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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Operations Upon the Sea
+       A Study
+
+Author: Franz Edelsheim
+
+Release Date: November 12, 2008 [EBook #27244]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON
+THE SEA
+
+A STUDY
+
+BY
+
+FREIHERR VON EDELSHEIM
+
+IN THE SERVICE OF THE GERMAN GENERAL
+STAFF IN 1901
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
+
+NEW YORK
+THE OUTDOOR PRESS
+1914
+
+
+
+
+Copyright, 1914, by
+THE OUTDOOR PRESS
+
+
+Published November, 1914
+
+
+
+
+VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY
+BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK
+
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+
+This book is of especial importance at this time, for if Germany is to
+reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed
+to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly
+active, and play a far different rôle than that it has assumed in the
+early stages of the war.
+
+Covering this phase of the German operations the present volume must
+appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of
+actuality. A literal translation is all that has been attempted, with
+absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. With
+characteristic bluntness this German officer brushes aside
+non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. For that
+very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions.
+
+Issued as a military study in Germany, semi-official in nature, to
+characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first
+time in English reveals the theories of at least a portion of the
+military arm of the German Government, which it is only fair to state
+may not represent the convictions of the German people.
+
+Americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings
+of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of
+revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. Beyond
+that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of
+this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the
+difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of
+enthusiasm for war.
+
+                                             THE PUBLISHERS.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+The purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over
+the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most
+important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful
+expedients provided by Germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden
+the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our
+Fatherland.
+
+                                                 THE AUTHOR.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                             PAGE
+
+INTRODUCTION                                                   13
+
+THEORETICAL VIEWS                                              17
+
+  I PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA                      19
+
+ II ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION                       27
+
+        PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE                              27
+
+        PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR                    39
+
+        EMBARKATION                                            46
+
+        SEA VOYAGE                                             56
+
+        LANDING                                                62
+
+        OPERATIONS                                             71
+
+        REEMBARKATION                                          75
+
+APPLICATION                                                    77
+
+  I CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS
+    THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA                            79
+
+ II VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS                              93
+
+III CONCLUDING VIEWS                                          106
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+Within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the
+sea in connection with wars on land. The war between Japan and China,
+between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and
+finally the Chinese Expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods
+of transporting troops over the sea. Whilst Moltke has shown the
+insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military
+authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of
+preparing for and conducting a war across the sea.
+
+Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is
+more efficient, than any other country. The excellent training and
+readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be
+mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has
+the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a
+first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally,
+the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords
+additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable
+factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world
+politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which
+will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by
+fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have
+attained in Europe.
+
+In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the
+near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a
+position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic
+participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of
+impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to
+direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect,
+with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in
+mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea.
+
+These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with
+the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small
+enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war
+as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the
+problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on
+land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly
+found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany.
+
+
+
+
+THEORETICAL VIEWS
+
+
+
+
+I. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA
+
+
+Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial
+intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in
+them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use
+of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main
+difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces
+must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be
+avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with
+their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation.
+It is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned
+for in advance. There is no prospect of success unless the parts of
+the complicated mechanism are individually prepared.
+
+The selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an
+important factor in its success. If an unexpected landing could be
+made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor
+would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the
+invasion. Hence the preparation of the land operations must be so
+thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and
+transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. How difficult and
+costly this task is has been demonstrated by the United States in its
+expedition to Cuba and by England in transporting its first troops to
+South Africa.
+
+The object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the
+preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the
+opponents. Napoleon's expedition against Egypt and the manner in
+which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example.
+
+A landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only
+where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can
+muster at a critical time. After a landing a victory at sea by our
+opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not
+provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the
+invasion. Therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our
+German battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe
+passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's
+naval forces which they could readily employ.
+
+If the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility
+that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried
+through. The rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the
+sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as
+an escort for the protection of the transports. In no case should the
+land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the
+fighting value of the ships. So, for example, the French admiral
+Gauthaunce--1801--in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled
+to withdraw to Toulon before the English fleet because his ships had
+suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops.
+
+Only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports
+because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops
+and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small
+battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course,
+of great value.
+
+Naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to
+the length of the voyage. In cases where the distance is not great the
+transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the
+principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not
+to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. The whole purpose
+of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive
+strength of the landing troops. The number of troops to be landed must
+be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. As they must be
+able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be
+debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be
+sent over. Such a combination gives the required fighting value.
+
+In spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the
+cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion,
+playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the
+field and heavy artillery. The cavalry will also be able to prevent an
+attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to
+retrieve. In the Crimean War Marshal St. Arnault was hindered in the
+pursuit of the routed Russians because of the deficiency in the
+cavalry and artillery in the French army. He had only one hundred
+troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses,
+were greatly hampered in their movements.
+
+The difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions
+can be overcome through modern methods. The extent of our merchant
+marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops,
+but it must be remembered that on account of our present political
+position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to
+dispense with at home, without endangering the country.
+
+The management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be
+better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the
+success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations.
+This leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the
+transport fleet and escorting squadron. It is out of the question to
+change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. With us the
+commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the
+commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the
+vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one
+well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral
+because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land
+operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the
+other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice of his admirals,
+disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing
+the fate of the fleet.
+
+After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport
+fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even
+the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base
+is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For
+technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an
+officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the
+advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on
+the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the
+flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not
+brought about in unison with the land attack.
+
+
+
+
+II. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION
+
+PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE.
+
+
+Whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be
+made during peace. These preparations include first of all the drawing
+up of plans through the study of political and military relations.
+Then the operations can be carried out under international
+jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. The
+possibilities of friction must be given careful thought.
+
+First of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by
+exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. While
+the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be
+completed by army officers. The following essential points must be
+kept in view in searches made by naval officers:
+
+I. To determine the naval strength required for protection of the
+transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home
+ports.
+
+II. To decide upon proper and specific points on the respective
+coasts, from a marine standpoint.
+
+III. To investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the
+troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will
+admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank.
+
+IV. To study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength
+required to attack them.
+
+The researches of the army officers concern principally the following:
+
+I. The aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported
+by the naval officers.
+
+II. The number of troops which the opponents can muster against the
+invasion should be estimated.
+
+III. All questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment
+necessary should be decided.
+
+All this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and
+perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition
+of the line of battle in case of war. Through a well ordered
+intelligence department definite plans can be made.
+
+Regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service,
+capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during
+times of peace and made note of accordingly. The division would make a
+suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different
+army corps. These divisions should be so equipped that they could
+operate independently in customary situations. Fuller preparations
+should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and
+airship divisions. These formations would be important problems during
+the voyage at sea. An especially skilled staff is needed. To this end,
+loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and
+other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors
+on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. An
+enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show
+sufficient strength in a relatively short time. Incidentally it might
+be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign
+possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of
+operations of this sort. This training would bring forth the simplest
+and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for
+transporting troops. All other expedients for the voyage would
+likewise be shown. Some of this needed experience has already been
+acquired through our expedition to China.
+
+Just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on
+land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which
+embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution
+of the tasks involved in embarking. On account of limited facilities
+only one division can be handled on a railroad. The necessity for
+transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and
+piers in many places. Furthermore, many different supply depots must
+be built and maintained. In these depots building material should be
+held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the
+transformation of the merchant ships into transports. All other
+apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting
+contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be
+stored in advance. Usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant
+marine. Light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in
+difficult land conditions is also recommended.
+
+In addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large
+warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. The small requirements
+of our transport to China did not emphasize sufficiently the value of
+advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over
+one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. To
+do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the
+difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor.
+
+For long distance transportation our large harbors on the North and
+East seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. Speed is the
+chief requisite. In order to lessen the distance of transporting,
+operations toward the west must be conducted from the North Sea ports
+and toward the east from our east sea ports. This does not preclude
+the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the
+Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to the North Sea should it be found desirable,
+but it would involve a waste of time. The smaller harbors should not
+be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the
+necessary facilities. They might be utilized to advantage in a smaller
+way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one
+division a day. Especially suitable harbors on the North Sea are
+Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, in connection with Bremen, and
+Cuxhaven with Hamburg and Glückstadt. These are the harbors that
+should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions.
+
+Bremerhaven is by far the best. In every respect it would take first
+place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. From this
+point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty.
+Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is
+important. If it were brought up to full development it could take
+care of two divisions a day which Hamburg could well supply.
+Glückstadt is an especially important base because most of our live
+stock exporting business is carried on there. It is recommended that a
+short double-track railroad be built from Elmshorn to Glückstadt,
+making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. In Glückstadt one
+infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped.
+
+In Wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is
+doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet,
+this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. In any
+event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. The
+railroad facilities would also have to be increased.
+
+While Emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many
+drawbacks. It needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it
+up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of
+troops at Wilhelmshaven. Under existing circumstances Leer and
+Papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with
+Emden could handle one division.
+
+The situation on the Baltic Sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor,
+with the exception of Kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our
+larger steamships. At Danzig the dredging of navigable waters and
+extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance
+from a military standpoint. The other smaller ports on the Baltic are
+at present not suitable for transporting troops.
+
+The Kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large
+transports because of the same conditions that affect Wilhelmshaven,
+namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet,
+which would not be permitted. The docks at Kiel must therefore be
+greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously
+the demands of the battle and transport fleets. Pillau and Swinemünde
+should be authorized to extend their very small docks. On the other
+hand, the large dry docks in Danzig, Stettin and Kiel should be in a
+position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary
+buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are
+planned correctly.
+
+Of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision
+of the proper number of ships. Defects in preparations in time of
+peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time
+to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. Yet it should
+be stated that England, at the outbreak of the Boer, although lacking
+full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured
+the required number of ships for the first shipment.
+
+The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading
+commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority
+to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for
+military transporting. This commission should also list the
+foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use
+in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be
+extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
+Copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign
+steamers.
+
+The construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would
+cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. It would seem
+advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build
+several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. This
+ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. The
+Hamburg-American Line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship.
+
+The management of the transport depots and the training of the
+dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading
+commission. In a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide
+the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet
+of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective
+protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy.
+
+
+PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.
+
+Actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of
+time. Opponents would receive information through secret channels,
+which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their
+forces. The immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not
+be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is
+conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. The aim should be to
+keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly
+executed operation would take them unawares. An unexpected attack
+depends largely upon rapidity of movement. Incidentally, diplomatic
+pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would
+lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking.
+
+In connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are
+simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and
+troops have been equipped and prepared for action. The methods to be
+employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and
+must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. It should
+be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle
+fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength
+for the defense and execution of the land operations. We must
+endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of
+foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. Thus the great
+political questions would be decided only upon the European scene.
+
+A rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which
+belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in
+from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create
+suspicion. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal affords us the means to
+concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the
+North or Baltic Sea.
+
+If the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations,
+proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and
+immediate reparation made. Plans should also be made to secure
+sufficient reenforcements of troops. In large operations where all our
+ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on
+the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be
+equipped. All ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our
+harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports.
+
+While the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points
+of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission,
+various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that
+by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such
+as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign
+chartered steamers arriving in our ports. The adjustment and equipment
+of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched
+in masses as fast as they arrive. Once the ships reach the selected
+harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made
+simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance
+preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. The time
+needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made.
+
+In England the steamers for transporting troops to Cape Town, which is
+a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven
+days for the cavalry and artillery. The consuming of such time, even
+for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. At the time
+of our expedition to China we had the ships complete in a short time.
+For one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for
+transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more
+than two days need be consumed. For short distances, according to
+English and Russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and
+two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. These periods
+can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building
+staff, as pointed out previously.
+
+The formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in
+the annual maneuvers. Various factors, such as seasons, political
+aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the
+available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures
+in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. The speedy
+concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation
+will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is
+short, and the shipment comparatively small. Arrangements should
+therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times
+sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt
+departure of the transports. It is urged that authority be given the
+loading commission to supervise and direct this work. It must be
+taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced
+reserves and good order must be maintained. A high standard of
+efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders.
+
+Numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do
+not require great space or support. The usefulness of a cyclist
+division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the
+hostile country. For the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not
+suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on
+land. In large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special
+cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes.
+Beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient
+to render possible an independent operation. It would also be of great
+value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand.
+
+Especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for
+these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult.
+They also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. When the
+transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after
+landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army
+independent of the vessels. There should be added, therefore, a
+reserve ammunition column to that already provided.
+
+A fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due
+consideration of the extent of the voyage. The troops could
+requisition some materials from the hostile country.
+
+
+EMBARKATION.
+
+Proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be
+conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of
+materials and men. To make landing effective the necessary supplies
+should go on the vessels with the troops. A loading plan should be so
+drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. The length of time
+consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage.
