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diff --git a/27244.txt b/27244.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a302d12 --- /dev/null +++ b/27244.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1870 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Operations Upon the Sea + A Study + +Author: Franz Edelsheim + +Release Date: November 12, 2008 [EBook #27244] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA *** + + + + +Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + +OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA + + + + +OPERATIONS UPON +THE SEA + +A STUDY + +BY + +FREIHERR VON EDELSHEIM + +IN THE SERVICE OF THE GERMAN GENERAL +STAFF IN 1901 + +TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN + +NEW YORK +THE OUTDOOR PRESS +1914 + + + + +Copyright, 1914, by +THE OUTDOOR PRESS + + +Published November, 1914 + + + + +VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY +BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK + + + + +FOREWORD + + +This book is of especial importance at this time, for if Germany is to +reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed +to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly +active, and play a far different role than that it has assumed in the +early stages of the war. + +Covering this phase of the German operations the present volume must +appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of +actuality. A literal translation is all that has been attempted, with +absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. With +characteristic bluntness this German officer brushes aside +non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. For that +very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions. + +Issued as a military study in Germany, semi-official in nature, to +characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first +time in English reveals the theories of at least a portion of the +military arm of the German Government, which it is only fair to state +may not represent the convictions of the German people. + +Americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings +of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of +revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. Beyond +that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of +this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the +difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of +enthusiasm for war. + + THE PUBLISHERS. + + + + +PREFACE + + +The purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over +the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most +important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful +expedients provided by Germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden +the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our +Fatherland. + + THE AUTHOR. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + +INTRODUCTION 13 + +THEORETICAL VIEWS 17 + + I PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA 19 + + II ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION 27 + + PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE 27 + + PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 39 + + EMBARKATION 46 + + SEA VOYAGE 56 + + LANDING 62 + + OPERATIONS 71 + + REEMBARKATION 75 + +APPLICATION 77 + + I CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS + THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA 79 + + II VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS 93 + +III CONCLUDING VIEWS 106 + + + + +OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the +sea in connection with wars on land. The war between Japan and China, +between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and +finally the Chinese Expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods +of transporting troops over the sea. Whilst Moltke has shown the +insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military +authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of +preparing for and conducting a war across the sea. + +Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is +more efficient, than any other country. The excellent training and +readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be +mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has +the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a +first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally, +the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords +additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable +factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world +politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which +will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by +fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have +attained in Europe. + +In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the +near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a +position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic +participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of +impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to +direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect, +with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in +mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea. + +These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with +the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small +enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war +as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the +problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on +land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly +found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany. + + + + +THEORETICAL VIEWS + + + + +I. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA + + +Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial +intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in +them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use +of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main +difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces +must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be +avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with +their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation. +It is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned +for in advance. There is no prospect of success unless the parts of +the complicated mechanism are individually prepared. + +The selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an +important factor in its success. If an unexpected landing could be +made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor +would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the +invasion. Hence the preparation of the land operations must be so +thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and +transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. How difficult and +costly this task is has been demonstrated by the United States in its +expedition to Cuba and by England in transporting its first troops to +South Africa. + +The object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the +preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the +opponents. Napoleon's expedition against Egypt and the manner in +which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example. + +A landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only +where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can +muster at a critical time. After a landing a victory at sea by our +opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not +provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the +invasion. Therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our +German battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe +passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's +naval forces which they could readily employ. + +If the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility +that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried +through. The rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the +sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as +an escort for the protection of the transports. In no case should the +land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the +fighting value of the ships. So, for example, the French admiral +Gauthaunce--1801--in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled +to withdraw to Toulon before the English fleet because his ships had +suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops. + +Only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports +because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops +and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small +battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course, +of great value. + +Naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to +the length of the voyage. In cases where the distance is not great the +transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the +principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not +to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. The whole purpose +of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive +strength of the landing troops. The number of troops to be landed must +be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. As they must be +able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be +debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be +sent over. Such a combination gives the required fighting value. + +In spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the +cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion, +playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the +field and heavy artillery. The cavalry will also be able to prevent an +attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to +retrieve. In the Crimean War Marshal St. Arnault was hindered in the +pursuit of the routed Russians because of the deficiency in the +cavalry and artillery in the French army. He had only one hundred +troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses, +were greatly hampered in their movements. + +The difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions +can be overcome through modern methods. The extent of our merchant +marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops, +but it must be remembered that on account of our present political +position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to +dispense with at home, without endangering the country. + +The management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be +better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the +success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations. +This leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the +transport fleet and escorting squadron. It is out of the question to +change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. With us the +commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the +commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the +vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one +well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral +because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land +operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the +other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice of his admirals, +disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing +the fate of the fleet. + +After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport +fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even +the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base +is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For +technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an +officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the +advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on +the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the +flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not +brought about in unison with the land attack. + + + + +II. