch&aacute;rv&aacute;ka-dar&#347;ana) for the
+<i>up&aacute;dhi</i>. The <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> or "condition" limits a too general middle
+term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
+but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
+"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
+mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
+Here, in answer to the Ny&aacute;ya argument in the text, our author objects
+that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
+belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, <i>i.e.</i>, it is sometimes
+found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, <i>e.g.</i>, in
+<i>sound</i> itself, according to the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; doctrine. To obviate this he
+proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
+readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, <i>while
+not causing audition</i>, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
+sense, as, <i>e.g.</i>, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
+would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the P&uacute;rva M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; and
+the Ny&aacute;ya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
+sound, as their points of view are so totally different.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276_276" id="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> In the former case we have the <i>dhwa&#7747;sa</i> of sound, in
+the latter its <i>pr&aacute;gabh&aacute;va</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_277_277" id="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> In p. 131, line 12, I read <i>samapauhi</i> for <i>sam&aacute;pohi</i>,
+<i>i.e.</i>, the passive aorist of <i>sam</i> + <i>apa</i> + <i>&uacute;h</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_278_278" id="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> I do not know this legend. T&aacute;la and Bet&aacute;la are the two
+demons who carry Vikram&aacute;ditya on their shoulders in the
+Si&#7747;h&aacute;san-batt&iacute;s&iacute;. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
+how one answer can suffice for two opponents.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_279_279" id="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> This is probably a work by Bh&aacute;sarvaj&ntilde;a (see Dr. Hall's
+<i>Bibl. Index</i>, p. 26).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_280_280" id="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> <i>Dhvani</i>, or our "articulate noise," produces the
+vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
+is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
+a definite speech by our various articulations. I take <i>sa&#7747;sk&#7771;ita</i>
+here as equivalent to <i>abhivyakta</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_281_281" id="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> I read in p. 131, line 15,
+<i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;rakasa&#7747;sk&aacute;ryabh&aacute;v&aacute;bh&aacute;v&aacute;num&aacute;nam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_282_282" id="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> It would be a case of <i>vyabhich&aacute;ra</i>. The Naiy&aacute;yika
+argument would seem to be something as follows:&mdash;Sound is not thus
+manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
+senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
+species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
+manifested by the species. But the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; rejoins that this would
+equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
+perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
+manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
+sure that I rightly understand the argument.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283_283" id="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> Here begins a long <i>p&uacute;rva-paksha</i>, from p. 131, line
+18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 <i>infra</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_284_284" id="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> This is Prabh&aacute;kara's view (see Siddh. Mukt&aacute;v., p. 118).
+The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (<i>pr&aacute;m&aacute;&#7751;ya</i>),
+which resides in it as its characteristic.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_285_285" id="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
+and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
+a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
+quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
+and therefore a substance.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_286_286" id="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> The eye, &amp;c., would be its instrumental causes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_287_287" id="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
+"action," are called <i>j&aacute;tis</i> or species; the last four, "genus,"
+"<i>vi&#347;esha</i>," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
+<i>up&aacute;dhis</i> or "general characteristics."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_288_288" id="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> The P&uacute;rva M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; denies that recollection is right
+knowledge.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_289_289" id="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
+causes (as the eye, &amp;c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
+<i>together with a "defect,"</i> as biliousness, distance &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_290_290" id="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> if there be <i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i> there is <i>pram&aacute;</i>; if
+not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read <i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;vatvena</i> for
+<i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;vasahak&#7771;itatvena</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_291_291" id="Footnote_291_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> <i>Anyath&aacute;siddhatvam</i> means <i>niyatap&uacute;rvavartitve sati
+an&aacute;va&#347;yakatvam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_292_292" id="Footnote_292_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> or the absence of "defect," <i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_293_293" id="Footnote_293_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> Wrong knowledge has <i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i> or the presence of a
+"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294_294" id="Footnote_294_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> Wrongness of knowledge (<i>apram&aacute;tva</i>) can only reside in
+knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a
+jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than
+those of knowledge (as, <i>e.g.</i>, the potter's stick, &amp;c.), but it is not
+produced by these other causes <i>in combination</i> with being also produced
+by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing
+directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit
+than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar
+is not
+produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_295_295" id="Footnote_295_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
+the previous long p&uacute;rva-paksha.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_296_296" id="Footnote_296_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> These words "and is other than defect"
+(<i>dosha-vyatirikta</i>) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
+knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
+bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
+the causes of knowledge <i>plus</i> "defect;" right knowledge by the former
+alone.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_297_297" id="Footnote_297_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> The Ny&aacute;ya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
+"defect," as jaundice, &amp;c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
+<i>gu&#7751;a</i> or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
+true object), or by the absence of a "defect."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_298_298" id="Footnote_298_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> The <i>gu&#7751;a</i> (or &#946;&#949;&#955;&#964;&#7985;&#963;&#964;&#951; &#7957;&#958;&#953;&#962; of an organ is
+not properly a cause of <i>pram&aacute;</i> but rather <i>dosh&aacute;bh&aacute;va-bodhaka</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299_299" id="Footnote_299_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> "doubtful" (<i>sandigdha</i>) and "ascertained
+non-authoritativeness" (<i>ni&#347;chit&aacute;pr&aacute;m&aacute;&#7751;ya</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_300_300" id="Footnote_300_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> <i>Utsarga</i> is a general conclusion which is not
+necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
+conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
+causes of knowledge, the eye," &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_301_301" id="Footnote_301_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
+of the perception, <i>i.e.</i>, its authoritativeness or <i>pr&aacute;m&aacute;&#7751;ya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_302_302" id="Footnote_302_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
+and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
+Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
+edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_303_303" id="Footnote_303_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> I read <i>tat-pr&aacute;churyam</i> for <i>tatpr&aacute;churye</i> in p. 134,
+line 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304_304" id="Footnote_304_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> This stanza affirms that according to the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;
+school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
+is proved from something else (as inference, &amp;c.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305_305" id="Footnote_305_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> I take <i>vyutpatti</i> here as used for <i>&#347;akti</i>; <i>siddhe</i>
+means <i>gha&#7789;&aacute;dau</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_306_306" id="Footnote_306_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> These are the two great M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; schools. The former, called
+<i>abhihit&aacute;nvaya-v&aacute;dina&#7717;</i>, hold (like the Naiy&aacute;yika school) that words by
+themselves can express their separate meaning by the function <i>abhidh&aacute;</i> or
+"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
+one connected idea. The latter, called <i>anvit&aacute;bhidh&aacute;na-v&aacute;dina&#7717;</i>, hold that
+words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
+connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
+with an action. In <i>g&aacute;m &aacute;naya</i>, <i>g&aacute;m</i> does not properly mean <i>gotva</i>, but
+<i>&aacute;nayan&aacute;nvita-gotva</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the bovine genus as connected with
+"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
+and <i>vice vers&acirc;</i>. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (<i>Comparative
+Philology</i>, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
+we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
+But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
+which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
+thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
+as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE P&Aacute;&#7750;INI-DAR&#346;ANA.<a name="FNanchor_307_307" id="FNanchor_307_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a></h2>
+
+
+<p>If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
+affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
+this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
+waters of Pata&ntilde;jali this question produces no confusion, since it is
+notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
+of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
+first sentence of the venerable Pata&ntilde;jali, the author of the "Great
+Commentary," is "<i>atha &#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i>," "Now comes the exposition of
+words." The particle <i>atha</i> ("now") is used here as implying a new
+topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
+meant the system of grammar put forth by P&aacute;&#7751;ini. Now a doubt might
+here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
+words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
+doubt that he employed the particle <i>atha</i>, since this particle
+implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
+exclusion of everything else.</p>
+
+<p>The word "exposition" (<i>anu&#347;&aacute;sana</i>), as here used, implies that thereby
+Vaidic words, such as those in the line <i>&#347;a&#7747; no dev&iacute;r abhish&#7789;aye</i>,<a name="FNanchor_308_308" id="FNanchor_308_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a>
+&amp;c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
+"cow," "horse," "man," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span>"elephant," "bird," &amp;c., are made the subject of
+the exposition, <i>i.e.</i>, are deduced from their original roots and properly
+formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
+We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
+the object [<i>&#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i> standing for <i>&#347;abdasy&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i>], and as
+there is a rule of P&aacute;&#7751;ini (<i>karma&#7751;i cha</i>, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
+composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
+phrase <i>&#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i> does not come before us as a duly authorised
+compound.</p>
+
+<p>Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
+alleged rule of P&aacute;&#7751;ini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
+object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
+connection with a word ending with a <i>k&#7771;it</i> affix, there the object
+alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;<a name="FNanchor_309_309" id="FNanchor_309_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> this
+limitation arising from our taking <i>ubhayapr&aacute;pti</i> in the s&uacute;tra as a
+<i>bahuvr&iacute;hi</i> compound.<a name="FNanchor_310_310" id="FNanchor_310_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
+of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
+that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
+in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
+the K&aacute;&#347;ik&aacute; Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
+option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
+equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words <i>of</i> the
+teacher' or '<i>by</i> the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
+the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
+relates to <i>words</i> and not to <i>things</i>, and since this can be at once
+understood without any mention of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span>agent, <i>i.e.</i>, the teacher, any
+such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
+and the agent are <i>not</i> both expressed in one and the same sentence,
+this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
+ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
+rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
+connection with a word ending with a k&#7771;it affix, is to be put in the
+genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the <i>tatpurusha</i>
+compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
+such recognised forms as <i>idhma-pravra&#347;chana</i>, <i>pal&aacute;&#347;a-&#347;&aacute;tana</i>,
+&amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_311_311" id="FNanchor_311_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
+<i>shash&#7789;h&iacute;tatpurusha</i> is one of the class called "residual," in
+accordance with P&aacute;&#7751;ini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
+in the residuum," [<i>i.e.</i>, in the other constructions not provided for
+by special rules];<a name="FNanchor_312_312" id="FNanchor_312_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a> and in this way we might defend the phrase
+against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
+alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
+thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
+genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
+hence Bhart&#7771;ihari in his <i>V&aacute;kyapad&iacute;ya</i> has shown that these rules are
+mainly useful where the question relates to the <i>accent</i>.<a name="FNanchor_313_313" id="FNanchor_313_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> To this
+effect are the words of the great doctor Vardham&aacute;na&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,</p>
+
+<p>"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
+employed.</p>
+
+<p>"Thus have they explained the meaning of P&aacute;&#7751;ini's s&uacute;tras,
+since</p>
+
+<p>"He himself uses such phrases as <i>janikartu&#7717;</i> and
+<i>tatprayojaka&#7717;</i>."<a name="FNanchor_314_314" id="FNanchor_314_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_314_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span></p><p>Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
+(of the <i>Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya</i>) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
+of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
+concerning words' are now commenced."</p>
+
+<p>"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
+meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
+as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
+excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
+the employment of such a word as <i>&#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i>, the sense of which
+can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
+intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
+subordinate study (<i>a&#7749;ga</i>) to the Veda.<a name="FNanchor_315_315" id="FNanchor_315_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> Otherwise, if there were
+no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
+readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
+will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
+with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
+(special) end,"<a name="FNanchor_316_316" id="FNanchor_316_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a> because, even though there be such an injunction,
+it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
+is mentioned which will establish that it is an <i>a&#7749;ga</i> of the Veda.
+Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
+haste to say&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
+common life,</p>
+
+<p>"And therefore grammar is useless?"</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an <i>a&#7749;ga</i> of the
+Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
+students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
+it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
+set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span>that
+grammar is an <i>a&#7749;ga</i> of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
+should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
+knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
+involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
+consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
+sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
+incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswat&iacute;." Now
+it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an <i>a&#7749;ga</i> of
+the Veda that he uses the words <i>atha &#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i> and not <i>atha
+vy&aacute;kara&#7751;am</i>. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
+end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
+in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
+the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
+concerning words, <i>i.e.</i>, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
+say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
+true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
+word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
+understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
+into proper and improper words.<a name="FNanchor_317_317" id="FNanchor_317_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> Thus there is a tradition that
+B&#7771;ihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
+words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
+word,<a name="FNanchor_318_318" id="FNanchor_318_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
+B&#7771;ihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
+years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,&mdash;how much
+less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
+rendered efficient by four appropriate means,&mdash;reading, understanding,
+practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
+would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
+word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
+consequently, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span>as we said at first, the desired end is not
+established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
+knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
+And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
+examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
+roots, &amp;c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
+this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
+for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), <i>karma&#7751;i</i>, the affix
+<i>a&#7751;</i> is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
+it; and by this rule we learn many words, as <i>kumbhak&aacute;ra</i>, "a potter,"
+<i>k&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;al&aacute;va</i>, "a cutter of stems," &amp;c. But the supplementary special
+rule (iii. 2, 3), <i>&aacute;to 'nupasarge ka&#7717;</i>, directing that the affix <i>ka</i>
+is to be used after a root that ends in long <i>&aacute;</i> when there is no
+<i>upasarga</i>, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
+[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an <i>upasarga</i>]. "But
+since there are other <i>a&#7749;gas</i>, why do you single out grammar as the
+one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six <i>a&#7749;gas</i> the
+principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
+is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
+austerities,</p>
+
+<p>"The wise have called grammar the first <i>a&#7749;ga</i> of the Veda."</p></div>
+
+<p>Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
+the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &amp;c.,
+of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
+great Commentary [quoting a V&aacute;rttika], "the end (or motive) is
+preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."<a name="FNanchor_319_319" id="FNanchor_319_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_319_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a>
+Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
+K&aacute;ty&aacute;yana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
+according to the <i>&#347;&aacute;stra</i>; it is equal to the words of the Veda
+itself." Others also have said <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>that "a single word thoroughly
+understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
+Thus (they say)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
+well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;</p>
+
+<p>"But those who use such false forms as <i>ach&iacute;kramata</i> must
+trudge thither on foot."<a name="FNanchor_320_320" id="FNanchor_320_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
+since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
+For the &#346;ruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
+heads, and seven its hands,&mdash;roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
+the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
+commentator thus explains it:&mdash;The "four horns" are the four kinds of
+words&mdash;nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
+mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
+tense-affixes, <i>la&#7789;</i>, &amp;c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
+(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
+"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
+the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
+three organs&mdash;the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
+(<i>v&#7771;ishabha</i>) is applied from its pouring forth (<i>varsha&#7751;a</i>), <i>i.e.</i>,
+from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
+<i>i.e.</i>, utters sound, for the root <i>ru</i> means "sound;" here by the
+word "sound" developed speech (or language)<a name="FNanchor_321_321" id="FNanchor_321_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_321_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> is implied; "the
+great god enters mortals,"&mdash;the "great god," <i>i.e.</i>, speech,&mdash;enters
+mortals, <i>i.e.</i>, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
+declared the likeness [of speech]<a name="FNanchor_322_322" id="FNanchor_322_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> to the supreme Brahman.</p>
+
+<p>The eternal word, called <i>spho&#7789;a</i>, without parts, and the cause of the
+world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>declared by Bhart&#7771;ihari in
+the part of his book called the Brahmak&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;a&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
+essence of speech,</p>
+
+<p>"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
+springs the creation of the world."</p></div>
+
+<p>"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
+and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
+too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prak&iacute;r&#7751;aka&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
+fivefold,</p>
+
+<p>"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
+like."</p></div>
+
+<p>Hel&aacute;r&aacute;ja interprets the fivefold division as including
+<i>karmapravachan&iacute;yas</i>.<a name="FNanchor_323_323" id="FNanchor_323_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_323_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
+great commentator, is proper, since <i>karmapravachan&iacute;yas</i> distinguish a
+connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
+out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
+kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
+(<i>upasargas</i>).<a name="FNanchor_324_324" id="FNanchor_324_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p>
+
+<p>"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
+<i>spho&#7789;a</i>? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
+is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
+there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
+distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
+absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
+word is a false perception.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as <i>spho&#7789;a</i>, as
+otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
+word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
+bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
+following dilemma:&mdash;Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
+of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
+first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
+cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
+single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
+[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
+other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
+(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
+cognition of the meaning, there must be a <i>spho&#7789;a</i> by means of which
+arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this <i>spho&#7789;a</i> is an eternal
+sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
+the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (<i>sphu&#7789;yate</i>) or
+revealed by the letters," hence it is called <i>spho&#7789;a</i>, as revealed by
+the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
+<i>spho&#7789;a</i> as causing the knowledge of the meaning,&mdash;these are the two
+etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
+said by the worshipful Pata&ntilde;jali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
+the word '<i>cow</i>' <i>gau&#7717;</i>? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
+there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
+hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiya&#7789;a in the passage
+commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
+from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
+expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
+following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
+wished]," and ending, "The <i>V&aacute;kyapad&iacute;ya</i> has established at length
+that it is the <i>spho&#7789;a</i> which, distinct from the letters and revealed
+by the sound, expresses the
+meaning."<a name="FNanchor_325_325" id="FNanchor_325_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325_325" class="fnanchor">[325]
+</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
+that the <i>spho&#7789;a</i> has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
+under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
+convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
+latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
+conveying the meaning always produced, since, as <i>spho&#7789;a</i> is supposed
+to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
+independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
+to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
+alternative, viz., that <i>spho&#7789;a</i> conveys the meaning when it is itself
+manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
+manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
+adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
+of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
+hypothesis that they have this power to manifest <i>spho&#7789;a</i>." This has
+been said by Bha&#7789;&#7789;a in his M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;-&#347;loka-v&aacute;rttika&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The grammarian who holds that <i>spho&#7789;a</i> is manifested by the
+letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
+and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
+difficulty."</p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span></p><p>The truth is, that, as P&aacute;&#7751;ini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (S&uacute;t. ii. 123) both
+lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
+the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
+apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
+help.<a name="FNanchor_326_326" id="FNanchor_326_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> If you object that as there are the same letters in <i>rasa</i> as
+in <i>sara</i>, in <i>nava</i> as in <i>vana</i>, in <i>d&iacute;n&aacute;</i> as in <i>nad&iacute;</i>, in <i>m&aacute;ra</i> as in
+<i>r&aacute;ma</i>, in <i>r&aacute;ja</i> as in <i>j&aacute;ra</i>, &amp;c., these several pairs of words would
+not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
+of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
+said by Taut&aacute;tita&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
+perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
+be the meaning which they convey."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
+attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
+alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
+thing called <i>spho&#7789;a</i> is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
+letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
+view having been shown to be irrelevant].</p>
+
+<p>All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
+a straw;<a name="FNanchor_327_327" id="FNanchor_327_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
+you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
+conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
+collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,<a name="FNanchor_328_328" id="FNanchor_328_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a>
+could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
+separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
+the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
+with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
+"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
+together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
+Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &amp;c., or to an elephant, a man, a
+horse, &amp;c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
+perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
+pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
+power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
+manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
+imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
+involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
+one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
+convey <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span>one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
+their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
+their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
+letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
+<i>spho&#7789;a</i>. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
+thing called <i>spho&#7789;a</i> which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
+alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
+will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
+with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"<a name="FNanchor_329_329" id="FNanchor_329_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> This, however, is
+only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
+between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
+reveals the invisible <i>spho&#7789;a</i>, and each successive letter makes this
+<i>spho&#7789;a</i> more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
+is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
+of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
+manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
+authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
+sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
+the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
+letter." Therefore, since Bhart&#7771;ihari has shown in his first book that
+the <i>letters</i> of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
+the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
+such and such a meaning from such and such a <i>word</i>," we are forced to
+assume the existence<a name="FNanchor_330_330" id="FNanchor_330_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> of an indivisible <i>spho&#7789;a</i> as a distinct
+category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
+has been established in the discussion (in the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya) on "genus"
+(<i>j&aacute;ti</i>), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
+ultimately that <i>summum genus</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span>existence whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality<a name="FNanchor_331_331" id="FNanchor_331_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a>
+(Brahman).</p>
+
+<p>"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
+will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
+ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
+uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
+purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
+be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
+and not by combination."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
+trouble of refuting."</p></div>
+
+<p>All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
+colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
+blue, red, yellow, &amp;c., so, since the <i>summum genus</i>, Brahman, is
+variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
+severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
+various conventional words which arise from the different
+species,<a name="FNanchor_332_332" id="FNanchor_332_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> as cow, &amp;c., these being "existence" (the <i>summum
+genus</i>) as found in the individual cow, &amp;c. To this purport we have
+the following authoritative testimony&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
+joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
+possessing that colour."</p></div>
+
+<p>And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
+divided, when found in cows, &amp;c., by reason of its connection with
+different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
+words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
+This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
+affixed <i>tva</i>, <i>tal</i>, &amp;c., express" (P&aacute;&#7751;ini v. 1, 119).</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span></p><p>"Existence" is that great <i>summum genus</i> which is found in cows,
+horses, &amp;c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
+resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &amp;c., are not really
+different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (<i>gotva</i> and
+<i>a&#347;vatva</i>) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
+residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
+expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one <i>summum
+genus</i> existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
+cows, &amp;c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
+of the stem-word (<i>pr&aacute;tipadika</i>). A "root" is sometimes defined as
+that which expresses <i>bh&aacute;va</i>;<a name="FNanchor_333_333" id="FNanchor_333_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a> now, as <i>bh&aacute;va</i> is "existence," the
+meaning of a root is really existence.<a name="FNanchor_334_334" id="FNanchor_334_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a> Others say that a root
+should be defined as that which expresses "action" (<i>kriy&aacute;</i>); but here
+again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
+"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
+subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
+line&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Others say that action (<i>kriy&aacute;</i>) is a genus, residing in
+many individuals."</p></div>
+
+<p>So, too, if we accept P&aacute;&#7751;ini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
+affixes <i>tva</i> and <i>tal</i> come after a word [denoting anything], when we
+speak of the nature (<i>bh&aacute;va</i>) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
+that abstract terms ending in <i>tva</i> or <i>t&aacute;</i> [as <i>a&#347;vatva</i> and
+<i>a&#347;vat&aacute;</i>] are used in the sense of <i>bh&aacute;va</i>, that they do express
+"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
+coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
+phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
+space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
+Such is the meaning of Hari's two <i>k&aacute;rik&aacute;s</i> quoted above. So, too, it
+is laid down in the discussion on <i>sambandha</i> [in Hari's verses] that
+the ultimate meaning of all <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span>words is that something whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
+Substance.</p>
+
+<p>"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
+substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
+object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
+discrimination,<a name="FNanchor_335_335" id="FNanchor_335_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
+[without owners] is expressed."<a name="FNanchor_336_336" id="FNanchor_336_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a></p>
+
+<p>So, too, the author of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya, when explaining the
+V&aacute;rttika,<a name="FNanchor_337_337" id="FNanchor_337_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
+in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
+meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
+determined by various unreal<a name="FNanchor_338_338" id="FNanchor_338_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_338_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> conditions [as "the nature of
+horse," &amp;c.]</p>
+
+<p>According to the opinion of V&aacute;japy&aacute;yana, who maintains that all words
+mean a genus, words like "cow," &amp;c.,<a name="FNanchor_339_339" id="FNanchor_339_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a> denote a genus which resides
+by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
+apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
+particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &amp;c.,
+denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
+connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
+connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
+in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
+the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
+into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
+produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &amp;c.,"
+we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,<a name="FNanchor_340_340" id="FNanchor_340_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> &amp;c. [as directly
+denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
+denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in <i>pa&#7789;hati</i>, "he reads," &amp;c.,
+since we find here a meaning common to all who read.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span></p><p>In the doctrine of Vy&aacute;&#7693;i, who maintained that words meant individual
+things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
+forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
+[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
+"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."<a name="FNanchor_341_341" id="FNanchor_341_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a></p>
+
+<p>Both views are allowed by the great teacher P&aacute;&#7751;ini; since in i. 2, 58,
+he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
+"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
+optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Br&aacute;hman is to be honoured,"
+which may equally run, "Br&aacute;hmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
+64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
+where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
+things similar in form" [<i>i.e.</i>, the dual means R&aacute;ma and R&aacute;ma, and the
+plural means R&aacute;ma, and R&aacute;ma and R&aacute;ma; but we retain only one, adding a
+dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
+assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
+Therefore both theories are in a sense true;<a name="FNanchor_342_342" id="FNanchor_342_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a> but the real fact is
+that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.</p>
+
+<p>As it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
+true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
+shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."</p></div>
+
+<p>Hari also, in his chapter discussing <i>sambandha</i>, thus describes the
+nature of this true meaning&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
+perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
+doubt,<a name="FNanchor_343_343" id="FNanchor_343_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> <i>that</i> only is called the truth by those who
+know the end of the three Vedas."</p></div>
+
+<p>So too in his description of substance, he says&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>That</i> which remains as the Real during the presence of
+modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
+earring,&mdash;<i>that</i> wherein change comes and goes, <i>that</i> they
+call the Supreme Nature."</p></div>
+
+<p>The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
+to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
+cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
+identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
+thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
+souls."<a name="FNanchor_344_344" id="FNanchor_344_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a></p>
+
+<p>The meaning of this K&aacute;rik&aacute; is that Brahman is the one object denoted
+by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
+it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
+the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
+result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
+power of "concealment"<a name="FNanchor_345_345" id="FNanchor_345_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
+conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
+the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Ved&aacute;nta lore tell us&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
+of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
+development of illusion likewise."</p></div>
+
+<p>When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
+joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
+ignorance is abolished, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span>final bliss is accomplished, which is best
+defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
+text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
+Supreme Brahman."<a name="FNanchor_346_346" id="FNanchor_346_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> And thus we establish the fact that the
+"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
+diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
+science of sciences."<a name="FNanchor_347_347" id="FNanchor_347_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>And so again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
+final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
+travellers to emancipation."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore our final conclusion is that the &#346;&aacute;stra of grammar should be
+studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_307_307" id="Footnote_307_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
+adopted and fully developed the idea of the P&uacute;rva-M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; school that
+sound is eternal. He therefore treats of <i>spho&#7789;a</i> here, and not in his
+Jaimini chapter.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_308_308" id="Footnote_308_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_309_309" id="Footnote_309_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309_309"><span class="label">[309]</span></a> <i>&#346;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sana</i>, if judged by the apparent sense of
+P&aacute;&#7751;ini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
+because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
+whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
+an agent expressed <i>as well as</i> an object, <i>i.e.</i>, if such a word as
+<i>&aacute;ch&aacute;rye&#7751;a</i> followed. In the example given, we cannot say <i>&aacute;&#347;charyo
+godoho &#347;ikshitena gop&aacute;lena</i> (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
+can we say <i>&aacute;&#347;charyo gav&aacute;&#7747; doho' &#347;ikshitasya gop&aacute;lasya</i> (as it would
+violate ii. 3, 66).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_310_310" id="Footnote_310_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_310_310"><span class="label">[310]</span></a> That is, the <i>ubhayapr&aacute;pti</i> of ii. 3, 66, is a
+<i>bahuvr&iacute;hi</i> agreeing with <i>k&#7771;iti</i> in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
+discussed at some length in the Commentaries on P&aacute;&#7751;ini.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_311_311" id="Footnote_311_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311_311"><span class="label">[311]</span></a> These actually occur in the Commentaries to P&aacute;&#7751;ini, ii.
+2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_312_312" id="Footnote_312_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312_312"><span class="label">[312]</span></a> This takes in all cases of relation, <i>sambandha</i>
+(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>shash&#7789;h&iacute;-sambandha</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_313_313" id="Footnote_313_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_313_313"><span class="label">[313]</span></a> As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_314_314" id="Footnote_314_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314_314"><span class="label">[314]</span></a> These compounds occur in P&aacute;&#7751;ini's own s&uacute;tras (i. 4, 30,
+and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
+to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
+<i>shash&#7789;h&iacute; &#347;eshe</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_315_315" id="Footnote_315_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_315_315"><span class="label">[315]</span></a> The very word <i>&#347;abda</i> in <i>&#347;abd&aacute;nu&#347;&aacute;sanam</i> implies the
+Veda, since this is pre-eminently <i>&#347;abda</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_316_316" id="Footnote_316_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_316_316"><span class="label">[316]</span></a> Compare Max M&uuml;ller, <i>Sansk. Liter.</i>, p. 113. It is
+quoted as from the Veda in the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_317_317" id="Footnote_317_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_317_317"><span class="label">[317]</span></a> In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele <i>da&#7751;&#7693;a</i> in line 3
+after <i>bhavet</i>, and insert it in line 4 after <i>&#347;abd&aacute;n&aacute;m</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_318_318" id="Footnote_318_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318_318"><span class="label">[318]</span></a> As in the so-called <i>pada</i> text.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_319_319" id="Footnote_319_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_319_319"><span class="label">[319]</span></a> See Ballantyne's <i>Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya</i>, pp. 12, 64.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_320_320" id="Footnote_320_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_320_320"><span class="label">[320]</span></a> <i>Ach&iacute;kramata</i> seems put here as a purposely false form
+of the frequentative of <i>kram</i> for <i>acha&#7749;kramyata</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_321_321" id="Footnote_321_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_321_321"><span class="label">[321]</span></a> Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
+lines of Bhart&#7771;ihari which immediately follow.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_322_322" id="Footnote_322_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_322_322"><span class="label">[322]</span></a> One would naturally supply <i>&#347;abdasya</i> after <i>s&aacute;myam</i>,
+but the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya has <i>na&#7717; s&aacute;myam</i> (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_323_323" id="Footnote_323_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_323_323"><span class="label">[323]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, prepositions used separately as governing cases
+of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_324_324" id="Footnote_324_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_324_324"><span class="label">[324]</span></a> The <i>karmapravachan&iacute;yas</i> imply a verb other than the one
+expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
+by this understood verb. Thus in the example, <i>&#346;&aacute;kalyasa&#7747;hit&aacute;m anu
+pr&aacute;varshat</i>, "he rained after the &#346;&aacute;kalya hymns," <i>anu</i> implies an
+understood verb <i>ni&#347;amya</i>, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
+is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
+<i>anu</i> is said to determine this relation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_325_325" id="Footnote_325_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_325_325"><span class="label">[325]</span></a> See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_326_326" id="Footnote_326_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_326_326"><span class="label">[326]</span></a> This is not very clear, the <i>anu</i> in <i>anugraha</i> might
+mean <i>krame&#7751;a</i>, and so imply the successive order of the letters.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_327_327" id="Footnote_327_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_327_327"><span class="label">[327]</span></a> In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
+<i>kalpam</i> for <i>kalpanam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_328_328" id="Footnote_328_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_328_328"><span class="label">[328]</span></a> In p. 142, line 3, I add <i>vin&aacute;</i> after <i>nimittam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_329_329" id="Footnote_329_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329_329"><span class="label">[329]</span></a> The gha&#7789;&#7789;a is the place where dues and taxes are
+collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
+by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
+dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means <i>udde&#347;y&aacute;siddhi</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_330_330" id="Footnote_330_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330_330"><span class="label">[330]</span></a> In p. 143, line 13, I read <i>spho&#7789;akabh&aacute;vam</i> for
+<i>spho&#7789;&aacute;bh&aacute;vam</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_331_331" id="Footnote_331_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_331_331"><span class="label">[331]</span></a> Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya, pp. 9,
+32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_332_332" id="Footnote_332_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_332_332"><span class="label">[332]</span></a> The M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&acirc; holds that a word means the genus (<i>j&aacute;ti</i>)
+and not the individual (<i>vyakti</i>); the Ny&aacute;ya holds that a word means
+an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_333_333" id="Footnote_333_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_333_333"><span class="label">[333]</span></a> Cf. Rig-Veda Pr&aacute;ti&#347;. xii. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_334_334" id="Footnote_334_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_334_334"><span class="label">[334]</span></a> He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
+the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_335_335" id="Footnote_335_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_335_335"><span class="label">[335]</span></a> Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_336_336" id="Footnote_336_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_336_336"><span class="label">[336]</span></a> So by the words "horse," "cow," &amp;c., Brahman is really
+meant, the one abiding existence.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_337_337" id="Footnote_337_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337_337"><span class="label">[337]</span></a> Cf. Ballantyne's Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya, pp. 44, 50.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_338_338" id="Footnote_338_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338_338"><span class="label">[338]</span></a> In p. 145, line 8, read <i>asatya</i> for <i>a&#347;vattha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_339_339" id="Footnote_339_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_339_339"><span class="label">[339]</span></a> We have here the well-known four grammatical
+categories, <i>j&aacute;ti</i>, <i>guna</i>, <i>dravya</i> or <i>sa&#7749;jn&aacute;</i>, and <i>kriy&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_340_340" id="Footnote_340_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340_340"><span class="label">[340]</span></a> But cf. Siddh. Mukt&aacute;v., p. 6, line 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_341_341" id="Footnote_341_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_341_341"><span class="label">[341]</span></a> Thus we read in the Siddh&aacute;nta Mukt&aacute;vali, p. 82, that
+the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
+since otherwise there would be <i>vyabhich&aacute;ra</i> and <i>&aacute;nantya</i> (cf. also
+Mahe&#347;achandra Ny&aacute;yaratna's note, K&aacute;vya-prak&aacute;&#347;a, p. 10). If a word is
+held to mean only <i>one</i> individual, there will be the first fault, as
+it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
+include; if it is held to mean <i>many</i> individuals, it will have an
+endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_342_342" id="Footnote_342_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_342_342"><span class="label">[342]</span></a> This seems the meaning of the text as printed <i>tasm&aacute;t
+dvaya&#7747; satyam</i>, but I should prefer to read conjecturally <i>tasm&aacute;d
+advaya&#7747; satyam</i>, "therefore non-duality is the truth."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_343_343" id="Footnote_343_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_343_343"><span class="label">[343]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
+exists.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_344_344" id="Footnote_344_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344_344"><span class="label">[344]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> the individual soul (<i>j&iacute;va</i>) and Brahman.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_345_345" id="Footnote_345_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345_345"><span class="label">[345]</span></a> The <i>Sa&#7747;v&#7771;iti</i> of the text seems to correspond to the
+<i>&aacute;vara&#7751;a</i> so frequent in Ved&aacute;nta books.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_346_346" id="Footnote_346_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_346_346"><span class="label">[346]</span></a> This passage is quoted in the Maitr&iacute; Upanishad, vi.
+22.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_347_347" id="Footnote_347_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347_347"><span class="label">[347]</span></a> <i>Adhividyam</i> occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
+it is explained by [']Sa&#7747;kara as <i>vidy&aacute;sv adhi yad dar[']sana&#7747; tad
+adhividyam</i>.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE S&Aacute;NKHYA-DAR&#346;ANA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
+by the grammarians, following the guidance of the <i>p&uacute;rva</i> and <i>uttara</i>
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; schools], when the system of development propounded by the
+S&aacute;&#7749;khyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
+the &#346;&aacute;stra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
+several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent<a name="FNanchor_348_348" id="FNanchor_348_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> only,
+that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
+and that which is neither. (<i>a.</i>) Of these the first is that which is
+only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
+itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
+the evolvent (<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
+of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
+expressed [in the S&aacute;&#7749;khya K&aacute;rik&aacute;], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
+It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
+the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
+&amp;c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
+should have a <i>regressus ad infinitum</i>. Nor can you reply that such a
+<i>regressus ad infinitum</i> is no objection, if, like the continued
+series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
+senses,<a name="FNanchor_349_349" id="FNanchor_349_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a>&mdash;because here there is no evidence to establish the
+hypothesis. (<i>b.</i>) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
+egoism, and the subtile elements,&mdash;thus the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span>S&aacute;&#7749;khya K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 3),
+"the seven, the great one, &amp;c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
+the seven principles, called the great one, &amp;c. Among these the great
+principle, called also the intellect,<a name="FNanchor_350_350" id="FNanchor_350_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> &amp;c., is itself the evolute
+of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
+egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (<i>abhim&aacute;na</i>), is the evolute
+of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
+the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
+subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
+the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
+perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
+action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
+mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
+our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
+cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
+by &Iacute;&#347;vara K&#7771;ish&#7751;a in his K&aacute;rik&aacute;s<a name="FNanchor_351_351" id="FNanchor_351_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> (&sect; 24-27), "Self-consciousness
+is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
+the five elemental rudiments. From modified<a name="FNanchor_352_352" id="FNanchor_352_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> egoism originates the
+class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
+elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
+darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
+one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
+ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
+voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
+mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
+organ (like the other ten) from having a common <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span>property with
+them."<a name="FNanchor_353_353" id="FNanchor_353_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> All this has been explained at length by the teacher
+V&aacute;chaspati Mi&#347;ra in the S&aacute;&#7749;khya-tattva-kaumud&iacute;.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c.</i>) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &amp;c.,
+and the eleven organs, as said in the K&aacute;rik&aacute;, "The evolute consists of
+sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
+evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &amp;c., are the evolvents
+of such productions as cows, jars, &amp;c., yet these are not a different
+"principle" (<i>tattva</i>) from earth, &amp;c., and therefore earth, &amp;c., are
+not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
+that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
+jars, &amp;c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
+consequence of their being all alike gross [<i>i.e.</i>, possessed of
+dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
+ether, &amp;c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
+and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
+precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
+two, three, four, and five qualities.<a name="FNanchor_354_354" id="FNanchor_354_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a> The creation of the organs
+has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the S&aacute;&#7749;khya
+K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 22)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
+this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
+proceed the five gross elements."</p></div>
+
+<p>(<i>d.</i>) The soul is neither,&mdash;as is said in the K&aacute;rik&aacute;, "The soul is
+neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
+eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
+nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
+establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 4).</p>
+
+<p>"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
+acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span>they comprise every mode
+of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
+which is to be proven."</p>
+
+<p>Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
+effect. The Saugatas<a name="FNanchor_355_355" id="FNanchor_355_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a> maintain that the existent is produced from
+the non-existent; the Naiy&aacute;yikas, &amp;c., that the (as yet) non-existent
+is produced from the existent; the Ved&aacute;ntins, that all effects are an
+illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
+existent; while the S&aacute;&#7749;khyas hold that the existent is produced from
+the existent.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a.</i>) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
+itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
+than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
+identical.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b.</i>) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
+it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
+originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
+produced, <i>i.e.</i>, become connected with existence; for not even the
+cleverest man living can make blue yellow.<a name="FNanchor_356_356" id="FNanchor_356_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> If you say, "But are
+not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
+incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
+regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
+the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
+existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
+produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
+the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
+milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
+the production of a thing previously non-existent.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
+with it or not connected; in the former <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span>alternative the effect's
+existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
+two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
+from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
+of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the S&aacute;&#7749;khya
+teacher:&mdash;"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
+no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
+who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
+utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
+not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
+capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
+from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
+allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
+oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
+non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
+whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
+not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
+apply here].</p>
+
+<p>From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
+that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
+is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
+[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
+we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
+cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
+other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
+is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
+its cause.<a name="FNanchor_357_357" id="FNanchor_357_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> If you object that, if this were true, the separate
+threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
+office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
+of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
+limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span>and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
+as cloth, &amp;c., of a cause, as threads, &amp;c., when they come forth and
+are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
+concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
+as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
+existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute; (ii. 16)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
+non-existence for the existent."</p></div>
+
+<p>And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
+the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>). This has
+been said [in the K&aacute;rik&aacute;, &sect; 9]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
+cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
+selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
+every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
+is competent; and like is produced from like."<a name="FNanchor_358_358" id="FNanchor_358_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Nor can we say [with the Ved&aacute;ntin] that the world is an illusory
+emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
+contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the <i>prim&acirc;
+facie</i> belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
+of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
+discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
+nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
+unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
+to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
+mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
+similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:&mdash;The subject of
+the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
+endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
+a cause endued <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span>with the same,&mdash;thus a ring has gold for its material
+cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
+case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
+composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
+goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
+activity;<a name="FNanchor_359_359" id="FNanchor_359_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_359_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
+darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
+(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>prak&#7771;iti</i>, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
+found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
+happiness is found in his wife Satyavat&iacute;, because the quality of
+"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
+her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
+towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
+possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
+manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
+causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
+viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
+being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
+the word <i>moha</i> is derived from the root <i>muh</i>, "to be confused,"
+since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
+which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
+composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
+Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
+in the &#346;vet&aacute;&#347;vatara Upanishad (iv. 5)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
+unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
+a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
+her when once she has been enjoyed."</p></div>
+
+<p>Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
+"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span>their severally
+possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
+concealing.</p>
+
+<p>Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
+Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
+produce these effects, intellect, &amp;c.? therefore there must be some
+intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
+supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
+unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
+experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
+intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
+the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
+unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
+unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
+has been said in the K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 57)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
+calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."</p></div>
+
+<p>But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
+which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
+existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
+hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
+act thus <i>before</i> or <i>after</i> creation? If you say "before," we reply
+that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &amp;c., there will be
+no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
+living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
+compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
+reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
+created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
+at all], and on the other hand<a name="FNanchor_360_360" id="FNanchor_360_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> that He compassionated after He
+had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
+Nature [even without any intelligent <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span>superintendent]&mdash;in the order of
+the series intellect, self-consciousness, &amp;c.,&mdash;is caused by the union
+of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
+as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
+unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
+proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
+caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
+blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
+experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
+the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
+fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
+recognising its own distinction therefrom.<a name="FNanchor_361_361" id="FNanchor_361_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_361_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a> This final bliss [or
+absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
+Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
+Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,<a name="FNanchor_362_362" id="FNanchor_362_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a>
+travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
+separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
+dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
+mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
+indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
+man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
+effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
+dependent. This has been said in the K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 21)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
+separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
+and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."</p></div>
+
+<p>"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
+the soul, but how do you account for its <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span>ceasing to act?" I reply,
+that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
+does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
+retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
+the K&aacute;rik&aacute; (&sect; 59)&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
+desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
+manifested herself to Soul."</p></div>
+
+<p>For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
+of the atheistic S&aacute;&#7749;khya School, been propounded.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_348_348" id="Footnote_348_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348_348"><span class="label">[348]</span></a> I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_349_349" id="Footnote_349_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349_349"><span class="label">[349]</span></a> Compare Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, i. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_350_350" id="Footnote_350_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_350_350"><span class="label">[350]</span></a> One great defect in the S&aacute;&#7749;khya nomenclature is the
+ambiguity between the terms for intellect (<i>buddh&iacute;</i>) and those for
+mind (<i>manas</i>). M&aacute;dhava here applies to the former the term
+<i>anta&#7717;kara&#7751;a</i> or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
+have ventured to alter it in the translation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_351_351" id="Footnote_351_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_351_351"><span class="label">[351]</span></a> It is singular that this is M&aacute;dhava's principal S&aacute;&#7749;khya
+authority, and not the S&aacute;&#7749;khya S&uacute;tras.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_352_352" id="Footnote_352_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352_352"><span class="label">[352]</span></a> <i>Vaik&#7771;ita</i> is here a technical term meaning that
+goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this K&aacute;rik&aacute;,
+comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the S&aacute;&#7749;khya-s&aacute;ra, pp. 30-35.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_353_353" id="Footnote_353_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_353_353"><span class="label">[353]</span></a> As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
+reading <i>sa&#7747;kalpavikalp&aacute;tmakam</i> must be corrected by the S&aacute;&#7749;khya
+K&aacute;rik&aacute;.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_354_354" id="Footnote_354_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_354_354"><span class="label">[354]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The <i>tanm&aacute;tras</i>
+will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
+elements.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_355_355" id="Footnote_355_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_355_355"><span class="label">[355]</span></a> A name of the Buddhists.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_356_356" id="Footnote_356_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_356_356"><span class="label">[356]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the nature of a thing (<i>Svabh&aacute;va</i>) cannot be
+altered&mdash;a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_357_357" id="Footnote_357_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_357_357"><span class="label">[357]</span></a> I take <i>arth&aacute;ntaram</i> here as simply <i>bhinnam</i> (cf.
+T&aacute;r&aacute;n&aacute;tha Tarkav&aacute;chaspati's note, <i>Tattva Kaumud&iacute;</i>, p. 47).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_358_358" id="Footnote_358_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_358_358"><span class="label">[358]</span></a> Colebrooke's translation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359_359" id="Footnote_359_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359_359"><span class="label">[359]</span></a> Or "passion," <i>rajas</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_360_360" id="Footnote_360_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_360_360"><span class="label">[360]</span></a> In other words&mdash;on the one hand the existing misery of
+beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
+and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
+caused their misery at all.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_361_361" id="Footnote_361_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_361_361"><span class="label">[361]</span></a> Bondage, &amp;c., reside in the intellect, and are only
+<i>reflected</i> upon soul through its proximity (cf.
+<i>S&aacute;&#7749;khyapravachanabh&aacute;shya</i>, i. 58).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_362_362" id="Footnote_362_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_362_362"><span class="label">[362]</span></a> This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
+is found in the Babylonian Talmud, <i>Sanhedrim</i>, fol. 91, <i>b</i>, and in
+the Gesta Romanorum.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV.</h2>
+
+<h2>THE PATANJALI-DARS&Aacute;NA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
+opinions of such Munis as Pata&ntilde;jali and others, who originated the
+system of the Theistic S&aacute;&#7749;khya philosophy. This school follows the
+so-called Yoga &#346;&aacute;stra promulgated by Pata&ntilde;jali, and consisting of four
+chapters, which also bears the name of the "S&aacute;&#7749;khya Pravachana," or
+detailed explanation of the S&aacute;&#7749;khya.<a name="FNanchor_363_363" id="FNanchor_363_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_363_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> In the first chapter thereof
+the venerable Pata&ntilde;jali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
+exposition of Concentration" (<i>yoga</i>), avowed his commencement of the
+Yoga &#346;&aacute;stra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
+his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
+the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
+Meditation (<i>sam&aacute;dhi</i>). In the second chapter, in the series of
+aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
+mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
+the practical part of <i>yoga</i> proper to him whose mind is not yet
+thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
+or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
+series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
+spot," he expounds the three internal subservients&mdash;attention,
+contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
+"subjugation" (<i>sa&#7747;yama</i>), and also the various superhuman powers
+which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span>are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
+series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
+mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
+Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
+"perfections" (<i>siddhis</i>). This school accepts the old twenty-five
+principles [of the S&aacute;&#7749;khya], "Nature," &amp;c.; only adding the Supreme
+Being as the twenty-sixth&mdash;a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
+fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
+to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,<a name="FNanchor_364_364" id="FNanchor_364_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a> and
+is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
+of mundane existence.</p>
+
+<p>"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
+of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
+Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
+Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
+is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
+influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
+quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
+declared&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
+understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
+torment,<a name="FNanchor_365_365" id="FNanchor_365_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p>
+
+<p>And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
+identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."</p></div>
+
+<p>It has been also said by Pata&ntilde;jali,<a name="FNanchor_366_366" id="FNanchor_366_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_366_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> "The power of the enjoyer,
+which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
+object which is developed and transferred experiences the
+modifications thereof."</p>
+
+<p>Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
+the soul; and in an object which is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span>"developed" and "transferred," or
+reflected,&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, in the thinking principle or the understanding,&mdash;it
+experiences the modifications thereof, <i>i.e.</i>, the power of intelligence,
+being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
+understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
+in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
+and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
+the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
+thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
+forbearance, religious observance, &amp;c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
+for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
+length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
+between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
+ignorance, &amp;c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
+desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
+undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.</p>
+
+<p>The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
+concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
+intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
+object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
+and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
+word "now" (<i>atha</i>) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
+[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
+be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
+<i>atha</i>; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
+particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
+gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '<i>Atha</i>
+is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,&mdash;after,&mdash;now
+(inceptive),&mdash;what? (interrogatively),&mdash;and all (comprehensively).'
+Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
+comprehensiveness;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> but since there are four senses certainly
+suitable, <i>i.e.</i>, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
+previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
+singling out the <i>last</i>." This objection, however, will not stand, for
+it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
+"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
+whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
+general definition of causation,<a name="FNanchor_367_367" id="FNanchor_367_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a> <i>i.e.</i>, "previous existence
+[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
+accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
+inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
+something else; and since this is at once understood without any
+direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
+<i>atha</i> to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
+because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
+does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &amp;c., yet
+these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
+exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
+[which the presumed <i>cause</i> should have]. "But why should we not hold
+that the word <i>atha</i> implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
+predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
+mind, &amp;c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
+(<i>anu&#347;&aacute;sana</i>), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
+which the <i>yoga</i> is explained, accompanied with definitions,
+divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
+such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &amp;c., the
+rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
+follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
+others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
+knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &amp;c., as their precursors,
+in accordance with the words of &#346;ruti: "Therefore <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span>having become
+tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
+and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."<a name="FNanchor_368_368" id="FNanchor_368_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> Nor can the word
+<i>atha</i> imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
+knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
+even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
+mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
+produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
+[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
+exposition of the <i>yoga</i> ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
+or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
+presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
+must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.<a name="FNanchor_369_369" id="FNanchor_369_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> But it
+is clear that the exposition in question <i>is</i> such a cause, since we
+have such a passage of the &#346;ruti as that [in the Ka&#7789;ha Upanishad, ii.
+12]: "By the acquirement of <i>yoga</i> or intense concentration on the
+Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
+sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Sm&#7771;iti as that [in the
+Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute;, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
+will then attain <i>yoga</i>." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
+interpret <i>atha</i> as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
+previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
+course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &amp;c. [to render the body
+strong].</p>
+
+<p>But in the case of the Ved&aacute;nta S&uacute;tras, which open with the aphorism,
+"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," &#346;a&#7749;kara &Aacute;ch&aacute;rya
+has declared that the inceptive meaning of <i>atha</i> must be left out of
+the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
+will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
+<i>i.e.</i>, that this desire must follow a previous <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span>course of
+tranquillity, &amp;c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
+the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
+contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
+to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
+so-called "means."<a name="FNanchor_370_370" id="FNanchor_370_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_370_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a></p>
+
+<p>"Well, then, let us grant that <i>atha</i> cannot mean 'after;' but why
+should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
+be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
+auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
+unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
+being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
+auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of <i>yoga</i>, since it is
+in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.<a name="FNanchor_371_371" id="FNanchor_371_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> Therefore
+it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
+that "the exposition of the <i>yoga</i> is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
+cannot be either the primary meaning of <i>atha</i> or its secondary
+meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
+auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
+drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
+the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
+auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
+unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"<a name="FNanchor_372_372" id="FNanchor_372_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> We reply,
+that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
+meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
+of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
+"verbal expectancy<a name="FNanchor_373_373" id="FNanchor_373_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> can be fulfilled by <i>words</i> alone."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span></p><p>"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
+the beginning of a &#346;&aacute;stra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
+would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
+begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
+it has been said by the wise, 'Those &#347;&aacute;stras become widely famous
+which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
+auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
+invincible in disputation'?<a name="FNanchor_374_374" id="FNanchor_374_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> Now the word <i>atha</i> implies
+'auspiciousness,' since there is a Sm&#7771;iti which says,</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'The word <i>Om</i> and the word <i>atha</i>,&mdash;these two in the
+ancient time,</p>
+
+<p>"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
+are both auspicious.'</p></div>
+
+<p>"Therefore let the word <i>atha</i> stand here as signifying
+'auspiciousness,' like the word '<i>v&#7771;iddhi</i>' used by P&aacute;&#7751;ini in his
+opening s&uacute;tra '<i>v&#7771;iddhir &aacute;d aich</i>.'"<a name="FNanchor_375_375" id="FNanchor_375_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_375_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> This view, however, is
+untenable; since the very word <i>atha</i>, when heard, has an auspicious
+influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
+signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &amp;c. [is
+auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
+can the particle <i>atha</i> have any other effect, if it is specially used
+here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
+new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly <i>can</i> have such
+other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
+some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
+journey.<a name="FNanchor_376_376" id="FNanchor_376_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> Nor does this contradict the sm&#7771;iti, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span>since the sm&#7771;iti
+will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
+only that they produce an auspicious effect.</p>
+
+<p>Nor can the particle <i>atha</i> have here the meaning of "reference to a
+previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
+apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
+already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
+as to whether this particular <i>atha</i> means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
+if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
+would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
+has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
+exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the <i>atha</i> of the s&uacute;tra,
+the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
+T&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;ya Br&aacute;hma&#7751;a, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
+this is the Vi&#347;vajyotis,"<a name="FNanchor_377_377" id="FNanchor_377_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> the particle <i>atha</i> is accepted as
+signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
+just as the <i>atha</i> in the commencement of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya, "now comes the
+exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
+Grammar. This has been declared by Vy&aacute;sa in his Commentary on the Yoga
+Aphorisms, "the <i>atha</i> in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
+and V&aacute;chaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
+be considered as settled that the <i>atha</i> here indicates a commencement and
+also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span>that this
+<i>atha</i> implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
+after a successful understanding of the &#347;&aacute;stra through the attainment of
+the <i>yoga</i>, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
+explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
+the sm&#7771;iti of Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya say, 'Hira&#7751;yagarbha is the promulgator of the
+Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Pata&ntilde;jali the teacher
+thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
+Pata&ntilde;jali,<a name="FNanchor_378_378" id="FNanchor_378_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_378_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
+to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
+Pur&aacute;&#7751;as, &amp;c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
+<i>anu&#347;&aacute;sana</i>,&mdash;the preposition <i>anu</i> implying that it was a teaching which
+followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
+the system.</p>
+
+<p>Since this <i>atha</i> in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
+meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
+institute for the exposition of the <i>yoga</i> is now commenced." In this
+institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
+is <i>yoga</i> [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
+fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
+(<i>kaivalya</i>) is the highest "end" of the <i>yoga</i> when it is produced.
+The "connection" between the institute and <i>yoga</i> is that of the
+producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between <i>yoga</i>
+and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
+well known from &#346;ruti and Sm&#7771;iti, as I have before shown. And it is
+established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
+are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
+one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
+opening aphorism of the Ved&aacute;nta s&uacute;tras, "Now, therefore, there is a
+wish to know Brahman;" and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span>lest here, too, we should seek to
+establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
+liberation are duly qualified students of the Ved&aacute;nta. For the word
+<i>atha</i>, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
+a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
+regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
+question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
+the context. Hence it has been said, "When &#346;ruti comes [as the
+determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
+place."<a name="FNanchor_379_379" id="FNanchor_379_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
+not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
+the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
+we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
+interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
+of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
+"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
+or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
+would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
+"<i>&#347;ruti</i>"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
+it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
+14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
+the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'&mdash;when any of these come into
+collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
+more remote"<a name="FNanchor_380_380" id="FNanchor_380_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_380_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
+summed up&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
+precluded by any of the preceding modes;</p>
+
+<p>"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
+precludes, depends on circumstances."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
+settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
+preliminaries, the study of the &#346;&aacute;stra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
+be commenced like that of the Ved&aacute;nta, which discusses the nature of
+Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
+be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
+the &#346;&aacute;stra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
+which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the &#346;&aacute;stra,
+especially directed thereto, this &#346;&aacute;stra is the means for its
+production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
+concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
+operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, <i>i.e.</i>, his lifting his arm up
+and down, &amp;c., relate rather to the instrument, <i>i.e.</i>, the axe, than
+to the object, <i>i.e.</i>, the tree, so here the speaker, Pata&ntilde;jali, in
+his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-&#346;&aacute;stra as his primary
+object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
+"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
+that the commencing the Yoga&#347;&aacute;stra is that which primarily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span>claims our
+attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
+the mind, is what is to be expounded in this S&aacute;&#347;tra. "But as we read
+in the lists of roots that the root <i>yuj</i> is used in the sense of
+'joining,' should not the word <i>yoga</i>, its derivative, mean
+'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
+Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya:<a name="FNanchor_381_381" id="FNanchor_381_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
+called <i>yoga</i>.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
+action,<a name="FNanchor_382_382" id="FNanchor_382_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> &amp;c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
+souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
+opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
+conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
+Vai&#347;eshika and Ny&aacute;ya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
+theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
+M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; [or Ved&aacute;nta], our Yoga&#347;&aacute;stra would be rendered nugatory by this
+concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
+identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
+something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
+be produced by our &#346;&aacute;stra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
+used in many different senses, the root <i>yuj</i> may very well be used here
+in the sense of "contemplation."<a name="FNanchor_383_383" id="FNanchor_383_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> Thus it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Particles, prepositions, and roots&mdash;these three are all
+held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
+are their evidence."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore some authors expressly give <i>yuj</i> in this sense, and insert
+in their lists "<i>yuj</i> in the sense of <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i>." Nor does this
+contradict Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya's declaration, as the word <i>yoga</i>, used by him,
+may bear this meaning; and he has himself said&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Sam&aacute;dhi</i> is the state of identity of the individual and
+supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
+<i>sam&aacute;dhi</i> of the individual soul."</p></div>
+
+<p>It has been also said by the venerable Vy&aacute;sa [in his Commentary on the
+Yoga-s&uacute;tras, i. 1], "<i>Yoga is sam&aacute;dhi</i>."</p>
+
+<p>An objection however, may be here raised that "the term <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i> is
+used by Pata&ntilde;jali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
+ancillary parts<a name="FNanchor_384_384" id="FNanchor_384_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_384_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> of the eightfold concentration (or <i>yoga</i>); and
+the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
+principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
+other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
+we see in the <i>dar&#347;ap&uacute;r&#7751;am&aacute;sa</i> sacrifices and their ancillary rites
+the <i>pray&aacute;jas</i>, and therefore <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i> cannot be the meaning of
+<i>yoga</i>." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
+although the term <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i> is used for etymological reasons<a name="FNanchor_385_385" id="FNanchor_385_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> to
+express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
+contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
+devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
+to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
+declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
+ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
+alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
+<i>go</i>, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root <i>gam</i>, "to
+go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
+words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
+would properly be called <i>go</i>, "a bull;" and, moreover, the S&uacute;tra, i.
+2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
+in this sense when it declares that "concentration (<i>yoga</i>) is the
+suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
+second or principal sense of <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i> will therefore be quite
+distinct from the first or inferior.]</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span></p><p>"But surely if <i>yoga</i> is held to be the suppression of the
+modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
+abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
+their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
+abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
+antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
+the counter-entity to these negations;<a name="FNanchor_386_386" id="FNanchor_386_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_386_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> and consequently in
+accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
+the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
+soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
+because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
+hindered,<a name="FNanchor_387_387" id="FNanchor_387_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
+"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
+(<i>chitta</i>), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
+unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
+perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
+intelligent soul<a name="FNanchor_388_388" id="FNanchor_388_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a> has not been proved, since there is an argument
+to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
+the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
+is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &amp;c. And so again, if this
+soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
+occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
+modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
+always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
+pure substance<a name="FNanchor_389_389" id="FNanchor_389_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_389_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> which abides always the same; and as it is this
+which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
+substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
+an <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span>impression;<a name="FNanchor_390_390" id="FNanchor_390_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a> and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
+proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
+and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
+understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
+not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
+"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
+susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
+influence of the object which resembles the magnet,&mdash;this influence or
+want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
+knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
+spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
+with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
+knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
+although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
+given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
+certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
+of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
+understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
+that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
+as these do iron,&mdash;coming in contact with it through the channels of
+the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
+understanding, not to the soul; and so says the &#346;ruti, "Desire,
+volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
+firmness,&mdash;all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pa&ntilde;cha&#347;ikha
+declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
+that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Pata&ntilde;jali also (iv. 18), "The
+modifications of the understanding are always known,&mdash;this arises from
+the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
+argument drawn out formally to establish the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span>changeableness of the
+understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
+various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
+of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
+notoriously threefold, <i>i.e.</i>, a change of "property," of
+"aspect,"<a name="FNanchor_391_391" id="FNanchor_391_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> and of "condition." When the subject, the
+understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &amp;c., there is a change of
+"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
+diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
+becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
+when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation<a name="FNanchor_392_392" id="FNanchor_392_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a> of the
+perception, as of blue, &amp;c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
+newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
+condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
+reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
+there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
+and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
+"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.</p>
+
+<p>[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
+said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '<i>yoga</i> is the
+suppression of the modifications of the <i>chitta</i>,' this will apply
+also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
+suspension] of the modifications found in <i>kshipta</i>, <i>vikshipta</i>,
+<i>m&uacute;&#7693;ha</i>,<a name="FNanchor_393_393" id="FNanchor_393_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> &amp;c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
+for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
+<i>kshipta</i>, &amp;c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
+attainment of the <i>summum bonum</i>. Let us examine this more closely.
+For the understanding is called <i>kshipta</i>, 'restless,' when it is
+restless [with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span>an excess of the quality <i>rajas</i>], as being tossed
+about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called <i>m&uacute;&#7693;ha</i>,
+'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
+sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality <i>tamas</i>].
+It is called <i>vikshipta</i>, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
+first state<a name="FNanchor_394_394" id="FNanchor_394_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a> [as filled with the quality <i>sattva</i>]." We must here,
+however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
+Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute; (vi. 34), 'The mind, O K&#7771;ish&#7751;a, is fickle, turbulent,
+violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
+occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
+but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
+&amp;c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
+Yoga S&uacute;tras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
+laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
+attain some stage, and instability,&mdash;these distractions of the mind
+are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &amp;c., caused by
+the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
+mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
+two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
+means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
+heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
+attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
+notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
+failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
+meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
+even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
+we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
+laid down as the definition of <i>yoga</i>.</p>
+
+<p>We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
+three conditions of the mind called <i>kshipta</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span><i>m&uacute;&#7693;ha</i>, and
+<i>vikshipta</i>, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
+all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
+modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
+[and so cannot be called <i>yoga</i>], this does not apply to the other two
+conditions called <i>ek&aacute;gra</i> and <i>niruddha</i>, which are to be pursued and
+attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
+two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as <i>yoga</i>. Now
+by <i>ek&aacute;gra</i> we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
+<i>sattva</i> quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
+<i>niruddha</i> we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
+and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.</p>
+
+<p>Now this <i>sam&aacute;dhi</i>, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
+in which there is distinct recognition" (<i>sa&#7747;praj&ntilde;&aacute;ta</i>), and "that in
+which distinct recognition is lost" (<i>asa&#7747;praj&ntilde;&aacute;ta</i>) [Yoga S., i. 17,
+18].<a name="FNanchor_395_395" id="FNanchor_395_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
+intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
+notion," &amp;c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
+or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect<a name="FNanchor_396_396" id="FNanchor_396_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a>
+is thoroughly recognised (<i>samyak praj&ntilde;&aacute;yate</i>) as distinct from Nature. It
+has a fourfold division, as <i>savitarka</i>, <i>savich&aacute;ra</i>, <i>s&aacute;nanda</i>, and
+<i>s&aacute;smita</i>. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (<i>bh&aacute;van&aacute;</i>),
+which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
+other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
+pondered is of two kinds, being either &Iacute;&#347;wara or the twenty-five
+principles. And these principles also are of two kinds&mdash;senseless and not
+senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &amp;c., are
+senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
+which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
+elements, as earth, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span>&amp;c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
+investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,<a name="FNanchor_397_397" id="FNanchor_397_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_397_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> or in
+the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
+produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
+(<i>savitarka</i>). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
+five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
+relation to space, time, &amp;c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
+(<i>savich&aacute;ra</i>). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
+"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
+(<i>s&aacute;nanda</i>), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
+manifestation of joy.<a name="FNanchor_398_398" id="FNanchor_398_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> When pondering is pursued, having as its object
+the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
+or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (<i>s&aacute;smita</i>),
+because here personal existence<a name="FNanchor_399_399" id="FNanchor_399_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_399_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> only remains, since the intellectual
+faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
+quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].</p>
+
+<p>But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
+the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.</p>
+
+<p>"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
+suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
+where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
+we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
+quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
+of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
+because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
+"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
+operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
+and the "stock of deserts."<a name="FNanchor_400_400" id="FNanchor_400_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p><p>The "afflictions" (<i>kle&#347;a</i>) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
+egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
+a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word <i>avidy&aacute;</i>,
+"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an <i>avyay&iacute;bh&aacute;va</i>
+compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
+"above-board"?<a name="FNanchor_401_401" id="FNanchor_401_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_401_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a> or is it a <i>tatpurusha</i> [or <i>karmadh&aacute;raya</i>]
+compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
+"town-clerk"? or is it a <i>bahuvr&iacute;hi</i> compound, where both portions are
+dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
+cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
+predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
+<i>avidy&aacute;</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, it would be an instance of what is called the
+express negation, or <i>prasajya-pratishedha</i>);<a name="FNanchor_402_402" id="FNanchor_402_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a> and consequently,
+as <i>avidy&aacute;</i> would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
+to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &amp;c., and the very
+form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
+second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
+characterised by (<i>a</i> + <i>vidy&aacute;</i>), opposes the "afflictions," &amp;c., and
+cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
+then,&mdash;in accordance with the words of the author of the V&#7771;itti,<a name="FNanchor_403_403" id="FNanchor_403_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a>
+"there is a <i>bahuvr&iacute;hi</i> compound which is formed with some word
+meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
+this subsequent word"<a name="FNanchor_404_404" id="FNanchor_404_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a>&mdash;we must explain this supposed <i>bahuvr&iacute;hi</i>
+compound <i>avidy&aacute;</i> as follows: "That <i>buddhi</i> is to be characterised as
+<i>avidy&aacute;</i> (<i>sc.</i> an adjective), <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span>of which there is not a <i>vidy&aacute;</i>
+existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an <i>avidy&aacute;</i>
+could not become the source of the "afflictions;"<a name="FNanchor_405_405" id="FNanchor_405_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> and yet, on the
+other hand, it ought to be their source,<a name="FNanchor_406_406" id="FNanchor_406_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a> even though it were
+associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"<a name="FNanchor_407_407" id="FNanchor_407_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a> and
+were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
+the quality of goodness [which is found in the <i>s&aacute;smita</i> meditation].</p>
+
+<p>Now it is said [in the Yoga S&uacute;tras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
+[or place of origin, <i>i.e.</i>, source] of the others, whether they be
+dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
+"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
+them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
+on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
+are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
+strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
+several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
+This has been expressed by V&aacute;chaspati Mi&#347;ra, in his Gloss on Vy&aacute;sa's
+Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
+are absorbed in the <i>tattvas</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, not embodied, but
+existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
+'extenuated'<a name="FNanchor_408_408" id="FNanchor_408_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> are found in <i>yogins</i>; but the
+'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
+with worldly objects."</p></div>
+
+<p>"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound <i>avidy&aacute;</i> as a
+<i>dvandva</i> compound,<a name="FNanchor_409_409" id="FNanchor_409_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> where both portions are equally predominant,
+because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
+Therefore under any <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span>one of these three admissible alternatives<a name="FNanchor_410_410" id="FNanchor_410_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a>
+the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
+would be overthrown."</p>
+
+<p>[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
+have recourse to the other kind of negation called <i>paryud&aacute;sa</i> [where
+the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that <i>avidy&aacute;</i> means a
+contradictory [or <i>wrong</i>] kind of knowledge, the reverse of <i>vidy&aacute;</i>;
+and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
+said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
+[or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
+thus the words <i>abr&aacute;hma&#7751;a</i> and <i>adharma</i> respectively
+signify, 'what is other than a Br&aacute;hman' and 'what is
+contrary to justice.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
+the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
+from the use in which it has been already employed."</p></div>
+
+<p>V&aacute;chaspati also says,<a name="FNanchor_411_411" id="FNanchor_411_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_411_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> "The connection of words and their meanings
+depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
+occasionally see that a <i>tatpurusha</i> negation, where the latter
+portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
+this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
+here too [in <i>avidy&aacute;</i>] the real meaning is something contrary to
+<i>vidy&aacute;</i>" [<i>i.e.</i>, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
+positive "ignorance"<a name="FNanchor_412_412" id="FNanchor_412_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_412_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a>]. It is with a view to this that it is said
+in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
+non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
+eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." <i>Viparyaya</i>, "misconception," is
+defined as <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span>"the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"<a name="FNanchor_413_413" id="FNanchor_413_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a>
+[<i>i.e.</i>, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
+"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, <i>i.e.</i>, a jar, or the imagining
+the "pure" in the "impure" body,<a name="FNanchor_414_414" id="FNanchor_414_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> when it has been declared by a
+proverbial couplet<a name="FNanchor_415_415" id="FNanchor_415_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_415_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
+place [the womb],&mdash;from its primal seed,&mdash;from its
+composition [of humours, &amp;c.],&mdash;from perspiration,&mdash;from
+death [as even a Br&aacute;hman's body defiles],&mdash;and from the fact
+that it has to be made pure by rites."</p></div>
+
+<p>So,&mdash;in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
+15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
+pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,<a name="FNanchor_416_416" id="FNanchor_416_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a> or through
+the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
+impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
+opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
+pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],&mdash;ignorance transfers the
+idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, <i>e.g.</i>, garlands,
+sandal-wood, women, &amp;c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
+<i>e.g.</i>, the body, &amp;c., as the "soul." As it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
+'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &amp;c.;</p>
+
+<p>"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
+liberation."</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.<a name="FNanchor_417_417" id="FNanchor_417_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a></p>
+
+<p>But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
+should there not be given some general definition applying to them
+all, as otherwise their special <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span>characteristics cannot be
+established? For thus it has been said by Bha&#7789;&#7789;a Kum&aacute;rila&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Without some general definition, a more special definition
+cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
+mentioned here.'"</p></div>
+
+<p>This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
+the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
+"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."</p>
+
+<p>"Egoism" (<i>asmit&aacute;</i>) is the notion that the two separate things, the
+soul and the quality of purity,<a name="FNanchor_418_418" id="FNanchor_418_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> are one and the same, as is said
+(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
+sight." "Desire" (<i>r&aacute;ga</i>) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
+the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
+the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (<i>dvesha</i>) is the
+feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
+the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
+expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
+"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).</p>
+
+<p>Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
+word <i>anu&#347;ayin</i> ('dwelling') as formed by the <i>k&#7771;it</i> affix <i>&#7751;ini</i> in
+the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the <i>taddhita</i> affix <i>ini</i> in the
+sense of <i>matup</i>? It cannot be the former, since the affix <i>&#7751;ini</i>
+cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as <i>anu&#347;&iacute;</i>;
+for, as the word <i>supi</i> has already occurred in the S&uacute;tra, iii. 2, 4,
+and has been exerting its influence in the following s&uacute;tras, this word
+must have been introduced a second time in the S&uacute;tra, iii. 2, 78,
+<i>supy aj&aacute;tau &#7751;inis t&aacute;chchh&iacute;lye</i>,<a name="FNanchor_419_419" id="FNanchor_419_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a> on purpose to exclude
+prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
+strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the S&uacute;tra, vii.
+2, 115, <i>acho &ntilde;&#7751;iti</i>,<a name="FNanchor_420_420" id="FNanchor_420_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span>the radical vowel must be subject to
+<i>v&#7771;iddhi</i>, and so the word must be <i>anu&#347;&aacute;yin</i>, in accordance with the
+analogy of such words as <i>ati&#347;&aacute;yin</i>, &amp;c. Nor is the latter view
+tenable (<i>i.e.</i>, that it is the <i>taddhita</i> affix <i>ini</i><a name="FNanchor_421_421" id="FNanchor_421_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_421_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a>), since
+<i>ini</i> is forbidden by the technical verse&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>'These two affixes<a name="FNanchor_422_422" id="FNanchor_422_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> are not used after a monosyllable
+nor a <i>k&#7771;it</i> formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
+a word in the locative case;'</p></div>
+
+<p>and the word <i>anu&#347;aya</i> is clearly a <i>k&#7771;it</i> formation as it ends with
+the affix <i>ach</i><a name="FNanchor_423_423" id="FNanchor_423_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
+renders it insusceptible of the affix <i>ini</i>]. Consequently, the word
+<i>anu&#347;ayin</i> in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
+very hard to justify."<a name="FNanchor_424_424" id="FNanchor_424_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a> This cavil, however, is not to be
+admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
+generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
+essential importance. Hence the author of the V&#7771;itti has said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word <i>iti</i>, as implying the idea of popular
+acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
+this rule<a name="FNanchor_425_425" id="FNanchor_425_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> [<i>i.e.</i>, it is not an absolute law]."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as <i>k&aacute;ryin</i>,
+<i>k&aacute;ryika</i> [where the affixes are added after a <i>k&#7771;it</i> formation],
+<i>ta&#7751;&#7693;ulin</i>, <i>ta&#7751;&#7693;ulika</i> [where they are added after a word meaning
+"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
+<i>k&#7771;it</i> formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
+the affix <i>ini</i> is justified, although the word <i>anu&#347;aya</i> is formed by
+a <i>k&#7771;it</i> affix. This doubt therefore is settled.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span></p><p>The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
+(<i>abhinive&#347;a</i>), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
+from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
+immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
+the body, things sensible, &amp;c.," through the force of the impression
+left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
+in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
+individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
+declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
+through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
+philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &amp;c., are well known as
+the "afflictions" (<i>kle&#347;a</i>), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
+upon it various mundane troubles.</p>
+
+<p>[We next describe the <i>karm&aacute;&#347;aya</i> of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
+"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (<i>karman</i>) consist of enjoined or
+forbidden actions, as the <i>jyotish&#7789;oma</i> sacrifice, br&aacute;hmanicide, &amp;c.
+"Stock" (<i>&aacute;&#347;aya</i>) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
+which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
+merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
+experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].</p>
+
+<p>Now "concentration" [<i>yoga</i>] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
+the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
+operation of the "afflictions," &amp;c.; and this "suppression" is not
+considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
+[<i>i.e.</i>, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
+could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
+the site of this non-existence,<a name="FNanchor_426_426" id="FNanchor_426_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a>&mdash;a particular state of the
+thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
+described hereafter], <i>madhumat&iacute;</i>, <i>madhuprat&iacute;k&aacute;</i>, <i>vi&#347;ok&aacute;</i>, and
+<i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra&#347;eshat&aacute;</i>. The word <i>nirodha</i> thus corresponds to its
+etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
+thinking principle, right notion, misconception, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span>&amp;c., are suppressed
+(<i>nirudhyante</i>). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
+"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
+that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
+This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
+development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
+state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
+assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.<a name="FNanchor_427_427" id="FNanchor_427_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a>
+"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
+to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
+<i>sthitau</i>, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
+as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
+skin."<a name="FNanchor_428_428" id="FNanchor_428_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
+in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
+that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
+reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
+who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
+perceiving the imperfections attached to them.</p>
+
+<p>Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
+to attain meditation, the <i>yogin</i> must first direct his attention to
+practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
+especial use in its attainment. This has been said by K&#7771;ish&#7751;a in the
+Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute; [vi. 3]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
+<i>yoga</i>;</p>
+
+<p>But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
+the means."</p></div>
+
+<p>Pata&ntilde;jali has thus defined the practical <i>yoga</i>: "Practical
+concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
+to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya has described "mortification"&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
+ch&aacute;ndr&aacute;ya&#7751;a fast, &amp;c.,</p>
+
+<p>"Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
+mortifications."<a name="FNanchor_429_429" id="FNanchor_429_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
+<i>g&aacute;yatr&iacute;</i>, &amp;c. Now these <i>mantras</i> are of two kinds, Vaidik and
+T&aacute;ntrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
+chanted. Those chanted are the <i>s&aacute;mans</i>; those not chanted are either
+in metre, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>&#7771;ichas</i>, or in prose, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>yaj&uacute;&#7747;shi</i>,
+as has been said by Jaimini,<a name="FNanchor_430_430" id="FNanchor_430_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a> "Of these, that is a <i>&#7771;ich</i> in which
+by the force of the sense there is a definite division into <i>p&aacute;das</i>
+[or portions of a verse]; the name <i>s&aacute;man</i> is applied to chanted
+portions; the word <i>yajus</i> is applied to the rest." Those <i>mantras</i>
+are called T&aacute;ntrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
+directed to topics of voluntary devotion;<a name="FNanchor_431_431" id="FNanchor_431_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_431_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> and these are again
+threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The <i>mantras</i> are of three kinds, as female, male, and
+neuter:</p>
+
+<p>"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (<i>i.e.</i>,
+the exclamation <i>sv&aacute;h&aacute;</i>); the neuter those which end in
+<i>namas</i>;</p>
+
+<p>"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
+all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &amp;c."</p></div>
+
+<p>They are called "all-powerful" (<i>siddha</i>) because they counteract all
+defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
+ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &amp;c., have been omitted.</p>
+
+<p>Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (<i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra</i>) are ten, and
+they have been thus described in the <i>&#346;&aacute;rad&aacute;-tilaka</i>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
+to <i>mantras</i> efficacy:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
+consecrated.</p>
+
+<p>"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
+'awakening,'</p>
+
+<p>"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'</p>
+
+<p>"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
+'concealing,'&mdash;these are the ten consecrations of <i>mantras</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"The 'begetting' (<i>janana</i>) is the extracting of the
+<i>mantra</i> from its vowels and consonants.</p>
+
+<p>"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
+<i>mantra</i>, each united to Om,</p>
+
+<p>"According to the number of the letters. This they call the
+'vivifying' (<i>j&iacute;vana</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"Having written the letters of the <i>mantra</i>, let him smite
+each with sandal-water,</p>
+
+<p>"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.<a name="FNanchor_432_432" id="FNanchor_432_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a> This is
+called the 'smiting' (<i>t&aacute;&#7693;ana</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"Having written the letters of the <i>mantra</i>, let him strike
+them with oleander flowers,</p>
+
+<p>"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
+'awakening' (<i>bodhana</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
+own special <i>tantra</i>,</p>
+
+<p>"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
+leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
+(<i>abhisheka</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"Having meditated on the <i>mantra</i> in his mind, let him
+consume by the <i>jyotir-mantra</i></p>
+
+<p>"The threefold impurity of the <i>mantra</i>. This is the
+'purification' (<i>vimal&iacute;-kara&#7751;a</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"The utterance of the <i>jyotir-mantra</i>, together with Om, and
+the <i>mantras</i> of Vyoman and Agni,</p>
+
+<p>"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
+of ku&#347;a grass,</p>
+
+<p>"With the mystical seed of water<a name="FNanchor_433_433" id="FNanchor_433_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> duly muttered,&mdash;this
+is held to be the 'fattening' (<i>&aacute;py&aacute;yana</i>).<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The satiating libation over the <i>mantra</i> with
+<i>mantra</i>-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (<i>tarpa&#7751;a</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"The joining of the <i>mantra</i> with Om and the 'seeds' of
+M&aacute;y&aacute;<a name="FNanchor_434_434" id="FNanchor_434_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_434_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> and Ram&aacute;<a name="FNanchor_435_435" id="FNanchor_435_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_435_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> is called its 'illumining'
+(<i>d&iacute;pana</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"The non-publication of the <i>mantra</i> which is being
+muttered&mdash;this is its 'concealing' (<i>gopana</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
+<i>tantras</i>;</p>
+
+<p>"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
+obtains his desire;</p>
+
+<p>"And <i>ruddha</i>, <i>k&iacute;lita</i>, <i>vichhinna</i>, <i>supta</i>, <i>&#347;apta</i>, and
+the rest,</p>
+
+<p>"All these faults in the <i>mantra</i> rites are abolished by
+these excellent consecrations."</p></div>
+
+<p>But enough of this venturing to make public the <i>tantra</i> mysteries
+connected with <i>mantras</i>, which has suddenly led us astray like an
+unexpected Bacchanalian dance.<a name="FNanchor_436_436" id="FNanchor_436_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a></p>
+
+<p>The third form of practical <i>yoga</i>, "resignation to the Lord"
+(<i>&iacute;&#347;vara-pra&#7751;idh&aacute;na</i>), is the consigning all one's works, whether
+mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
+Supremely Venerable. As it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,</p>
+
+<p>"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."</p></div>
+
+<p>This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
+the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
+since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
+sung in the Bhagavad G&iacute;t&aacute; [ii. 47]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
+fruits;</p>
+
+<p>"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
+attached to inaction."</p></div>
+
+<p>The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
+by the venerable N&iacute;laka&#7751;&#7789;ha-bh&aacute;rat&iacute;&mdash;</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
+by desire,</p>
+
+<p>"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
+has been licked by a dog."</p></div>
+
+<p>Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
+resignation is itself called <i>yoga</i>, because it is a means for
+producing <i>yoga</i>, this being an instance of the function of words
+called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
+"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
+meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
+with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
+meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
+a motive. This has been declared in the <i>K&aacute;vya-prak&aacute;&#347;a</i> [ii. 9]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
+principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
+another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
+this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."</p></div>
+
+<p>Now the word "this" [<i>i.e.</i>, <i>tat</i> in the neuter, which the neuter
+<i>yat</i> in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
+the feminine <i>s&aacute;</i>] would have signified some neuter word, like
+"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
+indicated." But <i>s&aacute;</i> is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
+with <i>laksha&#7751;&aacute;</i>], "this is indication," <i>i.e.</i>, the neuter "this" is
+put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
+been explained by Kaiya&#7789;a, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
+of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
+former, the latter of the latter."<a name="FNanchor_437_437" id="FNanchor_437_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> Now "expert (<i>ku&#347;ala</i>) in
+business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
+<i>ku&#347;ala</i>, which is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span>significant in its parts by being analysed
+etymologically as <i>ku&#347;a&#7747;</i> + <i>l&aacute;ti</i>, "one who gathers ku&#347;a grass for
+the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
+of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
+this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
+is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
+with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
+their immediate significance, just as is the case in
+'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."</p></div>
+
+<p>Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
+Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
+meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
+indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
+and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
+originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
+by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
+the author of the K&aacute;vya-prak&aacute;&#347;a used the expression, "This is
+'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
+based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,<a name="FNanchor_438_438" id="FNanchor_438_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> as
+"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men <i>with</i> the lances"]; 2.
+indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
+are meant <i>without</i> the benches]; 3. qualified<a name="FNanchor_439_439" id="FNanchor_439_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> superimponent
+indication, as "the man of the Panj&aacute;b is an ox" [here the object is
+not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
+indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
+5. pure superimponent indication, as "<i>gh&iacute;</i> is life;" 6. pure
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span>introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
+all explained in the K&aacute;vya-prak&aacute;&#347;a [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
+churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.</p>
+
+<p>This <i>yoga</i> has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
+(<i>a&#7749;ga</i>); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation [ii. 29]. Pata&ntilde;jali says, "Forbearance consists in not
+wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
+[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
+mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
+32]; and these are described in the Vish&#7751;u Pur&aacute;&#7751;a [vi. 7, 36-38]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
+Brahman, practises, void of all desire,</p>
+
+<p>"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
+and non-coveting;</p>
+
+<p>"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
+purification, contentment, and austerity,</p>
+
+<p>"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
+Brahman.</p>
+
+<p>"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
+the five 'religious observances;'</p>
+
+<p>"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
+reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."</p></div>
+
+<p>"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
+kinds, as the <i>padma</i>, <i>bhadra</i>, <i>v&iacute;ra</i>, <i>svastika</i>, <i>da&#7751;&#7693;aka</i>,
+<i>sop&aacute;&#347;raya</i>, <i>parya&#7749;ka</i>, <i>krau&ntilde;chanishadana</i>, <i>ush&#7789;ranishadana</i>,
+<i>samasa&#7747;sth&aacute;na</i>. Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya has described each of them in the passage
+which commences&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
+but in reverse order,</p>
+
+<p>"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Br&aacute;hmans,
+on his thighs;</p>
+
+<p>"This will be the <i>padma</i> posture, held in honour by all."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.&mdash;When this
+steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
+practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
+inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
+the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
+body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
+both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
+general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
+to the special kinds, as <i>rechaka</i>, <i>p&uacute;raka</i>, and <i>kumbhaka</i>." We
+reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
+"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
+in all these special kinds. Thus <i>rechaka</i>, which is the expulsion of
+the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
+has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and <i>p&uacute;raka</i>, which is the
+[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
+"inspiration;" and <i>kumbhaka</i> is the internal suspension of breathing,
+when the vital air, called <i>pr&aacute;&#7751;a</i>, remains motionless like water in a
+jar (<i>kumbha</i>). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
+and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
+is needless.</p>
+
+<p>Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two <i>gha&#7789;ik&aacute;s</i> and a
+half<a name="FNanchor_440_440" id="FNanchor_440_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> in each artery<a name="FNanchor_441_441" id="FNanchor_441_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> (<i>n&aacute;&#7693;i</i>), like the revolving buckets on
+a waterwheel.<a name="FNanchor_442_442" id="FNanchor_442_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> Thus in the course of a day and night there are
+produced 21,600 inspirations <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span>and expirations. Hence it has been said
+by those who know the secret of transmitting the <i>mantras</i>, concerning
+the transmission of the <i>ajap&aacute;mantra</i><a name="FNanchor_443_443" id="FNanchor_443_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a>&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Six hundred to Ga&#7751;e&#347;a, six thousand to the self-existent
+Brahman,</p>
+
+<p>"Six thousand to Vish&#7751;u, six thousand to &#346;iva,</p>
+
+<p>"One thousand to the Guru (B&#7771;ihaspati), one thousand to the
+Supreme Soul,</p>
+
+<p>"And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
+performed muttering."</p></div>
+
+<p>So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
+elements, earth, &amp;c., must be understood, according to their different
+colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
+thus explained by the wise&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let each artery convey the air two <i>gha&#7789;&iacute;s</i> and a half from
+sunrise.</p>
+
+<p>"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries<a name="FNanchor_444_444" id="FNanchor_444_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_444_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a>
+to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.</p>
+
+<p>"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
+place [in the hour],</p>
+
+<p>"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
+six hundred in a day and night.</p>
+
+<p>"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six <i>gu&#7751;a</i>
+letters,<a name="FNanchor_445_445" id="FNanchor_445_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_445_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p>
+
+<p>"That time elapses while the air passes along in the
+interval between two arteries.</p>
+
+<p>"There are five elements in each of the two conducting
+arteries,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
+the self-restrained.</p>
+
+<p>"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;</p>
+
+<p>"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.</p>
+
+<p>"They bear along in order,&mdash;air, fire, water, earth, ether;</p>
+
+<p>"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
+arteries.</p>
+
+<p>"The <i>palas</i><a name="FNanchor_446_446" id="FNanchor_446_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_446_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> of earth are fifty, of water forty,</p>
+
+<p>"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.</p>
+
+<p>"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
+reason that the two arteries are so disturbed</p>
+
+<p>"Is that earth has five properties,<a name="FNanchor_447_447" id="FNanchor_447_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> water four,</p>
+
+<p>"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.</p>
+
+<p>"There are ten <i>palas</i> for each property; hence earth has
+fifty <i>palas</i>,</p>
+
+<p>"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
+five properties of earth</p>
+
+<p>"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
+and these decrease one by one.</p>
+
+<p>"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
+the influence of 'quiet,'</p>
+
+<p>"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
+'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'<a name="FNanchor_448_448" id="FNanchor_448_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a></p>
+
+<p>"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
+ether are now declared;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
+the second arises desire;</p>
+
+<p>"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
+of mind;</p>
+
+<p>"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
+impressions of latent merit.</p>
+
+<p>"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
+finger in each nostril,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
+of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
+of his eyes,</p>
+
+<p>"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
+earth and the other elements within him,</p>
+
+<p>"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
+spots,<a name="FNanchor_449_449" id="FNanchor_449_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a>&mdash;the ether has no symbol."</p></div>
+
+<p>When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
+accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
+discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
+said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
+breath."<a name="FNanchor_450_450" id="FNanchor_450_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,</p>
+
+<p>"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
+the breath."<a name="FNanchor_451_451" id="FNanchor_451_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
+the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
+attain "self-mastery" (<i>sa&#7747;yama</i>)<a name="FNanchor_452_452" id="FNanchor_452_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> and "restraint" (<i>praty&aacute;h&aacute;ra</i>).
+"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &amp;c., to
+the nature of the mind,<a name="FNanchor_453_453" id="FNanchor_453_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_453_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a> which is intent on the soul's unaltered
+nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
+objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
+This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
+to it (<i>&aacute;</i> + <i>h&#7771;i</i>), away from them (<i>prat&iacute;pa</i>).</p>
+
+<p>"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
+senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
+therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
+could they be accommodated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span>to the nature of the mind?" What you say
+is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
+eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
+were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
+accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
+of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
+concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
+accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
+mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &amp;c., are
+restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
+follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
+the Vish&#7751;u-pur&aacute;&#7751;a [vi. 7, 43, 44]&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
+ever tend to pursue external objects,</p>
+
+<p>"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
+mind;</p>
+
+<p>"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
+senses;</p>
+
+<p>"If they are not controlled, the <i>yogin</i> will not accomplish
+his <i>yoga</i>."<a name="FNanchor_454_454" id="FNanchor_454_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>"Attention" (<i>dh&aacute;ra&#7751;&aacute;</i>) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
+all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
+self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
+the <i>sushum&#7751;&aacute;</i> artery, &amp;c., or something external, as Praj&aacute;pati,
+V&aacute;sava, Hira&#7751;yagarbha, &amp;c. This is declared by the aphorism,
+"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
+say the followers of the Pur&aacute;&#7751;as&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
+restraint the senses,</p>
+
+<p>"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
+his mind."<a name="FNanchor_455_455" id="FNanchor_455_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span></p><p>The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
+be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
+"contemplation" (<i>dhy&aacute;na</i>); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
+thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
+that kind and desiring no other,</p>
+
+<p>"This is 'contemplation,'&mdash;it is thus effected by the first
+six of the ancillary things."</p></div>
+
+<p>We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
+remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (<i>sam&aacute;dhi</i>, see p.
+243). By this practice of the ancillary means of <i>yoga</i>, pursued for a
+long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
+hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
+"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
+names Madhumat&iacute; and the rest.</p>
+
+<p>"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
+words from the dialects of Kar&#7751;&aacute;&#7789;a, Gau&#7693;a,<a name="FNanchor_456_456" id="FNanchor_456_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> and L&aacute;&#7789;a?"<a name="FNanchor_457_457" id="FNanchor_457_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a> We do
+not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
+meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
+needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.</p>
+
+<p>i. The <i>Madhumat&iacute;</i> perfection,&mdash;this is the perfection of meditation,
+called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
+illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
+"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
+"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &amp;c.
+Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
+which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," <i>i.e.</i>, to
+the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," <i>i.e.</i>,
+when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
+yogin. For the <i>yogins</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span>or devotees to the practice of <i>yoga</i> are
+well known to be of four kinds, viz.,&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>i. The <i>pr&aacute;thamakalpika</i>, in whom the light has just entered,<a name="FNanchor_458_458" id="FNanchor_458_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a>
+but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
+the power of knowing another's thoughts, &amp;c.;" 2. The <i>madhubh&uacute;mika</i>,
+who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
+<i>praj&ntilde;&aacute;jyotis</i>, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
+<i>atikr&aacute;nta-bh&aacute;van&iacute;ya</i>, who has attained the highest dispassion.</p>
+
+<p>ii. The <i>Madhuprat&iacute;k&aacute;</i> perfections are swiftness like thought, &amp;c.
+These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
+organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
+thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
+motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"<a name="FNanchor_459_459" id="FNanchor_459_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> is the
+attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
+to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
+the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
+perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
+subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
+conditions.<a name="FNanchor_460_460" id="FNanchor_460_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_460_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a> These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
+itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
+state is called <i>Madhuprat&iacute;k&aacute;</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, that whose parts are sweet].</p>
+
+<p>iii. The <i>Vi&#347;ok&aacute;</i> perfection consists in the supremacy over all
+existences, &amp;c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
+to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
+the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
+supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
+existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
+but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
+other qualities of "passion" and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span>"darkness" being already abolished],
+and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
+upon.<a name="FNanchor_461_461" id="FNanchor_461_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a> The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
+modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"<a name="FNanchor_462_462" id="FNanchor_462_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> is
+"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
+immediate cognition, free from sorrow<a name="FNanchor_463_463" id="FNanchor_463_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> [may produce steadiness of
+mind]."</p>
+
+<p>iv. The <i>Sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra&#347;eshat&aacute;</i> state is also called <i>asa&#7747;praj&ntilde;&aacute;ta</i>, <i>i.e.</i>,
+"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
+it is that meditation "without a seed" [<i>i.e.</i>, without any object]
+which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
+afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
+enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
+all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
+"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [<i>i.e.</i>, that in which
+distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
+exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
+modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
+thought after the departure of all objects] [<i>i.e.</i>, <i>sa&#7747;sk&aacute;ra&#347;esha</i>,
+i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
+everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
+rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
+abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
+there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
+"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
+into the primal <i>prak&#7771;iti</i>; and the soul, which is the power of pure
+intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
+connection with the phenomenal understanding (<i>buddhi</i>), or with
+existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (<i>kaivalya</i>). Final liberation
+is described by Pata&ntilde;jali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
+the repressive absorption<a name="FNanchor_464_464" id="FNanchor_464_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> of the 'qualities' which have
+consummated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span>the ends of the soul, <i>i.e.</i>, enjoyment and liberation,
+or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
+33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
+individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
+for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
+cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
+objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
+decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
+of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
+absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
+possibility. And so, too, says the &#346;ruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
+one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
+dumb man praised it."<a name="FNanchor_465_465" id="FNanchor_465_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p>
+
+<p>Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
+Yoga-&#347;&aacute;stra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
+disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-&#347;&aacute;stra also
+treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
+This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
+the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
+experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
+is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.<a name="FNanchor_466_466" id="FNanchor_466_466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> The same
+fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
+other &#346;&aacute;stras also. Thus all has been made clear.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span></p>
+
+<p><a name="Sankaracharya" id="Sankaracharya"></a>The system of &#346;a&#7749;kara, which comes next in succession, and which is
+the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
+is therefore left untouched here.<a name="FNanchor_467_467" id="FNanchor_467_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">NOTE ON THE YOGA.</p>
+
+<p>There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
+Raivataka in M&aacute;gha (iv. 55):&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
+(<i>maitr&iacute;</i>) and those other purifiers of the mind,&mdash;having successfully
+abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
+a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
+essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
+Soul,&mdash;desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."</p>
+
+<p>It is curious to notice that <i>maitr&iacute;</i>, which plays such a prominent
+part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
+condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
+start towards his final goal. It is called a <i>parikarman</i> (=
+<i>pras&aacute;dhaka</i>) in Vy&aacute;sa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
+borrowed by M&aacute;gha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
+an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
+in arithmetic the operations of addition, &amp;c., are valuable, not in
+themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
+which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
+Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.</p>
+
+<p>For the word <i>vy&aacute;kopa</i> in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
+<i>infra</i>), cf. Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, p. 6, l. 7.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_363_363" id="Footnote_363_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_363_363"><span class="label">[363]</span></a> On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to S&aacute;&#7749;khya Pr. Bh&aacute;sh., p.