+
+At the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered
+about forty-eight hours. This is too small an estimate; it should
+undoubtedly be doubled. The Italian General Staff estimates the length
+of a short sea voyage to be five days. Besides, to preserve the
+fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest.
+
+The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated
+by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity
+is net ton loading space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea
+voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for
+each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But
+the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of
+troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba
+were increased by one-third.
+
+As for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and
+washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here,
+as they have been discussed at length in the press. The stowing of
+equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the
+articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed.
+The ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse
+figures relatively as about one to five.
+
+Coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to
+place all common and machine guns on deck. A certain amount of
+ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. This is an
+essential measure to afford the transport protection from some
+privateer. The guns should be securely placed to prevent their
+movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on
+deck. Trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby
+field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this
+testing will certainly repay us. All rolling stock will be stowed away
+firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. The material
+and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships,
+so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. The airship division
+should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may
+be made during the voyage.
+
+The shipping of horses is especially difficult. By former methods the
+horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise.
+This left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest
+after arrival. For a war transport, in which is required a rapid and
+successful offensive, such horses are not useful. Because of the
+important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention
+should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition.
+To this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided
+for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at
+least three-quarters of an hour for each horse.
+
+Ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can
+be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck
+stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from
+three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand
+horses. Three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. On every
+large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition
+to its regular quota of men and supplies.
+
+After the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty
+horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded
+daily on the lower decks. Cleanliness, ventilation and care are the
+three most important factors for the good health of the horses. Every
+horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure
+sufficient fresh air. Artificial ventilation is to be preferred to
+natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses'
+lungs are easily affected. Through this cause, for example, the
+American transport to Cuba lost the greater number of their horses.
+
+Likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of
+drinking water. It is recommended that each ship be given its own
+condenser. The provision of only one or two large condensers on
+special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet,
+as the Americans employed in their expedition to Cuba, has not proved
+practical.
+
+For the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch
+substantially more troops, through Germany's geographical position.
+The strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate
+utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the
+operations are to succeed. For short expeditions, the general rule
+will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. The
+forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only
+straw bags and covers. They will keep their whole baggage with them.
+Cooking will be done in large field kettles. If time permits, it is
+recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made
+for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. This will prevent
+heavy losses in case of rough weather. Guns and accessories can be
+disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages.
+
+The length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can
+be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and
+materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the
+ships. The latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind
+and weather.
+
+The time required for loading is as follows: Fifteen minutes for one
+hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. In an
+operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry,
+were embarked in eight hours. In our loading of East Asia transports,
+it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. The
+speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. It is
+certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through
+detailed preparation and training. Napoleon I, in the year 1795, had
+ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put
+132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours.
+
+It must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must
+eventually be landed on open coasts. Portable flat-bottom boats and
+building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the
+transports. Special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with
+large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so
+forth. A cable-laying ship is also required.
+
+We must now consider to what extent Germany is able to load forces for
+the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in
+which success depends so much on speed. For embarkation on the North
+Sea, Hamburg and Bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable
+of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity
+the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four
+days. With the addition of ships from Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Glückstadt
+and Kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at
+least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry
+division. To these must be added several especially large and fast
+German steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and
+partly to expedite the return to home waters. A large number of troops
+can also be shipped from Baltic ports. Besides this, a repeated trip
+of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is
+maintained continuously.
+
+For longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so
+great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering
+or purchasing ships of foreign nations. Still, we are at present in
+the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present
+available ships, within ten or twelve days.
+
+
+SEA VOYAGE.
+
+For transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the
+navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. All enterprises of this
+kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore,
+must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports
+might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring
+about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of
+embarkation. As the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before
+the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an
+early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. Also,
+throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the
+battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve
+the same ends of keeping the course clear.
+
+The escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough
+ships to give immediate protection. A large number would increase
+unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its
+safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the
+greatest value. The task of the escorts is only to protect the
+transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the
+enemy. Our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service,
+and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used
+for this purpose. During the assembling of the transports, these
+boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic
+between the loading harbors.
+
+The departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so
+regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a
+quick landing. The loading commission must take appropriate means to
+expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the
+central assembling points. As a rule, the transport steamers would
+sail with the battle fleet; but in the English expedition to South
+Africa and ours to East Asia, this rule was not followed.
+
+An essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as
+the loading is complete. They cannot wait for news of the success of
+the battle fleet. A certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for
+the transport fleet can always turn back. Only an early departure
+would insure successful, unexpected landing. The shorter the voyage
+the greater the necessity for a surprise attack.
+
+In the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow
+that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be
+short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair
+prospect of success. Even the victor in a great naval battle might not
+be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. An
+individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to
+break into the transport fleet.
+
+An important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is
+the weather. For short distances, it is possible to a certain degree
+to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of
+scientific forecasts. Conditions might be such that a delay would not
+harm the operations. Adverse weather conditions would more seriously
+affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause
+abandonment. Our vessels must be so improved as to make them
+independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the
+voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. For the time
+of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard,
+which could probably be increased by towing with tugs.
+
+In putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of
+position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken
+until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is
+known only to the home officials. The advance guard of troops will
+sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected
+landing. The pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance
+guard. The ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop
+transports. Then follow the ships carrying supplies. The cable ship
+comes last. The laying of the cable gives a continuous communication
+with the home country. For extensive voyages, preparations must be
+made for taking on coal on the open sea. The commander-in-chief of the
+expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of
+a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance.
+
+On long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be
+pursued. Ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater
+part of the time of the cavalry. For short sea voyages these features
+are not so necessary. In general, strict discipline must be exercised
+to overcome the tediousness of the trip.
+
+While the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest
+officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain,
+who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. If this
+captain has not served in the German navy, a midshipman may be signed
+as a coordinate officer. It is our policy to provide every transport
+ship with a naval officer.
+
+
+LANDING.
+
+Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold
+landing is never successful. The defense must either scatter its
+forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full
+strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility
+of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the
+protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops
+quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the
+same time. A simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if
+the opponent can muster considerable strength. An expedition is seldom
+so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. On the
+other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the
+protection of numerous landing places. A division of the forces
+weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly
+managing the start of the operations for want of time and means.
+Therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select
+one central place for landing.
+
+For the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less
+advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the
+most unfavorable is the open coast. Yet a landing on the open coast
+would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great
+speed. If the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it
+would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this
+port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the
+mass of troops, horses and materials. The occupation of a good harbor
+will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the
+sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on
+the operations. If a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of
+the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared
+disembarking contrivances. Every transport must be equipped for
+landing on an open coast.
+
+The best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations,
+which would force the opponents to a decision before they were
+thoroughly prepared. Clear coast regions within range of the ships'
+guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing
+site.
+
+It is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and
+fortifications. Russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth
+of this statement. Fortifications are effective against landing
+enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the
+coast. If the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of
+troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be
+ineffective for defense. The best security, however, for the initial
+landing is its unexpected delivery. Reconnoitering of the coast site
+by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents
+immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given
+time for preparations for defense. Of great importance for rapid,
+well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal
+service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be
+installed advantageously. In anchoring the ships must be the correct
+distance apart, to avoid crowding.
+
+The execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: The advance
+guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of
+battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. If
+the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow
+should immediately throw up earthworks. The entire disembarking must
+be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished
+the less the danger of being disturbed. The most favorable time for
+attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown
+to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. As the ships do not
+carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open
+coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading
+horses and heavy material. The English employ collapsible boats for
+landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the Russians
+have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one
+complete cannon. It is recommended that we be permitted to try the
+Russian model, which has been well tested. Small power boats should be
+employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. To
+permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause
+confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number
+are sometimes lost. The Americans, in their landing in Cuba, lost
+seven per cent. of their horses. For the landing of artillery and
+heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach,
+for which prepared material is carried on the transports. The
+assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all
+space there must be kept for the landing of supplies.
+
+If a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will
+strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at
+hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast.
+If all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to
+draw near. The advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or
+bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack,
+through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited
+number of battleships. Earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine
+guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side.
+
+The piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for
+disembarking. The existing plans for improvising landing bridges and
+gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. The
+piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery
+and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the
+protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships,
+should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops
+should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin
+operations independent of the supply trains.
+
+The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading.
+The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the
+time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000
+men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the
+English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about
+100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account
+of their handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing
+maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and
+one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six
+kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that
+under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000
+cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a
+harbor, this time can be essentially lessened.
+
+After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the
+transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime
+strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in
+command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base
+for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the
+expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the
+transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile
+fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters.
+
+
+OPERATIONS.
+
+The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be
+conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of
+the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular
+conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine
+writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be
+offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried
+out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of
+the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of
+energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled
+strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance.
+Defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to
+receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is
+to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and
+with the least loss to ourselves.
+
+During the progress of the operations the country through which the
+troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies,
+but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not
+be decreased through extended raids. While the distance to the
+objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our
+endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. Much progress has
+been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse,
+which will help to solve the problem of provisions. The army of
+invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and
+utilize it as a base of operations. Continuous communication with the
+home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. In a densely
+populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and
+supplies. The maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous
+in that it requires excessive guard duty. When the battle fleet has
+gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect
+continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible
+for the corps of invasion to select new bases. Sherman's march to
+Savannah in the Civil War has shown the practicability of this plan.
+After one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the
+expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for
+further operations.
+
+Against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid
+enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. Dearly
+purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims.
+
+If the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if
+the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification,
+the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces.
+Battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved
+at will and so are hard to put out of action. Continuous bombardment
+from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops.
+
+It is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be
+joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as
+well as the naval forces. Small coast defenses of seaport cities could
+not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. It is
+certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an
+energetic attack from the land side. They are more vulnerable than
+inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from
+land and water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command
+of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the
+operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on
+land.
+
+
+REEMBARKATION.
+
+A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the
+battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of
+defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if
+good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites,
+with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If
+the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations
+for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is
+done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as
+explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For
+such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy
+should not be permitted to interfere with its management.
+
+
+
+
+APPLICATION
+
+
+
+
+I. CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS
+THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA
+
+
+The recognized military complication with England and America affords
+an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in
+which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the
+strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and
+lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of
+the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures.
+
+A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the
+great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great
+a danger as the advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations
+with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result.
+
+England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active
+navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to
+win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would
+the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct
+threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact
+menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location
+and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined
+operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime
+superiority against this alliance.
+
+England's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely,
+the land army. The English army responds to neither quantity nor
+quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the
+extent of the land; therefore England, from convictions, proceeds so
+that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. These
+convictions are in no way justified, for while England in developing a
+powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has
+not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really
+weaker sea opponent with its fighting units.
+
+These are the measures which Germany, in case of a threatened war with
+England, must adopt and practise: Our endeavors must be to engage the
+fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the English
+coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's
+land, where our troops are already superior in quality to England's,
+and so that a victory for England's powerful naval strength could
+have but the smallest influence.
+
+The army fighting strength of England under the commander-in-chief is
+composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the
+yeomanry. In the event of an unexpected invasion, only the
+commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent,
+for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they
+would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the
+first decisive battle. The volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short
+a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. Also their
+insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our
+well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents.
+
+The English army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to
+each corps. A third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia,
+so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too
+late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so
+untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a
+division. Of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are
+in Ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the
+undertaking of a German invasion through Ireland even though it
+brought about the longed-for freedom.
+
+The preparation for defense should also be considered. This might
+consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps
+comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up
+from three army corps. Whereas the army strength of an English
+division is about 10,000 men, a German division carries 16,000 men,
+hence four German divisions and a cavalry division would have a
+superiority over the English army. But we are in a position to set
+over in England, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or
+five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division.
+
+How a well regulated operation against England is to be conducted
+across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. The passage in
+moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our North
+Sea harbors. The English coast affords extensive stretches of shore
+which are suitable for landing troops. The land contains such large
+resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. On
+the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the
+English land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a
+successful invading force.
+
+It is improbable that Germany could carry on for very long a well
+regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. The
+supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land.
+Maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily
+be seen to be of importance.
+
+It is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in
+England is their field army, and the second must be London. It is
+probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the
+field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed
+for the protection of London fortifications, so as not to leave the
+metropolis insufficiently defended. Powerful public opinion would
+demand this for fear that London would fall into the hands of the
+invaders. But if London is taken by the invading army this would still
+be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a
+base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view
+to concluding the overthrow of England.
+
+Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely
+different. With that country, in particular, political friction,
+manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and
+has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part.
+However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to
+what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in
+order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our
+interests. Our main factor here is our fleet. Our battle fleet has
+every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United
+States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after
+the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of
+unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would
+compel them to make peace.