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION + +PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE. + + +Whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be +made during peace. These preparations include first of all the drawing +up of plans through the study of political and military relations. +Then the operations can be carried out under international +jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. The +possibilities of friction must be given careful thought. + +First of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by +exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. While +the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be +completed by army officers. The following essential points must be +kept in view in searches made by naval officers: + +I. To determine the naval strength required for protection of the +transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home +ports. + +II. To decide upon proper and specific points on the respective +coasts, from a marine standpoint. + +III. To investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the +troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will +admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank. + +IV. To study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength +required to attack them. + +The researches of the army officers concern principally the following: + +I. The aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported +by the naval officers. + +II. The number of troops which the opponents can muster against the +invasion should be estimated. + +III. All questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment +necessary should be decided. + +All this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and +perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition +of the line of battle in case of war. Through a well ordered +intelligence department definite plans can be made. + +Regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service, +capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during +times of peace and made note of accordingly. The division would make a +suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different +army corps. These divisions should be so equipped that they could +operate independently in customary situations. Fuller preparations +should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and +airship divisions. These formations would be important problems during +the voyage at sea. An especially skilled staff is needed. To this end, +loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and +other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors +on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. An +enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show +sufficient strength in a relatively short time. Incidentally it might +be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign +possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of +operations of this sort. This training would bring forth the simplest +and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for +transporting troops. All other expedients for the voyage would +likewise be shown. Some of this needed experience has already been +acquired through our expedition to China. + +Just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on +land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which +embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution +of the tasks involved in embarking. On account of limited facilities +only one division can be handled on a railroad. The necessity for +transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and +piers in many places. Furthermore, many different supply depots must +be built and maintained. In these depots building material should be +held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the +transformation of the merchant ships into transports. All other +apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting +contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be +stored in advance. Usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant +marine. Light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in +difficult land conditions is also recommended. + +In addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large +warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. The small requirements +of our transport to China did not emphasize sufficiently the value of +advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over +one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. To +do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the +difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor. + +For long distance transportation our large harbors on the North and +East seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. Speed is the +chief requisite. In order to lessen the distance of transporting, +operations toward the west must be conducted from the North Sea ports +and toward the east from our east sea ports. This does not preclude +the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the +Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to the North Sea should it be found desirable, +but it would involve a waste of time. The smaller harbors should not +be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the +necessary facilities. They might be utilized to advantage in a smaller +way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one +division a day. Especially suitable harbors on the North Sea are +Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, in connection with Bremen, and +Cuxhaven with Hamburg and Glueckstadt. These are the harbors that +should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions. + +Bremerhaven is by far the best. In every respect it would take first +place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. From this +point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty. +Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is +important. If it were brought up to full development it could take +care of two divisions a day which Hamburg could well supply. +Glueckstadt is an especially important base because most of our live +stock exporting business is carried on there. It is recommended that a +short double-track railroad be built from Elmshorn to Glueckstadt, +making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. In Glueckstadt one +infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped. + +In Wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is +doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet, +this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. In any +event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. The +railroad facilities would also have to be increased. + +While Emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many +drawbacks. It needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it +up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of +troops at Wilhelmshaven. Under existing circumstances Leer and +Papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with +Emden could handle one division. + +The situation on the Baltic Sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor, +with the exception of Kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our +larger steamships. At Danzig the dredging of navigable waters and +extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance +from a military standpoint. The other smaller ports on the Baltic are +at present not suitable for transporting troops. + +The Kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large +transports because of the same conditions that affect Wilhelmshaven, +namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet, +which would not be permitted. The docks at Kiel must therefore be +greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously +the demands of the battle and transport fleets. Pillau and Swinemuende +should be authorized to extend their very small docks. On the other +hand, the large dry docks in Danzig, Stettin and Kiel should be in a +position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary +buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are +planned correctly. + +Of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision +of the proper number of ships. Defects in preparations in time of +peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time +to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. Yet it should +be stated that England, at the outbreak of the Boer, although lacking +full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured +the required number of ships for the first shipment. + +The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading +commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority +to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for +military transporting. This commission should also list the +foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use +in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be +extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, +Copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign +steamers. + +The construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would +cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. It would seem +advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build +several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. This +ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. The +Hamburg-American Line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship. + +The management of the transport depots and the training of the +dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading +commission. In a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide +the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet +of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective +protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy. + + +PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. + +Actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of +time. Opponents would receive information through secret channels, +which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their +forces. The immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not +be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is +conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. The aim should be to +keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly +executed operation would take them unawares. An unexpected attack +depends largely upon rapidity of movement. Incidentally, diplomatic +pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would +lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking. + +In connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are +simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and +troops have been equipped and prepared for action. The methods to be +employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and +must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. It should +be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle +fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength +for the defense and execution of the land operations. We must +endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of +foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. Thus the great +political questions would be decided only upon the European scene. + +A rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which +belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in +from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create +suspicion. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal affords us the means to +concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the +North or Baltic Sea. + +If the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations, +proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and +immediate reparation made. Plans should also be made to secure +sufficient reenforcements of troops. In large operations where all our +ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on +the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be +equipped. All ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our +harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports. + +While the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points +of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission, +various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that +by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such +as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign +chartered steamers arriving in our ports. The adjustment and equipment +of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched +in masses as fast as they arrive. Once the ships reach the selected +harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made +simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance +preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. The time +needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made. + +In England the steamers for transporting troops to Cape Town, which is +a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven +days for the cavalry and artillery. The consuming of such time, even +for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. At the time +of our expedition to China we had the ships complete in a short time. +For one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for +transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more +than two days need be consumed. For short distances, according to +English and Russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and +two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. These periods +can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building +staff, as pointed out previously. + +The formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in +the annual maneuvers. Various factors, such as seasons, political +aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the +available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures +in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. The speedy +concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation +will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is +short, and the shipment comparatively small. Arrangements should +therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times +sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt +departure of the transports. It is urged that authority be given the +loading commission to supervise and direct this work. It must be +taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced +reserves and good order must be maintained. A high standard of +efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders. + +Numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do +not require great space or support. The usefulness of a cyclist +division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the +hostile country. For the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not +suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on +land. In large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special +cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes. +Beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient +to render possible an independent operation. It would also be of great +value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand. + +Especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for +these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult. +They also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. When the +transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after +landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army +independent of the vessels. There should be added, therefore, a +reserve ammunition column to that already provided. + +A fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due +consideration of the extent of the voyage. The troops could +requisition some materials from the hostile country. + + +EMBARKATION. + +Proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be +conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of +materials and men. To make landing effective the necessary supplies +should go on the vessels with the troops. A loading plan should be so +drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. The length of time +consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage. + +At the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered +about forty-eight hours. This is too small an estimate; it should +undoubtedly be doubled. The Italian General Staff estimates the length +of a short sea voyage to be five days. Besides, to preserve the +fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest. + +The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated +by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity +is net ton loading space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea +voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for +each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But +the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of +troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba +were increased by one-third. + +As for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and +washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here, +as they have been discussed at length in the press. The stowing of +equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the +articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed. +The ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse +figures relatively as about one to five. + +Coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to +place all common and machine guns on deck. A certain amount of +ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. This is an +essential measure to afford the transport protection from some +privateer. The guns should be securely placed to prevent their +movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on +deck. Trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby +field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this +testing will certainly repay us. All rolling stock will be stowed away +firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. The material +and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships, +so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. The airship division +should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may +be made during the voyage. + +The shipping of horses is especially difficult. By former methods the +horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise. +This left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest +after arrival. For a war transport, in which is required a rapid and +successful offensive, such horses are not useful. Because of the +important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention +should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition. +To this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided +for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at +least three-quarters of an hour for each horse. + +Ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can +be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck +stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from +three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand +horses. Three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. On every +large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition +to its regular quota of men and supplies. + +After the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty +horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded +daily on the lower decks. Cleanliness, ventilation and care are the +three most important factors for the good