+20; S. S&aacute;ra, p. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_364_364" id="Footnote_364_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364_364"><span class="label">[364]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
+meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
+in the arts of life.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_365_365" id="Footnote_365_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_365_365"><span class="label">[365]</span></a> I read <i>ye</i> for <i>te</i> with Dr. Hall's MS. <i>Tapya</i> means
+rather "susceptible of suffering."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_366_366" id="Footnote_366_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_366_366"><span class="label">[366]</span></a> This is really Vy&aacute;sa's comm. on S&uacute;t., iv. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_367_367" id="Footnote_367_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_367_367"><span class="label">[367]</span></a> Cf. <i>Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-parichchheda</i>, 15, <i>a</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_368_368" id="Footnote_368_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368_368"><span class="label">[368]</span></a> &#346;atapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_369_369" id="Footnote_369_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369_369"><span class="label">[369]</span></a> I read in the second clause <i>tadbh&aacute;ve'pi</i>,
+understanding by <i>tad</i> the different conditions which <i>atha</i> is
+supposed to assume as being necessarily present.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_370_370" id="Footnote_370_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370_370"><span class="label">[370]</span></a> These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
+the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
+hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
+&amp;c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_371_371" id="Footnote_371_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_371_371"><span class="label">[371]</span></a> It may be <i>sukha-janaka</i>, but it is not itself
+<i>sukha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_372_372" id="Footnote_372_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_372_372"><span class="label">[372]</span></a> Granting that <i>atha</i> does not here mean "auspicious,"
+why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
+particle <i>atha</i> does produce an auspicious influence?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_373_373" id="Footnote_373_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_373_373"><span class="label">[373]</span></a> <i>i.e.</i>, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
+some other word to complete the construction.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_374_374" id="Footnote_374_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_374_374"><span class="label">[374]</span></a> This is found with some variations in the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya
+(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_375_375" id="Footnote_375_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_375_375"><span class="label">[375]</span></a> The commentators hold that the word <i>v&#7771;iddhi&#7717;</i> is
+placed at the beginning of the first s&uacute;tra, while <i>gu&#7751;a&#7717;</i> in the
+second is placed at the end (<i>ad e&#7749; gu&#7751;a&#7717;</i>), in order to ensure an
+auspicious opening, <i>v&#7771;iddhi</i> meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
+well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_376_376" id="Footnote_376_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_376_376"><span class="label">[376]</span></a> In the old Bengali poem Cha&#7751;&#7693;&iacute;, we have an interesting
+list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
+the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Br&aacute;hman,
+a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
+hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
+"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
+<i>d&uacute;rv&aacute;</i> grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
+corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
+men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
+a guana (<i>godhik&aacute;</i>). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
+all &#347;&aacute;stras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
+the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
+and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_377_377" id="Footnote_377_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_377_377"><span class="label">[377]</span></a> These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
+lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
+officiating Br&aacute;hmans.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_378_378" id="Footnote_378_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_378_378"><span class="label">[378]</span></a> He is here called <i>pha&#7751;ipati</i>, "lord of
+snakes,"&mdash;Pata&ntilde;jali, the author of the Mah&aacute;bh&aacute;shya, being represented
+as a snake in mythology.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_379_379" id="Footnote_379_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_379_379"><span class="label">[379]</span></a> Cf. &#346;a&#7749;kara, Ved&aacute;nta-S&uacute;t., iii. 3, 49.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_380_380" id="Footnote_380_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_380_380"><span class="label">[380]</span></a> This is the M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; rule for settling the relative
+value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
+<i>&#346;ruti</i>, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
+are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. <i>Li&#7749;ga</i>, "a sign,"
+or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
+text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
+divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
+solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. <i>V&aacute;kya</i>, "the being
+mentioned in one sentence," <i>i.e.</i>, the context, as in the text "'(I
+cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
+"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
+the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
+welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
+"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. <i>Prakara&#7751;a</i>, "the
+subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
+parts," as in the <i>dar&#347;a-p&uacute;r&#7751;am&aacute;sa</i> sacrifice, where the <i>pray&aacute;ja</i>
+ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
+a mystic influence (<i>ap&uacute;rva</i>) which helps forward that influence of
+the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the <i>prakara&#7751;a</i>
+proves them to be ancillary. 5. <i>Sth&aacute;na</i> (or <i>krama</i>), "relative
+position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn <i>&#346;undhadhvam</i>, &amp;c.,
+"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
+of the <i>s&aacute;nn&aacute;yya</i> vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
+ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. <i>Sam&aacute;khy&aacute;</i>,
+"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
+<i>adhvaryu</i> priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are <i>prima
+facie</i> to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
+aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
+first, <i>&#347;ruti</i>, being the most important; the last, <i>sam&aacute;khy&aacute;</i>, the
+least. Cf. Jaimini's S&uacute;tras, iii. 3, 14; <i>M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute;paribh&aacute;sh&aacute;</i>, pp. 8,
+9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_381_381" id="Footnote_381_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_381_381"><span class="label">[381]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Yogi-Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya, the author of the
+<i>Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya-g&iacute;t&aacute;</i>. See Hall, <i>Bibl. Index</i>, p. 14; Aufrecht, <i>Bodl.
+Catal.</i>, p. 87 <i>b</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382_382" id="Footnote_382_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382_382"><span class="label">[382]</span></a> <i>Karman</i> seems here used for <i>kriy&acirc;</i>, which properly
+belongs only to the body, as the soul is <i>drash&#7789;&#7771;i</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_383_383" id="Footnote_383_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_383_383"><span class="label">[383]</span></a> <i>Scil. sam&aacute;dhi</i>, or the restraining the mind and senses
+to profound contemplation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_384_384" id="Footnote_384_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_384_384"><span class="label">[384]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation (<i>sam&aacute;dhi</i>)."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_385_385" id="Footnote_385_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385_385"><span class="label">[385]</span></a> See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, <i>samyag &aacute;dh&iacute;yate mano yatra sa
+sam&aacute;dhi&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_386_386" id="Footnote_386_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_386_386"><span class="label">[386]</span></a> Thus, <i>e.g.</i>, the antecedent non-existence and the
+destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
+itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
+intimate relation (<i>samav&aacute;ya-sambandha</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_387_387" id="Footnote_387_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387_387"><span class="label">[387]</span></a> I read <i>niroddhavy&aacute;n&aacute;m</i> for <i>nirodh&aacute;n&aacute;m</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_388_388" id="Footnote_388_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_388_388"><span class="label">[388]</span></a> <i>Chit-&#347;akti</i> and <i>chiti-&#347;akti</i> = soul.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_389_389" id="Footnote_389_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_389_389"><span class="label">[389]</span></a> The <i>sattva</i> of the <i>buddhi</i> or the internal organ.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_390_390" id="Footnote_390_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_390_390"><span class="label">[390]</span></a> This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
+(<i>buddhi</i>, <i>chitta</i>), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
+image of the object on a second looking-glass (<i>sc.</i> soul).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_391_391" id="Footnote_391_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391_391"><span class="label">[391]</span></a> V&aacute;chaspati explains <i>laksha&#7751;a</i> as <i>k&aacute;labheda</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_392_392" id="Footnote_392_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_392_392"><span class="label">[392]</span></a> I take <i>&aacute;di</i> as meaning <i>asphu&#7789;atva</i>. The change of state
+takes place between the several moments of the <i>laksha&#7751;a-pari&#7751;&aacute;ma</i>. Cf.
+the Commentaries on iii. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_393_393" id="Footnote_393_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393_393"><span class="label">[393]</span></a> These are generally called the five states of the
+thinking principle, <i>chittabh&uacute;mayas</i> or <i>avasth&aacute;s</i>. Cf. Commentary, i.
+2, 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_394_394" id="Footnote_394_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394_394"><span class="label">[394]</span></a> These three conditions respectively characterise men,
+demons, and gods.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_395_395" id="Footnote_395_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_395_395"><span class="label">[395]</span></a> Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
+have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_396_396" id="Footnote_396_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_396_396"><span class="label">[396]</span></a> Can <i>chitta</i> mean "soul" here?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_397_397" id="Footnote_397_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_397_397"><span class="label">[397]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, as, <i>e.g.</i>, whether the senses produce the
+elements or the elements the senses, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_398_398" id="Footnote_398_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_398_398"><span class="label">[398]</span></a> In p. 164, line 4 <i>infra</i>, read <i>sukhaprak&aacute;&#347;amayasya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_399_399" id="Footnote_399_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_399_399"><span class="label">[399]</span></a> In p. 164, line 2 <i>infra</i>, read <i>satt&aacute;m&aacute;tra</i> for
+<i>sattva-</i>. Bhoja well distinguishes <i>asmit&aacute;</i> from <i>aha&#7747;k&aacute;ra</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_400_400" id="Footnote_400_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_400_400"><span class="label">[400]</span></a> For these see <i>infra</i>, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_401_401" id="Footnote_401_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_401_401"><span class="label">[401]</span></a> I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
+English translation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_402_402" id="Footnote_402_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402_402"><span class="label">[402]</span></a> Where the negation is prominent it is called
+<i>prasajya-pratishedha</i>; but where it is not prominent, we have the
+<i>paryud&aacute;sa</i> negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
+verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
+as, <i>e.g.</i>&mdash;
+</p><p>
+(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
+</p><p>
+(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
+</p><p>
+The former corresponds to the logician's <i>atyant&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>, the latter to
+<i>anyony&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i> or <i>bheda</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403_403" id="Footnote_403_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403_403"><span class="label">[403]</span></a> Cf. the <i>v&aacute;rttika</i> in Siddh&aacute;nta Kaum., i. 401.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404_404" id="Footnote_404_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404_404"><span class="label">[404]</span></a> Thus <i>adhana</i> stands for <i>avidya-m&aacute;nadhana</i>, with
+<i>vidyam&aacute;na</i> omitted in the compound.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_405_405" id="Footnote_405_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405_405"><span class="label">[405]</span></a> As its subject would confessedly be <i>buddhi</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_406_406" id="Footnote_406_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406_406"><span class="label">[406]</span></a> As it is <i>avidy&aacute;</i> after all.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_407_407" id="Footnote_407_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407_407"><span class="label">[407]</span></a> In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of
+V&aacute;chaspati's Gloss), <i>sarvav&#7771;ittinirodhasampann&aacute;y&aacute; api
+tath&aacute;tvaprasa&#7749;g&aacute;t</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_408_408" id="Footnote_408_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408_408"><span class="label">[408]</span></a> I read <i>tanvavasth&aacute;&#347;cha</i> with the printed edition of
+V&aacute;chaspati's Gloss. If <i>tanudagdh&aacute;&#347;cha</i> is correct, it must mean
+<i>tanutvena dagdh&aacute;h</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_409_409" id="Footnote_409_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_409_409"><span class="label">[409]</span></a> As in <i>r&aacute;malakshma&#7751;au</i>, R&aacute;ma and Lakshma&#7751;a.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_410_410" id="Footnote_410_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410_410"><span class="label">[410]</span></a> I read <i>pakshatraye</i> for <i>pakshadvaye</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_411_411" id="Footnote_411_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411_411"><span class="label">[411]</span></a> In his Comm. on S&uacute;t., ii. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_412_412" id="Footnote_412_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_412_412"><span class="label">[412]</span></a> Thus <i>inimicus</i> is not a "friend," nor, on the other
+hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
+<i>agoshpada</i> is said to mean "a forest."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_413_413" id="Footnote_413_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413_413"><span class="label">[413]</span></a> Cf. Yoga S&uacute;t., i. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_414_414" id="Footnote_414_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_414_414"><span class="label">[414]</span></a> In p. 166, line 4 <i>infra</i>, read <i>k&aacute;y&aacute;dau</i> for
+<i>k&aacute;ry&aacute;dau</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_415_415" id="Footnote_415_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_415_415"><span class="label">[415]</span></a> This couplet is quoted by Vy&aacute;sa in his Comm. on Yoga
+S&uacute;tras, ii. 5, and I have followed V&aacute;chaspati in his explanation of
+it; he calls it <i>vaiy&aacute;sak&iacute; g&aacute;th&aacute;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_416_416" id="Footnote_416_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_416_416"><span class="label">[416]</span></a> Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
+increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
+(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_417_417" id="Footnote_417_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_417_417"><span class="label">[417]</span></a> Literally, "it has four feet."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_418_418" id="Footnote_418_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_418_418"><span class="label">[418]</span></a> Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
+of the quality of <i>sattva</i> unobstructed by <i>rajas</i> and <i>tamas</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_419_419" id="Footnote_419_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_419_419"><span class="label">[419]</span></a> "Let the affix <i>&#7751;ini</i> be used after a root in the sense
+of what is habitual, when the <i>upapada</i>, or subordinate word, is not a
+word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_420_420" id="Footnote_420_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420_420"><span class="label">[420]</span></a> "Let <i>v&#7771;iddhi</i> be the substitute of a base ending in a
+vowel, when that which has an indicatory <i>&ntilde;</i> or <i>&#7751;</i> follows;" <i>&#7751;ini</i>
+has an indicatory <i>&#7751;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_421_421" id="Footnote_421_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_421_421"><span class="label">[421]</span></a> Sc. <i>anu&#347;aya</i> + <i>ini</i> = <i>anu&#347;ayin</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_422_422" id="Footnote_422_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_422_422"><span class="label">[422]</span></a> <i>Ini</i> and <i>&#7789;han</i>, which respectively leave <i>in</i> and
+<i>ika</i>; thus <i>da&#7751;&#7693;a</i> gives <i>da&#7751;&#7693;in</i> and <i>da&#7751;&#7693;ika</i>. The line is quoted
+by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on P&aacute;&#7751;. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
+the <i>K&aacute;&#347;ik&aacute;</i>, <i>ad loc</i>. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
+the examples:&mdash;(1.) <i>svav&aacute;n</i>, <i>khav&aacute;n</i>; (2.) <i>k&aacute;rakav&aacute;n</i>; (3.)
+<i>vy&aacute;ghrav&aacute;n</i>, <i>si&#7747;hav&aacute;n</i>; (4.) <i>da&#7751;&#7693;avat&iacute; &#347;&aacute;l&aacute;</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>da&#7751;&#7693;&aacute; asy&aacute;&#7747;
+santi</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_423_423" id="Footnote_423_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423_423"><span class="label">[423]</span></a> By iii. 3, 56.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_424_424" id="Footnote_424_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424_424"><span class="label">[424]</span></a> It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
+study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_425_425" id="Footnote_425_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425_425"><span class="label">[425]</span></a> See the <i>K&aacute;&#347;ik&aacute;</i> on P&aacute;&#7751;. v. 2, 115. For <i>vivaksh&aacute;rtha</i>
+(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on P&aacute;&#7751;. ii. 2, 27.
+The edition in the Benares <i>Pandit</i> reads <i>vishayaniyam&aacute;rtha</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_426_426" id="Footnote_426_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_426_426"><span class="label">[426]</span></a> <i>i.e.</i>, Thus <i>nirodha</i> is not <i>v&#7771;itter abh&aacute;va&#7717;</i>, but
+<i>abh&aacute;vasy&aacute;&#347;rya&#7717;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_427_427" id="Footnote_427_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427_427"><span class="label">[427]</span></a> I read in p. 168, last line,
+<i>prak&aacute;&#347;aprav&#7771;ittiniyamar&uacute;pa</i>, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_428_428" id="Footnote_428_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428_428"><span class="label">[428]</span></a> See K&aacute;&#347;ik&aacute;, ii. 3, 36.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_429_429" id="Footnote_429_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429_429"><span class="label">[429]</span></a> This passage probably occurs in the <i>Y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya-g&iacute;t&aacute;</i>
+of Yogi-y&aacute;j&ntilde;avalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
+note.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_430_430" id="Footnote_430_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430_430"><span class="label">[430]</span></a> M&iacute;m&aacute;&#7747;s&aacute; S&uacute;tras, ii. 1, 35-37.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_431_431" id="Footnote_431_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_431_431"><span class="label">[431]</span></a> The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
+<i>nitya</i> or <i>naimittika</i>; they are <i>k&aacute;mya</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_432_432" id="Footnote_432_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_432_432"><span class="label">[432]</span></a> The <i>v&iacute;ja</i> of air is the syllable <i>ja&#7747;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_433_433" id="Footnote_433_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_433_433"><span class="label">[433]</span></a> The <i>v&iacute;ja</i> of water is the syllable <i>ba&#7747;</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_434_434" id="Footnote_434_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434_434"><span class="label">[434]</span></a> <i>Hr&iacute;&#7747;.</i></p></div> <div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_435_435" id="Footnote_435_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_435_435"><span class="label">[435]</span></a> <i>&#346;r&iacute;&#7747;.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_436_436" id="Footnote_436_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436_436"><span class="label">[436]</span></a> <i>T&aacute;&#7751;&#7693;ava</i> is the frantic dance of the god. &#346;iva and his
+votaries.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_437_437" id="Footnote_437_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437_437"><span class="label">[437]</span></a> Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
+one of the two." Cf. "Theb&aelig; ips&aelig; quod B&#339;oti&aelig; caput est," <i>Livy</i>, xlii.
+44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
+vocamus hominem," <i>Cic.</i>, <i>Legg</i>, i. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_438_438" id="Footnote_438_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_438_438"><span class="label">[438]</span></a> I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
+translation of the S&aacute;hitya-darpa&#7751;a.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_439_439" id="Footnote_439_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_439_439"><span class="label">[439]</span></a> Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
+is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
+relation, as cause and effect, &amp;c., thus butter is the cause of
+longevity.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_440_440" id="Footnote_440_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_440_440"><span class="label">[440]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, an hour, a <i>gha&#7789;ik&aacute;</i> being twenty-four
+minutes.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_441_441" id="Footnote_441_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_441_441"><span class="label">[441]</span></a> The <i>n&aacute;&#7693;&iacute;s</i> or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
+to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
+<i>n&aacute;&#7693;&iacute;s</i>. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_442_442" id="Footnote_442_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_442_442"><span class="label">[442]</span></a> M&aacute;dhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
+passage in the Aitareya Br&aacute;hma&#7751;a (iii. 29), where the relation of the
+vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
+the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
+other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
+and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
+the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
+waterwheel (<i>gha&#7789;&iacute;yantravat</i>); hence the seasons never pause in their
+course."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_443_443" id="Footnote_443_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_443_443"><span class="label">[443]</span></a> This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
+that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
+as their sound expresses the word <i>so'ha&#7747;</i> (i.e., <i>ha&#7747;sa&#7717;</i>), "I am
+he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
+it is called the <i>ajap&aacute;mantra</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the mantra uttered without
+voluntary muttering.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_444_444" id="Footnote_444_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_444_444"><span class="label">[444]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
+breath.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_445_445" id="Footnote_445_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_445_445"><span class="label">[445]</span></a> I cannot explain this. We might read <i>guruvar&#7751;&aacute;n&aacute;m</i> for
+<i>gu&#7751;avar&#7751;&aacute;n&aacute;&#7747;</i>, as the time spent in uttering a <i>guruvar&#7751;a</i> is a
+<i>vipala</i>, sixty of which make a <i>pala</i>, and two and a half <i>palas</i>
+make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
+details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
+fifth act of the <i>M&aacute;lat&iacute;m&aacute;dhava</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_446_446" id="Footnote_446_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_446_446"><span class="label">[446]</span></a> Sixty <i>palas</i> make a <i>gha&#7789;ik&aacute;</i> (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
+= 150, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>palas</i> in two and a half <i>gha&#7789;ik&aacute;s</i> or one hour).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_447_447" id="Footnote_447_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_447_447"><span class="label">[447]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_448_448" id="Footnote_448_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_448_448"><span class="label">[448]</span></a> Literally "the being ever more."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_449_449" id="Footnote_449_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_449_449"><span class="label">[449]</span></a> For these colours cf. <i>Chh&aacute;ndogya Up.</i>, viii. 6;
+<i>Maitri Up.</i>, vi. 30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_450_450" id="Footnote_450_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_450_450"><span class="label">[450]</span></a> This is an anonymous quotation in Vy&aacute;sa's Comm.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_451_451" id="Footnote_451_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_451_451"><span class="label">[451]</span></a> This seems a variation of &#346;loka 7 of the <i>Am&#7771;ita-n&aacute;da
+Up.</i> See Weber, <i>Indische Stud.</i>, ix. 26.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_452_452" id="Footnote_452_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_452_452"><span class="label">[452]</span></a> This is defined in the Yoga S&uacute;t., iii. 4, as consisting
+of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
+attention, and meditation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_453_453" id="Footnote_453_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_453_453"><span class="label">[453]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the internal organ (<i>chitta</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_454_454" id="Footnote_454_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_454_454"><span class="label">[454]</span></a> This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
+reading of the Bombay edition of the Pur&aacute;&#7751;a (only reading in line 3
+<i>chal&aacute;tman&aacute;m</i>).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_455_455" id="Footnote_455_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_455_455"><span class="label">[455]</span></a> Vish&#7751;u-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
+"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_456_456" id="Footnote_456_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_456_456"><span class="label">[456]</span></a> The old name for the central part of Bengal.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_457_457" id="Footnote_457_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_457_457"><span class="label">[457]</span></a> A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
+is the &#923;&#945;&#961;&#953;&#954;&#7969; of Ptolemy.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_458_458" id="Footnote_458_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_458_458"><span class="label">[458]</span></a> In p. 178, l. 2, <i>infra</i>, read <i>prav&#7771;itta</i> for
+<i>prav&#7771;itti</i>. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vy&aacute;sa's
+Comm.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_459_459" id="Footnote_459_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_459_459"><span class="label">[459]</span></a> Read <i>vikara&#7751;abh&aacute;va&#7717;</i>; V&aacute;chaspati explains it as
+"<i>videh&aacute;n&aacute;m indriy&aacute;&#7751;&aacute;&#7747; kara&#7751;abh&aacute;va&#7717;</i>."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_460_460" id="Footnote_460_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_460_460"><span class="label">[460]</span></a> Vy&aacute;sa has <i>kara&#7751;apa&ntilde;chakar&uacute;pajaya</i>; V&aacute;chaspati explains
+<i>r&uacute;pa</i> by <i>graha&#7751;&aacute;di</i> (cf. iii. 47).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_461_461" id="Footnote_461_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_461_461"><span class="label">[461]</span></a> I read in p. 179, l. 11, <i>vyava-s&aacute;yavyavasey&aacute;tmak&aacute;n&aacute;m</i>,
+from Vy&aacute;sa's Comm.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_462_462" id="Footnote_462_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_462_462"><span class="label">[462]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, as past, present, or future.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_463_463" id="Footnote_463_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_463_463"><span class="label">[463]</span></a> <i>Vi&#347;ok&aacute;.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_464_464" id="Footnote_464_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_464_464"><span class="label">[464]</span></a> This is explained by V&aacute;chaspati, "The latent
+impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
+<i>vyutth&aacute;na</i> (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
+'darkness,' iii. 9) and <i>nirodha</i> (when it is chiefly characterised by
+the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
+this in 'egoism' (<i>asmit&aacute;</i>); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
+(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>buddhi</i>); and <i>buddhi</i> into the 'irresolvable' (<i>i.e.</i>,
+<i>prak&#7771;iti</i>)." <i>Prak&#7771;iti</i> consists of the three 'qualities' in
+equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
+effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
+becomes predominant.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_465_465" id="Footnote_465_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_465_465"><span class="label">[465]</span></a> This curious passage occurs in the Taittir&iacute;ya-&Aacute;ra&#7751;yaka
+i. 11, 5. M&aacute;dhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
+quotes the &#346;vet&aacute;&#347;v. Up., iii. 19. M&aacute;dhava here takes <i>avindat</i> as "he
+pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
+Comm.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_466_466" id="Footnote_466_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_466_466"><span class="label">[466]</span></a> This is taken from V&aacute;chaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
+15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_467_467" id="Footnote_467_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_467_467"><span class="label">[467]</span></a> This probably refers to the Pa&ntilde;chada&#347;&iacute;. A Calcutta
+Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivara&#7751;a-sa&#7749;graha (cf.
+Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devat&aacute;dhy&aacute;ya-br&aacute;hma&#7751;a, p.
+x), but, if this is the same as the vivara&#7751;a-prameya-sa&#7749;graha, it is
+by Bh&aacute;rat&iacute;t&iacute;rthavidy&aacute;ra&#7751;ya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
+88).</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX"></a>APPENDIX.</h2>
+
+<h2>ON THE UP&Aacute;DHI (cf. <i>supra</i>, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).</h2>
+
+
+<p>[As the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
+is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
+the sections in the Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-parichchheda and the Siddh&aacute;nta-mukt&aacute;val&iacute;,
+which treat of it.]</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>cxxxvii. <i>That which always accompanies the major term
+(s&aacute;dhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
+is called the Condition (up&aacute;dhi); its examination is now set
+forth.</i></p></div>
+
+<p>Our author now proceeds to define the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> or condition,<a name="FNanchor_468_468" id="FNanchor_468_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a>
+which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
+laid down by another person;&mdash;"that which always accompanies," &amp;c. The
+meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span>accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
+invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
+middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
+because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
+produced from wet fuel," as an <i>up&aacute;dhi</i>, since "wet fuel" is
+necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
+<i>e.g.</i>, in a red-hot iron ball.]</p>
+
+<p>"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
+follow that (<i>a</i>) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
+argument, 'This [second] son of Mitr&aacute;'s, whom I have not seen, must be
+dark because he is Mitr&aacute;'s son,' we could not allege 'the being
+produced from feeding on vegetables'<a name="FNanchor_469_469" id="FNanchor_469_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> as a 'condition,'&mdash;inasmuch
+as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
+does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &amp;c., which have
+nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (<i>b</i>) Again, in the
+argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense<a name="FNanchor_470_470" id="FNanchor_470_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> because it is the
+site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
+form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
+is found in the soul, &amp;c., and yet soul, &amp;c., have no form [and
+therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
+accompany perceptibility]. (<i>c</i>) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
+is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
+a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
+existence'<a name="FNanchor_471_471" id="FNanchor_471_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
+"emergent," <i>dva&#7747;&#347;&aacute;bh&aacute;va</i>], <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span>inasmuch as perishability is found in
+antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
+included in any positive category of existence."</p>
+
+<p>We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
+definition is simply this,&mdash;that whatever fact or mark we take to
+determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
+our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
+be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
+is not invariably to accompany. Thus (<i>a</i>) the "being produced from
+feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
+determined by the fact that it is Mitr&aacute;'s son, whose dark colour is
+discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
+argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
+not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (<i>b</i>) Again,
+"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
+as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
+object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
+"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
+the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.<a name="FNanchor_472_472" id="FNanchor_472_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a>
+(<i>c</i>) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
+produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
+invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
+the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
+advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
+"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
+that this is produced at all.]</p>
+
+<p>But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
+middle terms, <i>i.e.</i>, there is nothing <i>there</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span>which invariably
+accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
+and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
+This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
+that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
+determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
+cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
+rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
+particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
+which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
+constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
+that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
+site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,<a name="FNanchor_473_473" id="FNanchor_473_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a> or
+else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
+excluding the said condition;<a name="FNanchor_474_474" id="FNanchor_474_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> and it will be when the case is
+determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
+the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
+term, and not always accompanying the middle term."<a name="FNanchor_475_475" id="FNanchor_475_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a></p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>cxxxviii. <i>All true Conditions reside in the same subjects
+with their major terms;<a name="FNanchor_476_476" id="FNanchor_476_476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a> and, their subjects being thus
+common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
+in regard to the Condition and the major term.</i><a name="FNanchor_477_477" id="FNanchor_477_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p>
+
+<p>cxxxix. <i>It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
+middle term that the Condition has to be employed.</i></p></div>
+
+<p>The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term
+being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that
+it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of
+having a condition at all. (<i>a.</i>) Thus, where the condition invariably
+accompanies an unlimited<a name="FNanchor_478_478" id="FNanchor_478_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> major term, we infer that the middle
+term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact
+that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in
+the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we
+infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is
+too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is
+too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too
+general for that which is invariably accompanied. (<i>b.</i>) But where we
+take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which
+the condition is invariably to accompany,&mdash;there it is from the middle
+term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases
+possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is
+equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,
+"B is dark because he is Mitr&aacute;'s son," the middle term "the fact of
+being Mitr&aacute;'s <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span>son" is too general in regard to the <i>s&aacute;dhya</i>, "dark
+colour," because it is too general in regard to the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i>, "feeding
+on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitr&aacute;'s second son [Mitr&aacute;'s
+parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitr&aacute; herself not having
+fed on vegetables previous to his birth].</p>
+
+<p>[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a
+condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your
+definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle
+term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire
+because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the
+being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this
+certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it
+is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to
+be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'
+since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as
+for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in
+this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You
+never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere
+than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some
+direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the
+first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your
+antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major
+term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly
+one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is
+self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally
+employed to overthrow the contrary argument].</p>
+
+<p>But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being
+always found elsewhere than in the subject"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span> becomes a true condition,
+[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant
+tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be
+non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
+"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by
+sense-evidence that fire is hot,<a name="FNanchor_479_479" id="FNanchor_479_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> [thus the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> here is a
+means of overthrowing the false argument].</p>
+
+<p>Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &amp;c., is
+disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.<a name="FNanchor_480_480" id="FNanchor_480_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> But
+"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed
+even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
+of logical controversy.<a name="FNanchor_481_481" id="FNanchor_481_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p>
+
+<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_468_468" id="Footnote_468_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_468_468"><span class="label">[468]</span></a> The <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> is the "condition" which must be supplied
+to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus
+restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;
+if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has
+fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied
+by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if
+the mountain <i>has</i> wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have
+smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is
+Mitr&aacute;'s son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her
+former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her
+happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove
+that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle
+term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_469_469" id="Footnote_469_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_469_469"><span class="label">[469]</span></a> The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from
+the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from
+her living on ghee.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_470_470" id="Footnote_470_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_470_470"><span class="label">[470]</span></a> By Bh&aacute;sh&aacute;-parich. &#347;l. 25, the four elements, earth,
+water, air, and fire, are <i>spar&#347;avat</i>, but by &#347;l. 27 of these air is
+neither <i>pratyaksha</i> nor <i>r&uacute;pavat</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_471_471" id="Footnote_471_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_471_471"><span class="label">[471]</span></a> This condition would imply that we could only argue
+from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive
+existence, not non-existence.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_472_472" id="Footnote_472_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_472_472"><span class="label">[472]</span></a> "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was
+not <i>soul</i>, but <i>air</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_473_473" id="Footnote_473_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_473_473"><span class="label">[473]</span></a> As, <i>e.g.</i>, the mountain and Mitr&aacute;'s first son in the
+two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire"
+(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and
+"Mitr&aacute;'s first son A is dark because he is Mitr&aacute;'s offspring" (when
+her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective
+<i>s&aacute;dhyas</i> or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are
+respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the
+mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_474_474" id="Footnote_474_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_474_474"><span class="label">[474]</span></a> As, <i>e.g.</i>, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitr&aacute;'s second
+son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire"
+and "the being Mitr&aacute;'s offspring" do not possess the respective
+conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor,
+consequently, the respective major terms (<i>s&aacute;dhya</i>) "smoke" and "dark
+colour."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_475_475" id="Footnote_475_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_475_475"><span class="label">[475]</span></a> This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in
+(<i>a</i>), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,
+though they are the sites of the <i>s&aacute;dhya</i> "dark colour," they do not
+admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term
+"the being Mitr&aacute;'s son."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_476_476" id="Footnote_476_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_476_476"><span class="label">[476]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel
+there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in
+their extension.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_477_477" id="Footnote_477_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_477_477"><span class="label">[477]</span></a> Where the <i>hetu</i> is found and not the <i>s&aacute;dhya</i> (as in
+the red-hot ball of iron), there the <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> also is not applicable.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_478_478" id="Footnote_478_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_478_478"><span class="label">[478]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, one which requires no determining fact or mark,
+such as the three objected arguments required in &sect; 137.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_479_479" id="Footnote_479_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_479_479"><span class="label">[479]</span></a> The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is
+artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an
+artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>,
+one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point."
+Here the proposed <i>up&aacute;dhi</i> "the being always found elsewhere than in
+fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the
+<i>hetu</i> "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the
+<i>s&aacute;dhya</i> "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_480_480" id="Footnote_480_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_480_480"><span class="label">[480]</span></a> As in the argument, "The earth, &amp;c., must have had a
+maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist
+disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing
+a body." See Kusum&aacute;&ntilde;jali, v. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_481_481" id="Footnote_481_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_481_481"><span class="label">[481]</span></a> In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the
+outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own
+point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a
+true condition must be consistent with <i>either</i> party's opinions.</p></div>
+
+</div>
+<h3>THE END.</h3>
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+
+<h2>TR&Uuml;BNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.</h2>
+<p class="blockquot">"A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental literature,
+philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the general reader of the
+present day as an acquaintance with the Latin and Greek classics was a
+generation or so ago. Immense strides have been made within the
+present century in these branches of learning; Sanskrit has been
+brought within the range of accurate philology, and its invaluable
+ancient literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred
+books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian, Assyrian, and
+other records of the remote past have been deciphered, and a group of
+scholars speak of still more recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments;
+but the results of all the scholarship that has been devoted to these
+subjects have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were
+contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or
+scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals. Messrs.
+Tr&uuml;bner &amp; Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does them infinite
+credit, have determined to supply the constantly-increasing want, and
+to give in a popular, or, at least, a comprehensive form, all this
+mass of knowledge to the world."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE INDIAN EMPIRE:<br />
+ ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.</h3>
+<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Hon. Sir W. W. Hunter</span>, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India.</p>
+
+<p>Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the
+general results of the Census of 1881.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a
+marvellous combination of literary condensation and
+research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire,
+its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy
+outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional
+opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing
+could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of
+the economic and political condition of India at the present
+time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the
+India of the past."&mdash;<i>The Times.</i></p></div>
+
+
+<p class="center"><i>THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED</i>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.</p>
+
+<h3>ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS,<br />
+ AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Martin Haug, Ph.D.</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Late of the Universities of T&uuml;bingen, G&ouml;ttingen, and Bonn;
+Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the
+Poona College.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Edited and Enlarged by Dr. E. W. West.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. <span class="smcap">Haug</span> by Prof.
+<span class="smcap">E. P. Evans</span>.</p>
+
+<p>I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of
+the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.</p>
+
+<p>II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.</p>
+
+<p>III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.</p>
+
+<p>IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of
+the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E.
+W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to
+expand the materials contained in this work into a
+comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the
+design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have,
+however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the
+researches into the sacred writings and religion of the
+Parsis from the earliest times down to the present&mdash;a
+dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a
+translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the
+Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with
+especial reference to its origin and development."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON</h3>
+<p class="center">COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>With Accompanying Narratives.</i></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese,
+University College, London.</p>
+
+<p>The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition, as edited
+by Fausb&ouml;ll, by Max M&uuml;ller's English, and Albrecht Weber's German
+translations, consists only of twenty-six chapters or sections, whilst
+the Chinese version, or rather recension, as now translated by Mr.
+Beal, consists of thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who
+possess Fausb&ouml;ll's text, or either of the above-named translations,
+will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the Chinese
+version; the thirteen above-named additional sections not being
+accessible to them in any other form; for, even if they understand
+Chinese, the Chinese original would be unobtainable by them.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most
+valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains
+authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and
+generally connected with some incident in the history of
+Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light
+which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote
+period at which they were written, and upon the method of
+teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method
+employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the
+tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well
+as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds
+of millions of people, make them a very remarkable
+study."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has
+added to the great services he has already rendered to the
+comparative study of religious history."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its
+purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader
+face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct
+which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is
+now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid
+its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies,
+forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so
+inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder
+denied a God, now worships that founder as a god
+himself."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Albrecht Weber.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Second German Edition by <span class="smcap">John Mann</span>, M.A., and
+<span class="smcap">Th&eacute;odor Zachariae</span>, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.</p>
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>Dr. <span class="smcap">Buhler</span>, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:&mdash;"When I was
+Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I frequently
+felt the want of such a work to which I could refer the students."</p>
+
+<p>Professor <span class="smcap">Cowell</span>, of Cambridge, writes:&mdash;"It will be especially useful
+to the students in our Indian colleges and universities. I used to
+long for such a book when I was teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students
+are intensely interested in the history of Sanskrit literature, and
+this volume will supply them with all they want on the subject."</p>
+
+<p>Professor <span class="smcap">Whitney</span>, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A., writes:&mdash;"I
+was one of the class to whom the work was originally given in the form
+of academic lectures. At their first appearance they were by far the
+most learned and able treatment of their subject; and with their
+recent additions they still maintain decidedly the same rank."</p></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of
+Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the
+volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and
+at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to
+be by far the most learned and able treatment of the
+subject. They have now been brought up to date by the
+addition of all the most important results of recent
+research."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price
+7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert N. Cust.</span></p>
+
+<p>The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of
+which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the
+languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge
+had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might
+be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he
+had collected for his own edification.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The book before us is then a valuable contribution to
+philological science. It passes under review a vast number
+of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every
+case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of
+the best-informed writers."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.</h3>
+<p class="center">A Poem. <span class="smcap">By Kalidasa.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by<br />
+<span class="smcap">Ralph T. H. Griffith</span>, M.A.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very spirited rendering of the <i>Kum&aacute;rasambhava</i>, which
+was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are
+glad to see made once more accessible."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to
+most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or
+enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative
+imagination of its author."&mdash;<i>Indian Antiquary.</i></p>
+
+<p>"We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor
+Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a
+second edition better."&mdash;<i>Athen&aelig;um.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.</p>
+
+<h3>A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY<br />
+  AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND <br />
+LITERATURE.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Dowson</span>, M.R.A.S.,<br />
+Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to
+students of Indian literature, but is also of great general
+interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible
+form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu
+mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little
+is known outside the limited circle of <i>savants</i>."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly
+and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the
+few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions
+detract but little from the general excellence of Mr.
+Dowson's work."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edward William Lane</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &amp;c., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center">A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by<br />
+<span class="smcap">Stanley Lane Poole</span>.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"... Has been long esteemed in this country as the
+compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the
+time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the
+'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the
+value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a
+great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of
+comment, and prefixing an introduction."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer....
+Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible
+for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for
+literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable
+form."&mdash;<i>Englishman, Calcutta.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.</p>
+
+<h3>MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,</h3>
+<p class="center">BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Monier Williams</span>, D.C.L.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay
+Asiatic Society,<br />
+Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions,<br />
+with Illustrations and a Map.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a
+thoughtful man on some of the most important questions
+connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened
+observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant
+people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the
+public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of
+the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have
+seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of
+every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of
+Modern India&mdash;a subject with which we should be specially
+familiar&mdash;but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee
+or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of
+their manners, their creeds, and their
+necessities."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.</p>
+
+<h3>METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.</h3>
+<p class="center">With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from<br />
+Classical Authors.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By J. Muir</span>, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration
+alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the
+legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."&mdash;<i>Edinburgh
+Daily Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE GULISTAN;</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or, Rose Garden of Shekh Mushliu'd-din Sadi of Shiraz</span>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an<br />
+Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edward B. Eastwick</span>, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a very fair rendering of the original."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed
+by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The
+<i>Gulistan</i> is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest
+order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long
+established itself in a secure position as the best version
+of Sadi's finest work."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price
+28s.</p>
+
+<h3>MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Brian Houghton Hodgson, Esq.</span>, F.R.S.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the
+Institute; <br />
+Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at the Court of Nepal, &amp;c., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. I.</i></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section I.</span>&mdash;On the Kocch, B&oacute;d&oacute;, and Dhim&aacute;l Tribes.&mdash;Part I.
+Vocabulary.&mdash;Part II. Grammar.&mdash;Part III. Their Origin, Location, Numbers,
+Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition, with a General Description of
+the Climate they dwell in&mdash;Appendix.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section II.</span>&mdash;On Himalayan Ethnology.&mdash;I. Comparative Vocabulary of the
+Languages of the Broken Tribes of N&eacute;p&aacute;l.&mdash;II. Vocabulary of the Dialects
+of the Kiranti Language.&mdash;III. Grammatical Analysis of the V&aacute;yu Language.
+The V&aacute;yu Grammar.&mdash;IV. Analysis of the B&aacute;hing Dialect of the Kiranti
+language. The B&aacute;hing Grammar.&mdash;V. On the V&aacute;yu or H&aacute;yu Tribe of the Central
+Himal&aacute;ya.&mdash;VI. On the Kiranti Tribe of the Central Himal&aacute;ya.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</i></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section III.</span>&mdash;On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India. Comparative
+Vocabulary of the Tibetan, B&oacute;d&oacute;, and G&aacute;r&oacute; Tongues.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section IV.</span>&mdash;Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section V.</span>&mdash;Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section VI.</span>&mdash;The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their connection with the
+Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers
+in Arakan. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section VII.</span>&mdash;The Mongolian Affinities of the Caucasians.&mdash;Comparison and
+Analysis of Caucasian and Mongolian Words.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section VIII.</span>&mdash;Physical Type of Tibetans.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section IX.</span>&mdash;The Aborigines of Central India.&mdash;Comparative Vocabulary of
+the Aboriginal Languages of Central India.&mdash;Aborigines of the Eastern
+Ghats.&mdash;Vocabulary of some of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering
+Tribes in the Northern Sircars.&mdash;Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks
+on their Affinities.&mdash;Supplement to the Nilgirian Vocabularies.&mdash;The
+Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section X.</span>&mdash;Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks on the
+Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section XI.</span>&mdash;Route from K&aacute;thm&aacute;nd&uacute;, the Capital of Nep&acirc;l, to Darjeeling in
+Sikim.&mdash;Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis of Nep&acirc;l.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section XII.</span>&mdash;Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police as recognised
+in the State of Nep&acirc;l.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section XIII.</span>&mdash;The Native Method of making the Paper denominated
+Hindustan, N&eacute;p&aacute;lese.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Section XIV.</span>&mdash;Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the Anglicists
+Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the People of India.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">"For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian Hodgson's
+'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable both to the philologist
+and the ethnologist."</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326,
+cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,</h3>
+<p class="center">THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.</p>
+
+<p class="center">The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By the Right Rev. P. Bigandet</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only
+illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect
+encyclop&aelig;dia of Buddhist lore."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism
+with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their
+investigations."&mdash;<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."&mdash;<i>Indian Antiquary.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place
+students of the subject under a deep obligation to its
+author."&mdash;<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"This work is one of the greatest authorities upon
+Buddhism."&mdash;<i>Dublin Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.</p>
+
+<h3>CHINESE BUDDHISM.</h3>
+<p class="center">A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By J. Edkins, D.D.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &amp;c., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It contains a vast deal of important information on the
+subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued
+study on the spot."&mdash;<i>Athen&aelig;um.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the
+extent of its original research, and the simplicity with
+which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,
+literature, and ritual is set forth."&mdash;<i>British Quarterly
+Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves
+most careful study from all interested in the history of the
+religions of the world, and expressly of those who are
+concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins
+notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise
+bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English
+writers."&mdash;<i>Record.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Written from the Year 1846 to 1878.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service;<br />
+ Hon. Secretary to the Royal Asiatic Society; and<br />
+Author of "The Modern Languages of the East Indies."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"We know none who has described Indian life, especially the
+life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and
+literary talent."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original
+remarks."&mdash;<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p>
+
+<p>"His book contains a vast amount of information. The result
+of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and
+speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as
+of food for thought."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and
+antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one
+having authority."&mdash;<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The author speaks with the authority of personal
+experience.... It is this constant association with the
+country and the people which gives such a vividness to many
+of the pages."&mdash;<i>Athen&aelig;um.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.</p>
+
+<h3>BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.</h3>
+<p class="center">The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:</p>
+
+<p class="center">BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,</p>
+
+<p class="center">For the first time Edited in the original P&#257;li.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By V. Fausboll</span>;</p>
+
+<p class="center">And Translated by <span class="smcap">T. W. Rhys Davids</span>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translation. Volume I.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of
+what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are
+probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan
+stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as
+India. The introduction contains a most interesting
+disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing
+their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore
+legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of
+the Judgment of Solomon."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his
+right to be heard on this subject by his able article on
+Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclop&aelig;dia
+Britannica.'"&mdash;<i>Leeds Mercury.</i></p>
+
+<p>"All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel
+deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established
+reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for
+the fidelity of his version, and the style of his
+translations is deserving of high praise."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than
+Mr. Rhys Davids. In the J&#257;taka book we have, then, a
+priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of
+our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete
+picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs
+of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to
+ourselves, just as they were passing through the first
+stages of civilisation."&mdash;<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.</p>
+
+<h3>A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or</span>, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND
+THE KABBALAH.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis
+According to the Talmud," &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center">With Notes and Copious Indexes.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a
+general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at
+least."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive
+to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent
+scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and
+indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon
+the Scriptures."&mdash;<i>British Quarterly Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful
+notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet
+appeared."&mdash;<i>Daily News.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Without overlooking in the slightest the several
+attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental
+Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses
+them all in interest."&mdash;<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we
+believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for
+themselves."&mdash;<i>The Record.</i></p>
+
+<p>"This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of
+knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and
+unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the
+wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood&mdash;so
+Jewish pride asserts&mdash;by the life-long devotion of scholars
+of the Chosen People."&mdash;<i>Inquirer.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact
+that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but
+throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those
+Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and
+Christian alike."&mdash;<i>John Bull.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument
+of learned, loving, light-giving labour."&mdash;<i>Jewish Herald.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Basil Hall Chamberlain</span>, Author of "Yeigo He&ntilde;kaku Shira&ntilde;."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted
+much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature
+of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into
+English verse."&mdash;<i>Daily News.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the
+first attempt which has been made to interpret the
+literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to
+the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for
+indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we
+have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful
+English verse."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric
+literature which has appeared during the close of the last
+year."&mdash;<i>Celestial Empire.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he
+undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.
