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diff --git a/34125-h/34125-h.htm b/34125-h/34125-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb9fe02 --- /dev/null +++ b/34125-h/34125-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,13797 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Mádhava Áchárya + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; background-color: #FFFFFF; +} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; +} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; +} + +table { padding: 1em; text-align: left; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + +.tr {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; margin-top: 5%; margin-bottom: 5%; padding: 2em; background-color: #f6f2f2; color: black; border: dotted black 1px;} + +.tocch { text-align: right; vertical-align: top;} + +.tocpg {text-align: right; vertical-align: bottom;} + +.p1 {margin-left: 80%; } + +.f1 { font-size:smaller; } + +a[name] { position: static; } +a:link { border:none; color:#0000ff; text-decoration:none; } +a:visited {color:#0000ff; text-decoration:none; } +a:hover { color:#ff0000; } + + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + font-style:normal; +} /* page numbers */ + +.blockquot { + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.u {text-decoration: underline;} + +.caption {font-weight: bold; font-size:smaller;} + + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: middle; + font-size: .8em; font-weight:normal; + text-decoration: + none; +font-style:normal; +} + +/* Poetry */ +.poem { + margin-left:10%; + margin-right:10%; + text-align: left; +} + +.poem br {display: none;} + +.poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + +.poem span.i0 { + display: block; + margin-left: 0em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; +} + +.poem span.i2 { + display: block; + margin-left: 2em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; +} + +.poem span.i4 { + display: block; + margin-left: 4em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; +} + +/* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha + Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy + +Author: Madhava Acharya + +Translator: E. B. Cowell + A. E. Gough + +Release Date: October 24, 2010 [EBook #34125] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA *** + + + + +Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div class="tr"><p class="center">Transcriber's Note:</p> +<p class="center">The Diacritical marks in this book are not consistent throughout the book. The original Diacritical marks have been retained.</p> +</div> +<p> </p> + +<h5>TRÜBNER'S</h5> +<h4>ORIENTAL SERIES.</h4> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> +<h4>THE</h4> +<h1>SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṂGRAHA</h1> +<p> </p> +<h4>OR</h4> +<h3><i>REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.</i></h3> +<p> </p> +<h2>BY</h2> + + <h2>MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA.</h2> + + <p> </p> + <h5>TRANSLATED BY</h5> + <h3> E. B. COWELL, M.A.</h3> + + <h4>PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE IN THE<br /> + UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,<br /> + AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.</h4> + <h5> AND</h5> + <h3> A. E. GOUGH, M.A.</h3> + + <h4>PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND<br /> + PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.</h4> + <p> </p> + <p> </p> + <h3>LONDON:</h3> + <h3>TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.</h3> + <h3> 1882. </h3> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> +<h2>PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of +Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mádhava +Áchárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by +Paṇḍit Íśvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent edition, with no +important alterations, was published in 1872 by Paṇḍit Táránátha +Tarkaváchaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of +the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic +Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have +been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and +those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity +of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought +originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu +character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose +from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have +noticed the same thing in the Nágarí copies of Mádhava's Commentary on +the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.</p> + +<p>As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span> Asiatic +Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently +read it with my friend Paṇḍit Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna, the present +Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to +translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other +engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to +England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several +chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest, +were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no +longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Paṇḍits +of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for +years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at +that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking +of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do +it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we +accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the +advantage of the help of some of the Paṇḍits of Benares, especially of +Paṇḍit Ráma Miśra, the assistant Professor of Sáṅkhya, who was himself +a Rámánuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some +things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to +throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original +abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in +the Benares Paṇḍit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully +revised for their present republication.</p> + +<p>The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. +The author successively passes in review<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span> the sixteen philosophical +systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and +gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the +principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain +them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself +for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it +were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance +with his own.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of +the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always +interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the +course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure +details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better +guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these +Darśanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in +the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his +materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical +controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from +the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is +continually following in their track even where he does not quote +their exact words.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<p>The systems are arranged from the Vedánta point of view,—our author +having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span>of the Smárta order in +the Maṭh of Śṛingeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Śaṃkara +Áchárya, the great Vedántist teacher of the eighth century, through +whose efforts the Vedánta became what it is at present—the +acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually +ascending scale,—the first, the Chárváka and Bauddha, being the +lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedánta, and the last, the +Sáṅkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.</p> + +<p>The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the +noblest minds in India throughout the mediæval period of its history. +Hiouen Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les écoles +philosophiques sont constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs +discussions passionnées s'élève comme les flots de la mer. Les +hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent à des maîtres particuliers, +et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous au même but." We can +still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the mediæval +literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among the +Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the +trees Árhata begging monks, Śvetapadas, Mahápáśupatas, +Páṇḍarabhikshus, Bhágavatas, Varṇins, Keśaluñchanas, Lokáyatikas, +Kápilas, Káṇádas, Aupanishadas, Ísvarakárins, Dharmaśástrins, +Pauráṇikas, Sáptatantavas, Śábdas, Páñcharátrikas, &c., all listening +to their own accepted tenets and zealously defending them."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Many of +these sects will occupy us in the ensuing pages; many of them also are +found in Mádhava's poem on the controversial triumphs <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span>of Śaṃkara +Áchárya, and in the spurious prose work on the same subject, ascribed +to Anantánandagiri. Well may some old poet have put into the mouth of +Yudhishṭhira the lines which one so often hears from the lips of +modern paṇḍits—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Vedá vibhinnáḥ smṛitayo vibhinná,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Násau munir yasya mataṃ na bhinnam,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guháyáṃ,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Mahájano yena gataḥ sa pantháḥ.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,</p> + +<p>μιᾶς τοίνυν οὔσης τῆς ἀληθείας, + τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος μυρίας<br /> +ἐκτροπὰς ἔχει, καθάπερ αἱ βάκχαι + τὰ τοῦ Πενθέως διαφορήσασαι<br /> +μέλη αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε + βαρβάρου τῆς τε<br /> +Ἑλληνικῆς αἱρέσεις, ἑκάστη ὅπερ + ἔλαχεν, ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ<br /> +τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φωτὸς δ', οἶμαι, + ἀνατολῇ πάντα φωτίζεται.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The most remarkable instance of this philosophical +equanimity is that of Váchaspati Miśra, who wrote standard treatises +on each of the six systems except the Vaiśeshika, adopting, of course, +the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every +alien tenet.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> An index of the names of authors and works quoted is +given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also +in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Śríharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Found in the Mahábh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I +give them as I have heard them from Paṇḍit Rámanáráyaṇa Vidyáratna.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> + + + +<table summary="Contents"> +<tr><td></td> +<td></td> +<td></td> +<td></td> +<td class="tocpg f1">Page</td> +</tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">I.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_I">The Chárváka System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_2">2</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">II.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_II">The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">III.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_III">The Árhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">IV.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">The Rámánuja System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">V.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_V">The Púrṇa-prajña System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_87">87</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">VI.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">The Nakulíśa-Páśupata System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">VII.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">The Śaiva System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">VIII.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">The Pratyabhijñá or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">IX.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">The Raseśvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">X.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_X">The Vaiśeshika or Aulúkya System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XI.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">The Akshapáda or Nyáya System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XII.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">The Jaiminíya System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_178">178</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XIII.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">The Páṇiníya System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_203">203</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XIV.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">The Sáṅkhya System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_221">221</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XV.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">The Pátañjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_231">231</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocch">XVI.</td> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#Sankaracharya">The Vedánta or System of Saṃkara Áchárya</a></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td></tr> +<tr><td></td> +<td> </td> +<td><span class="smcap"><a href="#APPENDIX">Appendix—On the Upádhi (E. B. C.)</a></span></td> +<td> </td> +<td class="tocpg"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td></tr> +</table> + + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA.</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>THE PROLOGUE.</h2> + + +<p>1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of +supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in +<i>him</i> only has this all a maker.</p> + +<p>2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Ágamas, +the son of Śárṅgapáṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas +of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the +proper meaning of the term Soul.</p> + +<p>3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava +mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the +fortunate Sáyaṇa.</p> + +<p>4. Having thoroughly searched the Śástras of former teachers, very +hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyaṇa-Mádhava<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> the lord has +expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen +with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not +delight in a garland strung of various flowers?</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the +Vaṃśa-Bráhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mádhava and +Sáyaṇa. Sáyaṇa is a pure Draviḍian name given to a child who is born +after all the elder children have died. Mádhava elsewhere calls Sáyaṇa +his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body, +himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sáyaṇa-Mádhavaḥ +here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the +same person. The body seems meant by the Sáyaṇa of the third śloka. +Máyaṇa was the father of Mádhava, and the true reading may be +<i>śríman-máyaṇa</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<h2>THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.</h2> + + +<p>[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the +abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but +how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme +felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka, +the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine +of Bṛihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be +eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current +refrain—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">While life is yours, live joyously;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">None can escape Death's searching eye:<br /></span> +<span class="i0">When once this frame of ours they burn,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">How shall it e'er again return?<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and +enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and +denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are +found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for +that school is Lokáyata,—a name well accordant with the thing +signified.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<p>In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span>original +principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, +intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed +from the mixing of certain ingredients;<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and when these are +destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti +for this [Bṛihad Áraṇy. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these +elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are +destroyed,—after death no intelligence remains."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Therefore the +soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, +since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as +such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the +only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.</p> + +<p>The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor +may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are +always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy +the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which +inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the +fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he +wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, +straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is +not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure +which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not +refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to +devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, +because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the +contents. If any one were <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span>so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, +he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the +poet—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,—such is the reasoning of fools;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future +world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the +agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great +expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be +accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are +only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the +three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> then +again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually +destructive, as the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa is overthrown by +those who maintain that of the karma-káṇḍa, while those who maintain +the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa reject that of the karma-káṇḍa; and +lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies +of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, +and smearing oneself with ashes,—</p> +<p>Bṛihaspati says, these are +but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor +sense.</p></div> + +<p>Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain +produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is +the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's +eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By +holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span>such +phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible, +as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside +in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my +body" is metaphorical "the head of Ráhu" [Ráhu being really <i>all +head</i>].</p> + +<p>All this has been thus summed up—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,—<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, &c., mixed together;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> abide in the same subject,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> it alone is the soul and no other,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if +inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; +else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the +thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on +hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do +those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"</p> + +<p>All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.</p> + +<p>Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the <i>sign</i> or +middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be +found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the +major.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute +of any condition accepted or disputed;<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> and this connection does +not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its +<i>existence</i>, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by +virtue of its being <i>known</i>. What then is the means of this +connection's being known?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span></p><p>We will first show that it is not <i>perception</i>. Now perception is +held to be of two kinds, external and internal [<i>i.e.</i>, as produced by +the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not +the required means; for although it is possible that the actual +contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the +particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be +such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal +proposition<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> which was to embrace the invariable connection of the +middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known. +Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition +has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise +a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this +particular case<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as +implying fire].</p> + +<p>Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that +the mind has any power to act independently towards an external +object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, +as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their +objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."</p> + +<p>Nor can <i>inference</i> be the means of the knowledge of the universal +proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also +require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would +arise the fallacy of an <i>ad infinitum</i> retrogression.</p> + +<p>Nor can <i>testimony</i> be the means thereof, since we may either allege +in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeshika doctrine of Kaṇáda, that +this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that +this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier +that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span>stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on +the recognition of a <i>sign</i> in the form of the language used in the +child's presence by the old man;<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and, moreover, there is no more +reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are +invariably connected, than for our receiving the <i>ipse dixit</i> of Manu, +&c. [which, of course, we Chárvákas reject].</p> + +<p>And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the +knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to +whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and +major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be +no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as +smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for +oneself<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> would have to end in mere idle words.</p> + +<p>Then again <i>comparison</i>,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> &c., must be utterly rejected as the +means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is +impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned +connection [<i>i.e.</i>, the universal proposition], because their end is +to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the +relation of a name to something so named.</p> + +<p>Again, this same absence of a condition,<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> which has been given as +the definition of an invariable connection [<i>i.e.</i>, a universal +proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to +establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and +therefore, although the absence of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>perceptible things may be itself +perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself +non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to +inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already +been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of +the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in +extension<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> with the major term though not constantly accompanying +the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly +accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major +term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [<i>i.e.</i>, reciprocal], +are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such +fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of +sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not +causing audition;"<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> wherefore the definition holds,—and again it +is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning +<i>samásama</i>.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span></p><p>But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the +knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the +knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of +the proposition is possible, <i>i.e.</i>, a knowledge in the form of such a +connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished +by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the +knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the +invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with +adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. +Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a +proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> + +<p>The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the +knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a +former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases +this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the +coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, +drugs, &c.</p> + +<p>From this it follows that fate, &c.,<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> do not exist, since these can +only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do +not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become +destitute of any cause.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span></p><p>But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena +can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. +Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>And all this has been also said by Bṛihaspati—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real effect.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a><br /></span> +<span class="i0">If the Śráddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Śráddha here,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?<br /></span> +<span class="i0">While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?<br /></span> +<span class="i0">If he who departs from the body goes to another world,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no other fruit anywhere.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All the well-known formulæ of the pandits, jarpharí, turpharí, &c.<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a><br /></span> +<span class="i0">And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśwamedha,<br /></span> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span><span class="i0">These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a><br /></span> +<span class="i0">While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge +to the doctrine of Chárváka. Such is the pleasant consummation.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> "Śaṅkara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the +Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka" +(Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in +the world" (<i>loka</i> and <i>áyata</i>). Laukáyatika occurs in Páṇini's +ukthagaṇa.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Kiṇwa</i> is explained as "drug or seed used to produce +fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c." +Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: "The faculty of thought results from a +modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a +ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as +betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an +exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very +different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual +existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. +Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> I take <i>kaṇa</i> as here equal to the Bengali <i>kunṛ</i>. Cf. +Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. <i>Aśváḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháḥ.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, personality and fatness, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> I read <i>dehe</i> for <i>dehaḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have +invariable concomitance (<i>vyápti</i>)."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For the <i>sandigdha</i> and <i>niśchita upádhi</i> see Siddhánta +Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance +(as of smoke by fire).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The attributes of the class are not always found in +every member,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; +and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some +other place.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and +Siddhánta-M., p. 80.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> The properly logical, as distinguished from the +rhetorical, argument.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> "<i>Upamána</i> or the knowledge of a similarity is the +instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This +particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a +name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to +restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain +has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of +the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case +of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> 'Αντιστρἑφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here +our A with distributed predicate.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi +"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly +accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is +non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" +would serve as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi, to establish the <i>vyabhichára</i> +fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted +clause excludes it, as an upádhi must be consistent with <i>either</i> +party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being +produced" <i>always</i> accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we +defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and +constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi "the +nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the +class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar +only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is +found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the +upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly +accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi "the not +causing audition," <i>i.e.</i>, the not being apprehended by the organs of +hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found +where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where +a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (<i>i.e.</i>, +universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their +predicates) relate to the same argument (as <i>e.g.</i>, to prove the +existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second +will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by +the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke +because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as +fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by +fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet +fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the +non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious +inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied +by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this +will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term <i>is</i> thus +invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has +fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not +reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably +accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add +here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many +another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-śaṅgraha to my old friend and +teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit +College.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the +Buddhist system <i>infra</i>, we have an attempt to establish the authority +of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or +genus and species.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Adṛishṭa</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the merit and demerit in our actions +which produce their effects in future births.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. +209.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's +Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be +handled in the rites."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<h2>THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.</h2> + + +<p>At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid +down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, +your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is +easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has +accordingly been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as +a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not +through the mere observation of the desired result in +similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in +dissimilar cases."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p></div> + +<p>On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and +non-concomitance (<i>e.g.</i>, A is where B is, A is not where B is not) +that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance +of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being +impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and +future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that +uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our +system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect +may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a +stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span>alone are to be +entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in +practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt +terminates where there is a practical absurdity."<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p>1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the +designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance +(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise +from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition +or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for +instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by +five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to +its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect +is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its +non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.</p> + +<p>2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the +ascertainment of identity (<i>e.g.</i>, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever +we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute +arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch +as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own +self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and +where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can +exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of +the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference +to the same object (<i>i.e.</i>, predication),—This tree is a sisu. For +reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where +there is no difference whatever (<i>e.g.</i>, to say, "A jar is a jar," is +no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the +two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor +can reference to the same object take place where there is a +reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, +for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span></p> + +<p>It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a +cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).</p> + +<p>If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence, +<i>pramáṇa</i>, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference +is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you +allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the +maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is +the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that +inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument +(to prove, <i>i.e.</i>, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an +absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren. +Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence +and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their +homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you +affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of +words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the +existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you +yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle +term. Conformably it has been said by Tathágata—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from +its being present to the understanding of others.</p> + +<p>"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its +negation by a certain person."</p></div> + +<p>All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist +for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.</p> + +<p>These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four +standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mádhyamika, +Yogáchára, Sautrántika, and Vaibháshika, these Buddhists adopt +respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external +void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects +(representationism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span>), and the perceptibility of external objects +(presentationism).<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Though the venerated Buddha be the only one +teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity +of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer, +the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time +to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, +and so forth, according to their several inclinations.</p> + +<p>It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out, +viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.) +all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.</p> + +<p>Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue +and so forth (<i>i.e.</i>, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred +from their existence; thus, whatever <i>is</i> is momentary (or fluxional) +like a bank of clouds, and all these things <i>are</i>.<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Nor may any one +object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an +existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by +perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the +exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is +established, provided that we exclude from <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span>it the non-momentary +succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of +the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical +efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under +succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between +succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a +manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior +alternative;</p> + +<p>"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a +repugnance in the very statement."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p></div> + +<p>And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent, +and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine +existence of the alternative of momentariness.—<span class="smcap">q.e.d.</span></p> + +<p>Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in +the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious +to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and +future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical +efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it +cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot +deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that +which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that +time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is +thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such +power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because +practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does +not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for +instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity +while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its +past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.</p> + +<p>You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> subsidiaries, there +is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and +future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do +the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are +not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with +the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this +assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is +other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the +cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect +will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the +adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect +is on the skin of man;</p> + +<p>"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent; +and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect +produced upon it."</p></div> + +<p>Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, <i>together with</i> +its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up +its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round +their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and +without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does +the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries +give rise to another additament or not? In either case the +afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of +stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another +additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress <i>in +infinitum</i>. If when the additament is to be generated another +auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless +series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite +regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an +additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as +water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament +would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> on +the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries; +otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that +a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add +to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves +requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be +productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be +established an infinite regression of additaments to (or +supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.</p> + +<p>Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of +the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like, +or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if +the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed +is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require +the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must +take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over +and over again an endless series of additaments added to the +additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite +regression is firmly set up.</p> + +<p>In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another +subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of +the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of +additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented +by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to +your embarrassment.</p> + +<p>Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a +supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it +may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that <i>minus</i> the +supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the +supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism) +<i>kurvad rúpa</i> (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus +the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne +its fruit.</p> + +<p>Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible. +Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time; +for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this +(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its +effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production +of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity +will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on +the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as +reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.</p> + +<p>That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as +heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions. +Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has +not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term +disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are +allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different +times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz., +That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at +that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that +time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence +of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to +produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of +stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the +seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical +efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. +The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does +anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement +of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity +exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper +to those times.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span></p> + +<p>(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there +being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard +to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence +which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and +there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue +of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or +"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance +observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by +the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jñána-śrí—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent +things;</p> + +<p>"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency, +and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as +eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);</p> + +<p>"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do +the work of another;</p> + +<p>"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and +simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains +true in regard to that which we have to prove."</p></div> + +<p>Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the +Vaiśeshikas and Naiyáyikas, that existence is a participation in the +universal form existence; for were this the case, universality, +particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the +universal) could have no existence.</p> + +<p>Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and +co-inhesion dependent on any <i>sui generis</i> existence of their own; for +such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many <i>sui generis</i> +existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a +dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the +many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through +all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so +forth, like the string running<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> through the gems strung upon it. +Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present +everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things +in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal), +and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-páda +has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is +present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature +of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to +another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the +other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes), +the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie +qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach +itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, +does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another +place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to +inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as +you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base +of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence +of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.</p> + +<p>Conformably it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one +place, engages without moving from that place in producing +itself in another place.</p> + +<p>"This entity (universality) is not connected with that +wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies +that place: great is this miracle.</p> + +<p>"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently +divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series +of difficulties!"</p></div> + +<p>If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many +rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to +repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of +heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span></p> + +<p>That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common +verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be +found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for +bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is +pain, and pain alone.</p> + +<p>If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an +instance,—we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised +being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is +impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that +all is like itself alone, like itself alone.</p> + +<p>In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we +are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has +not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were +(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act +of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular +nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon +that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and +so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a +semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a +fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs. +The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily +superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection +between them, the act of vision, and the <i>videns</i>, if one or more be +unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally +objects of the negation; the Mádhyamikas excellently wise explain as +follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a +total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression +like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a +momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory +assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of +reality.</p> + +<p>The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span> four +alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality +and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify +this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like, +the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.</p> + +<p>If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it +is said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the +like, for instance;</p> + +<p>"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers +of the sky and the like, for instance."</p></div> + +<p>The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are +inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated +Buddha in the Alaṅkárávatára<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is +ascertained;<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> + +<p>"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and +natureless."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No +sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."</p></div> + +<p>That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four +alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three +views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a +carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."</p></div> + +<p>In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are +come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result. +Accordingly we have overtaken our end, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>and there is nothing to be +taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the +student—interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the +putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained. +Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher. +These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the +religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence +their conventional designation of Mádhyamikas (or mediocre).</p> + +<p>Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogácháras, because while they +accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and +the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a +void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been +admitted? For their technology is as follows:—Self-subsistent +cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe +is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakírti: "To one +who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."</p> + +<p>An external <i>percipibile</i> is not admissible in consequence of the +following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise +from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that +which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for +what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do +you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting +cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with +the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a +supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be +apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the <i>percipibile</i> a simple atom or a +complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected +by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former +alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it +not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has +been said<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would +have six surfaces;</p> + +<p>"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a +body of atomic dimension."</p></div> + +<p>Intellect, therefore, as having no other <i>percipibile</i> but itself, is +shown to be itself its own <i>percipibile</i>, self-subsistent, luminous +with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no +cognition ulterior thereto;</p> + +<p>"There being no distinction between percept and percipient, +intellect shines forth of itself alone."</p></div> + +<p>The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which +is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as +soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue +and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there +were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could +not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no +identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to +determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an +interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an +illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The +cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without +beginning and without interruption; as it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the +cognition thereof are identical;</p> + +<p>"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory +cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by +reason of illusory perceptions,</p> + +<p>"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and +of percipient."</p></div> + +<p>Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> juice, the +energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual +sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though +the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and +subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in +virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by +reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient, +conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as +to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and +another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it +has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, +appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,</p> + +<p>"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and +percipient;</p> + +<p>"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the +example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and +the like,</p> + +<p>"Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as +percipient and percept."</p></div> + +<p>Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless +ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.</p> + +<p>When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of +view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises +knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects, +such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called +<i>Mahodaya</i> (the grand exaltation, emancipation).</p> + +<p>Others again (the Sautrántikas) hold that the position that there is +no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they +contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous +cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you +accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive, +being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span> +proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be +invariability of simultaneous cognition,—we refuse this, because +inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is +manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity +as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the +object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it +should be presented as <i>Ego</i>, not as <i>Hoc aliquid</i>, because the +cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A +blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external +and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and +so it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This side of knowledge which appears external to the other +portion,</p> + +<p>"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an +illusion."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself +as if it were external."</p></div> + +<p>To this we reply (say the Sautrántikas): This is untenable, for if +there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the +comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his +senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless +mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the +illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of +duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are +involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that +cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as +their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such, +and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal +states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is +difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity, +like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were +external," you must already suppose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> an external <i>percipibile</i>, and +your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.</p> + +<p>If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with +the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrántikas) reply that this +objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to +the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production, +and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The +interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If it be asked, How can there be a past <i>percipibile</i>? They +recognise perceptibility,</p> + +<p>"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is +its imposition of its form."</p></div> + +<p>To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as +nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred +from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may +be inferred. Therefore it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition) +without losing the nature of a half;</p> + +<p>"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable +is the nature of the knowable."</p></div> + +<p>For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the +cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if +indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things +to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of +external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only +at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for +instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of +speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or +walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under +discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, +are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the +recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the +manifestation as blue and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span> so forth is a presentment of activity, as +it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant +about the Ego:</p> + +<p>"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and +the rest."</p></div> + +<p>Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let +it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible, +which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external +world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of +presentments resulting from ideation.</p> + +<p>According to the view of the Sensationalists (<i>vijñánavádin</i>), +ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or +presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a +single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to +produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or +sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental +train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted +to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all +momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness +are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the +subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of +presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations) +had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the +stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have +this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any +intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding, +must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his +consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense +percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and +smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four +conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the +suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> dominant (organ). Of these, +the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in +the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the +like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of +forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The +restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the +medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant, +the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of +one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been +equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he +who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four +causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and +its modifications.</p> + +<p>So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is +of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional, +(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of +these, the sensible world (<i>rúpa-skandha</i>) is the sense organs and +their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are +discriminated (<i>rúpyante</i>) by these. The perceptional world is the +stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The +affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain +generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) +world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words—the words +"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as +desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser +miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.</p> + +<p>Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain, +and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the +principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been +said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the +four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p></div> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span></p> + +<p>In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the +"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as +(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of +these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by +concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition +of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of +causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious +being,—such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A +germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six +elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in +the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light +as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces +touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound; +the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism +comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the +Tathágatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or +by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and +determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the +cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathágata +Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation +between the cause and effect, results from production or from +non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something +exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of +the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where +the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix <i>tal</i> +(in the word <i>sthititā</i>) has the sense of the concrete. Determination +by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here +some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and +effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason +it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to +that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in +causes and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is +observed.<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> To illustrate this, the causal determination of a +genesis to be gone through is as follows:—From the seed the germ, +from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the +hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the +blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate +neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and +the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of +being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts +two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific +matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise +unduly prolix.</p> + +<p>Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the +rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method +(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the +knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former +ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrántika arose from +the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples +who asked what was the ultimate purport (<i>anta</i>) of the aphorism +(<i>sútra</i>), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be +Sautrántikas."</p> + +<p>Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of +odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to +produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the +venerated Buddha styled Práthamika (primary) disciples. A second school, +attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation +is the only reality. A third school, who <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span>contend that both are true (the +internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are +inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (<i>viruddhá +bháshá</i>), and are known under the designation of Vaibháshikas. Their +technical language springs up as follows:—According to the doctrine of +inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently +no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be +impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a +contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects, +therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension +is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere +representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of +evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is +non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the +appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.</p> + +<p>"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it +were aught else,</p> + +<p>"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things +derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."</p></div> + +<p>Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how +is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the +universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be +replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted +for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as +if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the +gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre +for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been +fully discussed in describing the Sautrántikas (cf. p. 27), and +therefore need not here be further detailed.</p> + +<p>It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> according +to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox); +for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha) +accommodating themselves to the character and disposition +(of those who are to be taught),</p> + +<p>"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a +plurality of methods.</p> + +<p>"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and +superficial,</p> + +<p>"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a +universal void which is a negation of duality."</p></div> + +<p>It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve +inner seats (<i>áyatana</i>) is conducive to felicity.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats</p> + +<p>"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing +aught else below?</p> + +<p>"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,</p> + +<p>"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by +the wise as the twelve inner seats."</p></div> + +<p>The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the +Viveka-vilása:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the +universe is momentarily fluxional;</p> + +<p>"The following four principles in order are to be known by +the name of the noble truths:—</p> + +<p>"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is +held,<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> + +<p>"And the path (method); of all this let the explication be +heard in order.</p> + +<p>"Pain, and the <i>skandhas</i> of the embodied one, which are +declared to be five,—</p> + +<p>"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.</p> + +<p>"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound +and the rest, the common sensory,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span></p> + +<p>"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,—these are the +twelve inner seats.</p> + +<p>"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when +it arises in the heart of man.</p> + +<p>"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the +aggregate.</p> + +<p>"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,</p> + +<p>"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled +emancipation.</p> + +<p>"Furthermore, there are two instruments of science, +perception and inference.</p> + +<p>"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects, +the Vaibháshikas and the rest.</p> + +<p>"The Vaibháshika highly esteems an object concomitant to the +cognition;</p> + +<p>"The Sautrántika allows no external object apprehensible by +perception;</p> + +<p>"The Yogáchára admits only intellect accompanied with forms;</p> + +<p>"The Mádhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.</p> + +<p>"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same +emancipation,</p> + +<p>"Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of +cognitions and impressions.</p> + +<p>"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the +single meal in the forenoon,</p> + +<p>"The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the +Bauddha mendicants."<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p></div> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p. +89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there +read more correctly, <i>'darśanán na na darśanát</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Kusumánjali, iii. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> The Bauddhas are thus divided into— +</p><p> +(1.) Mádhyamikas or Nihilists. +</p><p> +(2.) Yogácháras or Subjective Idealists. +</p><p> +(3.) Sautrántikas or Representationists. +</p><p> +(4.) Vaibháshikas or Presentationists.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119. +</p><p> +"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western +heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within +half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull +ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, +although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your +reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you +never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see +any abiding colour, any colour which truly <i>is</i>. Within the millionth +part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone +an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by +another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but +because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason +refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to +declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has +given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no +one of which <i>is</i>, because each of them continually vanishes in +another."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Query, Laṅkávatára?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If +every <i>completed</i> object of cognition must consist of object <i>plus</i> +the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that +is, inchoate—that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is +the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics +of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by +calling it a <i>flux</i>—or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps +more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into +sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Cf. Burnouf, <i>Lotus</i>, p. 520.—Should we read +<i>samudaya</i>?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85. +"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement +of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, +because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves +into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, +wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they +<i>have</i> this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite +forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in +definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical +agency."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p. +30.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of +Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his +explanations (as, <i>e.g.</i>, that of <i>samudáya</i> or <i>samudaya</i>, &c.) seem +to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<h2>THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.</h2> + + +<p>The Gymnosophists<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the +Muktakachchhas,<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> and maintaining continued existence to a certain +extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. +(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the +arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will +be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible—that +one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this +conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap +its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a +continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the +subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable +the doctrine of momentary existence, <i>i.e.</i>, an existence which lasts +only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.</p> + +<p>But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary +sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? +In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, +'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel +line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent +and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>you object that, 'if +this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'—[<i>i.e.</i>, A +might act, and B receive the punishment]—because there is an +essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and +effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in +sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite +certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the +stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series +to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled +with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through +the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As +it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'In whatever series of successive states the original +impression of the action was produced,</p> + +<p>"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness +produced in cotton.</p> + +<p>"'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the +citron, &c.,</p> + +<p>"'A certain capacity is produced in it,—do you not see +it?'"</p></div> + +<p>But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is +overthrown by the following dilemma:—</p> + +<p>In the example of the "cloud," &c. [<i>supra</i>, p. 15], was your +favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other? +It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not +always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your +example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to +the ground. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove +your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and +consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is +momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition +of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as +it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since +this undoubtedly produces the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> effect [of fear]. Hence it has been +said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an +origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."</p> + +<p>As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is +proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory +attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," +<i>that</i> also is wrong—for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the +holders of the Syád-váda<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> doctrine [<i>vide infra</i>] willingly admit the +indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the +example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, +and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each +moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated +without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In +individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or +in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is +held to be one [throughout all"].</p> + +<p>Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation +between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would +follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be +remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter +might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; +and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed +away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was +enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya—</p> + +<p>"The loss of the thing done,—the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing +not done,—the dissolution of all existence,—and the abolition of +memory,—bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of +these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary +destruction!"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></p> + +<p>Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time +of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment) +does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence +the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a +perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of +the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object +and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, +like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of +cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession], +and consequently the <i>Álambana</i>, or the object's data [<i>supra</i>, p. +29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes +(<i>pratyaya</i>).<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> + +<p>If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it +will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have +existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold. +For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a +certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of +explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of +impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon +it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid +incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the +perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the +abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the +external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a +definite reference to each man's personality [<i>i.e.</i>, I see the jar], +and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a +mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the +object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near," +&c., of the objects.<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as +exactly in accordance with your own <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span>views," because, in spite of all +our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as +"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you +say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really +possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are +applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really +belonging to it]"—because we do not find that this is the case in a +mirror [<i>i.e.</i>, it does not become a <i>far</i> reflection because it +represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an +object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object +be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become +itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to +grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into +hopeless difficulties.