+
+There is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its
+maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of
+American merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea
+forces of American ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses,
+while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the
+unpacified American colonies.
+
+It must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the United
+States would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster,
+but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to
+strike. It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United
+States cannot be carried on with success without at the same time
+inaugurating action on land. Because of the great extensions of the
+United States it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an
+invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the
+land. It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on
+the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of
+the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that
+the government would be willing to treat for peace.
+
+If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting
+the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions
+these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four
+weeks. To what extent we will be able to succeed has already been
+considered.
+
+The United States at this time is not in a position to oppose our
+troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals
+65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home
+country. Of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard Indian
+territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so
+that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service.
+There is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have
+not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly
+equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled.
+
+If an unexpected invasion of the United States is prevented by the
+length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected
+landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and
+inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a
+quick invasion.
+
+For the continued occupation of as large a territory as the United
+States, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important
+fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and
+to carry on a successful warfare. An invading operation will be
+difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet
+will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops,
+at such a great distance.
+
+It is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be
+gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land
+as the United States. The fact that one or two of her provinces are
+occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for
+peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real
+material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful
+seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the
+entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line
+of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through
+which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of
+these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply,
+disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful
+buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to
+impose heavy indemnities. For enterprises of this sort small land
+forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the
+American garrisons to attempt an attack.
+
+Their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to
+concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various
+recognized landing points on the coast. But there are many other
+splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to
+conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the
+fleet. The land corps can either advance aggressively against the
+concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and
+land at a new place.
+
+As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a
+position to conquer the United States. England could of course carry
+out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to
+protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could
+compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None
+of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to
+attempt an invasion.
+
+
+
+
+II. VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS
+
+
+All operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully
+because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to
+make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and
+trained troops. Just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried
+out in China before our own eyes.
+
+The sending of an expedition to East Asia affords an interesting
+example of what can be done. Without resistance we have set up
+governments at a distance from the home country. It is possible with
+the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. However, there are
+many obstacles to be overcome. It is imperative that in time of peace
+we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands
+which have any commercial value for us. Inasmuch as the German army
+has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of
+operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. In the future the
+conducting of such operations will rest with the General Staff. It
+will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the
+forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such
+countries as Asia, Africa and South America. Good judgment must be
+used in the selection of methods. The execution of the first
+operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the
+General Staff and the Admiral Staff.
+
+Our excellent knowledge of East Asia has given us the necessary
+technical preparation in the way of equipment. The chartering of
+transport ships for service to China should not be difficult in
+consequence of the large size of the expedition. The expedition corps
+would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five.
+The greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two
+large steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the
+Hamburg-American Line. The charter of these steamship companies
+provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this
+sort. The disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay
+through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the
+unfinished ships to Wilhelmshaven. Another drawback is that not enough
+room is provided in these ships. On the steamers of the
+Hamburg-American Line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their
+normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at
+the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only
+one man instead of two can be carried. An adjustment should be reached
+to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be
+counted upon.
+
+The interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport
+must be planned according to law. Fire-extinguishers, life-saving
+apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables
+and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the
+troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. Hospital
+arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength
+should be provided.
+
+The active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from
+volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new
+formations. Through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the
+expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly
+formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. It is
+advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained
+soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of
+reserves. It is also to be recommended that in the near future we form
+a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. Such a formation
+would have great intrinsic worth.
+
+A few words should be said about the organizing of a Colonial army,
+which would be called upon to play an essential part in German
+military operations over the sea. It would be of extraordinary value
+in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in
+commercial aims. The Colonial army would constitute a picked body of
+men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries,
+who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we
+might be at war.
+
+There would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home
+forces for colonial expeditions. We are not assured at present of the
+assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing
+on our regular army.
+
+It requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an
+expedition to East Asia. Therefore, contracts with capable firms
+should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time.
+
+While the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily
+accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be
+loaded by the English system. Some effort should be made to solve the
+horse problem. The purchasing of horses in Australia, America and
+South China has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a
+small percentage can withstand the change of climate.
+
+It would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of
+mounts. It is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted
+infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry
+troops to meet an emergency. It would be advantageous if large
+brigades now idle could be moved for operations in Eastern China. Past
+experience in China has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for
+operations in large countries.
+
+The losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would
+send trained horses accustomed to military service. The great loss in
+transporting horses is no longer to be feared. The experience of the
+English in transporting horses to Cape Town proves the worth of their
+loading system. And it should be pointed out that the Prussian
+horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the
+hardships of sea transportation much better than the English horses.
+
+The thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach
+East Asia. The ships should be fitted out with this aim in view.
+Accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. The Red Sea and the
+Indian Ocean are especially difficult to cross. This could be overcome
+by sending the transport by way of Cape Town, where a part of the trip
+could be made south through the Tropic of Cancer. It has been
+demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years
+should be selected for service abroad. No fear need be felt as to the
+feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn.
+Sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given
+favorable results.
+
+A possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the
+purchasing in Italy of native mules and loading them at Genoa. In
+English sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their
+exceptional powers of resistance. They are preferable to horses
+because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be
+accustomed to conditions in East Asia.
+
+While we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must
+be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of
+burden. This is often necessary in colonial expeditions. Experience
+shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field
+army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. This
+is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. It is surprising that
+our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not
+utilized.
+
+Our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital
+service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. The French
+seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called
+cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded.
+These are excellent for use in colonial countries. A light wagon model
+is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of
+the roads they must be able to follow the troops.
+
+It is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with
+our men-of-war can be improved. Once the forces and supplies are in
+Bremen and Bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking.
+For the future a central place is recommended from which the
+expedition corps can sail.
+
+If thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can
+be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it
+took two days for each ship. To facilitate the work, the loading
+should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. The
+greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from Bremen to
+Bremerhaven. The troops can consequently embark at Quai in about four
+hours. The vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available
+space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies.
+Great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately
+calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. It is
+therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the
+steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done
+properly from a military standpoint. Through a haphazard loading, the
+detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings,
+and they might not even know where their individual effects were
+stowed. Disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the
+forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and
+ammunition.
+
+With regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the
+sailing of the joint fleet is not required. The trip by transport
+would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. The trip from Shanghai
+to Taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. The
+transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no
+difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if
+they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they
+have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or
+auxiliary cruisers. Upon arrival at Taku, considerable difficulties
+might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically
+impossible to procure the extra help needed.
+
+Considering a landing at Tsingtau, it should be noted that there has
+not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. This
+situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must
+be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies.
+
+Experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary
+to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a
+foundation for future operations over the sea.
+
+
+
+
+III. CONCLUDING VIEWS
+
+
+Many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be
+conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our
+fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the
+combination of the land and sea forces. Now if the army across the sea
+is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance
+to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to
+assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. From studies of
+the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim
+at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us,
+it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial
+interests. It is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be
+increased. Not the least important thing to realize is the fact that
+as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the
+sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive
+preparations are made during times of peace.
+
+
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Operations Upon the Sea
+       A Study
+
+Author: Franz Edelsheim
+
+Release Date: November 12, 2008 [EBook #27244]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h1>OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA</h1>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h1>OPERATIONS UPON<br />
+THE SEA</h1>
+
+<h3>A STUDY</h3>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h4>BY</h4>
+
+<h2>FREIHERR von EDELSHEIM</h2>
+
+<h4 class="sc">In the Service of the German General<br />
+Staff in 1901</h4>
+
+<h4>TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN</h4>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h5>NEW YORK<br />
+THE OUTDOOR PRESS<br />
+1914</h5>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+
+<h5>Copyright, 1914, by<br />
+<span class="sc">The Outdoor Press</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+Published November, 1914<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY<br />
+BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK</h5>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>FOREWORD</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>This book is of especial importance at this time, for if Germany is to
+reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed
+to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly
+active, and play a far different r&ocirc;le than that it has assumed in the
+early stages of the war.</p>
+
+<p>Covering this phase of the German operations the present volume must
+appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of
+actuality. A literal translation is all that has been attempted, with
+absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. With
+characteristic bluntness this German officer brushes aside
+non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. For <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span>that
+very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions.</p>
+
+<p>Issued as a military study in Germany, semi-official in nature, to
+characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first
+time in English reveals the theories of at least a portion of the
+military arm of the German Government, which it is only fair to state
+may not represent the convictions of the German people.</p>
+
+<p>Americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings
+of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of
+revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. Beyond
+that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of
+this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the
+difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of
+enthusiasm for war.</p>
+
+<p class="right sc">The Publishers.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>PREFACE</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over
+the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most
+important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful
+expedients provided by Germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden
+the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our
+Fatherland.</p>
+
+<p class="right sc">The Author.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span><br />
+<a name="toc" id="toc"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CONTENTS</h3>
+<br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="80%" summary="">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr" width="5%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="75%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="20%" style="font-size: 80%;">PAGE</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc" colspan="2"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">13</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc" colspan="2"><a href="#THEORETICAL_VIEWS">Theoretical Views</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">17</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">I</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#I_Principles">Principles of Operations Over the Sea</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">19</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">II</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#II_Accomplishment">Accomplishment of Sea Transportation</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">27</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Preparations During Peace</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_27">27</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Preparations at the Outbreak of War</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_39">39</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Embarkation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Sea Voyage</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Landing</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Reembarkation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc" colspan="2"><a href="#APPLICATION">Application</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">77</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr2">I</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#I_Consideration">Consideration of Landing Operations Against Powers
+  that Can be Reached Only by Sea</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">79</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">II</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#II_Colonial_Expeditions">Views on Colonial Expeditions</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">93</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">III</td>
+  <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#III_Concluding_Views">Concluding Views</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">106</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span><br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2>OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span><br />
+<a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">INTRODUCTION<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>Within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the
+sea in connection with wars on land. The war between Japan and China,
+between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and
+finally the Chinese Expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods
+of transporting troops over the sea. Whilst Moltke has shown the
+insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military
+authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of
+preparing for and conducting a war across the sea.</p>
+
+<p>Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is
+more efficient, than any other country. The excellent <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span>training and
+readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be
+mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has
+the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a
+first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally,
+the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords
+additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable
+factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world
+politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which
+will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by
+fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have
+attained in Europe.</p>
+
+<p>In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the
+near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a
+position alone to solve for us <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span>the problems arising from energetic
+participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of
+impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to
+direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect,
+with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in
+mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea.</p>
+
+<p>These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with
+the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small
+enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war
+as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the
+problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on
+land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly
+found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span><br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2><a name="THEORETICAL_VIEWS" id="THEORETICAL_VIEWS"></a>THEORETICAL VIEWS</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span><br />
+<a name="I_Principles" id="I_Principles"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">I. Principles of Operations Over the Sea<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial
+intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in
+them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use
+of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main
+difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces
+must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be
+avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with
+their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation.
+It is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned
+for in advance. There is no prospect of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span>success unless the parts of
+the complicated mechanism are individually prepared.</p>
+
+<p>The selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an
+important factor in its success. If an unexpected landing could be
+made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor
+would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the
+invasion. Hence the preparation of the land operations must be so
+thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and
+transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. How difficult and
+costly this task is has been demonstrated by the United States in its
+expedition to Cuba and by England in transporting its first troops to
+South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>The object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the
+preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the
+opponents. Napoleon's <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span>expedition against Egypt and the manner in
+which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example.</p>
+
+<p>A landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only
+where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can
+muster at a critical time. After a landing a victory at sea by our
+opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not
+provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the
+invasion. Therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our
+German battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe
+passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's
+naval forces which they could readily employ.</p>
+
+<p>If the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility
+that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried
+through. The rule to be followed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span>is to employ for operations over the
+sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as
+an escort for the protection of the transports. In no case should the
+land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the
+fighting value of the ships. So, for example, the French admiral
+Gauthaunce&mdash;1801&mdash;in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled
+to withdraw to Toulon before the English fleet because his ships had
+suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops.</p>
+
+<p>Only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports
+because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops
+and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small
+battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course,
+of great value.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, the ships should be loaded to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span>a capacity in proportion to
+the length of the voyage. In cases where the distance is not great the
+transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the
+principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not
+to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. The whole purpose
+of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive
+strength of the landing troops. The number of troops to be landed must
+be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. As they must be
+able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be
+debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be
+sent over. Such a combination gives the required fighting value.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the
+cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion,
+playing a great part in offensive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>movements and in assisting the
+field and heavy artillery. The cavalry will also be able to prevent an
+attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to
+retrieve. In the Crimean War Marshal St. Arnault was hindered in the
+pursuit of the routed Russians because of the deficiency in the
+cavalry and artillery in the French army. He had only one hundred
+troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses,
+were greatly hampered in their movements.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions
+can be overcome through modern methods. The extent of our merchant
+marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops,
+but it must be remembered that on account of our present political
+position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to
+dispense with at home, without endangering the country.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>The management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be
+better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the
+success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations.