+But he has evidently laboured <i>con amore</i>, and his efforts
+are successful to a degree."&mdash;<i>London and China Express.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib),</h3>
+<p class="center"> KING OF ASSYRIA, <span class="smcap">b.c.</span>
+681-668.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders and Tablets in
+the British Museum Collection; together with a Grammatical Analysis of
+each Word, Explanations of the Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual
+Syllabaries, and List of Eponyms, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Ernest A. Budge</span>, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's
+College, Cambridge.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Students of scriptural arch&aelig;ology will also appreciate the
+'History of Esarhaddon.'"&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It
+does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in
+their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it
+does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers
+both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary
+non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling
+its results."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to
+Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be
+feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due
+to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted
+himself in his laborious task."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE MESNEVI</h3>
+
+<p class="center">(Usually known as <span class="smcap">The Mesneviyi Sherif</span>, or <span class="smcap">Holy Mesnevi</span>) OF MEVLANA
+(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Book the First.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his
+Ancestors, and of his Descendants.</i></p>
+
+<p class="center">Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected
+by their Historian,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Mevlana Shemsu-'D-Din Ahmed, el Eflaki, el 'Arifi.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By James W. Redhouse</span>, M.R.A.S., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."&mdash;<i>Saturday
+Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"This book will be a very valuable help to the reader
+ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight
+into a very important department of the literature extant in
+that language."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.</p>
+
+<h3>EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Illustrating Old Truths.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Rev. J. Long</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide
+circulation and attentive reading."&mdash;<i>Record.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."&mdash;<i>Globe.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is full of interesting matter."&mdash;<i>Antiquary.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>INDIAN POETRY;</h3>
+
+<p class="blockquot">Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from the Sanscrit
+of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books from "The Iliad of India"
+(Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom" from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and
+other Oriental Poems.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edwin Arnold</span>, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"In this new volume of Messrs. Tr&uuml;bner's Oriental Series,
+Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through
+the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of
+Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of
+Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have
+introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be
+more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna
+is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the
+love of</p></div>
+
+<p class="center">'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five
+senses are typified."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his
+art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas
+as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of
+language contained in these mighty epics."&mdash;<i>Daily
+Telegraph.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and
+sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of
+the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody
+sufficient to captivate the senses of the
+dullest."&mdash;<i>Standard.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has
+adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original
+text."&mdash;<i>Overland Mail.</i></p>
+
+<p>"We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to
+popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface
+tells us, the goal towards which he bends his
+efforts."&mdash;<i>Allen's Indian Mail.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE MIND OF MENCIUS;</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or</span>, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Systematic Digest of the Doctrines of the Chinese Philosopher
+Mencius.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and
+Explanations,</p>
+
+<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. Ernst Faber</span>, Rhenish Mission Society.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,</p>
+
+<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. A. B. Hutchinson</span>, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese
+studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The
+value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered
+that at no time since relations commenced between China and
+the West has the former been so powerful&mdash;we had almost said
+aggressive&mdash;as now. For those who will give it careful
+study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the
+excellent series to which it belongs."&mdash;<i>Nature.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By A. Barth.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the
+Author.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably
+enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of
+the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as
+an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,
+which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,
+but also a useful work of reference."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and
+additions, of an article contributed by the learned author
+two years ago to the 'Encyclop&eacute;die des Sciences
+Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first
+appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best
+summary extant of the vast subject with which it
+deals."&mdash;<i>Tablet.</i></p>
+
+<p>"This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual
+of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we
+have in English. The present work ... shows not only great
+knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but
+also great insight into the inner history and the deeper
+meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only
+one, which it proposes to describe."&mdash;<i>Modern Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by
+the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country
+and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few
+Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a
+good deal of information from it, and especially from the
+extensive bibliography provided in the notes."&mdash;<i>Dublin
+Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a
+master-hand."&mdash;<i>Critic (New York).</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.</p>
+
+<h3>HINDU PHILOSOPHY.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">The S&#256;nkhya K&#256;rika Of Is'wara Krishna.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Ny&#257;ya
+and Vais'eshika Systems.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Davies</span>, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.</p>
+
+<p class="center">The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in
+the department of pure philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and
+learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the
+philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he
+may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the
+system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give
+an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions
+which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the
+world, the nature and relations of man and his future
+destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the
+connection of the S&#257;nkhya system with the philosophy of
+Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with
+that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"&mdash;<i>Foreign Church
+Chronicle.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted
+gain to all students of the development of thought. The
+system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from
+the S&#257;nkhya K&#257;rik&#257;, is the only contribution of India to
+pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to
+the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.
+Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to
+appreciate these points in any adequate manner."&mdash;<i>Saturday
+Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our
+philosophical library."&mdash;<i>Notes and Queries.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.</p>
+
+<h3>A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VED&Acirc;NTAS&Acirc;RA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated, with copious Annotations,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Major G. A. Jacob</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for
+others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an
+accurate summary of the doctrines of the Ved&acirc;nta.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an
+inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in
+his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,
+indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they
+bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will
+rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hind&ucirc;
+philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its
+kind that we have seen."&mdash;<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>TSUNI&mdash;||GOAM:</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the
+Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
+Society, Vienna, &amp;c., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of
+interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of
+Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the
+comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of
+their religion and mythology were scattered about in various
+books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and
+printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what
+he has been able to collect himself."&mdash;<i>Prof. Max M&uuml;ller in
+the Nineteenth Century.</i></p>
+
+<p>"It is full of good things."&mdash;<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
+Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., <br />
+Vol. III., pp. viii.-414, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">To which is prefixed Sale's Preliminary Discourse, with Additional Notes
+and Emendations.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
+Notes.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,
+it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if
+they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and
+for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove
+useful."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE BHAGAVAD-G&Icirc;T&Acirc;.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated, with Introduction and Notes.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Davies, M.A.</span> (Cantab.)</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad G&icirc;t&acirc; is, as
+we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and
+that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar
+value."&mdash;<i>Dublin Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.
+Bengal Civil Service.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with
+considerable success, and his version contains much that
+will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's
+delightful selection."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their
+profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on
+philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and
+the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates
+them."&mdash;<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the <i>Calcutta
+Review</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of
+the Calcutta Madrasa.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important
+of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Tr&uuml;bner's
+Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may
+take it up the work must be one of profound
+interest."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">By <span class="smcap">Dr. C. P. Tiele</span>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Vol. I.&mdash;<span class="smcap">History of the Egyptian Religion.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By JAMES BALLINGAL.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It places in the hands of the English readers a history of
+Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on
+the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the
+latest results of research. In this volume there is a great
+deal of information, as well as independent investigation,
+for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in
+itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive
+religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the
+New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and
+minute."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Poem by Jami.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Persian into English Verse.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Ralph T. H. Griffith.</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as
+translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further
+good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has
+evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the
+quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more
+prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its
+intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most
+popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read
+in all the independent native schools of India where Persian
+is taught."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Carl Abel.</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical
+questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise
+dry technicalities of the science."&mdash;<i>Standard.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,
+for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery
+over the English language fits him to be a champion of
+unpopular doctrines."&mdash;<i>Athen&aelig;um.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or, Review Of The Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Madhava Acharya.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the
+University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of
+Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The
+author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems
+current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives
+what appears to him to be their most important tenets.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted
+sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has
+familiarised the translators with Indian
+thought."&mdash;<i>Athen&aelig;um.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.</p>
+
+<h3>TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Tibetan of the <span class="smcap">Kah-Gyur</span>.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By F. Anton Von Schiefner.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By W. R. S. Ralston, M.A.</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of
+Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western
+analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from
+Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the
+Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred
+books."&mdash;<i>Academy.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better
+hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the
+lives of those scholars who have given their attention to
+gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and
+language."&mdash;<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing
+stories, or for comparative folk-lore."&mdash;<i>Pall Mall
+Gazette.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>UD&Acirc;NAVARGA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Compiled by DHARMATR&Acirc;TA.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Being the Northern Buddhist Version of Dhammapada.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts
+from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By W. Woodville Rockhill.</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which
+assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding
+of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of
+comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan
+version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,
+who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a
+translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which
+has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be
+congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult
+task."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a
+Language Map, price 18s.</p>
+
+<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do
+better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclop&aelig;dic in its
+scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any
+particular language, and is left free to add to the initial
+sum of knowledge there collected."&mdash;<i>Natal Mercury.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to
+linguistic students."&mdash;<i>Nature.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL
+RELIGIONS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By C. P. Tiele</span>,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the
+University of Leyden.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Dutch by <span class="smcap">J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A.</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide
+thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to
+gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of
+investigations into the religious history of nations. As
+Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are
+outlines&mdash;pencil sketches, I might say&mdash;nothing more.' But
+there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of
+far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the
+crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these
+pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps
+also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and
+thorough research."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.</p>
+
+<h3>A HISTORY OF BURMA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the
+Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur P. Phayre</span>, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,
+Membre Correspondant de la Soci&eacute;t&eacute; Acad&eacute;mique Indo-Chinoise de France.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Tr&uuml;bner's Oriental
+Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has
+been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre
+deserves great credit for the patience and industry which
+has resulted in this History of Burma."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>RELIGION IN CHINA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">By <span class="smcap">Joseph Edkins, D.D., Peking</span>.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the
+Chinese, with Observations on the Prospects of Christian
+Conversion amongst that People.</p>
+
+<p>"Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and
+often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of
+considerable value of the subject."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p>
+
+<p>"As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to
+study the existing religions in China, and his long
+residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an
+intimate knowledge of them as they at present
+exist."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and
+revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,
+been the standard authority upon the subject of which it
+treats."&mdash;<i>Nonconformist.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the
+first authorities on Chinese religion and
+language."&mdash;<i>British Quarterly Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed
+by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness
+with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient
+documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those
+Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these
+Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter
+possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient
+Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and
+translated, have not yet attracted the attention of
+scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon
+the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded
+in these venerable authorities."&mdash;<i>Daily News.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares
+College.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and
+scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have
+every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the
+publishers."&mdash;<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price
+24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.</p>
+
+<h3>BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (<span class="smcap">a.d.</span> 629).</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> Samuel Beal, B.A.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of
+Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,
+&amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:&mdash;"Nothing
+more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's
+translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the
+best account of the condition of India at that ancient
+period has come down to us in the books of travel written by
+the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best
+known."&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This work is full of interest; while for the student of
+sociology and the science of religion it is full of
+importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in
+so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently
+translated."&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a
+really good translation of this well-known law book, first
+rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not
+only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced
+lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications
+the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in
+clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very
+grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could
+be published of the translation left by Burnell."&mdash;<span class="smcap">F. Max
+M&uuml;ller</span> in the <i>Academy.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his Published and
+Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original and for most part Unpublished
+Documents.</p>
+
+<p class="center">By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal
+Medical Service, Retired, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not too soon have Messrs. Tr&uuml;bner added to their valuable
+Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of
+the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander
+Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and
+though an account of his career was demanded soon after his
+decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of
+his compatriot, Dr. Duka."&mdash;<i>Bookseller.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches,"
+and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. I.</i></p>
+
+<p>I.&mdash;Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.</p>
+
+<p>II.&mdash;Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James
+Barton, of his several Surveys.</p>
+
+<p>III.&mdash;Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,
+dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.</p>
+
+<p>IV.&mdash;Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.</p>
+
+<p>V.&mdash;The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.</p>
+
+<p>VI.&mdash;On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.</p>
+
+<p>VII.&mdash;On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst
+the Malays. By William Marsden.</p>
+
+<p>VIII.&mdash;Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By
+James Howison.</p>
+
+<p>IX.&mdash;A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of
+Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>X.&mdash;An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying
+off Sumatra. By John Crisp.</p>
+
+<p>XI.&mdash;Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales
+Island. By William Hunter, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>XII.&mdash;On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.
+Leyden, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>XIII.&mdash;Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the
+Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>XIV.&mdash;Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of
+Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.</p>
+
+<p>XV.&mdash;Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring
+Islands. By T. Ware.</p>
+
+<p>XVI.&mdash;Climate of Singapore.</p>
+
+<p>XVII.&mdash;Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII.&mdash;Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.</p>
+
+<p>XIX.&mdash;Inscription at Singapore.</p>
+
+<p>XX&mdash;An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By
+Lieut.-Col. James Low.</p>
+
+<p>XXI.&mdash;Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By
+J. W. Laidlay.</p>
+
+<p>XXII.&mdash;On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII.&mdash;A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV.&mdash;Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian
+Archipelago.</p>
+
+<p>XXV.&mdash;Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B
+Tremenheere.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI.&mdash;Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII.&mdash;Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII.&mdash;Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX.&mdash;Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from
+Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.</p>
+
+<p>XXX.&mdash;Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities
+in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI.&mdash;Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence
+across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and
+Capt. J. G. Forlong.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII.&mdash;Report, &amp;c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui
+Tin Ore.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII.&mdash;Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV.&mdash;Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</i></p>
+
+<p>XXXV.&mdash;Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.
+By Theodore Cantor, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI.&mdash;On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII.&mdash;Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and
+Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII.&mdash;Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the
+Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX.&mdash;On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.</p>
+
+<p>XL.&mdash;Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.</p>
+
+<p>General Index.</p>
+
+<p>Index of Vernacular Terms.</p>
+
+<p>Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">"The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China&mdash;its philology,
+economy, geography, geology&mdash;and constitute a very material and important
+contribution to our accessible information regarding that country and its
+people."&mdash;<i>Contemporary Review.</i></p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit</p>
+
+<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. B. Hale Wortham</span>, M.R.A.S.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very interesting addition to Tr&uuml;bner's Oriental
+Series."&mdash;<i>Saturday Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and
+beauty of expression."&mdash;<i>St. James' Gazette.</i></p></div>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.</p>
+
+<h3>ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> James Gray,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">The Sanscrit-P&acirc;li word N&icirc;ti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract,
+and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a
+general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and
+didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as
+form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to
+his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and
+have served as a most effective medium of instruction.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:</h3>
+
+<p class="center">THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal
+Civil Service.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Original Sanskrit Text, with Critical Notes.</span> <span class="smcap">By</span> J. Jolly, Ph.D.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor
+of Law in the University of Calcutta.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code&mdash;the well-known Great
+Law Book of the Hindus&mdash;is 1250-500 <span class="smcap">b.c.</span>, although the rules and precepts
+contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages
+before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for
+many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work
+will supply a want long felt.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p>
+
+<h3>LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Frederic Henry Balfour.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic
+Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &amp;c. &amp;c.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Written from the Year 1847 to 1887.</span> <i>Second Series.</i></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust, LL.D.,</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late
+Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.</p>
+
+<h3>MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Edited <span class="smcap">By R. Rost, Ph.D., &amp;c. &amp;c.,</span> Librarian to the India Office.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Second Series.</span></p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the
+Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian
+Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the
+Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.</p>
+
+<h3>FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. J. Hinton Knowles</span>, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center">(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.</p>
+
+<h3>MEDI&AElig;VAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.</h3>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Fragments Towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central
+and Western Asia from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Century.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By E. Bretschneider,</span> M.D.,</p>
+
+<p class="center">Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.</p>
+
+<h3>ALBERUNI'S INDIA:</h3>
+<p class="center">AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY,<br />
+ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND ASTROLOGY (<span class="smcap">About a.d. 1031</span>).</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Translated into English.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&#8757; The Arabic Original, with an Index of
+the Sanskrit Words, Edited by Professor SACHAU, is in the press.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.</p>
+
+<h3>THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By the Shamans Hwui Li and Yen-tsung.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">With a Preface containing an account of the Works of <span class="smcap">I-Tsing</span>.</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Samuel Beal, B.A.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College,
+London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic
+Legend of Sakya Buddha," &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p class="blockquot">When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he
+took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent
+had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress,
+Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li,
+composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's
+travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to
+discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he
+revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised
+and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable
+sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many
+particulars.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
+
+<p class="center"><i>IN PREPARATION:&mdash;</i></p>
+
+<p class="center">Post 8vo.</p>
+
+<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.</h3>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By R. N. Cust, LL. D.</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of
+Africa," &amp;c.</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 45%;" />
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diff --git a/34125.txt b/34125.txt
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha
+       Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy
+
+Author: Madhava Acharya
+
+Translator: E. B. Cowell
+            A. E. Gough
+
+Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                              TRUBNER'S
+
+                           ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+
+
+                                 THE
+
+                        SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA
+
+                                  OR
+
+        _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._
+
+
+
+                                  BY
+
+                           MADHAVA ACHARYA.
+
+
+                            TRANSLATED BY
+
+                          E. B. COWELL, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE
+      IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE
+      UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.
+
+                                 AND
+
+                          A. E. GOUGH, M.A.
+
+      PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND
+      PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                               LONDON:
+
+                     TRUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
+
+                                1882.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
+Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhava
+Acharya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
+Pandit Isvarachandra Vidyasagara, but a subsequent edition, with no
+important alterations, was published in 1872 by Pandit Taranatha
+Tarkavachaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
+the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
+Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
+been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
+those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
+of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
+originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
+character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
+from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
+noticed the same thing in the Nagari copies of Madhava's Commentary on
+the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.
+
+As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic
+Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
+read it with my friend Pandit Mahesachandra Nyayaratna, the present
+Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
+translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
+engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
+England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
+chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
+were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
+longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits
+of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
+years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
+that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
+of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
+it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
+accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
+advantage of the help of some of the Pandits of Benares, especially of
+Pandit Rama Misra, the assistant Professor of Sankhya, who was himself
+a Ramanuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
+things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
+throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
+abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
+the Benares Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
+revised for their present republication.
+
+The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
+The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical
+systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
+gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
+principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
+them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
+for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
+were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
+with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
+the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
+interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
+course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
+details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
+guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
+Darsanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
+the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
+materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
+controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
+the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
+continually following in their track even where he does not quote
+their exact words.[2]
+
+The systems are arranged from the Vedanta point of view,--our author
+having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smarta order in
+the Math of Sringeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Samkara
+Acharya, the great Vedantist teacher of the eighth century, through
+whose efforts the Vedanta became what it is at present--the
+acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
+ascending scale,--the first, the Charvaka and Bauddha, being the
+lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedanta, and the last, the
+Sankhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.
+
+The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest
+minds in India throughout the mediaeval period of its history. Hiouen
+Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les ecoles philosophiques sont
+constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnees s'eleve
+comme les flots de la mer. Les heretiques des diverses sectes s'attachent
+a des maitres particuliers, et, par des voies differentes, marchent tous
+au meme but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the
+mediaeval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among
+the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
+trees Arhata begging monks, Svetapadas, Mahapasupatas, Pandarabhikshus,
+Bhagavatas, Varnins, Kesalunchanas, Lokayatikas, Kapilas, Kanadas,
+Aupanishadas, Isvarakarins, Dharmasastrins, Pauranikas, Saptatantavas,
+Sabdas, Pancharatrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets
+and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in
+the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Madhava's poem on the
+controversial triumphs of Samkara Acharya, and in the spurious prose work
+on the same subject, ascribed to Anantanandagiri. Well may some old poet
+have put into the mouth of Yudhishthira the lines which one so often hears
+from the lips of modern pandits--
+
+    Veda vibhinnah smritayo vibhinna,
+    Nasau munir yasya matam na bhinnam,
+    Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam,
+    Mahajano yena gatah sa panthah.[4]
+
+And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,
+
+[Greek: mias toinyn ouses tes aletheias, to gar pseudos myrias
+ektropas echei, kathaper hai bakchai ta tou Pentheos diaphoresasai
+mele hai tes philosophias tes te barbarou tes te
+Hellenikes haireseis, hekaste hoper elachen, hos pasan auchei
+ten aletheian, photos d', oimai, anatole panta photizetai.]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
+equanimity is that of Vachaspati Misra, who wrote standard treatises
+on each of the six systems except the Vaiseshika, adopting, of course,
+the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
+alien tenet.]
+
+[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
+given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
+in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Sriharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 4: Found in the Mahabh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
+give them as I have heard them from Pandit Ramanarayana Vidyaratna.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+                                                                 Page
+
+    I.    The Charvaka System (E. B. C.)                           2
+
+   II.    The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)                           12
+
+  III.    The Arhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)                   36
+
+   IV.    The Ramanuja System (A. E. G.)                          64
+
+    V.    The Purna-prajna System (A. E. G.)                      87
+
+   VI.    The Nakulisa-Pasupata System (A. E. G.)                103
+
+  VII.    The Saiva System (E. B. C.)                            112
+
+ VIII.    The Pratyabhijna or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)      128
+
+   IX.    The Rasesvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)           137
+
+    X.    The Vaiseshika or Aulukya System (E. B. C.)            145
+
+   XI.    The Akshapada or Nyaya System (E. B. C.)               161
+
+  XII.    The Jaiminiya System (E. B. C.)                        178
+
+ XIII.    The Paniniya System (E. B. C.)                         203
+
+  XIV.    The Sankhya System (E. B. C.)                          221
+
+   XV.    The Patanjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)                231
+
+  XVI.    The Vedanta or System of Samkara Acharya               273
+
+          APPENDIX--On the Upadhi (E. B. C.)                     275
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
+
+
+THE PROLOGUE.
+
+
+1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
+supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
+_him_ only has this all a maker.
+
+2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajna-Vishnu, who knows all the Agamas,
+the son of Sarngapani, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
+of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
+proper meaning of the term Soul.
+
+3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Madhava
+mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
+fortunate Sayana.
+
+4. Having thoroughly searched the Sastras of former teachers, very
+hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sayana-Madhava[5] the lord has
+expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
+with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
+delight in a garland strung of various flowers?
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
+Vamsa-Brahmana, has solved the riddle of the relation of Madhava and
+Sayana. Sayana is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born
+after all the elder children have died. Madhava elsewhere calls Sayana
+his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
+himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sayana-Madhavah
+here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
+same person. The body seems meant by the Sayana of the third sloka.
+Mayana was the father of Madhava, and the true reading may be
+_sriman-mayana_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM.
+
+
+[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Siva, the
+abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
+how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
+felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka,
+the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
+of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be
+eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
+refrain--
+
+    While life is yours, live joyously;
+    None can escape Death's searching eye:
+    When once this frame of ours they burn,
+    How shall it e'er again return?
+
+The mass of men, in accordance with the Sastras of policy and
+enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
+denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
+found to follow only the doctrine of Charvaka. Hence another name for
+that school is Lokayata,--a name well accordant with the thing
+signified.[6]
+
+In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original
+principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
+intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
+from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are
+destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Sruti
+for this [Brihad Arany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
+elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
+destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the
+soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
+since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
+such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
+only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.
+
+The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
+may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
+always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
+the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
+inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
+fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
+wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
+straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
+not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
+which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
+refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
+devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
+because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
+contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
+he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
+poet--
+
+    The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
+    Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning
+        of fools;
+    The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
+    What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered
+        with husk and dust?[9]
+
+If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
+world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
+agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
+expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
+accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are
+only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
+three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then
+again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
+destructive, as the authority of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by
+those who maintain that of the karma-kanda, while those who maintain
+the authority of the jnana-kanda reject that of the karma-kanda; and
+lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
+of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--
+
+     The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
+     and smearing oneself with ashes,--
+
+     Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those
+     who have no manliness nor sense.
+
+Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
+produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is
+the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
+eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
+holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such
+phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible,
+as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside
+in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
+body" is metaphorical "the head of Rahu" [Rahu being really _all
+head_].
+
+All this has been thus summed up--
+
+    In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;
+    And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--
+    Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed together;
+    Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the
+        same subject,
+    And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the
+        soul and no other,
+    And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.
+
+"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
+inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
+else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
+thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
+hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
+those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"
+
+All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.
+
+Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or
+middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
+found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
+major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
+of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does
+not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
+_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by
+virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this
+connection's being known?
+
+We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is
+held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by
+the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
+the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
+contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
+particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
+such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
+proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
+middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
+Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
+has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
+a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
+particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
+implying fire].
+
+Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
+the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
+object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
+as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their
+objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."
+
+Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal
+proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
+require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
+arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.
+
+Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege
+in reply, in accordance with the Vaiseshika doctrine of Kanada, that
+this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
+this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
+that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
+the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the
+child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more
+reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
+invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,
+&c. [which, of course, we Charvakas reject].
+
+And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
+knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
+whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
+major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
+no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
+smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
+oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.
+
+Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the
+means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
+impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
+connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is
+to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
+relation of a name to something so named.
+
+Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as
+the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal
+proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
+establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
+therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself
+perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
+non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
+inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
+been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
+the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
+extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying
+the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
+accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
+term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal],
+are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
+fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
+sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
+causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it
+is established by the sloka of the great Doctor beginning
+_samasama_.[23]
+
+But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
+knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
+knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
+the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a
+connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
+by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
+knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
+invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
+adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
+Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
+proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]
+
+The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
+knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
+former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
+this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
+coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
+drugs, &c.
+
+From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can
+only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
+not allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become
+destitute of any cause.
+
+But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
+can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+    The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
+    By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.
+
+And all this has been also said by Brihaspati--
+
+    There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
+    Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
+        effect.
+    The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and
+        smearing one's self with ashes,
+    Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
+        and manliness.
+    If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,
+    Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]
+    If the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
+    Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is
+        needless to give provisions for the journey.
+    If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sraddha here,
+    Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the
+        housetop?
+    While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
+        though he runs in debt;
+    When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
+    If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
+    How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
+        kindred?
+    Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have
+        established here
+    All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.
+    The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
+    All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turphari, &c.[27]
+    And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswamedha,
+    These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
+        presents to the priests,[28]
+    While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
+        demons.
+
+Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
+to the doctrine of Charvaka. Such is the pleasant consummation.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 6: "Sankara, Bhaskara, and other commentators name the
+Lokayatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Charvaka"
+(Colebrooke). Lokayata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
+the world" (_loka_ and _ayata_). Laukayatika occurs in Panini's
+ukthagana.]
+
+[Footnote 7: _Kinwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
+fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c."
+Colebrooke quotes from Sankara: "The faculty of thought results from a
+modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
+ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
+betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
+exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."]
+
+[Footnote 8: Of course Sankara, in his commentary, gives a very
+different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
+existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
+Sabara's Comm. Jaimini Sut., i. i. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 9: I take _kana_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunr_. Cf.
+Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Asvah kana gavas tandula masakas tushah._]
+
+[Footnote 10: See Nyaya Sutras, ii. 57.]
+
+[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehah_.]
+
+[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
+invariable concomitance (_vyapti_)."]
+
+[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _nischita upadhi_ see Siddhanta
+Muktavali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]
+
+[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
+(as of smoke by fire).]
+
+[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in
+every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
+and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
+other place.]
+
+[Footnote 17: See Sahitya Darpana (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
+Siddhanta-M., p. 80.]
+
+[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the
+rhetorical, argument.]
+
+[Footnote 19: "_Upamana_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the
+instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
+particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
+name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]
+
+[Footnote 20: The upadhi is the condition which must be supplied to
+restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
+has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
+the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
+of a true vyapti, there is, of course, no upadhi.]
+
+[Footnote 21: '[Greek: Antistrephei] (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We
+have here our A with distributed predicate.]
+
+[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upadhi
+"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
+accompanied by it," then in the Naiyayika argument "sound is
+non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
+would serve as a Mimamsaka upadhi, to establish the _vyabhichara_
+fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
+clause excludes it, as an upadhi must be consistent with _either_
+party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyayika maintains that "being
+produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
+defined the upadhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
+constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upadhi "the
+nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
+class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
+only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
+found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
+upadhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
+accompanying the major," we might have as a Mimamsaka upadhi "the not
+causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of
+hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
+where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure sloka of Udayanacharya, "where
+a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,
+universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
+predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the
+existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
+will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
+the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
+because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
+fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
+fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
+fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
+non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
+inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
+by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
+will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus
+invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
+fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
+reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
+accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
+here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
+another, difficulty in the Sarva-darsana-sangraha to my old friend and
+teacher, Pandit Mahesa Chandra Nyayaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
+College.]
+
+[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
+Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority
+of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
+genus and species.]
+
+[Footnote 25: _Adrishta_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions
+which produce their effects in future births.]
+
+[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
+209.]
+
+[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's
+Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]
+
+[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
+handled in the rites."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.
+
+
+At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Charvakas) laid
+down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
+your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
+easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
+accordingly been said--
+
+     "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
+     a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not
+     through the mere observation of the desired result in
+     similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
+     dissimilar cases."[29]
+
+On the hypothesis (of the Naiyayikas) that it is concomitance and
+non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
+that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
+of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
+impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
+future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyayika) rejoin that
+uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
+system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
+may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
+stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
+entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
+practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
+terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30]
+
+1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
+designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
+(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
+from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
+or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
+instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
+five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
+its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
+is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
+non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.
+
+2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
+ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
+we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
+arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
+as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
+self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
+where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
+exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
+the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
+to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For
+reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
+there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
+no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
+two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
+can reference to the same object take place where there is a
+reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
+for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.
+
+It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
+cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).
+
+If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
+_pramana_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
+is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
+allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
+maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
+the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
+inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
+(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
+absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
+Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
+and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
+homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
+affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
+words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
+existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
+yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
+term. Conformably it has been said by Tathagata--
+
+     "The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
+     its being present to the understanding of others.
+
+     "The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
+     negation by a certain person."
+
+All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
+for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.
+
+These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
+standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Madhyamika,
+Yogachara, Sautrantika, and Vaibhashika, these Buddhists adopt
+respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
+void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
+(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects
+(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
+teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
+of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
+the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
+to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
+and so forth, according to their several inclinations.
+
+It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
+viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
+all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.
+
+Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
+and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
+from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)
+like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one
+object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
+existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
+perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
+exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
+established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary
+succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
+the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
+efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
+succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
+succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
+manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--
+
+     "In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
+     alternative;
+
+     "Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
+     repugnance in the very statement."[33]
+
+And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
+and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
+existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.
+
+Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
+the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
+to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
+future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
+efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
+cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
+deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
+which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
+time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
+thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
+power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
+practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
+not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
+instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
+while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
+past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.
+
+You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there
+is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
+future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
+the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
+not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
+the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
+assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
+other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
+cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
+will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
+adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:
+
+     "What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
+     is on the skin of man;
+
+     "If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
+     and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
+     produced upon it."
+
+Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_
+its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
+its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
+their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
+without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
+the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
+give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
+afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
+stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
+additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in
+infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another
+auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
+series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
+regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
+additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
+water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
+would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on
+the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
+otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
+a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
+to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
+requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
+productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
+established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
+supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.
+
+Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
+the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
+or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
+the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
+is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
+the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
+take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
+and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
+additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
+regression is firmly set up.
+
+In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
+subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
+the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
+additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
+by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
+your embarrassment.
+
+Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
+supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
+may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the
+supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
+supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
+_kurvad rupa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
+the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
+its fruit.
+
+Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
+Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
+for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
+(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
+effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
+of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
+will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
+the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
+reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.
+
+That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
+heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
+Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
+not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
+disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
+allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
+times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
+That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
+that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
+time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
+of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
+produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
+stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
+seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
+efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
+The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
+anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
+of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
+exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
+to those times.
+
+(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
+being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
+to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
+which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
+there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
+of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
+"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
+observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
+the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jnana-sri--
+
+     "What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
+     things;
+
+     "The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
+     and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
+     eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);
+
+     "Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
+     the work of another;
+
+     "For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
+     simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
+     true in regard to that which we have to prove."
+
+Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
+Vaiseshikas and Naiyayikas, that existence is a participation in the
+universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
+particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
+universal) could have no existence.
+
+Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
+co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for
+such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_
+existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
+dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
+many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
+all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
+forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.
+Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
+everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
+in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
+and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Prasasta-pada
+has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
+present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
+of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
+another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
+other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
+the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
+qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
+itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
+does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
+place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
+inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
+you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
+of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
+of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.
+
+Conformably it has been said--
+
+     "Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
+     place, engages without moving from that place in producing
+     itself in another place.
+
+     "This entity (universality) is not connected with that
+     wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
+     that place: great is this miracle.
+
+     "It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
+     divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
+     of difficulties!"
+
+If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
+rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
+repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
+heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
+verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
+found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
+bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
+pain, and pain alone.
+
+If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
+instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
+being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
+impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
+all is like itself alone, like itself alone.
+
+In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
+are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
+not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
+(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
+of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular
+nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon
+that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
+so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
+semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
+fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
+The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
+superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection
+between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be
+unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
+objects of the negation; the Madhyamikas excellently wise explain as
+follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
+total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
+like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
+momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
+assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
+reality.
+
+The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four
+alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
+and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
+this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
+the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.
+
+If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
+is said--
+
+     "Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
+     like, for instance;
+
+     "No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
+     of the sky and the like, for instance."
+
+The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
+inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
+Buddha in the Alankaravatara[34]--
+
+     "Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
+     ascertained;[35]
+
+     "Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
+     natureless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
+     sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."
+
+That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
+alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--
+
+     "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
+     views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
+     carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."
+
+In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
+come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
+Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be
+taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
+student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
+putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
+Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
+These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
+religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
+their conventional designation of Madhyamikas (or mediocre).
+
+Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogacharas, because while they
+accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
+the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
+void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
+admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent
+cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
+is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakirti: "To one
+who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."
+
+An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the
+following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
+from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
+which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
+what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
+you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
+cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
+the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
+supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
+apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a
+complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
+by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
+alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
+not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
+been said--
+
+     "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
+     have six surfaces;
+
+     "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
+     body of atomic dimension."
+
+Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is
+shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous
+with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
+     cognition ulterior thereto;
+
+     "There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
+     intellect shines forth of itself alone."
+
+The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
+is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
+soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
+and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
+were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
+not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
+identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
+determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
+interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
+illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
+cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
+beginning and without interruption; as it has been said--
+
+     "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
+     cognition thereof are identical;
+
+     "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
+     cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
+     reason of illusory perceptions,
+
+     "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
+     of percipient."
+
+Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the
+energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
+sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
+the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
+subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
+virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
+reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
+conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
+to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
+another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
+     appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,
+
+     "Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
+     percipient;
+
+     "So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
+     example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
+     the like,
+
+     "Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
+     percipient and percept."
+
+Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
+ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.
+
+When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
+view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
+knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
+such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
+_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).
+
+Others again (the Sautrantikas) hold that the position that there is
+no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
+contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
+cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
+accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
+being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they
+proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
+invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because
+inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
+manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
+as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
+object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
+should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the
+cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
+blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
+and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
+so it has been said--
+
+     "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
+     portion,
+
+     "This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
+     illusion."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
+     as if it were external."
+
+To this we reply (say the Sautrantikas): This is untenable, for if
+there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
+comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
+senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
+mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
+illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
+duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
+involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
+cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
+their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
+and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
+states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
+difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
+like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
+external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and
+your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.
+
+If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
+the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrantikas) reply that this
+objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
+the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
+and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
+interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--
+
+     "If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They
+     recognise perceptibility,
+
+     "And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
+     its imposition of its form."
+
+To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
+nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
+from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
+be inferred. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
+     without losing the nature of a half;
+
+     "The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
+     is the nature of the knowable."
+
+For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
+cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
+indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
+to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
+external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
+at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
+instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
+speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
+walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
+discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
+are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
+recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
+manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as
+it has been said--
+
+     "That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
+     about the Ego:
+
+     "That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
+     the rest."
+
+Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
+it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
+which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
+world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
+presentments resulting from ideation.
+
+According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vijnanavadin_),
+ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
+presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
+single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
+produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
+sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
+train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
+to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
+momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
+are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
+subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
+presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
+had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
+stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
+this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
+intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
+must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
+consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
+percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
+smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
+conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
+suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,
+the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
+the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
+like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
+forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
+restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
+medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
+the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
+one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been
+equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
+who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
+causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
+its modifications.
+
+So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
+of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
+(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
+these, the sensible world (_rupa-skandha_) is the sense organs and
+their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
+discriminated (_rupyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the
+stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
+affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
+generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
+world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words
+"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
+desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
+miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.
+
+Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
+and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
+principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
+     four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36]
+
+In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
+"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
+(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
+these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
+concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
+of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
+causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
+being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
+germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
+elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
+the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
+as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
+touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
+the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism
+comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
+Tathagatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
+by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
+determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
+cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathagata
+Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
+between the cause and effect, results from production or from
+non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
+exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
+the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
+the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_
+(in the word _sthitita_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
+by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
+some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
+effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
+it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
+that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
+causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
+observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
+genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,
+from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
+hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
+blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
+neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
+the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
+being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
+two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
+matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
+unduly prolix.
+
+Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
+rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
+(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
+knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
+ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrantika arose from
+the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
+who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism
+(_sutra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
+Sautrantikas."
+
+Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
+odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to
+produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
+venerated Buddha styled Prathamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
+attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
+is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the
+internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
+inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddha
+bhasha_), and are known under the designation of Vaibhashikas. Their
+technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of
+inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
+no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
+impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
+contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
+therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
+is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
+representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
+evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--
+
+     "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
+     non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
+     appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
+
+     "The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
+     were aught else,
+
+     "There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
+     derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."
+
+Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
+is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
+universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
+replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
+for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
+if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
+gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
+for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
+fully discussed in describing the Sautrantikas (cf. p. 27), and
+therefore need not here be further detailed.
+
+It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according
+to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
+for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--
+
+     "The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
+     accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
+     (of those who are to be taught),
+
+     "Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
+     plurality of methods.
+
+     "For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
+     superficial,
+
+     "Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
+     universal void which is a negation of duality."
+
+It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
+inner seats (_ayatana_) is conducive to felicity.
+
+     "After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats
+
+     "Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
+     aught else below?
+
+     "The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,
+
+     "The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
+     the wise as the twelve inner seats."
+
+The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
+Viveka-vilasa:--
+
+     "Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
+     universe is momentarily fluxional;
+
+     "The following four principles in order are to be known by
+     the name of the noble truths:--
+
+     "Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
+     held,[38]
+
+     "And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
+     heard in order.
+
+     "Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are
+     declared to be five,--
+
+     "Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.
+
+     "The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
+     and the rest, the common sensory,
+
+     "And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the
+     twelve inner seats.
+
+     "This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
+     it arises in the heart of man.
+
+     "Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
+     aggregate.
+
+     "The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,
+
+     "This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
+     emancipation.
+
+     "Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
+     perception and inference.
+
+     "The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
+     the Vaibhashikas and the rest.
+
+     "The Vaibhashika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
+     cognition;
+
+     "The Sautrantika allows no external object apprehensible by
+     perception;
+
+     "The Yogachara admits only intellect accompanied with forms;
+
+     "The Madhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.
+
+     "All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
+     emancipation,
+
+     "Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of
+     cognitions and impressions.
+
+     "The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
+     single meal in the forenoon,
+
+     "The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
+     Bauddha mendicants."[39]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 29: This sloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
+89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
+read more correctly, _'darsanan na na darsanat_.]
+
+[Footnote 30: Kusumanjali, iii. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--
+
+(1.) Madhyamikas or Nihilists.
+
+(2.) Yogacharas or Subjective Idealists.
+
+(3.) Sautrantikas or Representationists.
+
+(4.) Vaibhashikas or Presentationists.]
+
+[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
+
+"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
+heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
+half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
+ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
+although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
+reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
+never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
+any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth
+part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
+an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
+another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
+because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
+refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
+declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
+given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
+one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in
+another."]
+
+[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]
+
+[Footnote 34: Query, Lankavatara?]
+
+[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
+every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_
+the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
+is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
+the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
+of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
+calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
+more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
+sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."]
+
+[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read
+_samudaya_?]
+
+[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
+"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
+of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
+because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
+into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
+wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
+_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
+forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
+definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
+agency."]
+
+[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
+30.]
+
+[Footnote 39: Madhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
+Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
+explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudaya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem
+to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE ARHATA SYSTEM.
+
+
+The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
+Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain
+extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
+(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
+arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
+be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that
+one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
+conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
+its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
+continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
+subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
+the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts
+only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
+
+But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
+sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
+In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
+'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel
+line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
+and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if
+this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A
+might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an
+essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
+effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
+sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
+certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
+stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series
+to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
+with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
+the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
+it has been said--
+
+     "'In whatever series of successive states the original
+     impression of the action was produced,
+
+     "'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
+     produced in cotton.
+
+     "'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the
+     citron, &c.,
+
+     "'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see
+     it?'"
+
+But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
+overthrown by the following dilemma:--
+
+In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your
+favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
+It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
+always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
+example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
+the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove
+your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
+consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
+momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
+of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
+it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
+this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
+said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
+origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."
+
+As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
+proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
+attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
+_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
+holders of the Syad-vada[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the
+indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
+example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
+and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
+moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
+without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
+individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
+in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
+held to be one [throughout all"].
+
+Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
+between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
+follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
+remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
+might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
+and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
+away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
+enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenavakya--
+
+"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
+not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of
+memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
+these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
+destruction!"
+
+Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
+of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
+does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
+the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
+perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
+the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
+and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
+like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
+cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
+and consequently the _Alambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.
+29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
+(_pratyaya_).[43]
+
+If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
+will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
+existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
+For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
+certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
+explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
+impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
+it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
+incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
+perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
+abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
+external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a
+definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],
+and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
+mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
+object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
+&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
+exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all
+our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
+"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
+say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
+possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are
+applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
+belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a
+mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it
+represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
+object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
+be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
+itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
+grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
+hopeless difficulties.
+
+If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
+perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
+would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is
+a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
+lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
+perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
+being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
+the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
+jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
+the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
+And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
+blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
+both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
+character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
+perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
+constituting its character.[46]
+
+All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
+length by the Jaina authors, Pratapachandra and others, in the
+_Prameyakamalamartanda_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
+the book too much.
+
+Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept
+the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Arhata doctrine.
+The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-suri,[47]
+in his _Aptanischayalankara_.
+
+"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
+overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the
+declarer of things as they are."
+
+But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
+path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
+to apply, as has been declared by Tautatita [Bhatta Kumarila[48]]?
+
+1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
+ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
+help us as a sign to infer his existence.
+
+2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals
+an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
+passages (_arthavada_) be applied here.
+
+3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
+quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
+repetitions (_anuvada_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
+before.
+
+4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
+of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
+spurious Veda?
+
+5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?
+How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
+support?
+
+6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
+omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
+point be established without some previously established foundation?
+
+7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
+of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
+words.
+
+8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
+we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
+proof, comparison (_upamana_).
+
+9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
+embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,
+if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."
+
+We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
+existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
+proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,
+&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become
+omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
+remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
+Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
+when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
+just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
+darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its
+hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things
+remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
+the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
+grasping all things; for otherwise the Mimamsist could not maintain
+that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
+authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be
+the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
+argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
+existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyaya will grant that
+universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
+of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
+Purva Mimamsa accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
+for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
+all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
+prohibitions, as is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the Sutras,
+i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
+the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it
+is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
+knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
+certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
+["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior
+assaults of argument can be put to flight.
+
+But the Naiyayika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
+which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
+sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
+can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
+been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
+eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
+eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
+like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated"
+necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the
+latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
+the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
+being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?
+according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a
+maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
+argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
+have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
+their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
+horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
+being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
+relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
+(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
+the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?
+
+Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would
+include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
+contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it
+would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by
+intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the
+third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
+disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,
+because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
+alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
+substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
+itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
+something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
+former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
+has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
+latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
+point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
+relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you
+mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
+terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
+such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
+existence.
+
+Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach
+too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
+to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
+be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
+something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
+of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
+contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
+all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
+all-pervading].
+
+And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?
+
+In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
+erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of
+many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if
+all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
+be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vitaragastuti_, or "Praise
+of Jina"--
+
+1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
+independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
+whose teacher art _thou_."
+
+And again--
+
+2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
+influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
+of yourself or all the artisans, if Iswara fabricates the three
+worlds?"
+
+Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
+when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.
+
+Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are
+impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this
+universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
+omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
+faults as _Anyonyasrayata_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal
+succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
+endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
+much for this preliminary discussion.
+
+The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are
+thus described in the _Paramagamasara_ (which is devoted to the
+exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right
+knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
+thus explained by Yogadeva:--
+
+(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been
+declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
+faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary
+idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
+_Tattvartha-sutra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right
+'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
+predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
+produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
+"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
+another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
+teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.
+
+(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
+&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
+doubt; as it has been said--
+
+"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
+predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
+wise."
+
+This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _sruta_, _avadhi_,
+_manas-paryaya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _s_ruta,
+_avadhi_, _manas-paryaya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The
+meaning of this is as follows:--
+
+1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the
+operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
+being abolished.
+
+2. _Sruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the
+obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
+
+3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
+abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
+&c.[56]
+
+4. _Manas-paryaya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's
+thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
+knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
+
+5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
+ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
+
+The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
+manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
+itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
+ways."
+
+But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
+the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
+
+(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
+evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
+diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
+constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
+the Arhat--
+
+1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of
+blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
+the 'five vows,' _ahimsa_, _sunrita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharya_, and
+_aparigraha_.[57]
+
+2. "The 'vow' of _ahimsa_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
+of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
+
+3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
+_sunrita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
+others and prejudicial.
+
+4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
+_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
+killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
+
+5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharya_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
+abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
+and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
+one's causing another to act.
+
+6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive
+interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
+may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
+
+7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
+these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."
+
+The full account of the five states of mind (_bhavana_) has been given
+in the following passage [of which we only quote one sloka]--
+
+"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _sunrita_ uninterruptedly by the
+abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
+deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.
+
+These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
+united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
+an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,
+and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce
+the elixir's effect, but not severally.
+
+Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,
+_jiva_ and _ajiva_; the soul, _jiva_, is pure intelligence; the
+non-soul, _ajiva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
+said--
+
+"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
+'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
+pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
+affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
+the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
+be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."
+
+_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
+place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
+of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
+_pradesa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
+[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
+its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
+be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
+these."[61]
+
+Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real
+nature of the soul viewed as _parinata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];
+but by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ it appears
+in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence
+of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
+&c.[63] As has been said by Vachakacharya [in a sutra]--
+
+"The _aupasamika_, the _Kshayika_, and the 'mixed' states are the
+nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Parinamika_."
+
+1. The _aupasamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of
+past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
+future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
+mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
+nut-plant,[64] &c.
+
+2. The _Kshayika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
+actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
+
+3. The "mixed" (_misra_) state combines both these, as when water is
+partly pure.
+
+4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
+influence on the future]. The _Parinamika_ state is the soul's innate
+condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent
+states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the
+above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
+happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sutra quoted above.
+
+This has been explained in the _Svarupa-sambodhana_--
+
+"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some
+way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;
+such is the soul described to be."
+
+If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
+we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
+equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
+support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
+non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
+is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
+advocates of the _Syad-vada_) it is perfectly notorious that all
+things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.
+
+Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned
+above, _jiva_ and _ajiva_; they hold that there are five _astikayas_
+or categories,--_jiva_, _akasa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.
+To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67]
+as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
+apply the idea of "body" (_kaya_),[68] from their occupying several
+parts of space.
+
+The _jivas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
+"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
+divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),
+and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _samjna_,
+_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
+instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
+also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable"
+(_sthavara_).
+
+The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
+taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as
+possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
+earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be
+made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are
+aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
+appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
+hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
+must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which
+have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,
+are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of
+earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]
+These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense
+of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
+passing into any other state of existence.
+
+_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _akasa_ are singular categories [and not
+generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
+the causes of a substance's change of place.
+
+_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They
+assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
+extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
+Lokakasa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
+from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
+_akasa_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
+occupied by another.