</p> + +<p>If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the +perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there +would be no perception that the object is insentient,<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> and so it is +a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has +lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no +perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its +being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, +the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a +jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that +the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. +And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the +blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that +both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the +character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on +perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also +constituting its character.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span></p><p>All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full +length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the +<i>Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa</i>, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling +the book too much.</p> + +<p>Therefore those who wish for the <i>summum bonum</i> of man must not accept +the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine. +The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> +in his <i>Áptaniśchayálaṅkára</i>.</p> + +<p>"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has +overcome all faults, desire, &c.,—adored by the three worlds, the +declarer of things as they are."</p> + +<p>But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the +path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found +to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhaṭṭa Kumárila<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>]?</p> + +<p>1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by +ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might +help us as a sign to infer his existence.</p> + +<p>2. "Nor is there any injunction (<i>vidhi</i>) of scripture which reveals +an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory +passages (<i>arthaváda</i>) be applied here.</p> + +<p>3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to +quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic +repetitions (<i>anuváda</i>), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere +before.</p> + +<p>4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject +of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and +spurious Veda?</p> + +<p>5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>his own word? +How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal +support?</p> + +<p>6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one +omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either +point be established without some previously established foundation?</p> + +<p>7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word +of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's +words.</p> + +<p>8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, +we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth] +proof, comparison (<i>upamána</i>).</p> + +<p>9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which +embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative, +if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and so on."</p> + +<p>We reply as follows:—As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's +existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative +proofs,—this is untenable, because there <i>are</i> proofs, as inference, +&c., which <i>do</i> establish<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> his existence. Thus any soul will become +omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects +remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. +Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, +when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, +just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of +darkness, &c., are removed. Now there <i>is</i> such a soul, which has its +hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>all things +remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is +the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for +grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímáṃsist could not maintain +that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the +authoritative injunction of a text,<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>—nor could there otherwise be +the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite +argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their +existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that +universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth +of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the +Púrva Mímáṃsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity +for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing +all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and +prohibitions, as is said [by Śabara in his commentary on the Sútras, +i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, +the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it +is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's +knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are +certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three +["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior +assaults of argument can be put to flight.</p> + +<p>But the Naiyáyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, +which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having +sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there +can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has +been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your +eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is +eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," +like other liberated persons,—since the use of the term "liberated" +necessarily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>implies the having been previously bound; and if the +latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of +the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his +being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.? +according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a +maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This +argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they +have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of +their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the +horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the +being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate +relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or +(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being +the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?</p> + +<p>Not <i>the first</i>, because it would apply too widely, as it would +include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in +contact with the parts of other things;] nor <i>the second</i>, because it +would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by +intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor <i>the +third</i>, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much +disputed as the one directly in question;<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> nor <i>the fourth</i>, +because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following +alternative:—Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a +substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to +itself,—or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to +something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the +former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and +has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the +latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original +point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate +relation in the parts, or the so-called <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>"intimate causes," which you +mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your +terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow +such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its +existence.</p> + +<p>Nor can <i>the fifth</i> alternative be allowed, because this would reach +too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object +of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged +to be not an effect.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> Nor can you maintain that the soul may still +be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with +something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object +of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual +contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is +all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not +all-pervading].</p> + +<p>And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?</p> + +<p>In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend +erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of +many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if +all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would +be superfluous. As it has been said in the <i>Vítarágastuti</i>, or "Praise +of Jina"—</p> + +<p>1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading, +independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, +whose teacher art <i>thou</i>."</p> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<p>2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his +influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use +of yourself or all the artisans, if Íśwara fabricates the three +worlds?"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span></p> + +<p>Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced +when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.</p> + +<p>Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are +impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,—because this +universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former +omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such +faults as <i>Anyonyáśrayatá</i>,<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> &c., because we accept an eternal +succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the +endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So +much for this preliminary discussion.</p> + +<p>The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are +thus described in the <i>Paramágamasára</i> (which is devoted to the +exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)—"Right intuition, right +knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been +thus explained by Yogadeva:—</p> + +<p>(<i>a.</i>) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been +declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute +faith in the teaching, <i>i.e.</i>, the entire absence of any contrary +idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the +<i>Tattvártha-sútra</i>, "Faith in the predicaments<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> is right +'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the +predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is +produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction." +"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of +another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the +teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.</p> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, +&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or +doubt; as it has been said—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span></p><p>"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the +predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the +wise."</p> + +<p>This knowledge is fivefold as divided into <i>mati</i>, <i>śruta</i>, <i>avadhi</i>, +<i>manas-paryáya</i>, and <i>kevala</i>; as it has been said, "<i>Mati</i>, <i>ś</i>ruta, +<i>avadhi</i>, <i>manas-paryáya</i>, and <i>kevala</i>, these are knowledge." The +meaning of this is as follows:—</p> + +<p>1. <i>Mati</i> is that by which one cognises an object through the +operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge +being abolished.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Śruta</i> is the clear knowledge produced by <i>mati</i>, all the +obstructions of knowledge being abolished.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Avadhi</i> is the knowledge of special objects caused by the +abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," +&c.<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> + +<p>4. <i>Manas-paryáya</i> is the clear definite knowledge of another's +thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of +knowledge caused by the veil of envy.</p> + +<p>5. <i>Kevala</i> is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which +ascetics practise various kinds of penance.</p> + +<p>The first of these (<i>mati</i>) is not self-cognised, the other four are. +Thus it has been said—</p> + +<p>"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which +manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and +itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two +ways."</p> + +<p>But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from +the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.</p> + +<p>(<i>c.</i>) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to +evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is +diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which +constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by +the Arhat—</p> + +<p>1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span>of +blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as +the 'five vows,' <i>ahiṃsá</i>, <i>súnṛita</i>, <i>asteya</i>, <i>brahmacharyá</i>, and +<i>aparigraha</i>.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<p>2. "The 'vow' of <i>ahiṃsá</i> is the avoidance of injuring life by any act +of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.</p> + +<p>3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of +<i>súnṛita</i>. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to +others and prejudicial.</p> + +<p>4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of +<i>asteya</i>; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is +killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.</p> + +<p>5. "The 'vow' of <i>brahmacharyá</i> (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the +abandonment of all desires,<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, +and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by +one's causing another to act.</p> + +<p>6. "The 'vow' of <i>aparigraha</i> is the renouncing of all delusive +interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought +may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.</p> + +<p>7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, +these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."</p> + +<p>The full account of the five states of mind (<i>bhávaná</i>) has been given +in the following passage [of which we only quote one śloka]—</p> + +<p>"Let him carry out the 'vow' of <i>súnṛita</i> uninterruptedly by the +abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the +deliberate avoidance of speech,"<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>—and so forth.</p> + +<p>These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when +united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of +an elixir, it is the knowledge of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>what it is, faith in its virtues, +and the actual application of the medicine,<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> united, which produce +the elixir's effect, but not severally.</p> + +<p>Here we may say concisely that the <i>tattvas</i> or predicaments are two, +<i>jíva</i> and <i>ajíva</i>; the soul, <i>jíva</i>, is pure intelligence; the +non-soul, <i>ajíva</i>, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus +said—</p> + +<p>"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;' +'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who +pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The +affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for +the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to +be pursued, which is defined as <i>upayoga</i>."</p> + +<p><i>Upayoga</i> [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes +place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation +of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of +<i>pradeśa</i> and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces +[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with +its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather +be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than +these."<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> + +<p>Intelligence (<i>chaitanya</i>) is common to all souls, and is the real +nature of the soul viewed as <i>pariṇata</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, as it is in itself]; +but by the influence of <i>upaśamakshaya</i> and <i>kshayopaśama</i> it appears +in the "mixed" form as possessing both,<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> or again, by the influence +of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, +&c.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span></p><p>"The <i>aupaśamika</i>, the <i>Ksháyika</i>, and the 'mixed' states are the +nature of the soul, and also the <i>audayika</i> and the <i>Páriṇámika</i>."</p> + +<p>1. The <i>aupaśamika</i> state of the soul arises when all the effects of +past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the +future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling +mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing +nut-plant,<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> &c.</p> + +<p>2. The <i>Ksháyika</i> state arises when there is the absolute abolition of +actions and their effects, as in final liberation.</p> + +<p>3. The "mixed" (<i>miśra</i>) state combines both these, as when water is +partly pure.</p> + +<p>4. The <i>audayika</i> state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent +influence on the future]. The <i>Páriṇámika</i> state is the soul's innate +condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent +states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> This nature, in one of the +above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether +happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.</p> + +<p>This has been explained in the <i>Svarúpa-sambodhana</i>—</p> + +<p>"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,—in some +way both different and the same,—knowledge is its first and last; +such is the soul described to be."</p> + +<p>If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, +we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being +equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to +support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid +non-perception<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this +is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the +advocates of the <i>Syád-váda</i>) it is perfectly notorious that all +things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p><p>Others lay down a different set of <i>tattvas</i> from the two mentioned +above, <i>jíva</i> and <i>ajíva</i>; they hold that there are five <i>astikáyas</i> +or categories,—<i>jíva</i>, <i>ákáśa</i>, <i>dharma</i>, <i>adharma</i>, and <i>pudgala</i>. +To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (<i>asti</i>),<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> +as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly +apply the idea of "body" (<i>káya</i>),<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> from their occupying several +parts of space.</p> + +<p>The <i>jívas</i> (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the +"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also +divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (<i>samanaska</i>), +and those destitute of it (<i>amanaska</i>). The former possesses <i>saṃjñá</i>, +<i>i.e.</i>, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving +instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are +also divided into two, as "locomotive" (<i>trasa</i>), or "immovable" +(<i>sthávara</i>).</p> + +<p>The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and +taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as +possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are +earth, water, fire, air, and trees.<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> But here a distinction must be +made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are +aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is +appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will +hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions +must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which +have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies, +are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of +earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> +These other immovable things, and such as only possess <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>the one sense +of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of +passing into any other state of existence.</p> + +<p><i>Dharma</i>, <i>adharma</i>, and <i>ákáśa</i> are singular categories [and not +generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are +the causes of a substance's change of place.</p> + +<p><i>Dharma</i>, "merit," and <i>adharma</i>, "demerit," are well known. They +assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally +extended<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called +Lokákáśa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred +from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of +<i>ákáśa</i> is seen when one thing enters into the space previously +occupied by another.</p> + +<p><i>Pudgala</i>, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of +two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> the +compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by +the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise +from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from +separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called +<i>pudgalas</i>, because they "fill" (<i>púr</i>), and "dissolve" (<i>gal</i>). +Although "time" is not properly an <i>astikáya</i>, because it does not +occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition], +still it is a <i>dravya</i> [or <i>tattva</i>], as the definition will hold; +"substance" (<i>dravya</i>) possesses "qualities and action."<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Qualities +reside <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the +general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the <i>jíva</i>, form, &c., of the +body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion +into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit," +"demerit," and <i>ákáśa</i>. "Action" (<i>paryáya</i>) has thus been defined; +the actions (<i>paryáyáḥ</i>) of a substance are, as has been said, its +existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its +course to the end, as, <i>e.g.</i>, in the <i>jíva</i>, the knowledge of +objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the <i>pudgala</i>, the +lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special +functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or <i>tattvas</i> +[<i>i.e.</i>, the five above mentioned and "time"].</p> + +<p>Others reckon the <i>tattvas</i> as seven, as has been said—</p> + +<p>"The <i>tattvas</i> are <i>jíva</i>, <i>ajíva</i>, <i>ásrava</i>, <i>bandha</i>, <i>saṃvara</i>, +<i>nirjará</i>, and <i>moksha</i>." <i>Jíva</i> and <i>ajíva</i> have been already described. +<i>Ásrava</i> is described as the movement of the soul called <i>yoga</i>,<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> +through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, +<i>audárika</i>, &c. As a door opening into the water is called <i>ásrava</i>, +because it causes the stream to descend through it,<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> so this <i>yoga</i> is +called <i>ásrava</i>, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences +flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to +it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, +collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions +which are brought to it by <i>yoga</i>. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated +lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the <i>jíva</i>, heated +by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought +by <i>yoga</i>. <i>Kasháya</i> ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts" +(<i>kash</i>) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, +pride, delusion, and lust. <i>Ásrava</i> is twofold, as good or evil. Thus +abstaining from doing injury is a good <i>yoga</i> of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>body; speaking what +is true, measured, and profitable is a good <i>yoga</i> of the speech.</p> + +<p>These various subdivisions of <i>ásrava</i> have been described at length +in several <i>Sútras</i>. "<i>Ásrava</i> is the impulse to action with body, +speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or +demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:—"<i>Ásrava</i> is the +action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; +the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by +means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form, +&c."<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> + +<p><i>Bandha</i>, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false +intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (<i>kasháya</i>), +and also by the force of <i>yoga</i>, assumes various bodies occupying many +parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are +suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes +bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"</p></div> + +<p>In this quotation the word "sin" (<i>kasháya</i>) is used to include the +other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed. +Váchakáchárya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes +of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and +sin."</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) "False intuition" is twofold,—either innate from one's natural +character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence +of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,—or +derived, when learned by another's teaching.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and +the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) "Carelessness" (<i>pramáda</i>) is a want of effort to practise the +five kinds of <i>samiti</i>, <i>gupti</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>&c.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction +that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of +bondage called <i>sthiti</i> and <i>anubháva</i>; <i>yoga</i> [or <i>ásrava</i>] causes +those kinds called <i>prakṛiti</i> and <i>pradeśa</i>.</p> + +<p>"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "<i>Prakṛiti</i>, <i>sthiti</i>, +<i>anubháva</i>, and <i>pradeśa</i> are its four kinds."</p> + +<p>1. <i>Prakṛiti</i> means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or +sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into +eight <i>múla-prakṛitis</i>.<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p> + +<p>Thus obstructions (<i>ávaraṇa</i>)<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> cloud the knowledge and intuition, +as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (<i>a</i>) +<i>jnánávaraṇa</i>, or (<i>b</i>) <i>darśanávaraṇa</i>. (<i>c</i>) An object recognised as +simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and +pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,—this is <i>vedaníya</i>. (<i>d</i>) +A delusion (<i>mohaníya</i>) in intuition produces want of faith in the +Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in +conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (<i>e</i>) +<i>Áyus</i> produces the bond of body, like a snare.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> (<i>f</i>) <i>Náman</i>, or +"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter +paints his different pictures. (<i>g</i>) <i>Gotra</i> produces the idea of +noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (<i>h</i>) <i>Antaráya</i> +produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the +king by considerations of economy.</p> + +<p>Thus is the <i>prakṛiti-bandha</i> eightfold, being denominated as the +eight <i>múla-prakṛitis</i>, with subdivisions according to the different +actions of the various subject-matter.</p> + +<p>And thus has Umáswáti-váchakáchárya<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> declared: "The first kind of +<i>bandha</i> consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition, +<i>vedaníya</i>, <i>mohaníya</i>, <i>áyus</i>, <i>náman</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span><i>gotra</i>, and <i>antaráya</i>;" and he +has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine, +twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been +explained at full length in the <i>Vidyánanda</i> and other works, and here is +omitted through fear of prolixity.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Sthiti.</i> As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued +unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first +three <i>múla-prakṛitis</i>, <i>jnánávaraṇa</i>, &c., and the last, <i>antaráya</i>, have +not swerved from their respective natures even through the period +described in the words, "<i>sthiti</i> lasts beyonds crores of crores of +periods of time measured by thirty <i>ságaropamas</i>."<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> This continuance is +<i>sthiti</i>.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Anubháva.</i> As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there +exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for +producing<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> its several effects, so in the different material bodies +produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (<i>anubháva</i>) +for producing their respective effects.</p> + +<p>4. <i>Pradeśa.</i> The <i>bandha</i> called <i>pradeśa</i> is the entrance into the +different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless +number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the +consequences of actions.</p> + +<p><i>Saṃvara</i> is the stopping of <i>ásrava</i>—that by which the influence of +past actions (<i>karman</i>) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is +divided into <i>gupti</i>, <i>samiti</i>, &c. <i>Gupti</i> is the withdrawal of the +soul from that "impulse" (<i>yoga</i>) which causes mundane existence,—it +is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. <i>Samiti</i> is the +acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided +into five kinds, as <i>íryá</i>,<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> <i>bháshá</i>, &c., as has been explained +by Hemachandra.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span></p><p>1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk +circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good +call <i>íryá</i>.</p> + +<p>2. "Let him practise<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> a measured utterance in his intercourse with +all people; this is called <i>bháshá-samiti</i>, dear to the restrainers of +speech.</p> + +<p>3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults +which may accrue to alms, is called the <i>eshaṇá-samiti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p> + +<p>4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let +him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,—this is called the +<i>ádána-samiti</i>.</p> + +<p>5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations +in a spot free from all living creatures,<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a>—this is the +<i>utsarga-samiti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Hence <i>samvara</i> has been etymologically analysed +as that which closes (<i>sam</i> + <i>vṛiṇoti</i>) the door of the stream of +<i>ásrava</i>,<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> as has been said by the learned, '<i>Ásrava</i> is the cause +of mundane existence, <i>saṃvara</i> is the cause of liberation;<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> this +is the Árhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification +of this.'"</p> + +<p><i>Nirjará</i> is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by +self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit +of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness +and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair, +&c. This <i>nirjará</i> is twofold,<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> "temporary" (<i>yathákála</i>) and +ancillary (<i>aupakramaṇika</i>). It is "temporary" as when a desire is +dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at +that particular time, from this completion of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span>the object aimed at, +<i>nirjará</i> arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c. +But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into +means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the <i>nirjará</i> of +actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions +which are the seeds of mundane existence, <i>nirjará</i> arises, which is +twofold, <i>sakámá</i> and <i>akámá</i>. That called <i>sakámá</i> belongs to +ascetics, the <i>akámá</i> to other embodied spirits."<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> + +<p><i>Moksha.</i> Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire +absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false +perception, &c.) are stopped,<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> and since all past actions are +abolished in the presence of the causes of <i>nirjará</i>, there arises the +absolute release from all actions,—this is <i>moksha</i>; as it has been +said: "<i>Moksha</i> is the absolute release from all actions by the decay +(<i>nirjará</i>) of the causes of bondage and of existence."</p> + +<p>Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's +wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have +stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated +contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of <i>moksha</i> +exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul +onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, +sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its +encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its +isolation,<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of +the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span></p><p>"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual +interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; <i>saṅga</i> is +merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:—</p> + +<p>"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, +from the absence of <i>saṅga</i>, from the cutting of all bonds, and from +the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the +potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the +castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."</p> + +<p>Hence they recite a śloka:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, +moon, and the rest;</p> + +<p>"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to +Álokákáśa."</p></div> + +<p>Others hold <i>moksha</i> to be the abiding in the highest regions, the +soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself +untainted by any pain or impression thereof.</p> + +<p>Others hold nine <i>tattwas</i>, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the +foregoing seven,—these two being the causes of pleasure and pain. +This has been declared in the <i>Siddhánta</i>, "<i>Jíva</i>, <i>ajíva</i>, <i>puṇya</i>, +<i>pápa</i>, <i>ásrava</i>, <i>saṃvara</i>, <i>nirjaraṇa</i>, <i>bandha</i>, and <i>moksha</i>, are +the nine <i>tattwas</i>." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.</p> + +<p>Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the +<i>sapta-bhaṅgí-naya</i>,<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may +be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may +be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable," +"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not, +and not predicable." All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:—</p> + +<p>1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say +'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'</p> + +<p>2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>procedure +likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it +be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.</p> + +<p>3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first +as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its +indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.</p> + +<p>4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be +employed simultaneously."</p> + +<p><i>Syát</i>, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a +part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it +has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This particle <i>syát</i> is in the form of a verb, but, from +its being connected with the sense, it denotes +indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect +on the implied meaning."</p></div> + +<p>If, again, the word <i>syát</i> denoted determinateness, then it would be +needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes +indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" <i>syát</i>, +"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," <i>kathaṃchit</i>; and so it is +not really useless. As one has said—</p> + +<p>"The doctrine of the <i>syád-váda</i> arises from our everywhere rejecting +the idea of the absolute;<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> it depends on the <i>sapta-bhaṅgí-naya</i>, +and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to +be accepted."</p> + +<p>If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, +everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would +ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to +treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. +But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at +certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. +Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is <i>being</i> +or <i>non-being</i> the real nature of the thing?" The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>real nature of the +thing cannot be <i>being</i>, for then you could not properly use the +phrase, "It is a pot" (<i>ghaṭósti</i>), as the two words "is" and "pot" +would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the +words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same +argument is to be used in other questions.<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> As it has been +declared—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' +implies 'is;'</p> + +<p>"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and +non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.</p></div> + +<p>The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents +severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and +non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is +inexplicable (<i>anirvachaníyatá</i>);<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> three other classes hold one or +other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> Now, +when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?" +&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way," +&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues +to the holder of the <i>Syád-váda</i>, which ascertains the entire meaning +of all things. Thus said the teacher in the <i>Syádváda-mañjarí</i>—</p> + +<p>"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the +omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of +scientific investigation.<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> When our reasonings based on one point +proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed <i>Syád-váda</i>, +which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."</p> + +<p>"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions +and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which +with no partiality equally favours all sects."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></p><p>The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri—</p> + +<p>"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, +giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, +liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, +deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (<i>dosha</i>) according to our +system.<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true +knowledge of the <i>tattwas</i>. The path<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> of emancipation consists of +knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof +(<i>pramáṇa</i>) in the <i>Syád-váda</i> doctrine,—sense-perception and +inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are +nine or seven <i>tattwas</i>. The <i>jíva</i>, the <i>ajíva</i>, merit and demerit, +<i>ásrava</i>, <i>saṃvara</i>, <i>bandha</i>, <i>nirjará</i>, <i>mukti</i>,—we will now +explain each. <i>Jíva</i> is defined as intelligence; <i>ajíva</i> is all other +than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the +opposite; <i>ásrava</i> is the bondage of actions,<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> <i>nirjará</i> is the +unloosing thereof; <i>moksha</i> arises from the destruction of the eight +forms of <i>karman</i> or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is +included in <i>saṃvara</i>,<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> and "demerit" in <i>ásrava</i>.</p> + +<p>"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> and is +hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute +liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetámbaras are the destroyers of +all defilement, they live by alms,<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> they pluck out their hair, +they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the +Jaina <i>Sádhus</i>. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>carry +peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they +eat upright in the giver's house,—these are the second class of the +Jaina Ṛishis.</p> + +<p>"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so +say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point +between them and the Śwetámbaras."<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Vivasanas</i>, "without garments."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> "The Buddhists are also called <i>Muktakachchhas</i>, +alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the +hem of the lower garment untucked."—<i>Colebrooke.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> In p. 26, line 3, read <i>Syád-vádinám</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, <i>infra</i>, <i>gráhyasya</i> +for <i>agráhyasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> I correct the reading <i>tasyágrahaṇaṃ</i> to <i>tasyá +grahaṇaṃ</i> (<i>tasyá</i> being <i>jaḍatáyáḥ</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, if you say that the <i>avayava</i> may be not seen +though the <i>avayavin</i> is seen, then I may say that the post is the +<i>avayavin</i>, and the unperceived three worlds its <i>avayava</i>!</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> I read <i>arhatsvarúpam arhachchandra</i> in p. 27, line 3, +<i>infra</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's +writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the +Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a +little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He +repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that +there was some truth in their teaching. <i>Jainagurumukhát kaśchid +vidyáleśo játaḥ.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as +his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised +proofs,—the sixth, <i>abháva</i>, being negative, is, of course, not +applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability +of "presumption" or <i>arthá-patti</i>. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat +were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, +but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by +retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a +Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it +cannot be convincing in his own.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> In p. 29, line 2, read <i>tatsadbhávávedakasya</i> for +<i>tatsadbhávádekasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> In p. 29, line 9, for <i>nikhilárthajñanát notpatty</i>, I +propose to read <i>nikhilárthajñánotpatty</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Janya</i> is included in <i>Kárya</i> and equally disputed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Thus "I am possessed of a body" (<i>aham Śarírí</i>), "my +hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the +notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the +<i>Anavasthádosha</i> or reasoning <i>ad infinitum</i>. He accepts the supposed +fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before +everybody's eyes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> In p. 31, line 5, <i>infra</i>, read <i>tattvárthe</i> for +<i>tattvártham</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> I read in p. 32, line 9, <i>Samyagdarśanádi</i> for +<i>asamyagdarśanádi</i>; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition +of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Cf. the five <i>yamas</i> in the <i>Yoga-sútras</i>, ii. 30. +Hemachandra (<i>Abhidh</i> 81) calls them <i>yamas</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> I read <i>kámánám</i> for <i>kámáṇám</i> in p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 = +18).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> For <i>abháshaṇa</i>, see Hemach. 16.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> I propose in p. 33, line 17, +<i>raśayanajñánaśraddhávacháraṇáni</i> for <i>rasáyaṇajñanaṃ +śraddhánávaraṇáni</i>. For <i>avacháraṇa</i>, see <i>Suśruta</i>, vol. ii. p. 157, +&c. If <i>anávaraṇa</i> be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the +absence of obstructions."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it +by the scholiast to Hemachandra, <i>Abhidh</i>. 79.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Or this may mean "by the influence of <i>upaśamakshaya</i> or +<i>kshayopaśama</i>, it appears characterised by one or the other."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> I read in p. 34, line 7, <i>kalushádyákáreṇa</i> for +<i>kalushányákáreṇa</i>. The <i>upaśamakshaya</i> and <i>kshayopaśama</i> seem to +correspond to the <i>aupaśamika</i> and <i>ksháyika</i> states about to be +described.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Strychnos potatorum.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not +really bound though it seems to itself to be so.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, +and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as +the eye, light, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> I read in p. 35, line 5, <i>'stíti</i> for <i>sthiti</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Hence the term here used for "category"—<i>astikáya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> These (by Hemach. <i>Abhidh.</i> 21), possess only one +sense—touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read <i>śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas +trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> In p. 35, line 16, I read <i>teshám ajívatvát</i> for <i>tesháṃ +jívatvát</i>. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because +the former only are animate."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read <i>sarvatrávasthite</i> for +<i>sarvatrávasthiti</i>. In the preceding line I read <i>álokenávachchhinne</i> for +<i>álokenávichchhinne</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. The <i>vishaya</i> is +<i>upabhoga-sádhanam</i>, but it begins with the <i>dvyaṇuka</i>. This category +takes up the forms of <i>sthávara</i> which were excluded from <i>jíva</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava +for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is +analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this +definition of <i>dravya</i>,—cf. <i>Vaiśesh. Sútra</i>, i. 1, 15. <i>Paryáya</i> is +explained as <i>karman</i> in Hemach. <i>Anek</i>. <i>Paryáya</i>, in p. 36, line 11 +(<i>infra</i>, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that +which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach. +<i>Abhidh</i>. 1503, <i>paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>Yoga</i> seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul +to act.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> In line 18, read <i>ásravaṇakáraṇatvád</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> The <i>jnána</i> is one, but it becomes apparently manifold +by its connection with the senses and external objects.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> These are also called the eight <i>karmans</i> in +Govindánanda's gloss, <i>Ved. Sút.</i>, ii. 2, 33.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> The Calcutta MS. reads <i>ádaraṇíyasya</i> for +<i>ávaraṇíyasya</i>, in p. 37, last line. But <i>ávaraṇíya</i> may be used for +<i>ávarana</i> (<i>Páṇ.</i> iii. 4, 68). Cf. <i>Yoga Sút.</i>, ii. 52, where Vyása's +Comm. has <i>ávaraṇíya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> <i>Jálavat</i>? The printed text has <i>jalavat</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Umásvámi-?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> For the <i>ságaropama</i>, see Wilson's <i>Essays</i>, vol. i. p. +309. In p. 38, line 16, I read <i>ityádyuktakálád úrdhvam api</i> for the +obscure <i>ityádyuktaṃ káladurddhánavat</i>. I also read at the end of the +line <i>prachyutiḥ sthitiḥ</i> for <i>prachyutisthitiḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> In p. 38, line 18, read <i>svakáryakaraṇe</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for <i>írshyá</i> read +<i>íryá</i>,—a bad misreading.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> In p. 39, line 6, I read <i>ápadyetá</i> for <i>ápadyatá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> In p. 39, line 9, for <i>seshaṇá</i> read <i>saishaṇá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> In p. 39, line 12, join <i>nirjantu</i> and <i>jagatítale</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> Mádhava omits the remaining divisions of <i>saṃvara</i>. +Wilson, <i>Essays</i>, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as <i>parishahá</i>, +"endurance," as of a vow; <i>yatidharma</i>, "the ten duties of an ascetic, +patience, gentleness," &c.; <i>bhávaná</i>, "conviction," such as that +worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; <i>cháritra</i>, "virtuous +observance."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> In p. 39, line 14, read <i>ásravasrotaso</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> For <i>moha</i>, in line 16, read <i>moksha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> In p. 39, line 2 <i>infra</i>, I read <i>yathákála-</i> for <i>yathá +kála-</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> This passage is very difficult and not improbably +corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary +<i>nirjará</i> is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a +passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That <i>nirjará</i> +is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the +attainment of the highest good. The former is <i>akámá</i>, "desireless," +because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the +latter is <i>sakámá</i>, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire +under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> I read <i>nirodhe</i> for <i>nirodhah</i> in p. 40, line 6; cf. p. +37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in +which future actions are to be performed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> Literally "absence of <i>sanga</i>."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> In p. 41, line 7, read <i>sapta-bhaṅgí-naya</i>, see Ved. S. +Gloss., ii. 2, 23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> I cannot understand the words at the end of the first +line, <i>kim vṛitatadvidheḥ</i>, and therefore leave them untranslated.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Thus Govindánanda applies it (<i>Ved. Sút.</i>, ii. 2, 33) to +"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> 'Ακαταληψἱα This is Śriharsha's tenet in the +<i>Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> In p. 42, line 17, for <i>matenámiśritáni</i> read <i>matena +miśritáni</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> In p. 43, line 2, for <i>na yasya</i> read <i>nayasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is +really identical with that given in Hemachandra's <i>Abhidhána-chintámaṇi</i>, +72, 73; but we must correct the readings to <i>antaráyás</i>, <i>rágadwesháv +aviratiḥ smaraḥ</i>, and <i>háso</i> for <i>himsá</i>. The order of the eighteen +<i>doshas</i> in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, +10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> In p. 43, line 13, for <i>vartini</i> read <i>vartiniḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> This seems corrupt,—a line is probably lost.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> In last line, for <i>saṃsrave</i> read <i>saṃvare</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, +the liberated and liberation? These are called <i>ananta</i>. See Weber's +<i>Bhagavatí</i>, pp. 250, 261-266.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>Sarajoharaṇáh</i> is explained by the <i>rajoharaṇadhárin</i> +(= <i>vratin</i>) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> Cf. Wilson, <i>Essays</i>, i. 340. For <i>strím</i> read <i>strí</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<h2>THE RÁMÁNUJA SYSTEM.</h2> + + +<p>This doctrine of the Árhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for +whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous +co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a +plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should +any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of +existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why +should there not be an alternation between existence and +non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not <i>Ens</i>, that +alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is +multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa +and of the incarnation of Vishṇu as half man, half lion; for the +elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human +in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts +being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of +a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the +same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence +in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be +compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different +times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then +indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to +be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length +and shortness which pertain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span> to the same thing (in different +relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no +contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects. +Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as +reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same +thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other +<i>bhaṅgas</i> (Árhata tenets).</p> + +<p>Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven <i>bhaṅgas</i>, which lies at +the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory), +or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform, +there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are +multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to +prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent) +proving nothing.<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> In either case, there is rope for a noose for +the neck of the Syád-Vádin.</p> + +<p>An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Árhata +system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be, +when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine +or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his +organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, +whether it be ninefold or not!</p> + +<p>In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Árhatas +say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in +the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism +assume a plurality of bodies, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>there is a differentiation of the soul +for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not +(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole +body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine +body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of +filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul +resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like +the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion, +according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the +road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior +of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition) +that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently +non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good +and evil unmerited.</p> + +<p>As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the +rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of +the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.</p> + +<p>Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible +revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyása accordingly +propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in +one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rámánuja with the +express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets +of Rámánuja are as follows:—Three categories are established, as +soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer. +Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari +(Vishṇu)</p> + +<p>"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible +world is not-soul."</p></div> + +<p>Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkaráchárya), maintain that pure +intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is +really existent; and that this absolute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span> whose essence is eternal, +pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the +individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object" +(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation. +The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject +and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one +reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair +sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so +forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this +beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of +individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity +with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows +spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of +things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz., +Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and +thinking themselves very wise, the Śáṅkaras will not tolerate this +division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and +Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:—This +might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But +there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity, +suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am +ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said +(to explain the views of the Śáṅkara)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by +knowledge,</p> + +<p>"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."</p></div> + +<p>This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about +the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One +who leans on the arm of Prabhákara, or one to whom Kumárila-bhaṭṭa +gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the +existent and non-existent,</p> + +<p>"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. +Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught +else is observed."</p></div> + +<p>They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being +cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (<i>anupalabdhi</i>), and +knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of +knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who +maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above +argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and +other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the +consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised +by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent? +If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of +knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there +is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness +presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will +not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Śáṅkaras continue) as the +foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be +entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and +other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative +ignorance.</p> + +<p>All this (the Rámánuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be +for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative +ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we +would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and +as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is +presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge +of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented, +how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no +object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is +revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and +thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> +accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we +rejoin:—Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must +arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion +to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must, +therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know +not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of +cognition allowed by us both.</p> + +<p>Well, then (the Śáṅkaras may contend), let the form of cognition +evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as +follows:—Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another +entity (<i>sc.</i> illusion), an entity different from mere prior +non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge, +which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of +knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object +not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the +first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand +grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent) +illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not +admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do +not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example +is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that +illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only +that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by +knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only +ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition, +ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness. +We dismiss further prolixity.</p> + +<p>The counterposition (of the Rámánujas) is as follows:—The illusion +under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge, +because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any +one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion +about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> Do not +start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare +existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about +(<i>i.e.</i>, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness, +also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c., +constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If +any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have +cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a +gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of +light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres—for light, +as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a +mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a +quality derived from determination by that substance,—so this soul, +while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence +as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always +within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is +within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is +itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no +suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul +which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For +this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the +thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the +like texts.</p> + +<p>It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the +existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth +(<i>anṛita</i>); for the word untruth (<i>anṛita</i>) denotes that which is +other than truth (<i>ṛita</i>). The word <i>ṛita</i> has a passive sense, as +appears from the words, Drinking <i>ṛita</i>. <i>Ṛita</i> means works done +without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the +bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in +question, untruth (<i>anṛita</i>) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed +during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from +propitiation of the Supreme Spirit),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> which temporal fruit is +obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (<i>brahman</i>); the +entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not +this supreme sphere (<i>brahma-loka</i>) are enveloped in untruth. In such +texts, again, as Let him know illusion (<i>máyá</i>) to be the primary +emanative cause (<i>prakṛiti</i>), the term (<i>máyá</i>) designates the +emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (<i>guṇa</i>), and +creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the +inexplicable illusion (for which the Śáṅkaras contend).</p> + +<p>In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child, +moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (<i>máyá</i>) of the barbarian were +swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion" +(<i>máyá</i>) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of +projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an +inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred +from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art +thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate +Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of +the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a +supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of +excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme +Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a +repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the +emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a +pastime;<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts +as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word +Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the +Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual +spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates +one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vádin may +reply: Why <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>may not the purport of the reference to the same object in +the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of +souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate +power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the +case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that +Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a +different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation +to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is +understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same +object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be +known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That) +must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and +place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text, +That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by +abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz., +finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and +infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul). +This suggestion (the Rámánujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is +no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that +Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of +"implication" (<i>lakshaṇá</i>, both This and That being used in their +denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past +and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed +to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a +supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being +past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede +to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable +by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is +unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we +admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one +thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it +differs as this and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> as that, permanence in things will be +inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things +will be triumphant.</p> + +<p>We have, therefore (the Rámánujas continue), laid it down in this +question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the +individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the +body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the +body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with +the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the +soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul +is the body.</p> + +<p>Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. <span class="smcap">All</span> words are +designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a +variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine, +human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the +body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit. +Hence—</p> + +<p>God, Man, Yaksha, Piśácha, serpent, Rákshasa, bird, tree, creeper, +wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,—these and all other words, be they +what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means +of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting +things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the +individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole +complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within. +That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme +Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktávalí and in the Chaturantara—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else +than That, called the established entity,</p> + +<p>"Of this there is much significant and undoubted +exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;</p> + +<p>"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the +form of gods, mortals, and the rest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span></p> + +<p>"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made +a diversity of names and forms in the world."</p></div> + +<p>In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the +rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in +systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words, +"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that +it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord, +lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all +words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be +ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by +Rámánuja in the Vedártha-saṅgraha, when analysing the Vedic text about +names and forms.</p> + +<p>Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there +can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even +in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned) +thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could +not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented +form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the +universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what +was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does +knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this +illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that +there is no proof of these positions.</p> + +<p>Nor is there an absurdity (as the Śáṅkaras would say), on the +hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming +that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it +is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary +cause (<i>prakṛiti</i>), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary +elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and +the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and +so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms, +is all an effect, and that from the single cognition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span> of absolute +spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is +absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect), +there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one +cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were +unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one +cognition all cognition would be sublated.</p> + +<p>It is laid down (by the Rámánujas) that retractation into the universe +(<i>pralaya</i>) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls +and the originant (<i>prakṛiti</i>), returns to its imperceptible state, +unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute +spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the +gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is +soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the +condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way +the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyása) +treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the +Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to +deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by +those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are +explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real +existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical +with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all +forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being +forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> + +<p>What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a +universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is +admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as +all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that +one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as +soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>that the +essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and +not to be confounded.</p> + +<p>Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls, +consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped +in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction +and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. +Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains +proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the +Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are +not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure +and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, +susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of +the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal +controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of +fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, +majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of +auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than +himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite +adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and +divine.</p> + +<p>Veṅkaṭa-nátha has given the following distribution of things:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Those who know it have declared the principle to be +twofold, substance and non-substance;</p> + +<p>"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the +former being the unevolved (<i>avyakta</i>), and time.</p> + +<p>"The latter is the 'near' (<i>pratyak</i>) and the 'distant' +(<i>parák</i>); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the +Lord;</p> + +<p>"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other +principle some have called the unsentient primary."</p></div> + +<p>Of these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the +originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;</p> + +<p>"Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and +cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;</p> + +<p>"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three +cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as +characterised by goodness;</p> + +<p>"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is +intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance +summarily recounted."</p></div> + +<p>Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called +souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the +text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20). +Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kaṇáda, iii. 2, 20), +Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity +of souls is often spoken of in revelation—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall +it again cease to be;</p> + +<p>"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not +killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gítá, ii. 20).</p></div> + +<p>Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of +requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has +accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautaṃa, iii. 25): Because +no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is +atomic is well known from revelation—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a +hundred times,</p> + +<p>"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is +capable of infinity."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a +wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as +atomic."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span></p> + +<p>The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is +divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of +fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the +Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vásudeva +(a patronymic of Kṛishṇa), and the like.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Vásudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with +auspicious attributes,</p> + +<p>"The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the +animator of spirits."</p></div> + +<p>This same Vásudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted +to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various +rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of +pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration" +(<i>archá</i>), "emanation" (<i>vibhava</i>), "manifestation" (<i>vyúha</i>), "the +subtile" (<i>súkshma</i>), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration" +is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Ráma, +and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vásudeva, +Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the +entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vásudeva. His +attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt +from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless, +without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.) +The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to +the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by +worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end +of the soul (<i>i.e.</i>, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary +becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It +has, therefore, been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Vásudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as +desired by each,</p> + +<p>"According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large +recompense.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span></p> + +<p>"For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five +embodiments;</p> + +<p>"Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are +'emanations;'</p> + +<p>"As Saṅkarshaṅa, Vásudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his +manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile' +is the entire six attributes;</p> + +<p>"That self-same called Vásudeva is styled the Supreme +Spirit;</p> + +<p>"The internal controller is declared as residing in the +soul, the actuator of the soul,</p> + +<p>"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such +as 'Who abiding in the soul.'</p> + +<p>"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his +defilement becomes a qualified votary;</p> + +<p>"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes +qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,</p> + +<p>"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able +to behold the 'internal controller.'"</p></div> + +<p>The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcha-rátra as +consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the +preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these, +access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the +temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the +like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities. +Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention +to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishṇu, the +commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth +the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the +visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by +the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme +Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his +lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless, +marked by consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> of being like him, from which there is no +future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the +traditionary text—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer +undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory, +having attained to the supreme consummation.</p> + +<p>"Vásudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own +mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more +return."</p></div> + +<p>After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of +the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedánta aphorisms by +the venerated Bodháyanachárya too prolix, Rámánuja composed a +commentary on the Śárírakamímánsá (or Vedánta theosophy). In this the +sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired +to be known," is given as follows:—The word <i>then</i> in this aphorism +means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the +glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to +know the absolute. The word <i>hence</i> states the reason, viz., because +one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its +meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being +perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs +for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By +the word <i>absolute</i> is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are +essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable +excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the +knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is +mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting +away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the +knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge +of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and +the latter Mímánsá constitute one system of institutes. On this +account the glossator has described<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> this system as one with the +sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is +perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable, +has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the +spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by +the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive +reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the +other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is +efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter +who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who +delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these +both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes +immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the +Pañcharátra-rahasya—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,</p> + +<p>"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.</p> + +<p>"These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the +Subtile, the Internal Controller,</p> + +<p>"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of +knowledge.</p> + +<p>"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,</p> + +<p>"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next +embodiment.</p> + +<p>"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and +traditional,</p> + +<p>"By the aforesaid worship Vásudeva becomes propitious to +mankind.</p> + +<p>"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of +meditation,</p> + +<p>"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the +aggregate of works.</p> + +<p>"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which +transmigration has vanished,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.</p> + +<p>"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and +the Lord,</p> + +<p>"Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the +Deity.