health of the horses. Every +horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure +sufficient fresh air. Artificial ventilation is to be preferred to +natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses' +lungs are easily affected. Through this cause, for example, the +American transport to Cuba lost the greater number of their horses. + +Likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of +drinking water. It is recommended that each ship be given its own +condenser. The provision of only one or two large condensers on +special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet, +as the Americans employed in their expedition to Cuba, has not proved +practical. + +For the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch +substantially more troops, through Germany's geographical position. +The strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate +utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the +operations are to succeed. For short expeditions, the general rule +will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. The +forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only +straw bags and covers. They will keep their whole baggage with them. +Cooking will be done in large field kettles. If time permits, it is +recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made +for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. This will prevent +heavy losses in case of rough weather. Guns and accessories can be +disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages. + +The length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can +be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and +materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the +ships. The latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind +and weather. + +The time required for loading is as follows: Fifteen minutes for one +hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. In an +operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry, +were embarked in eight hours. In our loading of East Asia transports, +it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. The +speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. It is +certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through +detailed preparation and training. Napoleon I, in the year 1795, had +ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put +132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours. + +It must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must +eventually be landed on open coasts. Portable flat-bottom boats and +building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the +transports. Special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with +large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so +forth. A cable-laying ship is also required. + +We must now consider to what extent Germany is able to load forces for +the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in +which success depends so much on speed. For embarkation on the North +Sea, Hamburg and Bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable +of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity +the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four +days. With the addition of ships from Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Glueckstadt +and Kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at +least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry +division. To these must be added several especially large and fast +German steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and +partly to expedite the return to home waters. A large number of troops +can also be shipped from Baltic ports. Besides this, a repeated trip +of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is +maintained continuously. + +For longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so +great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering +or purchasing ships of foreign nations. Still, we are at present in +the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present +available ships, within ten or twelve days. + + +SEA VOYAGE. + +For transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the +navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. All enterprises of this +kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore, +must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports +might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring +about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of +embarkation. As the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before +the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an +early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. Also, +throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the +battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve +the same ends of keeping the course clear. + +The escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough +ships to give immediate protection. A large number would increase +unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its +safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the +greatest value. The task of the escorts is only to protect the +transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the +enemy. Our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service, +and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used +for this purpose. During the assembling of the transports, these +boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic +between the loading harbors. + +The departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so +regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a +quick landing. The loading commission must take appropriate means to +expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the +central assembling points. As a rule, the transport steamers would +sail with the battle fleet; but in the English expedition to South +Africa and ours to East Asia, this rule was not followed. + +An essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as +the loading is complete. They cannot wait for news of the success of +the battle fleet. A certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for +the transport fleet can always turn back. Only an early departure +would insure successful, unexpected landing. The shorter the voyage +the greater the necessity for a surprise attack. + +In the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow +that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be +short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair +prospect of success. Even the victor in a great naval battle might not +be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. An +individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to +break into the transport fleet. + +An important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is +the weather. For short distances, it is possible to a certain degree +to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of +scientific forecasts. Conditions might be such that a delay would not +harm the operations. Adverse weather conditions would more seriously +affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause +abandonment. Our vessels must be so improved as to make them +independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the +voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. For the time +of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard, +which could probably be increased by towing with tugs. + +In putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of +position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken +until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is +known only to the home officials. The advance guard of troops will +sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected +landing. The pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance +guard. The ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop +transports. Then follow the ships carrying supplies. The cable ship +comes last. The laying of the cable gives a continuous communication +with the home country. For extensive voyages, preparations must be +made for taking on coal on the open sea. The commander-in-chief of the +expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of +a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance. + +On long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be +pursued. Ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater +part of the time of the cavalry. For short sea voyages these features +are not so necessary. In general, strict discipline must be exercised +to overcome the tediousness of the trip. + +While the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest +officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain, +who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. If this +captain has not served in the German navy, a midshipman may be signed +as a coordinate officer. It is our policy to provide every transport +ship with a naval officer. + + +LANDING. + +Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold +landing is never successful. The defense must either scatter its +forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full +strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility +of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the +protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops +quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the +same time. A simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if +the opponent can muster considerable strength. An expedition is seldom +so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. On the +other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the +protection of numerous landing places. A division of the forces +weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly +managing the start of the operations for want of time and means. +Therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select +one central place for landing. + +For the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less +advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the +most unfavorable is the open coast. Yet a landing on the open coast +would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great +speed. If the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it +would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this +port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the +mass of troops, horses and materials. The occupation of a good harbor +will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the +sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on +the operations. If a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of +the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared +disembarking contrivances. Every transport must be equipped for +landing on an open coast. + +The best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations, +which would force the opponents to a decision before they were +thoroughly prepared. Clear coast regions within range of the ships' +guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing +site. + +It is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and +fortifications. Russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth +of this statement. Fortifications are effective against landing +enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the +coast. If the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of +troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be +ineffective for defense. The best security, however, for the initial +landing is its unexpected delivery. Reconnoitering of the coast site +by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents +immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given +time for preparations for defense. Of great importance for rapid, +well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal +service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be +installed advantageously. In anchoring the ships must be the correct +distance apart, to avoid crowding. + +The execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: The advance +guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of +battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. If +the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow +should immediately throw up earthworks. The entire disembarking must +be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished +the less the danger of being disturbed. The most favorable time for +attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown +to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. As the ships do not +carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open +coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading +horses and heavy material. The English employ collapsible boats for +landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the Russians +have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one +complete cannon. It is recommended that we be permitted to try the +Russian model, which has been well tested. Small power boats should be +employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. To +permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause +confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number +are sometimes lost. The Americans, in their landing in Cuba, lost +seven per cent. of their horses. For the landing of artillery and +heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach, +for which prepared material is carried on the transports. The +assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all +space there must be kept for the landing of supplies. + +If a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will +strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at +hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast. +If all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to +draw near. The advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or +bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack, +through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited +number of battleships. Earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine +guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side. + +The piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for +disembarking. The existing plans for improvising landing bridges and +gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. The +piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery +and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the +protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships, +should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops +should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin +operations independent of the supply trains. + +The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading. +The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the +time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000 +men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the +English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about +100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account +of their handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing +maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and +one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six +kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that +under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000 +cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a +harbor, this time can be essentially lessened. + +After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the +transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime +strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in +command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base +for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the +expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the +transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile +fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters. + + +OPERATIONS. + +The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be +conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of +the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular +conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine +writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be +offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried +out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of +the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of +energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled +strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance. +Defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to +receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is +to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and +with the least loss to ourselves. + +During the progress of the operations the country through which the +troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies, +but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not +be decreased through extended raids. While the distance to the +objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our +endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. Much progress has +been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse, +which will help to solve the problem of provisions. The army of +invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and +utilize it as a base of operations. Continuous communication with the +home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. In a densely +populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and +supplies. The maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous +in that it requires excessive guard duty. When the battle fleet has +gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect +continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible +for the corps of invasion to select new bases. Sherman's march to +Savannah in the Civil War has shown the practicability of this plan. +After one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the +expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for +further operations. + +Against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid +enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. Dearly +purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims. + +If the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if +the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification, +the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces. +Battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved +at will and so are hard to put out of action. Continuous bombardment +from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops. + +It is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be +joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as +well as the naval forces. Small coast defenses of seaport cities could +not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. It is +certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an +energetic attack from the land side. They are more vulnerable than +inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from +land and water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command +of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the +operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on +land. + + +REEMBARKATION. + +A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the +battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of +defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if +good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites, +with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If +the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations +for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is +done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as +explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For +such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy +should not be permitted to interfere with its management. + + + + +APPLICATION + + + + +I. CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS +THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA + + +The recognized military complication with England and America affords +an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in +which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the +strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and +lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of +the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures. + +A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the +great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great +a danger as the advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations +with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result. + +England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active +navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to +win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would +the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct +threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact +menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location +and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined +operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime +superiority against this alliance. + +England's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely, +the land army. The English army responds to neither quantity nor +quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the +extent of the land; therefore England, from convictions, proceeds so +that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. These +convictions are in no way justified, for while England in developing a +powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has +not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really +weaker sea opponent with its fighting units. + +These are the measures which Germany, in case of a threatened war with +England, must adopt and practise: Our endeavors must be to engage the +fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the English +coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's +land, where our troops are already superior in quality to England's, +and so that a victory for England's powerful naval strength could +have but the smallest influence. + +The army fighting strength of England under the commander-in-chief is +composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the +yeomanry. In the event of an unexpected invasion, only the +commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent, +for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they +would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the +first decisive battle. The volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short +a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. Also their +insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our +well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents. + +The English army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to +each corps. A third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia, +so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too +late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so +untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a +division. Of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are +in Ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the +undertaking of a German invasion through Ireland even though it +brought about the longed-for freedom. + +The preparation for defense should also be considered. This might +consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps +comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up +from three army corps. Whereas the army strength of an English +division is about 10,000 men, a German division carries 16,000 men, +hence four German divisions and a cavalry division would have a +superiority over the English army. But we are in a position to set +over in England, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or +five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division. + +How a well regulated operation against England is to be conducted +across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. The passage in +moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our North +Sea harbors. The English coast affords extensive stretches of shore +which are suitable for landing troops. The land contains such large +resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. On +the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the +English land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a +successful invading force. + +It is improbable that Germany could carry on for very long a well +regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. The +supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land. +Maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily +be seen to be of importance. + +It is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in +England is their field army, and the second must be London. It is +probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the +field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed +for the protection of London fortifications, so as not to leave the +metropolis insufficiently defended. Powerful public opinion would +demand this for fear that London would fall into the hands of the +invaders. But if London is taken by the invading army this would still +be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a +base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view +to concluding the overthrow of England. + +Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely +different. With that country, in particular, political friction, +manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and +has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. +However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to +what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in +order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our +interests. Our main factor here is our fleet. Our battle fleet has +every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United +States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after +the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of +unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would +compel them to make peace. + +There is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its +maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of +American merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea +forces of American ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses, +while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the +unpacified American colonies. + +It must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the United +States would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster, +but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to +strike. It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United +States cannot be carried on with success without at the same time +inaugurating action on land. Because of the great extensions of the +United States it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an +invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the +land. It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on +the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of +the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that +the government would be willing to treat for peace. + +If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting +the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions +these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four +weeks. To what extent we will be able to succeed has already been +considered. + +The United States at this time is not in a position to oppose our +troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals +65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home +country. Of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard Indian +territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so +that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service. +There is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have +not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly +equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled. + +If an unexpected invasion of the United States is prevented by the +length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected +landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and +inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a +quick invasion. + +For the continued occupation of as large a territory as the United +States, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important +fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and +to carry on a successful warfare. An invading operation will be +difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet +will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops, +at such a great distance. + +It is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be +gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land +as the United States. The fact that one or two of her provinces are +occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for +peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real +material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful +seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the +entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line +of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through +which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of +these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, +disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful +buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to +impose heavy indemnities. For enterprises of this sort small land +forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the +American garrisons to attempt an attack. + +Their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to +concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various +recognized landing points on the coast. But there are many other +splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to +conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the +fleet. The land corps can either advance aggressively against the +concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and +land at a new place. + +As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a +position to conquer the United States. England could of course carry +out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to +protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could +compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None +of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to +attempt an invasion. + + + + +II. VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS + + +All operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully +because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to +make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and +trained troops. Just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried +out in China before our own eyes. + +The sending of an expedition to East Asia affords an interesting +example of what can be done. Without resistance we have set up +governments at a distance from the home country. It is possible with +the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. However, there are +many obstacles to be overcome. It is imperative that in time of peace +we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands +which have any commercial value for us. Inasmuch as the German army +has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of +operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. In the future the +conducting of such operations will rest with the General Staff. It +will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the +forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such +countries as Asia, Africa and South America. Good judgment must be +used in the selection of methods. The execution of the first +operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the +General Staff and the Admiral Staff. + +Our excellent knowledge of East Asia has given us the necessary +technical preparation in the way of equipment. The chartering of +transport ships for service to China should not be difficult in +consequence of the large size of the expedition. The expedition corps +would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five. +The greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two +large steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the +Hamburg-American Line. The charter of these steamship companies +provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this +sort. The disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay +through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the +unfinished ships to Wilhelmshaven. Another drawback is that not enough +room is provided in these ships. On the steamers of the +Hamburg-American Line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their +normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at +the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only +one man instead of two can be carried. An adjustment should be reached +to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be +counted upon. + +The interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport +must be planned according to law. Fire-extinguishers, life-saving +apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables +and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the +troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. Hospital +arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength +should be provided. + +The active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from +volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new +formations. Through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the +expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly +formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. It is +advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained +soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of +reserves. It is also to be recommended that in the near future we form +a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. Such a formation +would have great intrinsic worth. + +A few words should be said about the organizing of a Colonial army, +which would be called upon to play an essential part in German +military operations over the sea. It would be of extraordinary value +in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in +commercial aims. The Colonial army would constitute a picked body of +men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries, +who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we +might be at war. + +There would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home +forces for colonial expeditions. We are not assured at present of the +assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing +on our regular army. + +It requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an +expedition to East Asia. Therefore, contracts with capable firms +should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time. + +While the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily +accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be +loaded by the English system. Some effort should be made to solve the +horse problem. The purchasing of horses in Australia, America and +South China has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a +small percentage can withstand the change of climate. + +It would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of +mounts. It is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted +infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry +troops to meet an emergency. It would be advantageous if large +brigades now idle could be moved for operations in Eastern China. Past +experience in China has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for +operations in large countries. + +The losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would +send trained horses accustomed to military service. The great loss in +transporting horses is no longer to be feared. The experience of the +English in transporting horses to Cape Town proves the worth of their +loading system. And it should be pointed out that the Prussian +horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the +hardships of sea transportation much better than the English horses. + +The thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach +East Asia. The ships should be fitted out with this aim in view. +Accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. The Red Sea and the +Indian Ocean are especially difficult to cross. This could be overcome +by sending the transport by way of Cape Town, where a part of the trip +could be made south through the Tropic of Cancer. It has been +demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years +should be selected for service abroad. No fear need be felt as to the +feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn. +Sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given +favorable results. + +A possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the +purchasing in Italy of native mules and loading them at Genoa. In +English sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their +exceptional powers of resistance. They are preferable to horses +because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be +accustomed to conditions in East Asia. + +While we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must +be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of +burden. This is often necessary in colonial expeditions. Experience +shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field +army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. This +is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. It is surprising that +our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not +utilized. + +Our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital +service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. The French +seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called +cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded. +These are excellent for use in colonial countries. A light wagon model +is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of +the roads they must be able to follow the troops. + +It is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with +our men-of-war can be improved. Once the forces and supplies are in +Bremen and Bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking. +For the future a central place is recommended from which the +expedition corps can sail. + +If thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can +be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it +took two days for each ship. To facilitate the work, the loading +should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. The +greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from Bremen to +Bremerhaven. The troops can consequently embark at Quai in about four +hours. The vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available +space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies. +Great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately +calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. It is +therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the +steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done +properly from a military standpoint. Through a haphazard loading, the +detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings, +and they might not even know where their individual effects were +stowed. Disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the +forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and +ammunition. + +With regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the +sailing of the joint fleet is not required. The trip by transport +would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. The trip from Shanghai +to Taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. The +transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no +difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if +they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they +have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or +auxiliary cruisers. Upon arrival at Taku, considerable difficulties +might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically +impossible to procure the extra help needed. + +Considering a landing at Tsingtau, it should be noted that there has +not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. This +situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must +be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies. + +Experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary +to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a +foundation for future operations over the sea. + + + + +III. CONCLUDING VIEWS + + +Many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be +conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our +fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the +combination of the land and sea forces. Now if the army across the sea +is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance +to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to +assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. From studies of +the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim +at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us, +it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial +interests. It is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be +increased. Not the least important thing to realize is the fact that +as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the +sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive +preparations are made during times of peace. + + + + +THE END + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA *** + +***** This file should be named 27244.txt or 27244.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/7/2/4/27244/ + +Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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