+
+_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
+two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the
+compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
+the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
+from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
+separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
+_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_pur_), and "dissolve" (_gal_).
+Although "time" is not properly an _astikaya_, because it does not
+occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
+still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;
+"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities
+reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
+general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jiva_, form, &c., of the
+body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
+into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
+"demerit," and _akasa_. "Action" (_paryaya_) has thus been defined;
+the actions (_paryayah_) of a substance are, as has been said, its
+existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
+course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jiva_, the knowledge of
+objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the
+lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special
+functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_
+[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].
+
+Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--
+
+"The _tattvas_ are _jiva_, _ajiva_, _asrava_, _bandha_, _samvara_,
+_nirjara_, and _moksha_." _Jiva_ and _ajiva_ have been already described.
+_Asrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]
+through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
+_audarika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _asrava_,
+because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is
+called _asrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
+flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
+it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
+collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
+which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
+lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jiva_, heated
+by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
+by _yoga_. _Kashaya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
+(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
+pride, delusion, and lust. _Asrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
+abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what
+is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.
+
+These various subdivisions of _asrava_ have been described at length
+in several _Sutras_. "_Asrava_ is the impulse to action with body,
+speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
+demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Asrava_ is the
+action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
+the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
+means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
+&c."[76]
+
+_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
+intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kashaya_),
+and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many
+parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
+suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--
+
+     "Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
+     bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"
+
+In this quotation the word "sin" (_kashaya_) is used to include the
+other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
+Vachakacharya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
+of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
+sin."
+
+(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural
+character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
+of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or
+derived, when learned by another's teaching.
+
+(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
+the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.
+
+(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pramada_) is a want of effort to practise the
+five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.
+
+(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction
+that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of
+bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubhava_; _yoga_ [or _asrava_] causes
+those kinds called _prakriti_ and _pradesa_.
+
+"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakriti_, _sthiti_,
+_anubhava_, and _pradesa_ are its four kinds."
+
+1. _Prakriti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
+sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
+eight _mula-prakritis_.[77]
+
+Thus obstructions (_avarana_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,
+as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)
+_jnanavarana_, or (_b_) _darsanavarana_. (_c_) An object recognised as
+simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
+pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedaniya_. (_d_)
+A delusion (_mohaniya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the
+Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
+conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)
+_Ayus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _Naman_, or
+"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
+paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of
+noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antaraya_
+produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the
+king by considerations of economy.
+
+Thus is the _prakriti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the
+eight _mula-prakritis_, with subdivisions according to the different
+actions of the various subject-matter.
+
+And thus has Umaswati-vachakacharya[80] declared: "The first kind of
+_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
+_vedaniya_, _mohaniya_, _ayus_, _naman_, _gotra_, and _antaraya_;" and he
+has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
+twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
+explained at full length in the _Vidyananda_ and other works, and here is
+omitted through fear of prolixity.
+
+2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued
+unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
+three _mula-prakritis_, _jnanavarana_, &c., and the last, _antaraya_, have
+not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
+described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of
+periods of time measured by thirty _sagaropamas_."[81] This continuance is
+_sthiti_.
+
+3. _Anubhava._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there
+exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
+producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies
+produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubhava_)
+for producing their respective effects.
+
+4. _Pradesa._ The _bandha_ called _pradesa_ is the entrance into the
+different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
+number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
+consequences of actions.
+
+_Samvara_ is the stopping of _asrava_--that by which the influence of
+past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
+divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the
+soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it
+is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the
+acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
+into five kinds, as _irya_,[83] _bhasha_, &c., as has been explained
+by Hemachandra.
+
+1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
+circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
+call _irya_.
+
+2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with
+all people; this is called _bhasha-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of
+speech.
+
+3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
+which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshana-samiti_.[85]
+
+4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
+him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the
+_adana-samiti_.
+
+5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
+in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the
+_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed
+as that which closes (_sam_ + _vrinoti_) the door of the stream of
+_asrava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_Asrava_ is the cause
+of mundane existence, _samvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this
+is the Arhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
+of this.'"
+
+_Nirjara_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
+self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
+of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
+and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
+&c. This _nirjara_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yathakala_) and
+ancillary (_aupakramanika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
+dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
+that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,
+_nirjara_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.
+But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
+means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjara_ of
+actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
+which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjara_ arises, which is
+twofold, _sakama_ and _akama_. That called _sakama_ belongs to
+ascetics, the _akama_ to other embodied spirits."[91]
+
+_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
+absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
+perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are
+abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjara_, there arises the
+absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been
+said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
+(_nirjara_) of the causes of bondage and of existence."
+
+Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
+wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
+stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
+contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_
+exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
+onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
+sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
+encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
+isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
+the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.
+
+"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
+interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _sanga_ is
+merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--
+
+"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
+from the absence of _sanga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
+the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
+potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
+castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."
+
+Hence they recite a sloka:--
+
+     "However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
+     moon, and the rest;
+
+     "But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
+     Alokakasa."
+
+Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
+soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
+untainted by any pain or impression thereof.
+
+Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
+foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
+This has been declared in the _Siddhanta_, "_Jiva_, _ajiva_, _punya_,
+_papa_, _asrava_, _samvara_, _nirjarana_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are
+the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.
+
+Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
+_sapta-bhangi-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
+be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
+be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
+"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
+and not predicable." All this Anantavirya has thus laid down:--
+
+1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
+'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'
+
+2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure
+likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
+be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.
+
+3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
+as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
+indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.
+
+4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
+employed simultaneously."
+
+_Syat_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
+part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
+has been said--
+
+     "This particle _syat_ is in the form of a verb, but, from
+     its being connected with the sense, it denotes
+     indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
+     on the implied meaning."
+
+If, again, the word _syat_ denoted determinateness, then it would be
+needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
+indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syat_,
+"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathamchit_; and so it is
+not really useless. As one has said--
+
+"The doctrine of the _syad-vada_ arises from our everywhere rejecting
+the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhangi-naya_,
+and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
+be accepted."
+
+If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
+everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
+ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
+treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
+But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
+certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
+Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_
+or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the
+thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the
+phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghatosti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"
+would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
+words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
+argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been
+declared--
+
+     "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
+     implies 'is;'
+
+     "Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
+     non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.
+
+The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
+severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
+non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
+inexplicable (_anirvachaniyata_);[97] three other classes hold one or
+other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,
+when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
+&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
+&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
+to the holder of the _Syad-vada_, which ascertains the entire meaning
+of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syadvada-manjari_--
+
+"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
+omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
+scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point
+proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syad-vada_,
+which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."
+
+"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
+and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
+with no partiality equally favours all sects."
+
+The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-suri--
+
+"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
+giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
+liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
+deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our
+system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
+knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of
+knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
+(_pramana_) in the _Syad-vada_ doctrine,--sense-perception and
+inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
+nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jiva_, the _ajiva_, merit and demerit,
+_asrava_, _samvara_, _bandha_, _nirjara_, _mukti_,--we will now
+explain each. _Jiva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajiva_ is all other
+than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
+opposite; _asrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjara_ is the
+unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight
+forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
+included in _samvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _asrava_.
+
+"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is
+hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
+liberation is declared by Jina. The Swetambaras are the destroyers of
+all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,
+they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
+Jaina _Sadhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry
+peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
+eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the
+Jaina Rishis.
+
+"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so
+say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
+between them and the Swetambaras."[106]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]
+
+[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,
+alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
+hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syad-vadinam_.]
+
+[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _grahyasya_
+for _agrahyasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]
+
+[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyagrahanam_ to _tasya
+grahanam_ (_tasya_ being _jadatayah_).]
+
+[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen
+though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the
+_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]
+
+[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarupam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,
+_infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kumarila's
+writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
+Sankara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumarila had a
+little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
+repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
+there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhat kaschid
+vidyaleso jatah._]
+
+[Footnote 49: Kumarila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
+his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
+proofs,--the sixth, _abhava_, being negative, is, of course, not
+applicable. I understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability
+of "presumption" or _artha-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
+were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
+but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
+retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
+Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
+cannot be convincing in his own.]
+
+[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhavavedakasya_ for
+_tatsadbhavadekasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilarthajnanat notpatty_, I
+propose to read _nikhilarthajnanotpatty_.]
+
+[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Karya_ and equally disputed.]
+
+[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Sariri_), "my
+hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
+notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]
+
+[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the
+_Anavasthadosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed
+fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
+everybody's eyes.]
+
+[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvarthe_ for
+_tattvartham_.]
+
+[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarsanadi_ for
+_asamyagdarsanadi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
+of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sutras_, ii. 30.
+Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 58: I read _kamanam_ for _kamanam_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 times
+3 times 3 = 18).]
+
+[Footnote 59: For _abhashana_, see Hemach. 16.]
+
+[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,
+_rasayanajnanasraddhavacharanani_ for _rasayanajnanam
+sraddhanavaranani_. For _avacharana_, see _Susruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,
+&c. If _anavarana_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
+absence of obstructions."]
+
+[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
+by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ or
+_kshayopasama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]
+
+[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushadyakarena_ for
+_kalushanyakarena_. The _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ seem to
+correspond to the _aupasamika_ and _kshayika_ states about to be
+described.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]
+
+[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sankhya philosophy, the soul is not
+really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]
+
+[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
+and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
+the eye, light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'stiti_ for _sthiti_.]
+
+[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikaya_.]
+
+[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one
+sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _sankhagandolakaprabhritayas
+trasas chaturvidhah prithivyaptejo_.]
+
+[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _tesham ajivatvat_ for _tesham
+jivatvat_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
+the former only are animate."]
+
+[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatravasthite_ for
+_sarvatravasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _alokenavachchhinne_ for
+_alokenavichchhinne_.]
+
+[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddhanta-muktavali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is
+_upabhoga-sadhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyanuka_. This category
+takes up the forms of _sthavara_ which were excluded from _jiva_.]
+
+[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Madhava
+for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
+analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
+definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaisesh. Sutra_, i. 1, 15. _Paryaya_ is
+explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Paryaya_, in p. 36, line 11
+(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
+which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
+_Abhidh_. 1503, _paryayo 'nukramah kramah_.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
+to act.]
+
+[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _asravanakaranatvad_.]
+
+[Footnote 76: The _jnana_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
+by its connection with the senses and external objects.]
+
+[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in
+Govindananda's gloss, _Ved. Sut._, ii. 2, 33.]
+
+[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _adaraniyasya_ for
+_avaraniyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _avaraniya_ may be used for
+_avarana_ (_Pan._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga Sut._, ii. 52, where Vyasa's
+Comm. has _avaraniya_.]
+
+[Footnote 79: _Jalavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 80: Umasvami-?]
+
+[Footnote 81: For the _sagaropama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.
+309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ityadyuktakalad urdhvam api_ for the
+obscure _ityadyuktam kaladurddhanavat_. I also read at the end of the
+line _prachyutih sthitih_ for _prachyutisthitih_.]
+
+[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svakaryakarane_.]
+
+[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _irshya_ read
+_irya_,--a bad misreading.]
+
+[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _apadyeta_ for _apadyata_.]
+
+[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshana_ read _saishana_.]
+
+[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagatitale_.]
+
+[Footnote 87: Madhava omits the remaining divisions of _samvara_.
+Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishaha_,
+"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
+patience, gentleness," &c.; _bhavana_, "conviction," such as that
+worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _charitra_, "virtuous
+observance."]
+
+[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _asravasrotaso_.]
+
+[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]
+
+[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yathakala-_ for _yatha
+kala-_.]
+
+[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably
+corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
+_nirjara_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
+passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjara_
+is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
+attainment of the highest good. The former is _akama_, "desireless,"
+because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
+latter is _sakama_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
+under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
+37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
+which future actions are to be performed.]
+
+[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."]
+
+[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhangi-naya_, see Ved. S.
+Gloss., ii. 2, 23.]
+
+[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
+line, _kim vritatadvidheh_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]
+
+[Footnote 96: Thus Govindananda applies it (_Ved. Sut._, ii. 2, 33) to
+"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 97: '[Greek: AkatalepsiaAkatalepsia]. This is
+Sriharsha's tenet in the _Khandana-khanda-khadya_.]
+
+[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _matenamisritani_ read _matena
+misritani_.]
+
+[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
+really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidhana-chintamani_,
+72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antarayas_, _ragadweshav
+aviratih smarah_, and _haso_ for _himsa_. The order of the eighteen
+_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
+10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.]
+
+[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartinih_.]
+
+[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]
+
+[Footnote 103: In last line, for _samsrave_ read _samvare_.]
+
+[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
+the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's
+_Bhagavati_, pp. 250, 261-266.]
+
+[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharanah_ is explained by the _rajoharanadharin_
+(= _vratin_) of Halayudha, ii. 189.]
+
+[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _strim_ read _stri_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE RAMANUJA SYSTEM.
+
+
+This doctrine of the Arhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
+whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
+co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
+plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
+any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
+existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
+should there not be an alternation between existence and
+non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that
+alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
+multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ganesa
+and of the incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for the
+elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
+in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
+being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
+a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
+same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
+in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
+compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
+times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
+indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
+be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
+and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different
+relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
+contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
+Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
+reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
+thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
+_bhangas_ (Arhata tenets).
+
+Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhangas_, which lies at
+the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
+or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
+there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
+multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
+prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
+proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for
+the neck of the Syad-Vadin.
+
+An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Arhata
+system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
+when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
+or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
+organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
+whether it be ninefold or not!
+
+In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Arhatas
+say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
+the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
+assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul
+for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
+(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
+body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
+body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
+filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
+resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
+the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
+according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
+road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
+of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
+that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
+non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
+and evil unmerited.
+
+As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
+rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
+the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.
+
+Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
+revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyasa accordingly
+propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
+one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Ramanuja with the
+express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
+of Ramanuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as
+soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
+     (Vishnu)
+
+     "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
+     world is not-soul."
+
+Others, again (the followers of Sankaracharya), maintain that pure
+intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
+really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,
+pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
+individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
+(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
+The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
+and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
+reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
+sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
+forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
+beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
+individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
+with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
+spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
+things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
+Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
+thinking themselves very wise, the Sankaras will not tolerate this
+division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
+Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This
+might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
+there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
+suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
+ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
+(to explain the views of the Sankara)--
+
+     "Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
+     knowledge,
+
+     "Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."
+
+This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
+the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
+who leans on the arm of Prabhakara, or one to whom Kumarila-bhatta
+gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--
+
+     "By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
+     existent and non-existent,
+
+     "Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.
+
+     "Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
+     Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
+     else is observed."
+
+They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
+cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and
+knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
+knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
+maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
+argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
+consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
+by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
+If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
+knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
+is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
+presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
+not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Sankaras continue) as the
+foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
+entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
+other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
+ignorance.
+
+All this (the Ramanuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
+for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
+ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
+would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
+as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
+presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
+of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
+how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
+object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
+revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
+thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance
+accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
+rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
+arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
+to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
+therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
+not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
+cognition allowed by us both.
+
+Well, then (the Sankaras may contend), let the form of cognition
+evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
+follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
+entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior
+non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
+which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
+knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
+not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
+first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
+grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
+illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
+admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
+not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
+is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
+illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
+that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
+knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
+ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
+ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
+We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The counterposition (of the Ramanujas) is as follows:--The illusion
+under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
+because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any
+one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
+about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not
+start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
+existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
+(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
+also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,
+constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
+any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
+cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
+gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
+light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,
+as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
+mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
+quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,
+while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
+as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
+within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
+within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
+itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
+suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
+which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
+this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
+thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
+like texts.
+
+It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
+existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
+(_anrita_); for the word untruth (_anrita_) denotes that which is
+other than truth (_rita_). The word _rita_ has a passive sense, as
+appears from the words, Drinking _rita_. _Rita_ means works done
+without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
+bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
+question, untruth (_anrita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
+during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
+propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is
+obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the
+entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
+this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such
+texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_maya_) to be the primary
+emanative cause (_prakriti_), the term (_maya_) designates the
+emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guna_), and
+creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
+inexplicable illusion (for which the Sankaras contend).
+
+In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
+moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_maya_) of the barbarian were
+swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
+(_maya_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
+projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
+inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
+from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
+thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
+Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
+the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
+supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
+excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
+Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
+repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
+emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
+pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
+as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
+Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
+Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
+spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
+one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vadin may
+reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
+the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
+souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
+power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
+case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
+Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
+different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
+to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
+understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
+object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
+known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
+must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
+place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
+That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
+abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
+finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
+infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
+This suggestion (the Ramanujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
+no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
+Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
+"implication" (_lakshana_, both This and That being used in their
+denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
+and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
+to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
+supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
+past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
+to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
+by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
+unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
+admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
+thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
+differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be
+inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
+will be triumphant.
+
+We have, therefore (the Ramanujas continue), laid it down in this
+question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
+individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
+body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
+body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
+the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
+soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
+is the body.
+
+Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are
+designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
+variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
+human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
+body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
+Hence--
+
+God, Man, Yaksha, Pisacha, serpent, Rakshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
+wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they
+what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
+of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
+things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
+individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
+complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
+That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
+Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktavali and in the Chaturantara--
+
+     "God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
+     than That, called the established entity,
+
+     "Of this there is much significant and undoubted
+     exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;
+
+     "Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
+     form of gods, mortals, and the rest
+
+     "When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
+     a diversity of names and forms in the world."
+
+In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
+rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
+systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
+"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that
+it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
+lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all
+words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
+ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
+Ramanuja in the Vedartha-sangraha, when analysing the Vedic text about
+names and forms.
+
+Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
+can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
+in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
+thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
+not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
+form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
+universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
+was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
+knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
+illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
+there is no proof of these positions.
+
+Nor is there an absurdity (as the Sankaras would say), on the
+hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
+that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
+is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
+cause (_prakriti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
+elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
+the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
+so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
+is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute
+spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
+absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
+there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
+cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
+unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
+cognition all cognition would be sublated.
+
+It is laid down (by the Ramanujas) that retractation into the universe
+(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
+and the originant (_prakriti_), returns to its imperceptible state,
+unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
+spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
+gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
+soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
+condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
+the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyasa)
+treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
+Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
+deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
+those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
+explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
+existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
+with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
+forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
+forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]
+
+What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
+universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
+admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
+all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
+one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
+soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the
+essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
+not to be confounded.
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
+consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
+in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
+and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
+Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
+proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
+Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
+not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
+and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
+susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
+the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
+controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
+fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
+majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
+auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
+himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
+adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
+divine.
+
+Venkata-natha has given the following distribution of things:--
+
+     "Those who know it have declared the principle to be
+     twofold, substance and non-substance;
+
+     "Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
+     former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.
+
+     "The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'
+     (_parak_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
+     Lord;
+
+     "The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
+     principle some have called the unsentient primary."
+
+Of these--
+
+     "Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
+     originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;
+
+     "Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and
+     cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;
+
+     "Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
+     cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
+     characterised by goodness;
+
+     "The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
+     intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
+     summarily recounted."
+
+Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
+souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
+text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
+Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kanada, iii. 2, 20),
+Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
+of souls is often spoken of in revelation--
+
+     "The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
+     it again cease to be;
+
+     "Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
+     killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gita, ii. 20).
+
+Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
+requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
+accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25): Because
+no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
+atomic is well known from revelation--
+
+     "If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
+     hundred times,
+
+     "The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
+     capable of infinity."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
+     wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
+     atomic."
+
+The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
+divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
+fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
+Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vasudeva
+(a patronymic of Krishna), and the like.
+
+     "Vasudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
+     auspicious attributes,
+
+     "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
+     animator of spirits."
+
+This same Vasudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
+to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
+rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
+pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
+(_archa_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vyuha_), "the
+subtile" (_sukshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
+is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Rama,
+and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vasudeva,
+Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
+entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vasudeva. His
+attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
+from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
+without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
+The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
+the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
+worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
+of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
+becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
+has, therefore, been said--
+
+     "Vasudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
+     desired by each,
+
+     "According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
+     recompense.
+
+     "For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
+     embodiments;
+
+     "Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
+     'emanations;'
+
+     "As Sankarshana, Vasudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
+     manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
+     is the entire six attributes;
+
+     "That self-same called Vasudeva is styled the Supreme
+     Spirit;
+
+     "The internal controller is declared as residing in the
+     soul, the actuator of the soul,
+
+     "Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
+     as 'Who abiding in the soul.'
+
+     "By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
+     defilement becomes a qualified votary;
+
+     "By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
+     qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,
+
+     "By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
+     to behold the 'internal controller.'"
+
+The worship of the Deity is described in the Pancha-ratra as
+consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
+preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
+access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
+temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
+like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
+Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
+to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishnu, the
+commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
+the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
+visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
+the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
+Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
+lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
+marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no
+future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
+traditionary text--
+
+     "When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
+     undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
+     having attained to the supreme consummation.
+
+     "Vasudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
+     mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
+     return."
+
+After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
+the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedanta aphorisms by
+the venerated Bodhayanacharya too prolix, Ramanuja composed a
+commentary on the Sarirakamimansa (or Vedanta theosophy). In this the
+sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
+to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism
+means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
+glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
+know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because
+one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
+meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
+perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
+for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
+the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
+essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
+excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
+knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
+mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
+away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
+knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
+of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
+the latter Mimansa constitute one system of institutes. On this
+account the glossator has described this system as one with the
+sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
+perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
+has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
+spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
+the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
+reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
+other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
+efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
+who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
+delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
+both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
+immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
+Pancharatra-rahasya--
+
+     "That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,
+
+     "For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.
+
+     "These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
+     Subtile, the Internal Controller,
+
+     "Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
+     knowledge.
+
+     "As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,
+
+     "He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
+     embodiment.
+
+     "Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
+     traditional,
+
+     "By the aforesaid worship Vasudeva becomes propitious to
+     mankind.
+
+     "Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
+     meditation,
+
+     "At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
+     aggregate of works.
+
+     "Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
+     transmigration has vanished,
+
+     "Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.
+
+     "These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
+     the Lord,
+
+     "Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
+     Deity.
+
+     "Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
+     which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;
+
+     "They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."
+
+It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
+must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
+spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
+to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
+and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
+desire is predominant (in the word _jijnasitavya_), and desired
+knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
+must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
+such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
+knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
+any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
+even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
+Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
+be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
+let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
+knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
+understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
+_shadangena vedo'dhyeyo jneyascha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,
+is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
+must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
+engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
+and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
+be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
+understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
+aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
+significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
+succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
+the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
+knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
+emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.
+
+     "Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,
+
+     "And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
+     Highest and Lowest,"
+
+because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
+indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
+an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
+the representations. The author of the Vakya has treated of all this
+in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
+characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
+not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
+Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
+its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
+choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
+of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--
+
+     "To them always devoted, who worship me with love,
+
+     "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
+     me."
+
+And again--
+
+     "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
+     unwavering."
+
+But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
+motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
+desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
+other means. As is said by the author of the Vakya: Attainment
+thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),
+practice (_abhyasa_), observance (_kriya_), excellence (_kalyana_),
+freedom from despondency (_anavasada_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),
+according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
+(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
+resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
+discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
+by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
+is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
+quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
+explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gita) by (Ramanuja) the
+author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
+Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
+tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
+text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
+supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
+(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
+veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
+explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
+Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
+dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
+been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
+dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
+rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
+presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
+incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
+(Vaikuntha) is attained. Thus Yamuna says: Attainable by the final and
+absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
+and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
+the devotion of works and knowledge.
+
+In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to
+be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
+the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
+creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
+universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
+sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
+multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahma
+to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
+this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
+which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
+indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
+omniscient, and omnipotent.
+
+In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
+absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
+itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
+source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
+that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
+the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
+knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
+the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
+form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
+absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
+illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
+effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
+It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
+that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.
+
+Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
+kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
+of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
+anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
+aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
+exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is
+the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
+the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
+end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
+Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
+sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
+cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
+that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
+son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
+cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
+have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
+from the original (viz., Ramanuja's Bhashya on the Vedanta aphorisms);
+we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
+and thus all is clear.[110]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
+Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
+statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
+and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
+if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
+inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
+both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
+Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
+proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
+information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
+declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
+Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
+and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
+297, 298.]
+
+[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
+pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
+the plaything of God.]
+
+[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._]
+
+[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Ramanuja and his system,
+see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
+The _Tattva-muktavali_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;
+but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.
+
+
+Ananda-tirtha (Purna-prajna, or Madhva) rejected this same Ramanuja
+system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
+of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
+without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
+self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
+dependency upon the Pancha-ratra, the reality of plurality in the
+universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
+reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the
+tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
+number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
+a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
+new explication of the Brahma-Mimansa (or Vedanta).
+
+For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
+independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--
+
+     "Independent and dependent, two principles are received;
+
+     "The independent is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from
+     imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
+
+Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vadins): Why predicate of the
+absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
+which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
+heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not
+so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
+positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
+for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
+a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
+will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
+difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
+The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
+and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
+such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
+asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
+of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
+contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
+thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
+without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
+(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
+its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
+apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
+apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
+cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
+cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
+the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
+non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
+even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
+contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
+concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
+follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
+difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
+maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
+the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
+Brahman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being
+irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
+the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
+if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
+this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
+first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
+and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
+example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
+first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
+judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
+contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishnu-tattva-nirnaya:
+"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
+determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
+predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
+proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
+counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
+circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
+predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
+difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
+if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
+_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
+such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
+presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
+judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
+same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
+aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
+Sankhya-karika, v. vii.)--
+
+     "From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
+     defect in the organs, from instability of the common
+     sensory,
+
+     "From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
+     and from aggregation of similars."
+
+There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
+of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
+applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
+lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
+the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
+by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
+sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
+things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
+light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
+overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
+similars.
+
+Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
+harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
+and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
+possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
+in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
+ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
+infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
+ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
+say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
+Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
+for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
+inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
+it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
+little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
+no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
+is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
+then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
+trouble.
+
+Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
+Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
+obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
+person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring
+as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
+slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
+become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
+all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
+excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
+gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
+
+     "And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
+     all that they desire."
+
+Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vadins) in their thirst to be one
+with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishnu is like a
+mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
+fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishnu
+they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same
+thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
+Mahabharata-tatparya-nirnaya:--
+
+     "O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishnu's anger is waxed
+     great;
+
+     "He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
+     decide blindly."
+
+This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
+into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.
+
+Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
+weapons of Narayana (or Vishnu) as a memorial of him, and as a means
+of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
+of the Sakalya-samhita:--
+
+     "The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
+     Vishnu, which is the might of the gods,
+
+     "He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuntha)
+     which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:
+
+     "The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
+     gods entered that heaven;
+
+     "Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
+     world, that weapon Brahmans wear (stamped upon them);
+
+     "Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
+     Vishnu;
+
+     "Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishnu), let
+     us become beatified."
+
+Again, the Taittiriyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
+is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
+particular parts to be branded are specified in the Agneya-purana:--
+
+     "On his right hand let the Brahman wear Sudarsana,
+
+     "On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
+     Veda declared."
+
+In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
+branded with the discus:--
+
+     "Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,
+
+     "Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
+     Vishnu.
+
+     "Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
+     hand of Vishnu,
+
+     "Adored by all the gods; O Panchajanya, to thee be
+     adoration."
+
+(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
+names as Kesava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
+Lord.
+
+(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
+(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
+(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
+sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
+dedication to Narayana of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
+been said:--
+
+     "Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
+     of ten kinds."
+
+Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
+also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
+difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
+setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
+rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
+divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
+the truth, O Brahman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
+individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
+illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."
+
+Again:--
+
+     "After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,
+
+     "In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
+     perish not" (Bhagavad-gita, xiv. 2).
+
+According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
+because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."
+
+Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
+of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
+text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
+Brahman devoutly a Sudra becomes a Brahman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.
+
+If any one urge that according to the text:--
+
+     "If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"
+
+this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
+duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
+you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
+meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
+come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
+fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
+illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue
+of the testimony of many such passages as:--
+
+     "The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
+
+     "The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O
+     Infinite.
+
+     "The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
+     because it produces ideas;
+
+     "The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed
+     (_avidya_) ignorance:
+
+     "Styled (_maya_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
+     the name _maya_ is used of the pre-eminent;
+
+     "The excellent knowledge of Vishnu is called, though one
+     only, by these names;
+
+     "For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
+     by spontaneous beatitude."
+
+That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
+sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
+therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
+in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
+illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
+as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).
+
+If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
+answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
+Vishnu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
+Accordingly, the grand revelation:--
+
+     "A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
+     between the unsentient and the Lord,
+
+     "A difference among souls, and a difference of the
+     unsentient and the soul each from the other.
+
+     "Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
+     the world with its five divisions.
+
+     "This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
+     beginning it would have an end:
+
+     "Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
+     illusorily imagined:
+
+     "For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
+     ceases.
+
+     "That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
+     that lack knowledge;
+
+     "For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
+     and sustained by Vishnu."
+
+The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
+excellence of Vishnu. With this in view the Lord declared:--
+
+     "Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
+     the imperishable;
+
+     "The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
+     unmodified.
+
+     "The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
+     Spirit,
+
+     "Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
+     worlds.
+
+     "Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
+     the imperishable (soul),
+
+     "Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
+     of persons (_Purushottama_);
+
+     "He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
+     all-knowing worships me in every wise.
+
+     "Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
+     (Arjuna):
+
+     "Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
+     has to do, O Bharata" (Bhagavad-gita, xv. 16-20).
+
+So in the Maha-varaha--
+
+     "The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
+     spouse of Sri;
+
+     "Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
+     must be subordinate."
+
+It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
+excellence of Vishnu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,
+according to the text of the Bhallaveya Upanishad: While merit,
+wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
+therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
+emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu, according to the
+text of the Narayana Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
+state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
+while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
+the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
+from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
+Vishnu-purana--
+
+"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
+and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
+supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
+emancipation."
+
+And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only through the
+knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
+Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
+of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
+thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
+the real purport.
+
+     "The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
+     unknown,
+
+     "The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
+     be one?"
+
+And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
+the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
+revelation:--
+
+     "The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
+     similarity of cognition,
+
+     "Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
+     place of the individual;
+
+     "Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
+     different,
+
+     "The difference being independence and completeness (in the
+     Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
+     individual spirit)."
+
+Or to propose another explanation of the text, _Atma tat tvam asi_,
+That art thou, it may be divided, _atma tat tvam asi_. He alone is
+soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
+not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
+of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--
+
+     "Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be
+     well got rid of."
+
+According, therefore, to the Tattva-vada-rahasya, the words in the
+nine examples (in the Chhandogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
+a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
+non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--
+
+     "Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
+     trees;
+
+     "Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;
+
+     "Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;
+
+     "So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.
+
+     "Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
+     the supreme Hari
+
+     "Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
+     individual spirit, though he is its actuator;
+
+     "On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
+     he is bound."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Brahma, Siva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
+     decay of their bodies;
+
+     "Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
+     for the sustentation of Lakshmi.
+
+     "By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
+     knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,
+
+     "All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
+     him."
+
+And again:--
+
+     "Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
+     from transmigration,
+
+     "Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.
+
+     "Vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
+     ruler.
+
+     "Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."
+
+That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
+evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
+things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
+knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
+expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
+known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
+knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
+and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
+Advaita-vadins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_
+and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
+made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
+must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
+recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
+name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,
+cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
+these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
+with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
+such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
+words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
+then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
+statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
+statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
+statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.
+
+Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
+reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or
+transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
+author of the Nyaya-nirvana: The proof of the permanence of the
+transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
+And in the Tarkika-raksha--
+
+     "When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
+     or not such and such,
+
+     "The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
+     called Nitya-sama."
+
+With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
+stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
+results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
+rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
+the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
+general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
+the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
+an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
+subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
+form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
+in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
+true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
+said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
+equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.
+
+If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
+its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
+carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
+money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
+are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.
+
+The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
+be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to
+purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
+qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.
+
+Accordingly it is stated in the Garuda-purana:--
+
+     "All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
+     regularly; what then is the reason of this?
+
+     "And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
+     the most excellent?
+
+     "Tell me this, Brahma, that I may know it truly."
+
+Thus addressed by Narada, the most excellent Brahma replied:--
+
+     "The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
+     in an auspicious sense,
+
+     "And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."
+
+It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
+because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Narayana,
+and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
+which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
+the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
+The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
+result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
+words of the Skanda-purana--
+
+     "He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
+     emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
+     involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"
+
+and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
+adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
+has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
+way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
+Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
+Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
+Kaurma-purana--
+
+     "Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case
+
+     "Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
+     evidence;
+
+     "Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
+     revelation and tradition,
+
+     "Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
+     hesitation."
+
+What a Sastra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
+the Skanda-purana:--
+
+     "The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sama-veda, the
+     Atharva-veda, the Mahabharata, the Pancha-ratra, and the
+     original Ramayana, are called Sastras.
+
+     "That also which is conformable to these is called Sastra.
+
+     "Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
+     heterodoxy."
+
+According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
+is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
+viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
+duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
+there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
+duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
+can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
+texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
+has said:--
+
+     "I ever laud Narayana, the one being to be known from
+     genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
+     imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
+     excellences."
+
+It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
+of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth
+aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
+the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
+construction, in the Brihat-samhita:--
+
+     "Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
+     eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
+     purport is ascertained."
+
+It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the
+Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
+institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
+remains may be sought from the Anandatirtha-bhashya-vyakhyana (or
+exposition of the Commentary of Ananda-tirtha). We desist for fear of
+giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
+promulgated by Purna-prajna Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
+third incarnation of Vayu:--
+
+     "The first was Hanumat, the second Bhima,
+
+     "The third Purna-prajna, the worker of the work of the
+     Lord."
+
+After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
+following stanza at the conclusion of his work:--
+
+     "That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
+     text of the Veda, sufficiently
+
+     "Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
+     splendour of the Veda;
+
+     "The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
+     the words of Rama (Hanumat); the second was Bhima;
+
+     "By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
+     composed in regard to Kesava."
+
+The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
+texts.
+
+The purport of this is that Vishnu is the principle above all others
+in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 111: For a further account of Ananda-tirtha or Madhva see
+Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
+Brahma-sutras has been printed in Calcutta.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE PASUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULISA.
+
+
+Certain Mahesvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishnavas known
+by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch
+as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be
+a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as
+stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing
+for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend
+upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and
+others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme
+Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free
+from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these
+arguments, these Mahesvaras adopt the Pasupata system, which is
+conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to
+the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then
+we shall expound the Pasupata union and rites of Pasupati. The meaning
+is as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and
+this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the
+spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in
+the Ganakarika:--
+
+     "But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one
+     with three factors;
+
+     "He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a
+     spiritual guide.
+
+     "The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the
+     localities, the perseverance, the purifications,
+
+     "The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and
+     there are three functions."
+
+The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three
+(_trini_), instead of the feminine three (_tisrah_), is a Vedic
+construction.
+
+(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and
+is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of
+the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattacharya says: Knowledge,
+penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.
+
+(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is
+of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also
+says:--
+
+     "False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and
+     falling,
+
+     "These five, the root of bondage, are in this system
+     especially to be shunned."
+
+(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to
+liberation.
+
+These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.
+Thus he also says:--
+
+     "Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant
+     recollection of Rudra,
+
+     "And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients
+     of acquirements."
+
+(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the
+aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual
+teachers and the rest. Thus he says:--
+
+     "The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the
+     burning-ground, and Rudra only."
+
+(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads
+until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the
+differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:--
+
+     "The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,
+     and devotion as the fifth."
+
+(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false
+conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five
+species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said--
+
+     "The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of
+     interestedness,
+
+     "And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification
+     of the state of bondage."
+
+(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:--
+
+     "The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the
+     spiritual guide as the fifth."
+
+(_h._) The five powers are as follow:--
+
+     "Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,
+     conquest of pleasure and pain,
+
+     "Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of
+     power."
+
+The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent
+with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,
+mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.
+All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.
+
+In the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to
+introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),
+that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of
+pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _pasu_ we are
+to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that
+which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to
+understand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord,
+who is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of
+the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.
+
+In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and
+personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute
+extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the
+visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only
+one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly
+describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,
+discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of
+every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though
+imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of
+principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is
+cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.
+Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole
+system of institutes, according to the text and according to its
+significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and
+pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,
+summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this
+intellectual power.
+
+The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of
+three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of
+assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the
+possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with
+unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the
+faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.
+The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy
+even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.
+
+All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is
+threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,
+sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees
+according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive
+sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as
+proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable
+by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the
+cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in
+general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the
+light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive
+sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the
+objects of the sentient soul.
+
+The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,
+is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The
+insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and
+the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.
+The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,
+viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the
+three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the
+cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions
+ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and
+determination.
+
+The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,
+is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is
+the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is
+the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are
+to be found in the Panchartha-bhashyadipika and other works. The cause
+is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.
+This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of
+attributes and actions (into Mahesvara, Vishnu, &c.) The Lord is the
+possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely
+first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as
+possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is
+expounded by the author of the Adarsa, and other institutional
+authorities.
+
+Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and
+is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that
+characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by
+action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union
+characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c.
+
+Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of
+two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal
+is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise
+is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are
+bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and
+devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakulisa says:--
+
+     "He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
+     Oblation is an observance divided into six members."
+
+Thus the author of the aphorisms says:--
+
+     "He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,
+     laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious
+     ejaculation."
+
+Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and
+lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of
+Mahesvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-sastra, or
+art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars
+saltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and
+with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal
+sentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the
+bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the
+palate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like
+the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be
+gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require
+exposition.
+
+The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,
+talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being
+asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the
+joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if
+the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an
+_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is
+doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what
+should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the
+utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no
+meaning, and the like.
+
+The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution
+for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on
+broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:
+Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.
+
+(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive
+power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,
+relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in
+detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes
+generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we
+shall expound the Pasupata union and rites of Pasupati). Detail is the
+fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the
+instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the
+Rasikara-bhashya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these
+categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an
+enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,
+different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the
+cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the
+Sankhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is
+the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other
+systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall
+become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,
+the sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is
+determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of
+works, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus
+determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while
+in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of
+the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres
+involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in
+nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by
+such return to transmigratory experiences.
+
+Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,
+since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,
+then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be
+simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be
+created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge
+two difficulties. Think not so, replies the Pasupata, for your
+supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of
+works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without
+results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will
+follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the
+efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer
+of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the
+works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only
+when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so
+furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of
+Yayati, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one
+will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman
+engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient
+creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the
+creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all
+his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to
+be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Pasupata,
+that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,
+inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed
+active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose
+power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed
+in sacred tradition:--
+
+     "Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by
+     the efficacy of works,
+
+     "For this reason is he in this system the cause of all
+     causes."
+
+Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through
+a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies
+the Pasupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere
+knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or
+the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for
+then it would follow that the study of any system would be
+superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,
+like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that
+Mahadeva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of
+the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is
+competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of
+various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.
+On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an
+accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent
+to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be
+realised apart from the system of the Pasupatas. Therefore it is that
+our great teacher has said:--
+
+     "If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,
+     but intuition is unattainable;
+
+     "There is no accurate characterisation of principles
+     otherwise than by the five categories."
+
+Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man
+must adopt the system of the Pasupatas, which undertakes the
+exposition of the five categories.
+
+A. E. G.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE SAIVA-DARSANA.
+
+
+[The seventh system in Madhava's Sarva-darsana-sangraha is the
+Saiva-darsana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,
+especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about
+the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been
+lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the
+Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,
+by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,
+has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He
+has there translated the Tattuva-Kattalei, or law of the Tattwas, the
+Siva-Gnanapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the
+Siva-Pirakasam, or light of Siva, and the three works shed immense
+light on the outline as given by Madhava. One great use of the latter
+is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their
+Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _arul_ for _anugraha_
+and _tidchei_ for _diksha_ may testify.
+
+The Saivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sankhya; they
+hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,
+and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and
+gradually to unite it to God. Siva is the chief deity of the system,
+and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the
+allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pasupati is a
+well-known name of Siva, as the master or creator of all things.
+
+There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sutras. One is in
+five books, called by Colebrooke the Pasupati-sastra, which is probably
+the work quoted by Madhava in his account of the Nakulisa Pasupatas;
+another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemaraja, with its first
+sutra, _chaitanyam atma_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,
+and opens with the sloka given in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, p. 91, lines
+1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words--
+
+    _Kathanchid asadya Mahesvarasya dasyam._
+
+None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the
+present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight
+Agamas and some of the Puranas. A list of the Agamas is given in Mr.
+Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion;" and of these the Kirana
+and Karana are quoted in the following treatise.]
+
+
+THE SAIVA-DARSANA.
+
+Certain, however, of the Mahesvara sect receiving the system of truth
+authoritatively laid down in the Saiva Agama,[112] reject the
+foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of
+our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation
+of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion
+that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;"
+and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the
+Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the
+cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in
+the Tantra doctrines--
+
+     "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sutra
+     the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four
+     feet, has again declared the same at full length."
+
+The meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three
+before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,
+meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,
+possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not
+independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as
+being different from these, is first declared; next follows the
+account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing
+intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order
+of the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means
+to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without
+knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the
+Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the
+real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place
+as first the "foot" of _knowledge_ (_jnana_) which makes known all
+this unto us.[114] Next follows the "foot" of _ceremonial action_
+(_kriya_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the
+divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be
+attained, hence the "foot" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next,
+which declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts.
+And as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the
+fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is
+forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty
+(_charya_), which includes all this.
+
+Now Siva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in
+the divine nature of Siva belongs to liberated souls and to such
+beings as Vidyesvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they
+depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised
+to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact
+of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being
+effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent
+being. By the strength of this inference is the universal
+acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.
+
+"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an
+effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body
+being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that
+a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been
+seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not
+from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they
+possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are
+destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to
+infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus
+the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker,
+from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the
+afore-mentioned middle term (_sadhana_) must have the afore-mentioned
+major (_sadhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the
+latter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the
+authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been
+given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,
+that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions
+done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]--
+
+     "This ignorant _jivatman_, incapable of its own true
+     pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction
+     [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go
+     to heaven or always to hell."[117]
+
+Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,
+since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that
+he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the
+king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of
+his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru--
+
+     "It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to
+     employ means, &c.;
+
+     "This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting
+     irrespectively of works, &c."
+
+And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Sruti) establishes the
+existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their
+means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various
+individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable
+Brihaspati--
+
+     "He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and
+     material causes,--
+
+     "Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that
+     resides in accumulated actions should ripen."--
+
+     "The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must
+     have had an intelligent maker,
+
+     "This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see
+     in any other effect, as jars, &c."
+
+God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with
+everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot
+produce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious
+Mrigendra[119]--
+
+     "He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:
+     for it is an established principle
+
+     "That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,
+     parts, and end."
+
+"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent
+maker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all
+effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as
+potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be
+like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or
+omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal
+soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover,
+even though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still
+maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The
+Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of
+matter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body,
+but only a body of pure energy (Sakta),[122] since we know that his
+body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Sakti, according
+to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the _Isana_ as his head, the
+_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _Vamedeva_
+as his secret parts, and the _Sadyojata_ as his feet."[123] And this
+body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but
+is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are
+respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and
+production.[124] This has been said in the Srimat Mrigendra--
+
+     "From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the
+     body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."
+
+And it has also been said elsewhere--
+
+     "His body is composed of the five mantras which are
+     subservient to the five operations,
+
+     "And his head, &c., are formed out of the Isa, Tatpurusha,
+     Aghora, Vama, and other hymns."
+
+If you object to this view that "such passages in the Agamas as 'He is
+five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the
+Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what
+you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his
+assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since
+meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely
+destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara--
+
+     "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the
+     devotee."
+
+And similarly elsewhere--
+
+     "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of
+     form;
+
+     "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."
+
+Bhojaraja[125] has thus detailed the five operations--
+
+     "Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,
+     destruction, and obscuration,
+
+     "And to these must be added the active grace of him who is
+     eternally exalted."
+
+Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to
+be performed directly by Siva, but in that of the toilsome Path they
+are ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the Srimat
+Karana[127]--
+
+     "In the Pure Path Siva is declared to be the only agent, but
+     Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."
+
+It must here be understood that the word Siva includes in its proper
+meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Siva,
+as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheswara, the emancipated souls who have
+become Sivas, and the inspired teachers (_vachakas_), together with
+all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of
+Siva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_).
+
+We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_pasu_). The
+individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the
+non-atomic,[128] the _Kshetrajna_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is
+the _Pasu_. For we must not say with the Charvakas that it is the same
+as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as
+there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.
+Nor may we say with the Naiyayikas that it is cognisable by
+perception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As
+has been said--
+
+     "If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a
+     second knower;[131]
+
+     "And this would require another still, if the second were
+     itself to be known."
+
+Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with
+the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been
+said--
+
+     "That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or
+     time,
+
+     "They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's
+     all-pervadingness and eternity."
+
+Nor may we say with the Vedantin that it is only one, since the
+apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many
+individual souls; nor with the Sankhyas that it is devoid of action,
+since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Sruti informs us of
+a state of identity with Siva, which consists in intelligence in the
+form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been
+declared in the Srimat Mrigendra--
+
+     "It is revealed that identity with Siva results when all
+     fetters are removed."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in
+     his soul
+
+     "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after
+     liberation, Sruti calls it that which faces every way."
+
+It is also said in the Tattva-prakasa--
+
+     "The liberated souls are themselves Sivas, but these are
+     liberated by his favour;
+
+     "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose
+     body is the five Mantras."
+
+Now the souls are threefold, as denominated _vijnanakalah_,
+_pralayakalah_, and _sakalah_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are
+under the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by
+receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and
+knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments,
+such as _kala_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of
+cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The
+second are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since
+in their case _kala_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence
+their name _pralayakala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the
+three fetters of _mala_, _maya_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_.
+The first class are again subdivided into _samapta-kalushah_ and
+_asamapta-kalushah_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly
+exhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of
+their corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the
+privilege, raised by Siva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge
+(the Vidyesvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of
+Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya--
+
+     "Ananta, and Sukshma, and Sivottama,
+
+     "Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimurttika,
+
+     "Srikantha and Sikhandin,--these are declared to be the
+     Vidyesvaras."
+
+The latter Siva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million
+Mantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prakasa.[135] Similarly
+Soma-Sambhu has said--
+
+     "One class is named _vijnanakala_, the second _pralayakala_,
+
+     "The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the Sastra
+     regards as objects of mercy.
+
+     "The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_
+     and _karma_,
+
+     "The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with
+     _kala_ and ending with 'earth.'"[136]
+
+The _Pralayakalah_ are also twofold, as being _pakvapasadvaya_ or not,
+_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in
+whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the
+power of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryashtaka_[137] body, and pass
+through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakasa--
+
+     "Those among the Pralayakalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are
+     immature,
+
+     "Go, united with the _puryashtaka_ body, into many births by
+     the power of _karman_."