</p> + +<p>"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute, +which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;</p> + +<p>"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."</p></div> + +<p>It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain +must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute +spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According +to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, +and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of +desire is predominant (in the word <i>jijñásitavya</i>), and desired +knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute +must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by +such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial +knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to +any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each, +even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as: +Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to +be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known, +let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond +knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being +understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz., +<i>shaḍaṅgena vedo'dhyeyo jñeyaścha</i>, the Veda, with its six appendages, +is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda +must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages, +engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it +and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to +be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being +understood<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the +aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is +significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken +succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in +the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all +knots,—that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of +emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,</p> + +<p>"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the +Highest and Lowest,"</p></div> + +<p>because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self +indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is +an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of +the representations. The author of the Vákya has treated of all this +in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The +characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is +not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning; +Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds +its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is +choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is +of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"To them always devoted, who worship me with love,</p> + +<p>"I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to +me."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith +unwavering."</p></div> + +<p>But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other +motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other +desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and +other means. As is said by the author of the Vákya: Attainment +thereof<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> results from discrimination (<i>viveka</i>), exemption (<i>vimoka</i>), +practice (<i>abhyása</i>), observance (<i>kriyá</i>), excellence (<i>kalyáṇa</i>), +freedom from despondency (<i>anavasáda</i>), satisfaction (<i>anuddharsha</i>), +according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication +(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature, +resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of +discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and +by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption +is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the +quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary +explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gítá) by (Rámánuja) the +author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof. +Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and +tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic +text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the +supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity +(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by +veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the +explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted. +Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of +dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus +been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been +dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain +rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a +presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as +incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit +(Vaikuṇṭha) is attained. Thus Yámuna says: Attainable by the final and +absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works +and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by +the devotion of works and knowledge.</p> + +<p>In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> be desired to +be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which +the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the +creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the +universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation, +sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably +multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmá +to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from +this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities +which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as +indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, +omniscient, and omnipotent.</p> + +<p>In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an +absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes +itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its +source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be +that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is +the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of +knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is +the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other +form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the +absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the +illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an +effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin. +It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements, +that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.</p> + +<p>Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other +kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation +of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by +anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth +aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to +exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> system is +the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of +the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest +end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz., +Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a +sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with +cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe +that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A +son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the +cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We +have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt +from the original (viz., Rámánuja's Bháshya on the Vedánta aphorisms); +we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity; +and thus all is clear.<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of +Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular +statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands +and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, +if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to +inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples +both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the +Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he +proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive +information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he +declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean +Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, +and simply pointed with his finger."—Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp. +297, 298.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's +pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be +the plaything of God.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."—<i>Pope.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> For further details respecting Rámánuja and his system, +see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. +The <i>Tattva-muktávalí</i> was printed in the <i>Pandit</i> for September 1871; +but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<h2>THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.</h2> + + +<p>Ánanda-tírtha (Púrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rámánuja +system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size +of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda +without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the +self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, +dependency upon the Pañcha-rátra, the reality of plurality in the +universe, and so forth,—yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to +reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the +tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a +number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under +a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a +new explication of the Brahma-Mímáṇsá (or Vedánta).</p> + +<p>For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into +independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;</p> + +<p>"The independent is Vishṇu the Lord, exempt from +imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."</p></div> + +<p>Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vádins): Why predicate of the +absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads, +which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and +heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span> replied: Not +so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs +positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception, +for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces +a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent +will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional +difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite? +The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing +and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes +such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be +asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension +of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its +contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be +thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or +without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw +(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and +its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing +apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous +apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for +cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the +cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference; +the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and +non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised +even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent +contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent +concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as +follows:—Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a +difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who +maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In +the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable +Bráhman for the offence of a thief, the objections<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> you adduce being +irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is +the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but +if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere; +this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is +first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name +and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for +example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is +first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate +judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or +contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishṇu-tattva-nirṇaya: +"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and +determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or +predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were +proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its +counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical +circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real +predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because +difference is a <i>thing</i>) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as +if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word +<i>cow</i>. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as +such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a +presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and +judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the +same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., +aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the +Sáṅkhya-káriká, v. vii.)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from +defect in the organs, from instability of the common +sensory,</p> + +<p>"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered, +and from aggregation of similars."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span></p> + +<p>There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak +of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium +applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of +lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or +the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered +by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common +sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of +things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the +light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being +overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of +similars.</p> + +<p>Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no +harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes +and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is +possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference +in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some +ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to +infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said +ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and +say that two things are different as differenced from the different. +Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, +for there being no difference to serve as the example in such +inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus +it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a +little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be +no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride +is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, +then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no +trouble.</p> + +<p>Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the +Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its +obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that +person, a king, for instance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> from his attendant. For men, desiring +as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the +slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not +become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of +all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the +excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the +gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has +been said:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,</p> + +<p>"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence +all that they desire."</p></div> + +<p>Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vádins) in their thirst to be one +with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a +mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a +fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme +Vishṇu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness +(<i>andha-tamasa</i>). The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the +Mahábhárata-tátparya-nirṇaya:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishṇu's anger is waxed +great;</p> + +<p>"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they +decide blindly."</p></div> + +<p>This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised +into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.</p> + +<p>Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the +weapons of Náráyaṇa (or Vishṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means +of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel +of the Sákalya-samhitá:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal +Vishṇu, which is the might of the gods,</p> + +<p>"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaiku<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>ṇṭha) +which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:</p> + +<p>"The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the +gods entered that heaven;</p> + +<p>"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the +world, that weapon Bráhmans wear (stamped upon them);</p> + +<p>"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of +Vishṇu;</p> + +<p>"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishṇu), let +us become beatified."</p></div> + +<p>Again, the Taittiríyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded, +is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The +particular parts to be branded are specified in the Ágneya-puráṇa:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"On his right hand let the Bráhman wear Sudarśana,</p> + +<p>"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the +Veda declared."</p></div> + +<p>In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being +branded with the discus:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,</p> + +<p>"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of +Vishṇu.</p> + +<p>"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the +hand of Vishṇu,</p> + +<p>"Adored by all the gods; O Páṅchajanya, to thee be +adoration."</p></div> + +<p>(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such +names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme +Lord.</p> + +<p>(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity, +(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body, +(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common +sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the +dedication to Náráyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has +been said:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is +of ten kinds."</p></div> + +<p>Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may +also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also +difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts +setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All +rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the +divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know +the truth, O Bráhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is +individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is +illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."</p> + +<p>Again:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,</p> + +<p>"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they +perish not" (Bhagavad-gítá, xiv. 2).</p></div> + +<p>According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation +because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."</p> + +<p>Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue +of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this +text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a +Bráhman devoutly a Śúdra becomes a Bráhman, <i>i.e.</i>, becomes exalted.</p> + +<p>If any one urge that according to the text:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"</p></div> + +<p>this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that +duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What +you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real +meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt, +come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a +fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere +illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> the Lord, in virtue +of the testimony of many such passages as:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,</p> + +<p>"The originant, ideation,—thus is thy will called, O +Infinite.</p> + +<p>"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation, +because it produces ideas;</p> + +<p>"The illusion of Hari, who is called <i>a</i>, is termed +(<i>avidyá</i>) ignorance:</p> + +<p>"Styled (<i>máyá</i>) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for +the name <i>máyá</i> is used of the pre-eminent;</p> + +<p>"The excellent knowledge of Vishṇu is called, though one +only, by these names;</p> + +<p>"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised +by spontaneous beatitude."</p></div> + +<p>That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects +sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained, +therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For +in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible, +illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which +as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).</p> + +<p>If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the +answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality, +Vishṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior. +Accordingly, the grand revelation:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference +between the unsentient and the Lord,</p> + +<p>"A difference among souls, and a difference of the +unsentient and the soul each from the other.</p> + +<p>"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another, +the world with its five divisions.</p> + +<p>"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a +beginning it would have an end:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not +illusorily imagined:</p> + +<p>"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never +ceases.</p> + +<p>"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those +that lack knowledge;</p> + +<p>"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known +and sustained by Vishṇu."</p></div> + +<p>The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme +excellence of Vishṇu. With this in view the Lord declared:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and +the imperishable;</p> + +<p>"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the +unmodified.</p> + +<p>"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme +Spirit,</p> + +<p>"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three +worlds.</p> + +<p>"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than +the imperishable (soul),</p> + +<p>"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best +of persons (<i>Purushottama</i>);</p> + +<p>"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he +all-knowing worships me in every wise.</p> + +<p>"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless +(Arjuna):</p> + +<p>"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he +has to do, O Bhárata" (Bhagavad-gítá, xv. 16-20).</p></div> + +<p>So in the Mahá-varáha—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme +spouse of Śrī;</p> + +<p>"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity +must be subordinate."</p></div> + +<p>It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme +excellence of Vishṇu. For emancipation is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> the highest end of all men, +according to the text of the Bhállaveya Upanishad: While merit, +wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal; +therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And +emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishṇu, according to the +text of the Náráyaṇa Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest +state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration, +while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated; +the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated +from this snare of works. According also to the words of the +Vishṇu-puráṇa—</p> + +<p>"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth +and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the +supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of +emancipation."</p> + +<p>And it is declared that the grace of Vishṇu is won only through the +knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality. +Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory +of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art +thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of +the real purport.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally +unknown,</p> + +<p>"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these +be one?"</p></div> + +<p>And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like +the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand +revelation:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either +similarity of cognition,</p> + +<p>"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the +place of the individual;</p> + +<p>"Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is +different,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span></p> + +<p>"The difference being independence and completeness (in the +Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the +individual spirit)."</p></div> + +<p>Or to propose another explanation of the text, <i>Átmá tat tvam asi</i>, +That art thou, it may be divided, <i>átmá tat tvam asi</i>. He alone is +soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art +not-that (<i>atat</i>) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine +of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Or the division may be <i>Atat tvam</i>, and thus unity will be +well got rid of."</p></div> + +<p>According, therefore, to the Tattva-váda-rahasya, the words in the +nine examples (in the Chhándogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with +a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of +non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various +trees;</p> + +<p>"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;</p> + +<p>"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;</p> + +<p>"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.</p> + +<p>"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, +the supreme Hari</p> + +<p>"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the +individual spirit, though he is its actuator;</p> + +<p>"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise +he is bound."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Brahmá, Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the +decay of their bodies;</p> + +<p>"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is +for the sustentation of Lakshmí.</p> + +<p>"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, +knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,</p> + +<p>"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to +him."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span></p> + +<p>And again:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Knowing Vishṇu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted +from transmigration,</p> + +<p>"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.</p> + +<p>"Vishṇu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme +ruler.</p> + +<p>"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."</p></div> + +<p>That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be +evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all +things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by +knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and +expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is +known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man +knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior +and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the +Advaita-vádins that the world is false and illusory) the words <i>one</i> +and <i>lump</i> in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is +made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text +must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay +recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification, +name, clay (or other determinate object),—these alone are real, +cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of +these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance +with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name +such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the +words <i>name</i> and <i>alone</i> would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere, +then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the +statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the +statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the +statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.</p> + +<p>Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious +reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span> permanent or +transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the +author of the Nyáya-nirváṇa: The proof of the permanence of the +transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism. +And in the Tárkika-rakshá—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such, +or not such and such,</p> + +<p>"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is +called Nitya-sama."</p></div> + +<p>With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is +stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes +results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid +rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for +the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, +general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and +the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of +an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the +subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general +form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma +in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself +true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be +said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is +equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.</p> + +<p>If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not +its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the +carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of +money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence +are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.</p> + +<p>The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to +be desired to be known, is as follows:—The word <i>then</i> is allowed to +purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the +qualification (of the aspirant). The word <i>hence</i> indicates a reason.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span></p> + +<p>Accordingly it is stated in the Gáruḍa-puráṇa:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence +regularly; what then is the reason of this?</p> + +<p>"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those +the most excellent?</p> + +<p>"Tell me this, Brahmá, that I may know it truly."</p></div> + +<p>Thus addressed by Nárada, the most excellent Brahmá replied:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and +in an auspicious sense,</p> + +<p>"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."</p></div> + +<p>It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute, +because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Náráyana, +and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about +which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of +the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. +The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which +result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the +words of the Skanda-puráṇa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are +emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge, +involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"</p></div> + +<p>and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence +adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it +has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by +way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the +Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads. +Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the +Kaurma-puráṇa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case</p> + +<p>"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of +evidence;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by +revelation and tradition,</p> + +<p>"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no +hesitation."</p></div> + +<p>What a Śástra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in +the Skanda-puráṇa:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the +Atharva-veda, the Mahábhárata, the Pañcha-rátra, and the +original Rámáyaṇa, are called Śástras.</p> + +<p>"That also which is conformable to these is called Śástra.</p> + +<p>"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a +heterodoxy."</p></div> + +<p>According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes +is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, +viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the +duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as +there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the +duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there +can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the +texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it +has said:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I ever laud Náráyaṇa, the one being to be known from +genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the +imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible +excellences."</p></div> + +<p>It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence +of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, <i>Brahman</i>). (The fourth +aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this, +the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the +construction, in the Bṛihat-saṃhitá:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit, +eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the +purport is ascertained."</p></div> + +<p>It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> the +Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred +institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What +remains may be sought from the Ánandatírtha-bháshya-vyákhyána (or +exposition of the Commentary of Ánanda-tírtha). We desist for fear of +giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was +promulgated by Púrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the +third incarnation of Váyu:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The first was Hanumat, the second Bhíma,</p> + +<p>"The third Púrṇa-prajña, the worker of the work of the +Lord."</p></div> + +<p>After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the +following stanza at the conclusion of his work:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the +text of the Veda, sufficiently</p> + +<p>"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the +splendour of the Veda;</p> + +<p>"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to +the words of Ráma (Hanumat); the second was Bhíma;</p> + +<p>"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been +composed in regard to Keśava."</p></div> + +<p>The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic +texts.</p> + +<p>The purport of this is that Vishṇu is the principle above all others +in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> For a further account of Ánanda-tírtha or Madhva see +Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the +Brahma-sútras has been printed in Calcutta.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<h2>THE PÁŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULÍŚA.</h2> + + +<p>Certain Máheśvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishṇavas known +by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch +as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be +a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as +stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing +for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend +upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and +others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme +Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free +from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these +arguments, these Máheśvaras adopt the Páśupata system, which is +conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to +the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then +we shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati. The meaning +is as follows:—The word <i>now</i> refers to something antecedent, and +this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the +spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in +the Gaṇakáriká:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one +with three factors;</p> + +<p>"He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a +spiritual guide.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span></p> + +<p>"The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the +localities, the perseverance, the purifications,</p> + +<p>"The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and +there are three functions."</p></div> + +<p>The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three +(<i>tríṇi</i>), instead of the feminine three (<i>tisraḥ</i>), is a Vedic +construction.</p> + +<p>(<i>a.</i>) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and +is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of +the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattáchárya says: Knowledge, +penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.</p> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is +of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also +says:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and +falling,</p> + +<p>"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system +especially to be shunned."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>c.</i>) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to +liberation.</p> + +<p>These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest. +Thus he also says:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant +recollection of Rudra,</p> + +<p>"And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients +of acquirements."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>d.</i>) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the +aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual +teachers and the rest. Thus he says:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the +burning-ground, and Rudra only."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>e.</i>) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads +until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the +differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance, +and devotion as the fifth."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>f.</i>) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false +conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five +species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of +interestedness,</p> + +<p>"And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification +of the state of bondage."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>g.</i>) The five initiations are thus enumerated:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the +spiritual guide as the fifth."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>h.</i>) The five powers are as follow:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect, +conquest of pleasure and pain,</p> + +<p>"Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of +power."</p></div> + +<p>The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent +with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz., +mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies. +All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.</p> + +<p>In the first aphorism above recited, the word <i>now</i> serves to +introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation), +that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of +pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word <i>paśu</i> we are +to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that +which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word <i>pati</i> we are to +understand the cause (or <i>principium</i>), the word designating the Lord, +who is the cause of the universe, the <i>pati</i>, or ruler. The meaning of +the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.</p> + +<p>In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and +personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute +extirpation of all pains; the personal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span> in supremacy consisting of the +visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only +one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly +describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation, +discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of +every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though +imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of +principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is +cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts. +Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole +system of institutes, according to the text and according to its +significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and +pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared, +summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this +intellectual power.</p> + +<p>The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of +three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of +assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the +possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with +unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the +faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of +works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms. +The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy +even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.</p> + +<p>All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is +threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these, +sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees +according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive +sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as +proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable +by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the +cogitant organ every sentient being is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> cognisant of objects in +general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the +light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive +sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the +objects of the sentient soul.</p> + +<p>The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious, +is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The +insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and +the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest. +The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds, +viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the +three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the +cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions +ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and +determination.</p> + +<p>The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain, +is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is +the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is +the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are +to be found in the Pañchártha-bháshyadípiká and other works. The cause +is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation. +This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of +attributes and actions (into Maheśvara, Vishṇu, &c.) The Lord is the +possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely +first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as +possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is +expounded by the author of the Ádarśa, and other institutional +authorities.</p> + +<p>Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and +is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that +characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by +action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union +characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>&c.</p> + +<p>Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of +two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal +is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise +is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are +bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and +devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakulíśa says:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust. +Oblation is an observance divided into six members."</p></div> + +<p>Thus the author of the aphorisms says:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz., +laughter, song, dance, muttering <i>hum</i>, adoration, and pious +ejaculation."</p></div> + +<p>Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and +lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of +Maheśvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-śástra, or +art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the <i>ars +saltatoria</i>, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and +with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal +sentiment. The ejaculation <i>hum</i> is a sacred utterance, like the +bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the +palate, an imitation of the sound <i>hudung</i>, ascribed to a bull, like +the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be +gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require +exposition.</p> + +<p>The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly, +talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being +asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the +joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if +the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an +<i>innamorato</i> on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is +doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what +should and what should not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span> be done. Talking nonsensically is the +utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no +meaning, and the like.</p> + +<p>The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution +for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on +broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms: +Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.</p> + +<p>(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive +power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, +relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in +detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes +generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we +shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati). Detail is the +fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the +instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the +Ráśíkara-bháshya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these +categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an +enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters, +different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the +cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the +Sānkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is +the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other +systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall +become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth, +the sentient and insentient. In other systems the <i>principium</i> is +determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of +works, whereas in this system the <i>principium</i> is the Lord not thus +determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while +in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of +the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres +involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in +nearness to the Supreme Being, either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> followed or not followed by +such return to transmigratory experiences.</p> + +<p>Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions, +since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works, +then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be +simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be +created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge +two difficulties. Think not so, replies the Páśupata, for your +supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of +works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without +results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will +follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the +efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer +of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the +works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only +when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so +furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of +Yayáti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one +will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman +engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient +creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the +creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all +his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to +be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Páśupata, +that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable, +inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed +active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose +power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed +in sacred tradition:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by +the efficacy of works,</p> + +<p>"For this reason is he in this system the cause of all +causes."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span></p> + +<p>Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through +a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies +the Páśupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere +knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or +the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for +then it would follow that the study of any system would be +superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might, +like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that +Mahádeva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of +the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is +competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of +various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh. +On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an +accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent +to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be +realised apart from the system of the Páśupatas. Therefore it is that +our great teacher has said:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system, +but intuition is unattainable;</p> + +<p>"There is no accurate characterisation of principles +otherwise than by the five categories."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man +must adopt the system of the Páśupatas, which undertakes the +exposition of the five categories.</p> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII.</h2> + +<h2>THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.</h2> + + +<p>[The seventh system in Mádhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha is the +Śaiva-darśana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India, +especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about +the eleventh century <span class="smcap">a.d.</span> Several valuable contributions have been +lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the +Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially, +by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal, +has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He +has there translated the Tattuva-Kaṭṭalei, or law of the Tattwas, the +Śiva-Gnánapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the +Śiva-Pirakásam, or light of Śiva, and the three works shed immense +light on the outline as given by Mádhava. One great use of the latter +is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their +Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as <i>aṛul</i> for <i>anugraha</i> +and <i>tíḍchei</i> for <i>díkshá</i> may testify.</p> + +<p>The Śaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sánkhya; they +hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities, +and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and +gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system, +and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the +allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a +well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span></p> + +<p>There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sútras. One is in +five books, called by Colebrooke the Paśupati-śástra, which is probably +the work quoted by Mádhava in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas; +another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemarája, with its first +sútra, <i>chaítanyam átmá</i>. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta, +and opens with the śloka given in the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 91, lines +1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0"><i>Kathañchid ásádya Maheśvarasya dásyam.</i><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the +present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight +Ágamas and some of the Puráṇas. A list of the Ágamas is given in Mr. +Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion;" and of these the Kiraṇa +and Karaṇa are quoted in the following treatise.]</p> + +<h3>THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.</h3> +<p>Certain, however, of the Máheśvara sect receiving the system of truth +authoritatively laid down in the Śaiva Ágama,<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> reject the +foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of +our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation +of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion +that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;" +and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the +Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the +cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in +the Tantra doctrines—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sútra +the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four +feet, has again declared the same at full length."</p></div> + +<p>The meaning of this is as follows:—Its three categories are the three +before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action, +meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra, +possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not +independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as +being different from these, is first declared; next follows the +account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing +intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order +of the arrangement.<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> Since the ceremony of initiation is the means +to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without +knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the +Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the +real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place +as first the "foot" of <i>knowledge</i> (<i>jñána</i>) which makes known all +this unto us.<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Next follows the "foot" of <i>ceremonial action</i> +(<i>kriyá</i>) which declares the various rules of initiation with the +divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be +attained, hence the "foot" of <i>meditation</i> (<i>yoga</i>) follows next, +which declares the various kinds of <i>yoga</i> with their several parts. +And as meditation is worthless without practice, <i>i.e.</i>, the +fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span>forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty +(<i>charyá</i>), which includes all this.</p> + +<p>Now Śiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in +the divine nature of Śiva belongs to liberated souls and to such +beings as Vidyeśvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they +depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised +to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact +of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being +effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent +being. By the strength of this inference is the universal +acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.</p> + +<p>"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an +effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body +being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that +a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been +seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not +from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they +possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are +destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to +infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus +the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker, +from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the +afore-mentioned middle term (<i>sádhana</i>) must have the afore-mentioned +major (<i>sádhya</i>); and that which has not the former will not have the +latter, as the soul, &c.<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> The argument which establishes the +authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been +given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact, +that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions +done by living beings, is proved by the current verse<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a>—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This ignorant <i>jívátman</i>, incapable of its own true +pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction +[and its own merits not taken into account], would always go +to heaven or always to hell."<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p></div> + +<p>Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence, +since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that +he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the +king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of +his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to +employ means, &c.;</p> + +<p>"This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting +irrespectively of works, &c."</p></div> + +<p>And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Śruti) establishes the +existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their +means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various +individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable +Bṛihaspati—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and +material causes,—</p> + +<p>"Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that +resides in accumulated actions should ripen."—</p> + +<p>"The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must +have had an intelligent maker,</p> + +<p>"This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see +in any other effect, as jars, &c."</p></div> + +<p>God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with +everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot +produce a thing.<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> This has been said by the illustrious +Mṛigendra<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a>—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>"He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things: +for it is an established principle</p> + +<p>"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means, +parts, and end."</p></div> + +<p>"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent +maker, but then he has no body.<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> Now experience shows that all +effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as +potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be +like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or +omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal +soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover, +even though we conceded that God <i>did</i> possess a body, we should still +maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The +Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of +matter, such as <i>mala</i>,<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> action, &c., cannot have a material body, +but only a body of pure energy (Sákta),<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> since we know that his +body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Śakti, according +to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the <i>Iśána</i> as his head, the +<i>Tatpurusha</i> as his mouth, the <i>Aghora</i> as his heart, the <i>Vámedeva</i> +as his secret parts, and the <i>Sadyojáta</i> as his feet."<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> And this +body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but +is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are +respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and +production.<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> This has been said in the Śrímat Mṛigendra—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>"From the impossibility of its possessing <i>mala</i>, &c., the +body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."</p></div> + +<p>And it has also been said elsewhere—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"His body is composed of the five mantras which are +subservient to the five operations,</p> + +<p>"And his head, &c., are formed out of the Ísa, Tatpurusha, +Aghora, Váma, and other hymns."</p></div> + +<p>If you object to this view that "such passages in the Ágamas as 'He is +five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the +Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what +you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his +assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since +meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely +destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the +devotee."</p></div> + +<p>And similarly elsewhere—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of +form;</p> + +<p>"For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."</p></div> + +<p>Bhojarája<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> has thus detailed the five operations—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation, +destruction, and obscuration,</p> + +<p>"And to these must be added the active grace of him who is +eternally exalted."</p></div> + +<p>Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to +be performed directly by Śiva, but in that of the toilsome Path they +are ascribed to Ananta,<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> as is declared in the Śrímat +Karaṇa<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a>—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In the Pure Path Śiva is declared to be the only agent, but +Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."</p></div> + +<p>It must here be understood that the word Śiva includes in its proper +meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Śiva, +as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheśwara, the emancipated souls who have +become Śivas, and the inspired teachers (<i>váchakas</i>), together with +all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of +Śiva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (<i>pati</i>).</p> + +<p>We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (<i>paśu</i>). The +individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the +non-atomic,<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> the <i>Kshetrajña</i>, or knower of the body,<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> &c., is +the <i>Paśu</i>. For we must not say with the Chárvákas that it is the same +as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as +there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen. +Nor may we say with the Naiyáyikas that it is cognisable by +perception,<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> as this would involve an <i>ad infinitum</i> regressus. As +has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a +second knower;<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> + +<p>"And this would require another still, if the second were +itself to be known."</p></div> + +<p>Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with +the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been +said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or +time,</p> + +<p>"They hold to be eternal and pervading,—hence the soul's +all-pervadingness and eternity."</p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span></p><p>Nor may we say with the Vedántin that it is only one, since the +apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many +individual souls; nor with the Sánkhyas that it is devoid of action, +since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Śruti informs us of +a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the +form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> This has been +declared in the Śrímat Mṛigendra—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is revealed that identity with Śiva results when all +fetters are removed."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in +his soul</p> + +<p>"This exists always and on every side, therefore, after +liberation, Śruti calls it that which faces every way."</p></div> + +<p>It is also said in the Tattva-prakáśa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The liberated souls are themselves Śivas, but these are +liberated by his favour;</p> + +<p>"He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose +body is the five Mantras."</p></div> + +<p>Now the souls are threefold, as denominated <i>vijñánákaláḥ</i>, +<i>pralayákaláḥ</i>, and <i>sakaláḥ</i>.<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> (<i>a.</i>) The first are those who are +under the influence of <i>mala</i> only, since their actions are cancelled by +receiving their proper fruits, or <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span>by abstraction, contemplation, and +knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments, +such as <i>kalá</i>, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of +cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (<i>b.</i>) The +second are those who are under the influence of <i>mala</i> and <i>karman</i>, since +in their case <i>kalá</i>, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence +their name <i>pralayákala</i>. (<i>c.</i>) The third are those who are bound in the +three fetters of <i>mala</i>, <i>máyá</i>, and <i>karman</i>, hence their name <i>sakala</i>. +The first class are again subdivided into <i>samápta-kalusháḥ</i> and +<i>asamápta-kalusháḥ</i>, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly +exhausted or not. The former,—having received the mature penalties of +their corruptions,—are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the +privilege, raised by Śiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge +(the Vidyeśvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of +Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Ananta, and Súkshma, and Śivottama,</p> + +<p>"Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimúrttika,</p> + +<p>"Śríkaṇṭha and Śikhaṇḍin,—these are declared to be the +Vidyeśvaras."</p></div> + +<p>The latter Śiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million +Mantras.<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> All this is explained in the Tattva-prakáśa.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Similarly +Soma-Śambhu has said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"One class is named <i>vijñánákala</i>, the second <i>pralayákala</i>,</p> + +<p>"The third <i>sakala</i>,—these are the three whom the Śástra +regards as objects of mercy.</p> + +<p>"The first is united to <i>mala</i> alone, the second to <i>mala</i> +and <i>karma</i>,</p> + +<p>"The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with +<i>kalá</i> and ending with 'earth.'"<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p><p>The <i>Pralayákaláḥ</i> are also twofold, as being <i>pakvapáśadvaya</i> or not, +<i>i.e.</i>, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in +whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the +power of <i>karman</i>, are endowed with the <i>puryashṭaka</i><a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> body, and pass +through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Those among the Pralayákalas whose <i>karman</i> and <i>mala</i> are +immature,</p> + +<p>"Go, united with the <i>puryashṭaka</i> body, into many births by +the power of <i>karman</i>."</p></div> + +<p>The <i>puryashṭaka</i> is also thus described in the same work—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The <i>puryashṭaka</i> is composed of the internal organ, +thought (<i>dhí</i>), <i>karman</i>, and the instruments."</p></div> + +<p>This is thus explained by Aghora Śiva Áchárya, "the <i>puryashṭaka</i> is a +subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from +the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is +composed of the thirty<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending +with <i>kalá</i>." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending +with <i>kalá</i>, is assigned to each soul,</p> + +<p>"And wanders by the law of <i>karman</i> through all the bodies +produced by the world."</p></div> + +<p>The following is the full meaning of this passage:—The word +"<i>internal organ</i>," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence," +"egoism," and "reason,"<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> includes also the seven tattvas which +enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those +called <i>kalá</i>, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and +quality;<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>words "<i>thought</i>" (<i>dhí</i>) and <i>karman</i> signify the +five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile +rudiments. By the word "<i>instruments</i>" are comprehended the ten organs +of sense and action.</p> + +<p>"But is it not declared in the Śrímat Kálottara that 'The set of five, +sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism, +these constitute the <i>puryashṭaka</i>?'"</p> + +<p>How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and +hence the venerable Ráma Kaṇṭha has explained that sútra in its +literal meaning [<i>i. e</i>., as <i>puryashṭaka</i>, is derived from <i>ashṭa</i>, +"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you +ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal +definition of <i>puryashṭaka</i>, we reply that there is really no +contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in +the following manner:—(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five +rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action; +(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> (7.) +nature [prakṛiti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning +with <i>kalá</i>, which form a kind of case.<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> + +<p>Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the +<i>puryashṭaka</i> body, Maheśvara Ananta having compassionated them as +possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the +world; as has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Maheśvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the +world."</p></div> + +<p>The class called <i>sakala</i> is also divided into two, as <i>pakvakalusha</i> +and <i>apakvakalusha</i>. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in +conformity with their maturity (<i>paripáka</i>), <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>puts forth a power +agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred +and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Maṇḍalí, +&c., as has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The rest are denominated <i>sakala</i>, from their connection +with <i>Kalá</i>, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;</p> + +<p>"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen +of these the Lords of the Mantras.</p> + +<p>"Eight of these are called <i>Maṇḍalins</i>; eight again are +Krodha, &c.;</p> + +<p>"Víreśa, Śríkaṇṭha, and the hundred Rudras,—these together +are the hundred and eighteen."</p></div> + +<p>In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a +teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his +manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the +process of initiation; as has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"These creatures whose <i>mala</i> is matured, by putting forth a +healing power,</p> + +<p>"He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to +the highest principle."</p></div> + +<p>It is also said in the Srímad Mṛigendra—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which +previously exerted a contrary influence over it."<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p></div> + +<p>All this has been explained at great length by Náráyaṇa-Kaṇṭha, and +there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear +of prolixity.</p> + +<p>But as for the second class, or those called <i>apakvakalusha</i>, the +Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions, +appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy +the rewards of their previous actions.<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> As has been said—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he +appoints to enjoy their various deserts,</p> + +<p>"According to their respective actions: such are the various +kinds of souls."</p></div> + +<p>We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or <i>páśa</i>). +This is fourfold, <i>mala</i>,[1] <i>karman</i>, <i>máyá</i>, and <i>rodha-śakti</i>.<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> +But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Śaiva Ágamas that the +chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been +shown to mean Śiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic +bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> hence +matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only +fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:—Although the <i>vindu</i> or nasal +dot, which is the germinal atom of <i>máyá</i>, and is called a +Śiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the +highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Śiva, +still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that +it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the +state of such deities as Vidyeśvara, &c. Thus we see <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span>there is no +contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The bonds of matter will be fourfold."</p></div> + +<p>And again in the Srímad Mṛigendra—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The enveloper-controller (<i>mala</i>), the overpowerer +(<i>rodha</i>), action, and the work of Máyá,</p> + +<p>"These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively +called by the name of 'merit.'"</p></div> + +<p>The following is the meaning of this couplet:—</p> + +<p>(1.) "Enveloping," because <i>mala</i> exceedingly obscures and veils the +soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because <i>mala</i>, a +natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As +has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Mala</i>, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts +the soul's vision and action;</p> + +<p>"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on +copper."<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p></div> + +<p>(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond" +[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Śiva +obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself +partaking of the nature of matter].</p> + +<p>Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of +all,</p> + +<p>"I am metaphorically called <i>páśa</i>,<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> because I follow +desert."</p></div> + +<p>(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, <i>karman</i>] as being performed +by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit, +like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning +series. As has been said in the Śrímat Kiraṇa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As <i>Mala</i> has no beginning, its least actions are +beginningless:</p> + +<p>"If an eternal character is thus established, then what +cause could produce any change therein?"</p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span></p><p>(4.) "<i>Máyá</i>," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all +the world is potentially contained (<i>máti</i>) at a mundane destruction, +and again at a creation it all comes (<i>yáti</i>) into manifestation, +hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Śrímat +Saurabheya—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed +therein at a mundane destruction,</p> + +<p>"And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form +of effects as <i>kalá</i>, &c."<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p></div> + +<p>Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here +through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three +categories been declared,—the Lord, the soul, and matter.</p> + +<p>A different mode of treating the subject is found in the +Jñánaratnávalí, &c., in such lines as—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the +cause</p> + +<p>"Of the cessation thereof,—these are collectively the six +categories."</p></div> + +<p>But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself. +Thus our account of the system is complete.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Colebrooke speaks of the <i>Paśupati-sástra</i> +(<i>Maheśvara-siddhánta or Sivágama</i>), as the text-book of the Páśupata +sect. The Ágamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the +Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion").</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul, +matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with +the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and <i>páśa</i> is +eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p. +58 we find the <i>advaita</i> of the Vedánta attacked. In p. 62 it is said +that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his +five operations (see <i>infra</i>) to disentangle it, bringing out all that +is required for previous desert.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> These four feet are the four stages of religious life +(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil <i>sarithei</i>, +<i>kirikei</i>, <i>yokam</i>, and <i>gnánam</i>. The first is the stage of practical +piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second +is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications +involved in true <i>pújá</i>; the third is that of the eight observances of +the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for +intimate union with God.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke, <i>Essays</i> (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> <i>Nyáyena</i> may here mean "argument."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> if there were only one cause there would be +only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects +proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions) +necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural +stress to be laid on <i>eva</i>, but this is certainly not the original +meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahábhárata, iii. 1144 (cf. +Gauḍapáda, S. Kár. 61).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> In p. 82, line 3, <i>infra</i>, I read +<i>Karaṇásambhaváchcha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> This may be the same with the Meykáṇḍa of the Tamil +work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the <i>Mṛigendra</i>(?).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> Should we read <i>távad anaśaríraḥ</i> in p. 83, line 2?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> I retain this word, see <i>infra.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> "<i>Máyá</i> (or Prakṛiti) is the material, Śakti the +instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> These are the five first names of the eleven mantras +which are included in the five <i>kalás</i> (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243). +The Śivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is +composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Śiva (see J. +A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse +order in Taitt. Áraṇyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. <i>Nyáyá-málávist.</i> p. 3).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> These are the operations of the five manifestations of +Śiva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are +<i>Sáthákkiyam</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>Sadákshaya?</i>) or <i>Sadá-Śiva</i>, who is Śiva and +Śakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; <i>Ichchuran</i> or +<i>Mayesuran</i>, the obscure; <i>Sutta-vittei</i> (<i>Śuddhavidyá</i>) which is +properly the Hindu triad, <i>Rudra</i>, <i>Vishṇu</i>, and <i>Brahma</i>. They are +respectively symbolised by the <i>náda</i>, <i>vindu</i>, <i>m</i>, <i>u</i>, and <i>a</i> of +Om.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tántrik +work, the <i>Narapati-jaya-charyá</i>, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhár.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> Ananta is a name of Śiva in the Atharva-śiras Upanishad +(see Indische Stud. i. 385).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Ágamas (see +Foulkes' Catechism).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> <i>Aṇu?</i> "The soul, when clothed with these primary +things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body" +(Foulkes). Anaṇu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Bṛihad Ar. Up. +iii. 8. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> See Ind. Studien, i. 301.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bháshá +Parichchheda, śloka 49).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> Delete the <i>iti</i> in p. 84, line 5, <i>infra</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> Cf. the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, p. 76, 4 (<i>supra</i>, p. +103).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87, +137. They are there described as being respectively under the +influence of <i>áṇavam malam</i> only, or this with <i>kanmam malam</i>, or +these with <i>mayei malam</i>. The <i>áṇavam</i> is described as original sin, +or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; <i>kanmam</i> +is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its +deserts; <i>mayei</i> is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the +source of the senses. Mádhava uses "<i>kalá</i>," &c., for <i>máyá</i>. The +reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the +five <i>vidyátattvas</i> (<i>kalá</i>, <i>vidyá</i>, <i>rága</i>, <i>niyati</i>, and <i>kalá</i>) +and the twenty-four <i>átmatattvas</i> (<i>sc.</i> the gross and subtile +elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual +faculties <i>manas</i>, <i>buddhi</i>, <i>ahaṃkára</i>, and <i>chitta</i>), are all +developed from <i>máyá</i>. This exactly agrees with the quotation from +Soma Śambhu, <i>infra</i>. We may compare with it what Mádhava says, p. 77, +in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, where he describes <i>kalá</i> as +unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five +<i>tanmátras</i>, and the ten organs, with <i>buddhi</i>, <i>ahaṃkára</i> and +<i>manas</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read <i>anugrahakaraṇát</i> in +p. 86, line 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding. +It, however, names the three classes as <i>vijñána-kevala</i>, +<i>pralaya-kevala</i>, and <i>sakala</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, thus including five of the <i>vidyátattvas</i> and +all the twenty-four <i>átmatattvas</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> This term seems to be derived from <i>purí</i>, "body" (cf. +<i>puriśaya</i> for <i>purusha</i>, Bṛihad Ár. Up. ii. 5, 18), and <i>ashṭaka</i> +(cf. also the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya, p. 135).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> Or rather thirty-one?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> <i>Manas</i>, <i>buddhi</i>, <i>ahaṃkára</i>, <i>chitta</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> These are the seven <i>viḍyá-tattvas</i>, <i>kalá</i>, <i>kála</i>, +<i>niyati</i> (fate), <i>vidyá</i>, <i>rága</i>, <i>prakṛiti</i>, and <i>guṇa</i>. Hoisington, +however, puts <i>purushan</i> "the principle of life," instead of <i>guṇa</i>, +which seems better, as the three <i>guṇas</i> are included in <i>prakṛiti</i>. +He translates <i>kalá</i> by "continency," and describes it as "the power +by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into +subjection."