+This leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the
+transport fleet and escorting squadron. It is out of the question to
+change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. With us the
+commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the
+commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the
+vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one
+well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral
+because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land
+operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the
+other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span>of his admirals,
+disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing
+the fate of the fleet.</p>
+
+<p>After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport
+fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even
+the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base
+is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For
+technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an
+officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the
+advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on
+the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the
+flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not
+brought about in unison with the land attack.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="II_Accomplishment" id="II_Accomplishment"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">II. Accomplishment of Sea Transportation<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h2>
+
+<h4>PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE.</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>Whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be
+made during peace. These preparations include first of all the drawing
+up of plans through the study of political and military relations.
+Then the operations can be carried out under international
+jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. The
+possibilities of friction must be given careful thought.</p>
+
+<p>First of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by
+exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. While
+the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be
+completed by army officers. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span>following essential points must be
+kept in view in searches made by naval officers:</p>
+
+<p>I. To determine the naval strength required for protection of the
+transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home
+ports.</p>
+
+<p>II. To decide upon proper and specific points on the respective
+coasts, from a marine standpoint.</p>
+
+<p>III. To investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the
+troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will
+admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank.</p>
+
+<p>IV. To study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength
+required to attack them.</p>
+
+<p>The researches of the army officers concern principally the following:</p>
+
+<p>I. The aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported
+by the naval officers.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span>II. The number of troops which the opponents can muster against the
+invasion should be estimated.</p>
+
+<p>III. All questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment
+necessary should be decided.</p>
+
+<p>All this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and
+perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition
+of the line of battle in case of war. Through a well ordered
+intelligence department definite plans can be made.</p>
+
+<p>Regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service,
+capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during
+times of peace and made note of accordingly. The division would make a
+suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different
+army corps. These divisions should be so equipped that they could
+operate independently in customary situations. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span>Fuller preparations
+should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and
+airship divisions. These formations would be important problems during
+the voyage at sea. An especially skilled staff is needed. To this end,
+loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and
+other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors
+on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. An
+enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show
+sufficient strength in a relatively short time. Incidentally it might
+be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign
+possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of
+operations of this sort. This training would bring forth the simplest
+and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for
+transporting troops. All other expedients for the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span>voyage would
+likewise be shown. Some of this needed experience has already been
+acquired through our expedition to China.</p>
+
+<p>Just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on
+land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which
+embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution
+of the tasks involved in embarking. On account of limited facilities
+only one division can be handled on a railroad. The necessity for
+transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and
+piers in many places. Furthermore, many different supply depots must
+be built and maintained. In these depots building material should be
+held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the
+transformation of the merchant ships into transports. All other
+apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span>contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be
+stored in advance. Usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant
+marine. Light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in
+difficult land conditions is also recommended.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large
+warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. The small requirements
+of our transport to China did not emphasize sufficiently the value of
+advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over
+one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. To
+do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the
+difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor.</p>
+
+<p>For long distance transportation our large harbors on the North and
+East seas <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span>can be utilized equally well for embarkation. Speed is the
+chief requisite. In order to lessen the distance of transporting,
+operations toward the west must be conducted from the North Sea ports
+and toward the east from our east sea ports. This does not preclude
+the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the
+Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to the North Sea should it be found desirable,
+but it would involve a waste of time. The smaller harbors should not
+be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the
+necessary facilities. They might be utilized to advantage in a smaller
+way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one
+division a day. Especially suitable harbors on the North Sea are
+Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, in connection with Bremen, and
+Cuxhaven with Hamburg and Gl&uuml;ckstadt. These are the harbors that
+should have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span>complete preparations made for possible expeditions.</p>
+
+<p>Bremerhaven is by far the best. In every respect it would take first
+place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. From this
+point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty.
+Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is
+important. If it were brought up to full development it could take
+care of two divisions a day which Hamburg could well supply.
+Gl&uuml;ckstadt is an especially important base because most of our live
+stock exporting business is carried on there. It is recommended that a
+short double-track railroad be built from Elmshorn to Gl&uuml;ckstadt,
+making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. In Gl&uuml;ckstadt one
+infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped.</p>
+
+<p>In Wilhelmshaven all the essential <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span>features are at hand, but it is
+doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet,
+this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. In any
+event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. The
+railroad facilities would also have to be increased.</p>
+
+<p>While Emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many
+drawbacks. It needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it
+up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of
+troops at Wilhelmshaven. Under existing circumstances Leer and
+Papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with
+Emden could handle one division.</p>
+
+<p>The situation on the Baltic Sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor,
+with the exception of Kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our
+larger steamships. At Danzig the dredging of navigable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span>waters and
+extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance
+from a military standpoint. The other smaller ports on the Baltic are
+at present not suitable for transporting troops.</p>
+
+<p>The Kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large
+transports because of the same conditions that affect Wilhelmshaven,
+namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet,
+which would not be permitted. The docks at Kiel must therefore be
+greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously
+the demands of the battle and transport fleets. Pillau and Swinem&uuml;nde
+should be authorized to extend their very small docks. On the other
+hand, the large dry docks in Danzig, Stettin and Kiel should be in a
+position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary
+buildings for transporting, if the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>materials and warehouses are
+planned correctly.</p>
+
+<p>Of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision
+of the proper number of ships. Defects in preparations in time of
+peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time
+to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. Yet it should
+be stated that England, at the outbreak of the Boer, although lacking
+full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured
+the required number of ships for the first shipment.</p>
+
+<p>The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading
+commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority
+to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for
+military transporting. This <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span>commission should also list the
+foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use
+in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be
+extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
+Copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign
+steamers.</p>
+
+<p>The construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would
+cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. It would seem
+advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build
+several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. This
+ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. The
+Hamburg-American Line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship.</p>
+
+<p>The management of the transport depots and the training of the
+dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span>the loading
+commission. In a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide
+the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet
+of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective
+protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.</h4>
+
+<p>Actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of
+time. Opponents would receive information through secret channels,
+which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their
+forces. The immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not
+be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is
+conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. The aim should be to
+keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly
+executed operation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span>would take them unawares. An unexpected attack
+depends largely upon rapidity of movement. Incidentally, diplomatic
+pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would
+lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are
+simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and
+troops have been equipped and prepared for action. The methods to be
+employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and
+must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. It should
+be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle
+fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength
+for the defense and execution of the land operations. We must
+endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span>foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. Thus the great
+political questions would be decided only upon the European scene.</p>
+
+<p>A rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which
+belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in
+from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create
+suspicion. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal affords us the means to
+concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the
+North or Baltic Sea.</p>
+
+<p>If the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations,
+proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and
+immediate reparation made. Plans should also be made to secure
+sufficient reenforcements of troops. In large operations where all our
+ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on
+the voyage <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>the transports arriving from foreign waters can be
+equipped. All ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our
+harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports.</p>
+
+<p>While the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points
+of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission,
+various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that
+by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such
+as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign
+chartered steamers arriving in our ports. The adjustment and equipment
+of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched
+in masses as fast as they arrive. Once the ships reach the selected
+harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made
+simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. The time
+needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made.</p>
+
+<p>In England the steamers for transporting troops to Cape Town, which is
+a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven
+days for the cavalry and artillery. The consuming of such time, even
+for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. At the time
+of our expedition to China we had the ships complete in a short time.
+For one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for
+transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more
+than two days need be consumed. For short distances, according to
+English and Russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and
+two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. These periods
+can be greatly shortened through the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>efficiency of the building
+staff, as pointed out previously.</p>
+
+<p>The formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in
+the annual maneuvers. Various factors, such as seasons, political
+aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the
+available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures
+in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. The speedy
+concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation
+will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is
+short, and the shipment comparatively small. Arrangements should
+therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times
+sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt
+departure of the transports. It is urged that authority be given the
+loading commission to supervise and direct this work. It must be
+taken <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced
+reserves and good order must be maintained. A high standard of
+efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders.</p>
+
+<p>Numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do
+not require great space or support. The usefulness of a cyclist
+division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the
+hostile country. For the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not
+suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on
+land. In large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special
+cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes.
+Beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient
+to render possible an independent operation. It would also be of great
+value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span>Especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for
+these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult.
+They also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. When the
+transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after
+landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army
+independent of the vessels. There should be added, therefore, a
+reserve ammunition column to that already provided.</p>
+
+<p>A fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due
+consideration of the extent of the voyage. The troops could
+requisition some materials from the hostile country.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>EMBARKATION.</h4>
+
+<p>Proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be
+conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span>shipment of
+materials and men. To make landing effective the necessary supplies
+should go on the vessels with the troops. A loading plan should be so
+drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. The length of time
+consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage.</p>
+
+<p>At the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered
+about forty-eight hours. This is too small an estimate; it should
+undoubtedly be doubled. The Italian General Staff estimates the length
+of a short sea voyage to be five days. Besides, to preserve the
+fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest.</p>
+
+<p>The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated
+by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity
+is net ton loading space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea
+voyage, is set at two tons for each <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span>man and six to seven tons for
+each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But
+the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of
+troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba
+were increased by one-third.</p>
+
+<p>As for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and
+washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here,
+as they have been discussed at length in the press. The stowing of
+equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the
+articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed.
+The ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse
+figures relatively as about one to five.</p>
+
+<p>Coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to
+place all common and machine guns on deck. A <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>certain amount of
+ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. This is an
+essential measure to afford the transport protection from some
+privateer. The guns should be securely placed to prevent their
+movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on
+deck. Trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby
+field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this
+testing will certainly repay us. All rolling stock will be stowed away
+firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. The material
+and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships,
+so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. The airship division
+should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may
+be made during the voyage.</p>
+
+<p>The shipping of horses is especially difficult. By former methods the
+horses had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span>to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise.
+This left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest
+after arrival. For a war transport, in which is required a rapid and
+successful offensive, such horses are not useful. Because of the
+important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention
+should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition.
+To this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided
+for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at
+least three-quarters of an hour for each horse.</p>
+
+<p>Ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can
+be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck
+stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from
+three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand
+horses. Three ships <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span>would accommodate two cavalry brigades. On every
+large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition
+to its regular quota of men and supplies.</p>
+
+<p>After the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty
+horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded
+daily on the lower decks. Cleanliness, ventilation and care are the
+three most important factors for the good health of the horses. Every
+horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure
+sufficient fresh air. Artificial ventilation is to be preferred to
+natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses'
+lungs are easily affected. Through this cause, for example, the
+American transport to Cuba lost the greater number of their horses.</p>
+
+<p>Likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of
+drinking water. It is recommended that each ship be given <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>its own
+condenser. The provision of only one or two large condensers on
+special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet,
+as the Americans employed in their expedition to Cuba, has not proved
+practical.</p>
+
+<p>For the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch
+substantially more troops, through Germany's geographical position.
+The strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate
+utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the
+operations are to succeed. For short expeditions, the general rule
+will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. The
+forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only
+straw bags and covers. They will keep their whole baggage with them.