+
+The _puryashtaka_ is also thus described in the same work--
+
+     "The _puryashtaka_ is composed of the internal organ,
+     thought (_dhi_), _karman_, and the instruments."
+
+This is thus explained by Aghora Siva Acharya, "the _puryashtaka_ is a
+subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from
+the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is
+composed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending
+with _kala_." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha--
+
+     "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending
+     with _kala_, is assigned to each soul,
+
+     "And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies
+     produced by the world."
+
+The following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word
+"_internal organ_," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence,"
+"egoism," and "reason,"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which
+enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those
+called _kala_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and
+quality;[140] the words "_thought_" (_dhi_) and _karman_ signify the
+five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile
+rudiments. By the word "_instruments_" are comprehended the ten organs
+of sense and action.
+
+"But is it not declared in the Srimat Kalottara that 'The set of five,
+sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,
+these constitute the _puryashtaka_?'"
+
+How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and
+hence the venerable Rama Kantha has explained that sutra in its
+literal meaning [_i. e_., as _puryashtaka_, is derived from _ashta_,
+"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you
+ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal
+definition of _puryashtaka_, we reply that there is really no
+contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in
+the following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five
+rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;
+(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.)
+nature [prakriti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning
+with _kala_, which form a kind of case.[142]
+
+Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the
+_puryashtaka_ body, Mahesvara Ananta having compassionated them as
+possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the
+world; as has been said--
+
+     "Mahesvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the
+     world."
+
+The class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_
+and _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in
+conformity with their maturity (_paripaka_), puts forth a power
+agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred
+and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Mandali,
+&c., as has been said--
+
+     "The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection
+     with _Kala_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;
+
+     "The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen
+     of these the Lords of the Mantras.
+
+     "Eight of these are called _Mandalins_; eight again are
+     Krodha, &c.;
+
+     "Viresa, Srikantha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together
+     are the hundred and eighteen."
+
+In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a
+teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his
+manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the
+process of initiation; as has been said--
+
+     "These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a
+     healing power,
+
+     "He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to
+     the highest principle."
+
+It is also said in the Srimad Mrigendra--
+
+     "He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which
+     previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[143]
+
+All this has been explained at great length by Narayana-Kantha, and
+there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear
+of prolixity.
+
+But as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the
+Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,
+appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy
+the rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said--
+
+     "The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he
+     appoints to enjoy their various deserts,
+
+     "According to their respective actions: such are the various
+     kinds of souls."
+
+We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _pasa_).
+This is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _maya_, and _rodha-sakti_.[145]
+But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Saiva Agamas that the
+chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been
+shown to mean Siva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic
+bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence
+matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only
+fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal
+dot, which is the germinal atom of _maya_, and is called a
+Siva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the
+highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Siva,
+still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that
+it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the
+state of such deities as Vidyesvara, &c. Thus we see there is no
+contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakasa--
+
+     "The bonds of matter will be fourfold."
+
+And again in the Srimad Mrigendra--
+
+     "The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer
+     (_rodha_), action, and the work of Maya,
+
+     "These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively
+     called by the name of 'merit.'"
+
+The following is the meaning of this couplet:--
+
+(1.) "Enveloping," because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the
+soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because _mala_, a
+natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As
+has been said--
+
+     "_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts
+     the soul's vision and action;
+
+     "It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on
+     copper."[147]
+
+(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond"
+[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Siva
+obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself
+partaking of the nature of matter].
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of
+     all,
+
+     "I am metaphorically called _pasa_,[148] because I follow
+     desert."
+
+(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed
+by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,
+like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning
+series. As has been said in the Srimat Kirana--
+
+     "As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are
+     beginningless:
+
+     "If an eternal character is thus established, then what
+     cause could produce any change therein?"
+
+(4.) "_Maya_," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all
+the world is potentially contained (_mati_) at a mundane destruction,
+and again at a creation it all comes (_yati_) into manifestation,
+hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Srimat
+Saurabheya--
+
+     "The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed
+     therein at a mundane destruction,
+
+     "And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form
+     of effects as _kala_, &c."[149]
+
+Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here
+through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three
+categories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter.
+
+A different mode of treating the subject is found in the
+Jnanaratnavali, &c., in such lines as--
+
+     "The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the
+     cause
+
+     "Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six
+     categories."
+
+But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.
+Thus our account of the system is complete.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Pasupati-sastra_
+(_Mahesvara-siddhanta or Sivagama_), as the text-book of the Pasupata
+sect. The Agamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the
+Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion").]
+
+[Footnote 113: "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,
+matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with
+the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _pasa_ is
+eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.
+58 we find the _advaita_ of the Vedanta attacked. In p. 62 it is said
+that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his
+five operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that
+is required for previous desert.]
+
+[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life
+(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_,
+_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gnanam_. The first is the stage of practical
+piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second
+is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications
+involved in true _puja_; the third is that of the eight observances of
+the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for
+intimate union with God.]
+
+[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 116: _Nyayena_ may here mean "argument."]
+
+[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be
+only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects
+proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)
+necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural
+stress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original
+meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahabharata, iii. 1144 (cf.
+Gaudapada, S. Kar. 61).]
+
+[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read
+_Karanasambhavachcha_.]
+
+[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meykanda of the Tamil
+work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _Mrigendra_(?).]
+
+[Footnote 120: Should we read _tavad anasarirah_ in p. 83, line 2?]
+
+[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._]
+
+[Footnote 122: "_Maya_ (or Prakriti) is the material, Sakti the
+instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).]
+
+[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras
+which are included in the five _kalas_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).
+The Sivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is
+composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Siva (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse
+order in Taitt. Aranyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Nyaya-malavist._ p. 3).]
+
+[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of
+Siva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are
+_Sathakkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sadakshaya?_) or _Sada-Siva_, who is Siva and
+Sakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or
+_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_Suddhavidya_) which is
+properly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vishnu_, and _Brahma_. They are
+respectively symbolised by the _nada_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of
+Om.]
+
+[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tantrik
+work, the _Narapati-jaya-charya_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhar.]
+
+[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of Siva in the Atharva-siras Upanishad
+(see Indische Stud. i. 385).]
+
+[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Agamas (see
+Foulkes' Catechism).]
+
+[Footnote 128: _Anu?_ "The soul, when clothed with these primary
+things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body"
+(Foulkes). Ananu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Brihad Ar. Up.
+iii. 8. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.]
+
+[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bhasha
+Parichchheda, sloka 49).]
+
+[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakulisa Pasupatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p.
+103).]
+
+[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,
+137. They are there described as being respectively under the
+influence of _anavam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or
+these with _mayei malam_. The _anavam_ is described as original sin,
+or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_
+is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its
+deserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the
+source of the senses. Madhava uses "_kala_," &c., for _maya_. The
+reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the
+five _vidyatattvas_ (_kala_, _vidya_, _raga_, _niyati_, and _kala_)
+and the twenty-four _atmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile
+elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual
+faculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamkara_, and _chitta_), are all
+developed from _maya_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from
+Soma Sambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what Madhava says, p. 77,
+in his account of the Nakulisa Pasupatas, where he describes _kala_ as
+unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five
+_tanmatras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _ahamkara_ and
+_manas_.]
+
+[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakaranat_ in
+p. 86, line 3.]
+
+[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.
+It, however, names the three classes as _vijnana-kevala_,
+_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.]
+
+[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidyatattvas_ and
+all the twenty-four _atmatattvas_.]
+
+[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _puri_, "body" (cf.
+_purisaya_ for _purusha_, Brihad Ar. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ashtaka_
+(cf. also the Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya, p. 135).]
+
+[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?]
+
+[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _ahamkara_, _chitta_.]
+
+[Footnote 140: These are the seven _vidya-tattvas_, _kala_, _kala_,
+_niyati_ (fate), _vidya_, _raga_, _prakriti_, and _guna_. Hoisington,
+however, puts _purushan_ "the principle of life," instead of _guna_,
+which seems better, as the three _gunas_ are included in _prakriti_.
+He translates _kala_ by "continency," and describes it as "the power
+by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into
+subjection."]
+
+[Footnote 141: This "instrument" (_karana_) seems to mean what
+Hoisington calls _purushan_ or "the principle of life which
+establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes
+it one of the seven _vidyatattvas_. According to Madhava, it should be
+what he calls _guna_.]
+
+[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four
+_atmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanmatras_, ten organs of sense
+and action, four organs of the _antahkarana_, and seven _vidyatattvas_
+as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)]
+
+[Footnote 143: I take _anu_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean
+the second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of
+_mala_ is the _maya-mala_, the second _anava-mala_, the third
+_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).]
+
+[Footnote 144: "The soul, when clothed with these primary things
+(desire, knowledge, action, the _kaladipanchaka_, &c.), is an
+exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called
+_anava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to
+souls.]
+
+[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J.
+A. O. S., viz., _anavam_, _kanmam_, and _mayei_, the last is the
+"obscuring" power of Mayesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Saivas
+hold that Pasa, like the Sankhya Prakriti, is in itself eternal,
+although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.
+A. O. S. iv. p. 228).]
+
+[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _maya_,
+and _rodhasakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the
+Siva-prakasa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable
+_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.
+From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit
+letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and
+external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual
+knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have
+been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after
+these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be
+enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious
+deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the
+abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the
+abode of Siva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union
+with him." _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,
+153 (cf. also Weber, _Ramatapanyia Up_. pp. 312-315).]
+
+[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.]
+
+[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _pasa_
+from _paschat_.]
+
+[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _sa karyena_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.
+
+
+Other Mahesvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Saiva
+system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things
+causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating
+spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the
+construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)
+is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this
+Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several
+cognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self
+posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by
+revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of
+witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives
+manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150]
+as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon
+recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the
+highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest
+trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,
+suppression of the breath, and the like, these Mahesvaras set forth
+the system of recognition (_pratyabhijna_). The extent of this system
+is thus described by one of their authorities--
+
+     "The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two
+     explications, the greater and the less,
+
+     "The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system
+     of recognition."
+
+The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:--
+
+     "Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of
+     Mahesvara, and wishing also to help mankind,
+
+     "I set forth the recognition of Mahesvara, as the method of
+     attaining all felicity."
+
+[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:--
+
+"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus
+feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached,"
+having fully attained, this condition, having made it the
+unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which
+has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:
+otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.
+
+Mahesvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,
+beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence
+Vishnu, Virinchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they
+transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite
+illusion.
+
+The condition of being a slave to Mahesvara is the being a recipient
+of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the
+divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things
+according to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _dasya_, from _da_).
+
+The word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the
+doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom
+this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest
+reward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end
+of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the
+Siva-drishti by that supreme guide the revered Somanandanatha--
+
+     "When once the nature of Siva that resides in all things
+     has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof
+     or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,
+
+     "There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further
+     reflection. When he knows Suvarna (or Siva) a man may cease
+     to act and to reflect."
+
+The word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self
+which has recognised the nature of Mahesvara, and which manifests to
+itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,
+for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of
+others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a
+motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man
+that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a
+regard for others. Thus Akshapada (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive
+is that object towards which a man energises.
+
+The preposition _upa_ in _upapadayami_ (I set forth) indicates
+proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.
+
+Hence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all
+felicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all
+felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a
+man acquired the mountain Rohana (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all
+the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what
+else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpalacharya says--
+
+     "What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of
+     devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"
+
+We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method
+of attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound
+term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a
+Bahuvrihi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Mahesvara, the
+knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full
+attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external
+and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the
+language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an
+object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the
+same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in
+this system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the
+accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from
+argumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self
+the cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection
+of the powers of that God.
+
+This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I
+establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it
+convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism
+of the Recognitive Institutes.]
+
+Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial
+with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The
+answer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the
+soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and
+therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence
+of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the
+recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and
+active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as
+total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight
+the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This
+self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;
+for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he
+is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,
+therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here
+employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of
+things, the teaching of the Naiyayikas may be accepted. It has thus
+been said by the son of Udayakara--
+
+     "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that
+     self-active and cognitive is Mahesvara the primal being?
+
+     "Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the
+     powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and
+     imperfectly discerned."
+
+And again--
+
+     "The continuance of all living creatures in this
+     transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory
+     _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of
+     living creatures.
+
+     "Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action
+     (or ritual), which is best at Kasi,
+
+     "Is indicated by others also: different from these is real
+     knowledge."
+
+And also--
+
+     "The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those
+     things:
+
+     "The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge
+     without succession, is Mahesvara."
+
+Somanandanatha also says--
+
+     "He always knows by identity with Siva: he always knows by
+     identity with the real."
+
+Again at the end of the section on knowledge--
+
+     "Unless there were this unity with Siva, cognitions could
+     not exist as facts of daily life:
+
+     "Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the
+     one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).
+
+     "He is Mahesvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken
+     continuity of objects:
+
+     "Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the
+     deity."
+
+The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, "After
+that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that
+shines diversely this ALL," teaches that God illumines the whole round
+of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the
+diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which
+irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises
+from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,
+God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all
+limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,
+self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Saiva
+aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are
+Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective
+Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This
+self-same existing self is knowledge.
+
+By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Somanandanatha cited
+above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of
+these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy
+constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory
+experience. This is described in the section on activity--
+
+     "He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,
+     through the efficacy of his will: this activity is
+     creativeness."
+
+And at the close of the same section--
+
+     "The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world
+     under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his
+     activity worked out by motive and agent.
+
+     "This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be
+     that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,
+     insentient things."
+
+According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the
+insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of
+Mahesvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands
+of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or
+that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in
+the series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his
+progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his
+universal creativeness.
+
+How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the
+following illustration--
+
+     "The tree or jar produced by the mere will of
+     thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to
+     serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."
+
+If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the
+jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of
+the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of
+clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition
+of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact
+notorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from
+different materials.
+
+As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without
+materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he
+does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:
+they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation
+of the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception,
+must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the
+potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a
+body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the
+successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the
+genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the
+thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.
+
+On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahadeva,
+amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the
+Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus
+operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptacharya says--
+
+"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without
+appliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him
+resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."
+
+It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how
+comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The
+answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution--
+
+     "This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates
+     through the fatality of works:
+
+     "Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,
+     he is enfranchised."
+
+It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what
+difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated
+in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this
+question is given in a section of the Tattvartha-Sangraha--
+
+     "Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical
+     with itself, like Mahesvara free from bondage: the other (or
+     unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."
+
+An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the
+soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if
+all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate
+because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the
+recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to
+the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two
+degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in
+developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines
+felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the
+conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such
+recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In
+the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the
+power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the
+attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting
+in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the
+essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.
+
+It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious
+self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A
+certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular
+gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated
+by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote
+to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to
+her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities
+she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and
+she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she
+recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them
+out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self
+be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation
+effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of
+those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director
+to recognise in itself the perfections of Mahesvara, his omniscience,
+omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of
+being.
+
+It is therefore said in the fourth section--
+
+     "As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as
+     like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he
+     humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:
+     In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be
+     the universal soul, in which there is no perfection
+     unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and
+     therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."
+
+This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other
+teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we
+cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become
+too prolix. This then may suffice.[152]
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 150: Read _bhavan_ for _bhavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. Madhava here condenses Abhinava
+Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the
+eleventh century (see Buhler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).]
+
+[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Siva
+sutras by Utpala, the son of Udayakara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+THE RASESVARA-DARSANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153]
+
+
+Other Mahesvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self
+with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life
+taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily
+frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver
+as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _parada_,
+because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of
+transmigratory states. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called
+     _parada_."
+
+And again in the Rasarnava--
+
+     "It is styled _parada_ because it is employed for the
+     highest end by the best votaries.
+
+     "Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from
+     my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called
+     _rasa_."
+
+It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is
+incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another
+manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in
+the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this
+there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it
+free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise--
+
+     "Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the
+     death of the body.
+
+     "Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an
+     emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.
+
+     "Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of
+     mercury and of medicaments."
+
+Govinda-bhagavat also says--
+
+     "Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are
+     not permanent, one should strive
+
+     "After emancipation; but emancipation results from
+     knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible
+     in a healthy body."
+
+The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its
+permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the
+body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is
+dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gauri under the names
+of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahridaya--
+
+     "They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new
+     body, the creation of Hara and Gauri,
+
+     "They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose
+     service is the aggregate of magic texts."
+
+The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should
+first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is
+produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gauri, and mica is
+produced from Gauri, mercury and mica are severally identified with
+Hara and Gauri in the verse--
+
+     "Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;
+
+     "The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of
+     death and poverty."
+
+This is very little to say about the matter. In the
+Rasesvara-siddhanta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and
+mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by
+acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.
+
+     "Certain of the gods, Mahesa and others; certain Daityas,
+     Sukra and others;
+
+     "Certain Munis, the Balakhilyas and others; certain kings,
+     Somesvara and others;
+
+     "Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-nayaka,
+
+     "Charvati, Kapila, Vyali, Kapali, Kandalayana,
+
+     "These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while
+     alive,
+
+     "Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith
+     identified."
+
+The meaning of this, as explicated by Paramesvara to Paramesvari, is
+as follows:--
+
+     "By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,
+     the preservation of the body;
+
+     "And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and
+     air,
+
+     "Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they
+     restore to life,
+
+     "Bound they give the power of flying about."
+
+The swooning state of mercury is thus described--
+
+     "They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,
+     as characterised thus--
+
+     "Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.
+
+     "A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the
+     following marks are seen--
+
+     "Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."
+
+The bound condition is described in another place as follows:--
+
+     "The character of bound quicksilver is that it is--
+
+     "Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it
+     parts asunder under friction."
+
+Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gauri were
+proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but
+how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as
+that _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is
+stated by the authorities--
+
+     "Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully
+     discriminated,
+
+     "In the first place, as pure in every process, for
+     perfecting the adepts."
+
+And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus--
+
+     "Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,
+     restraining,
+
+     "Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,
+     covering,
+
+     "Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and
+     pouring,
+
+     "And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen
+     modes of treating quicksilver."
+
+These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,
+Sarvajna-ramesvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here
+omitted to avoid prolixity.
+
+The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of
+the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,
+a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the
+Rasarnava--
+
+"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the
+blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it
+attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),
+quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This
+makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try
+it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."
+
+It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a
+celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the
+self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,
+and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being
+inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the
+Rasahridaya--
+
+     "That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems
+     in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,
+
+     "Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings
+     whose bodies are unglorified?
+
+     "He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from
+     cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,
+
+     "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities
+     of the cognitive organs are obstructed.
+
+     "A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the
+     enjoyment of sensual pleasures,
+
+     "An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain
+     to emancipation?"
+
+Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass
+through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be
+extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two
+mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The
+objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following
+dilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which
+all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or
+as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is
+cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive
+cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddhanta--
+
+     "The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the
+     mercurial system, O subtile thinker.
+
+     "In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity
+     of argument,
+
+     "Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all
+     sacred texts;
+
+     "One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore
+     there is and must be life."
+
+And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents
+of the doctrine of Vishnu-svamin maintain the eternity of the body of
+Vishnu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sakara-siddhi--
+
+     "I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishnu-svamin,
+
+     "Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and
+     inconceivably perfect beatitude."
+
+If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which
+appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real
+existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be
+otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of
+proof: (1.) by the intuition of Sanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts
+such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puranic texts such
+as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the
+conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other
+like predicates are affirmed also by Srikanta-misra, the devoted
+adherent of Vishnu-svamin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest
+end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which
+we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus
+been said--
+
+     "What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,
+     immortal,
+
+     "The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,
+     pleasure, liberation?"
+
+It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as
+it is said--
+
+     "Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying
+     and imperishable."
+
+Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by
+seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasarnava--
+
+     "From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from
+     merely remembering it,
+
+     "From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,
+     appear its six virtues.
+
+     "Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from
+     seeing all the phallic emblems
+
+     "On earth, those at Kedara, and all others whatsoever."
+
+In another place we read--
+
+     "The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific
+     than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Kasi and
+     elsewhere,
+
+     "Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,
+     exemption from decay, and immortality."
+
+The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--
+
+     "The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged
+     should recall quicksilver to mind.
+
+     "He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his
+     blasphemy for ever filled with sin."
+
+The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes
+place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the
+practice of union ([Greek: henosis]) after the acquisition of a
+divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter--
+
+     "The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain
+     men of holy vision,
+
+     "Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the
+     universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:
+
+     "Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof
+     is luminousness, undifferenced,
+
+     "From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,
+     tranquil, self-recognised:
+
+     "Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole
+     universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,
+
+     "The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his
+     bondage to works annulled."
+
+A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained
+this he becomes beatitude.
+
+Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of
+passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we
+have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the
+supreme self--
+
+     "May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from
+     dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,
+
+     "Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those
+     that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,
+
+     "Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the
+     soul awakes,
+
+     "Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines
+     forth by itself from itself."
+
+A. E. G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogis in Colonel
+Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Parada-pana_ is one of the practices of
+the Siddhopasakas in the Sankara-digvijaya, No. 49, to obviate
+_apamrityu_, _akalamrityu_, &c.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE VAISESHIKA OR AULUKYA DARSANA.[154]
+
+
+Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by
+the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be
+essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to
+know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the
+Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such
+passages as these (_Svetasvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--
+
+     "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,
+
+     "Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of
+     Siva."
+
+Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing
+(_sravana_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhavana_), as it has
+been said--
+
+     "By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated
+     meditation,--
+
+     "By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the
+     highest union (_yoga_)."
+
+Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the
+knowledge of the _vyapti_ (or universal proposition), and the
+knowledge of the _vyapti_ follows the right understanding of the
+categories,--hence the saint Kanada[155] establishes the six
+categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now,
+therefore, we shall explain duty."
+
+In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all
+the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first
+_ahnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_jati_), in the
+second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the
+similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the
+first _ahnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the
+second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third
+book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the
+first _ahnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he
+discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _ahnika_,
+and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates
+action; in the first _ahnika_ he considers action as connected with
+the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he
+examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti; in the first _ahnika_
+he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second
+the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book
+he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _ahnika_ he
+considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those
+qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the
+eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception,
+and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics
+of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of
+inference.[156]
+
+The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"
+"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected,
+"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold,
+not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really
+included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare
+that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and
+intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an
+example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this
+definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since
+"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the
+categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in
+its generic character in all substances [though different substances
+have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with
+"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then
+"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"
+inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate
+relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.
+
+If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since
+'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of
+the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of
+conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the
+objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only
+six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the
+thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it
+is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,
+if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends
+his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite
+number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we
+cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a
+seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite
+number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if
+others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow
+to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a
+_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.
+
+Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvadi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance,
+quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,
+quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_)
+is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the
+(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and
+does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]
+
+The genus of quality (_gunatva_) is that which is immediately
+subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation
+in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of
+action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the
+genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything
+eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _samanya_) is that which is found
+in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the
+counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]
+(_visesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of
+generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation
+(_samavaya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate
+relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.
+
+Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,
+soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_prithivitva_), are the
+definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality
+which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same
+subject with colour produced by baking.[168]
+
+The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and
+sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate
+relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon
+and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to
+substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the
+skin.[169]
+
+As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be
+subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their
+technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is
+found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special
+quality which is not produced by contact.[170]
+
+Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the
+mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is
+not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that
+pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is
+not time.[173] The general terms _atmatva_ and _manastva_ are the
+respective definitions of soul (_atman_) and mind (_manas_). The
+general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being
+also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]
+(_amurtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to
+substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an
+atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any
+substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned
+directly in Kanada's Sutras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch,
+number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,
+proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
+effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word
+"_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,
+and sound. Their respective genera (_rupatva_, &c.) are their several
+definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is
+subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In
+the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.
+
+"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing
+upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:
+revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus
+of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The
+genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists
+with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of
+conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the
+definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is
+twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found
+with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and
+action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of
+generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation
+cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite
+number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate
+relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.
+
+There is a popular proverb--
+
+"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by
+disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true
+Vaiseshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the
+production of duality, &c.
+
+There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;
+thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the
+distinguishing perception _apekshabuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this
+is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_
+(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of
+duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it
+exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_samskara_).[177]
+
+But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus
+produced from _apekshabuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained
+that _apekshabuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because
+duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we
+cannot hold _apekshabuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and
+therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being
+produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,
+maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c.,
+cannot be held to be made known (_jnapya_) by that non-eternal
+apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._,
+_apekshabuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a
+plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as
+"severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshabuddhi_ is not their
+_jnapaka_, it must be their _janaka_].
+
+Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From
+_apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality
+(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;
+next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises,
+simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the
+destruction of _apekshabuddhi_; next from the destruction of
+_apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two
+substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of
+the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of
+imagination (_samskara_), the destruction of the knowledge of the
+quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the
+knowledge of the substances.
+
+The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,
+and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be
+found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are
+the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the
+rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a
+special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary
+duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of
+the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two
+things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to
+the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the
+subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its
+abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate
+action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshabuddhi_,
+there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united
+influence of both.[181]
+
+_Apekshabuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind
+which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._,
+destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]
+
+Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the
+destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyanuka_), another
+compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of
+this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,
+the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of
+steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the
+conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,
+&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire
+arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from
+conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the
+atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is
+produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,
+there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that
+former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another
+atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;
+ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms)
+are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the
+_dvyanuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The
+other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,
+are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if
+we hold (with the Vaiseshikas) that the baking process takes place in
+the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyayikas, however, maintain that the
+baking process takes place in the jar.
+
+"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by
+the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that
+produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause
+[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.
+
+It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the
+[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect
+[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a
+disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a
+disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,
+again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied
+by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary
+with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke
+without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking
+in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187]
+without there having previously been the origination of that
+disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot
+was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts
+produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the
+disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one
+part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which
+had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction
+of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causa cessat
+effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which
+resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes
+of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the
+pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,
+initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a
+disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the
+pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to
+produce it.[188]
+
+But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the
+hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,
+initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the
+original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the
+intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand
+produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates
+also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and
+the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]
+and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and
+the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of
+the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second
+disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the
+body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the
+action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing
+in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of
+disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we
+must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause
+and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the
+body and the points of space.
+
+But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.
+147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely
+unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different
+opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bhatta Mimamsakas
+and the Vedantins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Sridhara
+Acharya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus
+darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prabhakara Mimamsakas
+hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the
+Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we
+assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of
+the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible
+alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of
+the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different
+one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one
+you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should
+certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that
+it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself
+destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the
+very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of
+qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different
+substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that
+darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed
+of the dark blue of the tamala blossom?" We reply, that this is merely
+an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But
+enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it
+follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since
+you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some
+substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye
+as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,
+the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression
+independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind],
+because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an
+indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain
+that "absence or non-existence (_abhava_[195]) is incapable of being
+expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use
+such phrases as _tenebrae oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere
+non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would
+include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,
+destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do
+speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all
+are cases of _abhava_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of
+the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ
+which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
+would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is
+the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the
+fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness
+is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
+very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the
+qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_
+attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is
+connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert
+that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced
+by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
+object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's
+absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that
+on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on
+to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no
+dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend
+thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
+that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates
+the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will
+require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we
+cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is
+necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,
+else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is
+implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence,
+having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kanada
+uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]:
+"_Dravya-guna-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyad abhavas tamas_" (_Vais.
+Sut._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is
+dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."
+The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness
+is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances,
+if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the
+eye to be visible].
+
+Non-existence (_abhava_) is considered to be the seventh category, as
+established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that
+which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate
+relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and
+"reciprocal non-existence."
+
+The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and
+"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without
+any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though
+having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence
+which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal
+non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet
+no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_,
+as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].
+
+If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really
+the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to
+lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence"
+is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is
+not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose
+opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor
+need you here raise the objection that "_abhava_ can never be a means
+of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum
+bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for
+the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the
+category of _abhava_].
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 154: The Vaiseshikas are called Aulukyah in Hemachandra's
+_Abhidhana-chintamani_; in the Vayu-purana (quoted in Aufrecht's
+_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapada, Kanada, Uluka, and Vatsa are
+called the sons of Siva.]
+
+[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kanabhaksha.]
+
+[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book
+treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,
+&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the
+qualities of the soul, and the three causes.]
+
+[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bhashya_ of Vatsyayana,
+see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]
+
+[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bhasha-parichchheda_, sloka 14.]
+
+[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_visesha_) resides by "intimate
+relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would
+apply to "duality" and "conjunction."]
+
+[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply
+to "existence" (_satta_), which is the _summum genus_, to which
+substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]
+
+[Footnote 162: Existence (_satta_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guna_,
+and _kriya_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and
+all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and
+disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _samyoga_, _rupa_, &c.) may be
+mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the
+essence of _guna_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]
+
+[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found
+in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nitya-samavetatva_;
+this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College
+Library.]
+
+[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,
+however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore,
+the former clause of the definition is added.]
+
+[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiseshika) is not
+"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is
+the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being
+single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different
+atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,
+water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus
+ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own
+indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _visesha_ as "ultimate
+difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _visesha_.]
+
+[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyonyabhava_) exists between
+two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;"
+but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]
+
+[Footnote 167: "_Samavayasambandabhavat samavayo na jatih_," Siddh.
+Mukt. (_Samyoga_ being a _guna_ has _gunatva_ existing in it with
+intimate relation).]
+
+[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot
+nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union
+with fire" (Bhasha-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]
+
+[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an aerial
+integument.--_Colebrooke._]
+
+[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the
+_first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is
+added to exclude God's knowledge, while _samyogajanya_ excludes the
+soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind
+and the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time
+with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate
+cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the
+instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaranam_.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daisika_ and _kalika_.]
+
+[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the
+last, however, is not pervading but atomic.]
+
+[Footnote 174: The three other _padarthas_, beside soul, which are
+_amurtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]
+
+[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,
+_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things
+themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our
+choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]
+
+[Footnote 176: _Samskara_ is here the idea conceived by the
+mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material
+previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or
+mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]
+
+[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the
+original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]
+
+[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _jnapaka_ or _janaka_;
+_apekshabuddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]
+
+[Footnote 179: _Apekshabuddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is
+one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of
+these, but in _both_ together.]
+
+[Footnote 180: The Vaiseshikas held that the jivatman and space are
+each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each
+have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is
+ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion
+has not. Dr. Roer, in his version of the Bhasha-Parichchheda, has
+mistranslated an important Sutra which bears on this point. It is said
+in Sutra 26--
+
+     _----athakasasaririnam, avyapyavrittih kshaniko visesha-guna
+     ishyate,_
+
+which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are
+limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special
+qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are
+limited to different portions and of momentary duration."]
+
+[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the
+destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14
+(_apekshabuddhi-nasa_), viz., _asrayanasa_, and the united action of
+_both_:--
+
+1. Ekatva-jnana        |Avayava-kriya              |    . . .
+2. Apekshabuddhi       |Avayava-vibhaga            |Avayava-kriya.
+3. Dvitvotpatti and    |Avayava-samyoga-nasa       |Avayava-vibhaga.
+   ekatva-jnana-nasa   |                           |
+4. Dvitvatvajnana      |Dvitvadharasya             |Avayava-samyoga-nasa.
+                       |(_i.e._,                   |
+                       |avayavinah) nasah           |
+5. Dvitvaguna-buddhi|Dvitva-nasa                    |Adhara-nasa
+   and                 |of avayavin). (_i.e._,     |
+   apekshabuddhi-nasa  |(of avayavin).             |
+6. Dvitva-nasa  and    |         . . .             |Dvitva-nasa.
+   dravya-buddhi       |                           |
+
+The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the
+course of the six steps of _ekatvajnana_, &c., one of the two parts is
+itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the
+first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth
+moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding
+_dvitvadhara-nasa_, or, as Madhava calls it, _asrayanivritti_. In the
+second case, the _nasa_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by
+both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united
+action of two causes, _apekshabuddhi-nasa_ and _adhara-nasa_. Any
+_kriya_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would
+be unimportant, as the _nasa_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take
+place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and
+in this way it would be too late to affect that result.]
+
+[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apekshabuddhi_ follows
+the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously
+described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of
+_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvajnana_, &c. (cf.
+Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the
+counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]
+
+[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in
+the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;
+thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black
+(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two
+atoms.]
+
+[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]
+
+[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddhanta
+Muktavali, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the
+destruction of the _dvyanuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from
+the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the
+destruction of the black colour in the _dvyanuka_, and the
+simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyanuka_ with
+that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the
+simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the
+action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The
+remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]
+
+[Footnote 186: The Vaiseshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old
+black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c.,
+being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour
+in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,
+eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps
+prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of
+the Nyaya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different
+compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the
+old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes
+not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is
+red, not black.]
+
+[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read
+_gaganavibhagakartritvasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 188: The Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 112, describes the series
+of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the
+disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction
+which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.
+by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the
+severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction
+with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the
+cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second
+disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced
+by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the
+pot.]
+
+[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibhagan_, _i.e._,
+disjunctions from the several points.]
+
+[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of
+space.]
+
+[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gita.]
+
+[Footnote 192: For _dravyadi_ read _prithivyadi_.]
+
+[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read
+_viddhavevidhaya_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vriddhavivadhaya_.]
+
+[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a
+serpent.]
+
+[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bhave_.]
+
+[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadhanadishu_.
+_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying
+"command;" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bhavabodhaka-kriya_. It
+has that meaning in Kavya-prakasa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).]
+
+[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _aloka-jnana_, therefore it would
+perceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by
+the _eye_.]
+
+[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a
+jar's absence in the dark.]
+
+[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation
+is the _dhvamsabhava_, or "emergent non-existence."]
+
+[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p.
+110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,
+therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and
+would refer to the commentary (Vais. Sut. p. 250), "_yadi hi
+nila-rupavan nilam rupam eva va tamah syat, vahyalokapragraham
+antarena chakshusha na grihyeta_."]
+
+[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.]
+
+[Footnote 202: "Relative non-existence" (_samsargabhava_) is the
+negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is
+"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent,"
+and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the
+jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the
+spot of ground,--it is the _jati ghatatva_ which resides in the jar.]
+
+[Footnote 204: The opposite is "there _is_ colour in the air."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE AKSHAPADA (OR NYAYA) DARSANA.
+
+
+The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of
+pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
+sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
+particular tenet[205] of the Nyaya school, as is declared by the
+author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
+proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
+the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
+Nyaya Sastra. Now the Nyaya Sastra consists of five books, and each
+book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
+first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
+categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
+remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_vada_). In the first
+daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
+four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
+being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
+"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
+already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mimamsakas as
+separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
+examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
+second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first
+daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravritti_),
+the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
+"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to
+the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
+first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
+of futility (_jati_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
+for rebuke" (_nigrahasthana_, or "unfitness to be argued with").
+
+In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
+measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pramana_) is
+first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
+first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
+accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
+from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of
+knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes
+the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God is a source of right
+knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
+(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
+knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
+that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
+And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
+the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
+chapter of the Kusumanjali:
+
+"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
+possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
+school, the being separated from all absence thereof.
+
+"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
+and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
+existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being
+swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
+slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Siva, is my authority; what
+have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
+with rising doubts?"
+
+"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
+analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
+right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
+objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
+fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
+is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
+possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
+therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant
+qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
+particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The
+thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
+motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.
+"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
+general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]
+A "tenet" (_siddhanta_) is something which is accepted as being
+authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
+to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
+[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
+dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
+sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
+are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
+and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the
+showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
+of a false major[211] (cf. Sut. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of
+eleven kinds, as _vyaghata_, _atmasraya_, _itaretarasraya_, &c.
+
+"Ascertainment" (_nirnaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
+of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
+perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_vada_) is
+a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
+of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only
+wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
+of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitanda_) is the talk of a man
+who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
+43). "Dialogue" (_katha_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
+disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
+prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
+"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
+or "mistimed" (Sut. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing
+forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
+sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
+term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
+(_jati_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
+twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya
+aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
+his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
+described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
+here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
+prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.
+
+But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,
+are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
+of the Nyaya Sastra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Nyaya_, or logic,
+properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
+We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
+said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
+Nyaya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
+inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
+feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
+being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
+by Sarvajna, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyaya from its
+establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
+action;"[212] and by Pakshila Swamin, "This is the science of
+reasoning (_anvikshiki_) divided into the different categories,
+'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
+actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
+the declarations of science."[213]
+
+But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
+arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
+ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
+"No," for it is said in the second Nyaya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
+activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of
+these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
+by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
+thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
+"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
+soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
+it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
+to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
+"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
+stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
+impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
+by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;
+by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity"
+produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,
+as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,
+by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right
+activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
+leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
+and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
+which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
+this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
+continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
+existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
+whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
+deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
+that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
+pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
+abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced
+it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
+knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
+knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his
+mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
+things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
+disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
+them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
+cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
+absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
+that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
+as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras:
+"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the
+successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
+the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
+them] final beatitude."
+
+"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,
+'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
+as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this
+continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
+We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
+include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
+being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
+royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
+is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
+Madhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
+soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
+the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
+being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,
+we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
+alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued
+succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?
+(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyayikas allow
+that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish
+cognition as a cause of _pravritti_ or action[220]], for who would
+oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,
+then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,
+again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
+supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive
+to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
+principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
+and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
+very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].
+
+"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
+intelligence [_i.e._, the Yogacharas and the Sautrantikas[222]], that
+'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
+the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
+there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
+the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
+if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
+contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
+as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
+things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
+they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
+irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
+recognition of the real nature of things.
+
+And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
+accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and
+when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
+establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
+able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now
+liberated.
+
+Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
+releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
+impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
+he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and
+error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
+body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
+upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of
+a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
+said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
+parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
+definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
+parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
+of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has
+parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
+non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
+this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
+Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
+what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
+thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
+during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
+which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
+former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
+soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
+"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
+agent possessing form?[227]
+
+Again, if we take the Charvaka's view "that the only bondage is
+dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
+liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
+have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
+no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
+involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
+equalled.[228]
+
+Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
+are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's
+remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
+withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
+pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
+the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
+nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
+the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
+that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
+it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
+Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
+then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
+spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
+the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.
+
+Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
+doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajna and his followers, that "Liberation is the
+manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
+but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
+come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Sruti as the
+proof, we reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is
+precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its
+authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
+as floating stones.[230]
+
+"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
+happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
+only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
+dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
+rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
+speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
+truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of
+pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
+pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of
+perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
+involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
+its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
+proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
+since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
+incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
+is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
+attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is
+inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
+who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
+it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
+rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
+many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
+together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
+issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
+consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
+experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
+him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
+Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
+Sruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
+soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.
+
+But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
+of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Sruti? Certainly
+perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,
+must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
+universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor
+can Sruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be
+sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
+as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
+school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
+under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for
+comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
+sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a
+moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
+to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
+unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
+excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
+once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had
+a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
+(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
+rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a
+doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
+to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
+with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
+first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
+ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
+much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
+which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
+therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
+holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
+of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may
+adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the
+"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
+possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]
+
+(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
+(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal
+proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
+to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].
+(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikanta_), since it is never
+found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in
+the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor
+again is it precluded (_badhita_ or _kalatyayopadishta_), for there is no
+superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it
+counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be
+any such equally valid antagonist.
+
+If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
+&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
+produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this
+pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
+can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
+"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
+produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
+argument thus involves the fallacy called _vyapyatvasiddhi_].[239] Nor
+can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
+cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
+the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
+to limitation by any suggested condition (_upadhi_),[240] [such as
+"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
+"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
+valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
+&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
+acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
+that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
+of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
+involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
+the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
+and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
+causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
+the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
+of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
+these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
+doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
+There is a rule laid down by Sankara-kinkara which applies directly to
+the present case--
+
+     "When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
+     establish its validity,
+
+     "Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
+     account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
+     major term."
+
+If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
+"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
+&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
+whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
+not.[241]
+
+As has been said by Udayana Acharya [in the Kusumanjali, iii. 5]--
+
+     "If Sruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
+     fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
+     objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
+     ever."
+
+Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
+argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
+being known or unknown.[242]
+
+"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
+the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
+other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
+something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
+the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
+possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
+it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
+advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
+call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
+you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
+would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
+rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
+checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
+for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
+another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
+create the world." This has been said by Bhattacharya--
+
+     "Not even a fool acts without some object in view;
+
+     "Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
+     be left undone by  Him?"--
+
+We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for
+a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
+suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
+compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
+happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
+cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
+will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
+created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
+independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
+since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
+one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this
+there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
+Svetasvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
+admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your
+deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
+Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
+existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
+reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
+dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
+to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It
+cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
+dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
+possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
+being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
+Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
+can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
+for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_
+endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tivra_,[246] &c.)
+
+Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
+duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
+obtained; thus everything is clear.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.
+
+We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvabhasas_
+of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhantamukt._, No. 71, _Tarkasamgr._,
+55-67), viz., _anaikanta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kalatyayopadishta_
+or _badhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first
+of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichara_ or "erratic,"
+_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sadhyasama_ or "unproved," and
+_atitakala_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list
+of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_
+corresponds imperfectly to _prakaranasama_. The _prakaranasama_ or
+"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
+for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
+is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
+"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
+authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
+difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is
+non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
+this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
+question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one
+which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
+eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
+is a product."
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyaya Sutras, i. 29.]
+
+[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
+_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyaya Sut. iv.
+68).]
+
+[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include
+the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 208: Isvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramana_)
+according to the definition, because he is _pramaya asrayah_.]
+
+[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhanta-Muktavali, p. 115.]
+
+[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
+i. p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
+smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is
+the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).
+Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
+(_vyapaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyapya_").]
+
+[Footnote 212: Action (_pravritti_) follows after the ascertainment of
+the truth by _nyaya_.]
+
+[Footnote 213: Cp. Vatsyayana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
+reads _prakirtita_ for _parikshita_.]
+
+[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
+indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]
+
+[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for
+_tannivartakam_.]
+
+[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
+authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
+eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the
+stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kamandaki's
+_Nitisara_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vatsyayana's Com. p.
+3, from which Madhava is here borrowing.]
+
+[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
+lick her ear."]
+
+[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road
+through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with
+tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]
+
+[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
+during the second, and ceases in the third.]
+
+[Footnote 220: See Nyaya Sut. i. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
+Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyayikas have
+sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
+line 11.]
+
+[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]
+
+[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,
+all is unreal.]
+
+[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _klesas_ or "afflictions."]
+
+[Footnote 225: _Avarana_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]
+
+[Footnote 226: But the Nyaya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
+happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,
+mind (Bhasha P. No. 83).]
+
+[Footnote 227: The reading _murtapratibandhat_ is difficult, but I
+believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyapti_, as it does in Sankhya
+Sutras, i. 100.]
+
+[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be
+_niratisaya_,--incapable of being added to.]
+
+[Footnote 229: _Yogyanupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and
+yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
+light, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_gravanah plavanti_,"
+see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _asmanah plavanti_ occurs
+in Shadv. Br. 5, 12.]
+
+[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."]
+
+[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]
+
+[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
+authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
+to reveal the existence of God.]
+
+[Footnote 234: The Nyaya holds presumption to be included under
+inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
+relation of a name to the thing named.]
+
+[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
+everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]
+
+[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
+its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
+ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
+air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
+_visesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
+"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"
+excludes ether, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
+eternal substances being the one or the other.]
+
+[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where
+the major term is.]
+
+[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
+from the Kusumanjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
+there. "The older Naiyayikas maintained that the argument 'the
+mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
+vyapyatvasiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
+restricted (see Siddhanta Muktav. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
+wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
+objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
+validity of the assumed middle term."]
+
+[Footnote 240: For the _upadhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]
+
+[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
+subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
+to the fault of _asrayasiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your
+subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
+locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumanjali, iii. 2). "Just as
+that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
+unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]
+
+[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
+He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
+p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparahatatvat_, and then begin
+the next clause with _syad etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparahatah
+syat tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]
+
+[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
+Hiranyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
+as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
+constitutes his gross body (viraj).]
+
+[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]
+
+[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyasraya_ fallacy, see
+_Nyayasutra vritti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]
+
+[Footnote 246: For _tivra_ cf. _Yoga sutras_, i. 21, 22.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+THE JAIMINI-DARSANA.
+
+
+An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
+merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how
+is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
+reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mimamsa by the
+holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mimamsa consists of twelve books.[248] In
+the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
+of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),
+"explanatory passage" (_arthavada_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition
+(_smriti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
+[as _e.g._, on _apurva_] relating to the difference of various rites,
+refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
+performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
+third, _Sruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_linga_), "context"
+(_vakya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent
+opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karmani_,
+things mentioned incidentally (_anarabhyadhita_), things accessory to
+several main objects, as _prayajas_, &c., and the duties of the
+sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
+principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhu_ being
+made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which
+form subordinate parts of the _rajasuya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the
+relative order of different passages of _Sruti_, &c., the order of
+different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
+_vajapeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
+the respective force of the words of _Sruti_, order of mention, &c.,
+in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
+qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
+enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
+rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the
+different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
+ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
+text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
+transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
+"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
+takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
+adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_uha_), the
+adaptation of _samans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions
+connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
+the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
+non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
+are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
+discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _samans_,
+and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
+negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
+fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined
+into one], and _avapa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In
+the twelfth, a discussion on _prasanga_ [where the rite is performed
+for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
+_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.
+
+Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the
+Purva-Mimamsa arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
+know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
+"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the
+subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _prima facie_ argument, (_d._)
+the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sangati_).
+The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
+teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
+sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
+whether the study of Jaimini's _sastra_ concerning duty, beginning
+with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
+instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
+_anvaharya_," is to be commenced or not. The _prima facie_ argument is
+that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
+Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
+fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
+fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning
+of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
+enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
+or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
+we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,
+for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
+from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
+reading the Mahabharata; and we see by this argument that it would
+present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
+injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
+baked flour cake called _purodasa_ is made only of rice prepared by
+being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
+have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
+and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
+the principal _apurva_, by means of the various minor effects or
+subordinate _apurvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of
+the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apurva_ of the
+unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
+the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
+restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
+knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
+studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
+no injunction to study the Purva Mimamsa as a means of knowing the
+sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
+injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
+the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
+although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
+words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
+which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
+is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
+Visvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
+that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
+that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
+offer the Visvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
+characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
+present case also. As it has been said--
+
+"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
+injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
+heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
+analogy of the Visvajit, &c."
+
+Thus, too, we shall keep the Smriti rule from being violated: "Having
+read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
+long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
+student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
+he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
+house to read the Mimamsa discussions, and thus the idea of no
+interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three
+reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mimamsa is not enjoined, (_b._) that
+heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)
+that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
+we maintain that the study of the Mimamsa discussions on duty is not
+to be commenced.