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> This "instrument" (<i>karaṇa</i>) seems to mean what +Hoisington calls <i>purushan</i> or "the principle of life which +establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes +it one of the seven <i>vidyátattvas</i>. According to Mádhava, it should be +what he calls <i>guṇa</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> The thirty-one <i>tattvas</i> are as follow:—Twenty-four +<i>átmatattvas</i>, five elements, five <i>tanmátras</i>, ten organs of sense +and action, four organs of the <i>antaḥkaraṇa</i>, and seven <i>vidyátattvas</i> +as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> I take <i>aṇu</i> in this verse as the soul, but it may mean +the second kind of <i>mala</i> mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of +<i>mala</i> is the <i>máyá-mala</i>, the second <i>áṇava-mala</i>, the third +<i>kanma-mala</i> (<i>karman</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> "The soul, when clothed with these primary things +(desire, knowledge, action, the <i>kaládipanchaka</i>, &c.), is an +exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three <i>malas</i> is called +<i>áṇava</i>, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to +souls.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> The first three are the three kinds of <i>mala</i> in the J. +A. O. S., viz., <i>áṇavam</i>, <i>kanmam</i>, and <i>máyei</i>, the last is the +"obscuring" power of Máyesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Śaivas +hold that Páśa, like the Sánkhya Prakṛiti, is in itself eternal, +although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J. +A. O. S. iv. p. 228).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> These are the five, <i>vindu</i>, <i>mala</i>, <i>karman</i>, <i>máyá</i>, +and <i>rodhaśakti</i>. <i>Vindu</i> is described in Foulkes' translation of the +Śiva-prakáśa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable +<i>om</i>;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed. +From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit +letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and +external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual +knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have +been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after +these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be +enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious +deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the +abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the +abode of Śiva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union +with him." <i>Vindu</i> is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152, +153 (cf. also Weber, <i>Rámatápanyía Up</i>. pp. 312-315).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> Some forced derivation seems here intended as of <i>páśa</i> +from <i>paśchát</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> In p. 90, line 2, read <i>sá káryeṇa</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + +<h2>THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.</h2> + + +<p>Other Máheśvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva +system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things +causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating +spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the +construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) +is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this +Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several +cognitions and <i>cognita</i>, who is identical with the transcendent self +posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by +revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of +witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives +manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> +as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon +recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the +highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest +trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship, +suppression of the breath, and the like, these Máheśvaras set forth +the system of recognition (<i>pratyabhijñá</i>). The extent of this system +is thus described by one of their authorities—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two +explications, the greater and the less,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span></p> + +<p>"The five topics, and the expositions,—such is the system +of recognition."</p></div> + +<p>The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a>:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of +Maheśvara, and wishing also to help mankind,</p> + +<p>"I set forth the recognition of Maheśvara, as the method of +attaining all felicity."</p></div> + +<p>[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:—</p> + +<p>"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus +feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached," +having fully attained, this condition, having made it the +unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which +has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others: +otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.</p> + +<p>Maheśvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness, +beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence +Vishṇu, Viriñchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they +transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite +illusion.</p> + +<p>The condition of being a slave to Maheśvara is the being a recipient +of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the +divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things +according to his will and pleasure (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>dásya</i>, from <i>dá</i>).</p> + +<p>The word <i>mankind</i> imports that there is no restriction of the +doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom +this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest +reward, the emanatory <i>principium</i> itself operating to the highest end +of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the +Śiva-dṛishṭi by that supreme guide the revered Sománandanátha—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span>has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof +or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,</p> + +<p>"There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further +reflection. When he knows Suvarṇa (or Śiva) a man may cease +to act and to reflect."</p></div> + +<p>The word <i>also</i> excludes the supposition that there is room in self +which has recognised the nature of Maheśvara, and which manifests to +itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied, +for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of +others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a +motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man +that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a +regard for others. Thus Akshapáda (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive +is that object towards which a man energises.</p> + +<p>The preposition <i>upa</i> in <i>upapádayami</i> (I set forth) indicates +proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.</p> + +<p>Hence the word <i>all</i> in the phrase <i>the method of attaining all +felicities</i>. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all +felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a +man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all +the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what +else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpaláchárya says—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of +devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"</p></div> + +<p>We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words <i>the method +of attaining all felicities</i>, on the supposition that the compound +term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a +Bahuvríhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Maheśvara, the +knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full +attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> external +and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the +language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an +object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the +same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in +this system,—there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the +accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from +argumentation,—there arises in relation to my presented personal self +the cognition that I am that very God,—in virtue of my recollection +of the powers of that God.</p> + +<p>This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I +establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it +convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism +of the Recognitive Institutes.]</p> + +<p>Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial +with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The +answer is this:—The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the +soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and +therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence +of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the +recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and +active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as +total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight +the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This +self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers; +for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he +is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king, +therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here +employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of +things, the teaching of the Naiyáyikas may be accepted. It has thus +been said by the son of Udayákara—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that +self-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span>active and cognitive is Maheśvara the primal being?</p> + +<p>"Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the +powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and +imperfectly discerned."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The continuance of all living creatures in this +transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory +<i>involucrum</i>; knowledge and action are accounted the life of +living creatures.</p> + +<p>"Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action +(or ritual), which is best at Káśi,</p> + +<p>"Is indicated by others also: different from these is real +knowledge."</p></div> + +<p>And also—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those +things:</p> + +<p>"The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge +without succession, is Maheśvara."</p></div> + +<p>Sománandanátha also says—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He always knows by identity with Śiva: he always knows by +identity with the real."</p></div> + +<p>Again at the end of the section on knowledge—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Unless there were this unity with Śiva, cognitions could +not exist as facts of daily life:</p> + +<p>"Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the +one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).</p> + +<p>"He is Maheśvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken +continuity of objects:</p> + +<p>"Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the +deity."</p></div> + +<p>The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:—The text, "After +that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that +shines diversely this <span class="smcap">All</span>," teaches that God illumines the whole round +of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the +diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span> which +irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises +from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality, +God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all +limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence, +self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Śaiva +aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are +Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective +Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This +self-same existing self is knowledge.</p> + +<p>By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Sománandanátha cited +above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of +these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy +constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory +experience. This is described in the section on activity—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects, +through the efficacy of his will: this activity is +creativeness."</p></div> + +<p>And at the close of the same section—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world +under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his +activity worked out by motive and agent.</p> + +<p>"This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be +that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless, +insentient things."</p></div> + +<p>According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the +insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of +Maheśvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands +of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or +that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in +the series of transmigratory environments,—his mere will is his +progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his +universal creativeness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span></p> + +<p>How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the +following illustration—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The tree or jar produced by the mere will of +thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to +serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."</p></div> + +<p>If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the +jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of +the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of +clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition +of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact +notorious to all the world that <i>different</i> things must emanate from +different materials.</p> + +<p>As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without +materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he +does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it: +they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation +of the causal relation, <i>all</i> the co-efficients, without exception, +must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the +potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a +body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the +successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the +genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the +thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahádeva, +amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the +Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus +operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptáchárya says—</p> + +<p>"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without +appliances, without a wall to paint it on,—to him be glory, to him +resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."</p> + +<p>It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span> than God, how +comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The +answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates +through the fatality of works:</p> + +<p>"Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence, +he is enfranchised."</p></div> + +<p>It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what +difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated +in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this +question is given in a section of the Tattvártha-Saṅgraha—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical +with itself, like Maheśvara free from bondage: the other (or +unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."</p></div> + +<p>An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the +soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if +all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate +because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the +recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to +the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two +degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in +developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines +felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the +conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such +recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In +the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the +power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the +attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting +in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the +essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.</p> + +<p>It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious +self is observed independent of recognition.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> To this it is replied: A +certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular +gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated +by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote +to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to +her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities +she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and +she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she +recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them +out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self +be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation +effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of +those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director +to recognise in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience, +omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of +being.</p> + +<p>It is therefore said in the fourth section—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as +like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he +humble himself before her with all manner of importunities: +In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be +the universal soul, in which there is no perfection +unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and +therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."</p></div> + +<p>This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other +teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we +cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become +too prolix. This then may suffice.<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> Read <i>bháván</i> for <i>bhávát</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 113. Mádhava here condenses Abhinava +Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the +eleventh century (see Bühler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Śiva +sútras by Utpala, the son of Udayákara (cf. pp. 130, 131).—E. B. C.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX.</h2> + +<h2>THE RASEŚVARA-DARŚANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></h2> + + +<p>Other Máheśvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self +with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life +taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily +frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver +as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called <i>párada</i>, +because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of +transmigratory states. Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called +<i>párada</i>."</p></div> + +<p>And again in the Rasárṇava—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is styled <i>párada</i> because it is employed for the +highest end by the best votaries.</p> + +<p>"Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from +my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called +<i>rasa</i>."</p></div> + +<p>It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is +incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another +manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in +the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this +there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it +free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the +death of the body.</p> + +<p>"Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an +emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.</p> + +<p>"Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of +mercury and of medicaments."</p></div> + +<p>Govinda-bhagavat also says—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are +not permanent, one should strive</p> + +<p>"After emancipation; but emancipation results from +knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible +in a healthy body."</p></div> + +<p>The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its +permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the +body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is +dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaurí under the names +of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the +Rasahṛidaya—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new +body, the creation of Hara and Gaurí,</p> + +<p>"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose +service is the aggregate of magic texts."</p></div> + +<p>The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should +first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is +produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaurí, and mica is +produced from Gaurí, mercury and mica are severally identified with +Hara and Gaurí in the verse—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;</p> + +<p>"The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of +death and poverty."</p></div> + +<p>This is very little to say about the matter. In the +Raseśvara-siddhánta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and +mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by +acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Certain of the gods, Maheśa and others; certain Daityas, +Śukra and others;</p> + +<p>"Certain Munis, the Bálakhilyas and others; certain kings, +Someśvara and others;</p> + +<p>"Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-náyaka,</p> + +<p>"Charvaṭi, Kapila, Vyáli, Kápáli, Kandaláyana,</p> + +<p>"These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while +alive,</p> + +<p>"Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith +identified."</p></div> + +<p>The meaning of this, as explicated by Parameśvara to Parameśvarí, is +as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses, +the preservation of the body;</p> + +<p>"And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and +air,</p> + +<p>"Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they +restore to life,</p> + +<p>"Bound they give the power of flying about."</p></div> + +<p>The swooning state of mercury is thus described—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived, +as characterised thus—</p> + +<p>"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.</p> + +<p>"A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the +following marks are seen—</p> + +<p>"Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."</p></div> + +<p>The bound condition is described in another place as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The character of bound quicksilver is that it is—</p> + +<p>"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it +parts asunder under friction."</p></div> + +<p>Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaurí were +proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but +how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as +that <i>can</i> be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is +stated by the authorities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully +discriminated,</p> + +<p>"In the first place, as pure in every process, for +perfecting the adepts."</p></div> + +<p>And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion, +restraining,</p> + +<p>"Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising, +covering,</p> + +<p>"Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and +pouring,</p> + +<p>"And eating it by parting and piercing it,—are the eighteen +modes of treating quicksilver."</p></div> + +<p>These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat, +Sarvajña-rámeśvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here +omitted to avoid prolixity.</p> + +<p>The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of +the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body, +a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the +Rasárṇava—</p> + +<p>"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the +blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it +attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied), +quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This +makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try +it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."</p> + +<p>It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a +celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the +self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence, +and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being +inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the +Rasahṛidaya—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems +in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,</p> + +<p>"Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings +whose bodies are unglorified?</p> + +<p>"He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from +cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,</p> + +<p>"He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities +of the cognitive organs are obstructed.</p> + +<p>"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the +enjoyment of sensual pleasures,</p> + +<p>"An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain +to emancipation?"</p></div> + +<p>Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass +through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be +extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two +mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The +objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following +dilemmatic argument:—Is this extrication, as to the nature of which +all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or +as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is +cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive +cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddhánta—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the +mercurial system, O subtile thinker.</p> + +<p>"In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity +of argument,</p> + +<p>"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all +sacred texts;</p> + +<p>"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore +there is and must be life."</p></div> + +<p>And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents +of the doctrine of Vishṇu-svámin maintain the eternity of the body of +Vishṇu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sákára-siddhi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishṇu-svámin,</p> + +<p>"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and +inconceivably perfect beatitude."</p></div> + +<p>If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which +appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real +existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be +otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of +proof: (1.) by the intuition of Śanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts +such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puráṇic texts such +as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the +conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other +like predicates are affirmed also by Śríkánta-miśra, the devoted +adherent of Vishṇu-svámin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest +end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which +we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus +been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying, +immortal,</p> + +<p>"The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches, +pleasure, liberation?"</p></div> + +<p>It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as +it is said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying +and imperishable."</p></div> + +<p>Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by +seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasárṇava—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from +merely remembering it,</p> + +<p>"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it, +appear its six virtues.</p> + +<p>"Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from +seeing all the phallic emblems</p> + +<p>"On earth, those at Kedára, and all others whatsoever."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span></p> + +<p>In another place we read—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific +than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Káśi and +elsewhere,</p> + +<p>"Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health, +exemption from decay, and immortality."</p></div> + +<p>The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged +should recall quicksilver to mind.</p> + +<p>"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his +blasphemy for ever filled with sin."</p></div> + +<p>The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes +place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the +practice of union (ἕνωσις after the acquisition of a divine +body in the manner we have described. Thereafter—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain +men of holy vision,</p> + +<p>"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the +universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:</p> + +<p>"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof +is luminousness, undifferenced,</p> + +<p>"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, +tranquil, self-recognised:</p> + +<p>"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole +universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,</p> + +<p>"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his +bondage to works annulled."</p></div> + +<p>A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained +this he becomes beatitude.</p> + +<p>Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of +passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we +have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the +supreme self—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from +dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span></p> + +<p>"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those +that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,</p> + +<p>"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the +soul awakes,</p> + +<p>"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines +forth by itself from itself."</p></div> + +<p class="p1">A. E. G.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogís in Colonel +Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. <i>Párada-pána</i> is one of the practices of +the Siddhopásakas in the Śaṅkara-digvijaya, § 49, to obviate +<i>apamṛityu</i>, <i>akálamṛityu</i>, &c.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X.</h2> + +<h2>THE VAIŚESHIKA OR AULÚKYA DARŚANA.<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></h2> + + +<p>Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by +the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be +essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to +know the means of such escape,—learns that the knowledge of the +Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such +passages as these (<i>Śvetáśvatara Upan</i>. vi. 20)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,</p> + +<p>"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of +Śiva."</p></div> + +<p>Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing +(<i>śravaṇa</i>), thought (<i>manana</i>), and reflection (<i>bhávaná</i>), as it has +been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated +meditation,—</p> + +<p>"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the +highest union (<i>yoga</i>)."</p></div> + +<p>Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the +knowledge of the <i>vyápti</i> (or universal proposition), and the +knowledge of the <i>vyápti</i> follows the right understanding of the +categories,—hence the saint Kaṇáda<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> establishes the six +categories in his tenfold <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span>treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, +therefore, we shall explain duty."</p> + +<p>In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all +the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first +<i>áhnika</i> he defines those which possess "genus" (<i>játi</i>), in the +second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the +similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the +first <i>áhnika</i> the characteristics of the five elements, and in the +second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third +book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the +first <i>áhnika</i>, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he +discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first <i>áhnika</i>, +and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates +action; in the first <i>áhnika</i> he considers action as connected with +the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he +examines merit and demerit as revealed in Śruti; in the first <i>áhnika</i> +he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second +the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book +he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first <i>áhnika</i> he +considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those +qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the +eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, +and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics +of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of +inference.<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> + +<p>The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," +"definition," and "investigation."<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> "But," it may be objected, +"ought we not to include 'division,' <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span>and so make the method fourfold, +not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really +included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare +that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and +intimate relation are the only six positive categories,—this is an +example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this +definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:—Since +"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the +categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in +its generic character in all substances [though different substances +have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with +"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> then +"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," +inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> lastly, "intimate +relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.</p> + +<p>If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since +'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of +the six as positive categories, <i>i.e.</i>, as being the objects of +conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the +objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only +six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the +thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it +is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, +if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends +his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite +number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we +cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a +seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite +number) deny it to be one of the six <i>positive</i> categories,—and if +others attempt to include <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span>"capacity," "number," &c., which we allow +to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a +<i>seventh</i> category. But enough of this long discussion.</p> + +<p>Substantiality, &c. (<i>dravyatvádi</i>), <i>i.e.</i>, the genera of substance, +quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, +quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (<i>dravyatva</i>) +is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the +(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> and +does not exist with intimate relation in smell.<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p> + +<p>The genus of quality (<i>guṇatva</i>) is that which is immediately +subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation +in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> The genus of +action (<i>karmatva</i>) is that which is immediately subordinate to the +genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything +eternal.<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Generality (or genus, <i>sámánya</i>) is that which is found +in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the +counter-entity to emergent non-existence.<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> Particularity<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> +(<i>viśesha</i>) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>of +generality, which stops mutual non-existence.<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> Intimate relation +(<i>samaváya</i>) is that connection which itself has not intimate +relation.<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> Such are the definitions of the six categories.</p> + +<p>Substance is ninefold,—earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, +soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (<i>pṛithivítva</i>), are the +definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality +which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same +subject with colour produced by baking.<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p> + +<p>The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate +relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and +sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate +relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon +and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to +substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the +skin.<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p> + +<p>As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be +subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their +technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is +found in the same subject with the non-eternal (<i>janya</i>) special +quality which is not produced by contact.<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p> + +<p>Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the +mediate cause<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> of that idea of remoteness <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span>(<i>paratva</i>) which is +not found with intimate relation in space;<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a> while space is that +pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is +not time.<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> The general terms <i>átmatva</i> and <i>manastva</i> are the +respective definitions of soul (<i>átman</i>) and mind (<i>manas</i>). The +general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being +also found with intimate relation in that which is without form<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> +(<i>amúrtta</i>). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to +substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an +atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any +substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned +directly in Kaṇáda's Sútras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, +number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, +proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and +effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word +"<i>and</i>," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, +and sound. Their respective genera (<i>rúpatva</i>, &c.) are their several +definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is +subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In +the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.</p> + +<p>"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing +upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: +revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus +of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The +genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists +with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of +conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the +definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is +twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found +with intimate connection in substance and quality, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span>or in quality and +action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of +generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation +cannot be divided,—in the former case in consequence of the infinite +number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate +relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.</p> + +<p>There is a popular proverb—</p> + +<p>"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by +disjunction,—he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true +Vaiśeshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the +production of duality, &c.</p> + +<p>There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; +thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the +distinguishing perception <i>apekshábuddhi</i> [by which we apprehend "this +is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, <i>dvitva</i> +(in the object);<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> then the knowledge of the abstract genus of +duality (<i>dvitvatva</i>); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it +exists in the two things; then imagination<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> (<i>saṃskára</i>).<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p> + +<p>But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus +produced from <i>apekshábuddhi</i>? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained +that <i>apekshábuddhi</i> must be the producer of duality, &c., because +duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we +cannot hold <i>apekshábuddhi</i> as the cause only of its being known [and +therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being +produced<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a>], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, +maintain the same opinion by a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span>different argument; duality, &c., +cannot be held to be made known (<i>jñápya</i>) by that non-eternal +apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (<i>i.e.</i>, +<i>apekshábuddhi</i>), because these are qualities which reside in a +plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>] just as +"severalty" does [and, therefore, as <i>apekshábuddhi</i> is not their +<i>jñápaka</i>, it must be their <i>janaka</i>].</p> + +<p>Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From +<i>apekshábuddhi</i> arises, simultaneously with the production of duality +(<i>dvitva</i>), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; +next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (<i>dvitvatva</i>) arises, +simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the +destruction of <i>apekshábuddhi</i>; next from the destruction of +<i>apekshábuddhi</i> arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two +substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of +the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of +imagination (<i>saṃskára</i>), the destruction of the knowledge of the +quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the +knowledge of the substances.</p> + +<p>The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, +and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be +found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are +the subjects of the discussion <i>are</i> successively destroyed by the +rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a +special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary +duration.<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of +the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two +things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span>to +the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the +subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its +abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate +action taking place simultaneously with the rise of <i>apekshábuddhi</i>, +there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united +influence of both.<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p> + +<p><i>Apekshábuddhi</i> is to be considered as that operation of the mind +which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (<i>i.e.</i>, +destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span></p><p>Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the +destruction of the compound of two atoms (the <i>dvyaṇuka</i>), another +compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of +this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, +the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of +steps commencing with the contact of fire;<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> secondly, from the +conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, +&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire +arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from +conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> in the +atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is +produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, +there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that +former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another +atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; +ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (<i>i.e.</i>, the atoms) +are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (<i>i.e.</i>, the +<i>dvyaṇuka</i>). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The +other two series,<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, +are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if +we hold (with the Vaiśeshikas) that the baking process takes place in +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span>atoms of the jar.<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> The Naiyáyikas, however, maintain that the +baking process takes place in the jar.</p> + +<p>"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,—that produced by +the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that +produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause +[<i>i.e.</i>, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.</p> + +<p>It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the +[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect +[<i>i.e.</i>, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a +disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a +disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, +again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied +by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary +with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke +without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking +in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> +without there having previously been the origination of that +disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot +was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts +produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the +disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one +part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which +had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction +of the pot, according to the principle, <i>cessante causâ cessat +effectus</i>. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span>resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes +of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the +pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, +initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a +disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the +pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to +produce it.<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> + +<p>But the second kind is as follows:—As action which arises in the +hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, +initiates a disjunction<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> from the points of space in which the +original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the +intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand +produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates +also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and +the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect] +and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and +the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of +the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second +disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the +body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the +action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing +in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of +disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we +must accept the view—that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause +and the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span>non-cause<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> which causes the second disjunction of the +body and the points of space.</p> + +<p>But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p. +147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely +unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different +opinions maintained on this point,—thus (<i>a.</i>) the Bháṭṭa Mímáṃsakas +and the Vedántins hold that darkness is a substance; (<i>b.</i>) Śrídhara +Áchárya<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus +darkness will be a quality]; (<i>c.</i>) some of the Prábhákara Mímáṃsakas +hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (<i>d.</i>) the +Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we +assert that as for the first alleged opinion (<i>a.</i>) it is quite out of +the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible +alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of +the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> or some different +one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one +you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should +certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that +it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself +destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the +very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of +qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different +substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that +darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed +of the dark blue of the tamála blossom?" We reply, that this is merely +an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But +enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> (<i>b.</i>) Hence it +follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since +you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some +substratum <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span>to receive it;<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> and again, we cannot conceive the eye +as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, +the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression +independent of the eye [<i>i.e.</i>, produced by the internal sense, mind], +because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an +indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain +that "absence or non-existence (<i>abháva</i><a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a>) is incapable of being +expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we <i>do</i> use +such phrases as <i>tenebræ oriuntur</i>, darkness cannot be a mere +non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would +include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, +destruction, inattention,<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> &c. [and yet we all know that men do +speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all +are cases of <i>abháva</i>]. (<i>c.</i>) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of +the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ +which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it +would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is +the mind which perceives cognitions].<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Hence we conclude that the +fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness +is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is +very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the +qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness <i>is</i> +attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is +connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert +that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced +by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an +object possessing colour,<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> as we see in the case of a jar's +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that +on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on +to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no +dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend +thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort +that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates +the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and <i>this</i> will +require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we +cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is +necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, +else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is +implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> Hence, +having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇáda +uttered his aphorism [as an <i>ipse dixit</i> to settle the question]: +"<i>Dravya-guṇa-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyád abhávas tamas</i>" (<i>Vaiś. +Sút.</i> v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is +dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions." +The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness +is perceived by the eye<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> [without light, whereas all substances, +if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the +eye to be visible].</p> + +<p>Non-existence (<i>abháva</i>) is considered to be the seventh category, as +established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that +which, itself not having intimate relation, is <i>not</i> intimate +relation;<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> and +"reciprocal non-existence."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span></p><p>The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and +"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without +any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though +having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence +which abides in its own counter-entity;<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> "reciprocal +non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet +no defined limit [<i>i.e.</i>, no <i>terminus ad quem</i> nor <i>terminus a quo</i>, +as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].</p> + +<p>If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really +the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to +lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" +is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is +not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose +opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> Nor +need you here raise the objection that "<i>abháva</i> can never be a means +of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his <i>summum +bonum</i>, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for +the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the +category of <i>abháva</i>].</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra's +<i>Abhidhána-chintámaṇi</i>; in the Váyu-puráṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's +<i>Catal</i>. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kaṇáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are +called the sons of Śiva.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhaksha.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book +treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, +&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the +qualities of the soul, and the three causes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> For this extract from the old <i>bháshya</i> of Vátsyáyana, +see Colebrooke's <i>Essays</i> (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> Cf. <i>Bháshá-parichchheda</i>, śloka 14.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> "Particularity" (<i>viśesha</i>) resides by "intimate +relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would +apply to "duality" and "conjunction."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply +to "existence" (<i>sattá</i>), which is the <i>summum genus</i>, to which +substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> Existence (<i>sattá</i>) is the genus of <i>dravya</i>, <i>guṇa</i>, +and <i>kriyâ</i>. <i>Dravya</i> alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and +all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and +disjunction. <i>Some</i> qualities (as <i>saṃyoga</i>, <i>rúpa</i>, &c.) may be +mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the +essence of <i>guṇa</i>, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> As all karmas are transitory, <i>karmatva</i> is only found +in the <i>anitya</i>. I correct in p. 105, line 20, <i>nityá-samavetatva</i>; +this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College +Library.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, +however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, +the former clause of the definition is added.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeshika) is not +"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"—but it is +the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being +single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different +atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, +water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the <i>ne plus +ultra</i>, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own +indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated <i>viśesha</i> as "ultimate +difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has <i>viśesha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> Mutual non-existence (<i>anyonyábháva</i>) exists between +two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" +but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> "<i>Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játiḥ</i>," Siddh. +Mukt. (<i>Saṃyoga</i> being a <i>guṇa</i> has <i>guṇatva</i> existing in it with +intimate relation).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot +nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union +with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda, <i>sl.</i> 103, 104).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> The organ of touch is an aërial +integument.—<i>Colebrooke.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> Sound is twofold,—"produced from contact," as the +<i>first</i> sound, and "produced from sound," as the <i>second</i>. <i>Janya</i> is +added to exclude God's knowledge, while <i>saṃyogájanya</i> excludes the +soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind +and the senses, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time +with some body, &c., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate +cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the +instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read <i>adhikaraṇaṃ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> <i>Paratva</i> being of two kinds, <i>daiśika</i> and <i>kálika</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the +last, however, is not pervading but atomic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> The three other <i>padárthas</i>, beside soul, which are +<i>amúrtta</i>,—time, ether, and space,—are not genera.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, +<i>i.e.</i>, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things +themselves—each being <i>one</i>; and they only become two, &c., by our +choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> <i>Saṃskára</i> is here the idea conceived by the +mind—created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material +previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or +mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the +original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> Every cause must be either <i>jñápaka</i> or <i>janaka</i>; +<i>apekshábuddhi</i>, not being the former, must be the latter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> <i>Apekshábuddhi</i> apprehends "this is one," "this is +one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of +these, but in <i>both</i> together.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> The Vaiśeshikas held that the jívátman and space are +each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each +have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is +ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion +has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has +mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said +in Sútra 26— +</p> +<div class="blockquot"><p><i>——athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa +ishyate,</i></p></div> +<p> +which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are +limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special +qualities of ether and soul (<i>i.e.</i>, sound, knowledge, &c.) are +limited to different portions and of momentary duration."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> The author here mentions two other causes of the +destruction of <i>dvitva</i> besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 +(<i>apekshábuddhi-náśa</i>), viz., <i>áśrayanáśa</i>, and the united action of +<i>both</i>:— +</p> +<table summary="Vaiseshika"> + <tr> + <td>1.</td> + <td>Ekatva-jñána</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-kriyá</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>.......</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>2.</td> + <td> Apekshábuddhi </td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-vibhága </td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-kriyá.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>3.</td> + <td> Dvitvotpatti and akatva-jñána-náśa</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-vibhága.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>4.</td> + <td>Dvitvatvajñána </td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Dvitvádhárasya (<i>i.e.</i>, avayavinaḥ) náśaḥ</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>5.</td> + <td>Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekshábuddhi-náśa</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Dvitva-náśa (<i>i.e.</i>, of avayavin).</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Ádhára-náśa (of avayavin).</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>6.</td> + <td>Dvitva-náśa and dravya-buddhi </td> + <td>|</td> + <td>.......</td> + <td>|</td> + <td>Dvitva-náśa.</td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> +The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the +course of the six steps of <i>ekatvajñána</i>, &c., one of the two parts is +itself divided either at the <i>first</i> or the <i>second</i> moment. In the +first case, the <i>dvitva</i> of the whole is destroyed in the fifth +moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding +<i>dvitvádhára-náśa</i>, or, as Mádhava calls it, <i>áśrayanivṛitti</i>. In the +second case, the <i>náśa</i> arrives at the same moment simultaneously by +both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united +action of two causes, <i>apekshábuddhi-náśa</i> and <i>ádhára-náśa</i>. Any +<i>kriyá</i> which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would +be unimportant, as the <i>náśa</i> of the <i>dvitva</i> of the whole would take +place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and +in this way it would be too late to affect that result.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, from the destruction of <i>apekshábuddhi</i> follows +the destruction of <i>dvitva</i>; but the other destructions previously +described were followed by some production,—thus the knowledge of +<i>dvitvatva</i> arose from the destruction of <i>ekatvajñána</i>, &c. (cf. +Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the +counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in +the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; +thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black +(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two +atoms.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, a kind of initiative tendency.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta +Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have—1. the +destruction of the <i>dvyaṇuka</i> and simultaneously a disjunction from +the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the +destruction of the black colour in the <i>dvyaṇuka</i>, and the +simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the <i>dvyaṇuka</i> with +that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the +simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the +action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The +remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> The Vaiśeshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old +black jar is <i>destroyed</i>, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., +being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour +in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, +eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps +prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of +the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different +compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the +old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes +not the jar but its colour, &c.,—it is still the same jar, only it is +red, not black.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> In p. 109, line 14, I read +<i>gagaṇavibhágakartṛitvasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series +of steps:—1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the +disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction +which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. +by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the +severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction +with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the +cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second +disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced +by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the +pot.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> The original has a plural <i>vibhágán</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, +disjunctions from the several points.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the disjunction of the hand and the points of +space.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> For <i>dravyádi</i> read <i>pṛithivyádi</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> I am not sure that it would not be better to read +<i>viddhavevidhayá</i>, rewounding the wounded, instead of <i>vṛiddhavívadhayá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> Unless you <i>see</i> the rope you cannot mistake it for a +serpent.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> In p. 110, last line, read <i>'bháve</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> Read in p. 110, last line, <i>anavadhánádishu</i>. +<i>Vidhipratyaya</i> properly means an imperative or potential affix implying +"command;" but the pandit takes <i>vidhi</i> here as <i>bhávabodhaka-kriyá</i>. It +has that meaning in Kávya-prakáśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> The mind perceives <i>áloka-jñána</i>, therefore it would +perceive its absence, <i>i.e.</i>, darkness, but this last is perceived by +the <i>eye</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a +jar's absence in the dark.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation +is the <i>dhvaṃsábháva</i>, or "emergent non-existence."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> The reading <i>pratyayavedyatvena</i> seems supported by p. +110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, +therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read <i>pratyakshavedyatvena</i>, and +would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sút. p. 250), "<i>yadi hi +níla-rúpavan nílaṃ rúpam eva vá tamaḥ syát, váhyálokapragraham +antareṇa chakshushá na gṛihyeta</i>."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> "Relative non-existence" (<i>saṃsargábháva</i>) is the +negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is +"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," +and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the +jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the +spot of ground,—it is the <i>játi ghaṭatva</i> which resides in the jar.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> The opposite is "there <i>is</i> colour in the air."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI.</h2> + +<h2>THE AKSHAPÁDA (OR NYÁYA) DARŚANA.</h2> + + +<p>The principle that final bliss, <i>i.e.</i>, the absolute abolition of +pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain +sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a +particular tenet<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> of the Nyáya school, as is declared by the +author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be +proved, &c.,—from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is +the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the +Nyáya Śástra. Now the Nyáya Śástra consists of five books, and each +book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the +first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine +categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the +remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (<i>váda</i>). In the first +daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the +four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their +being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that +"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof" +already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mímáṃsakas as +separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he +examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the +second, "understanding" (<i>buddhi</i>), and "mind" (<i>manas</i>). In the first +daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (<i>pravṛitti</i>), +the "faults," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>"transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and +"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> as to +the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the +first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds +of futility (<i>játi</i>), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion +for rebuke" (<i>nigrahasthána</i>, or "unfitness to be argued with").</p> + +<p>In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be +measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (<i>pramáṇa</i>) is +first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have +first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always +accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined +from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of +knowledge [<i>i.e.</i>, the soul];<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> and this definition thus includes +the peculiar tenet of the Nyáya School that God is a source of right +knowledge,<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared +(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right +knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact +that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge." +And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to +the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth +chapter of the Kusumáñjali:</p> + +<p>"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the +possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's +school, the being separated from all absence thereof.</p> + +<p>"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him +and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various +existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being +swept away <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span>by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the +slightest want of observation in Him,—He, Śiva, is my authority; what +have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be +with rising doubts?"</p> + +<p>"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, +analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of +right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their +objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, +fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature +is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's +possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and +therefore not distinctive,—or by its possessing only irrelevant +qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the +particular point in question,<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a>—or by conflicting testimony. The +thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a +motive" (<i>prayojana</i>); this is twofold, <i>i.e.</i>, visible and invisible. +"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a +general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> +A "tenet" (<i>siddhánta</i>) is something which is accepted as being +authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common +to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption" +[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied +dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the +sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these +are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, +and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (<i>tarka</i>, i. 39) is the +showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission +of a false major<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> (cf. Sút. i. 39, and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span>iv. 3); and this is of +eleven kinds, as <i>vyágháta</i>, <i>átmáśraya</i>, <i>itaretaráśraya</i>, &c.</p> + +<p>"Ascertainment" (<i>nirṇaya</i>, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception +of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by +perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (<i>váda</i>) is +a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment +of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (<i>jalpa</i>) is the talk of a man only +wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side +of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (<i>vitaṇdá</i>) is the talk of a man +who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i. +43). "Dialogue" (<i>kathá</i>) is the taking of two opposite sides by two +disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to +prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the +"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded" +or "mistimed" (Sút. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (<i>chhala</i>) is the bringing +forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous +sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a +term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" +(<i>játi</i>) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of +twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyáya +aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses +his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as +described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert +here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too +prolix,—they are fully explained in the aphorisms.</p> + +<p>But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c., +are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name +of the Nyáya Śástra, [as reasoning, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>Nyáya</i>, or logic, +properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]" +We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially +said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name +Nyáya was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span> rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or +inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant +feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its +being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said +by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyáya from its +establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing +action;"<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> and by Pakshila Swámin, "This is the science of +reasoning (<i>ánvíkshikí</i>) divided into the different categories, +'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all +actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in +the declarations of science."<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> + +<p>But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation +arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation +ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply, +"No," for it is said in the second Nyáya aphorism, "Pain, birth, +activity, faults, false notions,—on the successive annihilation of +these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it," +by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the +thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul; +"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the +soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to +it,<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable +to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different +"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the +stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man, +impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus +by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.; +by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity" +produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>his body, +as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c., +by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right +activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each +leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation; +and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain," +which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now +this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is +continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane +existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And +whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good +deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge +that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with +pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to +abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced +it.<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the +knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right +knowledge divided into the four sciences,<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> there arises in his +mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of +things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions +disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with +them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the +cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this +absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this, +that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive, +as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyáya Sútras: +"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—since, on the +successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span>the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of +them] final beatitude."</p> + +<p>"But is not your definition of the <i>summum bonum</i>, liberation, <i>i.e.</i>, +'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach +as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> why then is this +continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" +We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do +include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as +being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the +royal highway<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain +is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the +Mádhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of +soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is +the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as +being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c., +we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either +alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (<i>a.</i>) the continued +succession of cognitions, or (<i>b.</i>) something different therefrom? +(<i>a.</i>) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyáyikas allow +that cognition is evanescent,<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> and we do desire to abolish +cognition as a cause of <i>pravṛitti</i> or action<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a>], for who would +oppose a view which makes for his own side? (<i>b.</i>) But if the latter, +then, since it must be eternal,<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> its abolition is impossible; and, +again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your +supposed "<i>summum bonum</i>;" for surely no sensible person would strive +to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span>principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" +and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this +very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].</p> + +<p>"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure +intelligence [<i>i.e.</i>, the Yogácháras and the Sautrántikas<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a>], that +'the <i>summum bonum</i>' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on +the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that +there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that +the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former, +if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha +contemplations<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that, +as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all +things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations, +they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at +irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct +recognition of the real nature of things.</p> + +<p>And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when +accompanied by the natural obstacles<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> is said to be "bound," and +when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot +establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be +able to say that the very same being which <i>was</i> bound <i>is</i> now +liberated.</p> + +<p>Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the +releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to +impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what +he means by "obstruction"?<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> If he answers "merit, demerit, and +error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the +body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual +upspringing of the soul consequent on the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span>body's annihilation, as of +a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this +said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it +parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known +definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without +parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those +of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> If you say that it has +parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is +non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if +this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the +Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that +what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and +thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped +during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil +which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a +former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the +soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's +"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an +agent possessing form?<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p> + +<p>Again, if we take the Chárváka's view "that the only bondage is +dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true +liberation,"—if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we +have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then +no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power +involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being +equalled.<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a></p> + +<p>Again, the Sánkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul +are utterly distinct, and then holds that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span>"liberation is the soul's +remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has +withdrawn,"—even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of +pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of +the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in +nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since +the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve +that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that +it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent. +Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former, +then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the +spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter, +the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.