+Cooking will be done in large field kettles. If time permits, it is
+recommended that the same adjustments as for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>a long journey be made
+for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. This will prevent
+heavy losses in case of rough weather. Guns and accessories can be
+disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages.</p>
+
+<p>The length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can
+be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and
+materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the
+ships. The latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind
+and weather.</p>
+
+<p>The time required for loading is as follows: Fifteen minutes for one
+hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. In an
+operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry,
+were embarked in eight hours. In our loading of East Asia transports,
+it required one to one and one-half <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>hours to load one battalion. The
+speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. It is
+certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through
+detailed preparation and training. Napoleon I, in the year 1795, had
+ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put
+132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours.</p>
+
+<p>It must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must
+eventually be landed on open coasts. Portable flat-bottom boats and
+building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the
+transports. Special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with
+large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so
+forth. A cable-laying ship is also required.</p>
+
+<p>We must now consider to what extent Germany is able to load forces for
+the execution of operations which involve only <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>a short voyage, in
+which success depends so much on speed. For embarkation on the North
+Sea, Hamburg and Bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable
+of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity
+the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four
+days. With the addition of ships from Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Gl&uuml;ckstadt
+and Kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at
+least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry
+division. To these must be added several especially large and fast
+German steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and
+partly to expedite the return to home waters. A large number of troops
+can also be shipped from Baltic ports. Besides this, a repeated trip
+of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is
+maintained continuously.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span>For longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so
+great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering
+or purchasing ships of foreign nations. Still, we are at present in
+the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present
+available ships, within ten or twelve days.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SEA VOYAGE.</h4>
+
+<p>For transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the
+navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. All enterprises of this
+kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore,
+must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports
+might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring
+about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of
+embarkation. As the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before
+the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span>transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an
+early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. Also,
+throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the
+battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve
+the same ends of keeping the course clear.</p>
+
+<p>The escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough
+ships to give immediate protection. A large number would increase
+unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its
+safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the
+greatest value. The task of the escorts is only to protect the
+transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the
+enemy. Our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service,
+and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used
+for this purpose. During the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span>assembling of the transports, these
+boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic
+between the loading harbors.</p>
+
+<p>The departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so
+regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a
+quick landing. The loading commission must take appropriate means to
+expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the
+central assembling points. As a rule, the transport steamers would
+sail with the battle fleet; but in the English expedition to South
+Africa and ours to East Asia, this rule was not followed.</p>
+
+<p>An essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as
+the loading is complete. They cannot wait for news of the success of
+the battle fleet. A certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for
+the transport fleet can always turn back. Only an early departure
+would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span>insure successful, unexpected landing. The shorter the voyage
+the greater the necessity for a surprise attack.</p>
+
+<p>In the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow
+that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be
+short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair
+prospect of success. Even the victor in a great naval battle might not
+be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. An
+individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to
+break into the transport fleet.</p>
+
+<p>An important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is
+the weather. For short distances, it is possible to a certain degree
+to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of
+scientific forecasts. Conditions might be such that a delay would not
+harm the operations. Adverse weather conditions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>would more seriously
+affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause
+abandonment. Our vessels must be so improved as to make them
+independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the
+voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. For the time
+of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard,
+which could probably be increased by towing with tugs.</p>
+
+<p>In putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of
+position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken
+until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is
+known only to the home officials. The advance guard of troops will
+sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected
+landing. The pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance
+guard. The ships which have artillery <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>ride on the flank of the troop
+transports. Then follow the ships carrying supplies. The cable ship
+comes last. The laying of the cable gives a continuous communication
+with the home country. For extensive voyages, preparations must be
+made for taking on coal on the open sea. The commander-in-chief of the
+expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of
+a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance.</p>
+
+<p>On long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be
+pursued. Ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater
+part of the time of the cavalry. For short sea voyages these features
+are not so necessary. In general, strict discipline must be exercised
+to overcome the tediousness of the trip.</p>
+
+<p>While the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest
+officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span>of the captain,
+who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. If this
+captain has not served in the German navy, a midshipman may be signed
+as a coordinate officer. It is our policy to provide every transport
+ship with a naval officer.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>LANDING.</h4>
+
+<p>Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold
+landing is never successful. The defense must either scatter its
+forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full
+strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility
+of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the
+protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops
+quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the
+same time. A simultaneous landing at different places is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>hazardous if
+the opponent can muster considerable strength. An expedition is seldom
+so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. On the
+other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the
+protection of numerous landing places. A division of the forces
+weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly
+managing the start of the operations for want of time and means.
+Therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select
+one central place for landing.</p>
+
+<p>For the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less
+advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the
+most unfavorable is the open coast. Yet a landing on the open coast
+would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great
+speed. If the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it
+would be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span>the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this
+port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the
+mass of troops, horses and materials. The occupation of a good harbor
+will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the
+sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on
+the operations. If a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of
+the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared
+disembarking contrivances. Every transport must be equipped for
+landing on an open coast.</p>
+
+<p>The best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations,
+which would force the opponents to a decision before they were
+thoroughly prepared. Clear coast regions within range of the ships'
+guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing
+site.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span>It is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and
+fortifications. Russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth
+of this statement. Fortifications are effective against landing
+enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the
+coast. If the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of
+troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be
+ineffective for defense. The best security, however, for the initial
+landing is its unexpected delivery. Reconnoitering of the coast site
+by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents
+immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given
+time for preparations for defense. Of great importance for rapid,
+well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal
+service of the ships and the telephone service on land, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>which can be
+installed advantageously. In anchoring the ships must be the correct
+distance apart, to avoid crowding.</p>
+
+<p>The execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: The advance
+guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of
+battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. If
+the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow
+should immediately throw up earthworks. The entire disembarking must
+be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished
+the less the danger of being disturbed. The most favorable time for
+attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown
+to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. As the ships do not
+carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open
+coast, special flat-bottom boats should be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span>prepared for unloading
+horses and heavy material. The English employ collapsible boats for
+landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the Russians
+have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one
+complete cannon. It is recommended that we be permitted to try the
+Russian model, which has been well tested. Small power boats should be
+employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. To
+permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause
+confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number
+are sometimes lost. The Americans, in their landing in Cuba, lost
+seven per cent. of their horses. For the landing of artillery and
+heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach,
+for which prepared material is carried on the transports. The
+assembling of the troops <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span>must not be permitted on the beach, for all
+space there must be kept for the landing of supplies.</p>
+
+<p>If a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will
+strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at
+hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast.
+If all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to
+draw near. The advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or
+bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack,
+through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited
+number of battleships. Earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine
+guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side.</p>
+
+<p>The piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for
+disembarking. The existing plans for improvising landing bridges and
+gangways should be extended, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span>in order to expedite the landing. The
+piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery
+and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the
+protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships,
+should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops
+should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin
+operations independent of the supply trains.</p>
+
+<p>The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading.
+The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the
+time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000
+men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the
+English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about
+100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account
+of their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span>handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing
+maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and
+one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six
+kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that
+under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000
+cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a
+harbor, this time can be essentially lessened.</p>
+
+<p>After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the
+transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime
+strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in
+command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base
+for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the
+expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the
+transport fleet must attempt to evade the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span>operations of the hostile
+fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>OPERATIONS.</h4>
+
+<p>The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be
+conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of
+the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular
+conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine
+writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be
+offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried
+out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of
+the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of
+energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled
+strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance.
+Defensive strategy should be used only <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>when a delay is necessary to
+receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is
+to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and
+with the least loss to ourselves.</p>
+
+<p>During the progress of the operations the country through which the
+troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies,
+but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not
+be decreased through extended raids. While the distance to the
+objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our
+endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. Much progress has
+been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse,
+which will help to solve the problem of provisions. The army of
+invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and
+utilize it as a base of operations. Continuous communication with the
+home country is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span>therefore not absolutely necessary. In a densely
+populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and
+supplies. The maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous
+in that it requires excessive guard duty. When the battle fleet has
+gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect
+continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible
+for the corps of invasion to select new bases. Sherman's march to
+Savannah in the Civil War has shown the practicability of this plan.
+After one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the
+expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for
+further operations.</p>
+
+<p>Against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid
+enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. Dearly
+purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span>If the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if
+the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification,
+the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces.
+Battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved
+at will and so are hard to put out of action. Continuous bombardment
+from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops.</p>
+
+<p>It is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be
+joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as
+well as the naval forces. Small coast defenses of seaport cities could
+not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. It is
+certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an
+energetic attack from the land side. They are more vulnerable than
+inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from
+land and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span>water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command
+of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the
+operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on
+land.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>REEMBARKATION.</h4>
+
+<p>A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the
+battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of
+defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if
+good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites,
+with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If
+the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations
+for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is
+done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as
+explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy
+should not be permitted to interfere with its management.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="APPLICATION" id="APPLICATION"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2>APPLICATION</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span><br />
+<a name="I_Consideration" id="I_Consideration"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">I. Consideration of Landing Operations Against Powers<br />
+That Can Be Reached Only by Sea</h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>The recognized military complication with England and America affords
+an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in
+which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the
+strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and
+lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of
+the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures.</p>
+
+<p>A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the
+great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great
+a danger as the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span>advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations
+with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result.</p>
+
+<p>England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active
+navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to
+win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would
+the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct
+threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact
+menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location
+and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined
+operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime
+superiority against this alliance.</p>
+
+<p>England's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely,
+the land army. The English army responds <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span>to neither quantity nor
+quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the
+extent of the land; therefore England, from convictions, proceeds so
+that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. These
+convictions are in no way justified, for while England in developing a
+powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has
+not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really
+weaker sea opponent with its fighting units.</p>
+
+<p>These are the measures which Germany, in case of a threatened war with
+England, must adopt and practise: Our endeavors must be to engage the
+fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the English
+coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's
+land, where our troops are already superior in quality to England's,
+and so that a victory for England's powerful naval <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span>strength could
+have but the smallest influence.</p>
+
+<p>The army fighting strength of England under the commander-in-chief is
+composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the
+yeomanry. In the event of an unexpected invasion, only the
+commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent,
+for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they
+would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the
+first decisive battle. The volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short
+a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. Also their
+insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our
+well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents.</p>
+
+<p>The English army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to
+each corps. A third to a half of these corps is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span>comprised of militia,
+so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too
+late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so
+untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a
+division. Of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are
+in Ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the
+undertaking of a German invasion through Ireland even though it
+brought about the longed-for freedom.</p>
+
+<p>The preparation for defense should also be considered. This might
+consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps
+comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up
+from three army corps. Whereas the army strength of an English
+division is about 10,000 men, a German division carries 16,000 men,
+hence four German divisions and a cavalry division would have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span>a
+superiority over the English army. But we are in a position to set
+over in England, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or
+five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division.</p>
+
+<p>How a well regulated operation against England is to be conducted
+across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. The passage in
+moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our North
+Sea harbors. The English coast affords extensive stretches of shore
+which are suitable for landing troops. The land contains such large
+resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. On
+the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the
+English land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a
+successful invading force.</p>
+
+<p>It is improbable that Germany could carry on for very long a well
+regulated <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span>war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. The
+supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land.
+Maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily
+be seen to be of importance.</p>
+
+<p>It is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in
+England is their field army, and the second must be London. It is
+probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the
+field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed
+for the protection of London fortifications, so as not to leave the
+metropolis insufficiently defended. Powerful public opinion would
+demand this for fear that London would fall into the hands of the
+invaders. But if London is taken by the invading army this would still
+be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span>a
+base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view
+to concluding the overthrow of England.</p>
+
+<p>Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely
+different. With that country, in particular, political friction,
+manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and
+has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part.
+However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to
+what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in
+order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our
+interests. Our main factor here is our fleet. Our battle fleet has
+every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United
+States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after
+the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of
+unprotected coast line and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span>powerful resources of that country would
+compel them to make peace.</p>
+
+<p>There is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its
+maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of
+American merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea
+forces of American ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses,
+while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the
+unpacified American colonies.</p>
+
+<p>It must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the United
+States would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster,
+but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to
+strike. It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United
+States cannot be carried on with success without at the same time
+inaugurating action on land. Because of the great extensions of the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span>United States it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an
+invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the
+land. It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on
+the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of
+the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that
+the government would be willing to treat for peace.</p>
+
+<p>If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting
+the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions
+these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four
+weeks. To what extent we will be able to succeed has already been
+considered.</p>
+
+<p>The United States at this time is not in a position to oppose our
+troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals
+65,000 men, of whom not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span>more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home
+country. Of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard Indian
+territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so
+that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service.
+There is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have
+not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly
+equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled.</p>
+
+<p>If an unexpected invasion of the United States is prevented by the
+length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected
+landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and
+inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a
+quick invasion.</p>
+
+<p>For the continued occupation of as large a territory as the United
+States, if they can oppose us for any length of time, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span>an important
+fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and
+to carry on a successful warfare. An invading operation will be
+difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet
+will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops,
+at such a great distance.</p>
+
+<p>It is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be
+gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land
+as the United States. The fact that one or two of her provinces are
+occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for
+peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real
+material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful
+seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the
+entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line
+of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span>land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through
+which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of
+these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply,
+disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful
+buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to
+impose heavy indemnities. For enterprises of this sort small land
+forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the
+American garrisons to attempt an attack.</p>
+
+<p>Their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to
+concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various
+recognized landing points on the coast. But there are many other
+splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to
+conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the
+fleet. The land corps can either <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>advance aggressively against the
+concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and
+land at a new place.</p>
+
+<p>As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a
+position to conquer the United States. England could of course carry
+out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to
+protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could
+compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None
+of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to
+attempt an invasion.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="II_Colonial_Expeditions" id="II_Colonial_Expeditions"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">II. Views on Colonial Expeditions<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>All operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully
+because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to
+make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and
+trained troops. Just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried
+out in China before our own eyes.</p>
+
+<p>The sending of an expedition to East Asia affords an interesting
+example of what can be done. Without resistance we have set up
+governments at a distance from the home country. It is possible with
+the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. However, there are
+many obstacles to be overcome. It is imperative that in time of peace
+we should prepare <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span>in every possible way for war in foreign lands
+which have any commercial value for us. Inasmuch as the German army
+has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of
+operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. In the future the
+conducting of such operations will rest with the General Staff. It
+will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the
+forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such
+countries as Asia, Africa and South America. Good judgment must be
+used in the selection of methods. The execution of the first
+operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the
+General Staff and the Admiral Staff.</p>
+
+<p>Our excellent knowledge of East Asia has given us the necessary
+technical preparation in the way of equipment. The chartering of
+transport ships for service <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span>to China should not be difficult in
+consequence of the large size of the expedition. The expedition corps
+would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five.