+
+The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhanta_), however, is as
+follows:--
+
+We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been
+adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
+could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
+of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
+_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be
+rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
+effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
+corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
+Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
+word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
+reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
+end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
+consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
+the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
+the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
+mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
+never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
+production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us
+is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
+sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
+has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
+aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
+sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
+the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
+written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
+"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
+reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
+duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _apurva_,
+produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
+establishes the subordinate _apurvas_ produced by the inferior
+sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _apurva_
+produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
+_apurva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which
+prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
+sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this
+future influence called _apurva_, the same doubt might equally
+invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same
+level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
+that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Visvajit_
+offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
+of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
+suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
+     unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of
+     a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."
+
+But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
+the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
+who reads the Veda with its _angas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this
+knowledge, the study of Mimamsa will be useless." But this is not
+true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
+literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
+discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
+gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will
+determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
+with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mimamsa discussion that the true
+meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
+brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of
+Mimamsa is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
+passage of Smriti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
+implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
+any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
+return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
+read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
+both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
+common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
+the injunction we conclude that the study of the Purva Mimamsa Sastra,
+consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic
+is connected with the main subject of the Sastra as being a subsidiary
+digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
+which helps to establish the main subject."[257]
+
+I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
+in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhakara.
+
+In the Smriti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
+eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct
+him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
+Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
+ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
+since, by Panini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ni_ is used in the
+_atmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a
+teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
+pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
+both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
+Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Brahman who girds his pupil with the
+sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
+_angas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_acharya_)."
+Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
+without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
+very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
+obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
+one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
+the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
+if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
+injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
+as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuvada_
+or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _prima facie_
+argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
+was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
+another way to suit this new view.
+
+Now the _prima facie_ argument was that the study of Mimamsa, not
+being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
+"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
+authoritatively enjoined.
+
+Now the upholders of the former or _prima facie_ view argue as
+follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
+dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
+understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
+bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
+teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
+what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
+and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
+sufficient, the Mimamsa discussions in question will have no subject
+or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
+doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
+way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
+should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
+the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
+accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
+use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
+intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
+in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
+present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
+useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mimamsa
+is not to be commenced."
+
+We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
+corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
+still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _angas_, and
+has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
+respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
+of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
+may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
+son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
+not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
+eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
+meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old
+objection will recur with full force that the study of Mimamsa will
+have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
+the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
+astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
+that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
+really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
+the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
+poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
+trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
+this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
+which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
+literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
+doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
+intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mimamsa
+discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
+"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
+obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
+authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
+subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
+Mimamsa _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.
+
+"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyaya], "but how can
+the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
+is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
+personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
+tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
+with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged
+characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those
+who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of
+tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
+universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
+is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
+no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
+since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
+second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
+viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
+some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former
+supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
+apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
+overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is
+inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
+omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
+person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
+personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda
+must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
+character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other writers. And,
+again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
+person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
+time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.
+
+But [ask the Mimamsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
+Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
+since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
+which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
+uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
+This reasoning, however [the Naiyayikas answer], cannot rise to the
+height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
+illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahabharata was preceded by
+an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
+of the Mahabharata, which must have been the same in former times as
+now." But [the Mimamsakas will ask whether there is not a difference
+between these two cases, since] the Smriti declares that [Vishnu
+incarnate as] Vyasa was the author of the Mahabharata, in accordance
+with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be the maker
+of the Mahabharata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
+Smriti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
+since those words of the Purushasukta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
+sprang the Rich and Saman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
+him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.
+
+Further [proceed the Naiyayikas] we hold that sound is
+non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
+external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]
+"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
+arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)
+as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
+extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
+our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as
+in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
+of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mimamsaka] how
+can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara, who has
+no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
+pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyayika] is
+not happy, because, though Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he
+can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
+worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
+the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."
+
+I shall now [says the Mimamsaka] clear up the whole question. What is
+meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]
+which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)
+from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
+ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with
+a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of
+proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
+If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
+us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
+(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)
+The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
+equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Malatimadhava
+[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
+character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
+clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line
+21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
+sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
+prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
+establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
+other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just
+as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
+if we granted that Paramesvara might assume a body in sport, in order
+to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
+he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
+of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
+time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
+other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
+for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
+experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhakara] when he
+refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--
+
+     "Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]
+     it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
+     thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
+     or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
+     of form."
+
+Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
+by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
+Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Rich and Saman verses"]. For the
+rule of Panini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
+grammatical affixes with which such names as Kathaka, Kalapa, and
+Taittiriya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
+"uttered by" Katha, Kalapin, &c., though we maintain that these names
+have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
+these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
+schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
+reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
+institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.
+
+Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,
+because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
+consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
+the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
+the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
+identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this
+idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
+forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
+the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
+shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
+cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises
+from the latter reason, we Mimamsakas, who hold that the Veda is its
+own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--
+
+     "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
+     him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
+     go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
+     mass of doubts."
+
+(_b._) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
+and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
+species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
+individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
+different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
+such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somasarman is reading'?" This
+objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
+as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
+there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
+_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
+[the Naiyayika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
+Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
+magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
+modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
+short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mimamsaka doctrine
+of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
+diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
+respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
+ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
+distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
+contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
+[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
+from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
+for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
+admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
+uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
+times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
+distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
+difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
+apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
+that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
+indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
+"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
+which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
+teacher--
+
+     "The object which the Naiyayikas seek by supposing a species
+     is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
+     which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
+     is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
+     of species is useless."
+
+And again--
+
+     "Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
+     recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
+     superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
+     non-eternity."
+
+This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyayika] treatise
+by Vagiswara, entitled _Mana-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the
+fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
+sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."
+
+We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the
+[Sankhya and Vedanta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
+overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if
+we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no
+dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)
+the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upadhi_] of
+_asravanatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at
+great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
+imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
+perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
+non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
+such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
+arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply
+[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises
+from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
+story, the demon Tala went away [as well as Betala] when the offering
+of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised
+by the author of the _Nyayabhushana_,[279] that, if sound were
+eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
+perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
+allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
+articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyayika) argument against the
+existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
+between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
+both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
+invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
+the soul.[282]
+
+Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
+personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
+thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
+that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
+duty.
+
+"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how
+about another well-known controversy? It is said--
+
+"'The Sankhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
+are self-proved; the followers of the Nyaya hold that both are proved by
+something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
+self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
+Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
+non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
+this discussion, how do the Mimamsakas accept as established their tenet
+that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
+of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that
+authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the
+right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the
+instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge
+in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
+knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
+produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right
+knowledge?
+
+"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of
+cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
+these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness
+cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if
+knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
+would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)
+It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
+be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general
+characteristic (_upadhi_) or a species (_jati_);[287] for if we call
+it an _upadhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
+contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
+the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we
+all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
+we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)
+Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
+knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
+causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
+the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
+'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
+_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
+particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
+therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
+knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
+Mimamsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
+considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong
+knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
+produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask
+whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which
+produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
+of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
+followers of the Nyaya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
+something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that
+authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
+combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter
+alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
+'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
+absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
+right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
+presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same
+time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that
+non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
+whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
+should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
+non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
+effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
+at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumanjali,
+i. 10]--
+
+     "'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
+     as well as an effect.'
+
+"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge
+depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,
+from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
+just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through
+something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises
+in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
+non-authoritativeness.
+
+"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
+and recognised by means of something external, the Mimamsa tenet that
+'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
+rotten."
+
+This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
+strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase
+"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
+instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other
+cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
+full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
+causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
+produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
+knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be
+brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
+something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
+equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
+produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
+is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being
+knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
+arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless
+complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
+it a _guna_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]
+
+"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
+knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
+right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
+absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
+acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
+     _gunas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence
+     the non-existence of the two kinds of
+     non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general
+     conclusion."[300]
+
+(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
+by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
+knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this
+view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
+thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
+although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
+also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
+&c.
+
+As for your argument [O Naiyayika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines
+17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
+or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
+itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
+whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
+should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some
+other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
+will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.
+
+As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumanjali, when he
+tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
+on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
+which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
+of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
+a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
+an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
+closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
+on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
+throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mimamsa idea of
+the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
+action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
+who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
+actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
+that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
+knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
+causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
+distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
+authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
+deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
+as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
+authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
+is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
+have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
+controversy; since it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
+     (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
+     fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
+     which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
+     discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]
+
+Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
+authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
+divergency between the two great Mimamsa schools]:--The Veda is
+composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_),
+"explanatory passages" (_arthavada_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and
+by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
+sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third
+person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
+rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
+opinion of the followers of Bhatta Kumarila, who maintain that words
+signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the
+sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold
+that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
+they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
+done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 247: Madhava here calls it the _prachi Mimamsa_.]
+
+[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyayamalavist_, pp. 5-9.]
+
+[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
+priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
+one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
+_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;
+but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
+thus it must be a case of _avapa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately
+(_J. Nyayamala_, xi. 1, 13).]
+
+[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshana-drishtaphala_.]
+
+[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter
+a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprapto niyamah pakshike
+sati, tatra chanyatra cha praptau parisamkhya vidhiyate_.]
+
+[Footnote 252: The Mimamsa holds that the potential and similar
+affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one
+they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
+root-meaning (_artha-bhavana_); by the other an enforcing power in the
+word (_sabda-bhavana_). Thus in _svargakamo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies
+"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
+up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
+an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
+self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
+course of action.]
+
+[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
+remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
+that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
+perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
+six _vikaras_ mentioned in Sankara's Vajrasuchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,
+_jayate_, _vardhate_, _viparinamate_, _apakshiyate_, _nasyati_. I do
+not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
+_apurva_, sc. _phala_, _samudaya_, _utpatti_, and _anga_, described in
+Nyaya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]
+
+[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yaska's
+_nirukta_.]
+
+[Footnote 255: See Nyaya-mala-vistara, i. 4, 19.]
+
+[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]
+
+[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the
+_samgati_.]
+
+[Footnote 258: Cf. Asvalayana's Grihya Sutras, i. 19, 1.]
+
+[Footnote 259: The _anuvada_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,
+which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
+authority. The _anuvada_ in the present case is the passage which
+mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
+_vidhi_ as to teaching.]
+
+[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamanasya_, and so
+the recension given in the Nyaya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamanasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently
+borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
+iii. p. 88.]
+
+[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive
+transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]
+
+[Footnote 263: Madhava means that the author of this stanza, though
+unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
+contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
+perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
+an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
+origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
+question is quoted in full in Bohtlingk's Indische Spruche, No. 5598,
+from the MS. anthology called the _Subhashitarnava_. For _muktaka_,
+see _Sah. Darp._, No. 558.]
+
+[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
+Mimamsa that sound is eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
+air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _visesha_, not
+_samanya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
+Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
+reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
+arguments belong rather to the Nyaya-vaiseshika school than to the
+Nyaya.]
+
+[Footnote 266: The Mimamsaka allows that the _uchcharana_ or utterance
+is non-eternal.]
+
+[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
+arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
+their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
+sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
+after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
+possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
+composition of Manu, &c."]
+
+[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
+material limitations.]
+
+[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
+developments (_atisayah_) in their saints.]
+
+[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
+"manifest" the always existing sound.]
+
+[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_nada_) is these
+'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
+air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mimamsa Aphorisms_, i. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 273: The Nyaya holds that colour and sound are respectively
+special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
+of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
+course, have its corresponding special quality.]
+
+[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshasiddheh_.]
+
+[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Charvaka-darsana) for the
+_upadhi_. The _upadhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle
+term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
+but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
+"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
+mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
+Here, in answer to the Nyaya argument in the text, our author objects
+that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
+belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes
+found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in
+_sound_ itself, according to the Mimamsa doctrine. To obviate this he
+proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
+readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while
+not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
+sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
+would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Purva Mimamsa and
+the Nyaya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
+sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]
+
+[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwamsa_ of sound, in
+the latter its _pragabhava_.]
+
+[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samapohi_,
+_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _uh_.]
+
+[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tala and Betala are the two
+demons who carry Vikramaditya on their shoulders in the
+Simhasan-battisi. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
+how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]
+
+[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhasarvajna (see Dr. Hall's
+_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]
+
+[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the
+vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
+is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
+a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _samskrita_
+here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]
+
+[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,
+_samskarakasamskaryabhavabhavanumanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichara_. The Naiyayika
+argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus
+manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
+senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
+species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
+manifested by the species. But the Mimamsa rejoins that this would
+equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
+perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
+manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
+sure that I rightly understand the argument.]
+
+[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _purva-paksha_, from p. 131, line
+18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 284: This is Prabhakara's view (see Siddh. Muktav., p. 118).
+The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_pramanya_),
+which resides in it as its characteristic.]
+
+[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
+and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
+a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
+quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
+and therefore a substance.]
+
+[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]
+
+[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
+"action," are called _jatis_ or species; the last four, "genus,"
+"_visesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
+_upadhis_ or "general characteristics."]
+
+[Footnote 288: The Purva Mimamsa denies that recollection is right
+knowledge.]
+
+[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
+causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
+_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]
+
+[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshabhava_ there is _prama_; if
+not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshabhavatvena_ for
+_doshabhavasahakritatvena_.]
+
+[Footnote 291: _Anyathasiddhatvam_ means _niyatapurvavartitve sati
+anavasyakatvam_.]
+
+[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshabhava_.]
+
+[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshabhava_ or the presence of a
+"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]
+
+[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramatva_) can only reside in
+knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in
+a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes
+than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it
+is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also
+produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has
+nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in
+Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass
+muster. The jar is not
+produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-
+at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]
+
+[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
+the previous long purva-paksha.]
+
+[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect"
+(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
+knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
+bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
+the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former
+alone.]
+
+[Footnote 297: The Nyaya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
+"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
+_guna_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
+true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]
+
+[Footnote 298: The _guna_ (or [Greek: beltiste hexis]) of an organ is not
+properly a cause of _prama_ but rather _doshabhava-bodhaka_.]
+
+[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained
+non-authoritativeness" (_nischitapramanya_).]
+
+[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not
+necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
+conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
+causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]
+
+[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
+knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
+the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
+of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _pramanya_.]
+
+[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
+and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
+Kusumanjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
+edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]
+
+[Footnote 303: I read _tat-prachuryam_ for _tatprachurye_ in p. 134,
+line 7.]
+
+[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mimamsa
+school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
+is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]
+
+[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _sakti_; _siddhe_
+means _ghatadau_.]
+
+[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mimamsa schools. The former, called
+_abhihitanvaya-vadinah_, hold (like the Naiyayika school) that words by
+themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidha_ or
+"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
+one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitabhidhana-vadinah_, hold that
+words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
+connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
+with an action. In _gam anaya_, _gam_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but
+_anayananvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with
+"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
+and _vice versa_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative
+Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
+we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
+But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
+which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
+thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
+as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+THE PANINI-DARSANA.[307]
+
+
+If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
+affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
+this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
+waters of Patanjali this question produces no confusion, since it is
+notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
+of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
+first sentence of the venerable Patanjali, the author of the "Great
+Commentary," is "_atha sabdanusasanam_," "Now comes the exposition of
+words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new
+topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
+meant the system of grammar put forth by Panini. Now a doubt might
+here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
+words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
+doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle
+implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
+exclusion of everything else.
+
+The word "exposition" (_anusasana_), as here used, implies that thereby
+Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no devir abhishtaye_,[308]
+&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
+"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of
+the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly
+formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
+We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
+the object [_sabdanusasanam_ standing for _sabdasyanusasanam_], and as
+there is a rule of Panini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
+composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
+phrase _sabdanusasanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised
+compound.
+
+Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
+alleged rule of Panini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
+object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
+connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object
+alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this
+limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprapti_ in the sutra as a
+_bahuvrihi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
+of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
+that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
+in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
+the Kasika Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
+option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
+equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the
+teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
+the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
+relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once
+understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any
+such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
+and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,
+this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
+ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
+rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
+connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the
+genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_
+compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
+such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _palasa-satana_,
+&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
+_shashthitatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in
+accordance with Panini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
+in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for
+by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase
+against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
+alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
+thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
+genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
+hence Bhartrihari in his _Vakyapadiya_ has shown that these rules are
+mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this
+effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamana--
+
+     "In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
+
+     "But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
+     employed.
+
+     "Thus have they explained the meaning of Panini's sutras,
+     since
+
+     "He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and
+     _tatprayojakah_."[314]
+
+Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
+(of the _Mahabhashya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
+of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
+concerning words' are now commenced."
+
+"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
+meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
+as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
+excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
+the employment of such a word as _sabdanusasanam_, the sense of which
+can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
+intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
+subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were
+no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
+readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
+will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
+with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
+(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,
+it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
+is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda.
+Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
+haste to say--
+
+     "Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
+     common life,
+
+     "And therefore grammar is useless?"
+
+Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the
+Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
+students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
+it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
+set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that
+grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
+should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
+knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
+involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
+consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
+sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
+incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswati." Now
+it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of
+the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabdanusasanam_ and not _atha
+vyakaranam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
+end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
+in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
+the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
+concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
+say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
+true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
+word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
+understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
+into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that
+Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
+words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
+word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
+Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
+years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much
+less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
+rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,
+practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
+would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
+word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
+consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not
+established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
+knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
+And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
+examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
+roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
+this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
+for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix
+_an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
+it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakara_, "a potter,"
+_kandalava_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special
+rule (iii. 2, 3), _ato 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_
+is to be used after a root that ends in long _a_ when there is no
+_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
+[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But
+since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the
+one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the
+principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
+is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
+     austerities,
+
+     "The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda."
+
+Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
+the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,
+of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
+great Commentary [quoting a Varttika], "the end (or motive) is
+preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]
+Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
+Katyayana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
+according to the _sastra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda
+itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly
+understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
+Thus (they say)--
+
+     "They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
+     well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;
+
+     "But those who use such false forms as _achikramata_ must
+     trudge thither on foot."[320]
+
+Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
+since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
+For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
+heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
+the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
+commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of
+words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
+mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
+tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
+(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
+"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
+the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
+three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
+(_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._,
+from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
+_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the
+word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the
+great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters
+mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
+declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.
+
+The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the
+world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in
+the part of his book called the Brahmakanda--
+
+     "Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
+     essence of speech,
+
+     "Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
+     springs the creation of the world."
+
+"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
+and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
+too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakirnaka--
+
+     "Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
+     fivefold,
+
+     "Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
+     like."
+
+Helaraja interprets the fivefold division as including
+_karmapravachaniyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
+great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaniyas_ distinguish a
+connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
+out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
+kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
+(_upasargas_).[324]
+
+"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
+_sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
+is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
+there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
+distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
+absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
+word is a false perception.
+
+Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as
+otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
+word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
+bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
+following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
+of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
+first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
+cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
+single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
+[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
+other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
+(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
+cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which
+arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal
+sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
+the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or
+revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by
+the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
+_sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two
+etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
+said by the worshipful Patanjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
+the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
+there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
+hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage
+commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
+from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
+expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
+following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
+wished]," and ending, "The _Vakyapadiya_ has established at length
+that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed
+by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]
+
+Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
+that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
+under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
+convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
+latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
+conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed
+to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
+independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
+to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
+alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself
+manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
+manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
+adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
+of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
+hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has
+been said by Bhatta in his Mimamsa-sloka-varttika--
+
+     "The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the
+     letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
+     and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
+     difficulty."
+
+The truth is, that, as Panini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sut. ii. 123) both
+lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
+the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
+apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
+help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as
+in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _dina_ as in _nadi_, in _mara_ as in
+_rama_, in _raja_ as in _jara_, &c., these several pairs of words would
+not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
+of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
+said by Tautatita--
+
+     "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
+     perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
+     be the meaning which they convey."
+
+Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
+attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
+alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
+thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
+letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
+view having been shown to be irrelevant].
+
+All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
+a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
+you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
+conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
+collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]
+could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
+separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
+the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
+with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
+"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
+together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
+Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a
+horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
+perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
+pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
+power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
+manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
+imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
+involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
+one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
+convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
+their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
+their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
+letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
+_sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
+thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
+alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
+will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
+with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is
+only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
+between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
+reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this
+_sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
+is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
+of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
+manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
+authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
+sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
+the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
+letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that
+the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
+the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
+such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to
+assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct
+category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
+has been established in the discussion (in the Mahabhashya) on "genus"
+(_jati_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
+ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]
+(Brahman).
+
+"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
+will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
+ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
+uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
+purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--
+
+     "The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
+     be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
+     and not by combination."
+
+     "Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
+     trouble of refuting."
+
+All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
+colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
+blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is
+variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
+severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
+various conventional words which arise from the different
+species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum
+genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have
+the following authoritative testimony--
+
+     "Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
+     joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
+     possessing that colour."
+
+And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
+divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with
+different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
+words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
+This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
+affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Panini v. 1, 119).
+
+"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,
+horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
+resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really
+different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and
+_asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
+residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
+expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum
+genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
+cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
+of the stem-word (_pratipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as
+that which expresses _bhava_;[333] now, as _bhava_ is "existence," the
+meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root
+should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriya_); but here
+again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
+"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
+subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
+line--
+
+     "Others say that action (_kriya_) is a genus, residing in
+     many individuals."
+
+So, too, if we accept Panini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
+affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we
+speak of the nature (_bhava_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
+that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _ta_ [as _asvatva_ and
+_asvata_] are used in the sense of _bhava_, that they do express
+"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
+coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
+phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
+space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
+Such is the meaning of Hari's two _karikas_ quoted above. So, too, it
+is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that
+the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose
+characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
+Substance.
+
+"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
+substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
+object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
+discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
+[without owners] is expressed."[336]
+
+So, too, the author of the Mahabhashya, when explaining the
+Varttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
+in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
+meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
+determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of
+horse," &c.]
+
+According to the opinion of Vajapyayana, who maintains that all words
+mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides
+by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
+apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
+particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,
+denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
+connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
+connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
+in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
+the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
+into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
+produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"
+we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly
+denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
+denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c.,
+since we find here a meaning common to all who read.
+
+In the doctrine of Vyadi, who maintained that words meant individual
+things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
+forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
+[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
+"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]
+
+Both views are allowed by the great teacher Panini; since in i. 2, 58,
+he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
+"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
+optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Brahman is to be honoured,"
+which may equally run, "Brahmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
+64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
+where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
+things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Rama and Rama, and the
+plural means Rama, and Rama and Rama; but we retain only one, adding a
+dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
+assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
+Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is
+that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.
+
+As it has been said--
+
+     "Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
+     true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
+     shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."
+
+Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the
+nature of this true meaning--
+
+     "That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
+     perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
+     doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who
+     know the end of the three Vedas."
+
+So too in his description of substance, he says--
+
+     "_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of
+     modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
+     earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they
+     call the Supreme Nature."
+
+The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
+to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
+cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.
+
+"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
+identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
+thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
+souls."[344]
+
+The meaning of this Karika is that Brahman is the one object denoted
+by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
+it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
+the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
+result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
+power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
+conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
+the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedanta lore tell us--
+
+     "As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
+     of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
+     development of illusion likewise."
+
+When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
+joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
+ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best
+defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
+text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
+Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the
+"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.
+
+Thus it has been said--
+
+     "They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
+     diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
+     science of sciences."[347]
+
+And so again--
+
+     "This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
+     final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
+     travellers to emancipation."
+
+Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sastra of grammar should be
+studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 307: Madhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
+adopted and fully developed the idea of the Purva-Mimamsa school that
+sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his
+Jaimini chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]
+
+[Footnote 309: _Sabdanusasana_, if judged by the apparent sense of
+Panini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
+because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
+whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
+an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as
+_acharyena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _ascharyo
+godoho sikshitena gopalena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
+can we say _ascharyo gavam doho' sikshitasya gopalasya_ (as it would
+violate ii. 3, 66).]
+
+[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprapti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a
+_bahuvrihi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
+discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Panini.]
+
+[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Panini, ii.
+2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_
+(_i.e._, _shashthi-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]
+
+[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Panini's own sutras (i. 4, 30,
+and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
+to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
+_shashthi seshe_.]
+
+[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabdanusasanam_ implies the
+Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.]
+
+[Footnote 316: Compare Max Muller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is
+quoted as from the Veda in the Mahabhashya.]
+
+[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3
+after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabdanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]
+
+[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahabhashya_, pp. 12, 64.]
+
+[Footnote 320: _Achikramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form
+of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.]
+
+[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
+lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.]
+
+[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _samyam_,
+but the Mahabhashya has _nah samyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]
+
+[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases
+of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]
+
+[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaniyas_ imply a verb other than the one
+expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
+by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Sakalyasamhitam anu
+pravarshat_, "he rained after the Sakalya hymns," _anu_ implies an
+understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
+is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
+_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]
+
+[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might
+mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]
+
+[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
+_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _vina_ after _nimittam_.]
+
+[Footnote 329: The ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are
+collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
+by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
+dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddesyasiddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphotakabhavam_ for
+_sphotabhavam_.]
+
+[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahabhashya, pp. 9,
+32.]
+
+[Footnote 332: The Mimamsa holds that a word means the genus (_jati_)
+and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyaya holds that a word means
+an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]
+
+[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Pratis. xii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
+the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]
+
+[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]
+
+[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really
+meant, the one abiding existence.]
+
+[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahabhashya, pp. 44, 50.]
+
+[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _asvattha_.]
+
+[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical
+categories, _jati_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sanjna_, and _kriya_.]
+
+[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktav., p. 6, line 12.]
+
+[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 82, that
+the Mimamsa holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
+since otherwise there would be _vyabhichara_ and _anantya_ (cf. also
+Mahesachandra Nyayaratna's note, Kavya-prakasa, p. 10). If a word is
+held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as
+it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
+include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an
+endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]
+
+[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmat
+dvayam satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmad
+advayam satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]
+
+[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
+exists.]
+
+[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jiva_) and Brahman.]
+
+[Footnote 345: The _Samvriti_ of the text seems to correspond to the
+_avarana_ so frequent in Vedanta books.]
+
+[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitri Upanishad, vi.
+22.]
+
+[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
+it is explained by [']Samkara as _vidyasv adhi yad dar[']sanam tad
+adhividyam_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE SANKHYA-DARSANA.
+
+
+"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
+by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _purva_ and _uttara_
+Mimamsa schools], when the system of development propounded by the
+Sankhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
+the Sastra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
+several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,
+that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
+and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is
+only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
+itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
+the evolvent (_prakriti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
+of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
+expressed [in the Sankhya Karika], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
+It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
+the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
+&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
+should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a
+_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued
+series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
+senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the
+hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
+egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the Sankhya Karika (No. 3),
+"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
+the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great
+principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute
+of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
+egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhimana_), is the evolute
+of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
+the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
+subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
+the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
+perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
+action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
+mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
+our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
+cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
+by Isvara Krishna in his Karikas[351] (No. 24-27), "Self-consciousness
+is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
+the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the
+class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
+elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
+darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
+one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
+ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
+voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
+mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
+organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with
+them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher
+Vachaspati Misra in the Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi.
+
+(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,
+and the eleven organs, as said in the Karika, "The evolute consists of
+sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
+evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents
+of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different
+"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are
+not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
+that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
+jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
+consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of
+dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
+ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
+and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
+precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
+two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs
+has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sankhya
+Karika (No. 22)--
+
+     "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
+     this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
+     proceed the five gross elements."
+
+(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the Karika, "The soul is
+neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
+eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
+nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
+establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Karika (No. 4).
+
+"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
+acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode
+of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
+which is to be proven."
+
+Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
+effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from
+the non-existent; the Naiyayikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent
+is produced from the existent; the Vedantins, that all effects are an
+illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
+existent; while the Sankhyas hold that the existent is produced from
+the existent.
+
+(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
+itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
+than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
+identical.
+
+(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
+it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
+originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
+produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the
+cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are
+not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
+incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
+regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
+the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
+existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
+produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
+the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
+milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
+the production of a thing previously non-existent.
+
+Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
+with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's
+existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
+two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
+from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
+of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sankhya
+teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
+no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
+who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
+utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
+not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
+capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
+from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
+allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
+oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
+non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
+whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
+not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
+apply here].
+
+From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
+that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
+is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
+[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
+we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
+cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
+other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
+is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
+its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate
+threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
+office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
+of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
+limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
+and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
+as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and
+are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
+concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
+as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
+existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gita (ii. 16)--
+
+     "There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
+     non-existence for the existent."
+
+And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
+the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakriti_). This has
+been said [in the Karika, No. 9]--
+
+     "Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
+     cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
+     selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
+     every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
+     is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]
+
+Nor can we say [with the Vedantin] that the world is an illusory
+emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
+contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _prima
+facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
+of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
+discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
+nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
+unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
+to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
+mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
+similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of
+the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
+composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
+endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
+a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material
+cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
+case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
+composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
+goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
+activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
+darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
+(_i.e._, _prakriti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
+found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
+happiness is found in his wife Satyavati, because the quality of
+"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
+her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
+towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
+possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
+manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
+causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
+viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
+being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
+the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused,"
+since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
+which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
+composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
+Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
+in the Svetasvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--
+
+     "The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
+     unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
+     a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
+     her when once she has been enjoyed."
+
+Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
+"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally
+possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
+concealing.
+
+Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
+Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
+produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some
+intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
+supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
+unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
+experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
+intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
+the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
+unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
+unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
+has been said in the Karika (No. 57)--
+
+     "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
+     calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."
+
+But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
+which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
+existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
+hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
+act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply
+that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be
+no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
+living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
+compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
+reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
+created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
+at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He
+had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
+Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of
+the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union
+of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
+as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
+unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
+proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
+caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
+blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
+experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
+the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
+fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
+recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or
+absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
+Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
+Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]
+travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
+separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
+dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
+mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
+indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
+man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
+effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
+dependent. This has been said in the Karika (No. 21)--
+
+     "For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
+     separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
+     and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."
+
+"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
+the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply,
+that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
+does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
+retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
+the Karika (No. 59)--
+
+     "As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
+     desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
+     manifested herself to Soul."
+
+For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
+of the atheistic Sankhya School, been propounded.
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]
+
+[Footnote 349: Compare Kusumanjali, i. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 350: One great defect in the Sankhya nomenclature is the
+ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddhi_) and those for
+mind (_manas_). Madhava here applies to the former the term
+_antahkarana_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
+have ventured to alter it in the translation.]
+
+[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is Madhava's principal Sankhya
+authority, and not the Sankhya Sutras.]
+
+[Footnote 352: _Vaikrita_ is here a technical term meaning that
+goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Karika,
+comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sankhya-sara, pp. 30-35.]
+
+[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
+reading _samkalpavikalpatmakam_ must be corrected by the Sankhya
+Karika.]
+
+[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanmatras_
+will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
+elements.]
+
+[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]
+
+[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabhava_) cannot be
+altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]
+
+[Footnote 357: I take _arthantaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.
+Taranatha Tarkavachaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumudi_, p. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.]
+
+[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of
+beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
+and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
+caused their misery at all.]
+
+[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only
+_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.
+_Sankhyapravachanabhashya_, i. 58).]
+
+[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
+is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in
+the Gesta Romanorum.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+THE PATANJALI-DARSANA.
+
+
+We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
+opinions of such Munis as Patanjali and others, who originated the
+system of the Theistic Sankhya philosophy. This school follows the
+so-called Yoga Sastra promulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four
+chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sankhya Pravachana," or
+detailed explanation of the Sankhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof
+the venerable Patanjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
+exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the
+Yoga Sastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
+his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
+the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
+Meditation (_samadhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of
+aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
+mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
+the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet
+thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
+or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
+series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
+spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,
+contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
+"subjugation" (_samyama_), and also the various superhuman powers
+which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
+series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
+mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
+Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
+"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five
+principles [of the Sankhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme
+Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
+fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
+to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and
+is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
+of mundane existence.
+
+"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
+of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
+Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
+Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
+is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
+influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
+quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
+declared--
+
+     "It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
+     understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
+     torment,[365]
+
+     And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
+     identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."
+
+It has been also said by Patanjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer,
+which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
+object which is developed and transferred experiences the
+modifications thereof."
+
+Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
+the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or
+reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it
+experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,
+being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
+understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
+in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
+and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
+the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
+thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
+forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
+for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
+length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
+between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
+ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
+desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
+undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.
+
+The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
+concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
+intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
+object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
+and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
+word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
+[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
+be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
+_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
+particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
+gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_
+is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now
+(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'
+Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
+comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly
+suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
+previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
+singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for
+it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
+"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
+whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
+general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence
+[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
+accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
+inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
+something else; and since this is at once understood without any
+direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
+_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
+because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
+does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet
+these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
+exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
+[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold
+that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
+predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
+mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
+(_anusasana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
+which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,
+divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
+such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the
+rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
+follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
+others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
+knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,
+in accordance with the words of Sruti: "Therefore having become
+tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
+and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word
+_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
+knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
+even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
+mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
+produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
+[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
+exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
+or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
+presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
+must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it
+is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we
+have such a passage of the Sruti as that [in the Katha Upanishad, ii.
+12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the
+Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
+sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smriti as that [in the
+Bhagavad Gita, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
+will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
+interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
+previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
+course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body
+strong].
+
+But in the case of the Vedanta Sutras, which open with the aphorism,
+"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Sankara Acharya
+has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of
+the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
+will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
+_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of
+tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
+the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
+contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
+to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
+so-called "means."[370]
+
+"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why
+should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
+be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
+auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
+unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
+being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
+auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is
+in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore
+it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
+that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
+cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary
+meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
+auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
+drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
+the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
+auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
+unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply,
+that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
+meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
+of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
+"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."
+
+"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
+the beginning of a Sastra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
+would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
+begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
+it has been said by the wise, 'Those sastras become widely famous
+which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
+auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
+invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies
+'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smriti which says,
+
+     "'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the
+     ancient time,
+
+     "'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
+     are both auspicious.'
+
+"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying
+'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vriddhi_' used by Panini in his
+opening sutra '_vriddhir ad aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is
+untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious
+influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
+signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is
+auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
+can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used
+here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
+new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such
+other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
+some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
+journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smriti, since the smriti
+will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
+only that they produce an auspicious effect.
+
+Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a
+previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
+apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
+already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
+as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
+if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
+would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
+has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
+exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sutra,
+the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
+Tandya Brahmana, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
+this is the Visvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as
+signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
+just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahabhashya, "now comes the
+exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
+Grammar. This has been declared by Vyasa in his Commentary on the Yoga
+Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
+and Vachaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
+be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and
+also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this
+_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
+after a successful understanding of the sastra through the attainment of
+the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
+explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
+the smriti of Yajnavalkya say, 'Hiranyagarbha is the promulgator of the
+Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patanjali the teacher
+thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
+Patanjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
+to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
+Puranas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
+_anusasana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which
+followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
+the system.
+
+Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
+meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
+institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this
+institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
+is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
+fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
+(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.
+The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the
+producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_
+and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
+well known from Sruti and Smriti, as I have before shown. And it is
+established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
+are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
+one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
+opening aphorism of the Vedanta sutras, "Now, therefore, there is a
+wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to
+establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
+liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word
+_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
+a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
+regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
+question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
+the context. Hence it has been said, "When Sruti comes [as the
+determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
+place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
+not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
+the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
+we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
+interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
+of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
+"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
+or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
+would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
+"_sruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
+it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
+14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
+the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into
+collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
+more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
+summed up--
+
+     "A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
+     precluded by any of the preceding modes;
+
+     "But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
+     precludes, depends on circumstances."
+
+Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
+settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
+preliminaries, the study of the Sastra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
+be commenced like that of the Vedanta, which discusses the nature of
+Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
+be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
+the Sastra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
+which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Sastra,
+especially directed thereto, this Sastra is the means for its
+production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
+concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
+operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up
+and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than
+to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patanjali, in
+his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Sastra as his primary
+object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
+"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
+that the commencing the Yogasastra is that which primarily claims our
+attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
+the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sastra. "But as we read
+in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of
+'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean
+'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
+Yajnavalkya:[381]--
+
+     'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
+     called _yoga_.'"
+
+This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
+action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
+souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
+opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
+conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
+Vaiseshika and Nyaya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
+theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
+Mimamsa [or Vedanta], our Yogasastra would be rendered nugatory by this
+concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
+identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
+something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
+be produced by our Sastra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
+used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here
+in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--
+
+     "Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all
+     held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
+     are their evidence."
+
+Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert
+in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samadhi_." Nor does this
+contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,
+may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--
+
+     "_Samadhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and
+     supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
+     _samadhi_ of the individual soul."
+
+It has been also said by the venerable Vyasa [in his Commentary on the
+Yoga-sutras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samadhi_."
+
+An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samadhi_ is
+used by Patanjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
+ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and
+the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
+principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
+other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
+we see in the _darsapurnamasa_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites
+the _prayajas_, and therefore _samadhi_ cannot be the meaning of
+_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
+although the term _samadhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to
+express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
+contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
+devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
+to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
+declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
+ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
+alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
+_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to
+go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
+words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
+would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sutra, i.
+2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
+in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the
+suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
+second or principal sense of _samadhi_ will therefore be quite
+distinct from the first or inferior.]
+
+"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the
+modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
+abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
+their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
+abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
+antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
+the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in
+accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
+the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
+soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
+because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
+hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
+"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
+(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
+unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
+perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
+intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument
+to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
+the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
+is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this
+soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
+occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
+modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
+always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
+pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this
+which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
+substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
+an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
+proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
+and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
+understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
+not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
+"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
+susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
+influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or
+want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
+knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
+spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
+with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
+knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
+although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
+given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
+certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
+of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
+understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
+that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
+as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of
+the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
+understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Sruti, "Desire,
+volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
+firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Panchasikha
+declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
+that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patanjali also (iv. 18), "The
+modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from
+the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
+argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the
+understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
+various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
+of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
+notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of
+"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the
+understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
+"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
+diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
+becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
+when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the
+perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
+newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
+condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
+reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
+there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
+and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
+"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.
+
+[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
+said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the
+suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply
+also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
+suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,
+_mudha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
+for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
+_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
+attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.
+For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is
+restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed
+about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _mudha_,
+'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
+sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].
+It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
+first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here,
+however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
+Bhagavad Gita (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Krishna, is fickle, turbulent,
+violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
+occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
+but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
+&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
+Yoga Sutras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
+laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
+attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind
+are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by
+the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
+mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
+two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
+means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
+heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
+attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
+notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
+failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
+meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
+even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
+we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
+laid down as the definition of _yoga_.
+
+We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
+three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _mudha_, and
+_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
+all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
+modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
+[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two
+conditions called _ekagra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and
+attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
+two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now
+by _ekagra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
+_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
+_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
+and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.
+
+Now this _samadhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
+in which there is distinct recognition" (_samprajnata_), and "that in
+which distinct recognition is lost" (_asamprajnata_) [Yoga S., i. 17,
+18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
+intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
+notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
+or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]
+is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajnayate_) as distinct from Nature. It
+has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichara_, _sananda_, and
+_sasmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhavana_),
+which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
+other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
+pondered is of two kinds, being either Iswara or the twenty-five
+principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not
+senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are
+senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
+which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
+elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
+investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in
+the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
+produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
+(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
+five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
+relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
+(_savichara_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
+"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
+(_sananda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
+manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object
+the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
+or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sasmita_),
+because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual
+faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
+quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].
+
+But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
+the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.
+
+"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
+suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
+where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
+we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
+quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
+of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
+because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
+"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
+operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
+and the "stock of deserts."[400]
+
+The "afflictions" (_klesa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
+egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
+a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidya_,
+"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayibhava_
+compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
+"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadharaya_]
+compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
+"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvrihi_ compound, where both portions are
+dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
+cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
+predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
+_avidya_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the
+express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,
+as _avidya_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
+to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very
+form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
+second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
+characterised by (_a_ + _vidya_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and
+cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
+then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vritti,[403]
+"there is a _bahuvrihi_ compound which is formed with some word
+meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
+this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvrihi_
+compound _avidya_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as
+_avidya_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidya_
+existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidya_
+could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the
+other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were
+associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and
+were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
+the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sasmita_ meditation].
+
+Now it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
+[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be
+dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
+"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
+them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
+on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
+are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
+strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
+several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
+This has been expressed by Vachaspati Misra, in his Gloss on Vyasa's
+Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:--
+
+     "The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
+     are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but
+     existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
+     'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the
+     'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
+     with worldly objects."
+
+"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidya_ as a
+_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,
+because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
+Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]
+the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
+would be overthrown."
+
+[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
+have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryudasa_ [where
+the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidya_ means a
+contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidya_;
+and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
+said--
+
+     "The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
+     [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
+     thus the words _abrahmana_ and _adharma_ respectively
+     signify, 'what is other than a Brahman' and 'what is
+     contrary to justice.'"
+
+And again--
+
+     "We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
+     the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
+     from the use in which it has been already employed."
+
+Vachaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings
+depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
+occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter
+portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
+this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
+here too [in _avidya_] the real meaning is something contrary to
+_vidya_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
+positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said
+in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
+non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
+eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is
+defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413]
+[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
+"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining
+the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a
+proverbial couplet[415]--
+
+     "The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
+     place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its
+     composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from
+     death [as even a Brahman's body defiles],--and from the fact
+     that it has to be made pure by rites."
+
+So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
+15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
+pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through
+the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
+impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
+opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
+pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the
+idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands,
+sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
+_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said--
+
+     "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
+     'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;
+
+     "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
+     liberation."
+
+Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]
+
+But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
+should there not be given some general definition applying to them
+all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be
+established? For thus it has been said by Bhatta Kumarila--
+
+     "'Without some general definition, a more special definition
+     cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
+     mentioned here.'"
+
+This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
+the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
+"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
+
+"Egoism" (_asmita_) is the notion that the two separate things, the
+soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said
+(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
+sight." "Desire" (_raga_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
+the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
+the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the
+feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
+the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
+expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
+"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).
+
+Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
+word _anusayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _krit_ affix _nini_ in
+the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the
+sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _nini_
+cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anusi_;
+for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the Sutra, iii. 2, 4,
+and has been exerting its influence in the following sutras, this word
+must have been introduced a second time in the Sutra, iii. 2, 78,
+_supy ajatau ninis tachchhilye_,[419] on purpose to exclude
+prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
+strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sutra, vii.
+2, 115, _acho nniti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to
+_vriddhi_, and so the word must be _anusayin_, in accordance with the
+analogy of such words as _atisayin_, &c. Nor is the latter view
+tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since
+_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--
+
+     'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable
+     nor a _krit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
+     a word in the locative case;'
+
+and the word _anusaya_ is clearly a _krit_ formation as it ends with
+the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
+renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word
+_anusayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
+very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be
+admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
+generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
+essential importance. Hence the author of the Vritti has said--
+
+     "The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular
+     acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
+     this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]."
+
+Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _karyin_,
+_karyika_ [where the affixes are added after a _krit_ formation],
+_tandulin_, _tandulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning
+"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
+_krit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
+the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anusaya_ is formed by
+a _krit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.
+
+The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
+(_abhinivesa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
+from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
+immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
+the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
+left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
+in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
+individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
+declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
+through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
+philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as
+the "afflictions" (_klesa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
+upon it various mundane troubles.
+
+[We next describe the _karmasaya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
+"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or
+forbidden actions, as the _jyotishtoma_ sacrifice, brahmanicide, &c.
+"Stock" (_asaya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
+which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
+merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
+experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
+
+Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
+the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
+operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not
+considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
+[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
+could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
+the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the
+thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
+described hereafter], _madhumati_, _madhupratika_, _visoka_, and
+_samskaraseshata_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its
+etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
+thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed
+(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
+"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
+that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
+This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
+development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
+state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
+assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]
+"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
+to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
+_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
+as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
+skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
+in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
+that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
+reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
+who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
+perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
+
+Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
+to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to
+practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
+especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Krishna in the
+Bhagavad Gita [vi. 3]--
+
+     "Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
+     _yoga_;
+
+     But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
+     the means."
+
+Patanjali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical
+concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
+to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yajnavalkya has described "mortification"--
+
+     "By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
+     chandrayana fast, &c.,
+
+     "Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
+     mortifications."[429]
+
+"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
+_gayatri_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and
+Tantrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
+chanted. Those chanted are the _samans_; those not chanted are either
+in metre, _i.e._, the _richas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yajumshi_,
+as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _rich_ in which
+by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _padas_
+[or portions of a verse]; the name _saman_ is applied to chanted
+portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_
+are called Tantrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
+directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again
+threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--
+
+     "The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and
+     neuter:
+
+     "The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,
+     the exclamation _svaha_); the neuter those which end in
+     _namas_;
+
+     "The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
+     all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."
+
+They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all
+defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
+ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.
+
+Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_samskara_) are ten, and
+they have been thus described in the _Sarada-tilaka_--
+
+     "There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
+     to _mantras_ efficacy:
+
+     "These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
+     consecrated.
+
+     "The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
+     'awakening,'
+
+     "The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
+
+     "The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
+     'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.
+
+     "The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the
+     _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.
+
+     "The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
+     _mantra_, each united to Om,
+
+     "According to the number of the letters. This they call the
+     'vivifying' (_jivana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite
+     each with sandal-water,
+
+     "Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is
+     called the 'smiting' (_tadana_).
+
+     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike
+     them with oleander flowers,
+
+     "Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
+     'awakening' (_bodhana_).
+
+     "Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
+     own special _tantra_,
+
+     "Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
+     leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
+     (_abhisheka_).
+
+     "Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him
+     consume by the _jyotir-mantra_
+
+     "The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the
+     'purification' (_vimali-karana_).
+
+     "The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and
+     the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,
+
+     "And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
+     of kusa grass,
+
+     "With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this
+     is held to be the 'fattening' (_apyayana_).
+
+     "The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with
+     _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpana_).
+
+     "The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of
+     Maya[434] and Rama[435] is called its 'illumining'
+     (_dipana_).
+
+     "The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being
+     muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).
+
+     "These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
+     _tantras_;
+
+     "And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
+     obtains his desire;
+
+     "And _ruddha_, _kilita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _sapta_, and
+     the rest,
+
+     "All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by
+     these excellent consecrations."
+
+But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries
+connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an
+unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]
+
+The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord"
+(_isvara-pranidhana_), is the consigning all one's works, whether
+mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
+Supremely Venerable. As it has been said--
+
+     "Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
+
+     "That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."
+
+This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
+the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
+since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
+sung in the Bhagavad Gita [ii. 47]--
+
+     "Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
+     fruits;
+
+     "Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
+     attached to inaction."
+
+The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
+by the venerable Nilakantha-bharati--
+
+     "Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
+     by desire,
+
+     "Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
+     has been licked by a dog."