</p> + +<p>Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the +doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the +manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;" +but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not +come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the +proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is +precluded by a valid non-perception;<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> or if you allow its +authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things +as floating stones.<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p> + +<p>"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of +happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be +only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the +dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour +rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some +speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The +truth is that all happiness must <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span>be included under the category of +pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by +pain, either as admitting of increase,<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> or as being an object of +perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as +involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for +its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the +proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search," +since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some +incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative +is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any +attempt to establish happiness as the <i>summum bonum</i>, since it is +inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man +who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that +it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by +rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how +many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got +together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future +issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers +consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious +experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for +him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the +Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed +Śruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the +soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.</p> + +<p>But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence +of a Supreme Being, <i>i.e.</i>, perception, inference, or Śruti? Certainly +perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., +must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no +universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> Nor +can Śruti, since neither of the resulting <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span>alternatives can be +sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or +as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our +school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal]; +under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> As for +comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that +sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a +moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply +to the present case.<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as +unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need +excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at +once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had +a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." +(<i>a.</i>) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be +rejected as unproved (<i>asiddha</i>), since it can be established beyond a +doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we +to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact +with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the +first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as +ether,<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too +much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, +which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It +therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it +holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class +of those substances which exist in intimate relation."<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> Or we may +adopt another view and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span>maintain that it is easy to infer the +"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their +possessing intermediate magnitude.<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" +(<i>viruddha</i>),<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a> since there is no such acknowledged universal +proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term +to that in our syllogism [<i>i.e.</i>, that they must have had no maker]. +(<i>c.</i>) Nor is our middle term too general (<i>anaikánta</i>), since it is never +found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the <i>vipaksha</i> in +the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (<i>d.</i>) Nor +again is it precluded (<i>bádhita</i> or <i>kálátyayopadishṭa</i>), for there is no +superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (<i>e.</i>) Nor is it +counter-balanced (<i>sat-pratipakshita</i>), for there does not appear to be +any such equally valid antagonist.</p> + +<p>If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, +&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not +produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"—this +pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn +can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words +"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not +produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the +argument thus involves the fallacy called <i>vyápyatvásiddhi</i>].<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> Nor +can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you +cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span>smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable +to limitation by any suggested condition (<i>upádhi</i>),<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> [such as +"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason +"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a +valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, +&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do +acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world +that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently +of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably +involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker" +the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, +and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other +causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if +the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action +of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since +these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous +doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all. +There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to +the present case—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to +establish its validity,</p> + +<p>"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on +account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the +major term."</p></div> + +<p>If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as +"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body," +&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, +whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or +not.<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span></p><p>As has been said by Udayana Áchárya [in the Kusumáñjali, iii. 5]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"If Śruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument +fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old +objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than +ever."</p></div> + +<p>Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our +argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's +being known or unknown.<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p> + +<p>"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating +the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some +other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain +something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be +the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who +possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too +it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the +advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would +call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If +you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one +would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have +rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not +checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion; +for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing +another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to +create the world." This has been said by Bhaṭṭáchárya—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;</p> + +<p>"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would +be left undone by Him?"—</p></div> + +<p>We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span>pleased for +a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following +suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by +compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of +happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there +cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which +will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be +created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own +independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], +since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder +one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> and for this +there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the +Śvetáśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he +admits<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your +deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the +Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's +existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any +reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal +dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard +to their being produced or in regard to their being known?<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> It +cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is +dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no +possibility of <i>His</i> being produced; nor can it be in regard to their +being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the +Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, +can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, +for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span>any <i>yogin</i> +endowed with the transcendent faculties (<i>tívra</i>,<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> &c.)</p> + +<p>Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of +duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is +obtained; thus everything is clear.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.</p> + +<p>We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or <i>hetvábhásas</i> +of the modern Hindu logic (cf. <i>Siddhántamukt.</i>, § 71, <i>Tarkasaṃgr.</i>, +55-67), viz., <i>anaikánta</i>, <i>viruddha</i>, <i>asiddha</i>, <i>kálátyayopadishṭa</i> +or <i>bádhita</i>, and <i>pratipakshita</i> or <i>sat-pratipaksha</i>. The four first +of these generally correspond to the <i>savyabhichára</i> or "erratic," +<i>viruddha</i> or "contradictory," <i>sádhyasama</i> or "unproved," and +<i>atítakála</i> or "mistimed," <i>i.e.</i>, "precluded," as given in the list +of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but <i>pratipakshita</i> +corresponds imperfectly to <i>prakaraṇasama</i>. The <i>prakaraṇasama</i> or +"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available +for both sides, as, <i>e.g.</i>, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it +is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, +"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other +authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same +difficulties as the original question, as, <i>e.g.</i>, "sound is +non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here +this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old +question, "Is sound eternal?" But the <i>pratipakshita</i> reason is one +which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is +eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it +is a product."</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read +<i>doshanimitta-tattva</i> for <i>doshanimittakatva</i> (compare Nyáya Sút. iv. +68).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> Without this last clause the definition might include +the objects (<i>vishaya</i>), as these are, of course, connected with right +knowledge.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (<i>pramáṇa</i>) +according to the definition, because he is <i>pramáyá áśrayaḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. +i. p. 315.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no +smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we <i>see</i> the smoke, is +the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (<i>Ballantyne</i>). +Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke +(<i>vyápaka</i>) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false <i>vyápya</i>").</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> Action (<i>pravṛitti</i>) follows after the ascertainment of +the truth by <i>nyáya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition +reads <i>prakírtitá</i> for <i>paríkshitá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid +indifference, <i>moha</i>," which is however referred to presently.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> In p. 116, line 3, I would read <i>tannirvartakam</i> for +<i>tannivartakam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu +authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the +eternal doctrine of polity,—these four sciences are the causes of the +stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki's +<i>Nítisára</i>, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p. +3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can +lick her ear."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> Literally the "bell-road," <i>i.e.</i>, "the chief road +through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with +tinkling ornaments, proceed."—<i>Wilson's Dict.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains +during the second, and ceases in the third.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? +Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have +sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167, +line 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> See <i>supra</i>, pp. 24-32.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> All is momentary, all is pain, all is <i>sui generis</i>, +all is unreal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> In the form of the various <i>kleśas</i> or "afflictions."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> <i>Ávaraṇa</i>, cf. pp. 55, 58.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as +happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense, +mind (Bháshá P. § 83).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> The reading <i>múrtapratibandhát</i> is difficult, but I +believe that <i>pratibandha</i> means here <i>vyápti</i>, as it does in Sánkhya +Sútras, i. 100.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> The true <i>summum bonum</i> must be +<i>niratiśaya</i>,—incapable of being added to.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> <i>Yogyánupalabdhi</i> is when an object is not seen, and +yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, +light, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "<i>grávánaḥ plavanti</i>," +see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase <i>aśmánaḥ plavanti</i> occurs +in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be +authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward +to reveal the existence of God.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under +inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the +relation of a name to the thing named.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of +everything, as <i>e.g.</i>, a jar.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in +its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, +ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and +air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category +<i>viśesha</i> does reside in them by intimate relation. The word +"substances" excludes <i>tantutva</i>, and "existing in intimate relation" +excludes ether, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all +eternal substances being the one or the other.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> The <i>viruddha-hetu</i> is that which is never found where +the major term is.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> This and much more of the whole discussion is taken +from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage +there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the +mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of +vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily +restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more +wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the +objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the +validity of the assumed middle term."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> For the <i>upádhi</i> cf. pp. 7, 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> As in the former case it would be clear that it is a +subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable +to the fault of <i>áśrayásiddhi</i>, a "baseless inference," since your +subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the +locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as +that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be +unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if +He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in +p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, <i>vikalpaparáhatatvát</i>, and then begin +the next clause with <i>syád etat</i>. The printed text, <i>vikalpaparáhataḥ +syát tad etat</i>, seems unintelligible.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes +Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world +as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly +constitutes his gross body (viráj).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> The usual reading is <i>tasthur</i> for <i>tasthe</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> For these divisions of the <i>anyonyáśraya</i> fallacy, see +<i>Nyáyasútra vṛitti</i>, i. 39 (p. 33).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> For <i>tívra</i> cf. <i>Yoga sútras</i>, i. 21, 22.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII.</h2> + +<h2>THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.</h2> + + +<p>An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that +merit (<i>dharma</i>) comes from the practice of duty (<i>dharma</i>), but how +is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A +reply to this question has been given in the older<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> Mímáṃsá by the +holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímáṃsá consists of twelve books.<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> In +the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections +of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (<i>vidhi</i>), +"explanatory passage" (<i>arthaváda</i>), hymn (<i>mantra</i>), tradition +(<i>smṛiti</i>), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions +[as <i>e.g.</i>, on <i>apúrva</i>] relating to the difference of various rites, +refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of +performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the +third, <i>Śruti</i>, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (<i>liṅga</i>), "context" +(<i>vákya</i>), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent +opposition to one another, the ceremonies called <i>pratipatti-karmáṇi</i>, +things mentioned incidentally (<i>anárabhyádhíta</i>), things accessory to +several main objects, as <i>prayájas</i>, &c., and the duties of the +sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the +principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the <i>juhú</i> being +made of the <i>butea frondosa</i>, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which +form subordinate parts of the <i>rájasúya</i> sacrifice. In the fifth, the +relative order of different <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>passages of <i>Śruti</i>, &c., the order of +different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the +<i>vájapeya</i>], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and +the respective force of the words of <i>Śruti</i>, order of mention, &c., +in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons +qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for +enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory +rites, the <i>sattra</i> offerings, things proper to be given, and the +different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the +ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic +text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth, +transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed +"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference +takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the +adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (<i>úha</i>), the +adaptation of <i>sámans</i> and <i>mantras</i>, and collateral questions +connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where +the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and +non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites +are precluded because other rites produce their special result, +discussions connected with the <i>graha</i> offerings, certain <i>sámans</i>, +and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of +negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the +fuller discussion of <i>tantra</i><a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> [where several acts are combined +into one], and <i>ávápa</i> [or the performing an act more than once]. In +the twelfth, a discussion on <i>prasaṅga</i> [where the rite is performed +for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference], +<i>tantra</i>, cumulation of concurrent rites (<i>samuchchaya</i>) and option.</p> + +<p>Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span>the +Púrva-Mímáṃsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to +know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a +"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (<i>a.</i>) the +subject, (<i>b.</i>) the doubt, (<i>c.</i>) the <i>primâ facie</i> argument, (<i>d.</i>) +the demonstrated conclusion, and (<i>e.</i>) the connection (<i>saṅgati</i>). +The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great +teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the +sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is +whether the study of Jaimini's <i>śástra</i> concerning duty, beginning +with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an +instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the +<i>anváhárya</i>," is to be commenced or not. The <i>primâ facie</i> argument is +that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the +Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future +fruit. (<i>a.</i>) If you say that this injunction must have a visible +fruit, and this can be no other<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> than the knowledge of the meaning +of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is +enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, +or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as +we see in the rule for shelling rice.<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> It cannot be the former, +for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof +from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of +reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would +present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the +injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the +baked flour cake called <i>puroḍása</i> is made only of rice prepared by +being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might +have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon +and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span>the principal <i>apúrva</i>, by means of the various minor effects or +subordinate <i>apúrvas</i>, produced by the various subordinate parts of +the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor <i>apúrva</i> of the +unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in +the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such +restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the +knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by +studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is +no injunction to study the Púrva Mímáṃsá as a means of knowing the +sense of the Veda. (<i>b.</i>) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic +injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with +the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, +although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal +words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning +which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, +is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the +Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let +that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes +that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to +offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its +characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the +present case also. As it has been said—</p> + +<p>"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the +injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose +heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the +analogy of the Viśvajit, &c."</p> + +<p>Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛiti rule from being violated: "Having +read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no +long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the +student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after +he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's +house to read the Mímáṃsá discussions, and thus the idea of no +interval between would be contradicted. Therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> for these three +reasons, (<i>a.</i>) that the study of Mímáṃsá is not enjoined, (<i>b.</i>) that +heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (<i>c.</i>) +that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, +we maintain that the study of the Mímáṃsá discussions on duty is not +to be commenced.</p> + +<p>The "authoritative conclusion" (<i>siddhánta</i>), however, is as +follows:—</p> + +<p>We grant that it cannot be a case of <i>vidhi</i>, for it might have been +adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt +could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case +of <i>niyama</i>. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix +<i>tavya</i> expresses an enforcing power in the word,<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> which is to be +rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain +effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some +corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort. +Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole +word <i>adhyetavya</i>, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of +reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an +end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, +consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could +the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as +the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really +mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could +never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action," +production, &c.<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> Therefore the only true end which remains to us +is the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span>knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the +sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He +has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are +aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon +sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And +the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of +written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word +"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the +reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a +duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal <i>apúrva</i>, +produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and +establishes the subordinate <i>apúrvas</i> produced by the inferior +sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of <i>apúrva</i> +produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous +<i>apúrva</i> produced by the restricting injunction (<i>niyama</i>), which +prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these +sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a <i>niyama</i> could have this +future influence called <i>apúrva</i>, the same doubt might equally +invalidate the efficacy of a <i>vidhi</i> [as the two stand on the same +level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one +that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the <i>Viśvajit</i> +offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form +of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to +suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an +unseen one; but if a <i>vidhi</i> has the restricting meaning of +a <i>niyama</i>, it does not thereby become meaningless."</p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span></p><p>But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of +the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he +who reads the Veda with its <i>aṅgas</i>, grammar, &c., may attain to this +knowledge, the study of Mímáṃsá will be useless." But this is not +true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the +literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of +discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed +gravel," neither grammar nor <i>nigama</i><a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> nor <i>nirukta</i> will +determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not +with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mímáṃsá discussion that the true +meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is +brightness."<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> It is therefore established that the study of +Mímáṃsá is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the +passage of Smṛiti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which +implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits +any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the +return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having +read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that +both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the +common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of +the injunction we conclude that the study of the Púrva Mímáṃsá Śástra, +consisting of a thousand "topics,"<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> is to be commenced. This topic +is connected with the main subject of the Śástra as being a subsidiary +digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression +which helps to establish the main subject."<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p> + +<p>I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic" +in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhákara.</p> + +<p>In the Smṛiti rule,<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when +eight years old (by investing him with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span>the sacred cord), let him instruct +him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. +Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you +ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher," +since, by Páṇini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root <i>ní</i> is used in the +<i>átmanepada</i> when honour, &c., are implied, <i>i.e.</i>, here the duty which a +teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a +pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since +both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage +Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Bráhman who girds his pupil with the +sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary +<i>aṅgas</i> and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (<i>áchárya</i>)." +Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled +without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the +very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding +obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of +one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading +the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us +if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate +injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined +as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual <i>anuváda</i> +or "supplementary repetition."<a name="FNanchor_259_259" id="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> Therefore the former <i>primâ facie</i> +argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there +was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in +another way to suit this new view.</p> + +<p>Now the <i>primâ facie</i> argument was that the study of Mímáṃsá, not +being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the +"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus +authoritatively enjoined.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span></p> + +<p>Now the upholders of the former or <i>primâ facie</i> view argue as +follows:—"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following +dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to +understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the +bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of +teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding +what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient]; +and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is +sufficient, the Mímáṃsá discussions in question will have no subject +or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is +doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu +way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why +should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining +the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in +accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of +use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an +intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and +in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the +present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a +useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mímáṃsá +is not to be commenced."</p> + +<p>We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a +corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; +still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary <i>aṅgas</i>, and +has comprehended the general connection of the words with their +respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning +of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But +may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her +son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was +not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his +eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal +meaning of the Veda does not express its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> real purport, the old +objection will recur with full force that the study of Mímáṃsá will +have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding +the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead +astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply, +that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not +really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of +the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat +poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and +trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that +this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, +which is underived from any personal author, why should not the +literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the +doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this +intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mímáṃsá +discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper +"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not +obtained<a name="FNanchor_260_260" id="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the +authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper +subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of +Mímáṃsá <i>is</i> enjoined, and should be commenced.</p> + +<p>"Well,<a name="FNanchor_261_261" id="FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> be it so" [say the followers of the Nyáya], "but how can +the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there +is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no +personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of +tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case +with the soul"?<a name="FNanchor_262_262" id="FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> This argument is weak, because the alleged +characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those +who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span>that the line of +tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the +universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author +is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that +no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted, +since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the +second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, +viz., is it meant (<i>a.</i>) that no author of the Veda is remembered by +some one person, or (<i>b.</i>) by any person whatever? The former +supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would +apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has +overcome pride and anger," &c.<a name="FNanchor_263_263" id="FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> And the latter supposition is +inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not +omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any +person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a +personal author, for we argue as follows:—The sentences of the Veda +must have originated from a personal author, since they have the +character of sentences like those of Kálidása and other writers. And, +again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent +person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same +time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.</p> + +<p>But [ask the Mímáṃsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the +Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, +since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character +which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this +uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda? +This reasoning, however [the Naiyáyikas <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>answer], cannot rise to the +height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously +illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahábhárata was preceded by +an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study +of the Mahábhárata, which must have been the same in former times as +now." But [the Mímáṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference +between these two cases, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu +incarnate as] Vyása was the author of the Mahábhárata, in accordance +with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishṇu could be the maker +of the Mahábhárata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any +Smṛiti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless, +since those words of the Purushasúkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him +sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from +him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.</p> + +<p>Further [proceed the Naiyáyikas] we hold that sound is +non-eternal<a name="FNanchor_264_264" id="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the +external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.<a name="FNanchor_265_265" id="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> +"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof +arising from the fact that we recognise the letter <i>g</i> (for example) +as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is +extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute +our argument, since it has reference only to identity of <i>species</i>, as +in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or +of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mímáṃsaka] how +can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has +no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have +pronounced the letters?" "This objection <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>[answers the Naiyáyika] is +not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he +can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his +worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that +the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."</p> + +<p>I shall now [says the Mímáṃsaka] clear up the whole question. What is +meant by this <i>paurusheyatva</i> ["derivation from a personal author"] +which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (<i>utpannatva</i>) +from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as +ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement—with +a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of +proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves? +If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between +us.<a name="FNanchor_266_266" id="FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established +(<i>a.</i>) by inference,<a name="FNanchor_267_267" id="FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> or (<i>b.</i>) by supernatural testimony? (<i>a.</i>) +The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would +equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Málatímádhava +[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative +character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving +clause, "while they possess authority,"<a name="FNanchor_268_268" id="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> [as supra, p. 188, line +21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the +sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which +prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could +establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by +other evidence, this definition would be at once <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span>contradicted, just +as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even +if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order +to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that +he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want +of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in +time, and in nature.<a name="FNanchor_269_269" id="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and +other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, +for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past +experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhákara] when he +refutes the supposition of an omniscient author—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,<a name="FNanchor_270_270" id="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> +it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; +thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant +or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant +of form."</p></div> + +<p>Hence (<i>b.</i>) we also maintain that your position cannot be established +by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the +Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses"]. For the +rule of Páṇini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the +grammatical affixes with which such names as Káṭhaka, Kálápa, and +Taittiríya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of +"uttered by" Kaṭha, Kalápin, &c., though we maintain that these names +have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by +these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain +schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in +reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the +institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.</p> + +<p>Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span>of sound, +because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our +consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as +the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although +the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their +identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question—Is this +idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put +forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being +the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience +shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the +cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (<i>a.</i>) If it arises +from the latter reason, we Mímáṃsakas, who hold that the Veda is its +own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to +him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will +go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a +mass of doubts."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition of <i>g</i> +and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the +species which exists the same in each, and not to the several +individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are +different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make +such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This +objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for +as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual <i>g</i>'s, +there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species +<i>g</i>; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand +[the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the species <i>g</i>, the one species [in the +Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, +magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously +modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as +short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímáṃsaka doctrine +of] one individual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> <i>g</i>, the one <i>g</i> (in our view) will by the +diversity of "manifesters,"<a name="FNanchor_271_271" id="FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> appear to him associated with their +respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way +ascribed [to the letter <i>g</i>], there is a fallacious appearance of +distinction [between different <i>g</i>'s]. But does this ascription of +contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference +[between the <i>g</i>'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.) +from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative; +for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be +admitted between different <i>g</i>'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has +uttered ten <i>g's</i>," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same <i>g</i> ten +times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent +distinction between <i>g</i>'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a +difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the +apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., +that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one +indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [<i>i.e.</i>, +"different" as applied to the <i>g</i>'s] is really caused by the <i>noise</i>, +which in each case is different. This has been said by the great +teacher—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species +is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object +which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters, +is attained from audible noises;<a name="FNanchor_272_272" id="FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> so that the assumption +of species is useless."</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of +recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its +superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's +non-eternity."</p></div> + +<p>This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyáyika] <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span>treatise +by Vágíśwara, entitled <i>Mána-manohara</i>, "sound is non-eternal from the +fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of +sense<a name="FNanchor_273_273" id="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> (<i>sc.</i> the ear), just as colour is to the eye."</p> + +<p>We can also refute it in the following ways: (<i>a.</i>) If we follow the +[Sáṅkhya and Vedánta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently +overthrown<a name="FNanchor_274_274" id="FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (<i>b.</i>) if +we take it as referring to the <i>noise</i>, not the <i>sound</i>, we have no +dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (<i>c.</i>) +the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [<i>upádhi</i>] of +<i>aśrávaṇatva</i>, or "the not causing audition."<a name="FNanchor_275_275" id="FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> So Udayana tries at +great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is +imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is +perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the +non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of +such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has +arisen."<a name="FNanchor_276_276" id="FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> But he is sufficiently answered<a name="FNanchor_277_277" id="FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> by our old reply +[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span>distinction arises +from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the +story, the demon Tála went away [as well as Betála] when the offering +of blood was given to the latter.<a name="FNanchor_278_278" id="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> And as for the objection raised +by the author of the <i>Nyáyabhúshaṇa</i>,<a name="FNanchor_279_279" id="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> that, if sound were +eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always +perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our +allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our +articulate noise.<a name="FNanchor_280_280" id="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> And as for the (Naiyáyika) argument against the +existence<a name="FNanchor_281_281" id="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> of such a constant relation as this which is supposed +between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they +both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is +invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of +the soul.<a name="FNanchor_282_282" id="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a></p> + +<p>Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any +personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is +thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated +that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to +duty.</p> + +<p>"Well"<a name="FNanchor_283_283" id="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> [say our opponents], "let this question rest; <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span>but how +about another well-known controversy? It is said—</p> + +<p>"'The Sáṅkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness +are self-proved; the followers of the Nyáya hold that both are proved by +something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is +self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the +Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and +non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all +this discussion, how do the Mímáṃsakas accept as established their tenet +that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning +of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (<i>a.</i>) that +authoritativeness springs from itself? or (<i>b.</i>) that it springs from the +right knowledge in which it resides? or (<i>c.</i>) that it springs from the +instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge +in which it resides? or (<i>d.</i>) that it resides in a particular knowledge +produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right +knowledge?<a name="FNanchor_284_284" id="FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> or (<i>e.</i>) that it resides in a particular knowledge +produced by the instrumental causes <i>only</i> which produced the right +knowledge?</p> + +<p>"(<i>a.</i>) It cannot be the <i>first</i>, because wherever the relation of +cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore +these two cannot reside in the same subject [<i>i.e.</i>, authoritativeness +cannot cause itself]. (<i>b.</i>) It cannot be the <i>second</i>, because if +knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it +would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.<a name="FNanchor_285_285" id="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> (<i>c.</i>) +It cannot be the <i>third</i>, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly +be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span>'produced' at all,<a name="FNanchor_286_286" id="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> whether we call it a general +characteristic (<i>upádhi</i>) or a species (<i>játi</i>);<a name="FNanchor_287_287" id="FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> for if we call +it an <i>upádhi</i>, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any +contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess +the nature of recollection;<a name="FNanchor_288_288" id="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> and this cannot be produced, for we +all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can +we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (<i>d.</i>) +Nor can it be the <i>fourth</i>, for wrong knowledge [as well as right +knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental +causes which produce the general are included in those which produce +the particular,<a name="FNanchor_289_289" id="FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to +'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as, +<i>e.g.</i>, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the +particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would +therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true +knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most +Mímáṃsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be +considered as residing in a particular knowledge [<i>i.e.</i>, a wrong +knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which +produced the right knowledge. (<i>e.</i>) As for your <i>fifth</i> view, we ask +whether by being produced by the instrumental causes <i>only</i> which +produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence +of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the +followers of the Nyáya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by +something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that +authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge +combined with the absence of a 'defect.' <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span>Neither can it be the latter +alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a +'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this +absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of +right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its +presence, and be absent if it is absent,<a name="FNanchor_290_290" id="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> and it will at the same +time be not an unimportant condition.<a name="FNanchor_291_291" id="FNanchor_291_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> If you object that +non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you +whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we +should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent +non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an +effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you +at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumáñjali, +i. 10]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause +as well as an effect.'</p></div> + +<p>"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:—Right knowledge +depends on some cause<a name="FNanchor_292_292" id="FNanchor_292_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> other than the common causes of knowledge, +from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, +just as wrong knowledge does.<a name="FNanchor_293_293" id="FNanchor_293_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_293_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> Authoritativeness is known through +something external to itself [<i>e.g.</i>, inference], because doubt arises +in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in +non-authoritativeness.</p> + +<p>"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced +and recognised by means of something external, the Mímáṃsá tenet that +'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and +rotten."</p> + +<p>This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to +strike the sky with his fist; for (<i>a.</i>) we mean by our phrase +"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the +instrumental causes of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span>knowledge, it is not produced by any other +cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in +full:—Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental +causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is +produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of +knowledge,—just like a jar.<a name="FNanchor_294_294" id="FNanchor_294_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> Nor can Udayana's<a name="FNanchor_295_295" id="FNanchor_295_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> argument be +brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on +something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the +equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not +produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and +is also other than 'defect,'<a name="FNanchor_296_296" id="FNanchor_296_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> from the very fact of its being +knowledge—like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can +arise from the causes of knowledge <i>per se</i>, it would be a needless +complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call +it a <i>guṇa</i> or the absence of a "defect" (<i>dosha</i>).<a name="FNanchor_297_297" id="FNanchor_297_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a></p> + +<p>"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong +knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of +right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the +absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only +acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of +<i>guṇas</i> the absence of 'defects,'<a name="FNanchor_298_298" id="FNanchor_298_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> from their absence +the non-existence of the two kinds of +non-authoritativeness,<a name="FNanchor_299_299" id="FNanchor_299_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a> and from this the general +conclusion."<a name="FNanchor_300_300" id="FNanchor_300_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p></div> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced +by the same causes only which make us perceive the first +knowledge<a name="FNanchor_301_301" id="FNanchor_301_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> [<i>sc.</i> the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this +view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such +thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, +although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is +also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect," +&c.</p> + +<p>As for your argument [O Naiyáyika! given <i>supra</i>, in p. 198, lines +17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself +or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to +itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, +whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we +should have a case of <i>regressus in infinitum</i>, for it will want some +other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn +will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.</p> + +<p>As for the argument urged by Udayana<a name="FNanchor_302_302" id="FNanchor_302_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> in the Kusumáñjali, when he +tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend +on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech +which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span>of the wish,<a name="FNanchor_303_303" id="FNanchor_303_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is +a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by +an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is +closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends +on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but +throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mímáṃsá idea of +the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of +action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief +who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had +actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge +that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this +knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which +causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can +distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of +authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to +deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, +as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of +authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what +is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would +have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix +controversy; since it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which +(authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real +fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,' +which perception is produced by some sign that proves the +discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."<a name="FNanchor_304_304" id="FNanchor_304_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a></p></div> + +<p>Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and +authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following +divergency between the two great Mímáṃsá <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span>schools]:—The Veda is +composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (<i>mantra</i>), +"explanatory passages" (<i>arthaváda</i>), and "injunctions" (<i>vidhi</i>); and +by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven +sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma." Here <i>ta</i>, the affix of the third +person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or +rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the +opinion of the followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumárila, who maintain that words +signify<a name="FNanchor_305_305" id="FNanchor_305_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> something definite by themselves [apart from the +sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhákara, on the contrary, hold +that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as +they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be +done.<a name="FNanchor_306_306" id="FNanchor_306_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_306_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> Thus all has been made plain.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> Mádhava here calls it the <i>práchí Mímáṃsá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> Cf. <i>J. Nyáyamálávist</i>, pp. 5-9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family +priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured +one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for +<i>tantra</i> or not? By <i>tantra</i> one offering to Agni would do for both; +but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and +thus it must be a case of <i>ávápa</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, offering the two separately +(<i>J. Nyáyamálá</i>, xi. 1, 13).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> In p. 123, line 4, I read <i>vilakshaṇa-dṛishṭaphala</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> In the former case it would be a <i>vidhi</i>, in the latter +a <i>niyama</i>. Cf. the lines <i>vidhir atyantam aprápto niyamaḥ pákshike +sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisaṃkhyá vidhíyate</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> The Mímáṃsá holds that the potential and similar +affixes, which constitute a <i>vidhi</i>, have a twofold power; by the one +they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the +root-meaning (<i>artha-bhávaná</i>); by the other an enforcing power in the +word (<i>śabda-bhávaná</i>). Thus in <i>svargakámo yajeta</i>, the <i>eta</i> implies +"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make +up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies +an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the +self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this +course of action.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not +remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India +that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and +perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the +six <i>vikáras</i> mentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasúchi, 2, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>asti</i>, +<i>jáyate</i>, <i>vardhate</i>, <i>vipariṇamate</i>, <i>apakshíyate</i>, <i>naśyati</i>. I do +not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of +<i>apúrva</i>, sc. <i>phala</i>, <i>samudáya</i>, <i>utpatti</i>, and <i>aṅga</i>, described in +Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> The <i>nigamas</i> are the Vedic quotations in Yáska's +<i>nirukta</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> The exact number is 915.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> This is to explain the last of the five members, the +<i>saṃgati</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> Cf. Aśvaláyana's Gṛihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_259_259" id="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> The <i>anuváda</i>, of course, implies a previous <i>vidhi</i>, +which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal +authority. The <i>anuváda</i> in the present case is the passage which +mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous +<i>vidhi</i> as to teaching.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_260_260" id="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> I read in p. 127, line 12, <i>anava-gamyamánasya</i>, and so +the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14, <i>na budhyamánasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_261_261" id="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> In the next two or three pages I have frequently +borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his <i>Sanskrit Texts</i>, vol. +iii. p. 88.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_262_262" id="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> The soul may be traced back through successive +transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_263_263" id="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though +unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his +contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might +perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have +an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the +origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in +question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598, +from the MS. anthology called the <i>Subháshitárṇava</i>. For <i>muktaka</i>, +see <i>Sáh. Darp.</i>, § 558.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_264_264" id="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the +Mímáṃsá that sound is eternal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265_265" id="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and +air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have <i>viśesha</i>, not +<i>sámánya</i> or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. +Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they +reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these +arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiśeshika school than to the +Nyáya.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266_266" id="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> The Mímáṃsaka allows that the <i>uchcháraṇa</i> or utterance +is non-eternal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_267_267" id="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were +arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to +their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of +sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_268_268" id="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged +after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they +possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the +composition of Manu, &c."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_269_269" id="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> In assuming a material body, he would be subject to +material limitations.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_270_270" id="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman +developments (<i>atiśayáḥ</i>) in their saints.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_271_271" id="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air +"manifest" the always existing sound.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_272_272" id="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> "What is meant by 'noise' (<i>náda</i>) is these +'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the +air."—<i>Ballantyne</i>, <i>Mímáṃsá Aphorisms</i>, i. 17.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_273_273" id="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively +special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs +of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of +course, have its corresponding special quality.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_274_274" id="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> In p. 131, line 7, I read <i>pratyakshásiddheḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_275_275" id="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for the +<i>upádhi</i>. The <i>upádhi</i> or "condition" limits a too general middle +term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, +but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition +"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the +mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. +Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects +that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality +belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, <i>i.e.</i>, it is sometimes +found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, <i>e.g.</i>, in +<i>sound</i> itself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he +proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will +readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, <i>while +not causing audition</i>, are special qualities belonging to an organ of +sense, as, <i>e.g.</i>, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition +would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and +the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of +sound, as their points of view are so totally different.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276_276" id="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> In the former case we have the <i>dhwaṃsa</i> of sound, in +the latter its <i>prágabháva</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_277_277" id="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> In p. 131, line 12, I read <i>samapauhi</i> for <i>samápohi</i>, +<i>i.e.</i>, the passive aorist of <i>sam</i> + <i>apa</i> + <i>úh</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_278_278" id="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two +demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the +Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating +how one answer can suffice for two opponents.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_279_279" id="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's +<i>Bibl. Index</i>, p. 26).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_280_280" id="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> <i>Dhvani</i>, or our "articulate noise," produces the +vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There +is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into +a definite speech by our various articulations. I take <i>saṃskṛita</i> +here as equivalent to <i>abhivyakta</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_281_281" id="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> I read in p. 131, line 15, +<i>saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_282_282" id="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> It would be a case of <i>vyabhichára</i>. The Naiyáyika +argument would seem to be something as follows:—Sound is not thus +manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the +senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its +species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not +manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would +equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense +perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be +manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not +sure that I rightly understand the argument.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283_283" id="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> Here begins a long <i>púrva-paksha</i>, from p. 131, line +18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 <i>infra</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_284_284" id="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118). +The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second +knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive +the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (<i>prámáṇya</i>), +which resides in it as its characteristic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_285_285" id="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, +and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is +a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a +quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause +and therefore a substance.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_286_286" id="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_287_287" id="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> The first three categories "substance," "quality," and +"action," are called <i>játis</i> or species; the last four, "genus," +"<i>viśesha</i>," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called +<i>upádhis</i> or "general characteristics."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_288_288" id="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right +knowledge.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_289_289" id="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental +causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these +<i>together with a "defect,"</i> as biliousness, distance &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_290_290" id="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> if there be <i>doshábháva</i> there is <i>pramá</i>; if +not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read <i>doshábhávatvena</i> for +<i>doshábhávasahakṛitatvena</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_291_291" id="Footnote_291_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> <i>Anyathásiddhatvam</i> means <i>niyatapúrvavartitve sati +anávaśyakatvam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_292_292" id="Footnote_292_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> or the absence of "defect," <i>doshábháva</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_293_293" id="Footnote_293_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> Wrong knowledge has <i>doshábháva</i> or the presence of a +"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294_294" id="Footnote_294_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> Wrongness of knowledge (<i>apramátva</i>) can only reside in +knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a +jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than +those of knowledge (as, <i>e.g.</i>, the potter's stick, &c.), but it is not +produced by these other causes <i>in combination</i> with being also produced +by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing +directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit +than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar +is not +produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_295_295" id="Footnote_295_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> I suppose this is the argument given at the close of +the previous long púrva-paksha.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_296_296" id="Footnote_296_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> These words "and is other than defect" +(<i>dosha-vyatirikta</i>) are, of course, meaningless as far as right +knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to +bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by +the causes of knowledge <i>plus</i> "defect;" right knowledge by the former +alone.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_297_297" id="Footnote_297_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a +"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a +<i>guṇa</i> or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a +true object), or by the absence of a "defect."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_298_298" id="Footnote_298_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> The <i>guṇa</i> (or βελτἱστη ἕξις of an organ is +not properly a cause of <i>pramá</i> but rather <i>doshábháva-bodhaka</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299_299" id="Footnote_299_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> "doubtful" (<i>sandigdha</i>) and "ascertained +non-authoritativeness" (<i>niśchitáprámáṇya</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_300_300" id="Footnote_300_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> <i>Utsarga</i> is a general conclusion which is not +necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the +conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common +causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_301_301" id="Footnote_301_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second +knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive +the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth +of the perception, <i>i.e.</i>, its authoritativeness or <i>prámáṇya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_302_302" id="Footnote_302_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, +and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the +Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my +edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_303_303" id="Footnote_303_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> I read <i>tat-práchuryam</i> for <i>tatpráchurye</i> in p. 134, +line 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304_304" id="Footnote_304_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá +school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness +is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305_305" id="Footnote_305_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> I take <i>vyutpatti</i> here as used for <i>śakti</i>; <i>siddhe</i> +means <i>ghaṭádau</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_306_306" id="Footnote_306_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, called +<i>abhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ</i>, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by +themselves can express their separate meaning by the function <i>abhidhá</i> or +"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing +one connected idea. The latter, called <i>anvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ</i>, hold that +words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically +connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected +with an action. In <i>gám ánaya</i>, <i>gám</i> does not properly mean <i>gotva</i>, but +<i>ánayanánvita-gotva</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the bovine genus as connected with +"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, +and <i>vice versâ</i>. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (<i>Comparative +Philology</i>, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence +we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. +But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words +which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding +thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such +as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII.</h2> + +<h2>THE PÁṆINI-DARŚANA.<a name="FNanchor_307_307" id="FNanchor_307_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a></h2> + + +<p>If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an +affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and +this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the +waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is +notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point +of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very +first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great +Commentary," is "<i>atha śabdánuśásanam</i>," "Now comes the exposition of +words." The particle <i>atha</i> ("now") is used here as implying a new +topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is +meant the system of grammar put forth by Páṇini. Now a doubt might +here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of +words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such +doubt that he employed the particle <i>atha</i>, since this particle +implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the +exclusion of everything else.</p> + +<p>The word "exposition" (<i>anuśásana</i>), as here used, implies that thereby +Vaidic words, such as those in the line <i>śaṃ no devír abhishṭaye</i>,<a name="FNanchor_308_308" id="FNanchor_308_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> +&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for +"cow," "horse," "man," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span>"elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of +the exposition, <i>i.e.</i>, are deduced from their original roots and properly +formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. +We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of +the object [<i>śabdánuśásanam</i> standing for <i>śabdasyánuśásanam</i>], and as +there is a rule of Páṇini (<i>karmaṇi cha</i>, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits +composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the +phrase <i>śabdánuśásanam</i> does not come before us as a duly authorised +compound.</p> + +<p>Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the +alleged rule of Páṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an +object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in +connection with a word ending with a <i>kṛit</i> affix, there the object +alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;<a name="FNanchor_309_309" id="FNanchor_309_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> this +limitation arising from our taking <i>ubhayaprápti</i> in the sútra as a +<i>bahuvríhi</i> compound.<a name="FNanchor_310_310" id="FNanchor_310_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking +of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing +that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put +in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in +the Káśiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an +option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would +equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words <i>of</i> the +teacher' or '<i>by</i> the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of +the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended +relates to <i>words</i> and not to <i>things</i>, and since this can be at once +understood without any mention of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span>agent, <i>i.e.</i>, the teacher, any +such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object +and the agent are <i>not</i> both expressed in one and the same sentence, +this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under +ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another +rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in +connection with a word ending with a kṛit affix, is to be put in the +genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the <i>tatpurusha</i> +compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to +such recognised forms as <i>idhma-pravraśchana</i>, <i>paláśa-śátana</i>, +&c.<a name="FNanchor_311_311" id="FNanchor_311_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this +<i>shashṭhítatpurusha</i> is one of the class called "residual," in +accordance with Páṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used +in the residuum," [<i>i.e.