+The greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two
+large steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the
+Hamburg-American Line. The charter of these steamship companies
+provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this
+sort. The disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay
+through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the
+unfinished ships to Wilhelmshaven. Another drawback is that not enough
+room is provided in these ships. On the steamers of the
+Hamburg-American Line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their
+normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at
+the most an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span>approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only
+one man instead of two can be carried. An adjustment should be reached
+to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be
+counted upon.</p>
+
+<p>The interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport
+must be planned according to law. Fire-extinguishers, life-saving
+apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables
+and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the
+troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. Hospital
+arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength
+should be provided.</p>
+
+<p>The active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from
+volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new
+formations. Through this the home defenses may be benefited, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span>the
+expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly
+formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. It is
+advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained
+soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of
+reserves. It is also to be recommended that in the near future we form
+a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. Such a formation
+would have great intrinsic worth.</p>
+
+<p>A few words should be said about the organizing of a Colonial army,
+which would be called upon to play an essential part in German
+military operations over the sea. It would be of extraordinary value
+in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in
+commercial aims. The Colonial army would constitute a picked body of
+men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span>countries,
+who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we
+might be at war.</p>
+
+<p>There would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home
+forces for colonial expeditions. We are not assured at present of the
+assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing
+on our regular army.</p>
+
+<p>It requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an
+expedition to East Asia. Therefore, contracts with capable firms
+should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time.</p>
+
+<p>While the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily
+accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be
+loaded by the English system. Some effort should be made to solve the
+horse problem. The purchasing of horses in Australia, America and
+South China has ceased, in consequence of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span>knowledge that only a
+small percentage can withstand the change of climate.</p>
+
+<p>It would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of
+mounts. It is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted
+infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry
+troops to meet an emergency. It would be advantageous if large
+brigades now idle could be moved for operations in Eastern China. Past
+experience in China has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for
+operations in large countries.</p>
+
+<p>The losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would
+send trained horses accustomed to military service. The great loss in
+transporting horses is no longer to be feared. The experience of the
+English in transporting horses to Cape Town proves the worth of their
+loading system. And it should be pointed out that the Prussian
+horses, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span>through their training, can endure climatic changes and the
+hardships of sea transportation much better than the English horses.</p>
+
+<p>The thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach
+East Asia. The ships should be fitted out with this aim in view.
+Accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. The Red Sea and the
+Indian Ocean are especially difficult to cross. This could be overcome
+by sending the transport by way of Cape Town, where a part of the trip
+could be made south through the Tropic of Cancer. It has been
+demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years
+should be selected for service abroad. No fear need be felt as to the
+feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn.
+Sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given
+favorable results.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span>A possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the
+purchasing in Italy of native mules and loading them at Genoa. In
+English sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their
+exceptional powers of resistance. They are preferable to horses
+because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be
+accustomed to conditions in East Asia.</p>
+
+<p>While we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must
+be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of
+burden. This is often necessary in colonial expeditions. Experience
+shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field
+army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. This
+is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. It is surprising that
+our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not
+utilized.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span>Our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital
+service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. The French
+seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called
+cacolets&mdash;saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded.
+These are excellent for use in colonial countries. A light wagon model
+is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of
+the roads they must be able to follow the troops.</p>
+
+<p>It is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with
+our men-of-war can be improved. Once the forces and supplies are in
+Bremen and Bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking.
+For the future a central place is recommended from which the
+expedition corps can sail.</p>
+
+<p>If thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can
+be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span>accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it
+took two days for each ship. To facilitate the work, the loading
+should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. The
+greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from Bremen to
+Bremerhaven. The troops can consequently embark at Quai in about four
+hours. The vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available
+space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies.
+Great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately
+calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. It is
+therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the
+steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done
+properly from a military standpoint. Through a haphazard loading, the
+detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings,
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span>and they might not even know where their individual effects were
+stowed. Disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the
+forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and
+ammunition.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the
+sailing of the joint fleet is not required. The trip by transport
+would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. The trip from Shanghai
+to Taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. The
+transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no
+difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if
+they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they
+have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or
+auxiliary cruisers. Upon arrival at Taku, considerable difficulties
+might be encountered, for it is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span>reported that it is practically
+impossible to procure the extra help needed.</p>
+
+<p>Considering a landing at Tsingtau, it should be noted that there has
+not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. This
+situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must
+be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies.</p>
+
+<p>Experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary
+to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a
+foundation for future operations over the sea.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="III_Concluding_Views" id="III_Concluding_Views"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2 class="sc">III. Concluding Views<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>Many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be
+conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our
+fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the
+combination of the land and sea forces. Now if the army across the sea
+is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance
+to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to
+assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. From studies of
+the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim
+at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us,
+it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial
+interests. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span>It is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be
+increased. Not the least important thing to realize is the fact that
+as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the
+sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive
+preparations are made during times of peace.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h4>THE END</h4>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Operations Upon the Sea
+       A Study
+
+Author: Franz Edelsheim
+
+Release Date: November 12, 2008 [EBook #27244]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON
+THE SEA
+
+A STUDY
+
+BY
+
+FREIHERR VON EDELSHEIM
+
+IN THE SERVICE OF THE GERMAN GENERAL
+STAFF IN 1901
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
+
+NEW YORK
+THE OUTDOOR PRESS
+1914
+
+
+
+
+Copyright, 1914, by
+THE OUTDOOR PRESS
+
+
+Published November, 1914
+
+
+
+
+VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY
+BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK
+
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+
+This book is of especial importance at this time, for if Germany is to
+reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed
+to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly
+active, and play a far different role than that it has assumed in the
+early stages of the war.
+
+Covering this phase of the German operations the present volume must
+appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of
+actuality. A literal translation is all that has been attempted, with
+absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. With
+characteristic bluntness this German officer brushes aside
+non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. For that
+very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions.
+
+Issued as a military study in Germany, semi-official in nature, to
+characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first
+time in English reveals the theories of at least a portion of the
+military arm of the German Government, which it is only fair to state
+may not represent the convictions of the German people.
+
+Americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings
+of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of
+revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. Beyond
+that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of
+this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the
+difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of
+enthusiasm for war.
+
+                                             THE PUBLISHERS.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+The purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over
+the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most
+important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful
+expedients provided by Germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden
+the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our
+Fatherland.
+
+                                                 THE AUTHOR.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                             PAGE
+
+INTRODUCTION                                                   13
+
+THEORETICAL VIEWS                                              17
+
+  I PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA                      19
+
+ II ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION                       27
+
+        PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE                              27
+
+        PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR                    39
+
+        EMBARKATION                                            46
+
+        SEA VOYAGE                                             56
+
+        LANDING                                                62
+
+        OPERATIONS                                             71
+
+        REEMBARKATION                                          75
+
+APPLICATION                                                    77
+
+  I CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS
+    THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA                            79
+
+ II VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS                              93
+
+III CONCLUDING VIEWS                                          106
+
+
+
+
+OPERATIONS UPON THE SEA
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+Within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the
+sea in connection with wars on land. The war between Japan and China,
+between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and
+finally the Chinese Expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods
+of transporting troops over the sea. Whilst Moltke has shown the
+insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military
+authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of
+preparing for and conducting a war across the sea.
+
+Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is
+more efficient, than any other country. The excellent training and
+readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be
+mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has
+the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a
+first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally,
+the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords
+additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable
+factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world
+politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which
+will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by
+fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have
+attained in Europe.
+
+In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the
+near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a
+position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic
+participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of
+impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to
+direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect,
+with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in
+mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea.
+
+These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with
+the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small
+enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war
+as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the
+problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on
+land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly
+found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany.
+
+
+
+
+THEORETICAL VIEWS
+
+
+
+
+I. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA
+
+
+Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial
+intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in
+them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use
+of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main
+difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces
+must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be
+avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with
+their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation.
+It is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned
+for in advance. There is no prospect of success unless the parts of
+the complicated mechanism are individually prepared.
+
+The selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an
+important factor in its success. If an unexpected landing could be
+made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor
+would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the
+invasion. Hence the preparation of the land operations must be so
+thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and
+transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. How difficult and
+costly this task is has been demonstrated by the United States in its
+expedition to Cuba and by England in transporting its first troops to
+South Africa.
+
+The object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the
+preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the
+opponents. Napoleon's expedition against Egypt and the manner in
+which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example.
+
+A landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only
+where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can
+muster at a critical time. After a landing a victory at sea by our
+opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not
+provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the
+invasion. Therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our
+German battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe
+passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's
+naval forces which they could readily employ.
+
+If the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility
+that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried
+through. The rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the
+sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as
+an escort for the protection of the transports. In no case should the
+land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the
+fighting value of the ships. So, for example, the French admiral
+Gauthaunce--1801--in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled
+to withdraw to Toulon before the English fleet because his ships had
+suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops.
+
+Only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports
+because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops
+and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small
+battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course,
+of great value.
+
+Naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to
+the length of the voyage. In cases where the distance is not great the
+transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the
+principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not
+to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. The whole purpose
+of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive
+strength of the landing troops. The number of troops to be landed must
+be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. As they must be
+able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be
+debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be
+sent over. Such a combination gives the required fighting value.
+
+In spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the
+cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion,
+playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the
+field and heavy artillery. The cavalry will also be able to prevent an
+attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to
+retrieve. In the Crimean War Marshal St. Arnault was hindered in the
+pursuit of the routed Russians because of the deficiency in the
+cavalry and artillery in the French army. He had only one hundred
+troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses,
+were greatly hampered in their movements.
+
+The difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions
+can be overcome through modern methods. The extent of our merchant
+marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops,
+but it must be remembered that on account of our present political
+position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to
+dispense with at home, without endangering the country.
+
+The management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be
+better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the
+success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations.
+This leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the
+transport fleet and escorting squadron. It is out of the question to
+change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. With us the
+commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the
+commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the
+vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one
+well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral
+because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land
+operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the
+other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice of his admirals,
+disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing
+the fate of the fleet.
+
+After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport
+fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even
+the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base
+is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For
+technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an
+officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the
+advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on
+the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the
+flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not
+brought about in unison with the land attack.
+
+
+
+
+II. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION
+
+PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE.
+
+
+Whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be
+made during peace. These preparations include first of all the drawing
+up of plans through the study of political and military relations.
+Then the operations can be carried out under international
+jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. The
+possibilities of friction must be given careful thought.
+
+First of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by
+exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. While
+the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be
+completed by army officers. The following essential points must be
+kept in view in searches made by naval officers:
+
+I. To determine the naval strength required for protection of the
+transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home
+ports.
+
+II. To decide upon proper and specific points on the respective
+coasts, from a marine standpoint.
+
+III. To investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the
+troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will
+admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank.
+
+IV. To study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength
+required to attack them.
+
+The researches of the army officers concern principally the following:
+
+I. The aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported
+by the naval officers.
+
+II. The number of troops which the opponents can muster against the
+invasion should be estimated.
+
+III. All questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment
+necessary should be decided.
+
+All this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and
+perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition
+of the line of battle in case of war. Through a well ordered
+intelligence department definite plans can be made.
+
+Regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service,
+capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during
+times of peace and made note of accordingly. The division would make a
+suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different
+army corps. These divisions should be so equipped that they could
+operate independently in customary situations. Fuller preparations
+should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and
+airship divisions. These formations would be important problems during
+the voyage at sea. An especially skilled staff is needed. To this end,
+loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and
+other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors
+on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. An
+enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show
+sufficient strength in a relatively short time. Incidentally it might
+be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign
+possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of
+operations of this sort. This training would bring forth the simplest
+and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for
+transporting troops. All other expedients for the voyage would
+likewise be shown. Some of this needed experience has already been
+acquired through our expedition to China.
+
+Just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on
+land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which
+embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution
+of the tasks involved in embarking. On account of limited facilities
+only one division can be handled on a railroad. The necessity for
+transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and
+piers in many places. Furthermore, many different supply depots must
+be built and maintained. In these depots building material should be
+held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the
+transformation of the merchant ships into transports. All other
+apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting
+contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be
+stored in advance. Usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant
+marine. Light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in
+difficult land conditions is also recommended.