+
+Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
+resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for
+producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words
+called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
+"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
+meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
+with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
+meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
+a motive. This has been declared in the _Kavya-prakasa_ [ii. 9]--
+
+     "When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
+     principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
+     another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
+     this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."
+
+Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter
+_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
+the feminine _sa_] would have signified some neuter word, like
+"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
+indicated." But _sa_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
+with _lakshana_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is
+put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
+been explained by Kaiyata, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
+of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
+former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kusala_) in
+business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
+_kusala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed
+etymologically as _kusam_ + _lati_, "one who gathers kusa grass for
+the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
+of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
+this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
+is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
+with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--
+
+     "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
+     their immediate significance, just as is the case in
+     'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."
+
+Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
+Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
+meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
+indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
+and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
+originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
+by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
+the author of the Kavya-prakasa used the expression, "This is
+'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
+based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as
+"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2.
+indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
+are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent
+indication, as "the man of the Panjab is an ox" [here the object is
+not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
+indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
+5. pure superimponent indication, as "_ghi_ is life;" 6. pure
+introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
+all explained in the Kavya-prakasa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
+churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.
+
+This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
+(_anga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation [ii. 29]. Patanjali says, "Forbearance consists in not
+wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
+[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
+mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
+32]; and these are described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7, 36-38]--
+
+     "The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
+     Brahman, practises, void of all desire,
+
+     "Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
+     and non-coveting;
+
+     "Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
+     purification, contentment, and austerity,
+
+     "And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
+     Brahman.
+
+     "These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
+     the five 'religious observances;'
+
+     "They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
+     reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."
+
+"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
+kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _vira_, _svastika_, _dandaka_,
+_sopasraya_, _paryanka_, _kraunchanishadana_, _ushtranishadana_,
+_samasamsthana_. Yajnavalkya has described each of them in the passage
+which commences--
+
+     "Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
+     but in reverse order,
+
+     "Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Brahmans,
+     on his thighs;
+
+     "This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all."
+
+The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this
+steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
+practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
+inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
+the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
+body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
+both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
+general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
+to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _puraka_, and _kumbhaka_." We
+reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
+"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
+in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of
+the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
+has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _puraka_, which is the
+[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
+"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,
+when the vital air, called _prana_, remains motionless like water in a
+jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
+and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
+is needless.
+
+Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghatikas_ and a
+half[440] in each artery[441] (_nadi_), like the revolving buckets on
+a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are
+produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said
+by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning
+the transmission of the _ajapamantra_[443]--
+
+     "Six hundred to Ganesa, six thousand to the self-existent
+     Brahman,
+
+     "Six thousand to Vishnu, six thousand to Siva,
+
+     "One thousand to the Guru (Brihaspati), one thousand to the
+     Supreme Soul,
+
+     "And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
+     performed muttering."
+
+So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
+elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different
+colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
+thus explained by the wise--
+
+     "Let each artery convey the air two _ghatis_ and a half from
+     sunrise.
+
+     "There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]
+     to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
+
+     "Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
+     place [in the hour],
+
+     "And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
+     six hundred in a day and night.
+
+     "The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guna_
+     letters,[445]
+
+     "That time elapses while the air passes along in the
+     interval between two arteries.
+
+     "There are five elements in each of the two conducting
+     arteries,--
+
+     "They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
+     the self-restrained.
+
+     "Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;
+
+     "Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.
+
+     "They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;
+
+     "This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
+     arteries.
+
+     "The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,
+
+     "Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
+
+     "This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
+     reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
+
+     "Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,
+
+     "Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
+
+     "There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has
+     fifty _palas_,
+
+     "And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
+     five properties of earth
+
+     "Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
+     and these decrease one by one.
+
+     "The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
+     the influence of 'quiet,'
+
+     "But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
+     'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]
+
+     "The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
+     ether are now declared;--
+
+     "Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
+     the second arises desire;
+
+     "From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
+     of mind;
+
+     "From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
+     impressions of latent merit.
+
+     "Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
+     finger in each nostril,
+
+     "And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
+     of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
+     of his eyes,
+
+     "Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
+     earth and the other elements within him,
+
+     "The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
+     spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol."
+
+When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
+accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
+discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
+said--
+
+     "There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
+     breath."[450]
+
+And again--
+
+     "As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
+
+     "So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
+     the breath."[451]
+
+Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
+the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
+attain "self-mastery" (_samyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_pratyahara_).
+"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to
+the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered
+nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
+objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
+This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
+to it (_a_ + _hri_), away from them (_pratipa_).
+
+"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
+senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
+therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
+could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say
+is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
+eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
+were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
+accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
+of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
+concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
+accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
+mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are
+restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
+follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
+the Vishnu-purana [vi. 7, 43, 44]--
+
+     "Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
+     ever tend to pursue external objects,
+
+     "Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
+     mind;
+
+     "By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
+     senses;
+
+     "If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish
+     his _yoga_."[454]
+
+"Attention" (_dharana_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
+all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
+self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
+the _sushumna_ artery, &c., or something external, as Prajapati,
+Vasava, Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
+"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
+say the followers of the Puranas--
+
+     "By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
+     restraint the senses,
+
+     "Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
+     his mind."[455]
+
+The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
+be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
+"contemplation" (_dhyana_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
+thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--
+
+     "A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
+     that kind and desiring no other,
+
+     "This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first
+     six of the ancillary things."
+
+We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
+remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_samadhi_, see p.
+243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a
+long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
+hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
+"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
+names Madhumati and the rest.
+
+"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
+words from the dialects of Karnata, Gauda,[456] and Lata?"[457] We do
+not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
+meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
+needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
+
+i. The _Madhumati_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,
+called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
+illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
+"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
+"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c.
+Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
+which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to
+the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._,
+when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
+yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are
+well known to be of four kinds, viz.,--
+
+i. The _prathamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]
+but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
+the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubhumika_,
+who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
+_prajnajyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
+_atikranta-bhavaniya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.
+
+ii. The _Madhupratika_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.
+These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
+organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
+thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
+motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the
+attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
+to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
+the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
+perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
+subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
+conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
+itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
+state is called _Madhupratika_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].
+
+iii. The _Visoka_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all
+existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
+to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
+the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
+supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
+existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
+but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
+other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished],
+and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
+upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
+modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is
+"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
+immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of
+mind]."
+
+iv. The _Samskaraseshata_ state is also called _asamprajnata_, _i.e._,
+"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
+it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object]
+which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
+afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
+enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
+all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
+"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which
+distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
+exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
+modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
+thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _samskarasesha_,
+i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
+everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
+rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
+abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
+there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
+"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
+into the primal _prakriti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure
+intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
+connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with
+existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation
+is described by Patanjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
+the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have
+consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,
+or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
+33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
+individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
+for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
+cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
+objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
+decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
+of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
+absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
+possibility. And so, too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
+one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
+dumb man praised it."[465]
+
+Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
+Yoga-sastra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
+disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-sastra also
+treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
+This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
+the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
+experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
+is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same
+fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
+other Sastras also. Thus all has been made clear.
+
+The system of Sankara, which comes next in succession, and which is
+the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
+is therefore left untouched here.[467]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON THE YOGA.
+
+There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
+Raivataka in Magha (iv. 55):--
+
+"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
+(_maitri_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully
+abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
+a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
+essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
+Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."
+
+It is curious to notice that _maitri_, which plays such a prominent
+part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
+condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
+start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=
+_prasadhaka_) in Vyasa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
+borrowed by Magha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
+an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
+in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in
+themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
+which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
+Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
+
+For the word _vyakopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
+_infra_), cf. Kusumanjali, p. 6, l. 7.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sankhya Pr. Bhash., p.
+20; S. Sara, p. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
+meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
+in the arts of life.]
+
+[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means
+rather "susceptible of suffering."]
+
+[Footnote 366: This is really Vyasa's comm. on Sut., iv. 21.]
+
+[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bhasha-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]
+
+[Footnote 368: Satapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]
+
+[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbhave'pi_,
+understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is
+supposed to assume as being necessarily present.]
+
+[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
+the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
+hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
+&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]
+
+[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself
+_sukha_.]
+
+[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious,"
+why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
+particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]
+
+[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
+some other word to complete the construction.]
+
+[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mahabhashya
+(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]
+
+[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vriddhih_ is
+placed at the beginning of the first sutra, while _gunah_ in the
+second is placed at the end (_ad en gunah_), in order to ensure an
+auspicious opening, _vriddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
+well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."]
+
+[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chandi, we have an interesting
+list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
+the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Brahman,
+a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
+hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
+"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
+_durva_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
+corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
+men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
+a guana (_godhika_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
+all sastras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
+the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
+and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]
+
+[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
+lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
+officiating Brahmans.]
+
+[Footnote 378: He is here called _phanipati_, "lord of
+snakes,"--Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhashya, being represented
+as a snake in mythology.]
+
+[Footnote 379: Cf. Sankara, Vedanta-Sut., iii. 3, 49.]
+
+[Footnote 380: This is the Mimamsa rule for settling the relative
+value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
+_Sruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
+are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Linga_, "a sign,"
+or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
+text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
+divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
+solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _Vakya_, "the being
+mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I
+cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
+"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
+the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
+welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
+"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakarana_, "the
+subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
+parts," as in the _darsa-purnamasa_ sacrifice, where the _prayaja_
+ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
+a mystic influence (_apurva_) which helps forward that influence of
+the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakarana_
+proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sthana_ (or _krama_), "relative
+position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Sundhadhvam_, &c.,
+"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
+of the _sannayya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
+ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Samakhya_,
+"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
+_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima
+facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
+aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
+first, _sruti_, being the most important; the last, _samakhya_, the
+least. Cf. Jaimini's Sutras, iii. 3, 14; _Mimamsaparibhasha_, pp. 8,
+9.]
+
+[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Yajnavalkya, the author of the
+_Yajnavalkya-gita_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl.
+Catal._, p. 87 _b_.]
+
+[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriya_, which properly
+belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashtri_.]
+
+[Footnote 383: _Scil. samadhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses
+to profound contemplation.]
+
+[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
+suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
+meditation (_samadhi_)."]
+
+[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag adhiyate mano yatra sa
+samadhih_.]
+
+[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the
+destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
+itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
+intimate relation (_samavaya-sambandha_).]
+
+[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavyanam_ for _nirodhanam_.]
+
+[Footnote 388: _Chit-sakti_ and _chiti-sakti_ = soul.]
+
+[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]
+
+[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
+(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
+image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]
+
+[Footnote 391: Vachaspati explains _lakshana_ as _kalabheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 392: I take _adi_ as meaning _asphutatva_. The change of state
+takes place between the several moments of the _lakshana-parinama_. Cf.
+the Commentaries on iii. 13.]
+
+[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the
+thinking principle, _chittabhumayas_ or _avasthas_. Cf. Commentary, i.
+2, 18.]
+
+[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,
+demons, and gods.]
+
+[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
+have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]
+
+[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?]
+
+[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the
+elements or the elements the senses, &c.]
+
+[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprakasamayasya_.]
+
+[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _sattamatra_ for
+_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmita_ from _ahamkara_.]
+
+[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]
+
+[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
+English translation.]
+
+[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called
+_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the
+_paryudasa_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
+verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
+as, _e.g._--
+
+(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
+
+(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
+
+The former corresponds to the logician's _atyantabhava_, the latter to
+_anyonyabhava_ or _bheda_.]
+
+[Footnote 403: Cf. the _varttika_ in Siddhanta Kaum., i. 401.]
+
+[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-manadhana_, with
+_vidyamana_ omitted in the compound.]
+
+[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]
+
+[Footnote 406: As it is _avidya_ after all.]
+
+[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Vachaspati's
+Gloss), _sarvavrittinirodhasampannaya api tathatvaprasangat_.]
+
+[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavasthascha_ with the printed edition of
+Vachaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdhascha_ is correct, it must mean
+_tanutvena dagdhah_.]
+
+[Footnote 409: As in _ramalakshmanau_, Rama and Lakshmana.]
+
+[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]
+
+[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on Sut., ii. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other
+hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
+_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."]
+
+[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga Sut., i. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _kayadau_ for
+_karyadau_.]
+
+[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vyasa in his Comm. on Yoga
+Sutras, ii. 5, and I have followed Vachaspati in his explanation of
+it; he calls it _vaiyasaki gatha_.]
+
+[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
+increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
+(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]
+
+[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."]
+
+[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
+of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]
+
+[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _nini_ be used after a root in the sense
+of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a
+word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."]
+
+[Footnote 420: "Let _vriddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a
+vowel, when that which has an indicatory _n_ or _n_ follows;" _nini_
+has an indicatory _n_.]
+
+[Footnote 421: Sc. _anusaya_ + _ini_ = _anusayin_.]
+
+[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _than_, which respectively leave _in_ and
+_ika_; thus _danda_ gives _dandin_ and _dandika_. The line is quoted
+by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pan. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
+the _Kasika_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
+the examples:--(1.) _svavan_, _khavan_; (2.) _karakavan_; (3.)
+_vyaghravan_, _simhavan_; (4.) _dandavati sala_ (_i.e._, _danda asyam
+santi_).]
+
+[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]
+
+[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
+study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]
+
+[Footnote 425: See the _Kasika_ on Pan. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshartha_
+(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pan. ii. 2, 27.
+The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamartha_.]
+
+[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vritter abhavah_, but
+_abhavasyasryah_.]
+
+[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,
+_prakasapravrittiniyamarupa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 428: See Kasika, ii. 3, 36.]
+
+[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yajnavalkya-gita_
+of Yogi-yajnavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
+note.]
+
+[Footnote 430: Mimamsa Sutras, ii. 1, 35-37.]
+
+[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
+_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kamya_.]
+
+[Footnote 432: The _vija_ of air is the syllable _jam_.]
+
+[Footnote 433: The _vija_ of water is the syllable _bam_.]
+
+[Footnote 434: _Hrim._]
+
+[Footnote 435: _Srim._]
+
+[Footnote 436: _Tandava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Siva and his
+votaries.]
+
+[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
+one of the two." Cf. "Thebae ipsae quod Boeotiae caput est," _Livy_, xlii.
+44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
+vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
+translation of the Sahitya-darpana.]
+
+[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
+is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
+relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of
+longevity.]
+
+[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghatika_ being twenty-four
+minutes.]
+
+[Footnote 441: The _nadis_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
+to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
+_nadis_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]
+
+[Footnote 442: Madhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
+passage in the Aitareya Brahmana (iii. 29), where the relation of the
+vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
+the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
+other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
+and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
+the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
+waterwheel (_ghatiyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their
+course."]
+
+[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
+that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
+as their sound expresses the word _so'ham_ (i.e., _hamsah_), "I am
+he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
+it is called the _ajapamantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without
+voluntary muttering.]
+
+[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
+breath.]
+
+[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarnanam_ for
+_gunavarnanam_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarna_ is a
+_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_
+make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
+details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
+fifth act of the _Malatimadhava_.]
+
+[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghatika_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
+= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghatikas_ or one hour).]
+
+[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]
+
+[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]
+
+[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhandogya Up._, viii. 6;
+_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyasa's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Sloka 7 of the _Amrita-nada
+Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sut., iii. 4, as consisting
+of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
+attention, and meditation.]
+
+[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]
+
+[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
+reading of the Bombay edition of the Purana (only reading in line 3
+_chalatmanam_).]
+
+[Footnote 455: Vishnu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
+"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]
+
+[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]
+
+[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
+is the [Greek: Larike] of Ptolemy.]
+
+[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravritta_ for
+_pravritti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyasa's
+Comm.)]
+
+[Footnote 459: Read _vikaranabhavah_; Vachaspati explains it as
+"_videhanam indriyanam karanabhavah_."]
+
+[Footnote 460: Vyasa has _karanapanchakarupajaya_; Vachaspati explains
+_rupa_ by _grahanadi_ (cf. iii. 47).]
+
+[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sayavyavaseyatmakanam_,
+from Vyasa's Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]
+
+[Footnote 463: _Visoka._]
+
+[Footnote 464: This is explained by Vachaspati, "The latent
+impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
+_vyutthana_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
+'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by
+the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
+this in 'egoism' (_asmita_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
+(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,
+_prakriti_)." _Prakriti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in
+equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
+effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
+becomes predominant.]
+
+[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiriya-Aranyaka
+i. 11, 5. Madhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
+quotes the Svetasv. Up., iii. 19. Madhava here takes _avindat_ as "he
+pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
+Comm.]
+
+[Footnote 466: This is taken from Vachaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
+15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]
+
+[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Panchadasi. A Calcutta
+Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivarana-sangraha (cf.
+Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatadhyaya-brahmana, p.
+x), but, if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha, it is
+by Bharatitirthavidyaranya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
+88).]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+ON THE UPADHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
+
+
+[As the _upadhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
+is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
+the sections in the Bhasha-parichchheda and the Siddhanta-muktavali,
+which treat of it.]
+
+     cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term
+     (sadhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
+     is called the Condition (upadhi); its examination is now set
+     forth._
+
+Our author now proceeds to define the _upadhi_ or condition,[468]
+which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
+laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The
+meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
+accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
+invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
+middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
+because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
+produced from wet fuel," as an _upadhi_, since "wet fuel" is
+necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
+_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]
+
+"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
+follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
+argument, 'This [second] son of Mitra's, whom I have not seen, must be
+dark because he is Mitra's son,' we could not allege 'the being
+produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch
+as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
+does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have
+nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the
+argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the
+site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
+form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
+is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and
+therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
+accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
+is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
+a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
+existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
+"emergent," _dvamsabhava_], inasmuch as perishability is found in
+antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
+included in any positive category of existence."
+
+We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
+definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to
+determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
+our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
+be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
+is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from
+feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
+determined by the fact that it is Mitra's son, whose dark colour is
+discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
+argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
+not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,
+"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
+as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
+object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
+"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
+the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]
+(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
+produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
+invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
+the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
+advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
+"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
+that this is produced at all.]
+
+But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
+middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably
+accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
+and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
+This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
+that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
+determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
+cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
+rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
+particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
+which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
+constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
+that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
+site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or
+else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
+excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is
+determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
+the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
+term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]
+
+     cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects
+     with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus
+     common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
+     in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]
+
+     cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
+     middle term that the Condition has to be employed._
+
+The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term
+being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that
+it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of
+having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably
+accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle
+term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact
+that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in
+the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we
+infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is
+too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is
+too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too
+general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we
+take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which
+the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle
+term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases
+possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is
+equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,
+"B is dark because he is Mitra's son," the middle term "the fact of
+being Mitra's son" is too general in regard to the _sadhya_, "dark
+colour," because it is too general in regard to the _upadhi_, "feeding
+on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitra's second son [Mitra's
+parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitra herself not having
+fed on vegetables previous to his birth].
+
+[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a
+condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your
+definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle
+term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire
+because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the
+being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this
+certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it
+is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to
+be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'
+since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as
+for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in
+this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You
+never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere
+than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some
+direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the
+first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your
+antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major
+term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly
+one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is
+self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally
+employed to overthrow the contrary argument].
+
+But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being
+always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition,
+[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant
+tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be
+non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
+"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by
+sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _upadhi_ here is a
+means of overthrowing the false argument].
+
+Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is
+disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But
+"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed
+even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
+of logical controversy.[481]
+
+E. B. C.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 468: The _upadhi_ is the "condition" which must be supplied
+to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus
+restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;
+if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has
+fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied
+by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if
+the mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have
+smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is
+Mitra's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her
+former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her
+happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove
+that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle
+term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.]
+
+[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from
+the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from
+her living on ghee.]
+
+[Footnote 470: By Bhasha-parich. sl. 25, the four elements, earth,
+water, air, and fire, are _sparsavat_, but by sl. 27 of these air is
+neither _pratyaksha_ nor _rupavat_.]
+
+[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue
+from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive
+existence, not non-existence.]
+
+[Footnote 472: "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was
+not _soul_, but _air_.]
+
+[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitra's first son in the
+two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire"
+(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and
+"Mitra's first son A is dark because he is Mitra's offspring" (when
+her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective
+_sadhyas_ or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are
+respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the
+mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.]
+
+[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitra's second
+son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire"
+and "the being Mitra's offspring" do not possess the respective
+conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor,
+consequently, the respective major terms (_sadhya_) "smoke" and "dark
+colour."]
+
+[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in
+(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,
+though they are the sites of the _sadhya_ "dark colour," they do not
+admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term
+"the being Mitra's son."]
+
+[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel
+there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in
+their extension.]
+
+[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _sadhya_ (as in
+the red-hot ball of iron), there the _upadhi_ also is not applicable.]
+
+[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark,
+such as the three objected arguments required in No. 137.]
+
+[Footnote 479: The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is
+artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an
+artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._,
+one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point."
+Here the proposed _upadhi_ "the being always found elsewhere than in
+fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the
+_hetu_ "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the
+_sadhya_ "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.]
+
+[Footnote 480: As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a
+maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist
+disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing
+a body." See Kusumanjali, v. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the
+outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own
+point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a
+true condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.]
+
+THE END.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.
+
+
+    "A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental
+    literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the
+    general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the
+    Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense
+    strides have been made within the present century in these
+    branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the
+    range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient
+    literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred
+    books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian,
+    Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been
+    deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more
+    recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of
+    all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects
+    have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were
+    contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or
+    scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals.
+    Messrs. Trubner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does
+    them infinite credit, have determined to supply the
+    constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at
+    least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to
+    the world."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.
+
+By the HON. SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,
+
+Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,
+
+Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India.
+
+Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the
+general results of the Census of 1881.
+
+     "It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a
+     marvellous combination of literary condensation and
+     research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire,
+     its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy
+     outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional
+     opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing
+     could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of
+     the economic and political condition of India at the present
+     time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the
+     India of the past."--_The Times._
+
+
+_THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED_:--
+
+Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.
+
+ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.
+
+BY MARTIN HAUG, PH.D.,
+
+Late of the Universities of Tubingen, Gottingen, and Bonn;
+Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the
+Poona College.
+
+EDITED AND ENLARGED BY DR. E. W. WEST.
+
+To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. HAUG by Prof.
+E. P. EVANS.
+
+I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of
+the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.
+
+II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.
+
+III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.
+
+IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.
+
+     "'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of
+     the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E.
+     W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to
+     expand the materials contained in this work into a
+     comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the
+     design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have,
+     however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the
+     researches into the sacred writings and religion of the
+     Parsis from the earliest times down to the present--a
+     dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a
+     translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the
+     Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with
+     especial reference to its origin and development."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.
+
+TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON
+
+COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."
+
+_With Accompanying Narratives._
+
+Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese,
+University College, London.
+
+    The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition,
+    as edited by Fausboll, by Max Muller's English, and Albrecht
+    Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six
+    chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather
+    recension, as now translated by Mr. Beal, consists of
+    thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who possess
+    Fausboll's text, or either of the above-named translations,
+    will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the
+    Chinese version; the thirteen above-named additional sections
+    not being accessible to them in any other form; for, even if
+    they understand Chinese, the Chinese original would be
+    unobtainable by them.
+
+     "Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most
+     valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains
+     authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and
+     generally connected with some incident in the history of
+     Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light
+     which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote
+     period at which they were written, and upon the method of
+     teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method
+     employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the
+     tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well
+     as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds
+     of millions of people, make them a very remarkable
+     study."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has
+     added to the great services he has already rendered to the
+     comparative study of religious history."--_Academy._
+
+     "Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its
+     purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader
+     face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct
+     which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is
+     now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid
+     its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies,
+     forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so
+     inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder
+     denied a God, now worships that founder as a god
+     himself."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.
+
+BY ALBRECHT WEBER.
+
+Translated from the Second German Edition by JOHN MANN, M.A., and
+THEODOR ZACHARIAE, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.
+
+    Dr. BUHLER, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:--"When I
+    was Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I
+    frequently felt the want of such a work to which I could
+    refer the students."
+
+    Professor COWELL, of Cambridge, writes:--"It will be
+    especially useful to the students in our Indian colleges and
+    universities. I used to long for such a book when I was
+    teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students are intensely interested
+    in the history of Sanskrit literature, and this volume will
+    supply them with all they want on the subject."
+
+    Professor WHITNEY, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.,
+    writes:--"I was one of the class to whom the work was
+    originally given in the form of academic lectures. At their
+    first appearance they were by far the most learned and able
+    treatment of their subject; and with their recent additions
+    they still maintain decidedly the same rank."
+
+     "Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of
+     Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the
+     volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and
+     at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to
+     be by far the most learned and able treatment of the
+     subject. They have now been brought up to date by the
+     addition of all the most important results of recent
+     research."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price
+7s. 6d.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.
+
+BY ROBERT N. CUST.
+
+The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of
+which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the
+languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge
+had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might
+be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he
+had collected for his own edification.
+
+     "Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt."--_Times._
+
+     "The book before us is then a valuable contribution to
+     philological science. It passes under review a vast number
+     of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every
+     case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of
+     the best-informed writers."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.
+
+A Poem. BY KALIDASA.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by RALPH T. H.
+GRIFFITH, M.A.
+
+     "A very spirited rendering of the _Kumarasambhava_, which
+     was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are
+     glad to see made once more accessible."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to
+     most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or
+     enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative
+     imagination of its author."--_Indian Antiquary._
+
+     "We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor
+     Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a
+     second edition better."--_Athenaeum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.
+
+A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY,
+HISTORY, AND LITERATURE.
+
+BY JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.
+
+     "This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to
+     students of Indian literature, but is also of great general
+     interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible
+     form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu
+     mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little
+     is known outside the limited circle of _savants_."--_Times._
+
+     "It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly
+     and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the
+     few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions
+     detract but little from the general excellence of Mr.
+     Dowson's work."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.
+
+SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.
+
+BY EDWARD WILLIAM LANE,
+
+Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c, &c.
+
+A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by STANLEY
+LANE POOLE.
+
+     "... Has been long esteemed in this country as the
+     compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the
+     time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the
+     'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the
+     value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a
+     great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of
+     comment, and prefixing an introduction."--_Times._
+
+     "Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer....
+     Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible
+     for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for
+     literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable
+     form."--_Englishman, Calcutta._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,
+
+BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.
+
+BY MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L.,
+
+Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay
+Asiatic Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of
+Oxford.
+
+Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, with
+Illustrations and a Map.
+
+     "In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a
+     thoughtful man on some of the most important questions
+     connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened
+     observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant
+     people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the
+     public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of
+     the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have
+     seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of
+     every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of
+     Modern India--a subject with which we should be specially
+     familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee
+     or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of
+     their manners, their creeds, and their
+     necessities."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.
+
+METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.
+
+With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from
+Classical Authors.
+
+BY J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.
+
+     "... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."--_Times._
+
+     "... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration
+     alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the
+     legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."--_Edinburgh
+     Daily Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE GULISTAN;
+
+OR, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU'D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ.
+
+Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an
+Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,
+
+BY EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.
+
+     "It is a very fair rendering of the original."--_Times._
+
+     "The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed
+     by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The
+     _Gulistan_ is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest
+     order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long
+     established itself in a secure position as the best version
+     of Sadi's finest work."--_Academy._
+
+     "It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price
+28s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.
+
+BY BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, ESQ., F.R.S.,
+
+Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the
+Institute; Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at
+the Court of Nepal, &c, &c.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+     SECTION I.--On the Kocch, Bodo, and Dhimal Tribes.--Part I.
+     Vocabulary.--Part II. Grammar.--Part III. Their Origin,
+     Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition,
+     with a General Description of the Climate they dwell
+     in--Appendix.
+
+     SECTION II.--On Himalayan Ethnology.--I. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of
+     Nepal.--II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti
+     Language.--III. Grammatical Analysis of the Vayu Language.
+     The Vayu Grammar.--IV. Analysis of the Bahing Dialect of the
+     Kiranti language. The Bahing Grammar.--V. On the Vayu or
+     Hayu Tribe of the Central Himalaya.--VI. On the Kiranti
+     Tribe of the Central Himalaya.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+     SECTION III.--On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India.
+     Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, Bodo, and Garo
+     Tongues.
+
+     SECTION IV.--Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION V.--Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.
+
+     SECTION VI.--The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their
+     connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative
+     Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.
+
+     SECTION VII.--The Mongolian Affinities of the
+     Caucasians.--Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and
+     Mongolian Words.
+
+     SECTION VIII.--Physical Type of Tibetans.
+
+     SECTION IX.--The Aborigines of Central India.--Comparative
+     Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central
+     India.--Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.--Vocabulary of some
+     of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the
+     Northern Sircars.--Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks
+     on their Affinities.--Supplement to the Nilgirian
+     Vocabularies.--The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.
+
+     SECTION X.--Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks
+     on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.
+
+     SECTION XI.--Route from Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal, to
+     Darjeeling in Sikim.--Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis
+     of Nepal.
+
+     SECTION XII.--Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police
+     as recognised in the State of Nepal.
+
+     SECTION XIII.--The Native Method of making the Paper
+     denominated Hindustan, Nepalese.
+
+     SECTION XIV.--Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the
+     Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the
+     People of India.
+
+     "For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian
+     Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable
+     both to the philologist and the ethnologist."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326,
+cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,
+
+THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.
+
+The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.
+
+BY THE RIGHT REV. P. BIGANDET,
+
+Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.
+
+     "The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only
+     illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect
+     encyclopaedia of Buddhist lore."--_Times._
+
+     "A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism
+     with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their
+     investigations."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."--_Indian Antiquary._
+
+     "Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place
+     students of the subject under a deep obligation to its
+     author."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "This work is one of the greatest authorities upon
+     Buddhism."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.
+
+CHINESE BUDDHISM.
+
+A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.
+
+BY J. EDKINS, D.D.
+
+Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c.
+
+     "It contains a vast deal of important information on the
+     subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued
+     study on the spot."--_Athenaeum._
+
+     "Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the
+     extent of its original research, and the simplicity with
+     which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,
+     literature, and ritual is set forth."--_British Quarterly
+     Review._
+
+     "The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves
+     most careful study from all interested in the history of the
+     religions of the world, and expressly of those who are
+     concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins
+     notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise
+     bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English
+     writers."--_Record._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.
+
+WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to
+the Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of "The Modern Languages of the
+East Indies."
+
+     "We know none who has described Indian life, especially the
+     life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and
+     literary talent."--_Academy._
+
+     "They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original
+     remarks."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+     "His book contains a vast amount of information. The result
+     of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and
+     speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as
+     of food for thought."--_Tablet._
+
+     "Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and
+     antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one
+     having authority."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "The author speaks with the authority of personal
+     experience.... It is this constant association with the
+     country and the people which gives such a vividness to many
+     of the pages."--_Athenaeum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.
+
+BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.
+
+The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:
+
+BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,
+
+For the first time Edited in the original Pali.
+
+BY V. FAUSBOLL;
+
+And Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
+
+Translation. Volume I.
+
+     "These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of
+     what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are
+     probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan
+     stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as
+     India. The introduction contains a most interesting
+     disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing
+     their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore
+     legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of
+     the Judgment of Solomon."--_Times._
+
+     "It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his
+     right to be heard on this subject by his able article on
+     Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclopaedia
+     Britannica.'"--_Leeds Mercury._
+
+     "All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel
+     deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established
+     reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for
+     the fidelity of his version, and the style of his
+     translations is deserving of high praise."--_Academy._
+
+     "No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than
+     Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jataka book we have, then, a
+     priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of
+     our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete
+     picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs
+     of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to
+     ourselves, just as they were passing through the first
+     stages of civilisation."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;
+
+OR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND
+THE KABBALAH.
+
+Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis
+According to the Talmud," &c.
+
+With Notes and Copious Indexes.
+
+     "To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a
+     general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at
+     least."--_Times._
+
+     "Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive
+     to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent
+     scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and
+     indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon
+     the Scriptures."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+     "Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful
+     notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet
+     appeared."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Without overlooking in the slightest the several
+     attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental
+     Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses
+     them all in interest."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._
+
+     "Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we
+     believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for
+     themselves."--_The Record._
+
+     "This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of
+     knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and
+     unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the
+     wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so
+     Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars
+     of the Chosen People."--_Inquirer._
+
+     "The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact
+     that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but
+     throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those
+     Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and
+     Christian alike."--_John Bull._
+
+     "It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument
+     of learned, loving, light-giving labour."--_Jewish Herald._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.
+
+BY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of "Yeigo Henkaku Shiran."
+
+     "A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted
+     much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature
+     of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into
+     English verse."--_Daily News._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the
+     first attempt which has been made to interpret the
+     literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to
+     the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for
+     indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we
+     have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful
+     English verse."--_Tablet._
+
+     "It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric
+     literature which has appeared during the close of the last
+     year."--_Celestial Empire._
+
+     "Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he
+     undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.
+     But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts
+     are successful to a degree."--_London and China Express._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C.
+681-668.
+
+     Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders
+     and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with
+     a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the
+     Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and
+     List of Eponyms, &c.
+
+BY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's
+College, Cambridge.
+
+     "Students of scriptural archaeology will also appreciate the
+     'History of Esarhaddon.'"--_Times._
+
+     "There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It
+     does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in
+     their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it
+     does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers
+     both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary
+     non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling
+     its results."--_Academy._
+
+     "Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to
+     Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be
+     feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due
+     to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted
+     himself in his laborious task."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.
+
+THE MESNEVI
+
+(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA
+(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.
+
+Book the First.
+
+_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his
+Ancestors, and of his Descendants._
+
+Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected
+by their Historian,
+
+MEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI.
+
+Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,
+
+BY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c.
+
+     "A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "This book will be a very valuable help to the reader
+     ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight
+     into a very important department of the literature extant in
+     that language."--_Tablet._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.
+
+EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS
+
+ILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS.
+
+BY REV. J. LONG,
+
+Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.
+
+     "We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide
+     circulation and attentive reading."--_Record._
+
+     "Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."--_Globe._
+
+     "It is full of interesting matter."--_Antiquary._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+INDIAN POETRY;
+
+     Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from
+     the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books
+     from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom"
+     from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental
+     Poems.
+
+BY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."
+
+     "In this new volume of Messrs. Trubner's Oriental Series,
+     Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through
+     the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of
+     Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of
+     Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have
+     introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be
+     more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna
+     is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the
+     love of
+
+                 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'
+
+     from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five
+     senses are typified."--_Times._
+
+     "No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his
+     art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas
+     as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of
+     language contained in these mighty epics."--_Daily
+     Telegraph._
+
+     "The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and
+     sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of
+     the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody
+     sufficient to captivate the senses of the
+     dullest."--_Standard._
+
+     "The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has
+     adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original
+     text."--_Overland Mail._
+
+     "We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to
+     popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface
+     tells us, the goal towards which he bends his
+     efforts."--_Allen's Indian Mail._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE MIND OF MENCIUS;
+
+OR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
+
+A SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER
+MENCIUS.
+
+Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and
+Explanations,
+
+By the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society.
+
+Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,
+
+By the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.
+
+     "Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese
+     studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The
+     value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered
+     that at no time since relations commenced between China and
+     the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said
+     aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful
+     study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the
+     excellent series to which it belongs."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.
+
+BY A. BARTH.
+
+Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the
+Author.
+
+The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably
+enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of
+the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as
+an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.
+
+     "Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,
+     which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,
+     but also a useful work of reference."--_Academy._
+
+     "This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and
+     additions, of an article contributed by the learned author
+     two years ago to the 'Encyclopedie des Sciences
+     Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first
+     appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best
+     summary extant of the vast subject with which it
+     deals."--_Tablet._
+
+     "This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual
+     of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we
+     have in English. The present work ... shows not only great
+     knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but
+     also great insight into the inner history and the deeper
+     meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only
+     one, which it proposes to describe."--_Modern Review._
+
+     "The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by
+     the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country
+     and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few
+     Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a
+     good deal of information from it, and especially from the
+     extensive bibliography provided in the notes."--_Dublin
+     Review._
+
+     "Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a
+     master-hand."--_Critic (New York)._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.
+
+HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA.
+
+An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyaya
+and Vais'eshika Systems.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.
+
+The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in
+the department of pure philosophy.
+
+     "The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and
+     learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the
+     philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he
+     may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the
+     system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give
+     an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions
+     which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the
+     world, the nature and relations of man and his future
+     destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the
+     connection of the Sankhya system with the philosophy of
+     Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with
+     that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"--_Foreign Church
+     Chronicle._
+
+     "Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted
+     gain to all students of the development of thought. The
+     system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from
+     the Sankhya Karika, is the only contribution of India to
+     pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to
+     the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.
+     Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to
+     appreciate these points in any adequate manner."--_Saturday
+     Review._
+
+     "We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our
+     philosophical library."--_Notes and Queries._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.
+
+A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDANTASARA.
+
+Translated, with copious Annotations,
+
+BY MAJOR G. A. JACOB,
+
+Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.
+
+The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for
+others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an
+accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedanta.
+
+     "The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an
+     inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in
+     his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,
+     indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they
+     bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will
+     rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hindu
+     philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its
+     kind that we have seen."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+TSUNI--||GOAM:
+
+THE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI.
+
+BY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,
+
+Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the
+Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
+Society, Vienna, &c., &c.
+
+     "The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of
+     interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of
+     Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the
+     comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of
+     their religion and mythology were scattered about in various
+     books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and
+     printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what
+     he has been able to collect himself."--_Prof. Max Muller in
+     the Nineteenth Century._
+
+     "It is full of good things."--_St. James's Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
+Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414,
+cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.
+
+TO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES
+AND EMENDATIONS.
+
+Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
+Notes.
+
+By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.
+
+     "As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,
+     it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if
+     they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and
+     for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove
+     useful."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+THE BHAGAVAD-GITA.
+
+Translated, with Introduction and Notes.
+
+BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.)
+
+     "Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad Gita is, as
+     we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and
+     that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar
+     value."--_Dublin Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.
+Bengal Civil Service.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.
+
+The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.
+
+By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.
+
+     "Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with
+     considerable success, and his version contains much that
+     will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's
+     delightful selection."--_Academy._
+
+     "The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their
+     profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on
+     philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and
+     the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates
+     them."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.
+
+As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta
+Review_.
+
+By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of
+the Calcutta Madrasa.
+
+     "For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important
+     of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Trubner's
+     Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may
+     take it up the work must be one of profound
+     interest."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.
+
+By DR. C. P. TIELE.
+
+Vol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
+
+Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.
+
+By JAMES BALLINGAL.
+
+     "It places in the hands of the English readers a history of
+     Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on
+     the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the
+     latest results of research. In this volume there is a great
+     deal of information, as well as independent investigation,
+     for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in
+     itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive
+     religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the
+     New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and
+     minute."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.
+
+YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.
+
+A POEM BY JAMI.
+
+Translated from the Persian into English Verse.
+
+BY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH.
+
+     "Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as
+     translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further
+     good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has
+     evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the
+     quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more
+     prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its
+     intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most
+     popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read
+     in all the independent native schools of India where Persian
+     is taught."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.
+
+LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.
+
+BY CARL ABEL.
+
+     "An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical
+     questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise
+     dry technicalities of the science."--_Standard._
+
+     "Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,
+     for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery
+     over the English language fits him to be a champion of
+     unpopular doctrines."--_Athenaeum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;
+
+OR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
+
+BY MADHAVA ACHARYA.
+
+Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the
+University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of
+Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.
+
+This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The
+author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems
+current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives
+what appears to him to be their most important tenets.
+
+     "The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted
+     sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has
+     familiarised the translators with Indian
+     thought."--_Athenaeum._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.
+
+TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR.
+
+BY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER.
+
+Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,
+
+BY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A.
+
+     "Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of
+     Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western
+     analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from
+     Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the
+     Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred
+     books."--_Academy._
+
+     "The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better
+     hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the
+     lives of those scholars who have given their attention to
+     gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and
+     language."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+     "Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing
+     stories, or for comparative folk-lore."--_Pall Mall
+     Gazette._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.
+
+UDANAVARGA.
+
+A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON.
+
+Compiled by DHARMATRATA.
+
+BEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA.
+
+Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts
+from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,
+
+BY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.
+
+     "Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which
+     assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding
+     of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of
+     comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan
+     version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,
+     who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a
+     translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which
+     has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be
+     congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult
+     task."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a
+Language Map, price 18s.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,
+
+Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.
+
+     "Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do
+     better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclopaedic in its
+     scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any
+     particular language, and is left free to add to the initial
+     sum of knowledge there collected."--_Natal Mercury._
+
+     "Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to
+     linguistic students."--_Nature._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL
+RELIGIONS.
+
+BY C. P. TIELE,
+
+Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the
+University of Leyden.
+
+Translated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A.
+
+     "Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide
+     thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to
+     gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of
+     investigations into the religious history of nations. As
+     Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are
+     outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But
+     there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of
+     far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the
+     crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these
+     pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps
+     also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and
+     thorough research."--_Scotsman._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.
+
+A HISTORY OF BURMA.
+
+Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the
+Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.
+
+BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,
+Membre Correspondant de la Societe Academique Indo-Chinoise de France.
+
+     "Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Trubner's Oriental
+     Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has
+     been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre
+     deserves great credit for the patience and industry which
+     has resulted in this History of Burma."--_Saturday Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+RELIGION IN CHINA.
+
+By JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING.
+
+Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with
+Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People.
+
+     "Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and
+     often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of
+     considerable value of the subject."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to
+     study the existing religions in China, and his long
+     residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an
+     intimate knowledge of them as they at present
+     exist."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and
+     revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,
+     been the standard authority upon the subject of which it
+     treats."--_Nonconformist._
+
+     "Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the
+     first authorities on Chinese religion and
+     language."--_British Quarterly Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.
+
+Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed
+by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.
+
+Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.
+
+     "The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness
+     with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient
+     documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."--_Times._
+
+     "Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those
+     Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these
+     Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter
+     possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient
+     Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and
+     translated, have not yet attracted the attention of
+     scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon
+     the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded
+     in these venerable authorities."--_Daily News._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.
+
+THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.
+
+With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.
+
+Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares
+College.
+
+Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.
+
+     "The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and
+     scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have
+     every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the
+     publishers."--_Calcutta Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price
+24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.
+
+BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,
+
+Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629).
+
+BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.,
+
+(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of
+Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,
+&c.
+
+An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--"Nothing
+more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's
+translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."
+
+     "It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the
+     best account of the condition of India at that ancient
+     period has come down to us in the books of travel written by
+     the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best
+     known."--_Times._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.
+
+THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.
+
+By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.
+
+Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.
+
+     "This work is full of interest; while for the student of
+     sociology and the science of religion it is full of
+     importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in
+     so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently
+     translated."--_Scotsman._
+
+     "Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a
+     really good translation of this well-known law book, first
+     rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not
+     only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced
+     lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications
+     the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in
+     clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very
+     grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could
+     be published of the translation left by Burnell."--F. MAX
+     MULLER in the _Academy._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.
+
+THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,
+
+     Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his
+     Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original
+     and for most part Unpublished Documents.
+
+By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal
+Medical Service, Retired, &c.
+
+     "Not too soon have Messrs. Trubner added to their valuable
+     Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of
+     the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander
+     Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and
+     though an account of his career was demanded soon after his
+     decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of
+     his compatriot, Dr. Duka."--_Bookseller._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.
+
+Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches,"
+and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._
+
+I.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.
+
+II.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James
+Barton, of his several Surveys.
+
+III.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,
+dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.
+
+IV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.
+
+V.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.
+
+VI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.
+
+VII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst
+the Malays. By William Marsden.
+
+VIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By
+James Howison.
+
+IX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of
+Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.
+
+X.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying
+off Sumatra. By John Crisp.
+
+XI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales
+Island. By William Hunter, M.D.
+
+XII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.
+Leyden, M.D.
+
+XIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the
+Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.
+
+XIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of
+Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.
+
+XV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring
+Islands. By T. Ware.
+
+XVI.--Climate of Singapore.
+
+XVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.
+
+XVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.
+
+XIX.--Inscription at Singapore.
+
+XX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By
+Lieut.-Col. James Low.
+
+XXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By
+J. W. Laidlay.
+
+XXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.
+
+XXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.
+
+XXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian
+Archipelago.
+
+XXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.
+
+XXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+XXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from
+Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.
+
+XXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities
+in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.
+Tremenheere.
+
+XXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence
+across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and
+Capt. J. G. Forlong.
+
+XXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui
+Tin Ore.
+
+XXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.
+
+XXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.
+
+_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._
+
+XXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.
+By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.
+
+XXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and
+Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.
+
+XXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the
+Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.
+
+XXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.
+
+XL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.
+
+General Index.
+
+Index of Vernacular Terms.
+
+Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.
+
+     "The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China--its
+     philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a
+     very material and important contribution to our accessible
+     information regarding that country and its
+     people."--_Contemporary Review._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.
+
+THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.
+
+Translated from the Sanskrit
+
+By the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S.,
+
+Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.
+
+     "A very interesting addition to Trubner's Oriental
+     Series."--_Saturday Review._
+
+     "Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and
+     beauty of expression."--_St. James' Gazette._
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.
+
+ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;
+
+Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.
+
+BY JAMES GRAY,
+
+Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.
+
+The Sanscrit-Pali word Niti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract,
+and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a
+general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and
+didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as
+form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to
+his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and
+have served as a most effective medium of instruction.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:
+
+THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.
+
+Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal
+Civil Service.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.
+
+MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.
+
+ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D.,
+
+Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor
+of Law in the University of Calcutta.
+
+The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great
+Law Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts
+contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages
+before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for
+many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work
+will supply a want long felt.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.
+
+LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.
+
+BY FREDERIC HENRY BALFOUR.
+
+Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic
+Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.
+
+LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.
+
+WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1847 TO 1887. _Second Series._
+
+BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, LL.D.,
+
+Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late
+Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.
+
+MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.
+
+Edited by R. ROST, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office.
+
+SECOND SERIES.
+
+Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the
+Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian
+Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the
+Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.
+
+FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.
+
+By the REV. J. HINTON KNOWLES, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.
+
+(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.
+
+MEDIAEVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.
+
+     FRAGMENTS TOWARDS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
+     OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE
+     SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
+
+BY E. BRETSCHNEIDER, M.D.,
+
+Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.
+
+ALBERUNI'S INDIA:
+
+     AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE,
+     GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND
+     ASTROLOGY (ABOUT A.D. 1031).
+
+TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.
+
+With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.
+
+[3 asterisks in triangle] The Arabic Original, with an Index of
+the Sanskrit Words, Edited by Professor SACHAU, is in the press.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.
+
+THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.
+
+BY THE SHAMANS HWUI LI AND YEN-TSUNG.
+
+With a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-TSING.
+
+BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.
+
+(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College,
+London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.
+
+Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic
+Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c.
+
+When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he
+took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent
+had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress,
+Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li,
+composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's
+travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to
+discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he
+revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised
+and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable
+sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many
+particulars.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_IN PREPARATION:--_
+
+Post 8vo.
+
+A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.
+
+BY R. N. CUST, LL. D.
+
+Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of
+Africa," &c.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+LONDON: TRUBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
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