</i>, in the other constructions not provided for +by special rules];<a name="FNanchor_312_312" id="FNanchor_312_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a> and in this way we might defend the phrase +against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your +alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should +thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a +genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and +hence Bhartṛihari in his <i>Vákyapadíya</i> has shown that these rules are +mainly useful where the question relates to the <i>accent</i>.<a name="FNanchor_313_313" id="FNanchor_313_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> To this +effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,</p> + +<p>"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be +employed.</p> + +<p>"Thus have they explained the meaning of Páṇini's sútras, +since</p> + +<p>"He himself uses such phrases as <i>janikartuḥ</i> and +<i>tatprayojakaḥ</i>."<a name="FNanchor_314_314" id="FNanchor_314_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_314_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span></p><p>Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question +(of the <i>Mahábháshya</i>) is that "it is to be understood that the rules +of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition +concerning words' are now commenced."</p> + +<p>"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended +meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' +as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless +excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since +the employment of such a word as <i>śabdánuśásanam</i>, the sense of which +can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author +intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a +subordinate study (<i>aṅga</i>) to the Veda.<a name="FNanchor_315_315" id="FNanchor_315_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> Otherwise, if there were +no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the +readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application +will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda +with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any +(special) end,"<a name="FNanchor_316_316" id="FNanchor_316_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a> because, even though there be such an injunction, +it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end +is mentioned which will establish that it is an <i>aṅga</i> of the Veda. +Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in +haste to say—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by +common life,</p> + +<p>"And therefore grammar is useless?"</p></div> + +<p>Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an <i>aṅga</i> of the +Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the +students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to +it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to +set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span>that +grammar is an <i>aṅga</i> of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they +should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all +knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become +involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would +consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of +sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an +incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now +it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an <i>aṅga</i> of +the Veda that he uses the words <i>atha śabdánuśásanam</i> and not <i>atha +vyákaraṇam</i>. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's +end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as +in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in +the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction +concerning words, <i>i.e.</i>, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may +say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the +true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by +word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the +understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided +into proper and improper words.<a name="FNanchor_317_317" id="FNanchor_317_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> Thus there is a tradition that +Bṛihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of +words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by +word,<a name="FNanchor_318_318" id="FNanchor_318_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was +Bṛihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand +years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,—how much +less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is +rendered efficient by four appropriate means,—reading, understanding, +practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life +would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading +word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and +consequently, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span>as we said at first, the desired end is not +established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the +knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. +And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many +examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called +roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in +this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, +for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), <i>karmaṇi</i>, the affix +<i>aṇ</i> is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with +it; and by this rule we learn many words, as <i>kumbhakára</i>, "a potter," +<i>káṇḍaláva</i>, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special +rule (iii. 2, 3), <i>áto 'nupasarge kaḥ</i>, directing that the affix <i>ka</i> +is to be used after a root that ends in long <i>á</i> when there is no +<i>upasarga</i>, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be +[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an <i>upasarga</i>]. "But +since there are other <i>aṅgas</i>, why do you single out grammar as the +one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six <i>aṅgas</i> the +principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal +is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious +austerities,</p> + +<p>"The wise have called grammar the first <i>aṅga</i> of the Veda."</p></div> + +<p>Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of +the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., +of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the +great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is +preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."<a name="FNanchor_319_319" id="FNanchor_319_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_319_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> +Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus +Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word +according to the <i>śástra</i>; it is equal to the words of the Veda +itself." Others also have said <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>that "a single word thoroughly +understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." +Thus (they say)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in +well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;</p> + +<p>"But those who use such false forms as <i>achíkramata</i> must +trudge thither on foot."<a name="FNanchor_320_320" id="FNanchor_320_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a></p></div> + +<p>Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" +since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. +For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its +heads, and seven its hands,—roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, +the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great +commentator thus explains it:—The "four horns" are the four kinds of +words—nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" +mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the +tense-affixes, <i>laṭ</i>, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary +(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the +"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including +the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the +three organs—the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" +(<i>vṛishabha</i>) is applied from its pouring forth (<i>varshaṇa</i>), <i>i.e.</i>, +from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," +<i>i.e.</i>, utters sound, for the root <i>ru</i> means "sound;" here by the +word "sound" developed speech (or language)<a name="FNanchor_321_321" id="FNanchor_321_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_321_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> is implied; "the +great god enters mortals,"—the "great god," <i>i.e.</i>, speech,—enters +mortals, <i>i.e.</i>, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is +declared the likeness [of speech]<a name="FNanchor_322_322" id="FNanchor_322_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> to the supreme Brahman.</p> + +<p>The eternal word, called <i>sphoṭa</i>, without parts, and the cause of the +world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>declared by Bhartṛihari in +the part of his book called the Brahmakáṇḍa—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible +essence of speech,</p> + +<p>"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence +springs the creation of the world."</p></div> + +<p>"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns +and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, +too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírṇaka—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a +fivefold,</p> + +<p>"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the +like."</p></div> + +<p>Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including +<i>karmapravachaníyas</i>.<a name="FNanchor_323_323" id="FNanchor_323_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_323_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> But the fourfold division, mentioned by the +great commentator, is proper, since <i>karmapravachaníyas</i> distinguish a +connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking +out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular +kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions +(<i>upasargas</i>).<a name="FNanchor_324_324" id="FNanchor_324_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p> + +<p>"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called +<i>sphoṭa</i>? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there +is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus +there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word +distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the +absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the +word is a false perception.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span></p> + +<p>Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as <i>sphoṭa</i>, as +otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the +word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot +bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the +following dilemma:—Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition +of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the +first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore +cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the +single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning +[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative +other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows +(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the +cognition of the meaning, there must be a <i>sphoṭa</i> by means of which +arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this <i>sphoṭa</i> is an eternal +sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes +the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (<i>sphuṭyate</i>) or +revealed by the letters," hence it is called <i>sphoṭa</i>, as revealed by +the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called +<i>sphoṭa</i> as causing the knowledge of the meaning,—these are the two +etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been +said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is +the word '<i>cow</i>' <i>gauḥ</i>? It is that word by which, when pronounced, +there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, +hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage +commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct +from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters +expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and +following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we +wished]," and ending, "The <i>Vákyapadíya</i> has established at length +that it is the <i>sphoṭa</i> which, distinct from the letters and revealed +by the sound, expresses the +meaning."<a name="FNanchor_325_325" id="FNanchor_325_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325_325" class="fnanchor">[325] +</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span></p> + +<p>Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say +that the <i>sphoṭa</i> has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails +under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to +convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the +latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of +conveying the meaning always produced, since, as <i>sphoṭa</i> is supposed +to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause +independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail +to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other +alternative, viz., that <i>sphoṭa</i> conveys the meaning when it is itself +manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this +manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you +adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis +of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your +hypothesis that they have this power to manifest <i>sphoṭa</i>." This has +been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mímáṃsá-śloka-várttika—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The grammarian who holds that <i>sphoṭa</i> is manifested by the +letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one +and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single +difficulty."</p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span></p><p>The truth is, that, as Páṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both +lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at +the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the +apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they +help.<a name="FNanchor_326_326" id="FNanchor_326_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> If you object that as there are the same letters in <i>rasa</i> as +in <i>sara</i>, in <i>nava</i> as in <i>vana</i>, in <i>díná</i> as in <i>nadí</i>, in <i>mára</i> as in +<i>ráma</i>, in <i>rája</i> as in <i>jára</i>, &c., these several pairs of words would +not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order +of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been +said by Tautátita—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is +perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will +be the meaning which they convey."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault +attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one +alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate +thing called <i>sphoṭa</i> is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the +letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our +view having been shown to be irrelevant].</p> + +<p>All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at +a straw;<a name="FNanchor_327_327" id="FNanchor_327_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether +you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which +conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a +collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,<a name="FNanchor_328_328" id="FNanchor_328_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a> +could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of +separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be +the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done +with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term +"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united +together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an +Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a +horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not +perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and +pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" +power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only +manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you +imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would +involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the +one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to +convey <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span>one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, +their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of +their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that +letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of +<i>sphoṭa</i>. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain +thing called <i>sphoṭa</i> which expresses the meaning, the same untenable +alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it +will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler +with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"<a name="FNanchor_329_329" id="FNanchor_329_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> This, however, is +only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference +between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, +reveals the invisible <i>sphoṭa</i>, and each successive letter makes this +<i>sphoṭa</i> more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, +is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature +of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely +manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the +authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the +sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, +the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered +letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛihari has shown in his first book that +the <i>letters</i> of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest +the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain +such and such a meaning from such and such a <i>word</i>," we are forced to +assume the existence<a name="FNanchor_330_330" id="FNanchor_330_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> of an indivisible <i>sphoṭa</i> as a distinct +category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this +has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus" +(<i>játi</i>), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is +ultimately that <i>summum genus</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span>existence whose +characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality<a name="FNanchor_331_331" id="FNanchor_331_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> +(Brahman).</p> + +<p>"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words +will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical +ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the +uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no +purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to +be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn +and not by combination."</p> + +<p>"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the +trouble of refuting."</p></div> + +<p>All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the +colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as +blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the <i>summum genus</i>, Brahman, is +variously cognised through its connection with different things, as +severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the +various conventional words which arise from the different +species,<a name="FNanchor_332_332" id="FNanchor_332_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the <i>summum +genus</i>) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have +the following authoritative testimony—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally +joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as +possessing that colour."</p></div> + +<p>And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being +divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with +different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all +words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. +This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the +affixed <i>tva</i>, <i>tal</i>, &c., express" (Páṇini v. 1, 119).</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span></p><p>"Existence" is that great <i>summum genus</i> which is found in cows, +horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it +resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really +different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (<i>gotva</i> and +<i>aśvatva</i>) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as +residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as +expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one <i>summum +genus</i> existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, +cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning +of the stem-word (<i>prátipadika</i>). A "root" is sometimes defined as +that which expresses <i>bháva</i>;<a name="FNanchor_333_333" id="FNanchor_333_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a> now, as <i>bháva</i> is "existence," the +meaning of a root is really existence.<a name="FNanchor_334_334" id="FNanchor_334_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a> Others say that a root +should be defined as that which expresses "action" (<i>kriyá</i>); but here +again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this +"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many +subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the +line—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Others say that action (<i>kriyá</i>) is a genus, residing in +many individuals."</p></div> + +<p>So, too, if we accept Páṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the +affixes <i>tva</i> and <i>tal</i> come after a word [denoting anything], when we +speak of the nature (<i>bháva</i>) thereof," it is clear from the very fact +that abstract terms ending in <i>tva</i> or <i>tá</i> [as <i>aśvatva</i> and +<i>aśvatá</i>] are used in the sense of <i>bháva</i>, that they do express +"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all +coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all +phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in +space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." +Such is the meaning of Hari's two <i>kárikás</i> quoted above. So, too, it +is laid down in the discussion on <i>sambandha</i> [in Hari's verses] that +the ultimate meaning of all <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span>words is that something whose +characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word +Substance.</p> + +<p>"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true +substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the +object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of +discrimination,<a name="FNanchor_335_335" id="FNanchor_335_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea +[without owners] is expressed."<a name="FNanchor_336_336" id="FNanchor_336_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a></p> + +<p>So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the +Várttika,<a name="FNanchor_337_337" id="FNanchor_337_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," +in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the +meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and +determined by various unreal<a name="FNanchor_338_338" id="FNanchor_338_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_338_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> conditions [as "the nature of +horse," &c.]</p> + +<p>According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words +mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,<a name="FNanchor_339_339" id="FNanchor_339_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a> denote a genus which resides +by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is +apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the +particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., +denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the +connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the +connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So +in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of +the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming +into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference +produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," +we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,<a name="FNanchor_340_340" id="FNanchor_340_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> &c. [as directly +denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is +denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in <i>paṭhati</i>, "he reads," &c., +since we find here a meaning common to all who read.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span></p><p>In the doctrine of Vyáḍi, who maintained that words meant individual +things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put +forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied +[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of +"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."<a name="FNanchor_341_341" id="FNanchor_341_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a></p> + +<p>Both views are allowed by the great teacher Páṇini; since in i. 2, 58, +he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that +"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be +optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured," +which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, +64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, +where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of +things similar in form" [<i>i.e.</i>, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the +plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a +dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all +assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. +Therefore both theories are in a sense true;<a name="FNanchor_342_342" id="FNanchor_342_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a> but the real fact is +that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.</p> + +<p>As it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one +true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, +shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."</p></div> + +<p>Hari also, in his chapter discussing <i>sambandha</i>, thus describes the +nature of this true meaning—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the +perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of +doubt,<a name="FNanchor_343_343" id="FNanchor_343_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> <i>that</i> only is called the truth by those who +know the end of the three Vedas."</p></div> + +<p>So too in his description of substance, he says—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>That</i> which remains as the Real during the presence of +modification, as the gold remains under the form of the +earring,—<i>that</i> wherein change comes and goes, <i>that</i> they +call the Supreme Nature."</p></div> + +<p>The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order +to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a +cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.</p> + +<p>"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is +identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are +thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two +souls."<a name="FNanchor_344_344" id="FNanchor_344_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a></p> + +<p>The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted +by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon +it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of +the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the +result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the +power of "concealment"<a name="FNanchor_345_345" id="FNanchor_345_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> [exercised by illusion] at the time of the +conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is +the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development +of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a +development of illusion likewise."</p></div> + +<p>When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent +joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval +ignorance is abolished, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span>final bliss is accomplished, which is best +defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the +text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the +Supreme Brahman."<a name="FNanchor_346_346" id="FNanchor_346_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> And thus we establish the fact that the +"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.</p> + +<p>Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the +diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the +science of sciences."<a name="FNanchor_347_347" id="FNanchor_347_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p></div> + +<p>And so again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of +final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the +travellers to emancipation."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śástra of grammar should be +studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_307_307" id="Footnote_307_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians +adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá school that +sound is eternal. He therefore treats of <i>sphoṭa</i> here, and not in his +Jaimini chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_308_308" id="Footnote_308_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_309_309" id="Footnote_309_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309_309"><span class="label">[309]</span></a> <i>Śabdánuśásana</i>, if judged by the apparent sense of +Páṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, +because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, +whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were +an agent expressed <i>as well as</i> an object, <i>i.e.</i>, if such a word as +<i>ácháryeṇa</i> followed. In the example given, we cannot say <i>áścharyo +godoho śikshitena gopálena</i> (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither +can we say <i>áścharyo gaváṃ doho' śikshitasya gopálasya</i> (as it would +violate ii. 3, 66).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_310_310" id="Footnote_310_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_310_310"><span class="label">[310]</span></a> That is, the <i>ubhayaprápti</i> of ii. 3, 66, is a +<i>bahuvríhi</i> agreeing with <i>kṛiti</i> in ii. 3, 65. These points are all +discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Páṇini.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_311_311" id="Footnote_311_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311_311"><span class="label">[311]</span></a> These actually occur in the Commentaries to Páṇini, ii. +2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_312_312" id="Footnote_312_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312_312"><span class="label">[312]</span></a> This takes in all cases of relation, <i>sambandha</i> +(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>shashṭhí-sambandha</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_313_313" id="Footnote_313_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_313_313"><span class="label">[313]</span></a> As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_314_314" id="Footnote_314_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314_314"><span class="label">[314]</span></a> These compounds occur in Páṇini's own sútras (i. 4, 30, +and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were +to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as +<i>shashṭhí śeshe</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_315_315" id="Footnote_315_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_315_315"><span class="label">[315]</span></a> The very word <i>śabda</i> in <i>śabdánuśásanam</i> implies the +Veda, since this is pre-eminently <i>śabda</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_316_316" id="Footnote_316_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_316_316"><span class="label">[316]</span></a> Compare Max Müller, <i>Sansk. Liter.</i>, p. 113. It is +quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_317_317" id="Footnote_317_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_317_317"><span class="label">[317]</span></a> In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele <i>daṇḍa</i> in line 3 +after <i>bhavet</i>, and insert it in line 4 after <i>śabdánám</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_318_318" id="Footnote_318_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318_318"><span class="label">[318]</span></a> As in the so-called <i>pada</i> text.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_319_319" id="Footnote_319_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_319_319"><span class="label">[319]</span></a> See Ballantyne's <i>Mahábháshya</i>, pp. 12, 64.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_320_320" id="Footnote_320_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_320_320"><span class="label">[320]</span></a> <i>Achíkramata</i> seems put here as a purposely false form +of the frequentative of <i>kram</i> for <i>achaṅkramyata</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_321_321" id="Footnote_321_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_321_321"><span class="label">[321]</span></a> Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the +lines of Bhartṛihari which immediately follow.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_322_322" id="Footnote_322_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_322_322"><span class="label">[322]</span></a> One would naturally supply <i>śabdasya</i> after <i>sámyam</i>, +but the Mahábháshya has <i>naḥ sámyam</i> (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_323_323" id="Footnote_323_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_323_323"><span class="label">[323]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, prepositions used separately as governing cases +of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_324_324" id="Footnote_324_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_324_324"><span class="label">[324]</span></a> The <i>karmapravachaníyas</i> imply a verb other than the one +expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced +by this understood verb. Thus in the example, <i>Śákalyasaṃhitám anu +právarshat</i>, "he rained after the Śákalya hymns," <i>anu</i> implies an +understood verb <i>niśamya</i>, "having heard," and this verb shows that there +is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This +<i>anu</i> is said to determine this relation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_325_325" id="Footnote_325_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_325_325"><span class="label">[325]</span></a> See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_326_326" id="Footnote_326_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_326_326"><span class="label">[326]</span></a> This is not very clear, the <i>anu</i> in <i>anugraha</i> might +mean <i>krameṇa</i>, and so imply the successive order of the letters.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_327_327" id="Footnote_327_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_327_327"><span class="label">[327]</span></a> In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read +<i>kalpam</i> for <i>kalpanam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_328_328" id="Footnote_328_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_328_328"><span class="label">[328]</span></a> In p. 142, line 3, I add <i>viná</i> after <i>nimittam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_329_329" id="Footnote_329_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329_329"><span class="label">[329]</span></a> The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are +collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way +by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day +dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means <i>uddeśyásiddhi</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_330_330" id="Footnote_330_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330_330"><span class="label">[330]</span></a> In p. 143, line 13, I read <i>sphoṭakabhávam</i> for +<i>sphoṭábhávam</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_331_331" id="Footnote_331_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_331_331"><span class="label">[331]</span></a> Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9, +32.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_332_332" id="Footnote_332_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_332_332"><span class="label">[332]</span></a> The Mímáṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (<i>játi</i>) +and not the individual (<i>vyakti</i>); the Nyáya holds that a word means +an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_333_333" id="Footnote_333_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_333_333"><span class="label">[333]</span></a> Cf. Rig-Veda Prátiś. xii. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_334_334" id="Footnote_334_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_334_334"><span class="label">[334]</span></a> He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by +the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_335_335" id="Footnote_335_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_335_335"><span class="label">[335]</span></a> Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_336_336" id="Footnote_336_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_336_336"><span class="label">[336]</span></a> So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really +meant, the one abiding existence.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_337_337" id="Footnote_337_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337_337"><span class="label">[337]</span></a> Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_338_338" id="Footnote_338_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338_338"><span class="label">[338]</span></a> In p. 145, line 8, read <i>asatya</i> for <i>aśvattha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_339_339" id="Footnote_339_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_339_339"><span class="label">[339]</span></a> We have here the well-known four grammatical +categories, <i>játi</i>, <i>guna</i>, <i>dravya</i> or <i>saṅjná</i>, and <i>kriyá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_340_340" id="Footnote_340_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340_340"><span class="label">[340]</span></a> But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_341_341" id="Footnote_341_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_341_341"><span class="label">[341]</span></a> Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that +the Mímáṃsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, +since otherwise there would be <i>vyabhichára</i> and <i>ánantya</i> (cf. also +Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakáśa, p. 10). If a word is +held to mean only <i>one</i> individual, there will be the first fault, as +it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not +include; if it is held to mean <i>many</i> individuals, it will have an +endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_342_342" id="Footnote_342_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_342_342"><span class="label">[342]</span></a> This seems the meaning of the text as printed <i>tasmát +dvayaṃ satyam</i>, but I should prefer to read conjecturally <i>tasmád +advayaṃ satyam</i>, "therefore non-duality is the truth."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_343_343" id="Footnote_343_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_343_343"><span class="label">[343]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone +exists.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_344_344" id="Footnote_344_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344_344"><span class="label">[344]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> the individual soul (<i>jíva</i>) and Brahman.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_345_345" id="Footnote_345_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345_345"><span class="label">[345]</span></a> The <i>Saṃvṛiti</i> of the text seems to correspond to the +<i>ávaraṇa</i> so frequent in Vedánta books.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_346_346" id="Footnote_346_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_346_346"><span class="label">[346]</span></a> This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi. +22.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_347_347" id="Footnote_347_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347_347"><span class="label">[347]</span></a> <i>Adhividyam</i> occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where +it is explained by [']Saṃkara as <i>vidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad +adhividyam</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV.</h2> + +<h2>THE SÁNKHYA-DARŚANA.</h2> + + +<p>"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held +by the grammarians, following the guidance of the <i>púrva</i> and <i>uttara</i> +Mímáṃsá schools], when the system of development propounded by the +Sáṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now +the Śástra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four +several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent<a name="FNanchor_348_348" id="FNanchor_348_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> only, +that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, +and that which is neither. (<i>a.</i>) Of these the first is that which is +only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not +itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called +the evolvent (<i>prakṛiti</i>) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium +of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is +expressed [in the Sáṅkhya Káriká], "the root-evolvent is no evolute." +It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is +the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one," +&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we +should have a <i>regressus ad infinitum</i>. Nor can you reply that such a +<i>regressus ad infinitum</i> is no objection, if, like the continued +series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our +senses,<a name="FNanchor_349_349" id="FNanchor_349_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a>—because here there is no evidence to establish the +hypothesis. (<i>b.</i>) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one, +egoism, and the subtile elements,—thus the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span>Sáṅkhya Káriká (§ 3), +"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are +the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great +principle, called also the intellect,<a name="FNanchor_350_350" id="FNanchor_350_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> &c., is itself the evolute +of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle +egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (<i>abhimána</i>), is the evolute +of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by +the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called +subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is +the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of +perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of +action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the +mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in +our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a +cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared +by Íśvara Kṛishṇa in his Kárikás<a name="FNanchor_351_351" id="FNanchor_351_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> (§ 24-27), "Self-consciousness +is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and +the five elemental rudiments. From modified<a name="FNanchor_352_352" id="FNanchor_352_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> egoism originates the +class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the +elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by +darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the +one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the +ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the +voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is +mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an +organ (like the other ten) from having a common <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span>property with +them."<a name="FNanchor_353_353" id="FNanchor_353_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> All this has been explained at length by the teacher +Váchaspati Miśra in the Sáṅkhya-tattva-kaumudí.</p> + +<p>(<i>c.</i>) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c., +and the eleven organs, as said in the Káriká, "The evolute consists of +sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not +evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents +of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different +"principle" (<i>tattva</i>) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are +not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is +that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows, +jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in +consequence of their being all alike gross [<i>i.e.</i>, possessed of +dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements, +ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste, +and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which +precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one, +two, three, four, and five qualities.<a name="FNanchor_354_354" id="FNanchor_354_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a> The creation of the organs +has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sáṅkhya +Káriká (§ 22)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from +this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen +proceed the five gross elements."</p></div> + +<p>(<i>d.</i>) The soul is neither,—as is said in the Káriká, "The soul is +neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute, +eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent +nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as +establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Káriká (§ 4).</p> + +<p>"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are +acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span>they comprise every mode +of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that +which is to be proven."</p> + +<p>Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and +effect. The Saugatas<a name="FNanchor_355_355" id="FNanchor_355_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a> maintain that the existent is produced from +the non-existent; the Naiyáyikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent +is produced from the existent; the Vedántins, that all effects are an +illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really +existent; while the Sáṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from +the existent.</p> + +<p>(<i>a.</i>) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is +itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more +than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be +identical.</p> + +<p>(<i>b.</i>) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since +it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the +originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be +produced, <i>i.e.</i>, become connected with existence; for not even the +cleverest man living can make blue yellow.<a name="FNanchor_356_356" id="FNanchor_356_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> If you say, "But are +not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is +incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in +regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that +the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is +existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only +produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like +the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the +milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove +the production of a thing previously non-existent.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected +with it or not connected; in the former <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span>alternative the effect's +existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between +two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise +from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action +of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sáṅkhya +teacher:—"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have +no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him +who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an +utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though +not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a +capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred +from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be +allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing +oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is +non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds, +whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or +not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally +apply here].</p> + +<p>From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows +that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth +is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter +[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there +we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a +cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the +other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth +is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from +its cause.<a name="FNanchor_357_357" id="FNanchor_357_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> If you object that, if this were true, the separate +threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the +office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature +of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the +limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span>and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, +as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and +are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are +concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing +as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the +existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gítá (ii. 16)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor +non-existence for the existent."</p></div> + +<p>And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish +the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (<i>prakṛiti</i>). This has +been said [in the Káriká, § 9]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of +cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are +selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by +every means possible; what is capable does that to which it +is competent; and like is produced from like."<a name="FNanchor_358_358" id="FNanchor_358_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a></p></div> + +<p>Nor can we say [with the Vedántin] that the world is an illusory +emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no +contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the <i>primâ +facie</i> belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case +of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will +discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed +nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the +unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution +to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one +mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is +composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause +similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:—The subject of +the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause +composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself +endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have +a cause endued <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span>with the same,—thus a ring has gold for its material +cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar +case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being +composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of +goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of +activity;<a name="FNanchor_359_359" id="FNanchor_359_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_359_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of +darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities +(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>prakṛiti</i>, Nature). And we see that individual objects are +found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's +happiness is found in his wife Satyavatí, because the quality of +"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of +her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested +towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not +possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is +manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, +causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is +viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this +being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since +the word <i>moha</i> is derived from the root <i>muh</i>, "to be confused," +since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to +which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being +composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause +Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared +in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one +unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces +a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons +her when once she has been enjoyed."</p></div> + +<p>Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities +"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span>their severally +possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and +concealing.</p> + +<p>Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent +Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to +produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some +intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing, +supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even +unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and +experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any +intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as +the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the +unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so +unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it +has been said in the Káriká (§ 57)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the +calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."</p></div> + +<p>But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," +which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his +existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the +hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he +act thus <i>before</i> or <i>after</i> creation? If you say "before," we reply +that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be +no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free +living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of +compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be +reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God +created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting +at all], and on the other hand<a name="FNanchor_360_360" id="FNanchor_360_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> that He compassionated after He +had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent +Nature [even without any intelligent <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span>superintendent]—in the order of +the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,—is caused by the union +of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just +as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the +unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the +proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is +caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the +blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the +experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off +the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have +fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not +recognising its own distinction therefrom.<a name="FNanchor_361_361" id="FNanchor_361_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_361_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a> This final bliss [or +absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and +Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on +Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,<a name="FNanchor_362_362" id="FNanchor_362_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> +travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become +separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great +dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man +mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path +indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame +man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is +effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually +dependent. This has been said in the Káriká (§ 21)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final +separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man +and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."</p></div> + +<p>"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of +the soul, but how do you account for its <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span>ceasing to act?" I reply, +that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband +does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, +retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in +the Káriká (§ 59)—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators, +desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having +manifested herself to Soul."</p></div> + +<p>For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder +of the atheistic Sáṅkhya School, been propounded.</p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_348_348" id="Footnote_348_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348_348"><span class="label">[348]</span></a> I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_349_349" id="Footnote_349_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349_349"><span class="label">[349]</span></a> Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_350_350" id="Footnote_350_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_350_350"><span class="label">[350]</span></a> One great defect in the Sáṅkhya nomenclature is the +ambiguity between the terms for intellect (<i>buddhí</i>) and those for +mind (<i>manas</i>). Mádhava here applies to the former the term +<i>antaḥkaraṇa</i> or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I +have ventured to alter it in the translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_351_351" id="Footnote_351_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_351_351"><span class="label">[351]</span></a> It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sáṅkhya +authority, and not the Sáṅkhya Sútras.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_352_352" id="Footnote_352_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352_352"><span class="label">[352]</span></a> <i>Vaikṛita</i> is here a technical term meaning that +goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká, +comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sáṅkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_353_353" id="Footnote_353_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_353_353"><span class="label">[353]</span></a> As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The +reading <i>saṃkalpavikalpátmakam</i> must be corrected by the Sáṅkhya +Káriká.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_354_354" id="Footnote_354_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_354_354"><span class="label">[354]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The <i>tanmátras</i> +will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross +elements.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_355_355" id="Footnote_355_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_355_355"><span class="label">[355]</span></a> A name of the Buddhists.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_356_356" id="Footnote_356_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_356_356"><span class="label">[356]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the nature of a thing (<i>Svabháva</i>) cannot be +altered—a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_357_357" id="Footnote_357_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_357_357"><span class="label">[357]</span></a> I take <i>arthántaram</i> here as simply <i>bhinnam</i> (cf. +Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note, <i>Tattva Kaumudí</i>, p. 47).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_358_358" id="Footnote_358_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_358_358"><span class="label">[358]</span></a> Colebrooke's translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359_359" id="Footnote_359_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359_359"><span class="label">[359]</span></a> Or "passion," <i>rajas</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_360_360" id="Footnote_360_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_360_360"><span class="label">[360]</span></a> In other words—on the one hand the existing misery of +beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, +and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which +caused their misery at all.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_361_361" id="Footnote_361_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_361_361"><span class="label">[361]</span></a> Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only +<i>reflected</i> upon soul through its proximity (cf. +<i>Sáṅkhyapravachanabháshya</i>, i. 58).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_362_362" id="Footnote_362_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_362_362"><span class="label">[362]</span></a> This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It +is found in the Babylonian Talmud, <i>Sanhedrim</i>, fol. 91, <i>b</i>, and in +the Gesta Romanorum.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV.</h2> + +<h2>THE PATANJALI-DARSÁNA.</h2> + + +<p>We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the +opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the +system of the Theistic Sáṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the +so-called Yoga Śástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four +chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sáṅkhya Pravachana," or +detailed explanation of the Sáṅkhya.<a name="FNanchor_363_363" id="FNanchor_363_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_363_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> In the first chapter thereof +the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the +exposition of Concentration" (<i>yoga</i>), avowed his commencement of the +Yoga Śástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of +his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of +the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of +Meditation (<i>samádhi</i>). In the second chapter, in the series of +aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is +mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds +the practical part of <i>yoga</i> proper to him whose mind is not yet +thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients +or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the +series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some +spot," he expounds the three internal subservients—attention, +contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name +"subjugation" (<i>saṃyama</i>), and also the various superhuman powers +which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span>are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the +series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, +mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, +Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called +"perfections" (<i>siddhis</i>). This school accepts the old twenty-five +principles [of the Sáṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme +Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, +fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order +to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,<a name="FNanchor_364_364" id="FNanchor_364_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a> and +is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal +of mundane existence.</p> + +<p>"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf +of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any +Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality +Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which +is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the +influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering +quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have +declared—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the +understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which +torment,<a name="FNanchor_365_365" id="FNanchor_365_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p> + +<p>And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly +identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."</p></div> + +<p>It has been also said by Patañjali,<a name="FNanchor_366_366" id="FNanchor_366_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_366_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> "The power of the enjoyer, +which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an +object which is developed and transferred experiences the +modifications thereof."</p> + +<p>Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is +the soul; and in an object which is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span>"developed" and "transferred," or +reflected,—<i>i.e.</i>, in the thinking principle or the understanding,—it +experiences the modifications thereof, <i>i.e.</i>, the power of intelligence, +being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the +understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though +in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; +and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from +the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is +thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, +forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and +for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at +length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction +between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," +ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of +desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the +undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.</p> + +<p>The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of +concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the +intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the +object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise +and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The +word "now" (<i>atha</i>) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, +[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may +be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word +<i>atha</i>; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this +particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their +gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '<i>Atha</i> +is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now +(inceptive),—what? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' +Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or +comprehensiveness;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> but since there are four senses certainly +suitable, <i>i.e.</i>, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a +previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for +singling out the <i>last</i>." This objection, however, will not stand, for +it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of +"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything +whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the +general definition of causation,<a name="FNanchor_367_367" id="FNanchor_367_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a> <i>i.e.</i>, "previous existence +[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in +accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment +inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing +something else; and since this is at once understood without any +direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle +<i>atha</i> to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; +because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration +does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet +these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of +exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance +[which the presumed <i>cause</i> should have]. "But why should we not hold +that the word <i>atha</i> implies that this very exposition is avowedly the +predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of +mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" +(<i>anuśásana</i>), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by +which the <i>yoga</i> is explained, accompanied with definitions, +divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that +such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the +rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must +follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to +others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived +knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, +in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Therefore <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span>having become +tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith +and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."<a name="FNanchor_368_368" id="FNanchor_368_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> Nor can the word +<i>atha</i> imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound +knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, +even granting that both these are present, they need not to be +mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to +produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still +[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the +exposition of the <i>yoga</i> ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude +or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain +presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it +must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.<a name="FNanchor_369_369" id="FNanchor_369_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> But it +is clear that the exposition in question <i>is</i> such a cause, since we +have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upanishad, ii. +12]: "By the acquirement of <i>yoga</i> or intense concentration on the +Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and +sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛiti as that [in the +Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation +will then attain <i>yoga</i>." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to +interpret <i>atha</i> as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a +previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous +course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body +strong].</p> + +<p>But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism, +"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Áchárya +has declared that the inceptive meaning of <i>atha</i> must be left out of +the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at +will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after," +<i>i.e.</i>, that this desire must follow a previous <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span>course of +tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins +the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, +contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching +to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four +so-called "means."<a name="FNanchor_370_370" id="FNanchor_370_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_370_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a></p> + +<p>"Well, then, let us grant that <i>atha</i> cannot mean 'after;' but why +should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot +be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such +auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an +unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as +being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this +auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of <i>yoga</i>, since it is +in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.<a name="FNanchor_371_371" id="FNanchor_371_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> Therefore +it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is +that "the exposition of the <i>yoga</i> is auspicious;" for auspiciousness +cannot be either the primary meaning of <i>atha</i> or its secondary +meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself +auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a +drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into +the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of +auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally +unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"<a name="FNanchor_372_372" id="FNanchor_372_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> We reply, +that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the +meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty +of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that +"verbal expectancy<a name="FNanchor_373_373" id="FNanchor_373_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> can be fulfilled by <i>words</i> alone."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span></p><p>"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at +the beginning of a Śástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that +would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to +begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since +it has been said by the wise, 'Those śástras become widely famous +which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and +auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are +invincible in disputation'?<a name="FNanchor_374_374" id="FNanchor_374_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> Now the word <i>atha</i> implies +'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛiti which says,</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'The word <i>Om</i> and the word <i>atha</i>,—these two in the +ancient time,</p> + +<p>"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they +are both auspicious.'</p></div> + +<p>"Therefore let the word <i>atha</i> stand here as signifying +'auspiciousness,' like the word '<i>vṛiddhi</i>' used by Páṇini in his +opening sútra '<i>vṛiddhir ád aich</i>.'"<a name="FNanchor_375_375" id="FNanchor_375_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_375_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> This view, however, is +untenable; since the very word <i>atha</i>, when heard, has an auspicious +influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special +signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is +auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How +can the particle <i>atha</i> have any other effect, if it is specially used +here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a +new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly <i>can</i> have such +other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for +some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a +journey.<a name="FNanchor_376_376" id="FNanchor_376_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> Nor does this contradict the smṛiti, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span>since the smṛiti +will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean +only that they produce an auspicious effect.</p> + +<p>Nor can the particle <i>atha</i> have here the meaning of "reference to a +previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally +apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have +already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, +as to whether this particular <i>atha</i> means "the inceptive now" or "after," +if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" +would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic +has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by +exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the <i>atha</i> of the sútra, +the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the +Táṇḍya Bráhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now +this is the Viśvajyotis,"<a name="FNanchor_377_377" id="FNanchor_377_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> the particle <i>atha</i> is accepted as +signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, +just as the <i>atha</i> in the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the +exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of +Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga +Aphorisms, "the <i>atha</i> in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" +and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may +be considered as settled that the <i>atha</i> here indicates a commencement and +also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span>that this +<i>atha</i> implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive +after a successful understanding of the śástra through the attainment of +the <i>yoga</i>, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's +explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not +the smṛiti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the +Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher +thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable +Patañjali,<a name="FNanchor_378_378" id="FNanchor_378_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_378_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was +to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the +Puráṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his +<i>anuśásana</i>,—the preposition <i>anu</i> implying that it was a teaching which +followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of +the system.</p> + +<p>Since this <i>atha</i> in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full +meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the +institute for the exposition of the <i>yoga</i> is now commenced." In this +institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, +is <i>yoga</i> [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its +fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption +(<i>kaivalya</i>) is the highest "end" of the <i>yoga</i> when it is produced. +The "connection" between the institute and <i>yoga</i> is that of the +producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between <i>yoga</i> +and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is +well known from Śruti and Smṛiti, as I have before shown. And it is +established by the general context that those who aim at liberation +are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any +one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the +opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a +wish to know Brahman;" and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span>lest here, too, we should seek to +establish by the general context that all persons who aim at +liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the word +<i>atha</i>, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is +a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a +regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the +question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by +the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the +determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no +place."<a name="FNanchor_379_379" id="FNanchor_379_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is +not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and +the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever +we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of +interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text +of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the +"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion +or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which +would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of +"<i>śruti</i>"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter +it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, +14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' +the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'—when any of these come into +collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is +more remote"<a name="FNanchor_380_380" id="FNanchor_380_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_380_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus +summed up—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always +precluded by any of the preceding modes;</p> + +<p>"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself +precludes, depends on circumstances."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as +settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other +preliminaries, the study of the Śástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to +be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of +Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to +be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not +the Śástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that +which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śástra, +especially directed thereto, this Śástra is the means for its +production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly +concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the +operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, <i>i.e.</i>, his lifting his arm up +and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, <i>i.e.</i>, the axe, than +to the object, <i>i.e.</i>, the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in +his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śástra as his primary +object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of +"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is +that the commencing the Yogaśástra is that which primarily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span>claims our +attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of +the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sáśtra. "But as we read +in the lists of roots that the root <i>yuj</i> is used in the sense of +'joining,' should not the word <i>yoga</i>, its derivative, mean +'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by +Yájñavalkya:<a name="FNanchor_381_381" id="FNanchor_381_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is +called <i>yoga</i>.'"</p></div> + +<p>This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such +action,<a name="FNanchor_382_382" id="FNanchor_382_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two +souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the +opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the +conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the +Vaiśeshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our +theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the +Mímáṃsá [or Vedánta], our Yogaśástra would be rendered nugatory by this +concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the +identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school +something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to +be produced by our Śástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are +used in many different senses, the root <i>yuj</i> may very well be used here +in the sense of "contemplation."<a name="FNanchor_383_383" id="FNanchor_383_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> Thus it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Particles, prepositions, and roots—these three are all +held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading +are their evidence."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore some authors expressly give <i>yuj</i> in this sense, and insert +in their lists "<i>yuj</i> in the sense of <i>samádhi</i>." Nor does this +contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the word <i>yoga</i>, used by him, +may bear this meaning; and he has himself said—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Samádhi</i> is the state of identity of the individual and +supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the +<i>samádhi</i> of the individual soul."</p></div> + +<p>It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the +Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "<i>Yoga is samádhi</i>."</p> + +<p>An objection however, may be here raised that "the term <i>samádhi</i> is +used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight +ancillary parts<a name="FNanchor_384_384" id="FNanchor_384_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_384_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> of the eightfold concentration (or <i>yoga</i>); and +the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the +principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each +other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as +we see in the <i>darśapúrṇamása</i> sacrifices and their ancillary rites +the <i>prayájas</i>, and therefore <i>samádhi</i> cannot be the meaning of +<i>yoga</i>." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for +although the term <i>samádhi</i> is used for etymological reasons<a name="FNanchor_385_385" id="FNanchor_385_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> to +express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the +contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently +devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term +to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to +declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior +ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology +alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word +<i>go</i>, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root <i>gam</i>, "to +go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two +words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, +would properly be called <i>go</i>, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i. +2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word +in this sense when it declares that "concentration (<i>yoga</i>) is the +suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The +second or principal sense of <i>samádhi</i> will therefore be quite +distinct from the first or inferior.]</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span></p><p>"But surely if <i>yoga</i> is held to be the suppression of the +modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications +abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, +their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also +abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the +antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as +the counter-entity to these negations;<a name="FNanchor_386_386" id="FNanchor_386_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_386_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> and consequently in +accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect +the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the +soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; +because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be +hindered,<a name="FNanchor_387_387" id="FNanchor_387_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," +"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ +(<i>chitta</i>), since the power of pure intelligence, which is +unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative +perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the +intelligent soul<a name="FNanchor_388_388" id="FNanchor_388_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a> has not been proved, since there is an argument +to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from +the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing +is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this +soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be +occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these +modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul +always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially +pure substance<a name="FNanchor_389_389" id="FNanchor_389_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_389_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> which abides always the same; and as it is this +which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible +substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces +an <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span>impression;<a name="FNanchor_390_390" id="FNanchor_390_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a> and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own +proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, +and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the +understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is +not affected is not known; for the understanding is called +"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is +susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of +influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or +want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of +knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which +spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected +with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a +knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even +although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a +given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and +certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge +of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that +understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold +that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just +as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of +the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the +understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, +volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of +firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchaśikha +declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power +that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The +modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from +the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the +argument drawn out formally to establish the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span>changeableness of the +understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its +various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ +of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is +notoriously threefold, <i>i.e.</i>, a change of "property," of +"aspect,"<a name="FNanchor_391_391" id="FNanchor_391_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> and of "condition." When the subject, the +understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of +"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a +diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property +becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" +when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation<a name="FNanchor_392_392" id="FNanchor_392_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a> of the +perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] +newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of +condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the +reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that +there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" +and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their +"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.</p> + +<p>[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have +said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '<i>yoga</i> is the +suppression of the modifications of the <i>chitta</i>,' this will apply +also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or +suspension] of the modifications found in <i>kshipta</i>, <i>vikshipta</i>, +<i>múḍha</i>,<a name="FNanchor_393_393" id="FNanchor_393_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible +for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called +<i>kshipta</i>, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the +attainment of the <i>summum bonum</i>. Let us examine this more closely. +For the understanding is called <i>kshipta</i>, 'restless,' when it is +restless [with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span>an excess of the quality <i>rajas</i>], as being tossed +about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called <i>múḍha</i>, +'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is +sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality <i>tamas</i>]. +It is called <i>vikshipta</i>, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the +first state<a name="FNanchor_394_394" id="FNanchor_394_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a> [as filled with the quality <i>sattva</i>]." We must here, +however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the +Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛishṇa, is fickle, turbulent, +violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may +occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; +but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, +&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the +Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, +laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to +attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind +are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by +the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the +mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces +two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the +means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from +heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an +attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken +notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the +failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract +meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, +even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore +we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be +laid down as the definition of <i>yoga</i>.</p> + +<p>We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the +three conditions of the mind called <i>kshipta</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span><i>múḍha</i>, and +<i>vikshipta</i>, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are +all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the +modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided +[and so cannot be called <i>yoga</i>], this does not apply to the other two +conditions called <i>ekágra</i> and <i>niruddha</i>, which are to be pursued and +attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these +two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as <i>yoga</i>. Now +by <i>ekágra</i> we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the +<i>sattva</i> quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by +<i>niruddha</i> we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, +and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.</p> + +<p>Now this <i>samádhi</i>, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that +in which there is distinct recognition" (<i>saṃprajñáta</i>), and "that in +which distinct recognition is lost" (<i>asaṃprajñáta</i>) [Yoga S., i. 17, +18].<a name="FNanchor_395_395" id="FNanchor_395_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is +intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right +notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, +or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect<a name="FNanchor_396_396" id="FNanchor_396_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> +is thoroughly recognised (<i>samyak prajñáyate</i>) as distinct from Nature. It +has a fourfold division, as <i>savitarka</i>, <i>savichára</i>, <i>sánanda</i>, and +<i>sásmita</i>. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (<i>bhávaná</i>), +which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all +other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be +pondered is of two kinds, being either Íśwara or the twenty-five +principles. And these principles also are of two kinds—senseless and not +senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are +senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects +which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross +elements, as earth, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span>&c., pondering is pursued in the form of an +investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,<a name="FNanchor_397_397" id="FNanchor_397_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_397_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> or in +the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be +produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative" +(<i>savitarka</i>). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the +five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in +relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative" +(<i>savichára</i>). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and +"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" +(<i>sánanda</i>), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the +manifestation of joy.<a name="FNanchor_398_398" id="FNanchor_398_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> When pondering is pursued, having as its object +the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" +or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (<i>sásmita</i>), +because here personal existence<a name="FNanchor_399_399" id="FNanchor_399_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_399_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> only remains, since the intellectual +faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become +quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].</p> + +<p>But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in +the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.</p> + +<p>"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the +suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation +where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since +we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the +quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality +of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, +because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the +"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the +operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," +and the "stock of deserts."<a name="FNanchor_400_400" id="FNanchor_400_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p><p>The "afflictions" (<i>kleśa</i>) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, +egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here +a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word <i>avidyá</i>, +"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an <i>avyayíbháva</i> +compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word +"above-board"?<a name="FNanchor_401_401" id="FNanchor_401_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_401_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a> or is it a <i>tatpurusha</i> [or <i>karmadháraya</i>] +compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word +"town-clerk"? or is it a <i>bahuvríhi</i> compound, where both portions are +dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It +cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were +predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in +<i>avidyá</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, it would be an instance of what is called the +express negation, or <i>prasajya-pratishedha</i>);<a name="FNanchor_402_402" id="FNanchor_402_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a> and consequently, +as <i>avidyá</i> would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable +to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very +form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the +second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be +characterised by (<i>a</i> + <i>vidyá</i>), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and +cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for +then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,<a name="FNanchor_403_403" id="FNanchor_403_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> +"there is a <i>bahuvríhi</i> compound which is formed with some word +meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of +this subsequent word"<a name="FNanchor_404_404" id="FNanchor_404_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a>—we must explain this supposed <i>bahuvríhi</i> +compound <i>avidyá</i> as follows: "That <i>buddhi</i> is to be characterised as +<i>avidyá</i> (<i>sc.</i> an adjective), <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span>of which there is not a <i>vidyá</i> +existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an <i>avidyá</i> +could not become the source of the "afflictions;"<a name="FNanchor_405_405" id="FNanchor_405_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> and yet, on the +other hand, it ought to be their source,<a name="FNanchor_406_406" id="FNanchor_406_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a> even though it were +associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"<a name="FNanchor_407_407" id="FNanchor_407_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a> and +were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and +the quality of goodness [which is found in the <i>sásmita</i> meditation].</p> + +<p>Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field +[or place of origin, <i>i.e.</i>, source] of the others, whether they be +dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be +"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake +them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating +on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they +are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other +strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their +several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. +This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's +Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which +are absorbed in the <i>tattvas</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, not embodied, but +existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the +'extenuated'<a name="FNanchor_408_408" id="FNanchor_408_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> are found in <i>yogins</i>; but the +'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact +with worldly objects."</p></div> + +<p>"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound <i>avidyá</i> as a +<i>dvandva</i> compound,<a name="FNanchor_409_409" id="FNanchor_409_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> where both portions are equally predominant, +because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. +Therefore under any <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span>one of these three admissible alternatives<a name="FNanchor_410_410" id="FNanchor_410_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> +the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' +would be overthrown."</p> + +<p>[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may +have recourse to the other kind of negation called <i>paryudása</i> [where +the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that <i>avidyá</i> means a +contradictory [or <i>wrong</i>] kind of knowledge, the reverse of <i>vidyá</i>; +and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been +said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' +[or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root; +thus the words <i>abráhmaṇa</i> and <i>adharma</i> respectively +signify, 'what is other than a Bráhman' and 'what is +contrary to justice.'"</p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of +the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested +from the use in which it has been already employed."</p></div> + +<p>Váchaspati also says,<a name="FNanchor_411_411" id="FNanchor_411_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_411_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> "The connection of words and their meanings +depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we +occasionally see that a <i>tatpurusha</i> negation, where the latter +portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of +this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even +here too [in <i>avidyá</i>] the real meaning is something contrary to +<i>vidyá</i>" [<i>i.e.</i>, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the +positive "ignorance"<a name="FNanchor_412_412" id="FNanchor_412_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_412_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a>]. It is with a view to this that it is said +in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the +non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) +eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." <i>Viparyaya</i>, "misconception," is +defined as <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span>"the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"<a name="FNanchor_413_413" id="FNanchor_413_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a> +[<i>i.e.</i>, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the +"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, <i>i.e.</i>, a jar, or the imagining +the "pure" in the "impure" body,<a name="FNanchor_414_414" id="FNanchor_414_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> when it has been declared by a +proverbial couplet<a name="FNanchor_415_415" id="FNanchor_415_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_415_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original +place [the womb],—from its primal seed,—from its +composition [of humours, &c.],—from perspiration,—from +death [as even a Bráhman's body defiles],—and from the fact +that it has to be made pure by rites."</p></div> + +<p>So,—in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii. +15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the +pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,<a name="FNanchor_416_416" id="FNanchor_416_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a> or through +the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent +impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual +opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of +pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],—ignorance transfers the +idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, <i>e.g.</i>, garlands, +sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul," +<i>e.g.</i>, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of +'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;</p> + +<p>"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is +liberation."</p></div> + +<p>Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.<a name="FNanchor_417_417" id="FNanchor_417_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a></p> + +<p>But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance +should there not be given some general definition applying to them +all, as otherwise their special <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span>characteristics cannot be +established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumárila—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Without some general definition, a more special definition +cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even +mentioned here.'"</p></div> + +<p>This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by +the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as +"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."</p> + +<p>"Egoism" (<i>asmitá</i>) is the notion that the two separate things, the +soul and the quality of purity,<a name="FNanchor_418_418" id="FNanchor_418_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> are one and the same, as is said +(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of +sight." "Desire" (<i>rága</i>) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for +the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on +the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (<i>dvesha</i>) is the +feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by +the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is +expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" +"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).</p> + +<p>Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this +word <i>anuśayin</i> ('dwelling') as formed by the <i>kṛit</i> affix <i>ṇini</i> in +the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the <i>taddhita</i> affix <i>ini</i> in the +sense of <i>matup</i>? It cannot be the former, since the affix <i>ṇini</i> +cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as <i>anuśí</i>; +for, as the word <i>supi</i> has already occurred in the Sútra, iii. 2, 4, +and has been exerting its influence in the following sútras, this word +must have been introduced a second time in the Sútra, iii. 2, 78, +<i>supy ajátau ṇinis táchchhílye</i>,<a name="FNanchor_419_419" id="FNanchor_419_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a> on purpose to exclude +prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did +strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sútra, vii. +2, 115, <i>acho ñṇiti</i>,<a name="FNanchor_420_420" id="FNanchor_420_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span>the radical vowel must be subject to +<i>vṛiddhi</i>, and so the word must be <i>anuśáyin</i>, in accordance with the +analogy of such words as <i>atiśáyin</i>, &c. Nor is the latter view +tenable (<i>i.e.</i>, that it is the <i>taddhita</i> affix <i>ini</i><a name="FNanchor_421_421" id="FNanchor_421_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_421_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a>), since +<i>ini</i> is forbidden by the technical verse—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>'These two affixes<a name="FNanchor_422_422" id="FNanchor_422_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> are not used after a monosyllable +nor a <i>kṛit</i> formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with +a word in the locative case;'</p></div> + +<p>and the word <i>anuśaya</i> is clearly a <i>kṛit</i> formation as it ends with +the affix <i>ach</i><a name="FNanchor_423_423" id="FNanchor_423_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> [which brings it under this prohibition, and so +renders it insusceptible of the affix <i>ini</i>]. Consequently, the word +<i>anuśayin</i> in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is +very hard to justify."<a name="FNanchor_424_424" id="FNanchor_424_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a> This cavil, however, is not to be +admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying +generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of +essential importance. Hence the author of the Vṛitti has said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The word <i>iti</i>, as implying the idea of popular +acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of +this rule<a name="FNanchor_425_425" id="FNanchor_425_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> [<i>i.e.</i>, it is not an absolute law]."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as <i>káryin</i>, +<i>káryika</i> [where the affixes are added after a <i>kṛit</i> formation], +<i>taṇḍulin</i>, <i>taṇḍulika</i> [where they are added after a word meaning +"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after +<i>kṛit</i> formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of +the affix <i>ini</i> is justified, although the word <i>anuśaya</i> is formed by +a <i>kṛit</i> affix. This doubt therefore is settled.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span></p><p>The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence" +(<i>abhiniveśa</i>), is what prevails in the case of all living beings, +from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any +immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from +the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression +left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered +in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every +individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is +declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on +through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the +philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as +the "afflictions" (<i>kleśa</i>), since they afflict the soul, as bringing +upon it various mundane troubles.</p> + +<p>[We next describe the <i>karmáśaya</i> of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or +"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (<i>karman</i>) consist of enjoined or +forbidden actions, as the <i>jyotishṭoma</i> sacrifice, bráhmanicide, &c. +"Stock" (<i>áśaya</i>) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, +which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of +merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own +experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].</p> + +<p>Now "concentration" [<i>yoga</i>] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of +the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the +operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not +considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications +[<i>i.e.</i>, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it +could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather +the site of this non-existence,<a name="FNanchor_426_426" id="FNanchor_426_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a>—a particular state of the +thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully +described hereafter], <i>madhumatí</i>, <i>madhupratíká</i>, <i>viśoká</i>, and +<i>saṃskáraśeshatá</i>. The word <i>nirodha</i> thus corresponds to its +etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the +thinking principle, right notion, misconception, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span>&c., are suppressed +(<i>nirudhyante</i>). This suppression of the modifications is produced by +"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort +that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13]. +This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of +development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural +state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times +assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.<a name="FNanchor_427_427" id="FNanchor_427_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a> +"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again +to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, +<i>sthitau</i>, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, +as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its +skin."<a name="FNanchor_428_428" id="FNanchor_428_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire +in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those +that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the +reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one +who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from +perceiving the imperfections attached to them.</p> + +<p>Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and +to attain meditation, the <i>yogin</i> must first direct his attention to +practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of +especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛishṇa in the +Bhagavad Gítá [vi. 3]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to +<i>yoga</i>;</p> + +<p>But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be +the means."</p></div> + +<p>Patañjali has thus defined the practical <i>yoga</i>: "Practical +concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation +to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yájñavalkya has described "mortification"—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult +chándráyaṇa fast, &c.,</p> + +<p>"Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all +mortifications."<a name="FNanchor_429_429" id="FNanchor_429_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a></p></div> + +<p>"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the +<i>gáyatrí</i>, &c. Now these <i>mantras</i> are of two kinds, Vaidik and +Tántrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not +chanted. Those chanted are the <i>sámans</i>; those not chanted are either +in metre, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>ṛichas</i>, or in prose, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>yajúṃshi</i>, +as has been said by Jaimini,<a name="FNanchor_430_430" id="FNanchor_430_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a> "Of these, that is a <i>ṛich</i> in which +by the force of the sense there is a definite division into <i>pádas</i> +[or portions of a verse]; the name <i>sáman</i> is applied to chanted +portions; the word <i>yajus</i> is applied to the rest." Those <i>mantras</i> +are called Tántrik which are set forth in sacred books that are +directed to topics of voluntary devotion;<a name="FNanchor_431_431" id="FNanchor_431_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_431_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> and these are again +threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The <i>mantras</i> are of three kinds, as female, male, and +neuter:</p> + +<p>"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (<i>i.e.</i>, +the exclamation <i>sváhá</i>); the neuter those which end in +<i>namas</i>;</p> + +<p>"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are +all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."</p></div> + +<p>They are called "all-powerful" (<i>siddha</i>) because they counteract all +defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the +ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.</p> + +<p>Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (<i>saṃskára</i>) are ten, and +they have been thus described in the <i>Śáradá-tilaka</i>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give +to <i>mantras</i> efficacy:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span></p> + +<p>"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly +consecrated.</p> + +<p>"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the +'awakening,'</p> + +<p>"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'</p> + +<p>"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the +'concealing,'—these are the ten consecrations of <i>mantras</i>.</p> + +<p>"The 'begetting' (<i>janana</i>) is the extracting of the +<i>mantra</i> from its vowels and consonants.</p> + +<p>"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the +<i>mantra</i>, each united to Om,</p> + +<p>"According to the number of the letters. This they call the +'vivifying' (<i>jívana</i>).</p> + +<p>"Having written the letters of the <i>mantra</i>, let him smite +each with sandal-water,</p> + +<p>"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.<a name="FNanchor_432_432" id="FNanchor_432_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a> This is +called the 'smiting' (<i>táḍana</i>).</p> + +<p>"Having written the letters of the <i>mantra</i>, let him strike +them with oleander flowers,</p> + +<p>"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the +'awakening' (<i>bodhana</i>).</p> + +<p>"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his +own special <i>tantra</i>,</p> + +<p>"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with +leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling' +(<i>abhisheka</i>).</p> + +<p>"Having meditated on the <i>mantra</i> in his mind, let him +consume by the <i>jyotir-mantra</i></p> + +<p>"The threefold impurity of the <i>mantra</i>. This is the +'purification' (<i>vimalí-karaṇa</i>).</p> + +<p>"The utterance of the <i>jyotir-mantra</i>, together with Om, and +the <i>mantras</i> of Vyoman and Agni,</p> + +<p>"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch +of kuśa grass,</p> + +<p>"With the mystical seed of water<a name="FNanchor_433_433" id="FNanchor_433_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> duly muttered,—this +is held to be the 'fattening' (<i>ápyáyana</i>).<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span></p> + +<p>"The satiating libation over the <i>mantra</i> with +<i>mantra</i>-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (<i>tarpaṇa</i>).</p> + +<p>"The joining of the <i>mantra</i> with Om and the 'seeds' of +Máyá<a name="FNanchor_434_434" id="FNanchor_434_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_434_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> and Ramá<a name="FNanchor_435_435" id="FNanchor_435_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_435_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> is called its 'illumining' +(<i>dípana</i>).</p> + +<p>"The non-publication of the <i>mantra</i> which is being +muttered—this is its 'concealing' (<i>gopana</i>).</p> + +<p>"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all +<i>tantras</i>;</p> + +<p>"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition +obtains his desire;</p> + +<p>"And <i>ruddha</i>, <i>kílita</i>, <i>vichhinna</i>, <i>supta</i>, <i>śapta</i>, and +the rest,</p> + +<p>"All these faults in the <i>mantra</i> rites are abolished by +these excellent consecrations."</p></div> + +<p>But enough of this venturing to make public the <i>tantra</i> mysteries +connected with <i>mantras</i>, which has suddenly led us astray like an +unexpected Bacchanalian dance.<a name="FNanchor_436_436" id="FNanchor_436_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a></p> + +<p>The third form of practical <i>yoga</i>, "resignation to the Lord" +(<i>íśvara-praṇidhána</i>), is the consigning all one's works, whether +mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the +Supremely Venerable. As it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,</p> + +<p>"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."</p></div> + +<p>This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of +the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, +since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is +sung in the Bhagavad Gítá [ii. 47]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the +fruits;</p> + +<p>"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou +attached to inaction."</p></div> + +<p>The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared +by the venerable Nílakaṇṭha-bháratí—</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated +by desire,</p> + +<p>"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which +has been licked by a dog."</p></div> + +<p>Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and +resignation is itself called <i>yoga</i>, because it is a means for +producing <i>yoga</i>, this being an instance of the function of words +called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, +"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another +meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning +with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new +meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on +a motive. This has been declared in the <i>Kávya-prakáśa</i> [ii. 9]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the +principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it, +another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive, +this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."</p></div> + +<p>Now the word "this" [<i>i.e.</i>, <i>tat</i> in the neuter, which the neuter +<i>yat</i> in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of +the feminine <i>sá</i>] would have signified some neuter word, like +"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is +indicated." But <i>sá</i> is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree +with <i>lakshaṇá</i>], "this is indication," <i>i.e.</i>, the neuter "this" is +put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has +been explained by Kaiyaṭa, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity +of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the +former, the latter of the latter."<a name="FNanchor_437_437" id="FNanchor_437_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> Now "expert (<i>kuśala</i>) in +business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word +<i>kuśala</i>, which is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span>significant in its parts by being analysed +etymologically as <i>kuśaṃ</i> + <i>láti</i>, "one who gathers kuśa grass for +the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation +of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and +this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each +is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance +with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from +their immediate significance, just as is the case in +'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."</p></div> + +<p>Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive. +Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal +meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently +indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning +and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which +originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly +by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that +the author of the Kávya-prakáśa used the expression, "This is +'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication +based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,<a name="FNanchor_438_438" id="FNanchor_438_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> as +"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men <i>with</i> the lances"]; 2. +indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators +are meant <i>without</i> the benches]; 3. qualified<a name="FNanchor_439_439" id="FNanchor_439_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> superimponent +indication, as "the man of the Panjáb is an ox" [here the object is +not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive +indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile]; +5. pure superimponent indication, as "<i>ghí</i> is life;" 6. pure +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span>introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been +all explained in the Kávya-prakáśa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this +churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.</p> + +<p>This <i>yoga</i> has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it +(<i>aṅga</i>); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures, +suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and +meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not +wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting" +[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment, +mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. +32]; and these are described in the Vishṇu Puráṇa [vi. 7, 36-38]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining +Brahman, practises, void of all desire,</p> + +<p>"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing, +and non-coveting;</p> + +<p>"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts, +purification, contentment, and austerity,</p> + +<p>"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme +Brahman.</p> + +<p>"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and +the five 'religious observances;'</p> + +<p>"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of +reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."</p></div> + +<p>"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten +kinds, as the <i>padma</i>, <i>bhadra</i>, <i>víra</i>, <i>svastika</i>, <i>daṇḍaka</i>, +<i>sopáśraya</i>, <i>paryaṅka</i>, <i>krauñchanishadana</i>, <i>ushṭranishadana</i>, +<i>samasaṃsthána</i>. Yájñavalkya has described each of them in the passage +which commences—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands, +but in reverse order,</p> + +<p>"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Bráhmans, +on his thighs;</p> + +<p>"This will be the <i>padma</i> posture, held in honour by all."</p></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span></p> + +<p>The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.—When this +steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is +practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of +inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of +the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the +body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in +both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a +general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply +to the special kinds, as <i>rechaka</i>, <i>púraka</i>, and <i>kumbhaka</i>." We +reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the +"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found +in all these special kinds. Thus <i>rechaka</i>, which is the expulsion of +the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which +has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and <i>púraka</i>, which is the +[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the +"inspiration;" and <i>kumbhaka</i> is the internal suspension of breathing, +when the vital air, called <i>práṇa</i>, remains motionless like water in a +jar (<i>kumbha</i>). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration +and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt +is needless.</p> + +<p>Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two <i>ghaṭikás</i> and a +half<a name="FNanchor_440_440" id="FNanchor_440_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> in each artery<a name="FNanchor_441_441" id="FNanchor_441_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> (<i>náḍi</i>), like the revolving buckets on +a waterwheel.<a name="FNanchor_442_442" id="FNanchor_442_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> Thus in the course of a day and night there are +produced 21,600 inspirations <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span>and expirations. Hence it has been said +by those who know the secret of transmitting the <i>mantras</i>, concerning +the transmission of the <i>ajapámantra</i><a name="FNanchor_443_443" id="FNanchor_443_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self-existent +Brahman,</p> + +<p>"Six thousand to Vishṇu, six thousand to Śiva,</p> + +<p>"One thousand to the Guru (Bṛihaspati), one thousand to the +Supreme Soul,</p> + +<p>"And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the +performed muttering."</p></div> + +<p>So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the +elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different +colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been +thus explained by the wise—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let each artery convey the air two <i>ghaṭís</i> and a half from +sunrise.</p> + +<p>"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries<a name="FNanchor_444_444" id="FNanchor_444_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_444_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> +to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.</p> + +<p>"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take +place [in the hour],</p> + +<p>"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand +six hundred in a day and night.</p> + +<p>"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six <i>guṇa</i> +letters,<a name="FNanchor_445_445" id="FNanchor_445_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_445_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p> + +<p>"That time elapses while the air passes along in the +interval between two arteries.</p> + +<p>"There are five elements in each of the two conducting +arteries,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span>—</p> + +<p>"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by +the self-restrained.</p> + +<p>"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;</p> + +<p>"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.</p> + +<p>"They bear along in order,—air, fire, water, earth, ether;</p> + +<p>"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting +arteries.</p> + +<p>"The <i>palas</i><a name="FNanchor_446_446" id="FNanchor_446_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_446_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> of earth are fifty, of water forty,</p> + +<p>"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.</p> + +<p>"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the +reason that the two arteries are so disturbed</p> + +<p>"Is that earth has five properties,<a name="FNanchor_447_447" id="FNanchor_447_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> water four,</p> + +<p>"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.</p> + +<p>"There are ten <i>palas</i> for each property; hence earth has +fifty <i>palas</i>,</p> + +<p>"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the +five properties of earth</p> + +<p>"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness; +and these decrease one by one.</p> + +<p>"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by +the influence of 'quiet,'</p> + +<p>"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,' +'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'<a name="FNanchor_448_448" id="FNanchor_448_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a></p> + +<p>"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and +ether are now declared;—</p> + +<p>"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of +the second arises desire;</p> + +<p>"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness +of mind;</p> + +<p>"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental +impressions of latent merit.</p> + +<p>"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle +finger in each nostril,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span></p> + +<p>"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners +of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners +of his eyes,</p> + +<p>"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the +earth and the other elements within him,</p> + +<p>"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue +spots,<a name="FNanchor_449_449" id="FNanchor_449_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a>—the ether has no symbol."</p></div> + +<p>When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is +accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed +discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been +said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the +breath."<a name="FNanchor_450_450" id="FNanchor_450_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a></p></div> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,</p> + +<p>"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of +the breath."<a name="FNanchor_451_451" id="FNanchor_451_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a></p></div> + +<p>Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and +the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to +attain "self-mastery" (<i>saṃyama</i>)<a name="FNanchor_452_452" id="FNanchor_452_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> and "restraint" (<i>pratyáhára</i>). +"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to +the nature of the mind,<a name="FNanchor_453_453" id="FNanchor_453_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_453_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a> which is intent on the soul's unaltered +nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several +objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. +This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn +to it (<i>á</i> + <i>hṛi</i>), away from them (<i>pratípa</i>).</p> + +<p>"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the +senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and +therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, +could they be accommodated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span>to the nature of the mind?" What you say +is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an +eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it +were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the +accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence +of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of +concernment with their several objects for the sake of being +accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we +mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are +restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they +follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in +the Vishṇu-puráṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which +ever tend to pursue external objects,</p> + +<p>"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the +mind;</p> + +<p>"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady +senses;</p> + +<p>"If they are not controlled, the <i>yogin</i> will not accomplish +his <i>yoga</i>."<a name="FNanchor_454_454" id="FNanchor_454_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p></div> + +<p>"Attention" (<i>dháraṇá</i>) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from +all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal +self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of +the <i>sushumṇá</i> artery, &c., or something external, as Prajápati, +Vásava, Hiraṇyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism, +"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too, +say the followers of the Puráṇas—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by +restraint the senses,</p> + +<p>"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of +his mind."<a name="FNanchor_455_455" id="FNanchor_455_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span></p><p>The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to +be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is +"contemplation" (<i>dhyána</i>); thus it is said, "A course of uniform +thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of +that kind and desiring no other,</p> + +<p>"This is 'contemplation,'—it is thus effected by the first +six of the ancillary things."</p></div> + +<p>We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the +remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (<i>samádhi</i>, see p. +243). By this practice of the ancillary means of <i>yoga</i>, pursued for a +long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which +hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and +"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the +names Madhumatí and the rest.</p> + +<p>"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous +words from the dialects of Karṇáṭa, Gauḍa,<a name="FNanchor_456_456" id="FNanchor_456_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> and Láṭa?"<a name="FNanchor_457_457" id="FNanchor_457_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a> We do +not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the +meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so +needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.</p> + +<p>i. The <i>Madhumatí</i> perfection,—this is the perfection of meditation, +called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the +illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of +"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of +"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c. +Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge +which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," <i>i.e.</i>, to +the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," <i>i.e.</i>, +when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second +yogin. For the <i>yogins</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span>or devotees to the practice of <i>yoga</i> are +well known to be of four kinds, viz.,—</p> + +<p>i. The <i>práthamakalpika</i>, in whom the light has just entered,<a name="FNanchor_458_458" id="FNanchor_458_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> +but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in +the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The <i>madhubhúmika</i>, +who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The +<i>prajñájyotis</i>, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The +<i>atikránta-bhávaníya</i>, who has attained the highest dispassion.</p> + +<p>ii. The <i>Madhupratíká</i> perfections are swiftness like thought, &c. +These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without +organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like +thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of +motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"<a name="FNanchor_459_459" id="FNanchor_459_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> is the +attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed +to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is +the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These +perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the +subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential +conditions.<a name="FNanchor_460_460" id="FNanchor_460_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_460_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a> These perfections are severally sweet, each one by +itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second +state is called <i>Madhupratíká</i> [<i>i.e.</i>, that whose parts are sweet].</p> + +<p>iii. The <i>Viśoká</i> perfection consists in the supremacy over all +existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses, +to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of +the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the +supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all +existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are +but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the +other qualities of "passion" and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span>"darkness" being already abolished], +and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised +upon.<a name="FNanchor_461_461" id="FNanchor_461_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a> The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the +modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"<a name="FNanchor_462_462" id="FNanchor_462_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> is +"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous +immediate cognition, free from sorrow<a name="FNanchor_463_463" id="FNanchor_463_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> [may produce steadiness of +mind]."</p> + +<p>iv. The <i>Saṃskáraśeshatá</i> state is also called <i>asaṃprajñáta</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, +"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" +it is that meditation "without a seed" [<i>i.e.</i>, without any object] +which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be +afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and +enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of +all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest +"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [<i>i.e.</i>, that in which +distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that +exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of +modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of +thought after the departure of all objects] [<i>i.e.</i>, <i>saṃskáraśesha</i>, +i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards +everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned +rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are +abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed, +there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded +"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects +into the primal <i>prakṛiti</i>; and the soul, which is the power of pure +intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all +connection with the phenomenal understanding (<i>buddhi</i>), or with +existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (<i>kaivalya</i>). Final liberation +is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is +the repressive absorption<a name="FNanchor_464_464" id="FNanchor_464_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> of the 'qualities' which have +consummated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span>the ends of the soul, <i>i.e.</i>, enjoyment and liberation, +or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv. +33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the +individual be born again even though this should have been attained?" +for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the +cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this +objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor +decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence +of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like +absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a +possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel; +one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a +dumb man praised it."<a name="FNanchor_465_465" id="FNanchor_465_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p> + +<p>Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the +Yoga-śástra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of +disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śástra also +treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. +This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from; +the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to +experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection +is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.<a name="FNanchor_466_466" id="FNanchor_466_466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> The same +fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in +other Śástras also. Thus all has been made clear.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span></p> + +<p><a name="Sankaracharya" id="Sankaracharya"></a>The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is +the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it +is therefore left untouched here.<a name="FNanchor_467_467" id="FNanchor_467_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">NOTE ON THE YOGA.</p> + +<p>There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain +Raivataka in Mágha (iv. 55):—</p> + +<p>"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence +(<i>maitrí</i>) and those other purifiers of the mind,—having successfully +abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of +a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the +essential difference between the quality Goodness and the +Soul,—desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."</p> + +<p>It is curious to notice that <i>maitrí</i>, which plays such a prominent +part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary +condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first +start towards his final goal. It is called a <i>parikarman</i> (= +<i>prasádhaka</i>) in Vyása's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is +borrowed by Mágha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is +an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as +in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in +themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations +which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to +Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.</p> + +<p>For the word <i>vyákopa</i> in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3 +<i>infra</i>), cf. Kusumáñjali, p. 6, l. 7.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_363_363" id="Footnote_363_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_363_363"><span class="label">[363]</span></a> On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sáṅkhya Pr. Bhásh., p. +20; S. Sára, p. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_364_364" id="Footnote_364_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364_364"><span class="label">[364]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the +meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind +in the arts of life.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_365_365" id="Footnote_365_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_365_365"><span class="label">[365]</span></a> I read <i>ye</i> for <i>te</i> with Dr. Hall's MS. <i>Tapya</i> means +rather "susceptible of suffering."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_366_366" id="Footnote_366_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_366_366"><span class="label">[366]</span></a> This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_367_367" id="Footnote_367_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_367_367"><span class="label">[367]</span></a> Cf. <i>Bháshá-parichchheda</i>, 15, <i>a</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_368_368" id="Footnote_368_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368_368"><span class="label">[368]</span></a> Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_369_369" id="Footnote_369_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369_369"><span class="label">[369]</span></a> I read in the second clause <i>tadbháve'pi</i>, +understanding by <i>tad</i> the different conditions which <i>atha</i> is +supposed to assume as being necessarily present.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_370_370" id="Footnote_370_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370_370"><span class="label">[370]</span></a> These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from +the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or +hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, +&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_371_371" id="Footnote_371_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_371_371"><span class="label">[371]</span></a> It may be <i>sukha-janaka</i>, but it is not itself +<i>sukha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_372_372" id="Footnote_372_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_372_372"><span class="label">[372]</span></a> Granting that <i>atha</i> does not here mean "auspicious," +why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the +particle <i>atha</i> does produce an auspicious influence?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_373_373" id="Footnote_373_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_373_373"><span class="label">[373]</span></a> <i>i.e.</i>, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without +some other word to complete the construction.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_374_374" id="Footnote_374_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_374_374"><span class="label">[374]</span></a> This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya +(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_375_375" id="Footnote_375_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_375_375"><span class="label">[375]</span></a> The commentators hold that the word <i>vṛiddhiḥ</i> is +placed at the beginning of the first sútra, while <i>guṇaḥ</i> in the +second is placed at the end (<i>ad eṅ guṇaḥ</i>), in order to ensure an +auspicious opening, <i>vṛiddhi</i> meaning "increase," "prosperity," as +well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_376_376" id="Footnote_376_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_376_376"><span class="label">[376]</span></a> In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍí, we have an interesting +list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has +the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman, +a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He +hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling +"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya," +<i>dúrvá</i> grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, +corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and +men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing +a guana (<i>godhiká</i>). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to +all śástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of +the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, +and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_377_377" id="Footnote_377_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_377_377"><span class="label">[377]</span></a> These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices +lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the +officiating Bráhmans.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_378_378" id="Footnote_378_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_378_378"><span class="label">[378]</span></a> He is here called <i>phaṇipati</i>, "lord of +snakes,"—Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented +as a snake in mythology.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_379_379" id="Footnote_379_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_379_379"><span class="label">[379]</span></a> Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_380_380" id="Footnote_380_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_380_380"><span class="label">[380]</span></a> This is the Mímáṃsá rule for settling the relative +value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1. +<i>Śruti</i>, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds +are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. <i>Liṅga</i>, "a sign," +or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the +text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be +divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide +solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. <i>Vákya</i>, "the being +mentioned in one sentence," <i>i.e.</i>, the context, as in the text "'(I +cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words +"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in +the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the +welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words +"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. <i>Prakaraṇa</i>, "the +subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its +parts," as in the <i>darśa-púrṇamása</i> sacrifice, where the <i>prayája</i> +ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, +a mystic influence (<i>apúrva</i>) which helps forward that influence of +the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the <i>prakaraṇa</i> +proves them to be ancillary. 5. <i>Sthána</i> (or <i>krama</i>), "relative +position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn <i>Śundhadhvam</i>, &c., +"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention +of the <i>sánnáyya</i> vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is +ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. <i>Samákhyá</i>, +"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the +<i>adhvaryu</i> priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are <i>prima +facie</i> to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the +aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the +first, <i>śruti</i>, being the most important; the last, <i>samákhyá</i>, the +least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14; <i>Mímáṃsáparibháshá</i>, pp. 8, +9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_381_381" id="Footnote_381_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_381_381"><span class="label">[381]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of the +<i>Yájñavalkya-gítá</i>. See Hall, <i>Bibl. Index</i>, p. 14; Aufrecht, <i>Bodl. +Catal.</i>, p. 87 <i>b</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382_382" id="Footnote_382_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382_382"><span class="label">[382]</span></a> <i>Karman</i> seems here used for <i>kriyâ</i>, which properly +belongs only to the body, as the soul is <i>drashṭṛi</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_383_383" id="Footnote_383_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_383_383"><span class="label">[383]</span></a> <i>Scil. samádhi</i>, or the restraining the mind and senses +to profound contemplation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_384_384" id="Footnote_384_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_384_384"><span class="label">[384]</span></a> <i>Scil.</i> "forbearance, religious observance, postures, +suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and +meditation (<i>samádhi</i>)."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_385_385" id="Footnote_385_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385_385"><span class="label">[385]</span></a> See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, <i>samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa +samádhiḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_386_386" id="Footnote_386_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_386_386"><span class="label">[386]</span></a> Thus, <i>e.g.</i>, the antecedent non-existence and the +destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot +itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by +intimate relation (<i>samaváya-sambandha</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_387_387" id="Footnote_387_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387_387"><span class="label">[387]</span></a> I read <i>niroddhavyánám</i> for <i>nirodhánám</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_388_388" id="Footnote_388_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_388_388"><span class="label">[388]</span></a> <i>Chit-śakti</i> and <i>chiti-śakti</i> = soul.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_389_389" id="Footnote_389_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_389_389"><span class="label">[389]</span></a> The <i>sattva</i> of the <i>buddhi</i> or the internal organ.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_390_390" id="Footnote_390_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_390_390"><span class="label">[390]</span></a> This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" +(<i>buddhi</i>, <i>chitta</i>), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the +image of the object on a second looking-glass (<i>sc.</i> soul).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_391_391" id="Footnote_391_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391_391"><span class="label">[391]</span></a> Váchaspati explains <i>lakshaṇa</i> as <i>kálabheda</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_392_392" id="Footnote_392_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_392_392"><span class="label">[392]</span></a> I take <i>ádi</i> as meaning <i>asphuṭatva</i>. The change of state +takes place between the several moments of the <i>lakshaṇa-pariṇáma</i>. Cf. +the Commentaries on iii. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_393_393" id="Footnote_393_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393_393"><span class="label">[393]</span></a> These are generally called the five states of the +thinking principle, <i>chittabhúmayas</i> or <i>avasthás</i>. Cf. Commentary, i. +2, 18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_394_394" id="Footnote_394_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394_394"><span class="label">[394]</span></a> These three conditions respectively characterise men, +demons, and gods.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_395_395" id="Footnote_395_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_395_395"><span class="label">[395]</span></a> Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I +have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_396_396" id="Footnote_396_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_396_396"><span class="label">[396]</span></a> Can <i>chitta</i> mean "soul" here?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_397_397" id="Footnote_397_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_397_397"><span class="label">[397]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, as, <i>e.g.</i>, whether the senses produce the +elements or the elements the senses, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_398_398" id="Footnote_398_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_398_398"><span class="label">[398]</span></a> In p. 164, line 4 <i>infra</i>, read <i>sukhaprakáśamayasya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_399_399" id="Footnote_399_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_399_399"><span class="label">[399]</span></a> In p. 164, line 2 <i>infra</i>, read <i>sattámátra</i> for +<i>sattva-</i>. Bhoja well distinguishes <i>asmitá</i> from <i>ahaṃkára</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_400_400" id="Footnote_400_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_400_400"><span class="label">[400]</span></a> For these see <i>infra</i>, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_401_401" id="Footnote_401_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_401_401"><span class="label">[401]</span></a> I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the +English translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_402_402" id="Footnote_402_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402_402"><span class="label">[402]</span></a> Where the negation is prominent it is called +<i>prasajya-pratishedha</i>; but where it is not prominent, we have the +<i>paryudása</i> negation. In the former the negative is connected with the +verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, +as, <i>e.g.</i>— +</p><p> +(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note." +</p><p> +(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway." +</p><p> +The former corresponds to the logician's <i>atyantábháva</i>, the latter to +<i>anyonyábháva</i> or <i>bheda</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403_403" id="Footnote_403_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403_403"><span class="label">[403]</span></a> Cf. the <i>várttika</i> in Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404_404" id="Footnote_404_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404_404"><span class="label">[404]</span></a> Thus <i>adhana</i> stands for <i>avidya-mánadhana</i>, with +<i>vidyamána</i> omitted in the compound.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_405_405" id="Footnote_405_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405_405"><span class="label">[405]</span></a> As its subject would confessedly be <i>buddhi</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_406_406" id="Footnote_406_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406_406"><span class="label">[406]</span></a> As it is <i>avidyá</i> after all.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_407_407" id="Footnote_407_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407_407"><span class="label">[407]</span></a> In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of +Váchaspati's Gloss), <i>sarvavṛittinirodhasampannáyá api +tathátvaprasaṅgát</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_408_408" id="Footnote_408_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408_408"><span class="label">[408]</span></a> I read <i>tanvavastháścha</i> with the printed edition of +Váchaspati's Gloss. If <i>tanudagdháścha</i> is correct, it must mean +<i>tanutvena dagdháh</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_409_409" id="Footnote_409_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_409_409"><span class="label">[409]</span></a> As in <i>rámalakshmaṇau</i>, Ráma and Lakshmaṇa.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_410_410" id="Footnote_410_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410_410"><span class="label">[410]</span></a> I read <i>pakshatraye</i> for <i>pakshadvaye</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_411_411" id="Footnote_411_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411_411"><span class="label">[411]</span></a> In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_412_412" id="Footnote_412_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_412_412"><span class="label">[412]</span></a> Thus <i>inimicus</i> is not a "friend," nor, on the other +hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So +<i>agoshpada</i> is said to mean "a forest."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_413_413" id="Footnote_413_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413_413"><span class="label">[413]</span></a> Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_414_414" id="Footnote_414_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_414_414"><span class="label">[414]</span></a> In p. 166, line 4 <i>infra</i>, read <i>káyádau</i> for +<i>káryádau</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_415_415" id="Footnote_415_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_415_415"><span class="label">[415]</span></a> This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga +Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of +it; he calls it <i>vaiyásakí gáthá</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_416_416" id="Footnote_416_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_416_416"><span class="label">[416]</span></a> Since the continued enjoyment of an object only +increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret +(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_417_417" id="Footnote_417_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_417_417"><span class="label">[417]</span></a> Literally, "it has four feet."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_418_418" id="Footnote_418_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_418_418"><span class="label">[418]</span></a> Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification +of the quality of <i>sattva</i> unobstructed by <i>rajas</i> and <i>tamas</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_419_419" id="Footnote_419_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_419_419"><span class="label">[419]</span></a> "Let the affix <i>ṇini</i> be used after a root in the sense +of what is habitual, when the <i>upapada</i>, or subordinate word, is not a +word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_420_420" id="Footnote_420_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420_420"><span class="label">[420]</span></a> "Let <i>vṛiddhi</i> be the substitute of a base ending in a +vowel, when that which has an indicatory <i>ñ</i> or <i>ṇ</i> follows;" <i>ṇini</i> +has an indicatory <i>ṇ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_421_421" id="Footnote_421_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_421_421"><span class="label">[421]</span></a> Sc. <i>anuśaya</i> + <i>ini</i> = <i>anuśayin</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_422_422" id="Footnote_422_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_422_422"><span class="label">[422]</span></a> <i>Ini</i> and <i>ṭhan</i>, which respectively leave <i>in</i> and +<i>ika</i>; thus <i>daṇḍa</i> gives <i>daṇḍin</i> and <i>daṇḍika</i>. The line is quoted +by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Páṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in +the <i>Káśiká</i>, <i>ad loc</i>. The different prohibitions are illustrated by +the examples:—(1.) <i>svaván</i>, <i>khaván</i>; (2.) <i>kárakaván</i>; (3.) +<i>vyághraván</i>, <i>siṃhaván</i>; (4.) <i>daṇḍavatí śálá</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, <i>daṇḍá asyáṃ +santi</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_423_423" id="Footnote_423_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423_423"><span class="label">[423]</span></a> By iii. 3, 56.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_424_424" id="Footnote_424_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424_424"><span class="label">[424]</span></a> It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite +study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_425_425" id="Footnote_425_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425_425"><span class="label">[425]</span></a> See the <i>Káśiká</i> on Páṇ. v. 2, 115. For <i>vivakshártha</i> +(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Páṇ. ii. 2, 27. +The edition in the Benares <i>Pandit</i> reads <i>vishayaniyamártha</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_426_426" id="Footnote_426_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_426_426"><span class="label">[426]</span></a> <i>i.e.</i>, Thus <i>nirodha</i> is not <i>vṛitter abhávaḥ</i>, but +<i>abhávasyáśryaḥ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_427_427" id="Footnote_427_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427_427"><span class="label">[427]</span></a> I read in p. 168, last line, +<i>prakáśapravṛittiniyamarúpa</i>, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_428_428" id="Footnote_428_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428_428"><span class="label">[428]</span></a> See Káśiká, ii. 3, 36.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_429_429" id="Footnote_429_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429_429"><span class="label">[429]</span></a> This passage probably occurs in the <i>Yájñavalkya-gítá</i> +of Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, +note.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_430_430" id="Footnote_430_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430_430"><span class="label">[430]</span></a> Mímáṃsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_431_431" id="Footnote_431_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_431_431"><span class="label">[431]</span></a> The tantras are not properly concerned with what is +<i>nitya</i> or <i>naimittika</i>; they are <i>kámya</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_432_432" id="Footnote_432_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_432_432"><span class="label">[432]</span></a> The <i>víja</i> of air is the syllable <i>jaṃ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_433_433" id="Footnote_433_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_433_433"><span class="label">[433]</span></a> The <i>víja</i> of water is the syllable <i>baṃ</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_434_434" id="Footnote_434_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434_434"><span class="label">[434]</span></a> <i>Hríṃ.</i></p></div> <div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_435_435" id="Footnote_435_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_435_435"><span class="label">[435]</span></a> <i>Śríṃ.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_436_436" id="Footnote_436_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436_436"><span class="label">[436]</span></a> <i>Táṇḍava</i> is the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his +votaries.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_437_437" id="Footnote_437_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437_437"><span class="label">[437]</span></a> Literally "they take severally in order the gender of +one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est," <i>Livy</i>, xlii. +44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem +vocamus hominem," <i>Cic.</i>, <i>Legg</i>, i. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_438_438" id="Footnote_438_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_438_438"><span class="label">[438]</span></a> I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's +translation of the Sáhitya-darpaṇa.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_439_439" id="Footnote_439_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_439_439"><span class="label">[439]</span></a> Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man +is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other +relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of +longevity.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_440_440" id="Footnote_440_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_440_440"><span class="label">[440]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, an hour, a <i>ghaṭiká</i> being twenty-four +minutes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_441_441" id="Footnote_441_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_441_441"><span class="label">[441]</span></a> The <i>náḍís</i> or tubular vessels are generally reckoned +to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal +<i>náḍís</i>. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_442_442" id="Footnote_442_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_442_442"><span class="label">[442]</span></a> Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the +passage in the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the +vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to +the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each +other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold +and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting +the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a +waterwheel (<i>ghaṭíyantravat</i>); hence the seasons never pause in their +course."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_443_443" id="Footnote_443_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_443_443"><span class="label">[443]</span></a> This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, +that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, +as their sound expresses the word <i>so'haṃ</i> (i.e., <i>haṃsaḥ</i>), "I am +he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; +it is called the <i>ajapámantra</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, the mantra uttered without +voluntary muttering.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_444_444" id="Footnote_444_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_444_444"><span class="label">[444]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled +breath.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_445_445" id="Footnote_445_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_445_445"><span class="label">[445]</span></a> I cannot explain this. We might read <i>guruvarṇánám</i> for +<i>guṇavarṇánáṃ</i>, as the time spent in uttering a <i>guruvarṇa</i> is a +<i>vipala</i>, sixty of which make a <i>pala</i>, and two and a half <i>palas</i> +make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical +details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the +fifth act of the <i>Málatímádhava</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_446_446" id="Footnote_446_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_446_446"><span class="label">[446]</span></a> Sixty <i>palas</i> make a <i>ghaṭiká</i> (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 += 150, <i>i.e.</i>, the <i>palas</i> in two and a half <i>ghaṭikás</i> or one hour).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_447_447" id="Footnote_447_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_447_447"><span class="label">[447]</span></a> Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_448_448" id="Footnote_448_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_448_448"><span class="label">[448]</span></a> Literally "the being ever more."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_449_449" id="Footnote_449_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_449_449"><span class="label">[449]</span></a> For these colours cf. <i>Chhándogya Up.</i>, viii. 6; +<i>Maitri Up.</i>, vi. 30.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_450_450" id="Footnote_450_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_450_450"><span class="label">[450]</span></a> This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_451_451" id="Footnote_451_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_451_451"><span class="label">[451]</span></a> This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the <i>Amṛita-náda +Up.</i> See Weber, <i>Indische Stud.</i>, ix. 26.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_452_452" id="Footnote_452_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_452_452"><span class="label">[452]</span></a> This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting +of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, +attention, and meditation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_453_453" id="Footnote_453_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_453_453"><span class="label">[453]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, the internal organ (<i>chitta</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_454_454" id="Footnote_454_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_454_454"><span class="label">[454]</span></a> This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the +reading of the Bombay edition of the Puráṇa (only reading in line 3 +<i>chalátmanám</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_455_455" id="Footnote_455_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_455_455"><span class="label">[455]</span></a> Vishṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The +"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_456_456" id="Footnote_456_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_456_456"><span class="label">[456]</span></a> The old name for the central part of Bengal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_457_457" id="Footnote_457_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_457_457"><span class="label">[457]</span></a> A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it +is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_458_458" id="Footnote_458_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_458_458"><span class="label">[458]</span></a> In p. 178, l. 2, <i>infra</i>, read <i>pravṛitta</i> for +<i>pravṛitti</i>. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's +Comm.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_459_459" id="Footnote_459_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_459_459"><span class="label">[459]</span></a> Read <i>vikaraṇabhávaḥ</i>; Váchaspati explains it as +"<i>videhánám indriyáṇáṃ karaṇabhávaḥ</i>."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_460_460" id="Footnote_460_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_460_460"><span class="label">[460]</span></a> Vyása has <i>karaṇapañchakarúpajaya</i>; Váchaspati explains +<i>rúpa</i> by <i>grahaṇádi</i> (cf. iii. 47).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_461_461" id="Footnote_461_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_461_461"><span class="label">[461]</span></a> I read in p. 179, l. 11, <i>vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám</i>, +from Vyása's Comm.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_462_462" id="Footnote_462_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_462_462"><span class="label">[462]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, as past, present, or future.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_463_463" id="Footnote_463_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_463_463"><span class="label">[463]</span></a> <i>Viśoká.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_464_464" id="Footnote_464_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_464_464"><span class="label">[464]</span></a> This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent +impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called +<i>vyutthána</i> (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or +'darkness,' iii. 9) and <i>nirodha</i> (when it is chiefly characterised by +the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; +this in 'egoism' (<i>asmitá</i>); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' +(<i>i.e.</i>, <i>buddhi</i>); and <i>buddhi</i> into the 'irresolvable' (<i>i.e.</i>, +<i>prakṛiti</i>)." <i>Prakṛiti</i> consists of the three 'qualities' in +equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and +effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another +becomes predominant.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_465_465" id="Footnote_465_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_465_465"><span class="label">[465]</span></a> This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áraṇyaka +i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and +quotes the Śvetáśv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takes <i>avindat</i> as "he +pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the +Comm.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_466_466" id="Footnote_466_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_466_466"><span class="label">[466]</span></a> This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. +15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_467_467" id="Footnote_467_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_467_467"><span class="label">[467]</span></a> This probably refers to the Pañchadaśí. A Calcutta +Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf. +Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmaṇa, p. +x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, it is +by Bháratítírthavidyáraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p. +88).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX"></a>APPENDIX.</h2> + +<h2>ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. <i>supra</i>, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).</h2> + + +<p>[As the <i>upádhi</i> or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which +is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of +the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí, +which treat of it.]</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>cxxxvii. <i>That which always accompanies the major term +(sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), +is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set +forth.</i></p></div> + +<p>Our author now proceeds to define the <i>upádhi</i> or condition,<a name="FNanchor_468_468" id="FNanchor_468_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a> +which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as +laid down by another person;—"that which always accompanies," &c. The +meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span>accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus +invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his +middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke +because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being +produced from wet fuel," as an <i>upádhi</i>, since "wet fuel" is +necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as +<i>e.g.</i>, in a red-hot iron ball.]</p> + +<p>"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not +follow that (<i>a</i>) in the case of the too wide middle term in the +argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be +dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being +produced from feeding on vegetables'<a name="FNanchor_469_469" id="FNanchor_469_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> as a 'condition,'—inasmuch +as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour +does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have +nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (<i>b</i>) Again, in the +argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense<a name="FNanchor_470_470" id="FNanchor_470_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> because it is the +site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate +form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] +is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and +therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably +accompany perceptibility]. (<i>c</i>) Again, in the argument,'Destruction +is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as +a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of +existence'<a name="FNanchor_471_471" id="FNanchor_471_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> [destruction being a form of non-existence, called +"emergent," <i>dvaṃśábháva</i>], <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span>inasmuch as perishability is found in +antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be +included in any positive category of existence."</p> + +<p>We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the +definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to +determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which +our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must +be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition +is not invariably to accompany. Thus (<i>a</i>) the "being produced from +feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as +determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is +discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the +argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is +not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (<i>b</i>) Again, +"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility +as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external +object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term +"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by +the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.<a name="FNanchor_472_472" id="FNanchor_472_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a> +(<i>c</i>) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being +produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" +invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by +the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term +advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, +"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends +that this is produced at all.]</p> + +<p>But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid +middle terms, <i>i.e.</i>, there is nothing <i>there</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span>which invariably +accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, +and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. +This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object +that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate +determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the +cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general +rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any +particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term +which is too general, the required general rule consists in the +constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., +that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged +site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,<a name="FNanchor_473_473" id="FNanchor_473_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a> or +else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but +excluding the said condition;<a name="FNanchor_474_474" id="FNanchor_474_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> and it will be when the case is +determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that +the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major +term, and not always accompanying the middle term."<a name="FNanchor_475_475" id="FNanchor_475_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span></p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>cxxxviii. <i>All true Conditions reside in the same subjects +with their major terms;<a name="FNanchor_476_476" id="FNanchor_476_476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a> and, their subjects being thus +common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general +in regard to the Condition and the major term.</i><a name="FNanchor_477_477" id="FNanchor_477_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p> + +<p>cxxxix. <i>It is in order to prove faulty generality in a +middle term that the Condition has to be employed.</i></p></div> + +<p>The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term +being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that +it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of +having a condition at all. (<i>a.</i>) Thus, where the condition invariably +accompanies an unlimited<a name="FNanchor_478_478" id="FNanchor_478_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> major term, we infer that the middle +term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact +that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in +the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we +infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is +too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is +too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too +general for that which is invariably accompanied. (<i>b.</i>) But where we +take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which +the condition is invariably to accompany,—there it is from the middle +term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases +possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is +equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, +"B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of +being Mitrá's <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span>son" is too general in regard to the <i>sádhya</i>, "dark +colour," because it is too general in regard to the <i>upádhi</i>, "feeding +on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's +parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having +fed on vegetables previous to his birth].</p> + +<p>[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a +condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your +definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle +term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire +because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the +being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this +certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it +is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to +be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' +since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as +for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in +this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You +never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere +than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some +direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the +first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your +antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major +term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly +one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is +self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally +employed to overthrow the contrary argument].</p> + +<p>But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being +always found elsewhere than in the subject"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span> becomes a true condition, +[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant +tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be +non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in +"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by +sense-evidence that fire is hot,<a name="FNanchor_479_479" id="FNanchor_479_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> [thus the <i>upádhi</i> here is a +means of overthrowing the false argument].</p> + +<p>Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is +disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.<a name="FNanchor_480_480" id="FNanchor_480_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> But +"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed +even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules +of logical controversy.<a name="FNanchor_481_481" id="FNanchor_481_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p> + +<p class="p1">E. B. C.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_468_468" id="Footnote_468_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_468_468"><span class="label">[468]</span></a> The <i>upádhi</i> is the "condition" which must be supplied +to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus +restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid; +if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has +fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied +by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if +the mountain <i>has</i> wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have +smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is +Mitrá's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her +former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her +happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove +that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle +term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_469_469" id="Footnote_469_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_469_469"><span class="label">[469]</span></a> The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from +the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from +her living on ghee.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_470_470" id="Footnote_470_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_470_470"><span class="label">[470]</span></a> By Bháshá-parich. śl. 25, the four elements, earth, +water, air, and fire, are <i>sparśavat</i>, but by śl. 27 of these air is +neither <i>pratyaksha</i> nor <i>rúpavat</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_471_471" id="Footnote_471_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_471_471"><span class="label">[471]</span></a> This condition would imply that we could only argue +from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive +existence, not non-existence.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_472_472" id="Footnote_472_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_472_472"><span class="label">[472]</span></a> "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was +not <i>soul</i>, but <i>air</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_473_473" id="Footnote_473_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_473_473"><span class="label">[473]</span></a> As, <i>e.g.</i>, the mountain and Mitrá's first son in the +two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" +(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and +"Mitrá's first son A is dark because he is Mitrá's offspring" (when +her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective +<i>sádhyas</i> or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are +respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the +mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_474_474" id="Footnote_474_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_474_474"><span class="label">[474]</span></a> As, <i>e.g.</i>, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrá's second +son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire" +and "the being Mitrá's offspring" do not possess the respective +conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor, +consequently, the respective major terms (<i>sádhya</i>) "smoke" and "dark +colour."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_475_475" id="Footnote_475_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_475_475"><span class="label">[475]</span></a> This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in +(<i>a</i>), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for, +though they are the sites of the <i>sádhya</i> "dark colour," they do not +admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term +"the being Mitrá's son."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_476_476" id="Footnote_476_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_476_476"><span class="label">[476]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel +there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in +their extension.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_477_477" id="Footnote_477_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_477_477"><span class="label">[477]</span></a> Where the <i>hetu</i> is found and not the <i>sádhya</i> (as in +the red-hot ball of iron), there the <i>upádhi</i> also is not applicable.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_478_478" id="Footnote_478_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_478_478"><span class="label">[478]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, one which requires no determining fact or mark, +such as the three objected arguments required in § 137.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_479_479" id="Footnote_479_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_479_479"><span class="label">[479]</span></a> The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is +artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an +artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,—<i>i.e.</i>, +one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point." +Here the proposed <i>upádhi</i> "the being always found elsewhere than in +fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the +<i>hetu</i> "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the +<i>sádhya</i> "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_480_480" id="Footnote_480_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_480_480"><span class="label">[480]</span></a> As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a +maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist +disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing +a body." See Kusumáñjali, v. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_481_481" id="Footnote_481_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_481_481"><span class="label">[481]</span></a> In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the +outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own +point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a +true condition must be consistent with <i>either</i> party's opinions.</p></div> + +</div> +<h3>THE END.</h3> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<h2>TRÜBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.</h2> +<p class="blockquot">"A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental literature, +philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the general reader of the +present day as an acquaintance with the Latin and Greek classics was a +generation or so ago. Immense strides have been made within the +present century in these branches of learning; Sanskrit has been +brought within the range of accurate philology, and its invaluable +ancient literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred +books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian, Assyrian, and +other records of the remote past have been deciphered, and a group of +scholars speak of still more recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; +but the results of all the scholarship that has been devoted to these +subjects have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were +contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or +scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals. Messrs. +Trübner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does them infinite +credit, have determined to supply the constantly-increasing want, and +to give in a popular, or, at least, a comprehensive form, all this +mass of knowledge to the world."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>THE INDIAN EMPIRE:<br /> + ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.</h3> +<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Hon. Sir W. W. Hunter</span>, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,</p> + +<p class="center">Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,</p> + +<p class="center">Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India.</p> + +<p>Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the +general results of the Census of 1881.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a +marvellous combination of literary condensation and +research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire, +its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy +outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional +opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing +could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of +the economic and political condition of India at the present +time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the +India of the past."—<i>The Times.</i></p></div> + + +<p class="center"><i>THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED</i>:—</p> + +<p class="center">Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.</p> + +<h3>ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS,<br /> + AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Martin Haug, Ph.D.</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Late of the Universities of Tübingen, Göttingen, and Bonn; +Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the +Poona College.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Edited and Enlarged by Dr. E. W. West.</span></p> + +<p class="center">To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. <span class="smcap">Haug</span> by Prof. +<span class="smcap">E. P. Evans</span>.</p> + +<p>I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of +the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.</p> + +<p>II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.</p> + +<p>III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.</p> + +<p>IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of +the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E. +W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to +expand the materials contained in this work into a +comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the +design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have, +however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the +researches into the sacred writings and religion of the +Parsis from the earliest times down to the present—a +dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a +translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the +Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with +especial reference to its origin and development."—<i>Times.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON</h3> +<p class="center">COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."</p> + +<p class="center"><i>With Accompanying Narratives.</i></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese, +University College, London.</p> + +<p>The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition, as edited +by Fausböll, by Max Müller's English, and Albrecht Weber's German +translations, consists only of twenty-six chapters or sections, whilst +the Chinese version, or rather recension, as now translated by Mr. +Beal, consists of thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who +possess Fausböll's text, or either of the above-named translations, +will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the Chinese +version; the thirteen above-named additional sections not being +accessible to them in any other form; for, even if they understand +Chinese, the Chinese original would be unobtainable by them.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most +valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains +authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and +generally connected with some incident in the history of +Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light +which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote +period at which they were written, and upon the method of +teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method +employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the +tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well +as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds +of millions of people, make them a very remarkable +study."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has +added to the great services he has already rendered to the +comparative study of religious history."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its +purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader +face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct +which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is +now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid +its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies, +forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so +inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder +denied a God, now worships that founder as a god +himself."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Albrecht Weber.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Second German Edition by <span class="smcap">John Mann</span>, M.A., and +<span class="smcap">Théodor Zachariae</span>, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.</p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>Dr. <span class="smcap">Buhler</span>, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:—"When I was +Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I frequently +felt the want of such a work to which I could refer the students."</p> + +<p>Professor <span class="smcap">Cowell</span>, of Cambridge, writes:—"It will be especially useful +to the students in our Indian colleges and universities. I used to +long for such a book when I was teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students +are intensely interested in the history of Sanskrit literature, and +this volume will supply them with all they want on the subject."</p> + +<p>Professor <span class="smcap">Whitney</span>, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A., writes:—"I +was one of the class to whom the work was originally given in the form +of academic lectures. At their first appearance they were by far the +most learned and able treatment of their subject; and with their +recent additions they still maintain decidedly the same rank."</p></div> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of +Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the +volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and +at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to +be by far the most learned and able treatment of the +subject. They have now been brought up to date by the +addition of all the most important results of recent +research."—<i>Times.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price +7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert N. Cust.</span></p> + +<p>The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of +which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the +languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge +had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might +be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he +had collected for his own edification.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"The book before us is then a valuable contribution to +philological science. It passes under review a vast number +of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every +case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of +the best-informed writers."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.</p> + +<h3>THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.</h3> +<p class="center">A Poem. <span class="smcap">By Kalidasa.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by<br /> +<span class="smcap">Ralph T. H. Griffith</span>, M.A.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very spirited rendering of the <i>Kumárasambhava</i>, which +was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are +glad to see made once more accessible."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to +most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or +enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative +imagination of its author."—<i>Indian Antiquary.</i></p> + +<p>"We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor +Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a +second edition better."—<i>Athenæum.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.</p> + +<h3>A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY<br /> + AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND <br /> +LITERATURE.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Dowson</span>, M.R.A.S.,<br /> +Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to +students of Indian literature, but is also of great general +interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible +form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu +mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little +is known outside the limited circle of <i>savants</i>."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly +and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the +few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions +detract but little from the general excellence of Mr. +Dowson's work."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edward William Lane</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c., &c.</p> + +<p class="center">A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by<br /> +<span class="smcap">Stanley Lane Poole</span>.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"... Has been long esteemed in this country as the +compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the +time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the +'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the +value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a +great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of +comment, and prefixing an introduction."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer.... +Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible +for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for +literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable +form."—<i>Englishman, Calcutta.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.</p> + +<h3>MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,</h3> +<p class="center">BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Monier Williams</span>, D.C.L.,</p> + +<p class="center">Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay +Asiatic Society,<br /> +Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford.</p> + +<p class="center">Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions,<br /> +with Illustrations and a Map.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a +thoughtful man on some of the most important questions +connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened +observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant +people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the +public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of +the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have +seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of +every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of +Modern India—a subject with which we should be specially +familiar—but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee +or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of +their manners, their creeds, and their +necessities."—<i>Times.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.</p> + +<h3>METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.</h3> +<p class="center">With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from<br /> +Classical Authors.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By J. Muir</span>, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration +alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the +legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers."—<i>Edinburgh +Daily Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE GULISTAN;</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or, Rose Garden of Shekh Mushliu'd-din Sadi of Shiraz</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an<br /> +Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edward B. Eastwick</span>, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a very fair rendering of the original."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed +by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The +<i>Gulistan</i> is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest +order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long +established itself in a secure position as the best version +of Sadi's finest work."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"It is both faithfully and gracefully executed."—<i>Tablet.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price +28s.</p> + +<h3>MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Brian Houghton Hodgson, Esq.</span>, F.R.S.,</p> + +<p class="center">Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the +Institute; <br /> +Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at the Court of Nepal, &c., &c.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. I.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section I.</span>—On the Kocch, Bódó, and Dhimál Tribes.—Part I. +Vocabulary.—Part II. Grammar.—Part III. Their Origin, Location, Numbers, +Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition, with a General Description of +the Climate they dwell in—Appendix.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section II.</span>—On Himalayan Ethnology.—I. Comparative Vocabulary of the +Languages of the Broken Tribes of Népál.—II. Vocabulary of the Dialects +of the Kiranti Language.—III. Grammatical Analysis of the Váyu Language. +The Váyu Grammar.—IV. Analysis of the Báhing Dialect of the Kiranti +language. The Báhing Grammar.—V. On the Váyu or Háyu Tribe of the Central +Himaláya.—VI. On the Kiranti Tribe of the Central Himaláya.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section III.</span>—On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India. Comparative +Vocabulary of the Tibetan, Bódó, and Gáró Tongues.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section IV.</span>—Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section V.</span>—Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section VI.</span>—The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their connection with the +Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers +in Arakan. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section VII.</span>—The Mongolian Affinities of the Caucasians.—Comparison and +Analysis of Caucasian and Mongolian Words.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section VIII.</span>—Physical Type of Tibetans.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section IX.</span>—The Aborigines of Central India.—Comparative Vocabulary of +the Aboriginal Languages of Central India.—Aborigines of the Eastern +Ghats.—Vocabulary of some of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering +Tribes in the Northern Sircars.—Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks +on their Affinities.—Supplement to the Nilgirian Vocabularies.—The +Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section X.</span>—Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks on the +Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section XI.</span>—Route from Káthmándú, the Capital of Nepâl, to Darjeeling in +Sikim.—Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis of Nepâl.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section XII.</span>—Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police as recognised +in the State of Nepâl.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section XIII.</span>—The Native Method of making the Paper denominated +Hindustan, Népálese.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Section XIV.</span>—Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the Anglicists +Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the People of India.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">"For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian Hodgson's +'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable both to the philologist +and the ethnologist."</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326, +cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,</h3> +<p class="center">THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.</p> + +<p class="center">The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By the Right Rev. P. Bigandet</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only +illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect +encyclopædia of Buddhist lore."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism +with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their +investigations."—<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work."—<i>Indian Antiquary.</i></p> + +<p>"Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place +students of the subject under a deep obligation to its +author."—<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p> + +<p>"This work is one of the greatest authorities upon +Buddhism."—<i>Dublin Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.</p> + +<h3>CHINESE BUDDHISM.</h3> +<p class="center">A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By J. Edkins, D.D.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It contains a vast deal of important information on the +subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued +study on the spot."—<i>Athenæum.</i></p> + +<p>"Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the +extent of its original research, and the simplicity with +which this complicated system of philosophy, religion, +literature, and ritual is set forth."—<i>British Quarterly +Review.</i></p> + +<p>"The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves +most careful study from all interested in the history of the +religions of the world, and expressly of those who are +concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins +notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise +bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English +writers."—<i>Record.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Written from the Year 1846 to 1878.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service;<br /> + Hon. Secretary to the Royal Asiatic Society; and<br /> +Author of "The Modern Languages of the East Indies."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We know none who has described Indian life, especially the +life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and +literary talent."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original +remarks."—<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p> + +<p>"His book contains a vast amount of information. The result +of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and +speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as +of food for thought."—<i>Tablet.</i></p> + +<p>"Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and +antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one +having authority."—<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p> + +<p>"The author speaks with the authority of personal +experience.... It is this constant association with the +country and the people which gives such a vividness to many +of the pages."—<i>Athenæum.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.</p> + +<h3>BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.</h3> +<p class="center">The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:</p> + +<p class="center">BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,</p> + +<p class="center">For the first time Edited in the original Pāli.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By V. Fausboll</span>;</p> + +<p class="center">And Translated by <span class="smcap">T. W. Rhys Davids</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">Translation. Volume I.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of +what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are +probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan +stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as +India. The introduction contains a most interesting +disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing +their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore +legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of +the Judgment of Solomon."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his +right to be heard on this subject by his able article on +Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclopædia +Britannica.'"—<i>Leeds Mercury.</i></p> + +<p>"All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel +deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established +reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for +the fidelity of his version, and the style of his +translations is deserving of high praise."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than +Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jātaka book we have, then, a +priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of +our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete +picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs +of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to +ourselves, just as they were passing through the first +stages of civilisation."—<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.</p> + +<h3>A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or</span>, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND +THE KABBALAH.</p> + +<p class="center">Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis +According to the Talmud," &c.</p> + +<p class="center">With Notes and Copious Indexes.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a +general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at +least."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive +to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent +scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and +indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon +the Scriptures."—<i>British Quarterly Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful +notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet +appeared."—<i>Daily News.</i></p> + +<p>"Without overlooking in the slightest the several +attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental +Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses +them all in interest."—<i>Edinburgh Daily Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we +believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for +themselves."—<i>The Record.</i></p> + +<p>"This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of +knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and +unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the +wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood—so +Jewish pride asserts—by the life-long devotion of scholars +of the Chosen People."—<i>Inquirer.</i></p> + +<p>"The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact +that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but +throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those +Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and +Christian alike."—<i>John Bull.</i></p> + +<p>"It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument +of learned, loving, light-giving labour."—<i>Jewish Herald.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Basil Hall Chamberlain</span>, Author of "Yeigo Heñkaku Shirañ."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted +much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature +of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into +English verse."—<i>Daily News.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the +first attempt which has been made to interpret the +literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to +the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for +indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we +have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful +English verse."—<i>Tablet.</i></p> + +<p>"It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric +literature which has appeared during the close of the last +year."—<i>Celestial Empire.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he +undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form. +But he has evidently laboured <i>con amore</i>, and his efforts +are successful to a degree."—<i>London and China Express.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib),</h3> +<p class="center"> KING OF ASSYRIA, <span class="smcap">b.c.</span> +681-668.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders and Tablets in +the British Museum Collection; together with a Grammatical Analysis of +each Word, Explanations of the Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual +Syllabaries, and List of Eponyms, &c.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Ernest A. Budge</span>, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's +College, Cambridge.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Students of scriptural archæology will also appreciate the +'History of Esarhaddon.'"—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It +does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in +their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it +does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers +both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary +non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling +its results."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to +Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be +feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due +to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted +himself in his laborious task."—<i>Tablet.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>THE MESNEVI</h3> + +<p class="center">(Usually known as <span class="smcap">The Mesneviyi Sherif</span>, or <span class="smcap">Holy Mesnevi</span>) OF MEVLANA +(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.</p> + +<p class="center">Book the First.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his +Ancestors, and of his Descendants.</i></p> + +<p class="center">Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected +by their Historian,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Mevlana Shemsu-'D-Din Ahmed, el Eflaki, el 'Arifi.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By James W. Redhouse</span>, M.R.A.S., &c.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."—<i>Saturday +Review.</i></p> + +<p>"This book will be a very valuable help to the reader +ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight +into a very important department of the literature extant in +that language."—<i>Tablet.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.</p> + +<h3>EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Illustrating Old Truths.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Rev. J. Long</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide +circulation and attentive reading."—<i>Record.</i></p> + +<p>"Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."—<i>Globe.</i></p> + +<p>"It is full of interesting matter."—<i>Antiquary.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>INDIAN POETRY;</h3> + +<p class="blockquot">Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from the Sanscrit +of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books from "The Iliad of India" +(Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom" from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and +other Oriental Poems.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Edwin Arnold</span>, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"In this new volume of Messrs. Trübner's Oriental Series, +Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through +the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of +Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of +Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have +introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be +more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna +is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the +love of</p></div> + +<p class="center">'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five +senses are typified."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his +art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas +as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of +language contained in these mighty epics."—<i>Daily +Telegraph.</i></p> + +<p>"The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and +sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of +the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody +sufficient to captivate the senses of the +dullest."—<i>Standard.</i></p> + +<p>"The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has +adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original +text."—<i>Overland Mail.</i></p> + +<p>"We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to +popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface +tells us, the goal towards which he bends his +efforts."—<i>Allen's Indian Mail.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE MIND OF MENCIUS;</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or</span>, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Systematic Digest of the Doctrines of the Chinese Philosopher +Mencius.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and +Explanations,</p> + +<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. Ernst Faber</span>, Rhenish Mission Society.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,</p> + +<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. A. B. Hutchinson</span>, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese +studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The +value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered +that at no time since relations commenced between China and +the West has the former been so powerful—we had almost said +aggressive—as now. For those who will give it careful +study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the +excellent series to which it belongs."—<i>Nature.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.</p> + +<h3>THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By A. Barth.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the +Author.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably +enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of +the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as +an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India, +which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject, +but also a useful work of reference."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and +additions, of an article contributed by the learned author +two years ago to the 'Encyclopédie des Sciences +Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first +appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best +summary extant of the vast subject with which it +deals."—<i>Tablet.</i></p> + +<p>"This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual +of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we +have in English. The present work ... shows not only great +knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but +also great insight into the inner history and the deeper +meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only +one, which it proposes to describe."—<i>Modern Review.</i></p> + +<p>"The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by +the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country +and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few +Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a +good deal of information from it, and especially from the +extensive bibliography provided in the notes."—<i>Dublin +Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a +master-hand."—<i>Critic (New York).</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.</p> + +<h3>HINDU PHILOSOPHY.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">The SĀnkhya KĀrika Of Is'wara Krishna.</span></p> + +<p class="center">An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyāya +and Vais'eshika Systems.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Davies</span>, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.</p> + +<p class="center">The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in +the department of pure philosophy.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and +learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the +philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he +may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the +system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give +an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions +which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the +world, the nature and relations of man and his future +destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the +connection of the Sānkhya system with the philosophy of +Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with +that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"—<i>Foreign Church +Chronicle.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted +gain to all students of the development of thought. The +system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from +the Sānkhya Kārikā, is the only contribution of India to +pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to +the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr. +Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to +appreciate these points in any adequate manner."—<i>Saturday +Review.</i></p> + +<p>"We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our +philosophical library."—<i>Notes and Queries.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.</p> + +<h3>A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDÂNTASÂRA.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated, with copious Annotations,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Major G. A. Jacob</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for +others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an +accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedânta.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an +inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in +his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious, +indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they +bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will +rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hindû +philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its +kind that we have seen."—<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>TSUNI—||GOAM:</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,</p> + +<p class="center">Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the +Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological +Society, Vienna, &c., &c.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of +interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of +Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the +comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of +their religion and mythology were scattered about in various +books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and +printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what +he has been able to collect himself."—<i>Prof. Max Müller in +the Nineteenth Century.</i></p> + +<p>"It is full of good things."—<i>St. James's Gazette.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d., +Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., <br /> +Vol. III., pp. viii.-414, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">To which is prefixed Sale's Preliminary Discourse, with Additional Notes +and Emendations.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and +Notes.</p> + +<p class="center">By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India, +it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if +they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and +for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove +useful."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE BHAGAVAD-GÎTÂ.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated, with Introduction and Notes.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By John Davies, M.A.</span> (Cantab.)</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is, as +we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and +that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar +value."—<i>Dublin Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.</p> + +<h3>THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M. +Bengal Civil Service.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.</h3> + +<p class="center">The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.</p> + +<p class="center">By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with +considerable success, and his version contains much that +will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's +delightful selection."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their +profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on +philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and +the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates +them."—<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.</h3> + +<p class="center">As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the <i>Calcutta +Review</i>.</p> + +<p class="center">By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of +the Calcutta Madrasa.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important +of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Trübner's +Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may +take it up the work must be one of profound +interest."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.</h3> + +<p class="center">By <span class="smcap">Dr. C. P. Tiele</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">Vol. I.—<span class="smcap">History of the Egyptian Religion.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.</p> + +<p class="center">By JAMES BALLINGAL.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It places in the hands of the English readers a history of +Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on +the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the +latest results of research. In this volume there is a great +deal of information, as well as independent investigation, +for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in +itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive +religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the +New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and +minute."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Poem by Jami.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Persian into English Verse.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Ralph T. H. Griffith.</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as +translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further +good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has +evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the +quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more +prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its +intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most +popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read +in all the independent native schools of India where Persian +is taught."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Carl Abel.</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical +questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise +dry technicalities of the science."—<i>Standard.</i></p> + +<p>"Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ, +for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery +over the English language fits him to be a champion of +unpopular doctrines."—<i>Athenæum.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Or, Review Of The Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Madhava Acharya.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the +University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of +Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The +author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems +current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives +what appears to him to be their most important tenets.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted +sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has +familiarised the translators with Indian +thought."—<i>Athenæum.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.</p> + +<h3>TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Tibetan of the <span class="smcap">Kah-Gyur</span>.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By F. Anton Von Schiefner.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By W. R. S. Ralston, M.A.</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of +Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western +analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from +Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the +Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred +books."—<i>Academy.</i></p> + +<p>"The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better +hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the +lives of those scholars who have given their attention to +gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and +language."—<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing +stories, or for comparative folk-lore."—<i>Pall Mall +Gazette.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>UDÂNAVARGA.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">A Collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Compiled by DHARMATRÂTA.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Being the Northern Buddhist Version of Dhammapada.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts +from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By W. Woodville Rockhill.</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which +assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding +of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of +comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan +version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner, +who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a +translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which +has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be +congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult +task."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a +Language Map, price 18s.</p> + +<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do +better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclopædic in its +scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any +particular language, and is left free to add to the initial +sum of knowledge there collected."—<i>Natal Mercury.</i></p> + +<p>"Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to +linguistic students."—<i>Nature.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL +RELIGIONS.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By C. P. Tiele</span>,</p> + +<p class="center">Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the +University of Leyden.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Dutch by <span class="smcap">J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A.</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide +thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to +gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of +investigations into the religious history of nations. As +Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are +outlines—pencil sketches, I might say—nothing more.' But +there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of +far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the +crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these +pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps +also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and +thorough research."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.</p> + +<h3>A HISTORY OF BURMA.</h3> + +<p class="center">Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the +Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur P. Phayre</span>, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B., +Membre Correspondant de la Société Académique Indo-Chinoise de France.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Trübner's Oriental +Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has +been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre +deserves great credit for the patience and industry which +has resulted in this History of Burma."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>RELIGION IN CHINA.</h3> + +<p class="center">By <span class="smcap">Joseph Edkins, D.D., Peking</span>.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the +Chinese, with Observations on the Prospects of Christian +Conversion amongst that People.</p> + +<p>"Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and +often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of +considerable value of the subject."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p> + +<p>"As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to +study the existing religions in China, and his long +residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an +intimate knowledge of them as they at present +exist."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and +revised edition, has, from the time that it was published, +been the standard authority upon the subject of which it +treats."—<i>Nonconformist.</i></p> + +<p>"Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the +first authorities on Chinese religion and +language."—<i>British Quarterly Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.</h3> + +<p class="center">Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed +by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness +with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient +documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p>"Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those +Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these +Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter +possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient +Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and +translated, have not yet attracted the attention of +scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon +the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded +in these venerable authorities."—<i>Daily News.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.</p> + +<h3>THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.</h3> + +<p class="center">With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares +College.</p> + +<p class="center">Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and +scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have +every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the +publishers."—<i>Calcutta Review.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price +24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.</p> + +<h3>BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (<span class="smcap">a.d.</span> 629).</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> Samuel Beal, B.A.,</p> + +<p class="center">(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of +Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, +&c.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:—"Nothing +more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's +translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the +best account of the condition of India at that ancient +period has come down to us in the books of travel written by +the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best +known."—<i>Times.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.</p> + +<h3>THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.</p> + +<p class="center">By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.</p> + +<p class="center">Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This work is full of interest; while for the student of +sociology and the science of religion it is full of +importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in +so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently +translated."—<i>Scotsman.</i></p> + +<p>"Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a +really good translation of this well-known law book, first +rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not +only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced +lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications +the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in +clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very +grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could +be published of the translation left by Burnell."—<span class="smcap">F. Max +Müller</span> in the <i>Academy.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.</p> + +<h3>THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,</h3> + +<p class="center">Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his Published and +Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original and for most part Unpublished +Documents.</p> + +<p class="center">By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal +Medical Service, Retired, &c.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not too soon have Messrs. Trübner added to their valuable +Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of +the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander +Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and +though an account of his career was demanded soon after his +decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of +his compatriot, Dr. Duka."—<i>Bookseller.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.</h3> + +<p class="center">Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches," +and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."</p> + +<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. I.</i></p> + +<p>I.—Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.</p> + +<p>II.—Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James +Barton, of his several Surveys.</p> + +<p>III.—Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse, +dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.</p> + +<p>IV.—Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.</p> + +<p>V.—The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.</p> + +<p>VI.—On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.</p> + +<p>VII.—On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst +the Malays. By William Marsden.</p> + +<p>VIII.—Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By +James Howison.</p> + +<p>IX.—A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of +Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.</p> + +<p>X.—An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying +off Sumatra. By John Crisp.</p> + +<p>XI.—Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales +Island. By William Hunter, M.D.</p> + +<p>XII.—On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J. +Leyden, M.D.</p> + +<p>XIII.—Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the +Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.</p> + +<p>XIV.—Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of +Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.</p> + +<p>XV.—Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring +Islands. By T. Ware.</p> + +<p>XVI.—Climate of Singapore.</p> + +<p>XVII.—Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.</p> + +<p>XVIII.—Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.</p> + +<p>XIX.—Inscription at Singapore.</p> + +<p>XX—An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By +Lieut.-Col. James Low.</p> + +<p>XXI.—Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By +J. W. Laidlay.</p> + +<p>XXII.—On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.</p> + +<p>XXIII.—A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.</p> + +<p>XXIV.—Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian +Archipelago.</p> + +<p>XXV.—Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B +Tremenheere.</p> + +<p>XXVI.—Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B. +Tremenheere.</p> + +<p>XXVII.—Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.</p> + +<p>XXVIII.—Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.</p> + +<p>XXIX.—Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from +Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.</p> + +<p>XXX.—Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities +in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B. +Tremenheere.</p> + +<p>XXXI.—Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence +across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and +Capt. J. G. Forlong.</p> + +<p>XXXII.—Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui +Tin Ore.</p> + +<p>XXXIII.—Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.</p> + +<p>XXXIV.—Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</i></p> + +<p>XXXV.—Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands. +By Theodore Cantor, M.D.</p> + +<p>XXXVI.—On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.</p> + +<p>XXXVII.—Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and +Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII.—Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the +Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.</p> + +<p>XXXIX.—On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.</p> + +<p>XL.—Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.</p> + +<p>General Index.</p> + +<p>Index of Vernacular Terms.</p> + +<p>Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">"The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China—its philology, +economy, geography, geology—and constitute a very material and important +contribution to our accessible information regarding that country and its +people."—<i>Contemporary Review.</i></p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.</p> + +<h3>THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.</h3> + +<p class="center">Translated from the Sanskrit</p> + +<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. B. Hale Wortham</span>, M.R.A.S.,</p> + +<p class="center">Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very interesting addition to Trübner's Oriental +Series."—<i>Saturday Review.</i></p> + +<p>"Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and +beauty of expression."—<i>St. James' Gazette.</i></p></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.</p> + +<h3>ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;</h3> + +<p class="center">Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By</span> James Gray,</p> + +<p class="center">Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">The Sanscrit-Pâli word Nîti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract, +and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a +general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and +didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as +form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to +his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and +have served as a most effective medium of instruction.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:</h3> + +<p class="center">THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.</p> + +<p class="center">Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal +Civil Service.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Original Sanskrit Text, with Critical Notes.</span> <span class="smcap">By</span> J. Jolly, Ph.D.,</p> + +<p class="center">Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor +of Law in the University of Calcutta.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code—the well-known Great +Law Book of the Hindus—is 1250-500 <span class="smcap">b.c.</span>, although the rules and precepts +contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages +before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for +many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work +will supply a want long felt.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.</p> + +<h3>LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Frederic Henry Balfour.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic +Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Written from the Year 1847 to 1887.</span> <i>Second Series.</i></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Robert Needham Cust, LL.D.,</span></p> + +<p class="center">Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late +Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.</p> + +<h3>MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.</h3> + +<p class="center">Edited <span class="smcap">By R. Rost, Ph.D., &c. &c.,</span> Librarian to the India Office.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Second Series.</span></p> + +<p class="blockquot">Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the +Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian +Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the +Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.</p> + +<h3>FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.</h3> + +<p class="center">By the <span class="smcap">Rev. J. Hinton Knowles</span>, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.</p> + +<p class="center">(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.</p> + +<h3>MEDIÆVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Fragments Towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central +and Western Asia from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Century.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By E. Bretschneider,</span> M.D.,</p> + +<p class="center">Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.</p> + +<h3>ALBERUNI'S INDIA:</h3> +<p class="center">AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY,<br /> +ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND ASTROLOGY (<span class="smcap">About a.d. 1031</span>).</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Translated into English.</span></p> + +<p class="center">With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.</p> + +<p class="center">∵ The Arabic Original, with an Index of +the Sanskrit Words, Edited by Professor SACHAU, is in the press.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.</p> + +<h3>THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By the Shamans Hwui Li and Yen-tsung.</span></p> + +<p class="center">With a Preface containing an account of the Works of <span class="smcap">I-Tsing</span>.</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By Samuel Beal, B.A.</span></p> + +<p class="center">(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College, +London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.</p> + +<p class="center">Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic +Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c.</p> + +<p class="blockquot">When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he +took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent +had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress, +Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li, +composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's +travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to +discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he +revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised +and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable +sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many +particulars.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class="center"><i>IN PREPARATION:—</i></p> + +<p class="center">Post 8vo.</p> + +<h3>A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.</h3> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">By R. N. Cust, LL. D.</span></p> + +<p class="center">Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of +Africa," &c.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<h3><span class="smcap">London: Trübner & CO., 57 and 59 Ludgate Hill.</span></h3> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA *** + +***** This file should be named 34125-h.htm or 34125-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/4/1/2/34125/ + +Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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