+
+In addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large
+warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. The small requirements
+of our transport to China did not emphasize sufficiently the value of
+advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over
+one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. To
+do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the
+difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor.
+
+For long distance transportation our large harbors on the North and
+East seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. Speed is the
+chief requisite. In order to lessen the distance of transporting,
+operations toward the west must be conducted from the North Sea ports
+and toward the east from our east sea ports. This does not preclude
+the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the
+Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to the North Sea should it be found desirable,
+but it would involve a waste of time. The smaller harbors should not
+be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the
+necessary facilities. They might be utilized to advantage in a smaller
+way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one
+division a day. Especially suitable harbors on the North Sea are
+Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, in connection with Bremen, and
+Cuxhaven with Hamburg and Glueckstadt. These are the harbors that
+should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions.
+
+Bremerhaven is by far the best. In every respect it would take first
+place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. From this
+point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty.
+Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is
+important. If it were brought up to full development it could take
+care of two divisions a day which Hamburg could well supply.
+Glueckstadt is an especially important base because most of our live
+stock exporting business is carried on there. It is recommended that a
+short double-track railroad be built from Elmshorn to Glueckstadt,
+making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. In Glueckstadt one
+infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped.
+
+In Wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is
+doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet,
+this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. In any
+event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. The
+railroad facilities would also have to be increased.
+
+While Emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many
+drawbacks. It needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it
+up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of
+troops at Wilhelmshaven. Under existing circumstances Leer and
+Papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with
+Emden could handle one division.
+
+The situation on the Baltic Sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor,
+with the exception of Kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our
+larger steamships. At Danzig the dredging of navigable waters and
+extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance
+from a military standpoint. The other smaller ports on the Baltic are
+at present not suitable for transporting troops.
+
+The Kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large
+transports because of the same conditions that affect Wilhelmshaven,
+namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet,
+which would not be permitted. The docks at Kiel must therefore be
+greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously
+the demands of the battle and transport fleets. Pillau and Swinemuende
+should be authorized to extend their very small docks. On the other
+hand, the large dry docks in Danzig, Stettin and Kiel should be in a
+position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary
+buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are
+planned correctly.
+
+Of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision
+of the proper number of ships. Defects in preparations in time of
+peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time
+to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. Yet it should
+be stated that England, at the outbreak of the Boer, although lacking
+full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured
+the required number of ships for the first shipment.
+
+The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading
+commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority
+to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for
+military transporting. This commission should also list the
+foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use
+in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be
+extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
+Copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign
+steamers.
+
+The construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would
+cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. It would seem
+advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build
+several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. This
+ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. The
+Hamburg-American Line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship.
+
+The management of the transport depots and the training of the
+dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading
+commission. In a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide
+the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet
+of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective
+protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy.
+
+
+PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.
+
+Actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of
+time. Opponents would receive information through secret channels,
+which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their
+forces. The immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not
+be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is
+conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. The aim should be to
+keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly
+executed operation would take them unawares. An unexpected attack
+depends largely upon rapidity of movement. Incidentally, diplomatic
+pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would
+lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking.
+
+In connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are
+simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and
+troops have been equipped and prepared for action. The methods to be
+employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and
+must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. It should
+be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle
+fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength
+for the defense and execution of the land operations. We must
+endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of
+foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. Thus the great
+political questions would be decided only upon the European scene.
+
+A rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which
+belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in
+from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create
+suspicion. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal affords us the means to
+concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the
+North or Baltic Sea.
+
+If the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations,
+proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and
+immediate reparation made. Plans should also be made to secure
+sufficient reenforcements of troops. In large operations where all our
+ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on
+the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be
+equipped. All ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our
+harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports.
+
+While the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points
+of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission,
+various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that
+by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such
+as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign
+chartered steamers arriving in our ports. The adjustment and equipment
+of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched
+in masses as fast as they arrive. Once the ships reach the selected
+harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made
+simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance
+preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. The time
+needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made.
+
+In England the steamers for transporting troops to Cape Town, which is
+a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven
+days for the cavalry and artillery. The consuming of such time, even
+for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. At the time
+of our expedition to China we had the ships complete in a short time.
+For one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for
+transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more
+than two days need be consumed. For short distances, according to
+English and Russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and
+two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. These periods
+can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building
+staff, as pointed out previously.
+
+The formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in
+the annual maneuvers. Various factors, such as seasons, political
+aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the
+available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures
+in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. The speedy
+concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation
+will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is
+short, and the shipment comparatively small. Arrangements should
+therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times
+sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt
+departure of the transports. It is urged that authority be given the
+loading commission to supervise and direct this work. It must be
+taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced
+reserves and good order must be maintained. A high standard of
+efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders.
+
+Numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do
+not require great space or support. The usefulness of a cyclist
+division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the
+hostile country. For the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not
+suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on
+land. In large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special
+cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes.
+Beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient
+to render possible an independent operation. It would also be of great
+value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand.
+
+Especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for
+these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult.
+They also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. When the
+transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after
+landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army
+independent of the vessels. There should be added, therefore, a
+reserve ammunition column to that already provided.
+
+A fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due
+consideration of the extent of the voyage. The troops could
+requisition some materials from the hostile country.
+
+
+EMBARKATION.
+
+Proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be
+conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of
+materials and men. To make landing effective the necessary supplies
+should go on the vessels with the troops. A loading plan should be so
+drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. The length of time
+consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage.
+
+At the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered
+about forty-eight hours. This is too small an estimate; it should
+undoubtedly be doubled. The Italian General Staff estimates the length
+of a short sea voyage to be five days. Besides, to preserve the
+fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest.
+
+The troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated
+by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity
+is net ton loading space. The necessary space for us, for a long sea
+voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for
+each horse. The English and Russian estimates are about the same. But
+the English transports to Cape Town accommodated a larger number of
+troops than was thought possible, and the American transports to Cuba
+were increased by one-third.
+
+As for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and
+washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here,
+as they have been discussed at length in the press. The stowing of
+equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the
+articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed.
+The ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse
+figures relatively as about one to five.
+
+Coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to
+place all common and machine guns on deck. A certain amount of
+ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. This is an
+essential measure to afford the transport protection from some
+privateer. The guns should be securely placed to prevent their
+movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on
+deck. Trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby
+field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this
+testing will certainly repay us. All rolling stock will be stowed away
+firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. The material
+and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships,
+so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. The airship division
+should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may
+be made during the voyage.
+
+The shipping of horses is especially difficult. By former methods the
+horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise.
+This left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest
+after arrival. For a war transport, in which is required a rapid and
+successful offensive, such horses are not useful. Because of the
+important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention
+should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition.
+To this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided
+for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at
+least three-quarters of an hour for each horse.
+
+Ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can
+be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck
+stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from
+three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand
+horses. Three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. On every
+large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition
+to its regular quota of men and supplies.
+
+After the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty
+horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded
+daily on the lower decks. Cleanliness, ventilation and care are the
+three most important factors for the good health of the horses. Every
+horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure
+sufficient fresh air. Artificial ventilation is to be preferred to
+natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses'
+lungs are easily affected. Through this cause, for example, the
+American transport to Cuba lost the greater number of their horses.
+
+Likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of
+drinking water. It is recommended that each ship be given its own
+condenser. The provision of only one or two large condensers on
+special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet,
+as the Americans employed in their expedition to Cuba, has not proved
+practical.
+
+For the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch
+substantially more troops, through Germany's geographical position.
+The strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate
+utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the
+operations are to succeed. For short expeditions, the general rule
+will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. The
+forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only
+straw bags and covers. They will keep their whole baggage with them.
+Cooking will be done in large field kettles. If time permits, it is
+recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made
+for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. This will prevent
+heavy losses in case of rough weather. Guns and accessories can be
+disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages.
+
+The length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can
+be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and
+materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the
+ships. The latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind
+and weather.
+
+The time required for loading is as follows: Fifteen minutes for one
+hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. In an
+operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry,
+were embarked in eight hours. In our loading of East Asia transports,
+it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. The
+speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. It is
+certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through
+detailed preparation and training. Napoleon I, in the year 1795, had
+ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put
+132,000 men and their materials on shipboard in two hours.
+
+It must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must
+eventually be landed on open coasts. Portable flat-bottom boats and
+building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the
+transports. Special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with
+large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so
+forth. A cable-laying ship is also required.
+
+We must now consider to what extent Germany is able to load forces for
+the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in
+which success depends so much on speed. For embarkation on the North
+Sea, Hamburg and Bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable
+of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity
+the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four
+days. With the addition of ships from Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Glueckstadt
+and Kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at
+least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry
+division. To these must be added several especially large and fast
+German steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and
+partly to expedite the return to home waters. A large number of troops
+can also be shipped from Baltic ports. Besides this, a repeated trip
+of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is
+maintained continuously.
+
+For longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so
+great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering
+or purchasing ships of foreign nations. Still, we are at present in
+the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present
+available ships, within ten or twelve days.
+
+
+SEA VOYAGE.
+
+For transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the
+navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. All enterprises of this
+kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore,
+must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports
+might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring
+about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of
+embarkation. As the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before
+the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an
+early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. Also,
+throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the
+battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve
+the same ends of keeping the course clear.
+
+The escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough
+ships to give immediate protection. A large number would increase
+unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its
+safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the
+greatest value. The task of the escorts is only to protect the
+transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the
+enemy. Our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service,
+and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used
+for this purpose. During the assembling of the transports, these
+boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic
+between the loading harbors.
+
+The departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so
+regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a
+quick landing. The loading commission must take appropriate means to
+expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the
+central assembling points. As a rule, the transport steamers would
+sail with the battle fleet; but in the English expedition to South
+Africa and ours to East Asia, this rule was not followed.
+
+An essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as
+the loading is complete. They cannot wait for news of the success of
+the battle fleet. A certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for
+the transport fleet can always turn back. Only an early departure
+would insure successful, unexpected landing. The shorter the voyage
+the greater the necessity for a surprise attack.
+
+In the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow
+that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be
+short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair
+prospect of success. Even the victor in a great naval battle might not
+be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. An
+individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to
+break into the transport fleet.
+
+An important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is
+the weather. For short distances, it is possible to a certain degree
+to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of
+scientific forecasts. Conditions might be such that a delay would not
+harm the operations. Adverse weather conditions would more seriously
+affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause
+abandonment. Our vessels must be so improved as to make them
+independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the
+voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. For the time
+of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard,
+which could probably be increased by towing with tugs.
+
+In putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of
+position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken
+until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is
+known only to the home officials. The advance guard of troops will
+sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected
+landing. The pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance
+guard. The ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop
+transports. Then follow the ships carrying supplies. The cable ship
+comes last. The laying of the cable gives a continuous communication
+with the home country. For extensive voyages, preparations must be
+made for taking on coal on the open sea. The commander-in-chief of the
+expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of
+a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance.
+
+On long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be
+pursued. Ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater
+part of the time of the cavalry. For short sea voyages these features
+are not so necessary. In general, strict discipline must be exercised
+to overcome the tediousness of the trip.
+
+While the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest
+officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain,
+who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. If this
+captain has not served in the German navy, a midshipman may be signed
+as a coordinate officer. It is our policy to provide every transport
+ship with a naval officer.
+
+
+LANDING.
+
+Military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold
+landing is never successful. The defense must either scatter its
+forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full
+strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility
+of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the
+protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops
+quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the
+same time. A simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if
+the opponent can muster considerable strength. An expedition is seldom
+so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. On the
+other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the
+protection of numerous landing places. A division of the forces
+weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly
+managing the start of the operations for want of time and means.
+Therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select
+one central place for landing.
+
+For the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less
+advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the
+most unfavorable is the open coast. Yet a landing on the open coast
+would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great
+speed. If the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it
+would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this
+port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the
+mass of troops, horses and materials. The occupation of a good harbor
+will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the
+sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on
+the operations. If a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of
+the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared
+disembarking contrivances. Every transport must be equipped for
+landing on an open coast.
+
+The best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations,
+which would force the opponents to a decision before they were
+thoroughly prepared. Clear coast regions within range of the ships'
+guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing
+site.
+
+It is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and
+fortifications. Russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth
+of this statement. Fortifications are effective against landing
+enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the
+coast. If the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of
+troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be
+ineffective for defense. The best security, however, for the initial
+landing is its unexpected delivery. Reconnoitering of the coast site
+by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents
+immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given
+time for preparations for defense. Of great importance for rapid,
+well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal
+service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be
+installed advantageously. In anchoring the ships must be the correct
+distance apart, to avoid crowding.
+
+The execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: The advance
+guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of
+battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. If
+the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow
+should immediately throw up earthworks. The entire disembarking must
+be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished
+the less the danger of being disturbed. The most favorable time for
+attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown
+to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. As the ships do not
+carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open
+coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading
+horses and heavy material. The English employ collapsible boats for
+landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the Russians
+have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one
+complete cannon. It is recommended that we be permitted to try the
+Russian model, which has been well tested. Small power boats should be
+employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. To
+permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause
+confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number
+are sometimes lost. The Americans, in their landing in Cuba, lost
+seven per cent. of their horses. For the landing of artillery and
+heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach,
+for which prepared material is carried on the transports. The
+assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all
+space there must be kept for the landing of supplies.
+
+If a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will
+strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at
+hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast.
+If all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to
+draw near. The advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or
+bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack,
+through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited
+number of battleships. Earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine
+guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side.
+
+The piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for
+disembarking. The existing plans for improvising landing bridges and
+gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. The
+piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery
+and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the
+protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships,
+should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops
+should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin
+operations independent of the supply trains.
+
+The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading.
+The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the
+time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000
+men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the
+English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about
+100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account
+of their handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing
+maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and
+one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six
+kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that
+under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000
+cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a
+harbor, this time can be essentially lessened.
+
+After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the
+transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime
+strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in
+command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base
+for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the
+expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the
+transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile
+fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters.
+
+
+OPERATIONS.
+
+The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be
+conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of
+the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular
+conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine
+writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be
+offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried
+out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of
+the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of
+energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled
+strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance.
+Defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to
+receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is
+to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and
+with the least loss to ourselves.
+
+During the progress of the operations the country through which the
+troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies,
+but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not
+be decreased through extended raids. While the distance to the
+objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our
+endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. Much progress has
+been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse,
+which will help to solve the problem of provisions. The army of
+invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and
+utilize it as a base of operations. Continuous communication with the
+home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. In a densely
+populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and
+supplies. The maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous
+in that it requires excessive guard duty. When the battle fleet has
+gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect
+continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible
+for the corps of invasion to select new bases. Sherman's march to
+Savannah in the Civil War has shown the practicability of this plan.
+After one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the
+expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for
+further operations.
+
+Against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid
+enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. Dearly
+purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims.
+
+If the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if
+the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification,
+the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces.
+Battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved
+at will and so are hard to put out of action. Continuous bombardment
+from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops.
+
+It is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be
+joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as
+well as the naval forces. Small coast defenses of seaport cities could
+not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. It is
+certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an
+energetic attack from the land side. They are more vulnerable than
+inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from
+land and water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command
+of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the
+operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on
+land.
+
+
+REEMBARKATION.
+
+A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the
+battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of
+defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if
+good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites,
+with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If
+the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations
+for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is
+done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as
+explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For
+such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy
+should not be permitted to interfere with its management.
+
+
+
+
+APPLICATION
+
+
+
+
+I. CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS
+THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA
+
+
+The recognized military complication with England and America affords
+an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in
+which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the
+strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and
+lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of
+the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures.
+
+A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the
+great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great
+a danger as the advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations
+with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result.
+
+England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active
+navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to
+win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would
+the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct
+threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact
+menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location
+and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined
+operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime
+superiority against this alliance.
+
+England's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely,
+the land army. The English army responds to neither quantity nor
+quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the
+extent of the land; therefore England, from convictions, proceeds so
+that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. These
+convictions are in no way justified, for while England in developing a
+powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has
+not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really
+weaker sea opponent with its fighting units.
+
+These are the measures which Germany, in case of a threatened war with
+England, must adopt and practise: Our endeavors must be to engage the
+fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the English
+coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's
+land, where our troops are already superior in quality to England's,
+and so that a victory for England's powerful naval strength could
+have but the smallest influence.
+
+The army fighting strength of England under the commander-in-chief is
+composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the
+yeomanry. In the event of an unexpected invasion, only the
+commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent,
+for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they
+would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the
+first decisive battle. The volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short
+a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. Also their
+insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our
+well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents.
+
+The English army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to
+each corps. A third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia,
+so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too
+late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so
+untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a
+division. Of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are
+in Ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the
+undertaking of a German invasion through Ireland even though it
+brought about the longed-for freedom.
+
+The preparation for defense should also be considered. This might
+consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps
+comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up
+from three army corps. Whereas the army strength of an English
+division is about 10,000 men, a German division carries 16,000 men,
+hence four German divisions and a cavalry division would have a
+superiority over the English army. But we are in a position to set
+over in England, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or
+five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division.
+
+How a well regulated operation against England is to be conducted
+across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. The passage in
+moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our North
+Sea harbors. The English coast affords extensive stretches of shore
+which are suitable for landing troops. The land contains such large
+resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. On
+the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the
+English land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a
+successful invading force.
+
+It is improbable that Germany could carry on for very long a well
+regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. The
+supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land.
+Maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily
+be seen to be of importance.
+
+It is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in
+England is their field army, and the second must be London. It is
+probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the
+field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed
+for the protection of London fortifications, so as not to leave the
+metropolis insufficiently defended. Powerful public opinion would
+demand this for fear that London would fall into the hands of the
+invaders. But if London is taken by the invading army this would still
+be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a
+base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view
+to concluding the overthrow of England.
+
+Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely
+different. With that country, in particular, political friction,
+manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and
+has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part.
+However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to
+what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in
+order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our
+interests. Our main factor here is our fleet. Our battle fleet has
+every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the United
+States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. It is certain that after
+the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of
+unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would
+compel them to make peace.
+
+There is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its
+maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of
+American merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea
+forces of American ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses,
+while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the
+unpacified American colonies.
+
+It must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the United
+States would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster,
+but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to
+strike. It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United
+States cannot be carried on with success without at the same time
+inaugurating action on land. Because of the great extensions of the
+United States it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an
+invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the
+land. It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on
+the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of
+the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that
+the government would be willing to treat for peace.
+
+If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting
+the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions
+these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four
+weeks. To what extent we will be able to succeed has already been
+considered.
+
+The United States at this time is not in a position to oppose our
+troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals
+65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home
+country. Of these at least 10,000 men are required to guard Indian
+territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so
+that only a regular army of 20,000 is available for field service.
+There is also a militia of 100,000 men, the larger number of whom have
+not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly
+equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled.
+
+If an unexpected invasion of the United States is prevented by the
+length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected
+landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and
+inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a
+quick invasion.
+
+For the continued occupation of as large a territory as the United
+States, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important
+fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and
+to carry on a successful warfare. An invading operation will be
+difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet
+will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops,
+at such a great distance.
+
+It is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be
+gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land
+as the United States. The fact that one or two of her provinces are
+occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for
+peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real
+material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful
+seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the
+entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line
+of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through
+which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of
+these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply,
+disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful
+buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to
+impose heavy indemnities. For enterprises of this sort small land
+forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the
+American garrisons to attempt an attack.
+
+Their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to
+concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various
+recognized landing points on the coast. But there are many other
+splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to
+conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the
+fleet. The land corps can either advance aggressively against the
+concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and
+land at a new place.
+
+As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a
+position to conquer the United States. England could of course carry
+out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to
+protect her Canadian provinces, with which the Americans could
+compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. None
+of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to
+attempt an invasion.
+
+
+
+
+II. VIEWS ON COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS
+
+
+All operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully
+because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to
+make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and
+trained troops. Just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried
+out in China before our own eyes.
+
+The sending of an expedition to East Asia affords an interesting
+example of what can be done. Without resistance we have set up
+governments at a distance from the home country. It is possible with
+the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. However, there are
+many obstacles to be overcome. It is imperative that in time of peace
+we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands
+which have any commercial value for us. Inasmuch as the German army
+has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of
+operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. In the future the
+conducting of such operations will rest with the General Staff. It
+will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the
+forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such
+countries as Asia, Africa and South America. Good judgment must be
+used in the selection of methods. The execution of the first
+operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the
+General Staff and the Admiral Staff.
+
+Our excellent knowledge of East Asia has given us the necessary
+technical preparation in the way of equipment. The chartering of
+transport ships for service to China should not be difficult in
+consequence of the large size of the expedition. The expedition corps
+would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five.
+The greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two
+large steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the
+Hamburg-American Line. The charter of these steamship companies
+provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this
+sort. The disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay
+through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the
+unfinished ships to Wilhelmshaven. Another drawback is that not enough
+room is provided in these ships. On the steamers of the
+Hamburg-American Line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their
+normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at
+the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only
+one man instead of two can be carried. An adjustment should be reached
+to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be
+counted upon.
+
+The interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport
+must be planned according to law. Fire-extinguishers, life-saving
+apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables
+and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the
+troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. Hospital
+arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength
+should be provided.
+
+The active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from
+volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new
+formations. Through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the
+expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly
+formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. It is
+advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained
+soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of
+reserves. It is also to be recommended that in the near future we form
+a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. Such a formation
+would have great intrinsic worth.
+
+A few words should be said about the organizing of a Colonial army,
+which would be called upon to play an essential part in German
+military operations over the sea. It would be of extraordinary value
+in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in
+commercial aims. The Colonial army would constitute a picked body of
+men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries,
+who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we
+might be at war.
+
+There would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home
+forces for colonial expeditions. We are not assured at present of the
+assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing
+on our regular army.
+
+It requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an
+expedition to East Asia. Therefore, contracts with capable firms
+should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time.
+
+While the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily
+accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be
+loaded by the English system. Some effort should be made to solve the
+horse problem. The purchasing of horses in Australia, America and
+South China has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a
+small percentage can withstand the change of climate.
+
+It would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of
+mounts. It is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted
+infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry
+troops to meet an emergency. It would be advantageous if large
+brigades now idle could be moved for operations in Eastern China. Past
+experience in China has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for
+operations in large countries.
+
+The losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would
+send trained horses accustomed to military service. The great loss in
+transporting horses is no longer to be feared. The experience of the
+English in transporting horses to Cape Town proves the worth of their
+loading system. And it should be pointed out that the Prussian
+horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the
+hardships of sea transportation much better than the English horses.
+
+The thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach
+East Asia. The ships should be fitted out with this aim in view.
+Accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. The Red Sea and the
+Indian Ocean are especially difficult to cross. This could be overcome
+by sending the transport by way of Cape Town, where a part of the trip
+could be made south through the Tropic of Cancer. It has been
+demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years
+should be selected for service abroad. No fear need be felt as to the
+feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn.
+Sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given
+favorable results.
+
+A possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the
+purchasing in Italy of native mules and loading them at Genoa. In
+English sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their
+exceptional powers of resistance. They are preferable to horses
+because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be
+accustomed to conditions in East Asia.
+
+While we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must
+be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of
+burden. This is often necessary in colonial expeditions. Experience
+shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field
+army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. This
+is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. It is surprising that
+our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not
+utilized.
+
+Our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital
+service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. The French
+seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called
+cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded.
+These are excellent for use in colonial countries. A light wagon model
+is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of
+the roads they must be able to follow the troops.
+
+It is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with
+our men-of-war can be improved. Once the forces and supplies are in
+Bremen and Bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking.
+For the future a central place is recommended from which the
+expedition corps can sail.
+
+If thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can
+be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it
+took two days for each ship. To facilitate the work, the loading
+should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. The
+greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from Bremen to
+Bremerhaven. The troops can consequently embark at Quai in about four
+hours. The vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available
+space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies.
+Great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately
+calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. It is
+therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the
+steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done
+properly from a military standpoint. Through a haphazard loading, the
+detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings,
+and they might not even know where their individual effects were
+stowed. Disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the
+forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and
+ammunition.
+
+With regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the
+sailing of the joint fleet is not required. The trip by transport
+would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. The trip from Shanghai
+to Taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. The
+transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no
+difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if
+they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they
+have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or
+auxiliary cruisers. Upon arrival at Taku, considerable difficulties
+might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically
+impossible to procure the extra help needed.
+
+Considering a landing at Tsingtau, it should be noted that there has
+not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. This
+situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must
+be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies.
+
+Experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary
+to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a
+foundation for future operations over the sea.
+
+
+
+
+III. CONCLUDING VIEWS
+
+
+Many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be
+conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our
+fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the
+combination of the land and sea forces. Now if the army across the sea
+is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance
+to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to
+assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. From studies of
+the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim
+at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us,
+it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial
+interests. It is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be
+increased. Not the least important thing to realize is the fact that
+as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the
+sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive
+preparations are made during times of peace.
+
+
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Operations Upon the Sea, by Franz Edelsheim
+
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